Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat.
Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.
So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection?
The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it?
I looked through the SEP article and Santa shows up frequently as an example of properties being assigned to something presumed nonexistent, but by exactly what definition of 'existence' is being used when making this presumption if this property makes no meaningful difference? If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. So "I think, therefore I am" becomes a non-sequitur in the absence of the subject principle.
Disclaimer:
I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition.
Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.
So what are the arguments against? Without begging the principle being questioned, what contradiction results from its rejection?
The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of
I looked through the SEP article and Santa shows up frequently as an example of properties being assigned to something presumed nonexistent, but by exactly what definition of 'existence' is being used when making this presumption if this property makes no meaningful difference? If Santa can be fat without existing, then it does not follow that Santa exists from the presumption of his girth. So "I think, therefore I am" becomes a non-sequitur in the absence of the subject principle.
Disclaimer:
I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition.
Comments (247)
I believe that for Bertrand Russell, there is something that is an apple and is red.
Being an apple is a predication in the same way that being red is a predication.
Should one say existence is prior to predication or existence is contemporaneous with its predication?
It is not as if something exists and then at a future date a predication is attached.
You're contrasting this with 'prior', right? It is not an assertion of temporal ordering. That just means that predication cannot apply to a nonexistent thing, not that the predication has some sort of temporal confinement to the duration of the existence. Some things don't exist in time. Is 17 prime? EPP says only if 17 exists. 'Contemporaneous' says only during times that it exists, a fairly meaningless concept.
Meinong says 17 is prime, period, regardless of its ontology. Santa is fat. Prove Meinong wrong.
Quoting noAxioms
I think you conclusion is correct.
:up: :up:
Thus, we can sensibly imagine and talk about fictions (or lies).
(à la Meinong)^
But the question is, Is there anything further to be said in favor of some particular recommendation? That is, apart from usefulness in laying out a metaphysics, is there a truth of the matter? If there was -- if there was a correct way to conceive of existence, and/or talk about it -- how would we show this?
I can't discern what it is you're asking for: a conceptual definition? or a logical demonstration / mathematical proof? or a fundamental physical theory? :chin:
If I understand what you are asking my answer would be no, there is no "correct" way, there is no truth of the matter, there would be different ways, each with more or less utility depending on the context of each. As I mentioned in another post, Sean Carroll does a good job of talking about this kind of categorical situation in his discussion of "free will" along with other constructs that appear to be contradictory in terms of what they say about existence. We cannot escape subjectivity which is absolutely bounded by context. His book The Big Picture does not address free will but he does introduce this categorical or context based problem we seem to have in these discussions.
The only way to conceive of or talk about a "truth of the matter" would be to have some absolute context or perspective which is primary or absolute itself and that's illusory. I don't believe there could be an absolute context, the terms are almost mutually contradictory. Think about it. How could there be an absolute "perspective"? The word is necessarily contingent or dependent on it's subjective position or location or point of view. Can't ever be absolute. There cannot be a "truth of the matter" that is absolute and not contingent upon the category that it occupies.(relativity)
Joe offers a particular doctrine about existence, Mary offers a different one. Is there anything either can appeal to, in order to determine whether one is correct? Let's just pick "conceptual definition" from your list. Would Joe and Mary be able to consult such a definition in order to resolve a disagreement between them?
That's about how I see it. The term "existence" simply doesn't lend itself to being identified with some particular thing/event/item, which could be checked in the case of disagreement, in the way that, say, "table" does.
Yes we are essentially agreeing that there is no objective reality that makes any sense with regard to human consciousness. We have no way of experiencing or expressing anything truly objectively. We can however be more or less close to objective for a given categorical perspective.(context)
Yikes, no! I'm speaking about a particularly troublesome term -- "existence" or "being" -- that has no clearly correct usage. But the vast majority of our terms do, and it is objective reality that makes this so. For that matter, there is probably something objectively real about whatever it is that philosophers want to call "existence," it's just that the language we use is so imprecise and contentious that it would be better to describe it another way -- structurally or mathematically, perhaps.
Didn't mean to scare you, lol. It's not objective reality that makes it so, it's a common language and vernacular. You can define objective reality in such a way that it may theoretically exist but we could never know it. We are 100% subjective beings. No part of any human knowledge or understanding or experience can be a part of or close to an "absolute objective reality". Our experience of the universe around us is subjective by definition. It is not possible, by experience or thought, to escape our subjective "selves". Buddhists might argue that one can; by meditating one can shed the "self" and experience the truly objective reality or the divine or the ground of being, call it anything you like. I can't say that's not possible just not likely.
Dr. Donald Hoffman(see Lex Freidman podcast 293) theorizes using the latest in theoretical physics and mathematics that space-time is dead as a place where objective reality might have been and that it's somewhat obvious that we have evolved precisely to NOT be able to see objective reality as it wouldn't allow us to survive very well in the space-time reality we do see. So if he is correct I would say what we call objective reality can be considered true in the context of human experience but it's not true in an absolute sense. This isn't that big a deal though as everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. What I mean to say is that practically speaking there could be an objective reality for space-time on which we could rely even if it isn't absolute, for our purposes it would be.
Existence is another one of those concepts as well. We exist beyond spacetime like everything else in our universe(other dimensions beyond space-time) but we have no way of even being able to grasp it even as a concept, let alone experience it directly. Consciousness is another one of those concepts. It appears to be an emergent property in spacetime but we can't even understand that very well. So every single word or concept that a human mind has ever uttered had it's meaning derived subjectively by a human being and then agreed upon by appealing to shared experience. ALL WORDS are qualifications. The types of words giving us trouble here are the hardest. They are ineffable, or rather they are referencing things that are ineffable.
No problem, I scare easily! Had to go to urgent care after reading Derrida.
Quoting philosch
Let's grant, ex hypothesi, the first and the last sentences. Why would the second sentence follow?: that objective reality is unreachable by subjective knowledge? That seems to import a lot of preconceptions about how objectivity and subjectivity relate, preconceptions which to say the least are controversial.
Quoting philosch
And that may be good enough. Intersubjectivity often makes more sense than "absolute objectivity." Certainly the idea is good enough to establish the distinction I want to make between ambiguous, controversial terms like "existence" and every-day words for things we can verify. We don't need to engage in a debate about whether a table is "objectively a table," as long as we can agree that, unlike "reality" or "being", we know how to verify whether object X is a table or not. And also, we shouldn't be distracted by the fact that any noun can be subject to bizarre exceptions or quibbles. Again, the point is that the problem with "existence" is not bizarre exceptions to an otherwise clear concept; the baseline concept itself is unclear. So while I agree that there is a sort of continuum of imprecision involving language, as you suggest, it doesn't amount to saying that everything is imprecise (or "subjective") in the same way.
What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?
From SEP - Existence
From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).
For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.
It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.
In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.
We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.
In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?
Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?
It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?
Quoting philoschOK, but this concerns mental abstractions, something I am trying to exclude per the disclaimer at the bottom of the OP.
Sure. abstractions themselves have predications, as potentially do the things being abstracted. But I am trying to avoid any anthropocentric definition of existence that centers itself on human epistemology and/or experience.
That said, an apple being an apple is a mental construct, as is its redness. It is actually difficult to identify a predicate of anything that is free from human abstraction. OK, 17 is prime, and while being a human discovery, it is not a human designation/predicate.
Santa is another case: Existing only as a mental construct and not in any way that is free from contradiction. Santa is not a possible thing AFAIK, so any predicate of Santa seems necessarily to be a reference to an ideal, not to a Santa. I acknowledge this unavoidability.
Thank you for your input. I have to agree with much that you post.
Quoting 180 Proof
This got me down the pipe of sosein vs sein. Still not sure if I get it since the difference seems to hinge on a prior agreed state of existence or not, but nobody seems to have answered how that distinction might be made. Who am I to declare the unicorn to not exist? Pretty sure the unicorn doesn't consider me to exist either, so we're even on that score.
A typical sein statement might be "Bob is hungry", which apparently translates to "There exists an x such that x is hungry" which seems to invoke a sort of existential quantification definition of 'exists'. But that definition seems to mean "x is a member of some implied set", a relation.
Quoting JI suspect no truth of the matter, and the best one can reach for is utility (usefulness). I am trying to explore the options since I find little utility in the typical realist position.
Quoting J
That I can answer with 'no'. Yes, there might be a truth (maybe), but if there is one, is there a way to determine it? I think not since multiple valid interpretations will always be avaliable. The best appeal one can make is to logical consistency and simplicity.
Quoting RussellAIt seems to mean that predication requires existence. The rejection of the principle that says this is what I'm trying to explore here.
If this holds, the existence itself is not a predicate, but if it doesn't hold, then yes, it becomes just another predicate.
Your SEP quote seems to answer your question, but the temporal definition is not the one being leveraged here.
With the EPP, existence becomes redundant and adds nothing to a statement. Without EPP, existence needs to be more clearly defined to have meaning, but it seems to be inherited. Existing parents beget existing children, but nonexistent parents beget nonexistent children. The two worlds seem disjoint, but other than that, there seems to be no obvious way to tell the two worlds apart.
Got news. Apples turn red after a while and don't start that way any more than I started out as cynical.
OK, but I'm not really concerned with knowing about something's existence since I'm not using an epistemic definition of existence. I'm explicitly avoiding it since it's a different path.
Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience. This is a good quote for something like aether theory or Russel's teapot. It has properties, sure, but none of them are experiential.
This statement doesn't follow if EPP is not presumed, and I'm not presuming it here.
Which gets me hunting for a counterexample of something existing, but with no properties.
God bless you! (or substitute "the Universe" if you prefer). If only more posters did the same.
Suppose two scientists are arguing over whether the Northern White Rhino still exists (which is at least an endangered species). The thesis in question is
Now is the term "exists" meaningful within that thesis-proposition? Because I would contend that such a term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful. Specifically, if you want to say that an argument over the meaning of existence is not meaningful or substantial or truth-apt, then I would contend that you must also say that the term "exists" as found within the scientific thesis is unmeaningful.
But perhaps the deeper issue here is your hangup with "metaphysical superglue," as if truth could apply to a term and not a proposition. Term-tokens do not have inherent meaning or truth, and the term-token e-x-i-s-t-e-n-c-e is no exception.
Quoting J
The difficulty is that you don't seem to be asking a meaningful question at all. Even your claim that some recommendation can be "sensible" and yet "nothing can be said in its favor" looks to lack coherence. I grant your claim that "X exists" is different from "X is a table," but I'm not sure what that claim is supposed to prove.
I agree that it is difficult and I get the prime number claim but is that really a predicate that is outside of the human notion of prime numbers? I am asking as I'm not sure either. It just may be that there's nothing that can escape the mind-construct reality.
Other than that I think I agree with the rest of your post, especially that there is no "Truth of the matter".
Does that proposition have no truth value? @noAxioms? @J?
In philosophy it is common to confuse oneself by conflating something that is not obvious with something that is impossible. When two philosophers offer two different accounts of existence, it is hard to discern who is correct (if anyone). But if you take from that the idea that no existence claims are truth-apt, then I think you have fallen into all sorts of absurdities.
Moving from what is not obvious to a generalization of the impossible would commit us to the absurd claims that these propositions are not truth-apt. It's a bit like saying, "The Riemann Hypothesis has no obvious truth value, therefore mathematical claims are not truth-apt, therefore 2+2=4 is not truth-apt."
(What is likely happening is a form of Empiricism which only permits a narrow form of justification. But those forms of Empiricism are reliably self-defeating. Just because two people are arguing doesn't mean neither one is right.)
Yeah I blew it with that sentence as you rightly pointed out, it doesn't necessarily follow. It's just difficult to understand how subjectively bounded subjects could perceive objects without their subjectivity filtering the perception.Quoting J
Excellent. I agree totally with your post here. Your distinction between types of words is really related to the categorical problems that Sean Carroll points out. For instance with a concept like free will he points out a way in which free will can certainly be experienced by humans and yet free will we can know doesn't really exist in the absolute sense because of determinism. It has to do with different ways of categorizing things, at what level do we look at them. It seems like a contradiction but it's not. Very interesting.
It certainly is. I don't know what your philosophical background is, but this is one of most entrenched questions in philosophy. Often, it's not a question of mere "filtering" but a challenge to whether there could ever be contact with objective reality at all -- Idealism, very broadly. A good overview of this issue is The View from Nowhere by Thomas Nagel.
I like the concept of intersubjectivity for many reasons, but does it always fit? Do we want to say that when physicists describe the quantum world, they are working toward intersubjective agreement rather than truth? At the quantum level, with its notorious perplexities, perhaps we should say that. But since we know that any intersubjective agreement can be challenged, this still seems to leave room for asking, But is it true? Similarly, describing the Law of Non-Contradiction as "intersubjectively agreed upon" doesn't seem to do justice to what we mean when we assert that law. So, I don't think one can abandon objectivity in favor of intersubjectivity in all cases without explaining why the "is it true" question would be incoherent. Which many philosophers have tried to do, of course. But we can't simply assert it.
The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.
The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.
However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced
Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.
When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.
We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.
A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.
What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.
The thesis
I looked at the reading group thing. Interesting, but better to participate in parallel while it's going on and not a month later.
Quoting philoschI use it as an example of a real predicate. It can be (and is) independently discovered (and not invented) by anything with rudimentary math skills. It, like Fibonacci numbers is found in nature. A pine cone always has rows and columns that number a pair of adjacent Fibonacci numbers. There are many species of cicadas that come out every X years, and the various species have various cycles, but the cycles are always prime numbers (and for a reason). The 17 year ones are numerous where I live now, but we have some 13 year ones as well. Cicadas rely on a real predicate of some numbers being prime that has nothing to do with human concepts. I actually don't know the purpose served by the Fibonacci thing, but it's found in so many places. It has something to do with being an integer approximation of the golden ratio (another non-human-ideal predicate).
Quoting Leontiskos
The obvious answer being 'yes', so I instinctively look for some definition that allows them to exist in the same way. Both are arguably mental assessments. That's a similarity, but the former is arguably not just that, so I still fail.
I care little about who is correct. I picked a position where predication does not require existence (with 'exists' not clearly defined). I am looking for a contradiction arising from that premise, a contradiction that does not beg the principle that such cannot be the case.
I can think of several definitions of 'exists' that one might use, but some possibilities:
E1 "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
E2 "I know about it"
E3 "Has predicates"
E4 "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world"
E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"
E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.
There are probably better wordings.
E1 is kind of an objective wording, and 17 being part of that seems to come down to Platonism. There seems to be no way to test for E1, rendering it pretty useless.
E2 is idealistic, and essentially solopsistic, but not necessarily non-realist.
E3 is a converse of EPP. Santa exists then? Unclear since it isn't clear if Santa can be fat.
E4 is closely related to E2 in that reality is what we see/infer and not what something else sees. Yet when asking if the northern white rhino exists, it seems to be an E2/4 sort of question.
E5 is relational (as opposed to objective) and applies only to states within a causal structure. So 17 doesn't exist, not being part of a causal structure. E5 has nothing to do with epistemology.
E6 is like E1, but just a different set than 'reality'.
E7: I welcome other definitions to add to the list.
Why does the truth value need to be obvious for there to be a truth value?
Quoting RussellADifferent answer: Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that.
Quoting RussellAA thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic.
Given that abstraction is itself experience, I agree. Talking about something is experiencing it, or at least experiencing the abstraction of it the same way that we experience only the abstraction of something that actually (supposedly) exists.
Kant's concludes the ideals (the experience) is all there is, and all that is talked about. So fine, abstract something, and talk about that, but with the realization that it's not the experience that's the subject being discussed, only the means of doing so.
Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it.
I have zero experience of Santa, yet I can discuss Santa and his properties. I have experience of say an image of Santa, but the image is not Santa, nor is either the image or the experience of it the subject of the discussion..Properties of Santa are not properties of either the image nor any of my experience.
I can talk about colours that I've not experienced. There's plenty of colours out there that say a bee can see but we cannot. Point is, I don't see personal experience limiting what can be discussed.
We definitely differ in this opinion. I do not define a property, nor existence, in any anthropocentric way. Human (solipsistic) epistemology works that way, but not metaphysics.
So do you agree with my claim that the term is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful? I assume we agree that by removing the word exists you did not remove the concept of existence from the proposition.
Quoting noAxioms
I agree with you. I dont think Quinian Actualism is defensible. I havent seen anyone who promotes that view other than @J, and I haven't seen him offer real arguments for his position.
Quoting noAxioms
Sure, but I would want to remember that we can always think of a definition of "exists" in which that proposition is made either true or false. But if our definitions are arbitrary then it makes no difference, and this seems to prove that not all definitions are on a par. For an example of an arbitrary definition, we could say that "exists" means "able to be conceived," on which definition it is false that
Not removed, just worded more carefully for clarity sake.
I had to look that one up. It all seems to be a bunch of synonyms that are not clearly distinct. X exists. X is being X. X is real. X is actual. X is. X relates to ...
These are all supposedly different, but the exact distinctions are rarely spelled out.
Definitions should never be arbitrary. They're sometimes context dependent. The dictionary is full of words that have different meanings in different contexts,. but 'X exists' needs more context than that.
I don't know what you mean by a proposition being 'made true/false' as opposed to it just having a truth value, known or not.
That did not seem to be an arbitrary definition. It was 1) specifically chosen so that the proposition could be false, and 2) it was far less ambiguous than the usage of the term in the thesis posed. BTW, your definition was very close to the one I chose for the same purpose, and it is quite an idealistic definition.
Let's have a quick look at the sort of reasons we have for not treating existence as a predicate. One example:
From
we infer
And write
( ?x) (x is in Sydney)
yet from
we do not infer:
( ?x) (there is no such thing as x)
"Circular Quay is in Sydney" treats being in Sydney as a predicate. If we were to treat existence as a predicate, the second inference would be valid.
So instead of parsing "There is no such thing as Pegasus" as Pegasus not having the property of existence, ~?!(Pegasus), we pars it as there not being any thing that is Pegasus: ~?(x)(x is pegasus).
This is the approach of Frege and Russell, and others, mentioned in the SEP article.
The Possibilism-Actualism Debate | SEP
Could you provide links to the resources you consulted before writing your OP? I'm trying to understand where you are coming from.
Quoting noAxioms
I'm not convinced that self-contradiction is a great way to look at it, given that Meinong and his opponents are not usually accused of self-contradiction. A better approach to disputed questions would probably be to present rationale and arguments pro and con, Medieval style.
I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.
Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.
Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property
For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.
But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?
Quoting noAxioms
Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.
Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.
Okay now this is interesting and although I knew Cicadas had a 17yr cycle, I didn't realize there was a `13 yr version nor the Fibonacci sequence being found in nature with such frequency. But I still wonder. There are lots of other mathematical concepts found in nature and just exactly what to think about their predicates now becomes more interesting and tougher to discuss or argue for or against. I've seen some discussions with regards to whether math is "real" or just subjectively descriptive but extremely precise and so very useful. You've given me something to dig into further, I'm not sure what to think about this just yet. Very good stuff!
So in the first place it's a straightforward biconditional, and should be parsed as such:
"The term ['exists' within the given proposition] is meaningful if and only if arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful."
And how does one oppose a biconditional? The same basic way they oppose a conditional: by providing a counterexample of one side obtaining without the other.
Quoting noAxioms
And so if you want to disagree you have to provide that counterexample. You can either show how the term could be meaningful even if arguments over the meaning of existence are not meaningful, or you could show how arguments over the meaning of existence are meaningful even if the term is not meaningful.
This is also what @J is required to do if he wishes to answer objections to his claims.
A "definition" is a statement without a truth-value and therefore cannot be used to "resolve a disagreement"; rather, in a given discursive context, it's either useful to some degree or not at all. Mary's conceptual definition is either more or less coherent consistent & sensible than Joe's. Afaik, only better, more sound, arguments can resolve rational disagreements.
Re: Meinong's predication (OP), the definition I think is more useful less ambiguous in this context is (a) 'exist' indictates a non-fictional, or concrete, object (or fact) and, by extension, (b) 'existence' denotes the (uncountable) set of all non-fictional, or concrete, objects (and all facts). I'm open to any definition more useful than mine. Maybe I should read past this post ...
Why doesn't a definition have a truth-value? You probably mean something simple that I'm overlooking, but I would have thought that "a bachelor is an unmarried male" has a truth-value in L. It's a truth about language, not the world, if that's what you mean -- and that's part of my point about the difficulties Joe and Mary will have using a definition to resolve their disagreement.
As to "coherent, consistent and sensible": Joe's doctrine about existence can be all of those things, while still being false -- if there is a truth of the matter. That's the question I'm trying to highlight.
I agree about better, sounder arguments. I just believe it's difficult to find a non-stipulative terminological place to stand, when it comes to arguments about "what existence is." I ask again, if two people disagree about the terms, how can they resolve the disagreement? Wouldn't they be better off noticing how "existence" is used in philosophical (and ordinary) discourse, and then coming up with sharper, more specific terms to cover the various cases? Indeed, isn't this what Meinong tried to do, in part?
And again, as I've pointed out ...
Quoting 180 Proof
For example, having greater scientific efficacy (i.e. unfalsified predictive model) "resolves the disagreement" a chemist and an alchemist have about the definition of "heat" or an astronomer and astrologer have about the definition of "planet". In philosophy, however, e.g. a German idealist (i.e. disembodied X) and a French materialist (i.e. embodied X) can only "resolve the disagreement" they have about the term "existence" by either one adopting becoming convinced via arguments of the other's metaphysical framework. Competing terms / definitions, in effect, belong to competing vocabularies; one simply learns to speak the other's language (game) in order to use the other term / definition in a way other than one agrees with in one's own language (game).
Quoting Banno
This usage of ( ?x) (x is in Sydney) is existential quantification (my E6 above, a couple posts back), a form of a relation, stating that x happens to be a member of the set of
Sydney seems not required to exist (E1, almost a platonic definition) for this to be true, just as the number 91 does not require 13 to exist (E1) for it to have the property of not being prime, but it does require 13 to exist (existential quantification) in order to have the property of not being prime. So for one, we seem to be referencing more than one defniition of existence, and E1 seems to be a property.
Quoting Banno
Yes, it is valid if we deny EPP, else wrong form, and wrong definition I think.
I'd write (?x) (x = Pegasus) (same thing?) This seems to reference a predicate of 'being', but the ? part is still existential quantification, no? It isn't a relation to Sydney this time, but more of an objective E1 sort of membership. Nothing in reality 'is Pegasus'.
This presumes a sort of reality with a list of stuff that is part of it, and there not being Pegasus on that list. Meinong might say that Pegasus has a property of not being on that list, and somebody more like me might deny the meaningfulness of that list altogether since there is no way to test for it. e.g. How would Pegasus conclude his own nonexistence? We are letting Pegasus ponder this because we're considering the case where predication does not require existence.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quite a few, and I'm not pushing any particular view, just running with the denial of the one principle.
I looked at parts of SEP on existence, and more recently the 'object' section at https://www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm
Quoting RussellA
That one I very much did get from one of the articles, but self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradox, in this case, any property that references the count of the properties, which is arguably never finite.
Quoting RussellANews to me, showing how much I actually dove in, so thanks for this since it seems relevant.
Exist: Is a physical object, contained by both space & time, a relation to our universe, or more in particular, a relation to a collapsed state of our universe. Meinong would never have used those words since the universe was still considered classical back in his day.
The universe is not something that exists by this definition, but it might not be how Meinong would qualify it. People (especially those embracing classical notions) don't like saying the universe doesn't exist.
I might be getting this wrong, but this definition seems to be a relation, not anything objective. A thing not part of our physical reality might be part of a very different physical reality.
Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?
Absist: Imaginations: Santa for instance, not requiring logical consistency. For reasons of my OP disclaimer, I am not worried much about this one.
Quoting RussellA
This presumes EPP.
Quoting RussellAReally? He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa. The whole point of this topic was to explore predication to things that lack existence.
Quoting RussellA
I have clues and can glean a fairly good picture from incomplete access. Maybe. It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich.
Quoting RussellA
Two ways to parse that:
1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
2) How can we know that something doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? This is the idealism vs physical-reality debate: Answer, we can't know since neither view can be falsified, even if there's significant evidence. Evidence and proof are different things.
Quoting philoschHuman math is limited, but yes, very useful. The vast majority of actual real numbers out there (say the distance between the CoM of moon and Earth) is a value that is utterly inexpressible by any means other than the words I just used.
I can do 6th order differential calculus in my head, real time. Thing is, I do it with the fast efficient part of me, not the slow digital part that got educated by the schools. The hard math is done analog (sort of), not digital (again, sort of).
Why primes for cicadas? So the different species have as low as possible chance of coming out at the same time as some other species. Non-primes might have common factors, increasing the frequency of the overlap. We just had such an overlap by us a couple years back. Every 221 years, they both come out at once, but we have so few of the 13 year guys that I didn't notice the difference.
Quoting 180 Proof
'Fictional' already begs an existence state. 'Concrete' leverages E2 (epistemic definition) or E4 (relation to same).
Meinong seems to allow predication of nonexistent things, but he still sorts stuff into existing and not existing (fictional for instance). Per the argument in my OP, I'm unconvinced that such sorting is a valid thing to do. I guess it is since 'existence' seems defined as a mere relation, but what if we're the fiction of something that actually exists? How would we know that?
Quoting J
Don't see how it could. I defined 'EPP' in my OP. That's a definition since I could not find an official term for the principle. Is 'EPP' the correct term? It might not be what is used elsewhere, but it's not wrong.
If two people have different definitions of some word they're both using, they will end up talking past each other, but with neither of them being wrong.
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Quoting J
Because you are thinking of it as a proposition, not as the definition of a term. If you make it a definition like so then it has no truth value: "A bachelor is[sub]df[/sub] an unmarried male."
The difficulty here is that "definition" is equivocal. Lexicographers can err, and in that sense the definitions provided by a dictionary can be true or false. And in the Aristotelian sense a nominal definition can be a better or lesser approximation of the real definition, i.e. the accurate abstraction of the essence. But "definition" in analytic philosophy tends to mean stipulative definition, and stipulative definitions are not true or false. More generally, in a linguistic sense the meaning of a term is not true or false; what is true or false is a proposition that involves multiple terms with a copula.
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Okay, thanks. :up:
Same. I was going to follow that with a series of posts on each of the approaches in the article, but travel intervened.
Quoting noAxioms
Extensionally, Sydney just is the set of stuff that is in Sydney. So as long as there is stuff in Sydney - the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.
So the quantification would work as follows: We note that Circular Quay is in Sydney, and so we can invoke the definition of existential quantification, that we list all the individuals in the domain, and say of them that at least one is in Sydney.
This avoids the messy "is a part of objective reality", or knowing about stuff, or being objective, or causal histories. And avoids Platonism. Quoting noAxioms
Yep. Is Pegasus in the domain, or not? If Pegasus is in the domain then we can use existential generalisation to talk about Pegasus - Pegasus sprang from the blood of medusa, therefore something sprang from the blood of Medusa.
I'll advocate for the "Anti-Meinongian First-Order View", such that "Pegasus" rigidly designates Pegasus, without the need for an intervening description. Pegasus is a myth, so we ought not to expect to meet Pegasus while out shopping.
Quoting noAxioms
The statement "a lack of properties is itself a property" breaks the Law of Non-contradiction. From the Law of Non-contradiction, A cannot be not A. Let A be the presence of a property.
Then the absence of a property cannot be the presence of a property.
Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses. Objects that subsist such as numbers. Objects that absist such as the round square.
Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.
Therefore, for Meinong, in reality there cannot be an absence of properties.
Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong there are three kinds of objects. Those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. All these objects have properties.
Those objects that subsist, such as numbers and Santa have non-existence and being.
There is a problem with Meinong's meaning of "existence". Presumably the word "existence" is being used to describe things in a world independent of the mind rather than being used to describe things in the mind. However, I would say that "thoughts exist", and I have always used the word" exist" to refer to things that exist not only in the mind but also in the world. However, it seems that in any discussion about Meinong, the word "exist" is being restricted to things in the world.
For me, it seems clear that Santa exists in the mind and doesn't exist in the world. But Meinong says that although Santa doesn't exist in the world, has a non-existence in the world, Santa has "being" in the world. This makes no sense to me. Just because I say "the moon is made of blue cheese" doesn't mean that the moon is made of blue cheese. Just because Meinong might say "Santa has being in the world" doesn't mean that Santa has being in the world.
Anyone can say anything, Sometimes they say true things and sometimes they say false things. Perhaps this is the case for Santa's being in the world.
Quoting noAxioms
Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences.
I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."
We can only ever know our experiences, never the thing-in-itself independent of our experiences.
As the consistent model exists in our minds, any understanding we have of existence must also exist in our minds. This makes it impossible to be able to understand the nature of existence independently of how we understand the nature of existence in our minds.
Quoting noAxioms
Through your visual experiences you experience on a number of different occasions a rectangular shape that is red. Because of the consistency in your visual observations, a rectangular shape that is red has the name "a brick".
On one particular occasion you see one particular instantiation of "a brick" and feel a pain in your head. You know the concept "a brick" and you know the relation between a pain in your head and seeing one particular instantiation of "a brick".
All these exist in your mind. The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.
Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time?
Haven't read Meinong, but if it is his idea, then I agree. Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time.
For Meinong, in the world an object may exist, such as a horse, may subsist, such as a number or absist, such as a round square. Objects have properties. Therefore, there is no instance in the world where there is not an object, where there is an absence of objects, an absence of properties.
Otherwise, one can imagine a space empty of objects, where this space passes through time. Space has the property of being extended. Time has the property of duration. Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.
I agree with this idea. So, is existence a property of object, or entity with mass? Or both?
If we agree that existence implies the both, then in the case of EPP, could we say, X doesn't exist, could mean it doesn't exist in entity with mass, but it still exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence.
IOW, when you say X doesn't exist, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It exists as an EPP with the property of nonexistence. Would appreciate your comment if you see any inconsistency or fallacy in this.
It seems to me that, when discussing Meinong, the word "exist" is only used when referring to the world, not the mind. I would say that thoughts exist, but this doesn't seem how the word "exist" is being used.
Therefore, for Meinong, as regards the world, although Santa is non-existent, Santa does have "being". Properties can be assigned to objects that have being, such as Santa.
What does it mean to exist or not? Is not one property of Santa is that it is an imagining and it exists as an imagining? Things exist if they have causal power. Just look at the causal power of Santa the imagining around Christmas time. So it is not a question of whether Santa exists, but how it exists. What is the nature of Santa Claus if not an imagining? Things that do not exist we can never talk about.
I take the point about definitions being sometimes non-truth-apt, but in the case you cite: Joe defines "bachelor" as "unmarried male", while Mary defines it as "a fir tree". In ordinary usage, we would say that Joe is right and Mary is wrong. Granted, either can simply stipulate a definition, but we would say that Joe is stipulating the dictionary definition and Mary is not, so there is some kind of wrongness attached to what Mary is doing. But what kind? What allows us to go from "Mary is using an unconventional definition" to "Mary is wrong about what a bachelor is"? I don't have a ready answer, but the question underlies why I think "resolution of a dispute by definition" is more problematic than you do.
Being is prior to predication in thought. In the flesh they are one. Noumena IS phenomenon seen in truth. "And this will be a sign to you, you will find a child in a manger". The child was not a sign, pointing to something else. This "sign" pointed to itself at the moment they knew the child as God-flesh. And the Indian snake is phenomena only so long as it's not seen as a rope. The world is misunderstood by the mind. To go deeper is to find pure being, what matter as extention truly is. What the brain and nervous system. Man is psycho-organic, spiritual enfleshed. Spiritual means "being"
Quoting BannoSo the set of integers necessarily exists because the set isn't empty?
Pegasus then also necessarily exists because of his list of parts isn't empty. Maybe I'm just not reading you right, but the existence of x in a set does not make the set exist, no? It seems a funny criteria.
Sounds circular, since the domain in question here seems to be 'things in the set of things that are members of objective reality', as opposed to say 'in Sydney', something to which we have more empirical access.
I don't expect to meet aliens either, but that doesn't imply (by most definitions) that they don't exist. Pegasus doesn't expect to meet you, so he questions your existence. OK, granted that if there is something that satisfies the description, it probably doesn't share the particular identity of the myth. It's just a flying horsey thing that happens to be named Pegasus.
Quoting RussellAAs I already posted, it seems that there cannot be a finite list of properties of a thing, or at least not a finite list of self-referential properties such as that one. Paradoxes result, just like with the liar paradox. You point this out.
By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist? I listed several, but E2/E6 seems to be the one being leveraged here, which is a relation. The horse exists because I see it, and thus relates to me. My experience defines existence. Leads to solipsism at worst and anthropocentrism at best. If not that, then what definition?
Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?
More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance. Hence it not being trivial to test if something is in reality or not.
I can make a square circle BTW. 4 equal nonzero length straight sides, 4 equal angles where the sides meet, and it's also a circle. Just got to think a little outside the box.
Quoting RussellAIt originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias. Something to not forget.
Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model. So we have to recognize for instance a strong observer bias, which can be very misleading.
Totally agree. The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it. I am laying no claim that abstraction is not involved in knowing anything.
Quoting Corvus
Not sure how Meinong would classify time. Subsist? I agree that time has properties, as does space (especially since they're arguably the same thing). So non-objects can also have properties. In some universes, there's no meaning to 'object' anyway. His classifications seem very much anthropocentric.
Quoting RussellAYou didn't say that only objects have properties. All your examples are of things with properties, including 'things' that subsist and absist.
You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties. How would they be classified? Imagnation? I don't imagine my thoughts, I utilize thoughts to do the imagining.
Good, We agree on that.
Sorry to butt into a conversation, but...
Quoting CorvusUnder EPP, existence is not a property. If it doesn't exist, it has no properties. EPP is the principle that says this. Meinong denies EPP, and I'm exploring the implications of only that, not necessarily everything else Meinong says, such as his classification into 3 categories.
Quoting Harry HinduI gave 6 different meanings to the word 3 posts back, E1-E6. More have been suggested. Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.
Concerning that: What is the location of our visible universe? It's not like it has coordinates. If I was to mail a letter to myself from outside the universe, what could I write that would get it here? Can't be done since there is only one origin (big bang) and that totally lacking in spacial location. There's not a place where it happened, so what becomes of the 'location' property? It too becomes a mere relation.
The statement (that he is an imagining) seems to presume his nonexistence. OK, granted that Santa is self-contradictory and so is not likely to logically exist, but some imagined things are. My example was of Pegasus imagining you, without every having any empirical contact with a human. Does that mean you don't exist?
It can be argued that only the concept has those causal effects, as intended. It is God for children after all, purpose being to herd sheep, very much cause-effect going on.
Quoting JMary's usage is entirely non-standard, and if she chooses this definition, it needs to be stated up front, else she is indeed just plain wrong. She is not communicating, perhaps deliberately so. The problem occurs more often when words have multiple valid definitions. I have a physics background and often see the lay definitions of words like 'accelerate' and 'event' used instead of the physics definitions, which probably needs to be explicitly stated somewhere to the lay person, even if not necessary in a discussion with those that have a little physics background.
In philosophy, words like 'exist' might have more definitions than you'd find in a dictionary. I listed several relevant ones, and explicitly reference different ones when I mix their usages in the same post.
And BTW, a bachelor is a device to sort a large collection of laundry into workable batches of like colors that fit in the wash machine.
The term is also used in the old mainframe days, a process to submit batch jobs to the mainframe at a pace that it can handle.
Sheesh, don't you know anything?? :)
Yes, I think we're on the same (or closely adjacent) page. The proliferation of definitions/usages of "exist" in philosophy makes it a poor candidate for dispute. Arguments about existence quickly become wrangles over terminology, which is a shame, because I'm convinced there are important things we can understand about metaphysical structure without trying to plug in the "existence" terminology and argue for it, in the hopes that someone will finally agree with us! Theodore Sider's Writing the Book of the World is in that spirit, I believe
Quoting noAxioms
:lol:
I'll get out my heidigger and see if I can get to the bottom of it . . .
Quoting noAxioms
Why introduce "necessarily"? What does that mean in this context? "In every possible world?
Extensionally, the predicate 'p' is
So the integers just are <1,2,3...>. hence the integers exist if <1,2,3...> exist.
And Pegasus does not exist in every possible world, so Pegasus does not exist necessarily. Quoting noAxioms
That's not what was said. But also, I adopted "set" only becasue you used the word, and sets are not predicates - treating them as such causes problems.
So I've not been able to follow your comments here. Too fast. Maybe go back to this:
Quoting Banno
to which you replied:
Quoting noAxioms
There is good reason for using ~(?x). It shows the quantifier and the negation are seperate operations. Pegasus is a mythical horse, is it not? And therefore, we might conclude (by existential generalisation) that there are mythical horses? We can make such a generalisations, hence there is something that is pegasus - the mythical horse. Of course, you will not meet Pegasus at the stables, but in the story of Perseus.
Santa is fat, hence, there is something that is fat
Santa is fat
?(x)( x is fat). (Existential generalisation)
It might be worth considering the suggestion that Santa exists, as a fictive individual, and is indeed fat, but that you will not find him by heading north.
That is, not everything that exists is physical.
Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong)
Suppose I thought about the object the Giza Pyramid. The Giza Pyramid has the property of being heavy. Does that mean my thought about the Giza Pyramid must also be heavy?
That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.
Quoting noAxioms
It depends on whether we are talking about Meinong or everyday life.
In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.
In the context of everyday life, one can imagine a space in which there are no objects. It seems to me that space has the property of extension and time has the property of duration, meaning that even in the absence of objects there will still be properties
It depends on the definition of "object"
Quoting noAxioms
As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused my (EDIT) experiences, but I believe that they did. This is my working hypothesis until proved wrong.
Quoting noAxioms
Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.
This breaks the Law of Non Contradiction.
Quoting noAxioms
In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".
Quoting noAxioms
I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm
For Meinong, Tom Sawyer would be an example of "subsist".
I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world, even though thoughts can be described as real and take place only in the mind.
As I see it, for Meinong, an object either exists, subsist or absists. All objects have properties.
This division seems sensible to me, yet generally attacked, which makes me think I don't understand Meinong's Theory. For example, Bertrand Russell attacked Meinong's Theory by saying that an object being both round and square would break the law of Non-contradiction. Yet Meinong never said that a round square exists, he said that a round square absists, and there is no reason why a round square cannot absist. It all depends on what "absists" means.
Sense 1 - exist.
i) such as a horse, ii) has a negation, iii) temporal and spatial, iv) Meinong must be using the word "exist" to refer to objects in the world. I would say that "thoughts exist", but Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way.
Sense 2 - subsist
i) aka as being, ii) such as Sherlock Holmes, numbers, iii) non-existent, iv) has a negation, v) non-temporal and non-spatial, vi) "subsist" must refer to objects in the mind, such as Sherlock Holmes. Objects that don't exist in the world, but objects that are logically possible in the world.
Sense 3 - absist
i) such as the round square, ii) non-existent, iii) as every possible object absists, there can be no negation, iv) non-temporal and non-spatial, v) "absist" must also refer to objects in the mind, such as the round square. Objects that don't exist in the world, because logically impossible in the world.
Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.
Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way, as something that obtains in the world rather than mind.
Asking the location of the universe is a silly question, like asking the for the location of reality. You could say that the universe is the set of all locations, or the set of all relations. I still prefer to tie existence to causation with location being just one property of causation.
Quoting noAxioms
Well, yeah. An imagining is a concept. Concepts have causal power. Do concepts and imaginings exist? What you are saying is that Santa does not exist as a flesh and blood organism. That is true. It exists as a concept, or a legend, and the legend had to start somewhere.
There might have been a person that existed long ago from which the concept Santa started, but has evolved over time to only vaguely represents the original.
Lacking a clear definition, let's step back from Meinong for a moment and consider the EPP principle. Existence is prior to predication, meaning something nonexistent cannot have a property. Under what definition of existence might that be valid?
Idealism: Santa, like the apple, is an ideal, and thus both exist and can have properties. The principle is meaningless since if it doesn't exist, it means it is not thought of at all, and so neither has its properties.
Existence only of 'objects', which doesn't work because 17 has the property of being prime despite not existing by this definition.
So it works for some definitions and not for others. But what I think was intended by the principle is more along the lines of Santa not being fat because there's no Santa to be fat. The concept of santa is of someone fat, but that's just a concept, not Santa. The concept is not fat, but rather of a fat Santa.
It works, but the exact definition of 'exists' is left unspecified, perhaps.referring only to what's on Earth (a relation again).
Quoting Banno
You said "So as long as [...] the set "in Sydney" is not empty - we can't say Sydney doesn't exist.". So conversely, if it isn't an empty set, it must exist. It necessarily exists, because if it didn't, it would violate the assertion above. Perhaps you didn't mean to say exactly that. It made little sense to me. Perhaps you didn't mean any set, but only this 'in Sydney' set. My comment was me trying to understand your comment.
Yes, I introduced the word 'set', which seemed fitting with your introduction of 'domain'. Also, 'set' as opposed to 'that which is in Sydney'.
I was treating membership within sets as predicates. The ontology of the set becomes a predicate if EPP is denied, else I agree that the contradictions you indicate result.
I accept your notational differences as being more clear than my ?(x)(x is pegasus) since your notation allowed distinction between two different interpretations of the statement.
That is its relation to humans, sure. That doesn't mean that there isn't one out there in some 'possible world', for lack of better term. If there is such a thing, that still wouldn't change our reference from being a reference to a mythical thing. So in the sense intended, there is indeed no such thing as Pegasus. If the intention (the definition of there being such a thing) is broadened, then we might conclude that there are possibly creatures that match the description of our myths. They wouldn't be mythical at that point.
Quoting Banno
Something went wrong there, since if EPP holds, 'Santa is fat' is not even wrong, but 'something is fat' is true. ?(x)(x is Santa & x is fat)
Depends on one's definition of course. Meinong's definition seemed to suggest otherwise, but I didn't like his three categories.
Quoting RussellASeems to contradict the 'physical object' definition I got from another (not particularly reliable) source. The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target), but the thought itself does not seem to qualify as an object itself, but they sometimes occur in a confined spatial region.
Thoughts do have properties, but pyramid thoughts are not often considered to be 'heavy' thoughts, and it would be a different definition of 'heavy' anyway.
An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one.
Quoting RussellAIs there a typo in there? Because a mind independent thing being caused by experiences seems to be a contradiction.
Hmm, it does seem to say that. I think I meant 'biased on the knowledge ...", trying to take observer bias into account, something easily omitted.
OK. I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it.
Quoting RussellASorry. I only read parts of it, trying to find definitions mostly.
By who? Does Meinong define 'reality'? I'm no realist, so I don't advocate any particular definition. Something being mind-independent doesn't necessarily make it real, more real, or less real. Any of those four cases is possible given the right choice of definition.
As for the three classifications, subsist and absist seem identical except for the whole 'logically possible' distinction. Two words, both to describe ideals, and only one for everything else. Hmm....
What is "has a negation"? I don't see that on the site I linked.
Where does combustion fit in? Not the idea of it, but the physical process. It has a location, but being a process, it isn't really an object. It does obtain in this world.
I don't follow this. Something that subsists by definition doesn't exist. It might have properties, but existing isn't one of them (per the definitions given). I don't see a contradiction.
Quoting Harry HinduTotally agree, and yet many treat the concept seriously, suggesting say that the universe might be bumping against the nearest neighbor reality or something.
I like to use the word to refer to our particular bit of spacetime,places where the laws of physics are the same and any location can be given relative to another. That's far less than 'all locations', some of which might be in say a realm with 5 spatial dimensions and has no location relative to 'here'.
Now you sound like me, with ontology being defined in a way that only makes sense in a structure with causal relationships.
Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.
You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?
Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?
Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world?
Quoting noAxioms
That objects that subsist, such as numbers and Sherlock Holmes, are logically possible and objects that absist, such as a square circle or A being not-A, are not logically possible, makes subsist and absist very different.
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Quoting noAxioms
See Russell's Theory of Descriptions 2 - Frege & Meinong
For "exist", a horse may exist or not exist in the field.
For "subsist", Sherlock Holmes may subsist or not subsist at 221B Baker Street
For "absist", as everything absists, there can be no negation.
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Quoting noAxioms
See Mehrdad Jazayeri
A thought can be a physical process or a physical part. A car can be a physical process, such as turning the wheel, going from A to B, and doesn't have mass. A car can be a physical part, such as wheels and an engine, which does have mass.
Then combustion as a physical part would "exist" and combustion as a physical process would "subsist"
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Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist. This is just how Meinong is defining the meaning of "object"
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Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong, the target of a mental act, such as a thought, is an object, even if that object is a number. This is how Meinong is using the term "object".
From SEP - Alexius Meinong
The target of a mental act is an object. As the target of a mental act cannot be itself, a mental act cannot be an object.
:100:
Quoting RussellA
Yes to all those questions as minds exist in the world. When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in? If both direct and indirect realists answer, "yes", to this question, then I don't see how this establishes a distinction between direct and indirect realists.
For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" are being used.
Meining seems to be naming something "exist", "subsist" and "absist" rather than describing something that is "existing", "subsisting" or "absisting".
For Meinong, within the mind are intentional acts towards objects.
Sense one of exist
The name "horse" can be given to objects having the properties hoofed, a mammal and long mane. "A horse" may be defined as "hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane".
Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse. Therefore, an object of intention such as a horse may be defined as "existing" as well as having the property existing.
He also gives the name "subsist" to those objects such as Sherlock Holmes, and the name "absist" to those objects such as the round square.
Because Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse, it becomes both a property of and a definition of objects of intention such as a horse.
In this sense of "exist", exist is a property.
Sense two of exist
However, there is another sense of exist, that of the Existential Generalization, whereby Fa ? ?x (Fx). If a is F then there exists something that is F.
For example, if something is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane, then there exists something that is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane.
Similarly, if something is existing (sense one), then there exists (sense two) something that is existing (sense one)
In conclusion, it seems that two senses of existing are being used.
We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain.
Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red.
None of that would read different if the word 'direct' was omitted. None of it explains the difference between direct and indirect, which is what I expressed confusion about.
Heavily dependent on definition of 'exist'. On the surface, it seems to ask if I am a realist about mind dependent experiences.
Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal. So not so similarly.
I still don't know the difference between a direct realist and an indirect realist.
Quoting RussellA
Here, 'exist' is being used as a relation.
Oh, I thought it was one of the three things, and not a heirarchy where 'exist' is just a special case of the other two. This contradicts your statement just below
Sounds like numbers don't absist, even though everything absists. Sounds like numbers are objects, despite not having a location.
Just picking apart what seems to be inconsistencies. Actually, I care little about Meinong's actual views since for one he presumes a classical 'reality'. I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPP, and all these classification details seem irrelevant to that, a derailment.
What is very relevant to my question is the defniition of 'existence' since the word is directly referenced in EPP. It's important, and seemingly unspecified. A horse isn't in the field, so a horse cannot have a tail? That makes no sense. Clearly a different definition of 'exist' is being referenced when asserting that a nonexistent horse cannot have a tail. It doesn't just mean that the horse is elsewhere.
Quoting RussellACan't be different senses of the word, else it wouldn't be a denial of anything that some other view held true.
That's kind of cheating, a view that is functionally no different except the meaning of certain words. So the EPP guy says the unicorn cannot have a property of being horny, but one can think of such a thing, so the abstraction exists, and is abstracted to be horny. Meinong comes along and says 'no, that's subsist', and yes, it's horny, so that's predication without existence, but only because he refused to classify it as existence.
I don't think he would have gained any recognition for such a lame argument, so I don't think that's the argument. I don't think it's just a case of renaming the 'exists' label of something with a predicate to demonstrate EPP to be false.
Sorry, but what is 'objects of intention' here? I looked it up and got morals: Intended results of an action, whether or not those results actually follow.
Anyway, I cannot follow your description of first sense of 'exist' without that.
So a is a round square, so there exists a round square. OK, a is also supposedly (I claimed the possibility above) a contradiction, so a is arguably not F.
What is F? A property? If a has the property of being F, then there exists something with that property, which seems to require EPP in order to follow. A creature is a unicorn, so there exists something that is a unicorn. Yes, that follows under existential generalization (my E6 way above), there is no predication without existence, not what Meinong says, so he probably is not using this sense.
You're numbering your senses of existence the same way I did, but I don't get your sense 1.
Quoting RussellAWhat we see seems irrelevant to the question, which was whether the pain of another is in the same world as you (or your pain). I suppose that depends on where you delimit 'the world'.
Hey, that's sort of the distinction I was requesting. To say something (apple) is red is seemingly to say that the apple (ding an sich) is experience, quite the idealistic assertion, and realism only of experience, not of actual apples. Just my take from that brief description.
From Wikipedia - Direct and indirect realism
Suppose someone sees a red, rectangular brick. Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that is causing that person to see a red, rectangular brick (ignoring the special cases of dreams and hallucinations).
However, the Direct Realist would say that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick, as the colour red, the shape rectangular and the object brick exist in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that they don't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself, as all they know are their subjective experiences.
I put my hand in a fire and feel pain. As an Indirect Realist, I say that the pain only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself. I look at a brick and see the colour red. As an Indirect Realist, I also say that the colour red only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself.
Suppose you have the subjective experiences of pain and the colour red. Presumably you believe that pain only exists in a mind and not a mind-independent world.
What argument would a Direct Realist make to justify that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world, when their only experience of the colour red is in their mind as a subjective experience?
We directly experience some things but not others seems to show that the distinction between direct and indirect is simply one of causal complexity - how far removed the effect is from its causes, not a difference in the ontology of perception as we can experience things directly and indirectly.
Quoting RussellA
This is non-sensical. Red is a property of minds. Ripeness is a property of apples, or fruit in general. Do we concern ourselves that the apple's ripeness can exist independently of fruit, or that it's ripeness is caused by things that are not ripe, like water, sunlight, the seed, the apple tree, etc.? No. So why do this with the color red? In which natural causal process is the cause and the effect the exact same thing? Ripeness does not cause ripeness. Red does not cause red. Information is the relationship between cause and effect. The cause or effect alone is not interesting. The relationship is, and that is what we are getting at when we perceive anything.
What does it even mean to say something is prior to properties? If something exists, how does it exist? In what way does it interact with other things? Does one's existence interact with another existence, or does one's properties interact with other properties and the type of properties interacting is what produces novel effects? Do properties exist?
There is another aspect that is critical to the difference between Indirect and Direct Realism, and that is the direction of flow of information in a causal chain.
One cause can only have one effect, in that if one knows the cause then the effect has been determined by the cause. For example, if a stone hitting a glass window causes the glass to shatter, the same stone under he same conditions hitting the same glass window will always cause the glass to shatter.
However one effect can have more than one cause, in that even if one knew the effect, it doesn't follow that that one will necessarily know the cause. For example, knowing that has a glass window has shattered is no reason why one will know what caused the glass to shatter. It could have been a bird, a stone, a window cleaner etc.
There is a temporal direction of information flow in a causal chain. The Indirect Realist accepts this fact, and accepts the fact that one effect may have several different causes. This makes it impossible to follow a causal chain backwards in time. The Direct Realist doesn't accept this fact, and believes that even though one effect may have several causes, it is possible to follow a causal chain backwards in time.
The Indirect Realist accepts that they may never know what broke the window. The Direct Realist has the position that they will always know what broke the window.
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Quoting Harry Hindu
You can only know whether an apple is ripe from experiences through your senses. It may be soft to the touch, it may have a sweet smell, it may have a speckled colour, it may taste bitter and there may be a dull sound when you hit it.
There is no escaping the fact that you can only know the ripeness of an apple through your senses.
Take one of these as an example. You experience a sweet smell through your sense of smell. This is no different in kind to experiencing the colour red through your sense of vision. As red is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself, a sweet smell is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself.
Ripeness is a set of properties in the mind, not a set of properties of a thing-in-itself.
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Quoting Harry Hindu
These are the questions @noAxiom wants answering.
For Meinong, exist, subsist and absist are part of a hierarchy. Round squares absist but cannot subsist or exist. Sherlock Holmes can absist but not exist. Horses can exist, subsist and absist.
In Meinong's domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist. In my domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes exists. The question is then raised, how can something that doesn't exist exist. But this question is conflating two different domains, understandably leading to contradiction
For Meinong to separate thoughts into exist, such as horse, subsist, such as Sherlock Holmes, and absist, such as a round square, seems quite sensible. But the fact that many attack his views makes me believe that I may not really understand what he is saying.
Properties are predicated of something. From SEP - Properties
Our only belief about things-in-themselves comes from experiences in our five senses. For example, the colour red in our vision, a silky feel to the touch, an acrid smell, a sweet taste or a grating noise. All these are properties. We can never know about the thing-in-itself that we believe has caused such experiences.
The EPP states that existence is prior to predication. However, all we can ever know are predications of the supposed thing-in-itself. We can never know about the the existence of any thing-in-itself. Therefore, it is a logical impossibility to say whether existence is prior to predication or not.
As David Hume argued, existence means no more than the bundle of properties an object has. From Wikipedia - Bundle theory
We experience properties in our mind, such as the colour red, but we can never know about the existence of the supposed thing-in-itself that may have caused these experiences. Therefore, the EPP is unknowable.
Can any objects be EPP, or only certain category or types of objects can be EPP? What objects belong to the EPP?
The EPP (existence is prior to predication) may refer to things other than objects.
Thoughts exist in the mind. Are thoughts objects?
Rain exists in the world. Is rain an object?
Thoughts appear and disappear in the mind. Thoughts also causes actions to perform.
Thoughts are not visible. but they are the most intimate form of mental events.
In that regard, yes thoughts exist.
Quoting RussellA
Whatever visible, touchable, perceptible, thinkable and knowable are objects.
Quite the naive view. Does it have significant support?
How does the direct realist explain that? Is there actual pain in his hand? Injury and pain are quite different, and there's not always injury at all.
Quoting Harry HinduExcellent point. Way too much weight is given to sight for instance, to the point that things arguably don't exist to a blind person.
Do pictures count? What if it's a picture taken at XRay frequencies? Is the resulting false color image what it looks like?
Quoting Harry HinduThat something 'nonexistent' (whatever that means) cannot have properties.
Hence the 'whatever that means'. I gave at least 6 definitions, and there are more.
Again, definition (of both words) dependent. It seems that everybody keeps saying 'definition dependent, but nobody every tries to make clear how the word is being used before using it.
Quoting RussellA
This seems totally wrong. A cause typically has many effects, and each effect has many causes. It's a complex network, not a linear chain as that comment seems to suggest.
It's the old butterfly effect ,that some hurricane would not have happened had butterfly X not wafted its wings months prior. True, but had that butterfly done the alternate thing, different hurricanes would have happened. The butterfly was not the sole cause of the hurricane, nor was the hurricane the sole effect of the wing wiggle.
Quoting RussellA
Really? Is this an epistemological assertion? Why then does he not know who shot Kennedy?
Why are not the direct realists in charge of the court system? Why are juries necessary? The phrase 'probable cause' becomes meaningless.
Quoting RussellAOK, the crux of it all then: How do we know that horses exist and not just subsist? Both kinds of subsisting things have properties (the same properties, except for existence property), so appealing to their properties does not distinguish the two cases.
Quoting RussellA
This is interesting. I've been saying that objecthood is no more than a mental abstraction, but this bundle theory may be an attempt to refute that. Seems kind of off-topic here, but relevant to some other threads I've done. Something to look into.
Quoting CorvusThis does not parse. EPP is a principle, and I don't know what it means for an object to be (or not) a principle.
You can ask what sort of objects are inapplicable to EPP for instance. My typical example is that 17 has the property of being prime, yet no conclusion of 17's existence follows from that. EPP seems not to apply there.
Isn't EPP, Existence Prior to Predication? Hence it is a type of existence such as unicorn or dragon. We can describe how they might look, and they have properties such as has horn, breathes fire, being mythical etc. It is not possible to say they exist, but they exist prior to predication as concepts.
So is it a principle? Principle is the way something works with consistency and coherence mostly in physical objects and movements, and sometimes in the law and logic too. Nothing to do with existence.
Quoting noAxioms
17 is a number. Numbers don't exist in real world. Numbers are concept. 17 has property being odd number, as well as being prime etc. Therefore it is EPP. Let me know if you don't agree or think not correct. Must admit EPP is a new concept for me.
:up:
Quoting noAxioms
For Meinong, the unicorn, being mythical, makes it subsist, rather than the horse, which exists.
From the Merriam Webster
Both the horse and unicorn have similar properties, apart from the unicorn having the property of being mythical.
The unicorn is mythical because no one has seen one in the world, whereas many people have seen horses in the world.
However, the fact that no one has seen a unicorn in the world does not mean that they don't exist in the world. After all, the Coelacanth had been thought extinct for 70 million years until one was found in 1938.
Meinong's terms exist, subsist and absist are useful guidelines, though particular examples can be argued over.
Quoting noAxioms
I would guess that half of everyone on the Forum are Direct Realists.
Some of your comments suggest that you are a Direct Realist
page 2 - 1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
page 2 - The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.
page 3 - Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal.
But other of your comments suggest that you an Indirect Realist
page 3 - I've been saying that objecthood is no more than a mental abstraction
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Quoting noAxioms
The Direct Realist knows that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick.
But this is only possible if there can be a direct flow of information from the present to the past. From the present experiences in the senses to the past causes of such experiences. But this is logically impossible.
This is one reason what I am not a Direct Realist, but rather an Indirect Realist.
One consequence of Direct Realism would be that the Detective would know who had carried out the crime, which is clearly not the case.
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Quoting noAxioms
If a "cause" has many effects, then by definition it is not a cause. A butterfly flapping its wings in Goa is not the cause of a tornado in Florida.
Assuming we live in a Deterministic world, then everything that happens in the world is determined completely by previously existing causes. From Wikipedia - Determinism
In a Deterministic world, which I believe we live in, by defintion, one cause only has one effect.
Well, most of our information about our environment comes in the form of visuals, so it seems logical that we would think the world is at it appears. A dog may think the world is as it smells, to a bat the world is as it sounds.
I think the wording is incorrect when we say that the world is as it appears. How it appears allows us to get at the way it is thanks to determinism (same causes lead to the same effects) and reasoning (incorporating multiple observations using all five senses over time).
Quoting noAxioms
Seems like a misuse of language to me. How can we ever hope to talk about such things? Why bother?
Quoting noAxioms It seems to me that in describing how something exists you would be inherently describing it's properties.
You're confusing your ignorance of the cause with there being more than one cause. There is only one cause and because you do not know the cause you might come up with some options but those options are mental constructs (possibilities), not actual causes. Only by doing an investigation can you eliminate those possibilities, thereby finding that those causes didn't really "exist", or at least don't exist apart from your mind.
You're also focusing only on the broken window as the effect. Breaking a window (any effect) is an interaction between at least two things (a rock and a window). If a rock broke the window, the effect is not only that the window is broken but also the location of the object that broke the window. There is a rock on the floor just inside the broken window, not outside in the rock garden where it was before the window was broken. Often there is more evidence (effects) than just a broken window. You have to use your senses and powers of reason to find it.
I think that this is part of the problem - that we arbitrarily "box in" effects and causes as discrete events when causation is a constant flow and any boundaries we impose on this process may be of our own mental makings.
Quoting RussellA
Actually, for a direct realist there is no causal process. The red apple on the table is the same red apple they perceive - the cause and effect are one and the same with no intervening process in between.
For a direct realist, the apple is not ripe as they never directly experience ripeness. They experience red. When a direct realist hears someone say, "That apple is ripe", what they interpret them to really mean is the apple is red. There is no such thing as ripeness for a direct realist. A direct realist would have problems explaining causation. Or they would be separating their minds from the causal interactions of the rest of the world - as if their minds are not subject to the same laws that govern the rest of the universe. As such, I find that most direct realists seem to be religious in some way or another as their God created them in a way (with a soul) that allows them to perceive the world as it is.
It is not the case that the indirect realist may never know the cause because we actually do get at the cause on a great many things. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to accomplish tasks with the degree of success that we do.
The issue for direct vs. indirect realism is that they are really just the extreme positions on the spectrum of explaining perception. The best explanation will lie somewhere in the middle and incorporate the best, non-contradictory parts of both extremes.
Incorporating determinism (same causes lead to the same effects) and the idea that we have multiple senses AND reasoning capable of getting at the same property in different ways for fault-tolerance gives us more confidence in our understanding of the causes of some effects. I don't ever hear indirect realist take into account determinism and reasoning - as if all the indirect realist has in their toolkit is their senses and not reasoning.
Quoting RussellA
Is it? I though ripeness is a property of the apple and all those sensory impressions you spoke of are mental representation (effects of our senses and brain interacting with light reflected off the apple) of that property. How can all those very different sensory impressions be the same property? Aren't they really just the many ways one can represent the ripeness of the apple, in the same way that we can use many different scribbles (languages) to refer to the same thing in the world (apple in English or manzana in Spanish)?
And doesn't this mean that our multiple senses provides a level of fault tolerance in getting at the actual properties of the apple? Those objects look like apples in the basket at the center of Grandma's dinner table but when you try to grab one and eat it you find that they are all ceramic apples in a ceramic basket that is the centerpiece on Grandma's dinner table. So your multiple senses and reasoning allow you to get at the true nature of the objects on the table, just as it would allow you to get at the cause of the broken window. If you only had the broken window as the effect, sure I can see your issue, but that is not the case. We often have more evidence available if we just use ALL of our senses AND reasoning to get at them.
Quoting RussellA
It seems to me that Meinong is simply conflating properties with different kinds of existence. Absisting an subsisting are different kinds of existence, or the nature of their existence, for what are they really saying when using these terms if not different modes of existing? What distinction are they trying to make in using these terms, if not how they interact with the world causally? Sherlock Holmes does not exist as a biological entity. It is a mental construct - an idea, but it has the same causal power as biological entities. The idea of Sherlock Holmes can cause you to do things in the world, so what exactly is the distinction they are trying to make if not the nature of their existence?
Yes I agree. Whoever sees a broken window can use all their senses, reasoning and available evidence, such as a rock lying on the floor inside the room, to make a judgement as to what actually broke the window. Their judgement might be right or wrong. This would be the same approach for both the Direct and Indirect Realist.
You are right when you say that we do know the cause of many things
Quoting Harry Hindu
But this doesn't get to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realism.
Your statement that for the Direct Realist the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table gets to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realists.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I cannot argue with your claim that God allows us to perceive the world as it really is, and if God exists then this would be a perfectly valid explanation.
Quoting Harry Hindu
However, I am looking at the problem in a secular way, and for me, it is a fact that there is a causal chain from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in the mind. It is this causal chain that makes the claims of Direct Realism invalid, that the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.
It is not the case that when perceiving a colour we use all our senses, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgement as to what colour we are seeing. We don't make the judgment that we are in fact seeing the colour red.
When we perceive the colour red, no judgment is involved. We perceive the colour red.
It is true that once perceiving the colour red, we can then use all our sense, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgment as to what has led up to our seeing the colour red. We can reason that there has been a flow of information from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in our mind involving a long and complex causal series of events. We can determine that there is a temporal direction to this flow of information, in that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect whilst one effect may have more than one possible causes.
We may perceive a red apple on a table, but for whatever reason, a medical problem with our eyes, the light having passed through a stained glass window or there being a sunset, the apple on the table may in fact have been green.
The Indirect Realist accepts that information may change along any causal series of events, and would not explicitly say that because they perceive a red apple the apple in the world was red.
However, as you say, for the Direct Realist there is no causal intervening process, and the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.
Both the Direct and Indirect Realist are the same in using all their senses, reasoning and evidence to try to understand the original cause of their perceptions. But they differ in that for the Direct Realist there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself but for the Indirect Realist, what they perceive is a representation of any thing-in-itself.
The asymmetric temporal flow along a causal series of events is an important reason why the Direct Realist's position is incorrect.
EPP = existence is prioir to predication.
It depends whether existence is referring to 1) the existence of the Universe prior to the predication of an apple, or 2) is referring to the existence of the apple prior to the predication of the apple.
The Universe
If 1), then the EPP is accepted, and existence is prior to the predication of an apple.
The apple
If 2), then something exists, and that something has the properties of being circular, being sweet and being green.
It cannot be that case that something exists for a period of time before its properties are attached.
It cannot be the case that there are properties not attached to something.
It must be the case that the something that exists must be contemporaneous with its properties.
Then the EPP is denied, and existence is contemporaneous with predication.
Existential Quantification
1) There is something x that exists.
2) X has the properties of being circular, being sweet, being green.
The set {being circular, being sweet, being green} may be named "being an apple"
Therefore, ?x A (x)
There is something x that exists and x has the property A of being an apple
The property of being an apple cannot be prior to x
X cannot be prior to the property being an apple
X has the property being an apple
There is something that exists that has the property of being an apple.
Therefore, the EPP and Existential Quantification are contradictory
How very well argued. A raw assertion without even a definition of what sort of 'exists' is being presumed.
I am looking for justified statements, not opinions.
I might agree given some definitions, and not agree given others.
E2-E6*, probably yes, I'd agree, some of these by definition. E1 is the problem case, and it seems it cannot be justified without leveraging (and consequently justifying) the EPP principle, something nobody has done.
