Contradiction in Kant's Worldview
Dialetheism is associated usually with Hegel, but we shouldn't forget how profound his readings of Kant were for him before his first book in 1807. The deeper i get into the latter the more i want to get into Kant. However, Kant, who was very interested in formal logic, has his mental "antimonies" in his system. So my question is: was contradiction a necessary part of logic and/or reality in the worldview of Kant? If we can only see two sides of an idea, how do we know they unite at a highet level?
Comments (154)
No.
Kant's use of the antinomies was to demonstrate that we do not know such things -- we can rationally argue for both the assertion and the negation, and both will appeal to reason, and they can be put side-by-side and end up in contradiction. For Kant this shows a limitation on reason's ability to answer some questions.
Ideas having a two-sidedness is very much a Hegel move and not a Kant move.
What said, except I rather think contradiction is certainly a necessary part of logic. Or, maybe, if not a necessary part, then at least the fundamental ground for the validity of logical constructs.
But each antinomy has for its subject matter everything we experience in the now: past and future, space and matter, spirituality vs materialism. Could it be said that Kant was not Hegelian, but was he an absurdist? If objects and our identity have paradox, how can we say all ideas we have have only one side to them?
The big difference between Kant and Hegel is that Kant set out to create a static philosophy that could be referenced in the future in resolving problems, much like Copernicus' science. His question is the possibility of treating philosophy, especially metaphysics, in terms of the sciences like Newton and Leibniz, but with a reflection to the problems of empiricism due to Hume. And Hegel incorporated the notion of history which moves rather than a static logic.
Hegel's notion of "one-sided" is basically his critique of Kant -- to be able to name an antinomy you have to be able to stand on both sides of it.
I disagree with Hegel's argument, for what it's worth -- I can point to a mountain without climbing over it, for instance.
Good point.
"contradiction" is part of the logic, but in Kantian terms I'd say he'd deny that contradiction is ever true in the transcendental logic.
Kant avoids history and history making perhaps because his noumena is always haunting his phenomena. Without knowledge of what is real except "i think therefore i am" all he has is faith, which makes him more a sceptic than anything else so it would seem. Many scpetics in the Enlightenment (Pierre Gassendi e.g) used sceptical arguments to let themselves forget about reason and leave all behind except faith. This was already done. So what exactly does transcendental philosophy add to this tradition of fideism? What is Kant's one great idea? Hegel, for one, has his historical dialectic
According to Bertrand Russell it was the transcendental aesthetic, in the CPR.
I'd say it's his introduction to the CPR, though. A and B editions make different arguments, but the distinctions he's exploring in each just by way of formulating his question is amazing and great.
He had more than one, however ;)
In relation to Hegel I'd say his distinction between "Logic as such" (formal logic) and "Transcendental Logic" is similar in height to Hegels historical dialectic.
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But really I think the two thinkers are different -- as a historicist might say :)
Quoting How Schopenhauer's Idealism Began with the First Eye Opening
Bolds added
Kant's great idea: that science is the science of appearances, and that appearance always entails the subject for whom it is appearance.
Ding an sich (Thing-in-itself): This refers to 'the object' (or: world) as it would exist independently of or outside perception. We can never know things-in-themselves directly because our knowledge is constructed on the basis of space, time, and the categories of understanding. As the 'in itself' has not by definition been made subject to those, then we can't know of it.
Noumenon: This is a more abstract term, referring to an object as it would be known if we had a kind of intellectual intuition beyond sensory experience. The original meaning is 'object of nous' (where 'nous' is translated as 'intellect'). So the noumenon is a purely intelligible object that does not appear in sensory experience. But as knowledge is bound to depend on sensible experience ('concepts without percepts are empty') then the noumenal is not an object of knowledge. Kant allows noumenon as a limiting concept (negative noumenon), marking the boundary of the known, but denies that the noumenal can be known positively.
Even though it's a subtle distinction, it's significant.
I can see when i ponder billions of years before me that the mind can despair and say "without the warm of a knowing mind, what does it even mean for material objects to exist". And yet i know this rock here has existence if no one looks at it. What exactly phenomena is needs to be explored further it seems.
The world without mind is called sometimes "pure potential", "emptiness", "randomness", even "freedom", ect. There has to be some rationality that lets the intellectual difficulties fall into place after having shown themselves in the past to be unsolvable. If the world is will, will at least has to have imagination in order to be a functioning faculty, right?
