What do you think about Harris health analogy in The Moral Landscape?
In Sam Harris The Moral Landscape he uses health as an example of something that may not have an objective definition but can still be rationally discussed and meaningful statements made about it. If someone went to a prestigious health conference and said their definition of good health was being in pain and vomiting until you die the other guests would laugh at them at best and ask them to leave at worst and they wouldnt get invited back. Heres a relevant excerpt from the book: https://ibb.co/tPkXjFMY.
My question is do you agree with Harris point regarding topics that have no strictly objective or easily proven right or wrong?
Its trivial in comparison to health or morality but I always use the example of cinema. I think the quality of films should be judged by the usual standards of story, dialogue, acting etc and most people would agree. Its fine to like films that arent necessarily good (or so bad theyre good) but another matter to claim something is objectively good when it fails at the above mentioned criteria. The criteria I mentioned arent objective but still the best and most meaningful standards we can and should use. If someone went to a film conference and tried to argue onstage that a random film was the best film of all time because it heavily features the color blue and their standard for a quality film is the inclusion of the color blue (or some other ridiculous standard) I think the response by the other attendants would likely be the same as the health conference mentioned above. As a serious/extreme example if someone told me they wanted to do nothing more in life than sit in their own filth and masturbate while watching Family Feud I would have no issue telling them that its their right to do so and they arent hurting anyone but thats still a terrible way to live, you shouldnt want to be the kind of person that lives like that and there has to be something mentally wrong with you for wanting to do so.
My question is do you agree with Harris point regarding topics that have no strictly objective or easily proven right or wrong?
Its trivial in comparison to health or morality but I always use the example of cinema. I think the quality of films should be judged by the usual standards of story, dialogue, acting etc and most people would agree. Its fine to like films that arent necessarily good (or so bad theyre good) but another matter to claim something is objectively good when it fails at the above mentioned criteria. The criteria I mentioned arent objective but still the best and most meaningful standards we can and should use. If someone went to a film conference and tried to argue onstage that a random film was the best film of all time because it heavily features the color blue and their standard for a quality film is the inclusion of the color blue (or some other ridiculous standard) I think the response by the other attendants would likely be the same as the health conference mentioned above. As a serious/extreme example if someone told me they wanted to do nothing more in life than sit in their own filth and masturbate while watching Family Feud I would have no issue telling them that its their right to do so and they arent hurting anyone but thats still a terrible way to live, you shouldnt want to be the kind of person that lives like that and there has to be something mentally wrong with you for wanting to do so.
Comments (31)
Harris' point here is salutary. It is that just because there is disagreement does not mean there is no truth to the matter. If there were no truth to the matter of health then the claim that health is "being in pain and vomiting until you die," would be no more true or false than any other claim about health. But this is clearly wrong. Therefore health is truth-apt. I make this sort of argument a lot to the many skeptics and pluralists of TPF, .
In Aristotelian language we would say that certain first principles are readily known even if there is disagreement about some entailments of those first principles. We do not disagree on the foundation, even though we can disagree on the more speculative matters which are not as easy to see as the foundation.
Aristotle even grounds disagreement itself in the agreement on the . In Metaphysics IV he shows that anyone who rejects the PNC will reduce their utterances to nonsense.
Quoting Leontiskos
This same subject is all over so many different threads. Its the central issue of philosophy if you ask me.
Here posed with a moral object good health as opposed to a consonance or an essence or the uses of existence without essence - the same predicament turned around and around. Its Plato as much as Wittgenstein as much as Aristotle as much as Harris.
We cant quite sum up in words what summing it up in words is without using words. We cant eliminate essence without drawing essentially distinct parts. And we cant see being without already looking. So we just keep starting over and try, trying again.
And the PNC reference is spot on. If the skeptical conclusion is objects are not objective, there is no essence in the way of existence, believe that if you must, but then, speaking serves no purpose, it moves nothing. Meaning, like the rest of this sentence, must then be left hollow, as if this sentence could really have a beginning somewhere and will come to some end. (Which it just did! Go figure )
It's true that defining has to stop somewhere. It ends with assumptions, axioms, faith, etc. This is pervasively true. It's not just true of morality and health. It's true of science as well. What am I supposed to be concluding from that?
Btw, I judge art by giving a rating for the size of the aspiration (the grandeur of the artist's intentions) and the success of the execution. The product of the two is a sort of aesthetics rating. For instance War and Peace has big numbers for both, whereas Young Frankenstein has a minor aspiration rating, but almost perfect execution.
This is a good way to frame it.
I think with art it's similar, but significantly more difficult. Often, when people point to difficulties in aesthetics, they start by doing things like comparing Beethoven and Bach, Homer and Dante, etc. Yet it seems wise to start with the easiest comparisons (i.e. the worst and the best), and to then work our way up to the difficult ones.
Art has many goals, and that's why it is such a difficult topic. One common goal of art is to be edifying. In this area, which art is "better" will depend on the receiver. Some people are more in need edification in some areas than others, or may not be ready for certain moves, etc. The Chronicles of Narnia might be an excellent work for children according to this criteria, but what is suitable for children is not necessarily what is suitable for adults.
For me it's more fruitful to analogize ethics with medicine because ill-health is an objective biological matter of fact (e.g. loss of homeostasis, dis-ease) that can either be prevented by behavior or reduced through treatment. Likewise, more generally, harm to self/others (as well as injustice) aka "suffering" can be prevented or reduced through moral behavior. Iirc, Harris proposes moral scientism instead of (more coherent, pragmatic) negative consequentialism
update:
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Sure. Language may be be variable, malleable, open to interpretation and tricky, but there are some words we all understand through common human experience. We know when we feel well and when we feel ill, no matter how somebody defines those conditions. We know when we love someone, even if there are many kinds of love and definition is elusive. We know what hunger, fear and grief are, regardless of the words used to describe them.