* Defined here if you missed it
Quoting CorvusYes, yes, and no. It's a principle, yes. It does have something to do with existence since it explicitly mentions 'existence', but without specification of what type is meant.
In short, the principle says that nonexistent things cannot have properties, but the wording of the principle leaves 'existence' undefined, so the principle might hold with some definitions and not with others. Without a clear definition, assertions like the one quoted just above are pretty meaningless.
You seem to switch definitions on the fly, not using any one definition consistently.
No, a principle is a sort of rule, not a type of existence.
Yes. That would be definition E2: thoughts, and it is hard to think of the properties of a dragon without thinking of a dragon, so EPP sees to be true given E2 definition. However, per the disclaimer in the OP, I am not talking about the existence of thoughts/ideals OF a thing, I'm talking about the thing itself. The principle says that dragons cannot breathe fire if dragons are not real. Thoughts of dragon fire are fine since thoughts of dragons seem to be a necessary part of doing so.
Concepts don't exist in real world? Your assertions are loaded with problems. 17 is indeed a number (E6), but then you call it a concept (E2), and a concept is not a number. That's a contradiction. You reference 'real world' like only one world is real (E1) and all others are not, which is not justified in any way, at least not without leveraging the EPP principle, which would then itself need justification, which is one of the things I'm trying to do in this topic.
Number are thoughts. Thoughts exist. Numbers don't exist. Ouch... I certainly deny the bold part. The other two are definition dependent.
Quoting RussellASo things that are non-mythical determines what exists?
E8: Isn't mythical
What if I become a myth? What about something nobody has thought of? That exists because it isn't mythical?
I don't think you meant that, and therefore the question wasn't answered.
More concise wording of the question: Given a denial of EPP, how can the existence of anything be known? First step in answering that is to define existence. Only then can a coherent justified answer be attempted. The answer may very well be different from one definition to the next.
This uses an anthropocentric definition of 'mythical'. Is the core of the Earth then mythical because no one has seen it? I'm not even going to list this one, but it seems related to the anthropocentric definition E2.
Yet again, per the OP disclaimer, I am not considering idealistic/anthropocentric arguments for reality.
Being nonexistent and being currently extinct are very different things.
Quoting RussellAMaybe we should let them (in their copious numbers) defend the position then. The description above got pretty implausible.
Some of your comments suggest that you are a Direct Realist
page 2 - 1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
page 2 - The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.
page 3 - Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal.[/quote]I think the middle comment clearly says otherwise, that my concept of the brick does not reflect its actual nature. Secondly, nothing in those three statements indicates that I'm a realist.
Indirect, sure. Realist is, like everything else, definition dependent, but I can write an R1-R6 that directly correspond to E1-E6.
Perhaps we are speaking past each other. I break my leg. That causes 1) pain, 2) doctor work 3) financial troubles 4) missed days at work 5) cancelled ski trip.
Plenty more, but that sounds like multiple effects to me, so why didn't my leg breakage cause any of those effects?
And this is relevant to the point above how, especially since both our comments (causes have more than one effect or not) seem to be relevant regardless of one's opinion on determinism.
Not by the definition you gave (I can think of at least 5 kinds of determinism), plus we do not know if the world is deterministic. As I said, we seem to be talking past each other.
Quoting Harry HinduThe naive classical stuff maybe, but not the deep stuff that gets important when exploring the gray areas.
Very pragmatic at least, and given that pragmatic utility, it may even be logical that we think the world is as it appears, but it isn't logical that the world is actually as it appears, for reasons you spelled out earlier.
What? Talking about dragons having properties? That's fine. All of those are ideals, valid things to talk about. The EPP concerns actual dragons having wings, not possible if there are not actual ones. The problem with that reasoning is that it presumes a division into actual and not actual before applying the logic, which is circular logic. Dispensing with EPP fixes that problem, but leaves us with no way to test for the existence (E1) (actuality) of anything, leaving the term without a distinction.
OK. Dragons breathe fire. Therefore, per EPP, dragons exist. That leverages definition E3.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field
That's four causes (there are more) of the hip break (true story). Coyote distracts attention from foot placement. Step off road and fall, instinctively to the side into a roll.
Once again, perhaps we are talking past each other when you say there can be but one cause and I disagree. If I say that each of those things is a cause, I mean the state of my broken (chipped actually) hip is a function of all those things and many others. Had any one of them not been the case, the hip thing would not have happened. Cause C (a system state) is a cause of effect E (another system state) if state E is in any way a function of state C. A state is a system state, however local, like say the coyote.
Quoting RussellAYou seem to be interpreting the word 'prior' to mean 'at an earlier time', which is not at all what the principle is saying. It says that existence is required for predication, and conversely a nonexistent thing cannot have predicates, not even be the nonexistent thing. It is not making any reference to time.
We still can apply several definitions of 'exists' to that principle, some of which make sense and some not. I care, because in denying EPP, I want to know exactly what is being denied.
No, there exists some integer x that satisfies some condition (being odd). (?x) (Int(x) ? x is odd), where your statement comes down to ?x which is empty.
So you want to say there an exists an object that is round, sweet and green. (?x) (x is round ? x is sweet ? x is green)
Hey, the green ones are tart!
Anyway, that's leveraging E6, a relation. One can say that there isn't an integer that breathes fire.
~?(x)(Int(x) ? x breathes fire).
EPP seems to hold here. There isn't anything that satisfies those predicates, so there's nothing on which those predicates are being hung. Under Meinong, a fire breathing integer has those predicates, and it absists, without contradiction.
Works for me.
No. You seem to be using the temporal definition of 'prior' to conclude this.
Strange, that nowhere I could find anyone describing it as principle, but there are many explications on EPP. It sounds like a theory or idea too.
Quoting noAxioms
Could it mean that it covers all existence? Could you define and list the types of existence?
What is existence?
True. My saying that "thoughts exist" is a raw assertion without any definition of either "thoughts" or "exist".
But considering books have been written about the nature of thoughts and existence, I think my trying to define these terms would make my post far too long.
I can only hope that the reader understands what I mean by saying that "thoughts exist".
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Quoting noAxioms
I would hope that few would argue with my saying that unicorns are mythical creatures.
For Meinong, something being mythical makes it subsist.
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Quoting noAxioms
Yes, Direct Realists should defend their position on the Forum.
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Quoting noAxioms
My assumption is that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect and one effect can have more than one possible causes.
This is the core of my argument against Direct Realism.
Your example is about one event having more than one effect, which I agree with, as it supports my argument against Direct Realism.
The question is, can breaking a leg be said to cause cancelling a ski trip. After all, there is no necessary reason to cancel a ski trip just because you broke your leg. Breaking a leg may contribute to your decision to cancel your ski trip, but it would be wrong to say that breaking your leg caused you to cancel your ski trip.
Books have been written about the meaning of "causation", including the SEP article The Metaphysics of Causation
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Quoting noAxioms
You say "There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all."
One of the accepted meanings of "prior" is "at an earlier time".
Do you have a source that establishes the principle that existence is conceptually prior to predication to help me understand how the terms have been defined?
I don't know what you mean by the "deep stuff that gets important". What form does the deep stuff that gets important take in the mind if not colors and shapes? Because we get most of our information about the world via vision, we tend to think in visuals as well. How do you know when you are thinking about the deep stuff that gets important? What is it like? What form do your thoughts take when thinking these things? What mental constructs are you pointing at when you talk about what you are thinking? And what form does the gray areas take when exploring them. You even used the color, "grey" (a visual) in your description.
Quoting noAxioms
That depends on what one means by, "the world is as it appears". If it means that the appearances allows us to get at the actual state-of-affairs, which it does most of the time or else we would be failing at our tasks much more often that we succeed, then what is the issue? What is missing from our knowledge when we successfully use appearances (representations) to accomplish a vast majority of our tasks that we set out to do? I don't know about you, but when I interact with the world, I interact with the actual state-of-affairs via its appearance in my mind. I don't interact with appearances.
I find that many indirect realists like to whine about how we might be mistaken, or that we end up not knowing anything, when we are not mistaken and we succeed in our goals most of the time. How often have we understood each other's scribbles on this screen as opposed to not understanding them?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Sure, this goes back to what I was saying about thinking in visuals. When describing a dragon, you are describing how it appears visually in your mind. Your description is visual in nature. You do the same thing for objects that exist in other locations in the world, like outside of your head. If ideas can have the same types of properties as physical objects, then what does it mean for lizards to exist but dragons do not exist? It seems to me that people are trying to make a special case for ideas (as having the property of non-existence) as opposed to everything else, when they possess the same types of properties and have as much causal power as everything else? The only difference is the location of the things we are talking about - either in your head or outside of it, and you head exists, but the things within it do not?Quoting noAxioms
You are talking past me. That is not what I was saying. Russell was making the point that, from his own position of ignorance, there appears to be multiple possible causes for some effect. He would be projecting multiple causal paths to the same effect when they are merely products of his mind (his ignorance of the one actual causal path that led to the effect).
If you read the rest of that post you would see that I go on to say that a cause is an interaction between two or more things. So depending on if you point at the interaction ( a single thing), or the two or more things interacting, one could say that the cause is a single thing, or multiple things. It depends on what our goal is in the moment.
You could say that the Big Bang is also a cause of your chipped hip.
We don't ever just perceive the color red. What is the purpose of experiencing red if we are just suppose to perceive it? Judgements involve integrating all percepts into a consistent whole experience of the world. It is not just using all of your senses, but using them over time that allows you to make valid judgements about the world. It also depends on the context. Red on an apple means something different than red on a street sign.
Quoting RussellA
What does a direct realist do when they say the chocolate ice cream is delicious but someone else says it is disgusting? Is the direct realist talking about the ice cream or their mental state when eating it?
Quoting RussellA
Yet both of them succeed in accomplishing their goals with the same rate of success.
What is the real dragon? If something looks like a dragon and breathes fire, is it a dragon? I saw the fake dragons made to breathe fire.
True, both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist are able to successfully drive through the city centre.
It is a philosophical question. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist may perceive the colour red at a traffic light, but what exactly is the nature of the thing-in-itself in the world that is causing them to see the colour red?
This is not something the driver of the car needs to think about. All they need to know when they arrive at the traffic light is whether they perceive red, orange or green.
It may well be that the thing-in-itself is in reality a yellow leprechaun, but as long as the driver consistently perceives the colour red, they will be able to successfully navigate the world.
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Quoting Harry Hindu
Exactly. Another reason against Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism.
The EPP
The EPP states that existence is conceptually prior to predication.
1) You say that this means that there must be existence before there are properties.
2) But equally, it could be the case that there must be properties before existence.
Why do you think 1) rather than 2)?
Why do you think that the existence of x is separate to the properties that x has?
Existential Quantification
In the domain of numbers, there is something x that exists that has the properties of being an integer and of being even. This something x exists in the domain of numbers, regardless of whether numbers exist in the world or are non-existent in the world.
In the domain of literature, there is something x that exists and has the properties of being a detective, of having Mrs Hudson as a landlady and of being a pipe-smoker. This something x exists in the domain of literature, regardless of whether literature exists in the world or is non-existent in the world.
Something x that exists in a domain that is non-existent in the world could be called "subsisting".
Perhaps that is so. It isn't a theory since it does not seem testable. Call it a premise maybe.
SEP calls it a principle, top of section 1 of the 'existence' page.
I linked to exactly that in my prior post. See the (*). I called them E1-E6, with openness for more.
Quoting RussellA
Given so many definitions, the reader probably presumes his own definition instead of yours.
Given anthropocentrism or idealism (E2), existence is mind dependent, a relation of sorts. Yea, thoughts exist.
Given the various relational definitions E4,E5,E6, thoughts relate to something, or are themselves relations, hence they exist.
The number 17 exists under E3 and E6 and under E1 if you're a platonist.
E1 (objective existence) is questionable since existence is reduced to a meaningless tag. There's zero way to distinguish an existing thing from a thing identical in every way except for it not existing. So given E1, there isn't a test for existence, and thus one cannot logically conclude anything either way.
That's a starting point, and it didn't require a book.
I'm not disagreeing with that. They're mythical to us, sure. We're perhaps we're mythical to them.
What I am doing is driving the definition of 'exists = not mythical' to absurdity.
Causation:
It seems you use 'cause' as 'necessarily causes', like there needs to be no possibility of the ski trip not being cancelled. In that case, give an example of a cause and effect that satisfies you, and then explain why no other necessary effect can also occur.
For instance: A family is in a house near a hill when an abrupt mudslide crushes the place flat before they are even aware of the danger. Mom dies. Dad dies. Kids die. House destroyed. TV no longer functions. Mud fills the street. The profile of the landscape is changed.
Plenty more on that list of effects, and all of it necessary. Why are most/all of those not effects caused by the mudslide? I'm especially interested in how you justify that there can be no more than one effect.
Also, what relevance does this quibble have to do with the topic of existence?
Yes, it is very much a valid usage, but if you read up on EPP, the word is never being used that way. Context!
SEP article on existence, section 1:
"To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties. (This principlethat existence is conceptually prior to predicationis rejected by Meinongians.) Saying it is red and an apple and furthermore exists is to say one thing too many."
Quoting Harry HinduMathematics, logic. Stuff like that. Take the issue of presentism or not. There being no empirical difference between the candidate interpretations, shapes and colors and visual avail you not, but they still can be used to convey language and make charts and such.
There is no issue with what one means by those words. It may or may not be true, but regardless, we can succeed at our tasks most of the time. That's what I mean by it being a pragmatic stance.
Pragmatically, I'm totally a presentist. I hold that belief an no amount of logic can sway me from it. I (the rational 'I', not the pragmatic 'I') also know it to be wrong, and logic can indeed influence that conclusion, but the empirical evidence just isn't there to make the case. So yes, I hold mutually contradictory beliefs because there is more than one purpose being served in there. I know which one is the boss, and both sides approve of the arrangement.
So I believe that there is no living T-Rex, and I also believe that there is a living T-Rex. Fun, huh? Not a contradiction since it isn't in the same way.
With you? More often than with most.
Yes. The result is an ideal (E2), not a dragon, even if describing something that's in the world (E4).
Definition dependent. Under E2 (an anthropocentric definition), there is empirical evidence of lizards but not of dragons. Under E1, what does it mean indeed? That's a question asked in the OP, one that still hasn't been answered. I'm pretty sure Meinong is using definition E1, and for this reason, since the denial makes little sense given the other definitions.
I know. I am trying to ask and answer clarifying questions so we stop talking past each other.
Good example of talking past since I cannot in any way figure out how there can be only one actual causal path to a given effect (some subsequent state). It isn't a path, it's a network. I gave four causes of my hip injury which wouldn't have happened given the absence of any of them. But from his post above, Russell seems to require a cause to necessarily (on its own) bring about the effect, and I cannot think of an example of that, so I asked for it.
I would parhaps say that since the hip thing wouldn't have happened sans big bang, but Russell uses the words differently.
On the other hand, the big bang is a state that doesn't uniquely identify this world (except under some specific types of determinism), so the BB does not necessarily cause my hip injury under many quantum interpretations. The thing with the road and the coyote is more of a classical cause.
Quoting CorvusTypically more criteria must be met to satisfy a human designation as being a real dragon. Sometimes unreasonably so, falling back to the logic, "there are no dragons, so whatever that is, it isn't a dragon". Not great logic, but frequently employed in other topics.
Quoting Harry HinduAnother reason to be a relational stance.
Premise Metaphysics is An Incomplete Project
Quoting philosch
Meinong, when he says certain things (a circular triangle) have no regular existence, but nonetheless have some kind of existence, speaks toward the indirection of complexity.
The indirection of complexity, as with the imaginary numbers of the complex number plane, shows us that some real things must be approached in terms of a multi-part complex.
Their existence is no less real than an imaginary number is a real complex number.
Quoting noAxioms
Existence references the item to the totality. Its a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time.
Existence as a property of things makes them complex in the sense of imaginary numbers being complex. Existing things have two parts: a) the local part (collections of attributes); b) the non-local part (inter-connection to all things). The suggestion of QM is that at that scale the non-local part of things becomes detectable.
Existence as a predication, given its non-local part, plays as an acknowledgement of the insuperability of context for presence. Present things are all connected. When I say a red apple exists, I say a red apple is a roadmap to all other existing things. The apple is the Gestault of its generalizable attributes such as red and apple, and existence is the general container, i.e., the inter-connectivity of all Gestaults. Existence of a thing is its approach to the container of containers.
Existence as a catalog reference for a thing and its ecology is useful to the physicist in general and the cosmologist in particular.
So existence is context generalized to insuperability. It is the limit of presence. It is why there is not nothing. The question answers itself by the brute fact of its existence.
The insuperability of context forestalls analysis. Questions of being are insoluble problems of perspective.
The serial solutions to questions of being reside within the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions. The third spatial dimension of depth looks at an infinite series of aerial planes and understands them categorically as algebraic manifolds. The cubic POV affords an overview of aerial manifolds.
What does an infinite series of cubes become categorically? We dont know the experience of hyper-cubic space. What does its overview of all cubic spaces afford?
If we generalize the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions to an infinite series, then we ask ourselves what is the Gestault of evolution toward infinite presence? Is it scalable presence across upwardly evolving complexity of dimensional extension? Existence as generalized and scalable context upwardly multi-dimensional perplexes vector measurement of location. Might the measurement problem of QM be evidence of strategic cosmic incompleteness? Can we express it locally as perpetual trans-hyper presence?
A big question asks, Whats the relationship between existence as context insuperable and consciousness as awareness uncontainable? When the inescapable container engulfs the uncontainable agent, what happens? happens. This is our universe (semi-verse really) as a bi-directional irrational expansion.
The POV problem of Why Existence? that forestalls analysis tells us that metaphysics is necessarily is an incomplete project.
It would be an impossible task for me to persuade everyone that "thoughts exist". All I can do is assert that "thoughts exist".
To cover myself, I could give a definition, such as because "I know about it". But this is no more than a tautology.
Definitions are really no more than unjustified assertions.
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Quoting noAxioms
Where do apples exist? The Direct Realist says apples exist both in the mind and in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist says apples exist only in the mind.
I don't accept Direct Realism as it depends on one effect having only one possible cause. This is where causation comes into the topic.
Why do I think that one cause has one effect? Imagine a snooker cue hitting a snooker ball. The game of snooker depends on one cause having one effect.
Over-determination is the situation where one effect has been determined by more than one cause. (Wikipedia - Over-determination). PhD's have been written about the problem.
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Quoting noAxioms
:up:
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Quoting noAxioms
Scenario one
1) You left the house for a walk.
2) You could have walked on the road or through the field. You walked on a road.
3) You could have walked in the centre of the road or on the unfilled shoulder. You walked on the unfilled shoulder of the road.
4) You could have been looking to houses the left where there was no coyote or to the field on the right where there was a coyote. You looked to the right.
Scenario two
You left the house for a walk, slipped on wet grass and broke your hip. You could have broken your hip even if there had been no coyote.
Scenario three
Even if there had been a coyote in the field to the right, you could have looked to the houses on the left, not seen a coyote, but seen a robbery, and then broken your hip.
Why relevant to existance? Do apples exist only in the mind, as the Indirect Realist says, or both in the mind and mind-independent world, as the Direct Realist says?
Kant says, all principles need arguments and proof why they are principles. But I don't see any such thing here.
Quoting noAxioms
How about "Existence is perceptible object in space and time"? This must be the defacto definition of existence.
That's what premises are. Definitions are descriptions about how certain words and terms are being used. The latter doesn't have a truth value to it. A premise or an assertion does.
That's a different question that 'do apples exist?". Your question already presumes they exist, and in a location at that, thus implying a sort of an E4 definition of exists.
Overdetermination concerns multiple causes, any of which would have caused the effect. I'm not talking about that. In all my examples, there are multiple causes, each of which is necessary for the effect. Take away any one of the causes and the effect would not have occurred. This is not the case with overdetermination.
I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field....................It isn't a path, it's a network. I gave four causes of my hip injury which wouldn't have happened given the absence of any of them. noAxioms
I think you just listed 2 more causes, since had any of the alterations you described actually taken place, the injury probably would not have occurred.
Yes, there are multiple paths to that sort of injury. Scenario 3 is another.
What you didn't do is demonstrate that there is but one cause for my injury, something you assert to be the case.
The topic is about denial of EPP, not the distinction between direct and indirect realism. On that note, the whole digress about how many causes there are to my injury seems irrelevant to the topic.
Things existing only in the mind or not is idealism, a valid view but one explicitly not being considered, per the disclaimer in the OP. Still, I did give it a line in the list of definitions of existence.
Quoting CorvusFine. For that, we need criteria that must be met for the word 'principle' to apply, and if EPP does not meet this criteria, then we call it a premise or something else.
Depends what you mean by perceptible. If it's the anthropocentric definition (perceived by humans), then E2 applies. If it is perceptible by anything, even in the absence of an observer noticing it, then E4 applies. Both definitions are relational, essentially 'is a member of X' where X is human perceptions (E2) or X is 'is somewhere in our universe' (E4) where universe is anything with coordinates relative to say time 0, Greenwich. Dark matter exists despite not being easy to perceive.
Living dinosaurs do have an E4 existence but not an E2 existence. The same is probably true of unicorns. The number 17 does not exist by your definition since it is not in space and time.
So 17 has the property of being prime, which is predication without existence. Is EPP wrong then?
Quoting ucarr
I made little sense of most of the post, but this seems to reference the E4 definition (is a member of our universe), a relation.
You bring up conservation laws. Mass conservation is a property of Newtonian mechanics. Mass/energy conservation is a property only of inertial frames which do not describe reality. Total energy (meaningful in the right coordinates) is going up, while energy density is going down.
Anyway, I suspect you care little about those nits, but I could not figure out what you were otherwise trying to convey.
EPP = existence is conceptually prior to predication. What does "exist" mean? The Merriam Webster defines "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual".
I agree that a definition does not have a truth value, in that the definition is not intended to represent the world as it actually is.
But why does "exist" mean "to have real being whether material or spiritual" rather than "a woody perennial plant".
It is not possible to justify why a word means one thing rather than another apart from being asserted by either common usage or government institution.
I still maintain that definitions are unjustified assertions.
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Quoting noAxioms
I agree that "where do apples exist" is a different question to "do apples exist", but they are connected.
The EPP implies that non-existent things cannot have properties. Meinong argued that non-existent things can have properties. But what has causation to do with this question?
For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind. For the Direct Realist, apples exist both in the mind and a mind-independent world
For the Direct Realist, Santa doesn't exist in a mind-independent world, and can therefore be said to be non-existent. For the Indirect Realist, both apples and Santa exist in the mind, and therefore neither can be said to be non-existent.
The Direct and Indirect Realist have different attitudes about non-existence.
My argument is that the Direct Realist position towards non-existence cannot be valid, because Direct Realism itself is not a valid philosophical position, in part because of the problem with causation.
This is why causation is part of the topic about non-existent things.
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Quoting noAxioms
Both Indirect and Direct Realism have different approaches to non-existence, but I don't believe that the Direct Realist approach is valid, partly because one effect can have more than one possible cause.
Specifically, on seeing the colour red, the Indirect Realist accepts that they may not know the cause because one effect may have more than one possible causes. For example, a migraine, a green tree with the light passing through a stained glass window or a yellow field at sunset. The Direct Realist, however, argues that they know the cause was a red colour on the belief that one effect can only have one cause.
You make my argument for me in saying that one effect, breaking a hip, can have more than one cause, such as taking a walk, a repaved road, a badly repaved road and a coyote.
Once Direct Realism has been set aside, the Indirect Realist approach to non-existence can be further investigated.
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Quoting noAxioms
The EPP infers that non-existent things cannot have properties. Meinong argued that non-existent things can have properties.
Everything we know about the world is because of what we experience in our senses.
There are two distinct approaches, that of the Indirect and Direct Realist. The Direct Realist believes they can know what exists in a mind-independent world, and the Indirect Realist disagrees.
I believe that the problem of causation shows that Direct Realism is not valid, meaning that there is no alternative to Indirect Realism.
Non-existence can only be investigated from the position of the Indirect Realist.
None of the definitions of existence mentions on space and time. Are being in space and time not important factors for objects qualifying as existence?
Quoting noAxioms
Fine, write your own, but also tell me in what way it is distinct from E4. Space and time are contained by the universe, and I see little point in listing the contents in the E4 definition.
Quoting RussellAThat is pretty vague since all it does is give a synonym. 'is real' or 'being'. So 'being real' can also be defined 6 ways, which I had called R1-R6, corresponding to E1-E6.
It does say 'material or spiritual', so that kind of eliminates 'mental', so maybe E2 is ruled out by this dictionary definition. I think 'spiritual' was put there so one can say God exists without contradicting the definition.
Don't go to a dictionary to answer definition questions from philosophy or science.
I remember a classic game show "what's my line" where the girl questions three candidates, only one of which is some expert, the other two pretending. The exxpertise in this case was chemistry. She asked each "what is a mole?". End of game. The other two gave the dictionary definition (which, if it's a good dictionary, might include the definition that it's a number).
Convention (or what you call 'common usage'). If you're going to use the latter definition, it needs to be stated up front because it's unconventional. Likewise, all these philosophers need to do this because your wording doesn't narrow it down to a single one of the possible conventions. This is a philosophical discussion, so a philosophical definition is expected, not a lay definition.
It is not possible to justify why a word means one thing rather than another apart from being asserted by either common usage or government institution.
You're describing idealism. The whole point of realism is that there is a real apple independent of mind, the actual nature of which is a matter of interpretation. For instance, absent a mind, there's nothing out there that's going to label it with the symbol 'apple', but absent any minds, said apple would likely have never evolved in the first place, so go figure.
No argument from me.
It seems that any realist (direct or not) presumes something is real, that it exists. The only justification for that I've seen so far is a statement of relation. The real thing relates to me, which is idealistic and anthropocentric, and since I don't think the universe was created for the purpose of making humans (or that it has a purpose or was created at all), I have little interest in how it relates to me. What does it mean to have mind independent existence? How much is EPP necessary to justify the stance? If it isn't, then why is it needed? If it is needed, how is it justified?
=======
I break my hip (an effect) because 1) I chose to take a walk that day 2) there was a recently repaved road 3) shoulder not properly filled 4) coyote in distant field......................In all my examples, there are multiple causes, each of which is necessary for the effect. noAxioms
All this seems irrelevant. My effect is a physical effect, not an experience. You're talking about the experience of red. Get away from experience. For at least the 10th time, per the disclaimer, I am not discussing ideals.
How so? You assert only one cause is possible. I list four (with there being more), and you don't counter it. My story contradicts your assertion, which is not 'making your argument for you'.
I am not discussing idealism, and what you call indirect realism is what everybody else calls idealism.
You contradict yourself again, since you claim there is no mind-independent reality under what you call indirect realism, and in so claiming, you claim to know everything about it. "Apples exist only in the mind" you say, so that's a claim that you know everything about mind-independent apples, which is that there aren't any, so there's nothing to know.
Where in the universe, are space and time contained?
How is "exist" defined in philosophy. You refer to the SEP article on Existence. But the article concludes that there is no satisfactory philosophical meaning of "exist"
I referred to the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual", but you say that this is not a philosophical definition.
This leads to an impasse, where a topic is being discussed yet there is no general agreement as to what the words being used mean.
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Quoting noAxioms
Idealism is about what exist in the mind and Realism is about what exists in a mind-independent world. There are Direct Realists and there are Indirect Realists. The Direct Realist, such as John Searle, knows that there is a mind-independent world and the Indirect Realist, such as Kant, believes that there is a mind-independent world. The Idealist, such as Berkeley, knows that there is no mind-independent world.
As an Indirect Realist, I don't claim that there is no mind-independent reality, but I do believe that there is a mind-independent reality.
The Direct Realist knows that there is a real apple independent of mind, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that there is something independent of the mind.
In your Disclaimer you write "I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else". This leads to an impossible situation, in that if we are not allowed to talk about mental abstractions, yet Santa only exists as a mental abstraction, then it becomes impossible to talk about Santa at all.
How does this relate to the EPP? The EPP principle is that something must exist in order for it to have properties. Within Realism, there is the mind and there is the mind-independent world. For the Direct Realist, apples exist in both the mind and a mind-independent world. For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind. If, as I believe, Direct Realism is not valid, then we can only consider existence and non-existence from the position of Indirect Realism. From the position of Indirect Realism, our only knowledge of existence and non-existence is as mental abstractions.
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Quoting noAxioms
If there had not been a Big Bang, you wouldn't have broken your hip. It depends whether it is valid to say that the Big Bang was one cause of your breaking your hip?
I would agree that the cause of the snooker ball starting to move was being hit by a snooker cue, but I have more difficulty in saying that one cause of the snooker ball starting to move was the Big Bang.
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Quoting noAxioms
I think that Existential Quantification E6 points to an important feature of "existing", and that is the domain in which something exists.
Integers exist in the domain of numbers, even if integers don't exist in a mind-independent world. Sherlock Holmes exists in the domain of literature, even if Sherlock Holmes is non-existent in a mind-independent world.
Something can both exist and be non-existent, dependent on which domain is being referred to.
Your Webster definition gives a general but very imprecise definition, mostly only a synonym, although it seems to preclude anything existing under idealism since mental is not part of physical or spiritual.
But you claim exactly that. "For the Indirect Realist, apples only exist in the mind.". Do clarify this contradiction then.
Since all the other causes (the coyote say) is also caused by the BB, the phrase "one of" implies a sort of redundancy. The BB caused everything in our world, so it's kind of empty (tautological) to identify it as the cause.
Imagine going to court and saying that I didn't cause the car crash, the big bang did. Or determinism made me do it (an argument frequently made in forums).
I notice that you still have not pointed out why my injury didn't have 4 or more causes, instead deflecting to an example that you think comes down to one clear cause, but pointing to one white swan isn't evidence for lack of a black swan. Tell me why my example is wrong, that nothing on my list caused my injury. I'm not saying you're wrong, but I am saying that you're using a very different definition of 'cause', one that you refuse to clarify, which tells me you lack confidence in it.
Yes. E2, E4, E5, E6 all have a domain. E1 is the only one that lacks it, and maybe not even then. Not sure how to classify E3, since it seems to be a self-referential domain.
There you go. All different definitions, all valid, especially since the domain is explcit. It isn't at all explicit in the wording of EPP, which is why that wording of the principle isn't very clear.
Quoting CorvusSpace and time are everywhere in the universe, and nowhere not in the universe, at least in the 4D spacetime model that cosmology uses. There are some naive models that have the universe contained by time, in which case things like big bang and black holes go away, to be replace by some other interpretation. There is no valid model of the universe being contained by space, which is akin to suggesting that the big bang occurred at some specific location and has been expanding into some kind of void since then.
I cannot explain it much better than that to somebody not familiar with even the basics of cosmology. To say 'in time and space' is no different than saying 'in the universe' and not in something else, some other domain. Hence E4 being the applicable definition to use.
It was more to hear about your own view on the point.
Quoting noAxioms
That sounds a daft statement. The basics of cosmology, and the whole the other subjects are on the internet ChatGPT. We are not asking what is the basic cosmology. We are asking where in the universe, space and time contained. It should be a simple few statement explanation with a coupe of examples. We don't expect to hear on the basics of cosmology the lot here.
Quoting noAxioms
It just sounds vague and empty statement, hence more elaboration with detail wouldn't go amiss. What do you mean by "the objective state", "the universe", and does it include space and time? You said space and time are contained in the universe? So, a simple question was, where in the universe are they contained? In what form and nature?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I'm defending the EPP. My defense stands upon E1 as its premise: "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
I catch my clue about the relationship between any material thing and general existence as an all-inclusive category like Star Trek's The Borg: "You will be assimilated resistance is futile."
Do you know how you can't get the last drop of ketchup out of the bottle, or how your birthday party balloons deflate and fall to the ground? Things cooperate with our intentions most of the way, but not all of the way.
Everyone and everything pays involuntary allegiance to the great cosmic trade-off. The impermanence of things is summed up by the conservation laws. If something is gained on one side, something of equal measure is lost on its mirror-image side. Everything in existence has been shifted around from some prior, reciprocal existence. When a guy digs a shovel into the dirt, he's got no choice about simultaneously creating a pile of shifted dirt and a corresponding hole of matching dimensions.
When we say matter is neither created nor destroyed, we're simultaneously saying existence is neither created nor destroyed.
Quoting philosch
The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.
You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.
Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.
You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.
What does existence-in-general add to the red apple? A notification of orientation to the void the red apple can never transcend, "You will be assimilated resistance is futile." The red apple is the local part; the void is the non-local part. The void seems not to be paired with the red apple because that's the nature of a void. Why death? Because life costs something. What does life cost? It costs the expenditure of energy allowing you to swim above the waves of the void, for a while. Eventually, however, we must be ourselves. We are the void.