All due respect, if you wish to study philosophy, this is something that you will need to be able to question. It seems obvious, but then an important part of philosophy is questioning what seems obvious.
Quoting Gregory
Antinomies are not the same as contradictions. The point of the antinomies of reason is to demonstrate Kant's maxim that 'reason is drawn to posit ideas beyond what it can establish'. Reason provides the ability to ask questions like: does the world have a beginning in time or not? But Kant is saying that even though such questions appear rational, they may be beyond the scope of reason to address. (And notice that even with the huge advances in cosmology since Kant's day, whether the Universe has a beginning or not is still an open question.) Reason has limits, and while we might think we can see beyond it, such claims might turn out to be illusory. He says in the Introduction:
and later in the text:
Do you agree with these passages? Can reason never know full truth? Did Kant fail by going to far into doubt?
Oh right, the Construction of Nature book. I had forgotten about it. We did discuss it way back when. I had a thread 'what is phenomena' way back when, but i haven't those old posts since then
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysical_Foundations_of_Natural_Science
I read the first part of the former but i never felt like it really clicked with me
Quoting Moliere
Yes, Kant's antimonies are (it seems to me) a modern reformulation of classical equipollence (re: Pyrrho / Sextus Empiricus ... no doubt inspired by, or derived from, Socrates' elenchus (esp. early Platonic dialogues)).
Quoting Mww
:100: (re: LNC)
:up: :up:
Quoting Wayfarer
Given that "subject" is also an "appearance", this so-called "great idea" amounts to a tautology. :smirk:
Quoting tim wood
Such as? :chin:
I would ask you, what about the human faculties do you think enables them to arrive at an understanding of the true nature of reality? I think the hallmark of Kant is actually his intellectual humility. He is one who dares question what most take for granted.
What of truth for it's own sake? Why is desire for a knowledge wrong? What if we spent less thoughts on doubts and more on constructing what we can know. Truth is always seen. It's not always recogized
People who enter my room experience a different room then the one i call my own space. Every object is understand by each person just as people are understood differently by different people.
I think - and I think Kant also thought, although he was not explicit about it - that knowing the truth has a spiritual dimension. There is an insight which generally speaking we ordinarily lack. Whereas today we have access to vast troves of knowledge but whether that imparts or conveys insight is another matter altogether.
[quote=Emrys Westacott;https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2014/11/the-continuing-relevance-of-immanuel-kant.html]Kant never lost sight of the fact that while modern science is one of humanity's most impressive achievements, we are not just knowers: we are also agents who make choices and hold ourselves responsible for our actions. In addition, we have a peculiar capacity to be affected by beauty, and a strange inextinguishable sense of wonder about the world we find ourselves in. Feelings of awe, an appreciation of beauty, and an ability to make moral choices on the basis of rational deliberation do not constitute knowledge, but this doesn't mean they lack value. On the contrary. But a danger carried by the scientific understanding of the world is that its power... may lead us to undervalue those things that don't count as science.[/quote]
I often wonder whether there should be such a thing as 'scientific truth'. I question that there is. There are scientific theories, scientifically-validated insights, to be sure. But truth has a quality of aliveness to it, which can't be captured by propositional knowledge.
I doubt this statement is true.
No doubt.
Quoting tim wood
For different reasons, e.g. Democritus (re: sensory conventions, limitless divisibility of things) and e.g. Parmenides/Plato (re: change/appearances aka "the many") proposed the idea of (subjective) "construct of mind" millennia ago. Kant just 'a prioritized' this with arbitrarily complex convoluted schema; of no use, as you acknowledge, pragmatically or in cognitive scientific terms.
Quoting Gregory
However, we can approximately defeasibly "understand it" and sufficiently enough for us to adapt and thrive in the world (i.e. nature) with which a priori we are entangled (pace Descartes, pace Berkeley).