We also know right from wrong, ever since that fatal apple that put us within striking distance of divinity and got us expelled from Eden. We spin it, skew it, twist it and pervert it; we can argue, legislate and lie about it, but we know.
That doesn't make you agree with Harris, though, unless, like him, you believe the example of health and scientific medicine suggests that our knowledge of right from wrong ought primarily to rest on the scientific investigation of what it is that makes people enjoy higher degrees of "well-being".
You're right. I don't think science has any part in it. We understood sickness and health, happiness and sorrow, love and hate, right and wrong long before we had a concept of science. oddly enough, we also practiced the scientific method long before we had made science a concept.
We are indeed in broad agreement. To what extent "science" has any part in it, though, depends how we conceive of science and of its methods. The problem isn't science, it's rather the modern scientism Harris is a vocal (albeit inconsistent) advocate for.
I think all intelligent living things practice science: observe, experiment, theorize, test, conclude. Somebody contained and controlled fire, invented a wheel, dammed a river and irrigated a field, built a boat, made a bow and arrow, planted a garden, all without knowing what science is. People found analgesics and disinfectants, preservatives and dyes, without a concept of science. That's just stuff you do to deal with the physical world.
But they didn't need that to know how they felt or how to interact with one another.
You're quite right. It also occurred to me after I posted that my broad focus on Harris's core theses in The Moral Landscape didn't do justice to the OP who was inquiring about a specific issue. When time permits, I will focus more narrowly on it, since it is indeed a theme that merits discussion regardless of one's general appreciation of Harris.
It does not, however, indicate that there is anything remotely close to objectivity involved in morality. "Good health" can be objective without a morally relevant consideration. "Being in good health is good" is not a similar phrase. It doesn't kow to the same logical inferences and it has no genuine basis for adherence, other than preference.
Which is what morality is, at base, in my view.
I think Harris wants to have his cake and eat it too. 'It's a meaningless universe, but you shouldn't do x.'.
I dont think Harris' position is necessarily wrong or contradictory. Even if the universe is meaningless (which can be interpreted in various ways - in Harris' case, he considers transcendental meaning or ultimate meaning to be absent), this still leaves us with the practical question of how we get along with others and minimise suffering. Our time on Earth can be better or worse, depending on how we relate to each other and work together. Even without inherent meaning in the universe, the quality of our lives is shaped by our interactions and the ways we contribute to the well-being of others. In this sense, Harris' focus on well-being as a moral foundation is reasonable: its not about finding cosmic meaning, but about creating value in our relationships and ensuring that we make life better for ourselves and others. At least, that's how I read him.
Aren't you describing consequentialism? If Harris defines morality as consequentialism, why would he give the opinion that morality doesn't have to have a clear definition in order to be rationally discussed?
Harris seems to want to reduce suffering because for him it is a fact that we can do something about this and make life less miserable. We can debate the specifics - which is what he seems to encourage people to do.
Many atheists (Rorty, Russell, Singer) still find moral imperatives grounded in human well-being, empathy/solidarity, and the impact we can have on the world around us. Even in the absence of a higher meaning, these human-centered values can be just as powerful. The point is not necessarily to seek a greater, cosmic purpose, but to improve the quality of life for ourselves and others, fostering a world where suffering is alleviated and wellness maximised. In this sense, you might say that improving the world becomes its own form of meaning; rooted in the tangible, real-world consequences of our choices and actions.
I understand what you're saying, but that doesn't mesh with the Harris comments posted in the OP.
Quoting frank
Did I misread your comment? Sorry if I got distracted.
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e.g. tikkum olam ...
Coming back to this point, i guess science operates this way: we don't really have precise definitions of concepts like "life" or "consciousness," but we can still study and make progress in understanding those notions. Similarly, Harris holds a view that we can identify moral truths through reason and evidence, even if our definitions of morality remain somewhat flexible. Welbeing is a guiding principle rather than a precisely definable concept, but we can readily identify examples (through consequences) where wellbeing is absent or enhanced. For instance, I don't need to fully define health, but it is pretty clear that poisoning the water supply won't promote health.
If you read the article posted in the OP, Harris is saying that it's ok that we don't have a "conceptual definition" for morality because we just sort of know what it is. One would assume from this that he's going the moral relativism route. Instead, he wants to use folk sentiments about morality to prop up some sort of absolute, or in his words, "objective" morality. That's just kind of ridiculous.
My comment to Amadeus was basically that he needs to make up his mind.
Are you reading that article differently?
I don't think so. Also, I think contemporary medicine has defined health pretty thoroughly, so I don't know what to make of that part of the argument.
I tend to agree with this, but I would probably not agree with Harris that morality is or can be scientific.
Yea. I think morality is more about the heart than the mind. I don't know how to translate that into science-speak.
An example is Iago in Othello. Objectively, all he did was steal a handkerchief and tell some minor lies. But we all know that he committed a massive betrayal. He used his wits to bring out the worst in another person. As he said, "Hell and Night must bring this monstrous birth to the world's light.". Hell and Night are both ancient gods from dead religions. That gives them a collective unconscious vibe.
So the intellect will let Iago off the hook. The heart knows he was a destroyer.