I partly agree and disagree. I think you are playing semantic gymnastics. Saying you exist because you exist is definitely just circular reasoning (Self referential). You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. There is no absolute meaning. There's only the meaning of the word in the context of our human language and shared experience. I could have just as easily said there is no objective reality, only subjective reality, or I could have said everything is relative, or nothing can be understood outside of it's relationship to other things which we have also defined. Those statements are all getting at the same thing. If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. It's locked in that context and cannot escape it. That's what my original statement was getting at.
Saying you can only talk about death as a living person is also obvious and trivial. Of course it's true because a dead person can't talk about anything. You we never dead is true but you were non-existent as a living conscious being before you were conceived and you will be non-existent as a conscious living being after you die because of the definition of "exist" and "death". You might say that your atoms existed in different forms before your being existed and that would be true and the atoms that make up your body may continue to exist after you die but they are not a conscious living human being by definition. Now you can try to alter or impart other meanings onto words or shift contexts mid statement, but that violates the rules of language. I call this semantic gymnastics which arm chair philosophers do all the time to try and prove some profound truth they think they have discovered.
"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial.
What you could reasonable assert in this case is that when A becomes the B-C, C is destroyed so there is no B as it's dependent on C. The fact that C is destroyed by A falls out of the meanings of the words you are using like "death". Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. This is so because death's meaning is contingent on the meaning of the word "life" by definition. Non-existence is the term you needed to pair with existence. In any case the following is true but still trivial for the given argument here;
A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C.
When you say "our" immersion within existence is weirdly infinite, this depends on the "our" that you are talking about. If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition. If you are referring to some mystical other worldly or spiritual existence of some kind then you may be right but that would fall under the heading of a belief, not a provable fact.
And chatbots are notorious for wrong answers when it comes to cosmology.
Poorly worded on my part. "Objectively part of the universe" would be better. 'state' implies a slice of it, a subset of the whole universe. The universe is not a state.
'State' shouldn't be there, especially since a universe does not have a state, but a world at a given moment in time does. One definition is that a thing is present at a moment in time. People exist, dinosaurs don't. That's a reference to state. The universe is all worlds, the entire structure, the initial state of which is what we know as the big bang.
Good question though since there are a lot of other definitions of 'universe', including something like 'all that there is', which renders meaningless the term 'multiverse' since there cannot be other 'everythings'.
Yes, our universe includes spacetime Space and time are different dimensions of the same thing, so it isn't space and time. The form and nature of spacetime is described in relativity theory, which is beyond my ability to describe to you. By 'contained', I mean what I said above. Spacetime is where everything is. There is no spacetime that is not our universe. That means that the universe does not have a location nor was it a thing created. It isn't an object. That would be a category error. Objects are created at a location and endure for some duration. They are thus contained by space and time.
I do include other worlds in 'universe', as well as distant observable universes, despite their states being counterfactuals. Some people define 'universe' to mean the observable parts of it, but that's more E2 than E4.
Quoting ucarrWell good. Nobody else seems willing to engage with that issue. E1 was the definition (it's not a premise or any kind of assertion) that was problematic with EPP since EPP was difficult to justify. Perhaps you can attempt to do that, but I really have a hard time parsing your posts. Try to be clear.
Nowhere in your post do I see EPP justified given an E1 definition, mostly because you never reference E1 at all.
E1 is objective and mind independent, so talk about intentions doesn't seem relevant.
Talk about conservation laws is irrelevant since they're 1) not objective, but relevant only to our universe (E4), and 2) wrong, as I explained in my prior reply.
You seem to be speaking of some sort of objective conservation law, like there is some external objective time and that the demise of one existing thing leaves 'stuff' for the next. None of this is justified, it's just being asserted.
You seem to be speaking of material in this universe (E4, not E1). There is classical conservation laws, but our universe has been proven to not be classical.
I think perhaps you are confused and that you are defending EPP using an E4 definition of 'exists'. I actually support that. Denial of EPP using E4 runs into serious troubles.
I agree with all this. It's called observer bias, and it references a relational definition of existence (E2,4,5,6).
Excellent leveraging of EPP. Denial of that statement is a subtle denial of EPP. But you also have to explain why it is still meaningful to say "Isaac Newton is dead".
This is a contradiction. If it's 'for you', it isn't objective.
it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.
Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.
You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.
This is the sort of poetry that I cannot parse.
Quoting philoschNot bad... But EPP principle, as typically phrased, uses the word without definition which meaning is being used.
Sounds like me
The OP is about existence prior to predicate, and existence is closely linked to space and time in some of the definitions, hence we were trying to clarify existence in space and time definition.
Quoting noAxioms
Some folks seem to think space and time are objects, and exist as real entity. But I am not sure if that is the case. I am more into the idea that space and time is emergent quality from movements of the objects in perception, as in the other thread running at the moment.
Quoting noAxioms
I went to ChatGPT, and it was actually quite good. It seems to be getting better all the time. It was quite different in response since my last visit a few months ago. For getting the basics of any topics or subjects, ChatGPT seems quite capable in providing good information.
I will do some concentrated reading on the rest of your post, and will return later with my points on it. Many thanks for your reply on the question.
The Indirect Realist, being a Realist, believes that there is a mind-independent world and all our knowledge about such a mind-independent world arrives as experiences through our senses.
Because of the asymmetric flow of information in a causal chain between a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world and the experiences in our senses, we can never know the true nature of any thing-in-itself.
For example, I could consistently experience in my senses the constant conjunction of a circular shape, a sweet taste, a silky touch, an acrid smell and an absence of sound. For convenience, this consistent set of properties could be named "apple".
My only knowledge of the concept "apple" has come from experiences in my senses, not from knowledge of things-in-themselves in a mind-independent world. I can say that the thing-in-itself is an apple, but that is not to say that in reality the thing-in-itself is an apple.
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Tell me why Quoting noAxioms
My argument against Direct Realism is that one effect, such as a broken window, can have more than one possible causes, such as a rock, bird or window cleaner. Knowing the window is broken doesn't of itself give us knowledge as to what caused the window to break.
There is a temporal direction of flow of information in a causal chain.
In a deterministic world, there is a direct flow of information in a causal chain forwards in time. I agree that choosing to walk, a recently repaved road, a shoulder not properly filled and a coyote in a distant field all inexorably lead to your breaking your hip.
There is no direct flow of information in a causal chain backwards in time. Knowing you broke your hip doesn't of itself give us knowledge as to what caused your hip to break. There could have been more than one possible cause, such as being hit by a car, slipping on wet grass, being distracted by a coyote, etc.
In a deterministic world, there is a causal chain from your choosing to take a walk to your breaking a hip, but it is also true that there is a causal chain from the Big Bang to your breaking a hip.
In that sense, the Big Bang is as much a cause of your breaking a hip as choosing to take a walk. If it is true as you say that it is empty and tautological to identify the Big Bang as the cause, then it must also be empty and tautological to identify your choosing to walk as the cause.
However, my argument against Direct Realism is that it relies on a symmetric flow of information in a causal chain. For example, Direct Realism relies on a stranger hearing that you have broken your hip and for the stranger to thereby know that the cause of your breaking your hip was your choosing to take a walk.
Direct Realism, being invalid, means that all our knowledge comes from experiences in our senses. We can then reason about the possible causes of such experiences. As all our knowledge about existence and properties are mental abstractions, this makes it difficult to discuss existence and properties when your disclaimer prohibits discussion about mental abstractions.
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Quoting noAxioms
E1 - "exists" may be defined as "is a member of all that is part of objective reality"
There is the domain of being within the mind and there is the domain of being within a mind-independent world.
E3 - "exists" may be defined as "has predicates"
A horse exists because it has the property of being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. In Meinong's term "exist"
Sherlock Holmes exists because he has the properties of being a detective, being a pipe-smoker, being housed in 221B Baker Street, etc. In Meinong's term "subsists"
A round square exists because it has the property of being round and being square. In Meinong's term "absists".
There are the domains of exist, subsist and absist.
If you mean by universe as some physical entity, then I am not sure where you can find space and time. You see the objects and objects in movements, changes and motions, but where is time? Isn't what you call time the durations and intervals observed and measured with the clocks and watches in some variables? Is that case, is time real? If you use some other measuring device other than the standard watches, clocks and calendar systems, you will get totally different measured time variables. In that case what is the real time? What are the nature of real space and time then?
Space and time is contained in the universe only makes sense, if you mean the universe as an entity created in your mind, not something out there in material entity. But in this case, is it correct to say space and time exist or contained in the universe? There are some physicists saying that spacetime doesn't exist. It is just an illusion derived from our imagination.
Quoting noAxioms
Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence.
This is the upshot of what I'm declaring to you.
Quoting noAxioms
Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. I equate it with existence. I equate existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable). There is an oscillation between "to experience (subject)" and "to measure (object)."
Eternal universe is the bank account that funds the reality chiefly characterized by mass, matter, energy, space, and time. So, the currency of phenomena and the science that observes and measures it is the aforementioned quintet. The bank account, being conserved, proceeds by way of a zero-sum structure. All transactions of the physics of reality balance to zero.
I think E1 is a distillation of my two above paragraphs. I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality." I see it as being distinct from E4, which I read as, "Existence is a part of objective reality."
All of the apparently distinct physical things of the phenomenal world are temporarily emergent from the "bank account" that funds the quintet of essentials part and parcel of the dynamism of material things emerging into and subsuming out of the physics of reality.
The zero sum structure -- powered by the symmetries and their laws of conservation -- of emergence and subsumption of the dynamism of physics is what I refer to when I say a physical_material thing has two parts: a) local part; b) non-local part. Example: the red apple: a) the local part is the piece of fruit in the bowl on your breakfast table; b) the non-local part is the "bank account" funding the quintet of essentials out of which the piece of fruit on your table is emergent.
If eternal universe lies at the heart of objective reality, and if it functions as the "bank account" funding an alternately emergent/subsumed change of forms eternal, then nothing can precede it, it being without a beginning.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
Are you viewing my quotes through a Wittgenstein-inspired lens of analytic philosophy?
Language is a voice emergent from the effects of expression constrained by the parameters enforced by the signification rules of grammar. If you believe the referents for the signs you express as language are just more signs of that same language, then you are: a) practicing the gymnastics of higher-order signification, an engulfing, upward spiral, all of it derivative; b) fraternization with solipsism.
Quoting philosch
You are not your context. This is a way of saying you did not generate yourself through you own language acts. If you're total existence is distinct from your language capacity, then you are not trapped within that language capacity. You are, however, trapped within the totality of your existence.
Let's try to examine the difference between the derivative language context and the insuperable existence context.
Russell's Paradox helps us see that existence is authentically insuperable: The unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory states that to every condition there corresponds a set of things meeting the condition: (?y) (y={x : Fx}). The axiom needs restriction, since Russell's paradox shows that in this form it will lead to contradiction.
Without comprehension restriction we get: Let R = (x | {x?x}), then R?R ?R?R. This tells us that a set cannot be a proper subset of itself. If we translate this rule into conversational speech, we get, "My statements are equal to their referents." This translates to, "My statements, being equal to their sources, are proper subsets of themselves." Your language capacity can't be equal to its sources in your experience of phenomena because that expresses phenomenal experience mapped to grammatical signs one-to-one. When you see two vehicles collide at an intersection, then later that day recount the event in words to your brother at the dinner table, your words do not equal the phenomena observed by you earlier. They sign for it. If the signs equal the phenomena, then one thing simultaneously possesses two different values. Thats the upshot of your subjective (cognitive_linguistic) reality equals your objective (dynamics of physics) reality. You might say, in push back, at the scene of the collision, I was immersed in language. Here we see why total existence cannot be analyzed. The totality which general existence embodies cannot be subsumed by anything outside itself for observation, measurement and analysis because that leads to Russells Paradox. In the case of totality, there can be nothing beyond it because that would mean a thing being greater than itself, a paradox. This limit expresses the insoluble POV problem lying at the heart of cosmology.
Quoting philosch
All of this supports the interpretation that language and the thought supporting it are emergent properties, not the fundamentals of the dynamism of physics. Absent mass, matter, energy, space, and time, no thought and no language to make assertions about the presumed priority of thought and language vis-á-vis physics.
Supervenience shows that emergent properties are downwardly causal, but not to the extent that thought and language conjure the physics from which they emerge. Were that the case, thought and utterance of the type depicted within Genesis would have precluded science. Few to no deathbed scenarios if thought and utterance could abolish the degeneration of the body.
Quoting philosch
The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:
Quoting philosch
then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:
Quoting philosch
Quoting philosch
You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.
Quoting philosch
There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole.
Quoting philosch
How is it that your two above quotes are not contradictory?
Quoting philosch
Supervenience and subvenience, I think, mirror-image each other as a symmetry essential to emergence. Given this, "No mind, no logical thinking/No brain, no mind," stand as evidence, facts and measurable truths.
You mean the "ontology of time" topic. I didn't post to that since time was not defined clearly. I can think of three obvious definitions and yea, some of them exist (depends on definition of 'exists' of course), and some don't. Two of the three can be perceived, including the one I consider nonexistent.
I read not too many posts before it became clear that definitions were not a priority.
Quoting RussellAThat doesn't mean there's no apple. It just means that we don't know the true nature of the apple. Common referent (the fact that more than one mind can experience the object) is solid evidence that it is there in some form. You can deny the common referent, but that becomes solipsism.
Sure you can. You just don't know the full nature of it. That doesn't stop anybody from applying the label or otherwise discussing the thing and not discussing only our concept of it. If you cannot do that, then your idealistic inclinations prevent communication on topics like this.
Quoting RussellASo you agree that there are at least four causes to my injury? If not, which ones are not? If you cannot, then your single-cause assertion is falsified by counterexample.
You talk endlessly about indirect realism and information flow, but not how any of that leads to a conclusion of the necessity of a single cause for any effect.
Quoting RussellAYes. The domain is objective in that one.
E2
E4
Unicorn then as well, and even square circle, all existent by E3. Meinong certainly does not use E3 as his existence definition.
The question never gets answered. If EPP holds, how is EPP justified? If it doesn't hold, how do we know the horse exists? How does Meinong (somebody known to deny EPP) justify the horse as being in a different domain than the unicorn?
Quoting CorvusIf you consider time to be an object, then it is up to you to point to where it might be. I don't, so the question makes no sense. Start off by defining time, something you didn't do in your own topic about it.
My three I think of first are
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.
None of those are objects with a location.
Quoting ucarr
A definition takes the form "I am using the word 'X' to mean such and such in some context". A premise takes the form "X is being presumed here to be the case".
I suppose with some careful wording, a statement can be used as either. The closest example I could think of was the fallacy of using a definition as a premise (actually as a conclusion), resulting in Anselm's ontological argument.
Give me an example of a definition being used as a premise.
Quoting ucarrThat would be great. Nobody else has tried. You're saying that if definition E1 is used (I think Meinong is using it), then EPP must be the case, something Meinong denies.
Quoting ucarrBy 'eternal', do you mean unbounded time (everlasting), or do you mean that time is part of the universe (eternalism)? Either way, it is uncaused. If it's caused, we're not including the entire universe, just part of it.
That's begging your conclusion. You need to justify it, not just assert it.
It isn't objective if it is confined to being public, repeatable, measureable. That's an empirical definition (E2). It exists relative to an observer. Putting the word 'objective' into a subjective description does not make it objective.
But then you go and describe a subjective reality. As far as I can tell, there is no test for something objectively existing or not objectively existing. Any test would be a relational test, a subjective one.
The above quote is wrong (logically invalid) if you stick with the generally accepted meanings of words. You are by syllogism, inferring that "existence" and "life" are interchangeable and that "death" and "non-existence" are also interchangeable, and they are not synonymous. Your first premise, "there is no beginning nor ending of existence" is actually interesting and worthy of the philosophical debate. I'm not sure what my position is on that premise but it's certainly interesting. Your conclusion is "for this reason, no life ever knows death", simply does not follow from the first premise unless you hold "being alive" as equal to "existing". They are not the same thing without bending the rules of language. Your above argument or assertion is of the form;
Premise 1. "A" has no beginning and no end
Conclusion: From premise 1 (for that reason) "B" never knows "C".
Where;
A = existence
B = Life or being alive (either definition works)
C = Death or the end of A, (either definition works)
[b]It's not valid logic period. The conclusion clearly does not follow from the premise.
You had to have added the following second premise; A = B and C = end of A[/b]
You now get:
P1 - A has no beginning or end
P2 - A = B
Conclusion : B has no end (C)
The second premise makes the logic valid but that just render's the conclusion as a partial restatement of the first premise using different labels and it is trivial. However without the second premise the logic is invalid so the conclusion is false. A does not equal B without altering standard, accepted meanings.
Existence is defined as the quality of being real. Life or living things exist, but so do things that are not alive. Now you might get cute and start question whether or not a rock is alive or real but that's just playing with generally accepted meanings. Also by definition, life is a distinct quality of organic matter and the organic "things" that possess that quality, clearly lose that quality upon death, so "a" life has an end. Take a human being as something that exists. It's aliveness had a beginning and it has an end. The body still exists after the quality of life has ended, as long as standard definitions are being adhered to. Your above quote is in error.
This is the essence of my objection to your arguments. Words matter and the rules of logic matter. If we start letting the accepted meanings of words become malleable or squishy then we get malleable or squishy philosophy.
As far as being a solipsist, I am not. The assertion that the only thing we can be certain exists is our own consciousness has not been proven. I don't support that position even theoretically. IMO, everything you perceive through your senses is real by definition, including your consciousness meaning everything your perceive exists. I simply stated in so many words that you can only experience a subjective reality, your perspective or context limits you from experiencing (absolute) objective reality. I'm not stating whether objective reality exists or not, only that you cannot experience it if it does, because your conscious experience is filtered through your senses. I can say unequivocally that a rock exists but I cannot "know" the object state of the rock's reality, I can only know the subjective reality of the rock that I experience.
I wasn't making any argument. I only formalized your argument. I don't support it. I stand by the fact you can't know any objective reality. If you have one that was yours it would clearly cease if you did, that is obvious and trivial.
I didn't over generalize anything. I specifically stated if the existence of a thing is dependent on the existence of something else and the first thing ceases to exist, then by the rules of logic so des the existence of the dependent thing. In this context of the argument you setup, the dependence is absolute. The dependence of a child's life on it's parent's life is a non sequitur as existence and being alive are not the same thing as I previously argued and a child's existence is not absolutely dependent on the parents continued existence. It's a different argument altogether.
The OP started with little assumption and open mindedness on the definitions, because it is known to be historically abstract and contentious topic. It was looking for good arguments from different angles for exploration, which could offer us better understanding on the concept of time, and possible solid definitions and conclusions.
I assume you are referring to apples in a mind-independent world rather than "apples" in the mind.
It is a logical contradiction to say that we don't know the true nature of the apple, but we do we know that the true nature of the thing-in-itself is an apple.
We perceive an "apple" in our minds. Both the Direct and Indirect Realist agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that has caused us to perceive an "apple" (ignoring dreams and hallucinations).
The Direct Realist says that there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself, meaning that the true nature of the thing-in-itself is an apple. The Indirect Realist doesn't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself.
Regardless of the true nature of the thing-in-itself, it can be labelled as an apple, which means that the label is the common referent, not the thing-in-itself.
For example, suppose the true nature of a thing-in-itself is being green, but this thing-in-itself has been labelled pink. Suppose person A perceives the thing-in-itself as purple and person B perceives the thing-in-itself as red. Person A and person B can have a conversation about the pink object because that is its label, even if the true nature of the thing-in-itself is not pink and neither person perceives the thing-in-itself as pink.
That there is a common referent, the label pink, is not evidence about the true nature of the thing-in-itself.
===============================================================================
Quoting noAxioms
When walking on wet gravel looking at a coyote, you slip. Simplifying the situation, you walk on gravel and slip. What is the cause of your slipping?
Walking and not gravel - don't slip
Walking and gravel - slip
Not walking and not gravel - don't slip
Not walking and gravel - don't slip
How many causes are there to your slipping? Walking is not a cause of your slipping, as you could have been walking on asphalt. Gravel is not a cause of your slipping as you may not have been walking. Walking on gravel is the cause of your slipping.
Walking on gravel is the single cause of your slipping
===============================================================================
Quoting noAxioms
Forwards in time, a single cause has a single effect. For example, a snooker ball moves in a pre-determined way when hit by a snooker cue.
Backwards in time, a single effect has more than one possible cause. For example, knowing the positions of the snooker balls on a snooker table gives no knowledge about the positions of the snooker balls on the snooker table at a prior time.
An effect is overdetermined if it has two or more distinct, sufficient causes (Wikipedia - Overdetermination). As the Wikipedia article notes, there are many problems with
overdetermination, and PhD's have been written about the topic.
As I believe that neither Idealism nor Direct Realism are valid, the question can only be looked at from the perspective of Indirect Realism.
Q1 The EPP principle is that there cannot be properties without being attached to something existing. How is this principle justified
The Indirect Realist perceives a set of properties in the mind, such as being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc. The Indirect Realist believes that there is a thing-in-itself existing in a mind-independent world that has caused them to perceive this set of properties in their mind, but they know nothing about any thing-in-itself.
The Indirect Realist cannot justify the EPP principle, as although they do know that there are properties in their mind, they don't know if these properties are attached to something existing in a mind-independent world. There may be, or there may not be.
Q2 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses exist
The Indirect Realist may consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, etc.
They can then attach the mental concept "horse" to this set of properties.
When the Indirect Realist is thinking about a "horse", they are thinking about a set of properties. They are not thinking about an unknown thing-in-itself that may or may not be existing in a mind independent world.
Q3 If there can be properties in the absence of something existing, how do we know that horses are in a different domain to unicorns
The Indirect Realist may consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, not being horned, not only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "horse" to this set of properties.
They may also consistently perceive in their mind the constant conjunction of the set of properties being four legged, being maned, being hoofed, being horned, only being in a book, etc. They can then attach the mental concept "unicorn" to this set of properties.
The domains of horse and unicorn are different. One domain can include the property "not only being in a book", whilst another domain can include the property "only being in a book".
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
In your two descriptions, respectively, of "definition" and of "premise," you example something taking a form by force of an axiomatic assumption without evaluation to a reasoned conclusion. This is an argument they are non-identical yet interchangeable. Example: You can't dig up earth without creating a pile of earth and a hole that shake hands symmetrically. This is my definition of symmetry, i.e., transformation without net change. It's also my premise for reasoning to the conclusion that matter is neither created nor destroyed. In the case of digging up the earth, the net change is re-arrangement of matter at zero change due to the material pile and the material space it created being summed to zero.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things, both concrete and abstract. Existence as supervenient context establishes all real things in relationship to each other. I don't expect anyone to claim they can name something both real and non-existent.
You can't name an attribute of a thing without simultaneously indexing it within the quintet: mass, matter, energy, space, and time.
Insuperability serves as an index of the eternal reach of existence.
Existence is eternal and nothing is prior to an eternal thing. An emergent property is a derivative, so the fund of that property, the quintet, exists prior to it. The fund of a potential thing is that thing's necessary prior condition.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Time is part of existence, as is the universe. Existence is the largest largest container; it is insuperable to all that lies within it. The insuperability is so extreme that occupants of existence can't fathom non-existence beyond positing it as a limit of existence.
Eternal [s]universe[/s] existence uncaused is my starting point. [s]I equate it with existence[/s]. I [s]equate[/s] connect existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable). There is an oscillation between "to experience (subject)" and "to measure (object)."
The measurement problem of QM might be related to subject/object entanglement, and it might example a bi-conditional relationship between subject/object such that a complex grayscale region of the two inter-mingled perplexes simple, binary notions of subject/object. This relates to the insuperability of existence from the standpoint of observation_measurement not being possible without inter-subjective_inter-objective entanglement.
Quoting noAxioms
The subject/object duet is not divisible. Where there is subject there is object. If we examine subjectivity without objectivity, what do we have? The answer is solipsism.* If we have objectivity without subjectivity, what do we have? The answer is Kant's noumena. In separation, the two modes become lighthouses of eternal isolation. Be of good cheer, no existing thing is truly isolated.
*Even with the assumption of solipsism, we still can't avoid the self as both subject and object of itself.
The alternative to the subject/object duet is neither, but that entails non-existence. There is no non-existence. Given the indivisibility of the subject/object duet, we see the problem of the search for an origin story in cosmology. There is the insoluble problem of point-or-view. If you're trapped within a container - existence is an insuperable context-as-ecology-of-physics - you can't observe it as a whole because that demands you be greater than yourself. This, in turn, tells us that every sentient being comprises the entirety of existence by means of consciousness. What happens when consciousness, the uncontainable agent meets existence, the inescapable container?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
In this statement, you bolster my claim: the subject/object duet is not divisible. Moreover, you sign on to the index function of the quintet, the scaffold of existence.
Quoting philosch
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
Sticking with the accepted meaning of words is one of the things writing and talking is specifically allowed to refuse to do. The reason we of our generation don't sound much like those of Shakespeare's generation is the fact that language is a practice alive with continual variation and invention. Life demands continuous adjustment, and language, more often than, not obliges.
Life and existence are distinct but not disjunct. Consider the Venn diagram linking two different domains by their common ground. I don't expect anyone to claim a living being non-existent. I don't expect anyone to claim a bottle of beer and the man drinking it interchangeable. No, life and existence are not interchangeable, and I'm not suggesting they are. You, philosch, have always been alive, and you've never been dead. How is that not eternity, bounded yes, but eternity nonetheless? The quintet of mass, matter, energy, space, and time, the fundamentals that fund your existence, index you to eternity, the only thing that can create life. It has your back, and will never let you go. Just as you warn me not to make the mistake of confusing myself with it, I warn you not to make the mistake of divesting yourself from it.
It's not necessary to equate life with existence. Rather, it's useful to perceive that life will not persist outside of existence. Life, by its nature, bends the rules as life will not be understood. Rules applied to life populate morals, but life transcends morals. Does life transcend logic? Life transcends present logic. In the presence of living things, there's always an unseen window of nascent possibility nuancing present logic towards a better tomorrow. Synkismetricity (synchronicity+kismet).
Quoting philosch
I oppose your interpretation which posits: ¬A=C. The quintet indexes you to the source eternal and therefore ¬A?C. Our lives emerge from existence general into individuality for a period of time, then return to it. Information is never destroyed, so existence general preserves your individuality.
That B never knows C is not due to non-existence, but rather due to the bounded infinity of individualized life. The banishment of death is life inviting you to plight your trust with the uncontainable. What happens when the uncontainable, your consciousness, meets the insuperable, your existence? Nature happens.
Na, I don't buy anything you say here. Bounded infinity doesn't make any sense at all, it's not infinity if it is bounded....again by definition.
Individualized life? Again just some words strung together in poetic fashion. Writing and speaking do not specifically enjoin you to alter the common words of language to suit your own sensibilities unless you are writing or speaking poetically, in which case anything goes. Philosophical and scientific writing and argumentation and debate demand the coherence of accepted meanings to allow for meaningful information exchange.
I'm going to assert; "No light bulb ever knows darkness". Um, I can play around with this statement but ultimately it's of little use. It becomes nothing but an exercise in semantic gymnastics. It is poetically useful and that's it. I believe that is what is driving your writing.
Quoting ucarr Again this may be poetic but it's not true rationally. Normal, logical, philosophical discussion and argument demand a consensus, a shared or agreed upon set of definitions. I was not "alive" 400 years ago. If you want to change the definition of what "always" means or what "alive" means then feel free, that's all you've been doing in your arguments......mixing, fuzzing and altering definitions in a poetic way to make grandiose un-provable assertions which is not philosophy.
Your understanding of the conservation of information is un-informed. The notion that your individuality is preserved is a gross misunderstanding of that law. It's quantum information that is theoretically preserved in that law, not macro scale emergent properties such as consciousness and memory. You may pose some other theory about the preservation of consciousness after death but the conservation of information that has been proposed as a physical law does NOT do it.
Quoting philosch
Instead, I get:
A=Existence
B=Life
C=Death
A ? ((?B)?C)
As far as what we know empirically, we only experience life without beginning or end. We see others born and dead, and we correctly believe these two states apply to us, but we never experience either.
Quoting philosch
Consider: a bounded set can include the cardinality of the entire set of real numbers. This is a bounded infinity. Your life is a bounded infinity. It has no beginning and no ending. The life in you was never non-life. The seed and the egg must be alive, or no baby. All of your forebears were alive unto their passing of their living seed forward towards your life never begun and never ended. Life infinite is what existence infinite imparts to your contingent individualizing attributes marking your individuality. Understand your life, young-to-old, is a navigation of the parameters of a bounded infinity of total life. There is no entrance into life from non-life, and no return of life to non-life.
Quoting philosch
The view forward is sharp with hailstones and lusty wind. About face without scanning the looking glass backwards.
Quoting philosch
You have an understanding that puts "subjective" brackets around knowledge. Why do you not put these same brackets around your birth and your death? By your own words, you cannot know the "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. What do you know about them? You know what you experience empirically which, by your discreteness, seals you off from "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. Through your senses, you never saw yourself non-living before birth. You can imagine it now by definition of words in abstraction. You will not see yourself non-living after death; you might see your death approaching, but you will be alive while doing so.
Well now that is true. I stand by the fact you cannot know anything for absolute. I have held dear friends as they took their last breath and all I can say with absolute certainty is they are no longer present in my subjective reality. Something has dramatically been lost or changed state. We collectively call that transformation death. It is real in so far as anything else I can know is real. No amount of conjecture changes that level of real experience. The rest is the poetry of our collective reality, never to be fully grasped or understood, as I've stated, we cannot escape the limitations of our context. (Not withstanding any altered states of consciousness of which just deepens the conjecture and mystery that we are.) But these statements do not invalidate the practical aspects of reality, birth and death and so forth.
Quoting philosch
The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:
Quoting philosch
then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:
Quoting philosch
Quoting philosch
You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.
Quoting philosch
This argument is predicated upon B (Objective Reality) = C (You). You say, as I quote you above, objective reality is inaccessible to perception. Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C.
Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C. Were not examining exercise of pure reason wherein observation of material events is unnecessary.
The language field of pure reason can practice your logic inside a shuttered room. Our debate, in contrast, has its focus on what we see and understand about ourselves while active in the social world. I apply your cognition boundaries of language to the social world while you apply it to the formalisms of abstract logic. In consequence of this, you bring an apples argument to an oranges claim, and I bring an oranges argument to an apples claim.
You might counter that logic is the same everywhere, and I can then counter with my math logic pertaining to bounded infinities.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
I doubt you don't fully believe your cognition has its entire grounding in socially-supported definitions of words. The report of your senses, sans words, tells you when an independently real corpse lowers into the ground. As you say, "...existence and being alive are not the same thing..." This equation you ascribe to my words, but I don't agree they state or imply that. The existence of your corpse will be a remnant that is not you, and thus we know you will not see your own corpse. I've been saying this from the start, so you can reason from my words that I've never equated existence with life.
Both arguments focus on contingent things. Both arguments focus on a Venn diagram of common ground connecting two distinct things. This common ground - in the instance of a child, genetic inheritance - continues to shape the path forward of the contingent thing. The conclusion to equivalence is your evaluation, not mine. Ignoring that, the sanctity of life goes forward for the life-in-the-child of the foreseeing parent, and also for the remembering child looking back to its family roots.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
If you're willing to enter "bounded infinity" into the Google Search Engine, you can start learning about it. Take for example: {0,1} This bounded infinity accommodates an unlimited number of values between 0 and 1, the boundaries of the infinite series.
Quoting philosch
When Einstein's associate Minkowski coined the word "spacetime," he gave the world a easy label for The Theory of Relativity. Do you approve of the word?
Quoting philosch
Do you read poetry?
Quoting philosch
You've stayed in this conversation in order to teach me things?
Quoting philosch
Do you think the sub-atomics of atoms in humans are categorically different from the sub-atomics of atoms in stars?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
:up:
Empirical Experience Vs Pure Logic
Your partition between the two modes: a) pure logic; b) empirical experience presents artificial. The same pure logic your stock in trade applies in both situations. Logically speaking, if your parents cease to exist, you cease to exist. Thats the logical truth of a child being contingent upon their parent. Do you see that this is more evidence that we are neither born nor eventually become dead. With pure logic symbols on paper, we say that if B is contingent upon A, then destruction of A logically demands destruction of B.
Empirical experience is different from pure logic because when a parent leaves human form, they do not cease to exist. Instead, the parent changes form from individualized person to general stock in the quintet (mass, matter, motion, space, and time) funding general existence. Human individuals are emergent from this fund.