What about this rock question however: are there rocks in existence when they are never seen? But what if they are heard, or tasted or smelled. Suppose there was one conscious being in the universe and his only sense was smell. If he smelled a "rock", does the rock exist? It seems individuation is on the part of the object presenting itself to me. Maybe truth i the reverse of science
Truth is seen in that ignorance clouds the eyes of the mind that are, nonethless, seeing. Plato learned this from Socratea. There is a common stream running from Persia (Zorastrianism) to the Gnostics, neo-Platonists, and the followes of Mythra (largely Roman soldiers) which whispers of release from ideas that only know particular things as just that. Intuition is sometimes called the third eye... I was going to say something about Eckhart, but i have to go back and see my sources
I use intuitiom and insight interchangeably. These leads to true knowledge though. Otherwise all is will. That knowledge is different from scientific knowledge. Will and reason are both necessary, so Schopenhauer and Hegel may have both been right
Kant was an empirical realist, from which perspective he would say, 'of course'. But he was also a transcendental idealist, so he would ask you 'what do you mean by "in existence"'? And that's a very difficult question.
If I think of the Big Bang for example, since there was no consciousness in the space-time reality at that time, to even think about it is to declare that a subjectless object existed once. People are very attached to being one with the past, as in evolution and cosmology (we are stardust?). It sems odd to take your own body thougy as phenomena instead of the intergal thing-in-itself, thrown through the chaotees of history.. Kant would have learned a lot from Hegel ii think, had he only lived longer
Yes, such declarations are made, and are supported by empirical evidence.
But my senses only feel in my visiom of sense. It takes abstract thought coupled withe imagination to think of something or someone not before you in their presence. We know each oher as humans, so then should we treat the body as phenomena or the thing in itself
Quoting tim wood
Right, that knowledge is had only by minds is a vacuous truism, and hence "not so useful".
Quoting Gregory
Why wouldn't they be? As to Kant, he didn't question their existence, what he questioned was our ability to know what they are "in themselves". Kant acknowledged that they are something in themselves (that is they exist in themselves) but he said we could not know what that existence in itself is. But this is true by mere stipulation, is therefore true by definition, a mere tautology.
It's "not so useful".
It's important to understand the link between Kant and cognitive science. Scholars recognise that Kant understood, in a way that nobody before him did, the role of the mind in the construction of what we take to be independently real. This is Kant's 'Copernican Revolution in Philosophy' which means that thought doesn't conform with things, but that things conform with thought. 'Kant drew a parallel to the Copernican Revolution in his proposal to think of the objects of experience as conforming to our spatial and temporal forms of intuition and the categories of our understanding, so that we have a priori cognition of those objects.'
So why is that? It's because our knowledge of the world, even though that is outside us, is constituted by the brain as 'idea' (per Schopenhauer). It's really important to understand what that means. The division between self and world is itself part of what the brain constructs. Easy to say, but hard to discern.
For Hegel contradiction is the essential element in the changes and progress of the world.
Quoting Gregory
Kant's logic was not formal logic. It was transcendental logic i.e. he thought transcendental idealism works under the principle of the logic.
Quoting Gregory
Antinomies were what our reasons face when dealing with God, world, freedom and souls. Reason was supposed to know truth on everything. But when it comes to these objects, reason doesn't know what they are. For Kant, that was antinomy of reason, which is also the limitation of reason.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's merely empirical, not transcendental in Kant's system (CPR); your statement doesn't make sense, Wayf.
Kant lived in the earlier times than Hegel. How could Kant have had been a Hegelian? Could Plato have had been Heideggerian? :D
Logic employed by the understanding is commonly, albeit loosely, called formal, but by Kants theory-specific terminology, called general or applied. Reason, on the other hand, employs transcendental logic, which has congruent subject/predicate form, but different origin of conceptions contained therein.
Understanding is the faculty of cognition in accordance with general/applied logic of rules, hence may or may not be empirical; reason is the faculty of determination of rules in accordance with transcendental logic, hence is never empirical. Logic is still logic, the source of its conceptions indicates the kind of logic it is, the functional domain to which it belongs.
Kantian speculative philosophy treats human intelligence as a tripartite syllogistic logical system, in which understanding provides the major either with or without conjunction with sensibility, judgement provides the minor(s) either with or without empirical representations, reason provides the conclusion, which is always and only transcendental, in accordance with pure a priori principles, the arbiter being contradiction either with itself or with experience. In this format, there is given the contingency of empirical knowledge on the one hand, and the certainty of pure a priori inference on the other.