Since the parent A does not cease to exist, the contingent child B also does not cease to exist, even after the parent A changes form from individualized human back to the general stock of the quintet.
The fallacy obscuring the bounded infinity of human existence eternal is that we are born and eventually become dead. No. We emerge from the eternal change of form into the individualization of personhood for an interval of time, then we change form back into the general stock of existence eternal.
That's just giving a synonym, pretty vague if 'being real' is not subsequently defined.
I called my 6 definitions of 'real' R1-R6 corresponding to my 6 definitions of exists E1-E6.
Quoting Corvus
I still don't know what kind of time is asserted to not exist.
Quoting RussellAIt would indeed be contradictory.
Those are mental perceptions, hardly qualities of the apple itself. The only quality of the apple I'm interested in is whether or not it exists, and which definition of exists is being used when justifying the assessment one way or another.
Again you discard my scenario. But you still have two causes: walking and gravel. Likewise, my injury would not have occurred had any of the four causes not have happened. So again you seem to argue support of multiple causes, but denying it all the same.
OK, so you label (cause1 & cause2) as a single cause. That's our disconnect. You reject gravel being a cause despite slipping not taking place in the absence of gravel, and also you cannot know the cause of anything since you don't know the entire list.
Crazy definitions, but at least the disconnect was identified.
This presumes an epistemic definition of cause, not a metaphysical one.
Quoting RussellAOK, the bold bit seems to be a reference to either E4. If it was E2, it wouldn't be mind independent. 'world' indicates at least a portion of our universe.
You claim this indirect realist knows nothing about the thing, and yet he holds a belief that it exists in this way. Isn't that irrational? Is the belief just a matter of faith then? I mean, you can count =the apples there on the table, and so can somebody else (common referent), so it's not just a dream. Looks like evidence of EPP (E4) to me. Sounds like an absence of knowing nothing about them.
I can count the horses and the number agrees with the number you count, but the same cannot be done with unicorns. That makes the unicorns distinct by the E2 definition. Not so much by the E4 definition since I've not empirical access to the entire world.
You don't answer this one. You talk about indirect realists, but the question is not addressed. The question as worded is similar to Q3, especially if E4 is used.
Short story, by switching to definition E2. I mean, what other evidence is there that unicorns appear nowhere but in a book?
I'm not tearing apart your argument, but rather pointing out that almost everybody uses definition E2 when the say 'exists', but then convince themselves that some other definition must also be the case. I'm not arguing against the fact that we see horses and we don't see unicorns, but that is just a relation between people and the things we say exist. It is completely anthropocentric reasoning, but then somewhere we declare, quite unreasonably, that these distinctions are objective.
Quoting ucarrThis is not an example of a definition. If I didn't know the meaning of the word 'symmetrical', I would not know how to use the word after reading that.
That wording sounds more like a definition, even if it's not one that is in any dictionary. But that one is not worded as a premise.
This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not.
You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence.
What does Meinong say about the existence of time?
Why would he mention that explicitly? He published his stuff before modern physics even gave us words for the three kinds of time, and even you don't know which kind of time you're denying despite not having that excuse.
There are lots of you-tubes claiming time doesn't exist, but I don't watch links whose arguments are not summarized by the posters, so I don't know what they're denying or how they go about it.
Why not? Even the ancient Greek folks mentioned on the existence of time.
Quoting noAxioms
When did I say I denied anything? I have been just asking questions to various folks for their opinions and ideas, so I could compare them in order to learn more about it.
Quoting noAxioms
Well, you need to have listens to, think and learn about them rather than just be narrowminded and trying to twist everything said.
That's good. What was learned? I did peek at the tail of your topic when you mentioned it. Why post links to all those time-denial videos? Do you understand any of their arguments? Do you agree? None of that was posted, so all I can presume is that you're using them to promote an opinion of denying it, without even knowing which kind is being denied. Maybe I'm wrong, but that's usually why people post links like that without discussion of them.
I don't because I didn't participate in that topic, and this one isn't about time specifically, especially when 'exists' has not been defined when asking if any particular thing exists or not. This topic is about the necessity of doing that, and the justifications or lack of them for the various definitions.
Fair enough. Existence seems to be an ambiguous concept. X exists, can mean many different things. X doesn't exist, doesn't mean X is denied.
Time doesn't exist, doesn't mean time is denied. It could mean we don't perceive time, or time could be a priori condition for our perception of external world ... etc. Present exists, but it disappears before we notice it. Past exists in our memories only. There were some folks who confuse the archive of events or objects as pasts, and some words denoting future as future itself. That's daft.
Time flows to the future. In this statement, time is an existence, flows is a copula and future is the predicate. This is an example statement of EPP.
You are proposing Overdetermination, which is philosophically problematic. A solution to the Overdetermination problem would make a good PhD thesis.
From the Wikipedia article on Overdetermination
Knowledge is justified true belief. As an Indirect Realist, I believe that things exist in a mind-independent world and I can justify my belief. But as my belief may or may not be true, I cannot call it knowledge.
Yes, my belief that there are things in a mind-independent world is in a sense a matter of faith, as a religious person's belief in a god is a matter of faith, but that doesn't mean it is irrational.
On the other hand, I know my perceptions of colour, smell, taste, etc, which are not matters of either belief or faith.
I know that my perceptions are real, and believe that there are things in a mind-independent world that are also real.
Generally, "real" and "exist" are synonyms, though there is nothing to stop anyone from redefining them.
I see a broken window and can imagine several possible causes, but don't know the actual cause. A detective visits the scene of a crime and can imagine several possible causes, but doesn't know the actual cause.
As an Indirect Realist, I see the colour green and can imagine several possible causes, but don't know the actual cause. The Direct Realist, on seeing the colour green knows that green was the actual cause.
For the Indirect Realist, epistemology limits metaphysical knowledge. For the Direct Realist, their metaphysical knowledge is not epistemologically limited.
There are three theories of perception, Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.
I don't think that either Idealism or Direct Realism are philosophically valid. Therefore, the question of the definition of "exist" must of necessity be considered from the position of Indirect Realism.
E1 The only objective reality I know about exists in my mind, although I believe that an objective reality also exists in a mind-independent world.
E2 The only things I know about exist in my mind.
E3 The only things that have predicates exist in my mind.
E4 The only objective state of this universe I know about exists in my mind, although I believe that an objective state of the universe also exists in a mind-independent world.
E5 I know the state that exists in my mind, and believe that it was caused by a prior state that existed in a mind-independent world.
E6 I know the domain that exists in my mind and believe that there is another domain that exists in a mind-independent world
This is patently not true or incomplete at best. You are the one over generalizing. A child's life starting is contingent upon their parents initially and that's it. Once the child's life is set in motion there remains some level of dependence but if the parents die after that point, the child doesn't automatically cease to live. If you substitute "existence" for "life" like you do in your next quote, you would have better chance. Once again the words you choose are critical to making a meaningful assertion.
Quoting ucarr
The child coming into being is contingent on it's parents existing in the first place, and so what. It's true and of no particular profundity. Our existence and our lives are processes. The start of the child's (life) process starting is contingent upon the parents (lives) process existing and whether the parents are alive or dead does make a difference obviously. Once the process of life in the child starts, the absolute contingency which you are implying ceases. There is no way to make the parents non-existent once they have existed. Their state changes but the fact of their existence does not. You seem to want to continually use "life"(aliveness) and "existence" interchangeably and that is an error.
Even if you setup a logically valid statement about this contingency, that still doesn't mean the argument is necessarily true anyhow. In formal logic, truth is not determined by logical validity. Once validity is established, then the premises have to be evaluated for truth in order to convey truth upon the conclusion. Truth is truth, logically or otherwise, it's not an important distinction. To say something is logically true is an often misused term. Most people really mean to say something is logically valid and then they try and claim truth based on that validity, but that is a fallacy. The premises still must be true for the conclusion to be true period and end of story regardless of the logical validity.
One last thing is, I will concede the point about bounded infinity. I get what you mean by your example and I was mistaken.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
This is one of my premises.
Quoting noAxioms
~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.
My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
Now we're looking at an opportunity to have a good exchange of ideas.
Quoting ucarr
In my quote above, the critically important words are "Logically speaking..." and "...the logical truth..."
As you say, a logically valid argument doesn't always correspond with what's true in life. I was trying to say the same thing with my statement:
Quoting ucarr
Whether its true or not -- I know my idea is way out there and feels wrong -- my statement has me recognizing, like you, that evaluating logical symbols on paper lies a great distance from the flesh and blood frailty of real human lives.
Now, if we focus on the other critical words "bounded infinity," we arrive at another clearing of the fog shrouding my message. Math tells us something important through the concept of bounded infinity. The difference between both life and existence and non-life and non-existence is always infinity. This is why you see me seemingly conflating existence and life.
The child born remembers nothing of the journey to earth from the quintet that funds the general existence of the world. We can make a near approach to our beginning of life, but we never arrive. You cant ease your way from non-life into life. No, its instantaneously alive for the screaming newborn just pulled from the womb. Likewise, you cant ease your way from life into non-life.
You ask how do I know these things? I only know them by inference from my statements.
At the beginning, and at the end, there is the forever approach to the bounded infinity that nurtures life. What does this mean? The meaning is simple. Life can only be life if it is everlasting with neither beginning nor end. The beginning and the ending of our lives and our semi-verse can be represented by a bi-directional number irrational in both directions.
It's the passage from and return to "forever" that makes us alive. Existence imbues individualized things possessing defining attributes with the fundamentally unexplainable uncontainability of existence that knows itself, life.
If you want my opinion, Proper time exists by E2,3,4,5,6. Coordinate time exists E2,3,6 The time you mention above exists E2,3 (pretty much the same score as the tooth fairy).
E1 thus far is meaningless and I cannot assign that to anything.
Quoting RussellA
Not overdeterminism because any one of my causes along would not have caused the injury. I already explained this.
Quoting RussellAGot it. Anything not proven (pretty much everything) doesn't count as 'knowing', so you know nothing. So maybe we should not talk about knowing and just go with what has evidence and what doesn't, looking for plausible conclusions rather than definite ones.
On the other hand, I know my perceptions of colour, smell, taste, etc, which are not matters of either belief or faith.[/quote]I agree with those beliefs. I don't agree that they're any more than beliefs, especially when one begins to question what the 'I' is doing the perceiving, or if it's doing any perceiving at all. Skepticism goes a lot deeper than intuitions. If you're going to play the 'don't know' card, I can play that card in a higher suit.
What do you mean by 'are real'? Funny that I've hammered on that question dozens of times and you still use the word without mention of which definition R1-R6 you mean.
Which is why they correspond to E1-E6, but you still didn't pick one.
I got a quote that suggests that Meinong is perhaps using E4 as his definition of exists. He uses a relational definition. Maybe. I'd love to have asked him if the universe exists, because it doesn't fit the E4 requirement of having a location in space.
Quoting RussellAWhat happened to 'none of the above'? I certainly don't identify with any of those labels. But then, I suppose it comes down to the definition of 'realism', which is not specified in the label 'realist'.
Anyway, thank you for actually considering each of the definitions. Remember that you can add your own if my list is inadequate.
Keep in mind that we're doing metaphysics and not epistemology.
You're describing E2. If it's objective, it's not relative to anything.
In other words, suppose there are two minds, identical, except that one is real and the other not. How would either of them figure out which one they were? That's E1. It isn't a relation, so they both relate the same things as the other, except presumably the nonexistent mind relates to nonexistent cars and moons and forum posts and v-v. My assertion is that they cannot tell. There's no empirical test.
EPP doesn't hold since both of our candidates have the same properties and experience the same stuff.
Sure, by definition. E2 is effectively solipsism or at least anthropocentrism. E2 is reality defined by perception. EPP holds since predication requires a mind in order for the predicate to be.
No, that's still E2. I think you're stuck on E2. All your comments are about what you know, and none are about the metaphysics of what is. Use logic, not perception, to analyze the mind independent ones. EPP holds under E3 by definition.
Which is like saying that the universe is the universe. EPP apparently doesn't hold because things in other universe also have predicates despite not existing. This has nothing to do with anybody knowing about it. Most of the definitions have nothing to do with epistemology.
E4 has nothing to do with me or the universe. It has to do with causality, any causal structure. E5 applies say to the set of all possible chess states. It does not apply to the Mandelbrot set. EPP does not hold because there are things with predication (17 being prime for example) but not meeting the E5 definition. E5 requires a temporal structure.
Again E2. E6 is another mind independent definition. Hard to judge EPP on this one but I think it holds since I can form a contradiction if you posit otherwise.
Quoting ucarrThis is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.
BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.
I have no clue how those words are to be interpreted. You wouldn't even define 'eternal' for me, even though I made it a multiple choice question.
I suspect English is not your first language? There is no correct English language logical reasoning that would support the premise or conclusion that we are "neither born nor eventually become dead". I'm now convinced you do not understand English and the rules of syntax and meaning, nor the rules of logic or you would not make such an absurd and/or ridiculous statement. Your application of formal logic is drastically, even fatally flawed. You are clearly making an equivalence between being alive and existence which is wrong to start with. It causes you to say that we are not born nor become dead. These terms; existence and ceasing to exist are not biological, they do not map to "begin to live" (born) and ceasing to live"(death), they are different things. You may wish and hope that because you believe existence has no beginning or end that your individual life has no beginning or end and I'm sorry but you are completely misguided in your reasoning.
Your are saying;
P1. A = B
P2 -A = -B
P3 A and -A have no beginning or end
Conclusion: B and -B have no beginning or end
That is explicit formalization of what you are saying where A is existence and B is life or living.
The logic is valid but NOT true. The premises are false to begin with, which I can't seem to get you to understand.
A = B is false (existence does not equal life)
-A = -B is also false (Non existence does not equal death)
So as I stated previously, this is the classic error of thinking logical validity somehow equals truth and it most definitely does not. There is no more to be said about this. If you cannot see the error you are making, I can not help you.
Here's a very basic example of the error you are making;
A = B
B = C
Therefore A = C.
This is logically valid in all cases.
It's sometimes true and most of the time false as a truth claim.
For the above argument to be true, A has to actually be equal to B and B has to actually be equal to C .
This is true in all cases. If A is related to B but not exactly equal to B then the conclusion is false even though the logic is valid. If B is related to C but not identical, then the conclusion is false.
Ex.
P1. 3 = 4
P2. 4 = 7
Conclusion: Therefore 3 = 7.
The logic is valid. The conclusion is still false. The reason is that the premise's are false. There's nothing more to it then that. Your interchanging of the meanings of words has lead you down this fallacious path.
E1 to E6 can be interpreted from the position of Idealism, from the position of Direct Realism and from the position of Indirect Realism. Each interpretation will be different. Any interpretation of E1 to E6 that is based on a combination of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism will become unnecessarily convoluted.
If you don't identify with either Idealism, Direct Realism or Indirect Realism, which theory of perception are you using?
My understanding of Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realism agrees with an article from philosophy A level.com, but there are many articles on these three theories of perception.
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Quoting noAxioms
Meinong uses the terms "exists", "subsists" and "absists".
We can divide the Universe into the domain of the mind and the domain of the mind-independent.
Objective reality in E1 can refer to both the domain of the mind and the domain of the mind-independent.
By the objective state of this universe in E4, do you mean the domain of the mind or the domain of the mind-independent?
I understand that Meinong uses "exist" to refer to the domain of the mind-independent.
Quoting noAxioms
I am not sure if E1,4,5,6 make sense or are meaningful for existence of time, when they are made up of abstract and obscure concepts which need clarification.
For instance, what do you mean by "part of objective reality"? Are we supposed to be able to understand and grasp the full meaning of objective reality? What is "this universe"? How far and how much "this universe" supposed to cover, or be? "the causal history"? What do you mean by that? "existential quantification"? Surely that is not time itself is it?
Quoting philosch
Quoting philosch
I acknowledge what you have written above is the truth and moreover, your technique of examination is both sound and correctly applied to my reasoning.
If A = Existence; B = Life, and therefore A = C is the claim being made, then, as you say, the conclusion is logically sound but factually incorrect because, again as you say, Existence ? Life.
This is where we differ. You evaluate my argument to the conclusion that A = B. I do not believe Existence and Life are one and the same. It follows, therefore, that I do not intend to conclude Existence equals Life. It may be the case, however, that my statements logically evaluate to this conclusion. If that is the case, then my error lies somewhere in how I evaluate to my intended conclusion.
My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named.
Let me try to show you that I do not intentionally evaluate to A = B. Consider: {0,1}. This is a set that examples a bounded infinity. The bounded infinity enclosed within this set is the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. 0 and 1 are the limits of the infinite series of numbers lying between them. The series goes on forever in both directions without arrival at either of the limits.
Here's the distinction between Existence and Life: Existence equals the scope of numbers from 0 to 1. Life equals the scope of the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. The scope of Existence is greater than the scope of life even though the latter is infinite.
I know not all existing things are living things.
I looked up the SEP page on 'action theories of perception' and got all kinds of options, many of which are not mutually exclusive. I didn't read enough to figure out which one(s) seems to match how I think of it. Your items were not on any of the lists, and are more theories of mind and/or ontology, but apparently you find pages that do list them under 'perception'. All three are realist views, and I'm not a realist (E1), but I could be a realist under E5 in that I acknowledge that certain things relate to other things. E5 explicitly confines this to a causal relation. See my response to Corvus below for more detail.
This topic is about ontology and realism, and not about perception.
Please read the disclaimer in the OP if you still have to ask that.
Which is consistent with my disclaimer, and which eliminates E2 and narrows things down to 5 possibilities instead of 6.
Quoting CorvusWhat needs clarification then is your notion of 'time'. I said nothing so ambiguous as any of the definitions being applicable or not to time. I listed three very well known and very different kinds of time, all three of which are heavily defined, used, and discussed in literature, and are not obscure at all. Hence my ability to render a meaningful opinion about how the various definitions of 'exists' might apply to each or not.
Interestingly, your description of time in the prior post seems to correspond to my third kind, the kind whose existence I put on par with the tooth fairy. I suspect that it is this definition of 'time' is how you're using the word.
That's E1, which I did not list for anything, since I do not identify as a realist. As for what it means, that is unclear. The meaning needs to be clarified by anybody who asserts it, but from my standpoint, a thing that has this property is indistinguishable from a things that doesn't have it, but is otherwise identical. I cannot say that of any of the other 5 definitions. The other 5 are all meaningful in some way, and a distinction can be drawn.
All I can say about E1 is that it is objective, not a relation. So it just plain exists, and not 'is a member-of / part-of some domain', all of which are expressions of relations.
If somebody asserts E1 existence, then at least a partial meaning would be nice.
The universe that has you in it, as opposed to different universes that don't.
The bounds of 'this universe' is left to the user. Some define it to be only the visible universe, or only 'this world'. If so confined, then other visible universes or worlds become a multiverse of sorts (Tegmark listed four kinds of multiverse, the first and third of which are mentioned here). But at one's choice, these can be considered to all be just 'the universe'. Type 4 is more of an E1 definition: All that exists or all that is real. I find that pretty meaningless.
This has to do with the E5 definition (causal definition). It is an utterly explicit relational definition that only works with structures with temporal causation. X and Y are system states. Let's say X is a meteor. Y is a moon crater. State X is prior to state Y since it takes time for state X to evolve into a world including state Y.. Since state Y is a function of state X, then X can be said to exist in relation to state Y.
This is a classical example of a definition that comes from quantum mechanics.
For a more quantum example, take Schrodinger's cat. State X is the cat state, in the box. State Y is the lab outside. The cat state (being dead or alive) does not exist relative to the lab since the distinction between dead and alive has had no causal effect on it. Sure, the cat exists relative to the lab since it had an effect on the lab before the box was closed. The cat exists, but it's state of living or not is a counterfactual, and definition E5 denies the principle of counterfactual definiteness which states that systems are in a defined state even when not measured.
No, it has nothing to do with time. 35 is not prime because (?x) (x is non-trivial factor of 35). That's straight up existential quantification, and an example that makes no reference to time.
Now this I find is an interesting question. I find myself initially at least, in agreement with your position on this although I'd like to give it further thought before I affirm that. I'm not sure of your use of the word obverse here but it may not matter. For now, I think I agree. Existence is the "maximum" or primary or most inclusive context. I'll have more on this after I give it some thought. There is an issue having to do with things that are real and things that are fictional concepts in our minds. Harry Potter exists and is real as a fictional character but is he "real" in the common use off the term real. Does he exist only as a concept? Does it matter? I'll have to ponder this.
Quoting noAxioms
If we had no perceptions, we would have nothing to reason about. But we do have perceptions. Idealism reasons that there is no mind-independent world. Indirect Realism reasons that our perceptions are only representations of any mind-independent world. Direct Realism reasons that our perceptions are a one to one correspondence with the mind-independent world.
As you say, any reasoning about E1 to E6 combining Idealism, Direct Realism and Indirect Realist would result in contradictions.
Quoting noAxioms
Only the Direct Realist argues that we can understand existence independent of the mind, yet this is a logical impossibility. It is logically impossible because any such understanding of a mind-independent world depends on the mind understanding something that is mind-independent.
Quoting noAxioms
Our only knowledge about ontology and realism is founded on our perceptions, and our only understanding of the metaphysical depends on the epistemological/empirical.
My notion of time is that it is a concept. Can concepts be said to exist? We have concepts, and use them. But they don't exist like trees and cups do.
Quoting noAxioms
The list of 6 definitions of Existence you listed are made up of ambiguous words, that need to be clarified.
Quoting noAxioms
Where are the 3 definitions of time you listed? I cannot locate them in the thread, and I have not been reading all the posts in the thread but just have been replying to your posts to me. Could you list them again?
Quoting noAxioms
It is not the tooth fairy at all. If time is a concept, then how we use the concept in our statements and propositions reflect time. If our temporal statements are to be meaningful, then time must be real in the statements.
Quoting noAxioms
Now you are trying to clarify the definitions of Existence, which is good. E1 saying that Quoting noAxioms
sounds like tautology or circular. Objective reality sounds also unclear. Isn't reality supposed to be objective, if there is such a thing as reality. But what is objectivity? What is reality? Can we ever get to know the reality? If E1 doesn't make sense, should it not be dropped, and move on to E2?
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
If you know something, is it Existence? I know a name called Pegasus. Is Pegasus existence, because you know, and I know it? Pegasus has predicates too. It is a horse, has wings and suppose to fly.
Or if someone comes along and say he is a Pegasus, is he the real Pegasus? Or is he someone pretending to be a Pegasus, therefore a fake Pegasus? Can he be qualified as the existence of Pegasus? Hence these definitions present us further questions than firm definitions.
Exactly !!
Quoting noAxioms
Not a standard definition afraid.
Quoting noAxioms
Existence is also nonexistence, and nonexistence is also existence. Something cannot exist without possibility of nonexistence. Nonexistence cannot exist without possibility of existence.
Quoting noAxioms
Existence of X means that X was perceived. Perceiving X means perceiving of the time X was perceived. Hence all existence exists in time, and time is perception.
When 35 is perceived or stated as a non prime, its instantiation of the idea emerges with time perceived. When the perception ends, and the statement is forgotten, the instantiation disappears or fades away into nonexistence and the associated time fades away too.
Hence it is too simple to say X doesn't exist means there is nothing to it, or X exists means we know it and use it. There are more involved in existence.
Again, I never claimed otherwise.
It's actually quite easy if you follow my disclaimer since understanding of such a world does not require the understander to lack a mind. It just requires the world under consideration to lack the mind.
That you cannot distinguish the difference is pretty hard evidence that you're an idealist, despite whatever label you pin on yourself.
Quoting CorvusI didn't even list the ideal of time as one of my options since I don't consider concepts to be time. It doesn't take an hour of concept to bake my brownies. Your other topic seemed to want it to be an object, something you could see with a location and color or whatever. "But still I cannot see time. I only see the movement.". But movement is a concept as well then, no? How can you see a concept? If not, why is time a concept but movement is not?
You don't seem to have sorted yourself out.
Yes, they do. Thus there are more than 6 definitions, depending on those clarifications. But most notions of existence fall into those 6 categories, and few would choose say E5, but that one was unique and is sort of derived from Rovelli.
The reply was directly to you here. The relevant bit:
1) proper time, that which clocks measure
2) Coordinate time, that which dilates
3) Progression of the present, one's intuitive sense of the flow of events.
Of course, to an idealist, a clock is a concept, and concepts don't measure proper time. Concepts don't dilate, but per my disclaimer, I'm talking about time and not just about the concept of time.
I didn't say it was the tooth fairy. I said that in my opinion, it shared the same ontology with the tooth fairy, which also exists only under E2 and E3.
Exactly so, but you're the one defining time to be a concept, not me.
I agree, especially with the circular part.
Too many people assert it to do that.
Under E2 definition, yes. There seems to be no distinction between a horse and a unicorn under E2 or E3.
This gets into identity. Pegasus isn't just 'a flying horse', it's a specific one, but other entities can be similar or share its name. Both might exist in the same way, but only one is the actual Pegasus typically referenced and the other is not.
Notice that I said 'a unicorn' above, which is not a particular the way 'Pegasus' is.
Something pretending to be a certain identity does not (arguable) alter the ontology of the actual thing with that identity.
Quoting Corvus
What do you think the 'standard' definitions of existence are under quantum mechanics then? I admit it comes from one of the interpretations and not from the theory proper since the theory proper doesn't make metaphysical assertions. E5 did not fit into any of the other categories, and it's important.
Not so. While I didn't list it, E8 could be "is possible", which is similar to Meinong's 'subsist' category. E8 could then be worded as "anything that subsists", thus merging his two highest categories. Point is, anything that subsists by definition has no possibility of nonsusbistence.
Similar counterexamples falsify this assertion.
I will try to reword your assertions to something that might make sense:
Existence is meaningless without distinction from something that doesn't exist.
That renders totally empty an assertion like "everything exists" or "nothing exists". The latter is perhaps nihilism, which is perhaps more of an awareness of the meaningless of the notion of existence than it is an assertion that there is a reality, and that reality is empty.
No. There is similarly no mention of perception either in my example of E6. You're using E2 again.
None of this is logically valid. I might think of something while being totally unaware of the time. Even if I was aware of the time, only under E4 or E5 would existing things be in time, and not even then since proper time itself exists under E4 and yet does not exist in time.
Your assertion doesn't even work under E2 (the only one based on perception) since you consider time to be a concept, and your mind does not exist within a concept.
Quoting CorvusFine, but per my disclaimer, my example was about 35 and not about the idea of 35. My example was of a mind independent kind of existence. Only E2 is mind dependent.
I am looking at an object on my desk right now. I can say I know what it is because it exists in front of me. Or conversely, because I see it exists, I know what it is.
But you can't. You don't see it, and you don't know what it is. Hence, the object I am seeing and is existing concretely and solidly, doesn't exist in you. You don't even know what it is. Where do you see problem in my argument here?
When I see the object, I can also tell the time of seeing it. The time I read belongs to the concept of time. It is not a concept of time. It is a read time, which instantiated at the moment of reading and noticing. So you seem to be confusing between the concept of time and read time.
We agree that there is the domain of the mind and the domain of a mind-independent world.
The problem remains that your disclaimer requires the mind to be able to understand something that we agree by defintion is independent of the mind, ie, to understand existence in a mind-independent world.
This is the same problem of how is it possible to know the unknown.
It doesn't exist in you either, unless you ate your desk.
Since this topic isn't about epistemology, no, I don't see any problem. Said object exists under E2,3,4,5,6, and perhaps meaninglessly under E1. That's the whole list.
But you indicated that the telling of time was necessary, not just an option, for said object to exist. Maybe you meant something else by that wording, but rather than clarifying, you seem to be doubling down on the assertion.
Quoting RussellAAnd other domains besides those two. Not sure if you agree with the validity of other domains, but E6 examples have referenced some of them.
No. ... to understand the existence OF a mind independent world, not that anything IN that world is doing the understanding. So no problem at all.
Any realist (of the physical universe) believes in a mind-independent world, that is, something not dependent on (supervenes on?) mind. Our own world is such a world, but hardly the only one.
This presumes that 'understanding' is only something that a 'mind' can do, else said world could be understood by some non-mind thing contained by that world.
Edit: I thought about it and ours is a mind-dependent world. It has minds in it (presuming a non-supernatural definition of 'mind'), and had it not those minds, it would be a different world. Ergo, ours is a mind dependent world in the same way that it is a Betelgeuse dependent world.
The point is that you don't know anything about it apart from it is an object. And you know even that much, because I told you about it.
Quoting noAxioms
"It doesn't exist in you." means it doesn't exist in your mind, not in your stomach.
Quoting noAxioms
Existence is the result of perception. Of course it is about epistemology too.
Quoting noAxioms
Time is always implicated in perception. You just don't seem to be able to understand it.
That is not a very mind-independent view. This topic is meant to discuss the meaning of mind-independent existence. Do you have anything to contribute to that besides assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject?
That sounds like gross dishonesty to keep pretending to know, when not knowing anything about it.
The point is that without perception, you don't have existence.
Quoting noAxioms
Mind-independent existence? Tell us some examples of mind-independent existence.
Assertions of definitions not compatible with the topic subject? It has been noticed some folks resort to this claim when they run out of ideas on what to say, or don't want to admit their claims are wrong. A typical act of self defense mechanism motivated by dishonesty.
In order to understand what existence prior to predicates, you must first understand what existence means. Would you not agree?
So you just told me something and now I'm being accused of being grossly dishonest when I indicate that I know what you just told me. Strange claim there. For the record, even if you define existence by perception, I have perceived your object precisely via your telling me about it. That perception told me the one predicate of the object that I care about.
But this topic is about definitions of existence other than E2, and only under E2 does existence require perception. In a world like this one in every way except absent perceiving things, that object (assuming it is not itself a perceiving entity) would still exist upon your desk in the same ways (E1,3,4,5,6) that it did with the presence of the perceiving entities. Only it's existence under E2 would not be satisfied.
All this seems very strange coming from somebody claiming to be a realist. I really don't think you know what the term means.
The object on your desk is such an example.
E1 The object exists if the desk exists.
E3 The object has the property of being on your desk, so it exists.
E4 The object is in the universe, so it exists.
E5 The object being at rest is a function of the desk exerting a force on it, so that makes the desk exist in relation to the object.
E6 (?x) (x is on your desk) Your object satisfies that, so your object exists by E6.
Not one of those examples mentions or relies on perception by a mind. Only the reading and understanding of those words requires perception, but the existence of the object by any of the above definitions doesn't require those words to be perceived or understood.
Totally agree, which is why I reference one of the six main definitions whenever I use the word, and then I wonder why you don't follow your own advice when you make assertions like this one:
Despite stressing the importance of what 'existence' means, you didn't define the word there, so non-sequitur. The object on your desk presumably doesn't have perception, and yet I suspect that you consider it to exist, in direct contradiction to the literal wording of that assertion.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
This is one of my premises.
~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.
Quoting noAxioms
If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist?
Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations? Consider: You're planning a trip to another city. The distance from your home to the other city has no meaning for you in terms of the cost of gas, the amount of time for travel, and the best route to take? Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?
Quoting noAxioms
This is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.
Your meaning here is unclear. All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material." Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality." Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.
BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.
If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime, there is an empirically detectable change of state regarding your position, whether or not you know math.
Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property. Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused." It possess two fundamental properties that it attaches to material things: symmetries and their conservation laws. These two fundamentals support all properties emergent from uncaused existence.
Arvin Ash_Symmetry Fundamental
I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.
My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."
You seems to be taking the statement too personally. If you read carefully, it says "That sounds like". It doesn't mean that "That is". What makes you think "sounds like" is "is", is a mystery to me. There was NO accusation on anyone, but it was just describing about the post with a simile form of expression.
You are also still in confusion between the sentence in the post to you with your own visual perception of the object on my desk. You have no visual perception on the object on my desk, hence you have no idea what the object is, and the object doesn't exist in your mind or perception, and that was the point. But your saying that you know the object relation to my desk sounded not quite right, which SOUNDED LIKE some kind of pretention or dishonest assertion,
I will respond to further points in rest part of your post later.
I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not.
People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting philosch
If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. The concept of the number two is perhaps more complicated than two stones side-by-side, but it is material. The argument for this claim says, No brain, no mind. The mind, like the brain, is emergent. Both emerge from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. As we know, no mind works without consuming energy. Mind is the material dynamism of the everyday world internalized. Consider: You went to a racetrack in the afternoon. That night, while asleep, you dreamt of horses rounding the track and entering into the final stretch. You heard the thundering of the hooves through the dirt. All of this mental activity is the motion of the world internalized within your brain_mind. No brain, no memory, so its physical.