The purity of this type of speculative analysis was taken to be sufficient ground for refuting Hume, which was the primary raison detre for the construction of transcendental philosophy in the first place .to falsify the standard empiricists claim that a priori cognitions in general, all that which cannot follow from the constant conjunction of empirical cause and effect, should be consigned to the flames , insofar as if such were to be the case, the universality and necessity of mathematical truths cannot be explained.
.or so it seems.
Quoting Mww
Formal logic means the type of logic which uses symbols and formal languages for analysing the statements and propositions for validity i.e. propositional logic, predicate logic and modal logic.
In mathematical logic it also means the logic which can be computable via the intelligent machines.
Quoting Mww
Reason itself is a faculty which analyses and finds truths, but if it is to employ transcendental logic for its operation, then does it not duplicate itself with another faculty of truth telling system? Does it imply that reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time? If both of them says true, then why does reason need the logic, and why logic needs reason?
Are they not rather actually the same faculty expressed in different terms?
Which is why I said commonly, but loosely, called, insofar as the human intellectual faculties do not use symbols or language; it is only when talking about such use, in the attempts at describing it, is various symbology necessary in order to communicate. We represent to ourselves logic in a metaphysical sense, merely that by which the system functions, with various conceptions some of which the system itself doesnt even use. Reification writ large, and the bane of proper metaphysics.
Quoting Corvus
Sorry, that makes no sense to me.
We don't "know," we settle (or, knowledge is settlement); and, they don't unite at a "highest" level, they unite at the [temporary] ["most"] functional level (or highest is functional)
When there are the official definition of formal logic, describing logic in commonly and loosely was a bit odd. We do use symbols extensively in all sciences, mathematics, arts, and communications too. Ignoring the symbols would be ignoring intelligence.
Quoting Mww
How could a case of contradiction which is possible in the reality and also in logical thinking not make sense to you?
First of all, nowhere in the statement that made no sense to me was the concept of reality to be found, and nowhere in the logic of my own understanding of the statement, was the deduction of the conception of reality possible.
The second statement, in response, in the form of a secondary conditional query, the conception of reality is found, so that statement makes sense to me. Now I can say, reality does not hold contradiction, that being the purview of pure a priori logic manifest in critical thought, so even though the statement makes sense, it is theoretically invalid.
The world seems to be objects we perceive by our senses as extended. But there is so much more to experience than that. Phenomena is embedded in the pure extension stripped of color, smell, and taste (subjective?). There are all the ideas of philosophy living in the very being of things. Hegel presents the world as negative, moving, and as positive, objective, and Platonic on the flip side. Where does purpose come from? We don't know but it's there. Where does the extended come from for that matter
And yes, Hedeigger was a finitist Hegelian lol, imo
Quoting Mww
Quoting Mww
Your writings are ambiguous in what it is trying to say. My point was clear. If reason is based on logic, then they are likely to conflict on their judgements. Moreover it sounds a redundant statement to say that reason is based on logic.
Purpose for what? Isn't purpose from your psychology?
Quoting Gregory
Under what evidence is it the case? Gadamer was into Hegel stuff for mainly on hermeneutics, but not sure if Heidegger was.
Yeahrp.
:up:
Quoting Corvus
No.
There's a lot of lingo there that can be interpreted in various ways. But "No", I think, is the true answer to all of your questions above.
"Faculty" is a fun word from the early modern period. It doesn't specify much other than thought-furniture/functions in the imaginations of the early moderns.
Reason, in Kant, is a generalizations of the various powers of judgment which ultimately want truth.
I'd compare "Faculty" to "Category" in Kant, though -- not so much that reason itself is a faculty but faculties (categories) are a part of Reason.
Exactly, ideas about the brain and whatever it is understood to do is part of an empirical understanding, not a transcendental.
Heidegger ends Being and Time on Hegel's analysis of time. He might have been referring to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, the first pary of it about math, space, and time. Have you read one of Hegel's books? I've Phenomenology of the Mind about 7 times, and his "encyclopaedia' a few times. Sometimes there can be synchronisity in life
I read Kant's insistence upon the intuitions as not a claim upon the limits of knowledge but acceptance of a structure we always use. The objection to Hume is about the range of options being entertained, a luxury not available to all.
"Intuition" has a special meaning in Kant, for instance -- it's the form in which the given is given. He doesn't insist upon intuition, though, but argues for it in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
I'd say that Kant's formulation of the categories of cause are the response to Hume.