Quoting philosch
Have you ever watched a good movie and experienced a stirring emotional ride through the journey of the story? Maybe it was an adventure tale. When the hero carefully inches out onto the string bridge suspended over a deep valley where a rushing river crashes over boulders far below, with close shots of the frayed strings of the bridge unraveling, and the girl in distress screaming in fear, afraid he wont reach her in time, you may have felt an ache in the pit of your stomach. If the movie is truly a classic, you mightve reached a point where you forgot you were in a theater watching a movie. It was as if you were living in the world of the story.
The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind.
I have no visual perception of the object on your desk, and never claimed to have it. Please stick to what I said and not what you unreasonably imply from what I said.
I did not disagree with your point. Your point was simply irrelevant to the existence of the object, which is what this topic is about.
If I parse that correctly, I think you're saying that what I posted didn't sound quite right to you. That's acceptable. You are trapped in a mode where you seemingly cannot assess the validity of a statement that uses a different definition of 'exists' than E2. But if that's the case, why are you contributing to a topic that explicitly states up front that it is not about mind-dependent views?
Quoting ucarrDepends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means.
No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word.
Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition.
1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.
2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe.
Yea, that's a pretty good reading of E1.
Objective reality being accessible to a specific consciousness depends probably on if said consciousness is part of that reality or not. There seems to be no test for being part of objective reality or the exact same thing not being part of that reality. That's not your problem, it's the problem of the E1 definition.
One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime.
I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. As for the two words not meaning the same thing, 'distance' is frame dependent, and 'interval' is not.
So to translate between frames, a Lorentz transform is used which says that x' = ?(x - vt) which shows x' (the distance in the 2nd frame) not to be equal to the x (distance in 1st frame).
The interval on the other hand is invariant over a Lorentz transform. You can verify the algebra if you look it up. All this is since you asked, but is off topic.
With what part are you in disagreement. I assure you that existence becoming a property follows from denial of EPP. Disagreeing with EPP on the other hand is an opinion, one which is logically valid. The question is, how justified is that opinion?
OK, but I don't accept (let alone understand) your premises, so I don't accept that existence needs to be emergent. It does seem to be emergent under say E5 at least.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.
Whether or not non-material things exist is a deep topic with many believers who have important things to teach us all. I'm not going to make a conclusive statement of judgment about what I think is the correct answer to the question because I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?" without making such an announcement within this conversation. Instead, I'll make a short argument for using physics in my attempt to answer your question. Our minds, our language and most of our empirical experience trade in the currency of physics, viz., the quintet WRT what we experience as the world around us. If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?
Quoting noAxioms
Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?
Quoting noAxioms
Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?
Quoting noAxioms
How do immaterial things relate to material things? The purpose of this question is to get from you a description how immaterial things connect to your body. If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?
Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?
Quoting noAxioms
We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B. This is a description of distance and interval being framed between two different states.
You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added.
Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes.
Quoting ucarrSo you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception?
If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around.
This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something.
The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical.
Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology.
I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance.
In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.
2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible.
All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."
No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'.
Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation.
Another example is the fine-structure constant (?) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation.
I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material.
Light travels on a geodesic, so it doesn't curve. As for heat, light has energy. If energy is considered to be material, then I guess light is considered to be material.
No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location.
I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. noAxioms
If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points.
The mental construct of "2" in the brain is not material. Again this is definition dependent. Material has a meaning that excludes mental constructs and so literally the number 2 is not material. The rocks can be quantified by a mind as another concept. The quantity(2) of rocks has no meaning outside of a mind. The difference is central to this argument. I believe there are 2 categories of real where subjective experience is concerned. "Real" in common terms means material. It's a blurring of it's definition to include mind constructs as the same kind of "real" as a material object like a table. You can say a construct in a mind may have quantum state correlates which are material and those correlates may indeed be material, that's why I can see where a confusion about what is real comes from. Nevertheless it is inaccurate to say all mental constructs are real. 2 is a symbol. It represents a concept or construct. It is a real "symbol" in that I can right it on a piece of paper but it is only a representation of what it symbolizes.
Here's another example: Harry Potter is a construct in a mind. The word "table" is also a construct in a mind. They both exist. One represents and imaginary character that is not real. The other represents a physical, material structure that is real.
Quoting ucarr
This is not completely true either. A brain by definition is the primary organ of the central nervous system of all higher animals after the single cell stage is passed. It is biological, organic material. The mind emerges from the activity in a brain, that is true. So No mind, no brain is true but not because they are both emergent. It's because mind depends on it's organic substrate which is a brain.
Quoting ucarr
The experience is real. That does not mean the characters in the movie are real. They are only real as constructs, not literally. There is no "real" wizard named Harry Potter with magical powers even though the movies about Harry Potter made you feel emotions and have real physical reactions. Unless of course you want to "fuzz" the meaning of "real" which brings us right back to why I responded to the post in the first place. Harry Potter exists as an imaginary character. Imaginary characters are by definition, NOT REAL. They do exist as mind constructs, not as literal objects. This means of course that existence and being "real" are not synonymous which is what I have been contending. It may be of more benefit to to say there are different categories of existence as well as different types of "real".
It's like arguing about the realness of a thought. Thoughts certainly exist. The thought is only "real" as a set of electrical signals traversing your neural pathways but what the thought represents linguistically is not literally "real". I can imagine(thought) a horrible 7 headed winged beast the size of a football stadium and that thought may give me a nightmare with a pounding heart and night sweats. The thought's physical reality or "realness" is a set of quantum state correlates, ie. electrical signals being propagated through neuronal receptors in a brain. What the thought represents (the monster) is not literally real. I'm not sure why you can't see the categorical difference.
So the mind and it's experiences exist yes, but the mind can have experiences that are triggered by imaginary things which are by definition "not real". To deny this is to the alter the meanings of these words.
But he is not Pegasus. Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con.
:up:
Quoting Banno
How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real.
Pegasus was the mount of Bellerophon. Therefor something was the mount of Bellerophon.
Whether that something was an object or not depends on how you use "object".
An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Thanks for the correction.
Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? The color read exists, but it doesn't colorize anything, not even empty space?
What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?
I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from. In line with my thinking, existence is the reality of faces uncountable.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing. The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind. Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.
How does a mind-enclosed sentient describe mind-independent reality with any authority? I take recourse to Kant's noumenal realm for guidance. My mind instinctively goes to a conception characterized by unlimited, undiminished stimuli that resembles a computer screen displaying raw data unformatted by a software program. Therefore, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, it doesn't make a sound. Instead, it makes a proto-sound, which is the totality of all possible sounds unformatted by an observer. This seems to support the notion from QM that the observer's identity is entangled with the environment it perceives. Working backwards from here, we go to a scenario wherein no observer is present within an unlimited, undiminished reality that examples hyper-presence, viz., presence unmeasurable. Reverse direction again and I'm backwards engineering from mind-independent reality to mind-dependent reality that fraternizes with solipsism. We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Since perceive means to become aware of something; to realize or come to understand something, it's reactive rather than proactive. If it's impossible to measure something not present, and if, therefore, presence precedes measurement, then measurability and measurement are reactive rather than proactive.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named. So life is a part of existence; existence contextualizes life as an encompassing container in parallel with a library encompassing a book.
Quoting noAxioms
Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere; b) if two things exist outside of (A?A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ? (A').
Quoting noAxioms
I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. That journey, being as it is a relation that costs time and energy to traverse, expresses itself as a physical relation between the two locations. Moreover, this concept of distance as an abstract thought has a referent of two locations separated by time and energy. No referent no thought/no brain no thought and thus abstract thought is also physical. Yes, abstract thought is emergent, but it can't exist without its material ground, and thus it belongs to the world of physics.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way. There's nothing we perceive that doesn't become anthropocentric.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Since, as you say above, "...the universe may arguably contain material things... the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe..." Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. If you can't do that, then you must consider whether our universe is a case of material inter-relating with material. Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?
If "...treating the universe as an object that 'does things (like expand)'." is a category error, then does it follow that pairing immaterial universe with material things is also a category error?
Quoting noAxioms
Photons possess energy, force and momentum, material properties.
Quoting noAxioms
I read this as alpha equal to an unchanging value. The value I take to be a measurement of something material, given my belief you can't measure immaterial things directly, but only indirectly in relation to material measurements.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I don't see how these two sentences are consistent.
Quoting noAxioms
A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.
Quoting noAxioms
In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints. Intervals are important in many areas of math, including algebra, calculus, and statistics.
There are 3 types of interval notation: open interval, closed interval, and half-open interval. The interval with no infinity symbol is called a bounded interval. The interval containing the infinity symbol is called an unbounded interval.
Intervals in Math
Quoting Corvus
Troy was a mythical city. Is the Troy they discovered a con then? It certainly didn't have all the embellished events happen there, but some of them are based on real events. Just saying that being mythical does not necessarily equate to not real. Hard to argue with Pegasus though.
There was likely for instance a real King Arthur, but the legend about the sword&stone is almost certainly mythology.
Quoting CorvusOnly if you don't define object as that to which words have been assigned. If this restraint is lifted, there are (E4 say) more unnamed objects than named ones. There are waaaay more given a non-athropocentric definition like E5.
Quoting Corvus
It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14.
Quoting ucarrAdjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used.
Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself, much like 'sweet' exists (E2). It didn't exist relative to my father, but blue did, which is why he always played the blue pieces in a game of 'Sorry' or something. When he was able to do something mean to one of the other pieces, he couldn't play favorites since he didn't know whose pieces the other colors were. There was just blue and not-blue.
I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton.
OK, that's fine. To be honest, why did you wait this long to state this? Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions.
Sounds like both of us actually don't know then, in which case it seems too soon to draw conclusions about how existence is dependent on perception.
The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind.[/quote]A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing.
Agree. I have appealed to logic rather than inference, but even that doesn't supply a helpful solution. Hence I don't lay claim to realism. Mind dependent existence has pragmatic value and humans simply forget that it is a relation.
I did not quote the whole but, but it sounds like you are actually exploring this area, more than most of the posters to this topic.
I thought it meant 'not absence', and not 'perceived'. The opposite of that is unperceived.
Not impossible. It's just a little more indirect is all. Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. Time dilation is not perceived, but it can be measured/calculated.
Sorry, just looking for counterexamples.
The most inclusive context would include Pegasus, and there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. Not saying it's wrong, just that it lacks utility.
Quoting ucarrMine was a relational definition. If X doesn't exist in domain D1, it might exist in domain D2, so your a) doesn't follow. It seems to be more of a rule for E1: absolute existence, a property that is had or is not had, period.
Sorry, I don't follow this notation. All I see is one domain 'A', and it is unclear if these 'two things' are part of it or not.
1) They're not claims, they're consequences of some of the various definitions. Secondly, I live my life to a very different set of definitions and beliefs than what I rationally have concluded. I hold pragmatic beliefs for the former, even if these are demonstrably false. We all do this. I'm just more aware of it than most.
Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies).
True, but characterization isn't necessary for the planet to orbit at that distance. The part that I find anthropocentric is where we say words like 'the universe' or 'our universe' which carries the implication that ours is the only one, that our universe has a preferred existence over the others due to us being in it. That's the sort of thinking that prompts me to label a definition as anthropocentric, not the inability to conceive of the mind-independent thing without utilizing a mind, and not just 'a mind', but 'my mind' in particular.
The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object.
Common misconception. Space expands over time, but the universe, not being 'over' time, does not expand, and doesn't meaningfully have a size or an age. This is presuming of course the consensus model of spacetime and not something weird like aether theory under which the universe kind of is an object and very much does have an age.
There you go. That is not a description of travel.
OK. Different definition of 'interval'. I was using the spacetime interval definition from physics.
But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
The concept of 14 is 14.
Quoting noAxioms
Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? Since an adjective is defined as a modifier (of a noun), how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? Consider a parallel question, "How can red exist if there's no thing that's red?" Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. Clearly, if redness doesn't exist (the state of being red), then red doesn't exist.
As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.
Quoting noAxioms
The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.
Quoting noAxioms
Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood.
Quoting noAxioms
My answer here is the same as directly above: unicorns and prime numbers exist within language, and language is a real thing, so they are real linguistically. As we say in common speech, a real person differs from a fictional person in that the former exists in both flesh and blood and language whereas the latter exists only in language.
Quoting noAxioms
You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?
Quoting noAxioms
In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.
Quoting noAxioms
This explains our conversation; it's hard to define and rationalize totality.
Quoting ucarr
Think of a fraction in math. If the numerator and the denominator are the same, then, as you know, the value of the fraction evaluates to one. In the first statement in parentheses, it's merely saying noAxioms is noAxioms, a circularity we don't waste our time on. The second statement, an equation, translates to A/A. Then we can treat A as a variable that let's us add a coefficient, such as 2. So 2A/2A = 1A = A. The third statement is a logical deduction from knowing that if a fraction has a value other than 1, then the numerator and the denominator are not equal.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I think the implication you describe is a true implication. If D(istance) = A, and A > 0, then any length beyond a dimensionless point is meaningful in terms of the definition of distance. We know this because the dimensionless point (0 distance) is the negation of length which, in our context here, equals distance. Our conclusion, then, says both thinking about and experiencing distance becomes meaningful as a journey either of the mind or of the body.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Math ? emergent from brain; Greed ? emergent from brain; Shadow ? emergent from massive object. The bi-conditional IFF connects them necessarily to physics.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?
Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence.
If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing.
OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'.
I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us.
I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.
Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism.
So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2.
Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers.
I will protest this one. A hydrocarbon is simply not sweetness. It is a molecule, and sweetness is only a perception when the molecule is contacted in just the right places by something evolved to be sensitive to it.
Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them.
To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different.
No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so.
Whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists or not depends on definitions, and by your definition above, I would say that yes, he exists since you can measure him the same way you claimed to measure the mathematical concept of infinity. To that, instead of giving examples of things that exist, give some examples of something nonexistent. Pretty tough to do since the mere act of thinking about the example is a measurement, and thus it must exist.
You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.
None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them.
Under E2, yes. Oddly enough, under E5 it doesn't. Rovelli discussed that interesting bit. Under a relational view like that, measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement.
Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. Space expansion over time means that (given a simplified linear expansion), a meter expands to two meters after twice the time. The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime.
Of course there are other definitions of 'universe', some of which are contained by time. Some use the word to refer to the visible universe, which expands over time since after a longer time, light from more distant things has had enough time to reach us. The visible universe has a time-dependent size, and thus the visible universe expands, currently at a rate of about 6-7c proper distance along lines of constant cosmological time. But that would be true even without expansion of space.
Quoting CorvusNo. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue.
Per a very explicit statement in the OP, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X'. Your inability to distinguish the two prevents any productive participation in a discussion about realism.
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. Your inability to understand even what a variable has been the cause of muddle and confusion
Quoting noAxioms
It is not matter of if you wanted. We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept. Your ignorance on the fact has been contributing to beating around the bush in circles instead of seeing any progress in the discussion.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
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I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence;
D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) ? Let C = {D | D ? C}, then D ? C ? D ? C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. If E, a modifier, can modify E[B} so that it evaluates to 0{B}, then you show how E changes the initial state of B to a final state of B = to 0{B}. This statement says that B = Object, when modified by E, becomes 0{B}. The translation for this says, "B = Object, when modified by E becomes { }. This means that E modifies B = Object such that it becomes B equals an expression of the null set, the set of nothing. So modifier E changes Object B into non-existence. Only non-existence can practice infinite negation so that there is never any existence that can get started. Non-existence admits no presence of existence. They cannot intersect. This tells us that E{B} ? { } because something existing, such as E, cannot modify non-existence because E itself cannot exist within the presence of non-existence. Only zero can evaluate to zero, a non-modification. This tells us that modification only applies to existing things acting upon other existing things, and thus there are no attributes modifying things that don't exist.
Quoting noAxioms
What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?
Don't follow, but that may be me. You reference only C and D, so let's say B is my mailbox and C is
Maybe I read it wrong. E would be 'has a flag'. We can go to Pegasus after we work out the mailbox example, and also if we have a far better definition of 'existence'.
Don't know what any of that means. Sorry if I'm not up on the notation. I don't know what the zero means. Existence of Pegasus is the zero of Pegasus?
It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is.
Quoting CorvusFine, then X is a statue of Pegasus, but that doesn't make your statement valid since a statue of X would be a statue of a statue, not a statue of Pegasus. And yes, they do make statues of statues. They sell them in gift shops.
Only by a non-realist, and this discussion is about realism. Per my OP, if I say '14', I am discussing 14 and not the concept of 14. If you can't do that (if only to demonstrate the inconsistency of it), then as I say, you've nothing to contribute to a discussion about a stance that distinguishes the two.
14 being no more than a concept is not a fact, it's an idealistic opinion.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Let C = {D | D ? C}, then D ? C ? D ? C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ? C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ? C, which means D is not a part of existence. This is a sentence logic (SL) statement representing your sentence verbal statement:
Quoting noAxioms
By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.
Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier and it modifies an object that doesn't exist. Since the adjective, defined as a modifier of an object, exists, then its object exists. If the adjective also modifies an object that doesn't exist, you imply that the object simultaneously does and doesn't exist. The contradiction of something simultaneously existing and not existing is expressed in sentence logic as: Let C (existence) = {D | D ? C}.
You think a modifier can modify an object that exists, and you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist. I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists. If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state, and thus its state can't be changed, and thus it can't have a modifier that changes its state.
Quoting ucarr
E{B} says E (Winged) changes B (Horse) into Winged Horse. 0{B} says 0 (non-existence) changes B (Horse) into { }, the null set, which is the empty set, or non-existence. This is the crux of my argument supporting EPP. Non-existence, like zero, negates infinitely all that would seek to be in its presence.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
All of this, speaking in terms of logical consistency, revolves around definition, grammar and syntax. Object by definition ? non-existence. Adjective, by grammar ? modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence. If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
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I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.
Quoting noAxiomsI need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]
I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.
Quoting noAxioms
You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.
Quoting noAxioms
Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
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Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?
Quoting noAxioms
With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?
Quoting ucarr
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I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.
Quoting ucarr
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I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.
Quoting noAxioms
Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.
Quoting noAxioms
How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?
That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me.
Is this meant to be your definition of 'exists'? Because from that I have no idea what does and doesn't exist. It seems to presume that we already know, yet no definition is given.
Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them.
Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2.
If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. If not, then you need to define how you're using 'exists' here before I can agree to taking such a position. Remember, no EPP if we're predicating nonexistent things.
I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration.
Actually, your logic in your earlier post was perhaps predicating nonexistent things when talking about winged horses. But yes, you did say that you hold to EPP.
I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate.
Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.
For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't).
Quoting ucarrTwo things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.
Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse.
Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic.
Quoting ucarrOK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality.
Yes, there is a tiny bit of overlap between perception and quantum entanglement, but they're a world apart in my opinion.
But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition.
But nobody was questioning the existence of the drawing or of a statue (OK, I am questioning it). We're questioning the existence of Pegasus, and by E2, yes. Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence.
Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. I have better proof of mind independence.
So OK, the drawing is perhaps more than an ideal. The ideal corresponds to something mind independent. Next question: Does it exist? Depends on definition. OK, specifically, does it exist under definitions E1,3,4,5,6? Most of those are similar but with different domains. Under which domains does the drawing exist? Under which domains is EPP valid? E4 still seems anthropocentric, a form of mind dependency. Thus E4 makes for a poor definition for mind independent existence.
My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. I also did not mention a third part. The example was how you would see it.
What is evidence for the sign's mind independence is that we both see it, as we did with your example of a drawing above.
By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway.
No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post.
Kind of off topic, no? I have neither claimed this nor denied this.
The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition.
Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical
Yes, it did (E5), because it was measured even before you had a notion to seek after it. Your current state was a function of the ball, as it is a function of a great deal of anything inside your past light cone.
f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? ucarr
Most people use 'material' to mean matter. If space was matter, you could not walk into a room since it was already full. So rather than argue about this, let's clearly define 'material' before we decide if space qualifies as it or not.
Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property.
I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'.
It has a temporal dimension. What you call 'change' is a difference in cross sections at different times, just like an MRI image has different pictures of cross sections of a body at different values of some spatial axis.
I suppose I hold to it. I only know the relevance to general relativity.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Things that [s]either[/s] exist [s]or[/s] don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying, Quoting noAxioms
is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.
Quoting noAxioms
I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.
Quoting noAxioms
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Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.
Quoting noAxioms
I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.
This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.
Quoting noAxioms
I think here you have a good policy.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.
Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said.
2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept.
Quoting ucarrWrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur.
Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature.
I never said it exists. Read the quote.
Quoting ucarrOK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.
Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.
There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one.
Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets.
As for my counter to EPP, I point out that 8 is an even number, which is a predicate of 8. The concept of 8 is not even, but the concept of 8 bears the concept of something even. Either way it is not a predicate of the concept. How is EPP consistent with that?
No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong.
Quoting ucarrYou know I don't consider color to be a predicate of a soccer ball, but I will allow it to have physical properties that would result in perception by some as what you call these proto-colors, yet unspecified.
More like black and white. All colors look pretty much like grayscale under monochrome light. If the ball had two different materials (as most do), the one would be lighter than the other. Anyway, were it observed by a simple human-made digital camera, yes, you'd get a picture with only reds in it. I'm just being picky here, not disagreeing with anything. More picky: Is there such a thing as invisible red light?
Your soccer ball seems to reflect at least these two wavelengths of light, else your story would not work.
Not clear under E1. Yes, clear under E2 and E4, the two anthropocentric definitions.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If existence and predicate are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.
Quoting noAxiomsI need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
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Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.
If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.
Quoting noAxioms
Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.
Quoting noAxioms
I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.
Quoting ucarr
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You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?
Quoting ucarr
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You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?
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E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"
Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.
Quoting noAxioms
Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
So-called emptiness ? emptiness.
When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.
Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds.
You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception.
A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)
Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events.
Quoting ucarrYes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric.
Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless.
Quoting ucarrI am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there.
'Ontic' means existence, so it seems contradictory to refer to ontic status independent of existence. But while 'ontic' refers to what is, it isn't confined to just one definition of what is, E1-E6+.
Quoting ucarrI am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.
How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.
So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP.
Quoting ucarrFor the most part, I am willing to accept this. The measurement event and the wave function of its entire causal past (a subset of its past light cone given a presumption of locality) can be thought of as expressions of the same thing, neither being prior to the other. But all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v.
Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.
Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that.
Quoting ucarrYes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained.
Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration.
This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe)
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist." See your own quote below.
Quoting noAxioms
You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.
Quoting noAxioms
You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim. If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio. Although a human-level mind is required to know this, a chimp in Cincinnati is also simultaneously in Ohio, and this is an existential truth independent of whether or not the Chimp knows it.
Quoting noAxioms
You and Meinong, when talking about predication sans existence, navigate the mind-scape of abstractions including paradox. At the level of practical English, and everyday conversation, if I say, "Yesterday, I looked at the red..." In response, you would probably say, "You looked at the red what?" My statement is either an incomplete thought with a adjective dangling, or it is a complete thought about a noun expressed by the word "red." An example of the latter is "red" used to designate a radical leftist.
These two predications, assuming existing things, make declarations about them. The scope of predication always includes existing things. Our declarations fall into two categories: a) claims about the behavior of an existing thing; b) claims about the state of being of an existing thing. We can wax fanciful and make claims about non-existing things - such as a winged Pegasus of the mind non-existent - but such talk inhabits the realm of paradox.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Is EPP your language denoting Sartres Existence Precedes Essence?
Quoting noAxioms
Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:
noun | ?atr??byo?ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. The Apple Dictionary
I think it likely the cited definition of attribute assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition of.
preposition | ?v | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. The Apple Dictionary
noun | ?atr??byo?ot | 1 a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something
Someone might wish to argue attribute and existence are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. At least twice youve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:
Quoting noAxioms
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The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? It's quite distinct from what you argue below:
Quoting noAxioms
I had explicitly not posited EPP in my example. This does not mean I embrace anything, it means I am testing it. I am trying to have it driven to contradiction, but I've not seen that done yet.
There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure. Aether theories come to mind, but then all talk of spacetime is discarded.
So you are. It's simultaneity at a distance that is abstract. I stand clarified.
No. I suppose I would abbreviate that as EPE.
Quoting ucarr
No leverage of EPP is there. 'of' refers to Pegasus in our example. None of your cited definitions make mention of the object of predication necessarily existing.
Besides, it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything.
I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all.
I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either.
Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way.
Quoting noAxioms
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I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. It's like multiplying 'has wings' by zero with a total non-existence result.). Next you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." Your first sentence posits an object. Your second sentence denies its existence. The two sentences describe a paradox.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. Wikipedia
Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noethers Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If numbers exist as a concept, then they exist. Zero does not equal non-existence because it's an unsigned number that's a placeholder and, as such, it can add great positive value to other numbers. For example,
in base 10, the difference between 1 and 10 is a factor of ten, a big difference of value.
In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether. Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. It negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Everything in the sentence has existence as a concept.
You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it.
Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others.
I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe.
Make up your mind...
All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. Sorry, I digress, but I totally didn't see any point to the number base comment.
I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it.
So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.
Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be a whole apple and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.
Quoting noAxioms
In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws. My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.
All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time. The dimension of time applies to both modes. My saying your "analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field," does not establish an either/or binary governing the two modes.
Quoting noAxioms
Observer entanglement raises doubt about cognition having no impact upon E1, E3, E4, E5, E6.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I don't argue with the claim all of our human perceptions of existence are mind-dependent. My "inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence." stands as my argument inference from observed behaviors of other persons gives us reliable information about their cognitive states as objective reality. No reasonable person disputes one person's ability to predict another person's behavior on the basis of inference from past observed behavior.
Quoting noAxioms
Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.
Quoting ucarr
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Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2. Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.
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Quoting ucarr
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When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics. E2 "I know about it," refers to cognitive things of the mind-scape. E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe," as I understand it, refers to a flying horse defined by physics as rendered through a cognitive thing of the mind-scape.
Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." youre asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an as if physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This as if version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non as-if mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.
Quoting ucarr
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From our consensus-based social reality, we know the stop sign is red because we infer from the similar behavior of others reacting to it their mental content in reaction to it. This means the mind-independent physics we call "stop sign" lies in the causal history of the socially verified public reaction to it. Why should we, the perceiving society, think the causal history of the referent might be, WRT language, an intentional deception or an unintentional distortion of the mind-independent state of the stop sign? This type of supposition presents itself as likely being a capricious frolic of a wayward mind.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
By this argument, EPP is allowed as the causal history of Sherlock Holmes as rendered in the socially-verified mind-scape. E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1. Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1. This is the argument for EPP protected by contradiction if EPP is denied.
The issue herein concerns the relationship between E1 and E2. Can anyone verify a distortion factor in the translation between the two too large to render a functional translation?
Quoting noAxioms
Causal relationships are not temporal. When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before. Speaking reciprocally, when you were conceived, you became effect to their cause, and not a moment before. This relationship will always be true.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
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The inter-relatedness you describe here is parallel to the inter-relatedness that general existence, as the quintet funding physics, holds in relation to all temporary physical forms emergent from it.
Quoting ucarr
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The part/whole relationship connecting spacetime_universe might be emergence of universe from spacetime. If so, then the two are fundamentally connected. The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.
Quoting ucarr
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Deformation of flat spacetime resulting in shorter time-like worldlines between two events isn't warping of spacetime around a massive celestial body?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
From your quotes here it sounds like you're describing a worldline dimension warping around a massive celestial body.
Gravity and acceleration causing the passing of time to slow are well known, long established predictions of Relativity. Do you deny the validity of the experimental verification of these predictions and do you deny their truth content?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Are you saying passing time is contained within the universe and applies to its parts but doesn't apply to the universe as a whole?
None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass.
None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions.
Your premise seems to presume that only 'material' things have objective existence, which confines them to our universe or one very much like it, pretty much an E4 definition. What if your premise is wrong? I mean, 14 is even (a predicate) and yet 14 is not material, so it doesn't exist by your premise. That seems to be a counterexample to your premise. And remember, I'm talking about 14 and not the concept of 14, the latter of which does not have the listed predicate.
14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time.
The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates.
event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked.
The stipulation is logical. The topic is about mind independent existence, and E2 is by definition mind dependent existence. I'm not saying it's wrong, it's just not mind independent.
I am discussing ontology, not epistemology.
Not sure if physics defines Pegasus. That specific creature is, after all, in violation of our physics. Physics does allow a winged thing that in a reasonable way otherwise resembles a horse, so I'll accept the comment.
I don't understand almost any of that, but in the end you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not.
Quoting ucarrFalse, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain.
This seems to say that there cannot be more than one objective reality, or one OR embedded within another. With that I can agree, but tell me if I parsed it wrong, because it's obfuscated wording.
Nothing is 'part of E1'. E1 is a definition. So anything that exists is part of objective reality (OR), by definition. If Sherlock Holmes is not part of OR (and I had presumed this), then I see no contradiction still. X exists. Y does not. I see no contradiction in some things being part of OR and other things not.
The only rule seems to be that if X and Y interact, they must have similar ontology. I can interact with ghosts only if ghosts are real or if I'm not real.
Anyway, you said 'get a contradiction from excluding Holmes from OR. Please spell out that contradiction since I do not see one. It is asserted, but in no way demonstrated.
By definition they very much are.
I was talking about the E5 definition, and this isn't true under E5. They are not the cause to my effect until my effect measures them, and that doesn't happen for over half a century after said conception event. E5 is not a standard ontology definition. Rovelli is the only one that got close to its wording.
I didn't say it was. I said that under E5 definition, its existence relative to you is due to your measurement of it. That measurement has zero to do with epistemology. Rocks measure things in this sense just as much as a biological system. E5 is a completely mind independent definition.
Wow, I have no trouble conceiving of a universe without spacetime.
Quoting noAxioms
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The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time.
preposition - of | ?v | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. The Apple Dictionary
noun - attribute | ?atr??byo?ot | 1 a quality or feature a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something
The part/whole relationship connecting functions to the dynamic system (material thing) they describe examples an indivisible unity. The emergent system, a temporal form, encloses the defining characteristics within its perimeter. You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.
A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.
This overview of the insuperable container by the thing it contains insuperably equals the thing contained being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself.
In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere and observing the whole sphere with itself as a part. This is an example of the curvature of the surface area of the sphere being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself, a contradiction.
This contradiction is inevitable whenever a subordinate attribute attempts to describe the insuperable whole encompassing it.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
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My interpretation of your statement quoted above understands that when you say, "'has wings has an object to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence," you're saying that something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence. These two states combined into one thing: a) an object that can be modified; b) an object that lacks the property of existence examples a paradox.
My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist.
When you claim something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence, you argue for predication outside of EPP, but you do so by resorting to paradox. If you don't resort to paradox, you evaluate to 2 { } = 0.
Quoting noAxioms
You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?
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If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.
Quoting ucarr
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Eternal universe precludes "nothing."
Quoting noAxioms
Don't confuse necessity of matter with necessity of existence.
If there are meaningful distinctions between E1-E6, then existence supervenes on all of their applications.
"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.
The conservation laws establish and maintain the noumenal substantiation of the ontically-supported abstractions - as opposed to the ideals - you stipulated in your quest for a metaphysical definition of existence.
Quoting ucarr
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The wave function in quantum fluctuations at the singularity stands as a good candidate for eternal matter.
Quoting ucarr
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Even to desist implies the existence of a subject carrying out the action described.
None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)?
The bold part directly begs EPP. As I said, you just cannot set it aside long enough to drive its absence to contradiction.
Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something.
A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.
This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of.
Maybe I'm just not getting the poetic way you word things.
Quoting ucarrThe last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied.
As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.
It comes with embrace of spacetime, big bang, black holes, all of which are described only by relativity theory and denied by absolutist theories. Relativity of simultaneity directly follows from the premises of special relativity. The absolutist alternatives deny both of those premises. You are of course free to join that group.
Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line.
Still not demonstrated, only asserted.
Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I understand you to be saying I can't show EPP is necessary because the lack of it evaluates to a contradiction. I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
If you want to see the original post of this definition with full context, use the link below.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/976808
This definition is more that axiomatic language because you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. This is proof that for humans existence is insuperable. Therefore, all thought and talk of non-existence is just more naming of existence. This leads us to understand that talking about non-existence as humans confined to existence is a contradiction. This is my short route to the lack of EPP necessarily leading to a contradiction.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You say, "'E1- Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality' has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws." Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. We agree on this point. However, because you are cementing the fact numbers exist with the example of the eight planets, your example is of the type predication about two existing things. Haven't you been rebutting me by arguing predications about non-existence are possible?
As a factor, zero negates the presence of all other things, and yet that's still not non-existence because the evaluation to zero has a number as its conclusion.
Quoting noAxioms
All numbers can use base 10, but not all number bases are 10. Some other number bases include base 2, base 8 and base 16.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If two wings are a part of Pegasus, given that Pegasus doesn't exist, then also given that two wings a part of Pegasus don't exist. If we stipulate two wings exist with no existing Pegasus, we can't prove they're a predication about Pegasus. If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past with two wings, inferring two wings are a predication about Pegasus is an historical claim about a prior state; it is not a predication about a non-existent Pegasus.
Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings, unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.
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modify | ?mäd??f? |verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft.
We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action.
Quoting noAxioms
Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.
Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be all of the states of the apple within its entire history and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.
In your example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.
Quoting noAxioms
Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things.
Regarding change of states of material things, explain how a infinite series of negations (non-existence) of the existence of things with states of being allows such states to be changed.
Quoting noAxioms
There's no simple division of mind-independent reality and mind-dependent reality. EPP, whether accepted or discarded, articulates an inter-weave of the two realities. Were that not the case, there would be no controversy about it. This inter-weave is the foundation of your conversation and our debate. E1-E6 are distillations from a fluid inter-weave of noumena meets phenomena. There will be no perfectly discrete separation one from the other. E1 is mind-independent reality. E2 is mind-dependent reality. Without their inter-weave, no philosophy possible.
Quoting noAxioms
The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. Do you suppose you'd be making statements without them? Can you show something non-physical not tied to the them?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Are their predicates outside time?
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Quoting ucarr
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There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles.
Quoting ucarr
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The distinction is partial. What we know must have an referent external to itself. The Incompleteness Theorem of logic demonstrates math axiomatic systems' inability to justify all their true statements. This is proof of the entanglement of E1 with E2.
Without this entanglement of ontology and epistemology, knowledge, if it could exist, would be nothing more than a vacuous circularity. Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.
Quoting noAxioms
Here's the distinction between something directly observable and something not directly observable.
With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.
In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.
Quoting noAxioms
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Quoting ucarr
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If it's Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. in London, and not some ontic Baker St. in physical London, then there is no example of non-existent Baker St. with predicates. Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. has predicates in the world of fiction; ontic Baker St. in physical London has predicates in the real world of objective reality.
I already commented on that definition. What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me.
Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence.
Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP).
Quoting ucarrYou are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.
I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.
Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence.
Quoting ucarrThat burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well.
Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.
Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation.
Quoting ucarrOK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence.
This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. But if you mean E1 existence, then there's no domain. The thing either exists or not, and Pegasus counting himself isn't empirical evidence one way or the other.
Quoting ucarrI didn't even put temporal restrictions in my list of 6. Exists in the (abstract) domain of 'now', which has a general form of existence within a restricted domain.
Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise.
No such premise is required for nonexistent Pegasus to have two wings since existence of anything was not mentioned, let alone posited, in the above description. You've not justified why anything needs to exist in this scenario that explicitly references only nonexistent things.
Quoting ucarrI don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. How many times do I have to remind you of that? This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition.
Quoting ucarrDifferent definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one.
None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction.
I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp.
Quoting ucarrThat they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14'. I was not talking about the conception of it.
Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates.
Similarly I can talk about 14 being even, despite 14 not having a time coordinate (nor a spatial coordinate).
Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow.
Concerning E5 definition:
Quoting ucarr
There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event. The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. That part of the definition holding to the principle of locality. There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.
Quoting ucarrNo, it would be a vacuous absence of knowledge, but this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them.
QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles.
Quoting ucarrOh you do have a concept of something external to your own mind.
OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. Furthermore, I'm saying the Newtonian physics humans know empirically is linked by symmetry and conservation to the Standard Model. If these two premises are true, then predication of existing things is governed by symmetry and conservation within the context of the Standard Model.
Quoting noAxioms
I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum.
Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as Santa. My topic concerns two things: Arguments for/against this position, and implications of it.
Saying Santa is nonexistent is a simplification and distortion that terminates in falsehood. The neuronal circuits of the brain, physical realities, support imaginings about Santa and the like. It's wrong to think abstract cognition is divorced from material reality.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
It does break something; it makes the curvature disappear. Since the city of Columbus lies within the border of Ohio, we know every part of Columbus is also a part of Ohio. If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally. In a parallel, curvature is a part of the sphere; it's a part of the definition of sphere. If the sphere disappears totally, its curvature disappears totally.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
The preposition subordinates predication without reference to location of the thing predicated. Consider: "I see the red car." One of the predications in this sentence is the description of the car as having red color. This predication, like all predications, is about something. Break the connection and the predication, by definition, disappears.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Does this statement beg EPP? In defending EPP, I'm allowed to reason from the definition of predication since it's fundamental to EPP. In saying, "When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." I'm articulating the definition of modification. I assert nothing that explicity assumes existence being prior to predication. If the definition of predication implies its subservience to existence of what it modifies, then denial of EPP is blocked by the definition of one of its fundamental parts.
predicate
noun | ?pred?k?t | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.
As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.[/quote]
In making your effort to pivot away from my argument, you appear to have taken recourse to E2 and its reliance upon language. In doing so, you appear to be contradicting your purpose in this conversation:
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.
If this is correct, then you acknowledge proof is limited by mind-dependence. Given these points, the first part of your claim is inconsistent with the second part.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
My assertion, without the negation of existence, is consistent with existence. All assertions, save one (negation of existence), are internally consistent WRT existence. We can only make an approach to non-existence. We cannot arrive there. We cannot even describe non-existence without speaking paradox.
Quoting noAxioms
Although your sentence is understandable, non-existence cannot be the subject of a predicate.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If you're talking about my sentence quoted below, it expresses an implication of existence by predication. The definition of existence comes just before it.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.
Quoting noAxioms
A finite series of negations doesn't equate to non-existence because the material universe is infinite.
The meaning of negation-to-non-existence by infinite series examples language approaching what cannot be arrived at: non-existence. Existence is an insuperable context. Talking about non-existence, implies existence doing the talking. The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence.
Yes, negation of existence is a predication, this fact being more evidence you can't arrive at non-existence while existing. The answer to the question, "Why existence?" is the fact of it being asked. Such fact means existence of the questioner. In the unspeakable reality of non-existence, there can be no questioner and no question, "Why existence?" This lets us know that when the question is raised, the fact of it being raised answers the question. It cannot be asked unless existence obtains.
Quoting noAxioms
Of course my definitions are based upon perceptions and, later down the line, upon abstract reasoning from the info and understanding made possible by empirical experience. We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. There's no disputing the entanglement of sentient beings and their environments.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access. Direct access to mind independence means having no mind which means not existing in the first person perspective. Since all of our talk about mind-independence must be by inference, we only experience mind-independence as a part of mind-dependence.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.
I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.
Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence. If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
The currency of our debate is thought expressed in words. With the expression ¬A, we understand not A or no presence of A. An infinite series of negations is likewise words expressing erasure of an infinite series of existences.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I've already presented a math theorem justifying the conservation laws of just this one particular universe.
Quoting ucarr
Can you counter-narrate the following:
Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Since I read you as thinking numbers exist and you say your words express the opposite thought, I now know you think numbers don't exist.
Consider: You're teaching numbers to your child. In your backyard you've laid two stones set apart. You walk your child to the first stone and place his hand upon it. You say aloud, "one." You coax your child to say aloud, "one." You repeat this action at the next stone. You then put the two stones close together and place your child's hand on each stone, one after the other. At each stone the little person says aloud, "one." You then say aloud, "two." While speaking, you put your hand onto one stone and then onto the other. Finally you coax the child to say aloud, "two." The child picks up a stone in each hand and runs around the yard excited, yelling, "two!"
Does the child, completely ignorant about numbers, see the difference between one stone and two stones?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists. I made the math statement Peagasus exists zero times, meaning he doesn't exist.
Quoting noAxioms
You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. Your assumption doesn't specify which domain he occupies, and thus his absence from Moscow has no bearing upon the fact of his existence. Can you demonstrate predication sans existence without paradoxically assuming the existence of the non-existent thing?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence. There's no logical refutation of EPP via demonstration of predication sans existence if it's assumed (or presumed).
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You're examining the grammar governing the ontics of material things. There are no discussions that aren't about mind-dependent perception somewhere down the line. Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception, I don't see how we can apply our minds to both modes.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
predicate
noun | ?pred?k?t | Grammar
the part of a sentence or clause containing a verb and stating something about the subject (e.g., went home in John went home): [as modifier] : predicate adjective.
Logic something that is affirmed or denied concerning an argument of a proposition.
verb | ?pred??k?t | [with object]
1 Grammar & Logic state, affirm, or assert (something) about the subject of a sentence or an argument of a proposition: a word that predicates something about its subject | aggression is predicated of those who act aggressively.
2 (predicate something on/upon) found or base something on: the theory of structure on which later chemistry was predicated.
I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
I read your two above quotes as evidence of you talking about abstractions towards examining whether EPP can be eliminated without causing a problem. I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Let's establish that here we're examining: a) a material red stop sign that's mind-independent; b) a concept of a material red stop sign that's mind-dependent.
You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.
Yes, I insist on considering mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. My justification for this insistence is simple and obvious. Our access to mind independence only occurs through mind. You acknowledge this limitation when you say, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."
You address the core issue of this conversation when you say, "I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way."
Can we go beyond the bounds of mind in our observations of nature? We've already agreed we get beyond our own solitary mind through social reality. By observing the behavior of others, when we compare it to our own behavior in similar situations entailing similar stimuli, and when we see similar reactions, we infer other minds are perceiving what our mind perceives.
Perhaps we disagree on the interpretation of objective reality inferred from social interaction. I think the subject/object couplet is a fluid dynamic associated with entanglement of subject-object. With your talk of mind independence, and your frustration with my adherence to mind dependence and perception in application to observation of nature, you suggest to me a striving for clearly articulated separation of subject and object, as if somehow observation can be done without subjectivity.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You were talking about it because whenever you talk of mind independence, that's just more neuronal circuits in your brain allowing you to entertain another concept. You've acknowledged this by saying, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one."
A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstractions, a set that predicates belong to. Abstractions, being mind dependent, don't inhabit the realm of mind independence. Given this limitation, predicates are contingent things. Their position within the causal cone of material things establishes them as contemporaries of material things but logically subsequent to them. This argument establishes EPPL, viz., Existence Precedes Predication Logically.
EPPL establishes (E ? P) as a two-part complex. It precludes predication without existence because ¬(E ? P) = (¬E ? ¬P) = { }.
If predicates do have temporal coordinates, then they exist as abstractions derived from multi-part sampling of observations of individual material things linked thematically and collected into a set expressed by the abstract concept. They are materially encoded within the brain as neuronal circuits.
The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through its attachment to its material referents (14 stones). This attachment gives 14 existential meaning and presence as a position on the number line. Detached from its material referents, 14 becomes graphic markings without ontics or physics.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them. You're never independent of time, so your cognitive claims about things timeless are always based upon your temporal neural activity. You cannot set aside your material subjectivity. No material existence, no claims about immaterial things. Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If non-events equal non-existence in your context here, then all events - including predications - expressed in terms of non-events, are category errors.
Quoting noAxioms
This topic, and all others, must necessarily be concerned with knowledge as facts. There is no mind independence paired with subjectivity.
Quoting noAxioms
Inference from calculations applied to experimental data detected phenomena now labeled QM. Math analysis of QM phenomena translates to the technology enabling our online dialog. QM is the basis of the information age.
Quoting noAxioms
The white horse exists relative to the mind and also to other material things. Pegasus only exists relative to the mind.
The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers. There's a presumption of mind independence within the context of mind-inter-dependence, something that reduces to individualized mind dependence.
Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number?
Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is.
Quoting ucarrColumbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me.
Quoting ucarrHow can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist.
Quoting ucarrI don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.
I came up with a nonexhaustive list of 6 definiitions, one or two of which are mind dependent. None are fundamental, and being definitions, I think all 6 are abstract. Mostly I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. The other five I've already analyzed.
Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there.
QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding.
Quoting ucarr
I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. I could not figure out how the size of the universe had an relevance whatsoever to a thing being talked about.
The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about.
Quoting ucarrI didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist.
So don't access it directly.
I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase.
I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it.
Quoting ucarrI don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted.
Quoting ucarrI think if there was direct evidence of them, they by definition wouldn't be other universes. Most of the basic multiverse types fall necessarily out of theories that explain observation that no single classical universe theory can. For instance, Greene's inflationary multiverse (Tegmark's type II) explains the fine tuning issue, a very serious problem in a mono-universe interpretation.
The simplest (by far) quantum interpretation necessitates Greene's quantum multiverse. Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor.
The only relevant quote in the wiki multiverse page was references to existence.
"Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them."
This one seems to presume a sort of E4 existence, substituting the multiverse for just our universe. Same relation, but far less anthropocentric.
Most of the references seem to use something like the E4 definition, but I think the intent is meant objectively despite the authors not thinking that out though. It isn't the point of the web page.
Quoting ucarrI didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions.
By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous.
Quoting ucarrNo, I just don't presume EPP when having him perform that. But as I said, you cannot conceive of no EPP, leaving you in no position to justify it. Trust me, there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence.
Sure. One counterexample is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple.
Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning.
I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct.
It does not. It is about existence independent of perception.
Quoting ucarrThere's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication.
Quoting ucarrSpacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics.
It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them.
I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity.
It's not fundamental (outside of idealism). Yes, consideration is mind dependent, but I'm not talking about the consideration, I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity.
So yes, use your mind to consider this or that, but don't talk about the considering or the perceiving. Four consecutive examples below where you talk only of the concepts and not about the mind independent thing.
1Quoting ucarrI am not talking about abstractions of predicates.
2Not talking about the concept of 14.
3 I am not talking about conceptualizing or neurons.
4And again. Not talking about cognitive Baker St. I'm talking about Baker St.
Quoting ucarrWhat are P & Q? Events? I am presuming so. They are effectively each a set of four coordinates
I don't know what you think it means for one event to be a correlation of another. Measurement of entangled pairs are said to be correlated, but not that one is a correlation of the other. It's a mutual thing, not an arrow going one way, I'm presuming this sort of mutual thing in my answers.
I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other.
There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals.
Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q.
Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R.
Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical.
Predications are not events. They don't have coordinates.
Yes, such is the basis for E4, but it is still anthropocentric existence, still dependent on perception. Such is presumed by the wiki article on the multiverse, which still suggests a restriction that what exists is defined as what we see and infer from it.
E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things?
I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape. Specifically, I equate metaphysics with the grammar, viz., the foundational rules governing the complex (as in multi-part entity) of material reality and its emergent forms (cognitions of the mind-scape).
I think metaphysics an emergent property of material things. As such, it's part of the sub-domain of material things labeled cognition. Within cognition, metaphysics is the grammar governing both material things and cognitive things.
Quoting noAxioms
I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics.
I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.[/quote]
I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context. The Standard Model, with its symmetries and conservation laws, grounds existence, the largest of all contexts.
I think it likely your E1-E6 do not cover all facets of my definition of existence. For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its
subject-object complex.
Quoting noAxioms
You seem to be asking whether math is encompassed within The Standard Model. Yes, it's contained within cognition.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
For proper understanding of my intended communication, my quote needs to be presented and evaluated in its entirety.
Quoting ucarr
The main point of my argument points to the generality of existence in terms of its grasp of all of the forms taken by emergent material things. Saying existence has no properties is like saying variable x doesn't signify a specific number because its range encompasses all numbers (when you add (a+bi) to the mix).
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
I argue my statement doesn't assume EPP in route to proving it because of the statement, "Modifiers attach to their objects." This isn't a re-wording of EPP. It's a stipulation by definition pertaining to the application of "modify" WRT EPP. For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun. Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication, I don't see how it's an example of begging EPP.
Perhaps you think because I say, "there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist." that means I'm assuming existence instead of proving it. I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?
Quoting noAxioms
I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP. I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.
realism | ?r???liz(?)m |
noun
Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence. The theory that universals have their own reality is sometimes called Platonic realism because it was first outlined by Plato's doctrine of forms or ideas. Often contrasted with nominalism.
the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has real existence and is neither reducible to
universal mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent. Often contrasted with idealism (sense
2). - The Apple Dictionary
Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism? I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means:
reality | r??al?d? |
noun
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions. - The Apple Dictionary
I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape.[/quote]Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space"
Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model.
OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things.
That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions.
Quoting ucarrAll that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent.
Not true. You can conclude ¬O ? ¬C from that, but not O ? C
But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP.
Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions.
You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious.
Quoting ucarrI cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that.
I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent.
It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1.
Disagree. Language is used for far more than just proofs and finding of truth.
The way it is typically put: Language (and models) describe, they do not proscribe.
The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.
The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary.
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The issue of measurement within QM adds complexity and uncertainty of interpretation WRT the subject-object binary. There's evidence supporting the view they're entangled. The Schrödinger Equation allows us to infer super-position, but we never see it. Does the wave function collapse under observation? The measurement issue links directly to your ability to examine mind-independent existence. It fogs over your clear vision of its measurement.
Quoting ucarr
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We've already discussed the scope of existence within my definition; it includes mind-dependent abstractions of the mind and also presumed mind-independent material things understood by inference from social interactions revealing similar responses to perceived stimuli.
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Is Pegasus independent of all human minds, or do all human minds assemble Pegasus internally from their memory banks? I'm familiar with E1-E6. What is D5?
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Your opening clause, independent, is inconsistent with your second clause, dependent. Your use of "mind-independent" as a modifier for real things shows their independence is only rendered as fact through the activity of the mind that asserts mind-independence. Mind-independence can't be conceived without mind, and thus it is encompassed within mind, a fact making it clear "mind-independence" is never apart from mind.
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Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.
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This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?
I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.
Quoting noAxioms
Saying, "So an apple is red only if the apple exists..." examples our inability to refute the existence of something without first assuming its existence. In the situation of the true non-existence of a thing, no thought of its refutation would occur. We can think of things not known to exist independent of mind, and the language here says the important thing, we can think of things only extant within the mind. Indeed, within the mind they do exist, so likewise in the mind, we can think about refuting their existence. Yes, mental-only things have a type of existence that can be made the object of refutation. Truly non-existent things cannot even be thought of.
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Santa is not non-existent. Santa exists as a mental simulation of a mind-independent man.
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Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.
What is your response?
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Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications.
Quoting ucarr
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E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality
Objective Reality ? E
E2 Existence is what is known
Mind ? E
E3 Existence has predicates
E ? Phenomena
E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)
E ? Objective Reality = {A,B,C,D,E...}
E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X
X (Causal History) ?? Y
E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.
( ? x ) ( | x | > 5 )
Your stipulation prohibiting assumption of EPP en route to evaluating to EPP is invalid. A clarifying parallel goes as follows: Stipulation 01: Evaluate to math given: for m = math, ( ? m ) ( | m | m < ? ?m > 0). This statement quantifies the existence of math such that math has a positive value and therefore math exists. Stipulation 02: Evaluate to the existence of math without using math logic. Since math is essential to math logic, you cannot evaluate to math existence using math logic without assumption of math. Likewise, you can't evaluate to mind exists if you stipulate no assumption of MPP (Mind Precedes Predication) because without MPP you can't make the predication of "Math exists." without presumption of (and use of) the prior mind that makes the predication.
Quoting ucarr
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I conclude your multi-verse attack on the pertinence of the symmetries and their conservation laws of our universe fizzles into irrelevance. The symmetries and their conservation laws connect all material things as emergent forms temporal. There are no empirical non-existences, whether directly observed or logically inferred.
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Parsing existence into separate categories is a falsehood. All material things are emergent forms temporal. Existence cannot be analyzed. Avoid confusing analysis of emergent forms temporal with analysis of existence general. You can analyze the attributes of yourself as an emergent form temporal. You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.
Quoting ucarr
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Your division of existence into separate categories has no bearing on the symmetries, so, WRT general existence, your categories merge into general existence. I expect you to counter-narrate this, so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.
Quoting ucarr
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Pegasus exists as a material thing in the form of a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain.
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Scope-limiters applied to existence by definition get over-ridden by the symmetries and their conservation laws. For example, if you define Pegasus as a winged horse of the mind, then Pegasus exists as a memory-based simulation emergent from neuronal activity of the brain. All of the activity of the brain and mind are emergent from a pre-existing fund of conserved physics. The imaginative cognition of mind can configure Pegasus however it wishes, but that cognition is an emergent temporal form drawn from the pre-existing fund of conserved physics.
Quoting ucarr
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I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.
Quoting ucarr
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How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?
Quoting ucarr
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I'm not putting myself at odds with physics because my point is based in the belief abstractions - although platformed by temporal neuronal circuits of the brain - signify their meanings in terms of atemporal samplings of multiple instances of a state of a system condensed to a generalization.
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I've established my allegiance to mind independence through social consensus based upon empirical evidence that similarity of human behavior as a reaction to stimuli denotes similarity of stimuli independent of one observer. I acknowledge my belief what is real depends, ultimately, upon the mind in conversation with other minds.
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Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock. This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it. It doesn't matter if you see the rock with your physical eyes, or with your mind's eye. Either way, the empirical reality of the rock you can experience always involves your mind.
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Directly below your words show that you, like me, believe a stop sign holds existence apart from its predication.
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Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q. Moreover, causation implies correlation. If A makes you sick, removal of A from your presence cures your sickness. This is to say that as A becomes zero, so S for sickness becomes zero.
Quoting noAxioms
The point is that correlations, like causal relationships, involve correspondents. P alone doesn't imply Q. Given P ? Q, there's a correlation because of correspondence. Red, as an adjective, by definition, implies a subject it makes predication about. Predication, with no existing subject to make a predication about, examples nonsense.
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Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P ? Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?
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P ? Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.
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Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.
Coordinate systems map to material things local.
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Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?
No contradiction since nowhere does it suggest an absence of perception in the act of defining something.
OP disclaimer says what I am talking about.
Quoting ucarrDefinition dependent, and definition not specified.
Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication.
No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing.
It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again).
I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic.
Quoting ucarrDoesn't seem to be.
Yes, but sans EPP, objective reality could be empty, a property that nothing has, that nothing needs. Hence it seems empty in absence of justification, and an unjustified assumption of EPP seems its only justification.
No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates.
Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am.
Not objective. Part of 'the' universe, like the one that humans find happens to be the preferred one. All very anthropocentric, and thus very questionably mind independent.
Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it.
E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.
I agree. Explanatory power does not constitute testability, and lack of alternative explanation does not constitute falsification of not-multiverse.
By some apparently.
You can, just not by starting with an assumption of it being brute fact.
Fine. Pegasus has no access (no way to test for) E1 existence. It in no way helps or hinders his ability to count his wings.
If Pegasus wasn't logically possible, that's another story. That would inhibit said ability. I didn't even list 'logcially possible' as one of my definitions. Should have.
Quoting ucarrDirect is a relation, by your description. If it implies existence, then existence relative to you, nothing at all objective.
So indirect is imagination. You called it knowledge? Of what? That you are imagining a flying horse? I'd say you have direct knowledge of that.
I don't consider that to be fact, nor does any realist.
I also do not presume anything's specific membership in objective reality (R1), in contrast with said realists. I'm not big on presuming things.
My making statements is not a mind independent activity.
Maybe, but the ontology of the rock is unaffected by my perception of it, link or no link. I will actually question this for the apple. I suspect there are no mind-independent apples, meaning no apples in worlds lacking minds. Not so much with the rocks.
So, no, it does not tell me that, and existence is undefined here.
OK, so you're talking about a different sort of correlation than what you get with say entangled particle measurements.
Frame dependent, and no, that's not how inertial frames work. Elapsed time between two events is a difference in one abstract coordinate of each of those two events. and that difference is frame dependent.
No, just one way. Q does not exist relative to P under E5.
No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point.
Social consensus is an argument against solipsism, but it's still a form of mind dependence.
Quoting ucarr
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E2 Existence is what is known; E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)
EPP in the context of E1 is neither true nor false, but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold? Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?
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I'm referring to our conversation about existence independent of perception. Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.
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This is why I say in our exchange immediately above that, "Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind."
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The neuronal circuits supporting abstract concepts are temporal, but the logical relations posited are atemporal. For example, we can let x stand for any number, and this function is atemporal. We never talk about the rate at which a function outputs a y in place of x.
Quoting ucarr
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Of course my definition of existence depends upon me, as yours depends upon you. When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you. Unless you're claiming to have seen a winged horse alongside a crowd of other human observers at a horse show, I know your description of Pegasus is based upon your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.
Quoting ucarr
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Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."
You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? Consider the two definitions below.
principle | ?prins?p(?)l |
noun
1 a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning: the basic principles of Christianity.
(usually principles) a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior: struggling to be true to their own principles | she resigned over a matter of principle.
morally correct behavior and attitudes: a man of principle.
2 a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine: these machines all operate on the same general principle.
cognition | ?kä??niSH(?)n |
noun
the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses: these infections can adversely affect cognition and educational achievement | a scientific study of human cognition.
a perception, sensation, idea, or intuition resulting from the process of cognition: greater emphasis should be placed on examining cognitions of individual family members.
Quoting ucarr
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I'm referring to the Standard Model as a centerpiece of modern science that has referents within the scope of elementary particles. Of course the cognition of the scientists who established the Standard Model precedes its expression.
You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction.
Quoting ucarrIf it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent.
I've given counterexamples, so no, it doesn't hold. Let's suppose a roughly rectangular rock exists in (is part of some other domain of: )some other universe. It is rectangular and yet does not exist in this universe, so it doesn't exist under E4, despite having that 'roughly rectangular' predication.
I think so.
Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined.
This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience.
Not talking about the concept of Pegasus.
Quoting ucarrNot claiming that, nor is the quoted definition.
Quoting ucarr
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The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence, and moreover, the material ground of the elementary particles is not a very restricted context. Apparently you think abstractions immaterial whereas I don't. We agree that cognition is an emergent property of the elementary particles. If this is correct so far, then you're the one holding inconsistent beliefs as, per my view, emergent cognition that supports abstract thought demonstrates abstract thought, like cognition, being grounded in elementary particles, and thus not immaterial.
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This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP. Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality.
Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea. The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.
Quoting ucarr
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Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).
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The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.
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Quoting ucarr
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No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:
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Whether the pronoun refers to existence, or to predication, either way, per your characterization of EPP, property must pre-exist. Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.
My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6. By equating existence with the quintet, the idealism of E2 is refuted and, likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted.
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You say, "¬O ? ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation. This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio. Given this, how is it not true that O ? C? Perhaps you're arguing from the premise, "There are parts of Ohio not Columbus." This separation of territory cannot be inferred from O without the restriction O ? C. So O ? C = ¬(O ? C).
Quoting ucarr
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In the case of predication, the subject noun is always the object of the predication. When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject." we're saying the subject is the object of the predication, and thus predication is a modifying function. Perhaps now you can see why predication about a non-existent subject evaluates to zero. The existence of the predication as a modifier depends upon the existence of its object, which is the subject.
Yes, my definition of existence here is mind-dependent. However, as explained above, I've been invoking MPP throughout our conversation. EPP is prior to MPP, so MPP applied to E2 also implies EPP applied to E2.
Quoting ucarr
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Don't conflate the application of A with A. The former is about the use of A within a context. The latter is about what term is being applied within a context.
Quoting ucarr
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Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence? Existence Precedes Predication is a statement, not a question. This means the existence of existence is presumed. The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right? The existential precedence of existence vis-á-vis predication is clearly something different from the brute fact of existence, right? Perhaps you think the proximity of "predication" with "existence" shows a mind-dependent declaration establishing "existence," the thing to be proven. The omnipresence of cognition within all human inquiries and exams supports MPP. Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?
Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction?
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I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.[/quote]
Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.
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Your declarations about mind-independence have kept much of my focus upon MPP.
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Can you develop a chain of reasoning from non-existent subject to analysis?
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I think your statement above in bold aligns you closely with E1. I, too, am closely aligned with E1. The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.
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Regardless of the spectrum of definitions of existence in context, your statement in bold aligns you with the Standard Model regarding existence. You frequently pivot away from E1 to the others, but allegiance to E1 aligns you with me on the relationship between the Standard Model and existence.
Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence.
Quoting ucarrNot sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process.
I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself.
So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example.
Quoting ucarrThat doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all.
Depends on definitions. There are plenty of those on these forums that restrict the word 'mind' to 'human mind', meaning that if something nonhuman does the exact same thing, it isn't mind and it probably isn't abstracting. Anyway, I will accept the statement if it doesn't come with the anthropocentric baggage.
Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way.
Quoting ucarrNo mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role.
No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'.
E3 seems to be the only definition 'within the context of EPP".
I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that.
I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted.
No, the statement does not mean that. It was what could be concluded from "Columbus implies Ohio", which in this case is, in the absence of Ohio, there is no Columbus.
Not it doesn't. An Ohio without Columbus is completely consistent with the statement "Columbus implies Ohio". This is trivial logic.
In the absence of EPP, a) is false. b) is false regardless since there's no necessity of 'action'. There is no necessity of claim. So for instance with 14 being even, "is even" is the predicate. That predicate is performing no action and is not something making a claim. It is just a property that applies to some integers and not to others.
No mention of existence is there, except as part of the domain of integers. Is pi not even? Unclear if the predicate applies at all to something not an integer. So 14 being even gives it a certain E6 kind of existence. There exists in the set of integers, 14, which happens to be even.
No, the principle seems to assume existence, and worse, it seems to assume E1 existence, but as worded, it's not explicit about that, only demonstrably false with some of the others.
That doesn't even make syntactic sense, let alone follow from anything. Maybe you mean some sort of empty tautology, that all that exists exists.
Wrong. I have zero trouble examining relationships without presuming E1 existence. You didn't specify E1 though.
I can't, but no such claim was ever made.
Quoting ucarrSee your definition quoted at the top then, defining existence grounded in material.
Didn't know there was one.
But it does make such a statement.
The statement is valid with most definitions of the word, except definitions where existence/reality is dependent on language rules..
Your 'material' definition above aligns with E4, not E1. There are empirical tests for existence under E4, and not under E1.
E2 isn't foundational under E1. Neither is the standard model.
Quoting ucarr
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My question aims at perceiving whether Pegasus is mind-independent. Pegasus exists as a mind-dependent entity. Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. Only the mind's eye of the imaginative person has seen Pegasus.
Quoting noAxioms
Your quoted statement, I have no trouble defining existence sans perception can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception. In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock. In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.
Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.
You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality. If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence. This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. Some of your language implies you believe in EPP.
Your language statement, a realist position, undermines catastrophically your exam of EPP concerning the establishment of predication without existence. If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language, then it produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact. This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication. Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication. Such predications are tantamount to empty sets. Predication without existence doesnt undermine EPP because an empty set ? a set containing paradoxes called non-existent things with predications.
Quoting ucarr
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Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T
Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T
If it's true the two statements have the same evaluation for E1-E6, then they're not different by force of "Santa being anything is a predication." So Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa. equals Santa is non-existent.
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Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind?
Quoting ucarr
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No. We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that. We know the newborn uses its brain to live before it knows it's using its brain. This is social-consensus verification of objective reality not affected by a theoretician's definitions. Theoretical exploration in definitions is language play and, as you say, "...the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works."
Quoting noAxioms
Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence (The newborn cries out in response to the doctor slapping his bottom. The newborn doesn't know he has a mind.) If we generalize from here, we see that pre-existent mind makes all thoughts - including mind independence - possible. If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.
Here I present an argument that evaluates to a contradiction resulting from the rejection of EPP. Its the rejection of MPP that necessarily concludes in a contradiction. Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.
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If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question, then Ive reasoned to your own conclusion to the effect of saying:
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and thus predication without the priority of EPP and MPP is impossible.
Being unobserved is not what makes something mind-independent since the moon seems mind independent despite being observed. Does it exist (E1)? That's a different question.
Both wrong. Perhaps a type of existence that lacks the necessity of perception. Else the stop sign doesn't exist because you perceive it.
I don't see one. Language and proofs are the media of concepts and epistemology, but none of that has any effect on mind-independent existence, only our potential knowledge of it.
Agree
Yes, it seems that an immediate contradiction would follow if this 2nd statement were not the case.
Still agree, but keep separate the making of the claim, knowledge of the way things work, and the actual way things work, the latter of which would be entirely independent of the others.
How so? Objective existence seemed not even mentioned anywhere except the statement that I didn't find a way it would be meaningful, at least in the absence of EPP. With EPP, E1 and E3 are almost identical. Almost...
I imply that only with some definitions. E3 or E5 for instance have rules, which can be described by language, but are not a product of language. Most of the others seem to select some arbitrary domain to suit the purposes of the chooser of the definition, and that does seem to make them mind dependent. E1 stands out as having no mind dependence, but also having no particular rules.
How did 'material things' suddenly appear from that sequence? I hadn't specified material as being in any way special. It might be under some forms of E4 existence, but I maintain that any such definition is just a less solipsistic version of human-mind-dependent reality.
It does not since I gave so many counterexamples of predication without existence, especially when one of the 'restricted domain' definitions was used.
Wait, I didn't see that argued, and there's no example. I don't see how this follows from lack of EPP. What does it mean to be 'isolated from predication'? That concept was never introduced.
An empty set has zero members, which is a predicate of an empty set. Pegasus is not an empty set. The set of all existing Pegasus' is (for the sake of argument) empty, but Pegasus having 2 wings does not directly contradict that.
"non-existent things with predications. has not been shown to be paradoxical.
You seem to be trying to show this, but my critiques need to be addressed.
For either, E3=F, E4=T E6=domain dependent. Seems I disagree with half of your assessments. Still, pretty nice demonstration that 'does not exist' and 'is nonexistent' mean the same thing in an ontological sense.
So why did I say otherwise? Suppose EPP is the case. Then the former might be true, but the latter is paradoxical, listing a predicate of a nonexistent thing. That's the distinction I was referencing, but it isn't an ontological distinction, so the assessment of E1-E6 is unchanged.
Why did I agree to Santa not existing (E1)? Probably because Santa is contradictory, and while I don't see a lot of rules for E1, 'is possible' seems to be a reasonable one.
[quote=noAxioms]No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing.[/quote]Wow, even that is wrong, since a rock is supposedly mind-independent and yet I have empirical access to it. I need to be more careful with my wordings.
Quoting ucarrAsk somebody who claims that.
How a baby's brain works is irrelevant. Epistemology is almost on-topic since there is the issue of how one might know something exists. Answer E1:No test E2 by definition, E3 everything E4 empirical E5 ill-phrased E6 domain dependent
I don't know what 'pre-existent' means in the context of this topic. If it is true that nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then EPP holds at least for minds, but not necessarily anything else. And if that is not true, then EPP does not hold at all.
That doesn't follow at all. It only implies that rejection of EPP means that MPP also doesn't hold, and even then only if the premise is true.
For example, a chandelier is dependent on the chain from which it hangs. You're saying that absence of the chandelier implies the absence of the chain, but it could still be there, holding a plant hook or something. This is basic logic.
The example didn't show this. Here's what you said:
Quoting ucarr
The bold part is straight up begging EPP by asserting the existence of this mind without justification, and without specifying even what kind of existence. Not even under E2 does mind existence precede the predication of self-awareness.
And, as I said, how an infant's brain works is irrelevant to my rejection of that act of begging.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You had a mind in the womb. Did you make predications in the womb?
Quoting noAxioms
You don't use IFF unless you mean bi-conditional relationship which is X ?? Y.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Temporal predicates imply the S-MPP (Standard Model Prior to Predicates). Nothing is prior to the standard model as the fundamental particles and their forces are neither created nor destroyed.
Quoting noAxioms
Any predication implies existence of mind; MPP ? EPP.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
The earth is emergent from the singularity.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You make my point. Your talk of mind-independent things is a contradiction because it assumes perception while denying it by definition.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
You make an argument against my interpretation of E4. In making this argument, you assume existence doesn't exist because you assume its lack of a measurable position. If you're right and existence lacks a measurable position, then your argument fails because it must assume an attribute (lack of measurable position) establishing its existence. If you're wrong and existence possesses a measurable position, then your argument succeeds with the proviso existence exists.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined by mind, and you know that by definition, and thus you know it by mind, then claiming its independence from mind is a contradiction.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Possibility of perception by an audience destroys mind independence because you can't know this about a mind-independent thing. Generalizing from here, we know the possibility of mind independent things is impossible because the conceptualization of such a possibility is mind-dependent. Truly mind-independent things cannot be conceived of.
Quoting noAxioms
You can only state things about the concept of Pegasus. Barring that, we're back to:
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Explain how your quote denying any connection between metaphysics and cognition, holds consistent with:
Quoting noAxioms
I made my mother nauseous, so I guess that counts as making a predication.
It means if and only if, and I very much use it in a one way relationship. X being part of the cause of Y in no way implies that Y is part of the cause of X. That would be retrocausality.
There are plenty of other temporal relationships that in no way involve the standard model, so this is false.
Not talking about idealism.
I asked for Earth's location relative to existence, not from the singularity. And where is Earth relative to the singularity? Can you point in the general direction of the singularity, perhaps give a rough estimate how far Earth is from it?
You need to review what it means for something to be mind-independent.
No, I just think it's a category error-, but under E4, all existing things have a location (except the singularity, which is why it's a singularity). With any other definition, I can think of plenty of potentially existing things that don't have a location. But you were talking about E4 with this comment, so my request of it's location is valid.
Rather than worry about this, let's first define what you think 'existence' is, that it would meaningfully be something that exists or not by whatever definition you choose.
Non-sequitur. I agree with all but your claim of a contradiction. Maybe you should rewrite as a more formal argument. Mind-independence doesn't mean that nobody is thinking of a thing, but you seem to be proceeding as if this was the case, as evidenced by the following nonsense statement:
You seem to think that mind-independent existence depends on the lack of mind, but any dependence on say lack of perception would make it very much mind dependent since it would be exactly the lack of perception that defines its existence.
Perhaps you are thus impaired, but I am very explicitly am talking about something else, per the disclaimer in the OP.
I can use E4 definition and suggest that some rock masses one Kg, and use my perception to verify that. Is it fact? Maybe the rock is an illusion, but it remains an empirical fact about a rock that has mind-independent existence per E4. It being mind independent means that the rock would still mass 1 Kg even if I wasn't there to perceive it.
Quoting noAxioms
You'll first have to quote where I made this denial.
I left the part you bolded, which I presume you take to be such a denial, nowhere is there a denial of any connection between the two, only a denial that no standard (not one you deliberately made up) definition of the word defines it as any kind of cognition. The study of metaphysics certainly involves cognition, and the definition quoted does not deny that, and the study of cognition itself has certain metaphysical elements to it. Dualism vs physicalism is arguably a metaphysical issue (and arguably not).
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Maybe it's now clear the big difference between our points of view. If, as it appears to me from what you say above, you make a hard separation between cognition (acquiring knowledge and understanding by reasoning from sensory input), and the physics of objective reality, then that puts a big difference between your view of reality and mine. I don't believe there exists such a hard separation between the two. In my view, E2 and E4 are not polar opposites. Considering this, my oscillations between E2 and E4 are not contradictory. My simple explanation says, "cognition is a mental activity emergent from the elementary particles that make up the physics of the brain. If one holds this view, then there's nothing perplexing about claiming, "All temporal things material and emergent from the Standard Model - such as the human brain - are only known about and understood by means of the abstract and reasoning mind." Regarding E2 and material emerging from the mind, I say the opposite, "mind emerges from the physics of the elementary particles making neuronal circuits of the brain possible."
Quoting noAxioms
There's a strong link between definitions and theories. Can you cite an example of a definition and a theory both viable and contradictory?
Metaphysics is merely the conclusions of reasoning at the scope of broad generality within a given discipline. In this conversation you endeavor to examine metaphysical claims about mind-independent reality and its inhabitants. You think general existence an empty predication suggesting the need for its de facto abandonment. I think mind-independent reality a second-order emergence of abstract reasoning, itself an emergent property of brain activity. This chain link of connections confines mind-independent reality within the mental architecture of cognition. We can theorize about what it might be like, but our closest approach to it finds us still standing firmly within our physics-dependent cognition grounded within the Standard Model.
MPP is no article of faith because articles of faith and rational beliefs alike are mind-dependent. If this is true, then clearly all notions of mind-independence are thoroughly mind-dependent.
If MPP is dependent on EPP, then E2 and E3 are based upon clear-eyed reasoning, not upon blind trust. E2, E4, E5 and E6 are rationalistic partitions of EPP. If so, it follows they can't exist without EPP. My views herein follow Sartre's, "Existence precedes essence," an early expression of mind emergent from matter.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Regarding your method of ontological perception, you seem inclined to hedge every boundary you encounter, thinking it keeps your options at maximum. That you think abstraction not necessarily material is my impression of you based upon some of the evidence quoted below:
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
You allow yourself to flow between opposites while charging me with self-contradiction for doing same. I think your view of the partitioning of opposites harder than mine, viz., I navigate the grayscale between polarities more than you do. Why is it okay for you to use both E1 and E2 and not for me?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
This is part of our trench warfare; herein we're slugging it out. In response to your batting away, I keep batting away your supposition we can do otherwise than talk about concepts of things.
Quoting noAxioms
Saying I confine existence to material things is a simplification. I ground existence in material things, a complex interweave of physics and its emergent properties.
The ontological status of numbers is a topic too complex and undecided to make it a good example in our context. For example, numbers represent points in space. This corresponds with material things in motion. Heisenberg Uncertainty is math-inferred physics about the possibility of the completeness of measurement of things in motion. The measurement problem, distinct from Heisenberg Uncertainty, remains unresolved. There's no easy evaluation to a definitive ontology of numbers. Claiming the number 14 causes EPP to fail is jumping to an unsupported conclusion.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You think cognition and objective reality equal? By asserting their equality, you endorse my side of our central argument: mind-independent reality is wholly contained within mind-dependent cognition. My declaration assumes mind-independent reality coincides with objective reality.
My statement about objective reality and mind follows the form of Objective Reality ? Mind. Mind ? Cognition. In consequence, the mind's cognition, examining objective reality, sees its dependence upon the environment of nature, which is objective reality.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
The whole of cognition - which includes social consensus - is a form of mind-dependency.
Inference beyond empirical experience, or pure reason, is the most extreme form of mind-dependency.
Nothing in existence, as it is rendered to the understanding, lies outside of the inter-relatedness linking all material and material-based existences. This is the general meaning of symmetry, the conservation laws and the Standard Model. Why do you think the pursuit of super-symmetry is called the theory of everything?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the subject of an action upon it (measurement), how can the action be prior to it?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
When you say, "...measurement is what collapses a wave function..." you're talking about an observer doing a measurement, such as an experimenter calculating with Schrödinger's Equation. This unless you think calculating with Schrödinger's Equation can be done without an entity doing the calculation.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Predication is verbal.
Quoting noAxioms
My definition of existence says, "Existence has two parts: a) the local and temporal material forms emergent from the quintet; b) the non-local part (the quintet) that funds the local part.
Quoting noAxioms
Gauge Theory establishes the symmetries of the quantum fields of the Standard Model. The Standard Model elementary particles fund the physics of nature and the presumed mind-independent things. What is known (the cognition/materialism relationship un-clarified) and what is math-restricted in scope (equation symmetry un-clarified) sums to a pair of artificially parsed definitions of limited existence inconsistent with my two-part definition describing existence as an all-encompassing context both local and non-local.
2) There is not 'physics of objective reality' since the physics we know is the physics of only this universe and not others. There are no objective physical rules. So reword as 'physics of this universe', and leave off the word 'reality' entirely.
3) I have no particular 'view of reality' since the word has different definitions in different contexts. I tend to use the word in an epistemic sense, and epistemology has little to do with ontology unless ontology is defined in such terms (E2, E4).
Agree with both. In fact, I see little difference between E2 and E4 to the point where I wonder if they should be separately listed. The mind dependence is very explicit under E2 and only implicit under E4. That seems to be one significant difference.
Another difference: E2 seems more presentist. If humans go extinct, then nothing would exist under E2, but under E4, Earth is presumed (by humans now) to endure beyond the time of human extinction.
E2 is not necessarily idealism where only concepts exist, and not actual apples and such, but the reality of an idealist probably still falls under E2.
OK, that's pretty straight up E4. If you took out the reference to the standard model, it would be more inclusive of other universes with different physics but still with what could be considered 'temporal things material'. It excludes non-temporal things like 14 or triangles or round squares.
Not emerging from mind, but nevertheless asserted to exist precisely because it is perceived. This part is also true of E4.
I cannot think of a statement that is worded as both a definition and as a theory. A definition simply says how a word is being used in a particular context. A theory is something that makes predictions, is testable.
I can agree with both, and I don't see any conflict between the two statements. You're saying that mind-independent reality is but a concept, with no ding-an-sich associated with it. I cannot argue against that. It would explain why I don't identify as a realist.
But I do not put mind as fundamental as would an idealist. That constitutes being realist about mind, which seems entirely circular.
The mistake made by most seems to be forgetting that all these relational definitions of reality are still relations. The relation is most often implied, but it's still there. Being implied, it is forgotten, and one presumes, totally unjustified, a sort of objective (E1) existence. E1 is truly mind independent (as is E5), and it simply does not follow from the above lines of reasoning.
Well, your definition might be thus mind-grounded, but I'm reaching for something less anthropocentric than that, and yes, one can conceive of such things, even if you personally choose not to.
MPP seems to be a principle. Acceptance of MPP (like acceptance of any other philosophical principle) is very much an article of faith, and MPP leads to idealism, a complete denial of any distinction between a thing and the concept of a thing. Acceptance of MPP contrasts heavily with the assertion of mental activity being emergent from particles doing their thing.
Even if it's not true, all notions of anything are mind-dependent simply by any reasonable definition of ;'notion'.
Oddly enough, it isn't.
Indeed, because I consider the opposites as premises, one at a time, and you assert opposites to both be true at once, typically existence being grounded in perception, and existence being grounded in material law of this universe.
I don't ever combine those. They're not compatible. E2 and E4 are subsets of E5 and E6 so there is a bit compatibility with some combinations.
The literature is full of realist distinctions between the concept of a thing (apple say) and the apple itself (ding an sich). Your comment seems to take the stance, without justification, that there cannot be such a distinction, the position is necessarily wrong .You say you ground existence in material thing, yet here you seem to deny material, and only acknowledge the concept of material. This seems contradictory.
I am admittedly becoming moved to the position that 'existence' is nothing but an abstraction, something made up by thinking entities to separate that which in some way pertains to their interaction with their environment and that which doesn't. God exists. Why? Because God is meaningful to whoever says that. But my search for existence beyond the concept seems to not be productive. Maybe there is no mind-independent ontology. Not to say that mind creates existence (idealism), but it creates only the concept of it. Human cognition still supervenes on matter, but the existence of matter is nothing but a label pasted onto it.
I'm not asserting all that, but I am definitely considering it. Existence being not mind-dependent, but nevertheless a mental product, like any other conception. So not 'I think, therefore I am', but "I think, therefore I decide that I am'. Does that make sense?
EPP, as stated in the OP, sort of implies such an abstract definition of existence by saying that existence is conceptually prior to predication, instead of saying that existence is prior to predication.
EPP is arguably true given such a definition, but I also might arguably find a counterexample to that. Jury still out.
Numbers are part of what can be used to identify a point in space, but they do not themselves represent such points. Your wording makes it sound like all numbers constitutes spatial references.
If ontology is nothing but an abstraction as I described just above, then the ontology of number is simply a matter of personal choice. The ongoing debate about say anti or pro-Platonic-existence of numbers is a debate simply between two different choices being made, with no actual fact to the matter either way.
I didn't say it causes EPP to fail. I said it causes EPP to fail given a definition of existence grounded in material. 14 is not a material thing, so it doesn't exist by that definition. But 14 is even, so it has predicates. Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where. EPP might hold given a different definition of existence, so I make no claim that 14 causes EPP to fail.
No, mind and cognition, the two words compared in your fairly tautological statement above. For purposes of this discussion, I find them to be synonymous.
Mind is not objective (unless asserted to be so, which makes it grounded on that assertion, a contradiction). Objective reality cannot depend on nature since there is no objective nature, no objective laws. Other universes have different laws. Even differenter universes don't even have what could be considered 'laws'. Objective existence cannot be grounded in anything more fundamental since any such grounding is a restriction of domain.
Quoting ucarrAgree. Some realists would probably not agree, but I am (for that and some other reasons) not 'some realist'.
With that I do not agree, but given that 'by choice' definition I explored above, all existence is mind dependent, EPP is backwards, and no form is more or less extreme than any other.
Your assertion above actually kind of holds for existence grounded in material.
Mind independent existence is in no way necessarily 'rendered to the understanding'. There are definitions of existence where this simply is not the case.
Because it combines all theories of this universe (a limited domain), not that it in any way describes all domains. ToE is a cute catch phrase, but no theory will ever describe everything.
What you call 'measurement' is an effect, not an action. The latter word implies intent. So does 'measurement' or 'observer', which is why I shy from using it rather than something like 'interaction'. There is no significance of mind or intent under E5, and these comments were made in context of E5.
Told you those words carry that connotation, but no, there is no role of an experimenter in any of quantum theory. Human involvement is necessary for epistemology only, and has no effect on how physics works.
There are interpretations where said equation is ontic, and ones where it is but abstract. Quatum theory does not say. 'Calculating' is something that requires some sort of information processor, but 'calculating' has not effect on what happens, 'observed' or not.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Numbers derive their meaning from their representation of points in space. Every number is assigned a unique position on the real number line. Without connection to a unique position,14 is merely two meaningless shapes juxtaposed, with the juxtaposition likewise meaningless. With reference to its unique position, 14 is a number, a material thing. When 14 connects to you as a number, it predicates you to a specific and relative position on the real number line. Anyone with knowledge of basic math will know exactly where you stand on the real number line whenever 14 predicates you there. This physical reality is universally true.
Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line.
The meaning of number 14 places it within a context which gives it 13 and 15 as its integer neighbors.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
All of existence is grounded in material; matter is neither created nor destroyed, etc. 14 placing you in a specific position in context of the real number line is a material thing that articulates a predication of position, a material reality in the context of existence. 14 accepts the predicate even. This predicate names the set of numbers with the same relative position in context as 14. 14 is a particular instantiation of even, a set to which it belongs. EPP is not wrong by E4 because 14 is material, and thus its an example of a material thing existent with predication.
My assumptions here say objective reality is material and supposedly mind-independent.
Presence the ability to hold a relative position in context materially.
Meaning the ability to articulate into jointed extensions connecting to other presences; this articulation supports holism. Meaning is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity.
Non-existence a supposition of an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end.
Existence an infinite series of affirmations of material presence with neither beginning nor end.
E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) (existence is one of the parts of many parts of objective reality)
Therefore EPP is wrong given E4. If you think that logic is invalid, you need to specifically point out where.
E = General Existence; Given the symmetries and their conservation laws, viz., Matter is neither created nor destroyed; it only changes forms, E ??. Moreover, E is supported by the Standard Model, which reduces to the singularity, where no laws of physics exist. This tells us E cannot be parsed, so ? E {n+?, n-?, n x ?, n/?}.
E4 is an invalid definition of E because E ? ? means it cannot be parsed by the four basic math operations: add, subtract, multiply or divide. E4 tries to contain E as ?E4={A,B,C,D,E }, but thats a subtraction from the unbounded scope of E. The axiom of choice doesnt apply here because E cannot be constrained as a bounded infinite series amenable to the building of an infinite subset not equal to its unbound set. This leads to E being a proper subset of itself, something forbidden.
If this reasoning is sound, then it vacates E2, E3, E4, E5, E6. Only E1 is valid.
Numbers are not necessarily linear, but complex and quaternions are still arguably representable by space. Space seems to represent numbers more than numbers seem to represent space. Just my thoughts. These are not assertions.
14 is never a shape. You're instead referencing a numeral (symbol), not a number (a quantity maybe). Don't confuse the two.
I disagree that either 14 or a number line is anything physical.
Existing things, being a part of general existence, an insuperable context, possess temporal material forms. These forms possess presence and meaning. Presence is the ability to hold a specific and measurable position materially. Meaning is the context of every position relating it to the real number line.
Yes and No. Yes: a relation and a predicate. No: I am cautious about the distinction of 14 meaning something and being something. I would have chosen the latter. The numeral (as a symbol) means something. Again, thoughts, not assertions.
So in this change of stance, things don't exist because they're material, but rather things are material because they exist, kind of destroying any distinction between the two words.
Is material also matter? Are you asserting that 14 consists of atoms or something? Are larger numbers made of more material? What color is 14? Is a square square material but a round square is not, or are both material?
Anyway, I know of nobody that has published any such suggestion. Sounds made up.
About these, what about the case of a finite series of affirmations or negations of presence, or a mixed series, finite or not. Does the thing exist or not? It just seems like you left a lot of cases not covered by these two definitions which are supposed to handle any case.
For instance, I have an infinite series for all displacements from arbitrary origin X:
{...,
ucarr not present at X-13,
ucarr not present at X-12,
ucarr is present at X-11,
ucarr not present at X-10,
ucarr not present at X-9,
ucarr not present at X-8,
...}
That is an infinite series of negations of presence with neither beginning nor end, and one affirmation of material presence. Therefore you don't exist by your definitions above.
So it's a predicate then? States of something are predicates. 'apple is ripe', 'Santa is fat'. Universe is existing.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.
Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing).
When you say, "Numbers (as concepts) probably came...from roots of positive integers." does "roots" in your context mean something other than a mathematical root, such as 2 is the square root of 4?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Show me the number 14 doing something mathematical without reference to its distance in space from another number.
Show me how to count objects without using numbers (and that includes without using a word other than a number-word that means the same thing, and without using a collection of objects defined numerically by their separation from each other in space).
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, numeral is the symbol representing the unique position of a number on the real number line. Uncouple the numeral from the unique position of a number on the real number line named by a number-word and you have a random form without meaning.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Let's suppose you sit in a chair before your computer when you read my posts to you. Do you have a unique position within the space where you read my posts? Does the computer have a unique position it occupies? Are you physically present in your unique position? Is the computer physically present in its unique position? When you leave your chair and walk to the kitchen for a glass of water, do you travel to a different unique position? Are you physically present in your new unique position? Is your entire life a sequence of you moving from one position to another? Have you been physically present in all of them? If someone were to attempt to remove you from your current position and moreover attempt to remove you from all possible future positions you might physically occupy, would you fight for your life? If so, would this fight be physical?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. Meaning, being contextual, is inter-relational. Meaning radiates outward from inter-relational being. I think Heidegger writes about being residing within something "ready to hand," an inter-relational situation.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
States of something support predications. For this reason, sentences have subjects. They're the states of being either performing actions or expressing states of being. If you merely say, "ripe," "fat," or "existing," your thought is incomplete and we don't precisely understand what you intend to communicate, although we easily infer you're probably making a predication about a subject.
My example was about counting objects, like nuts on one's hand. There's no 'space' between 13 and 14 when doing that. It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not.
No, I mean the earliest usage of numbers, when humans first came aware of them and began assigning symbols (holding up fingers?) to them. Visualization of number lines came thousands of years later. You seem to only be able to visualize numbers this way.
Actually no, but I know what you mean. You're describing physical space.
If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned.
I notice that you did not answer this question, instead telling me about things that we both agree are physical. I don't think that the count of nuts in my hand is physically present at mostly to the far right of a police lineup, even if there is a reference to the number there.
The vast majority of numbers cannot have a physical representation since there are countable many ways to represent numbers, but the reals are not countable.
Exactly. I've noticed that. I question it. Everybody else just assumes it, calling it 'brute fact' despite the lack of justification. The nature of it seems very different than what most assume.
Mixing it also seems to annihilate existence, leaving you in neither state.
But I was supposing an infinite series. Clearly I cannot post each element since there is a posting limit on this forum. But the supposition is there.
Yours might. Mine is not making any such assumption.
I would consider it to be noticing a predicate, not making it. Not that I can't make a predicate. I can paint a car, and subsequently the car has the predicate of being a different color.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You say, "There's no 'space' between 13 and 14... It's just the difference between one more nut being there or not." How do you tell one nut from another? They occupy different positions in space. How do you tell one number from another? They occupy different positions on the number line. Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? Some say at the singularity - a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions - the laws of physics break down. Those laws are a bunch of numbers.
Quoting noAxioms
When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say thats one object in space, a compound.
Quoting noAxioms
You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding.
Material and matter share some common ground as to their meaning.
Regarding 14 as a sign, it is material as in the example of ink on paper. Its referent, a position on the real number line, holds material as in the example of the neuronal circuits supporting your entertainment of the thought. Larger numbers are farther from zero, just as larger objects are farther from a zero measurement of dimensional extension. A given color of the visible light spectrum has a specific wavelength measurement. Given this, we can say, meaningfully, the color red, for example, has a number identity. The geometric configuration of material objects, when considered at the atomic scale, varies. Crystals have a different geometric structure than non-crystals.
The set of real numbers is uncountable, but its members, even its irrationals, are individually mappable to material things, as in the case of pi.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Can you show a chain of reasoning that evaluates to existence independent of the existence making the effort possible? Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
This is why they don't mix: the presence of either state excludes the other.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If you suppose an infinite series of negations, then it never ends and thus the annihilation of existence is forever approached but never achieved.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence. Thinking about non-existence, because it examples consciousness and thus your existence as the thinker, forestalls any possibility of your transcendence of existence in pursuit of non-existence. It follows, therefore, that all of your examinations of non-existence are really a convoluted variety of examination of existence. By undertaking your cogitations on non-existence, you demonstrate another part of what it means to exist as a thinker.
I could count the number of times the light blinks. 3 blinks, all in the same physical space. I don't conclude that 3 has a physical location from this.
Two objects becoming one seems to be an ideal, not anything physical. I did a topic on it here. You seem to have commented on that topic.
My body has extension. It is physically present at events (events are physical) but the spatial location of those events varies from frame to frame, and frames are abstractions. So for instance you talked about me going to the kitchen, but maybe the kitchen goes to me when I need a drink. It changes location, not me, since I am at all times 'here' (also an abstraction). Anyway, I said I knew what you meant.
Yea, but I didn't say anything was reading it. It's in isolation we said.
And here I am looking for one. Yes, it's axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason.
Pi is definitely early on the countable list. It is easily expressed with a couple characters. Most numbers cannot be expressed at all. I cannot, by definition, give an example.
Sure. Just don't posit EPP.
I don't assume that. I said it in the OP. 'I think therefore I am' is a non-sequitur without EPP. But 'I think, therefore I decide Io posit that I am' seems to work far better. There is no fallacy to that, just as there is no fallacy in saying "'I balk, yet I decline Io posit that I am'. It becomes a personal choice instead of a logical conclusion. There is a pragmatic utility to making the first choice, but logic seems not to forbid the second choice. As you said, it's an axiom, an assumed thing, not something necessarily the case.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You mis-understand the question. With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. This reality translates to not being able to do the four big math operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Numbers and their symbols have no meaning without movement through space which is physical. Saying numbers are not physical equals denying their foundational meaning as nodes for relationships between positions in space. Abstract thought doesn't establish independence from movement through space and time because it's supported by neuronal activity traveling through space and time.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
In this example, 3 has a temporal motion.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. Change of context implies change of position, which is motion. Where you are bodily is not an abstraction.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
In our context here, isolation and meaning are opposites. Isolation, as in the case of non-existence, has no connection to meaning, so written words in such theoretical isolation (which isolation is already noted as absurd) cannot have meaning because they cannot have referents. What you say is true if the isolation is really spatial and temporal separation from context, not discontinuity from context. A book is a portable point-of-view, viz., point of reference, for a spatially and temporally non-local context. This non-local context is made local by decoding of the word-signs, viz., by reading.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? So proving EPP strengthens your commitment to what you know to be axiomatic? So proving ¬EPP, with predication of non-existent things, gives license to your aversion to axioms? So proving ¬EPP vindicates your website name of noAxioms?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.
Quoting noAxioms
How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."
It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested.
This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body.
It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms.
You seem to be doing that just fine. Positing things is easy. Justifying them not so much.
An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process.
I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them.
Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.
Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare.
Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? You think NaCl results from minds performing alchemy?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You might access memory to imagine yourself sitting in your study while you stand in the kitchen, but these two brain circuits are independent and your bedroom frame is virtual while your kitchen frame is empirical. Any higher sentient with memory supports a virtual frame portable simultaneous with an empirical frame. Where is the contradiction?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic. Proof it's not axiomatic depends on your ability to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to you without you pre-existing your examination of your existence.
In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.
Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You believe a man thinks without proactive support of his fertilized egg?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.
Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact?
A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object.
Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified.
No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated.
But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water.
We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there.
How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? ucarr
No, not any more than I am self-willed into one.
I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence.
All that aside, I was referred to an interesting bit about the Eleatic Principle, which seems on-topic.
It says "An entity is to be counted as real iff it is capable of participating in causal processes".
Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself.
The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes.
I found an interesting article that attempts to justify it, but it dismisses other causal structures by several references to 'the world', a very anthropocentric assumption that this world is somehow special over other causal structures, violating the wording of the principle taken from that very article.
I may open a new topic on this.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Neither am I discussing the purpose of life. I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history, and that's a continuing sequence of positions you occupy physically.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting noAxioms
You do.
Quoting noAxioms
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Quantum fields are measured.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic. I think general existence, or the Standard Model, is a necessary first-order system for consciousness. In the presence of consciousness, existence is self-evidently true.
Your position sounds like rationalism. You pivot away from anything suggesting confinement of exploration, but your restless ideation seems rooted in the demand for reasoning to every belief to the exclusion of axioms. This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven. A theory is just a working hypothesis always subject to revision or replacement.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
Here's my demonstration.
Quoting ucarr
Where is yours?
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.
Quoting ucarr
Quoting noAxioms
You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow. This claim sounds like a stretcher that explodes reason, but it doesn't because general existence is the non-local part of every existing thing emergent as a temporal material thing. This means that all material things are tied in with the Standard Model basis for existential symmetries and their conservation laws. Nothing is created or destroyed; only the forms of material things change. General existence is everywhere at all times, and that's a part of your material existence as it is of mine.
QM has thrown open the shudders on omnipresent general existence, and subject-dependent measurement of material things is one of the symmetries of general existence. It's the mirror image of non-locality. Just as we're not completely local to our measurable position, the objects of our perception are not completely local to their perceived (by us) objectivity. This is QM entanglement.
Quoting noAxioms
We're either engulfed in solipsism or idealism, and there's no mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, or there is a mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, and we're using our empirical experience of same to generate cognition about reality ambiguously interior/exterior.
Quoting noAxioms
You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.
Quoting noAxioms
Why do you think position non-causal? Presence, always tied to location, dynamically consumes the material phenomena provided by physics. The symmetry of a dynamic presence drives the rotation and reflection of physics, chemistry and life. The groups supported by position and presence animate nature. This depth of functionality is deep causation.
I don't recall saying that, but if the existence of the world in which those fields apply is grounded in human presence in that world, then yes, they, like the rocks, seem pretty mind dependent. I meet few realists who go beyond that bias. Tegmark is one, but he goes to the extent of 'everything exists' or maybe 'everything possible', which is a problematic stance.
They probably wouldn't be posited if they were not measured, yes.
Hence the axioms of mathematics for instance. Without careful selection of axioms, mathematics as a tool would be pretty useless. So better written, yes.
I don't find EPP necessary. 'We need to do something about that asteroid headed for us' works just fine without adding 'only if it objectively exists' to the end. We can see the asteroid coming. It shares the same objective ontology as do we, and exactly what that objective state is doesn't seem to be relevant to the situation at hand.
Science doesn't depend much on a specific stance on metaphysics. It pragmatically uses a definition like E4, even if E4 is mind dependent, because science is all about knowing and predicting, which is also mind dependent.
That would be EMPA (existing mind precedes asserting, and also MPA: mind preceding asserting). Predication (a rock being massive) is different than a mind noting a predication. Hence the rock can be massive sans mind (MPP false), but it still takes a mind to conceive of predication (MPCP). This is per my OP where concept of X needs to be explicitly distinguished from X.
None of MPP, MPA, nor MPCP specify an existing mind. It just say mind, which may or may not exist depending on definitions chosen.
I accept MPA and MPCP, and EMPA only with EPP, but not MPP. It seems logical that mind would precede any mental constructs.
Anyway, the bold part of your argument begs the conclusion, so the demonstration says no more than: "If EPP is true, then EPP being false entails a contradiction".
I'm not making a positive claim. A negative cannot be demonstrated, only falsified by counterexample.
You mistake a relation for objectivity. Social interaction establishes a common relation. I'm totally fine with a relational (finite domain) definition of existence, even if EPP doesn't hold under it.
OK, but you're changing domains to say that, and the existence of something in one domain is not always a fact in another. What about something that resides on a planet near the star Deneb? Its presence there is not a fact in Moscow (it might be under some non-local interpretation of QM where retrocausality is allowed). That example is one of a more disjoint domain, and they get more disjoint than that. The thing residing near Deneb has predicates, and yet said existence is not factual in Moscow. For that matter, Moscow is not factual relative to the described thing.
You should quote where you think I said or implied that. The bit about the existence of existence seems pretty circular to me.
I don't.remember saying it was.
Thank-you for your time and attention.