But, I agree that these considerations are often...Quoting Paine
I think it's important to see that Heidegger never ended Being and Time by his own design.
I think he got lost in his own hermeneutic, or perhaps just ended in aporia from his initial ambitions.
The important thing to note is that he never finished his thoughts -- so they are interesting, but he didn't do what Camus did, for instance, in posing a question and then answering it.
I believe the same was the fate of Kant and Leibniz. They never finished their systems to their own satisfaction.
I think Hegel was just philosophically spent by the end. Anything else he would have written would have been redundant in my opinion
As for Heidegger, his sense that time is alive and informs us of life reminds me of the turning wheels of the system of Hegel
Understanding may construct a priori cognitions concerning possible experience, true enough, re: motion is necessarily change in time but not necessarily change in space (think: rotation). But principles and mathematical axioms, on the other hand, are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, hence, while they may certainly condition possible experience, insofar as their proofs reside in the domain of empirical knowledge, they are not conditioned by it, contra Hume.
Good question, but tough to short-answer convincingly.
Kant said he did. Not only his own satisfaction, but to everyone elses as well, assuming a commensurate ability to understand it. See Bxxiv.
Ok, fair enough. I was wondering if reason and logic are the same or separate faculties in Kant. If they are the separate faculties, then they might create possible contradictory situations in their operations. That was my point to Mww. For the word "faculties", Kant uses the word often in his Lecture on "LOGIC" for meaning divisions.
Quoting Moliere
We can see the word "faculty" often in the Logic Lecture book of Kant. For example "Reason is the faculty of the derivation of the particular from the universal or cognition a priori." - pp.442
I did read some commentary books on Hegel. I did not read any of his original works.
Quoting Gregory
Cool. You must be very much familiar with Hegel's system. :up:
I support your effort to become persnickity in the use of terms.
Kant is pretty darn specific in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic regarding what he supports and objects to in Hume.
My observation applies more to comparisons made afterwards.
Thanks. I've read several places that Kant wanted to complete Descartes "universal algebra" agenda. That is, a system that can explain everything that humans can know. Leibniz tried this as well
Quoting Corvus
After getting better at reading his works, it felt as if i could predict what each next paragraph would be about. Or maybe it was a psychological trick, idk, but his arguing is dizzying, so it's best to keep it abstract and keep in mind the various uses of the words form, universal, particular, negative, positive, abstract, concrete, ratio, measure, essence, ect.
In Logic Lecture book, it says logic is derived from reason. and is is a doctrine, it provides rules / it is a demonstrated theory. It contains the ground for passing judgements as to whether something is true or false. -pp.432
Which Hegelian text are you referring to? There are at least three your description could be pointing to.
How about quoting some text so that the context can be appreciated?
I feel Hegel is an important and significant philosopher, and was planning to read his original texts sometime. His metaphysics, and philosophy of religion were interesting. But Science of Logic sounds interesting too. Look forward to discussing on Hegel sometime in the near future with you and others who are interested in Hegel too.
I have Hegel's Philosophy of Religion, Phenomenology of Spirit and some other books too. I need to get back to reading them. I did read a couple of introductory books on Hegel long time ago, so most of them are faded away from my memory. Need to refresh searching and looking for the books somewhere in the cupboards. This is not a Hegel thread, so maybe if someone starts one on Hegel, I would follow. I am only a learner, hence would be for studying mostly reading and asking if any questions arise.
What was Hegel's main response do you think to Kant's divided (by antimony?) world of phenomena and the beyond?
I, too, am only a learner.
In asking for clear references, I am not questioning your experience of a text but asking for a means to accurately share it. Otherwise, our swift ostensive gestures leave us talking to ourselves.
So, I could pursue each one of them. But how is it my job to separate what you claim as a thesis to be what stands together? Why should I think that is true?
Kant's primary psychological observation is that we are separate from something about which we are very curious. Hegel tries to create thought spaces where we can satisfy our desires for complete systamization
My general impression of Hegel, as a psychologist (him, not me), is that all this stuff we think about is directly related to our experiences while being people.
That is not to deny a desire for complete understating but Hegel's approach in Lordship and Bondage is a sharp departure from Kant preaching universal peace.
Hegel was pointing out that slavery is a part of the human condition; however, he believed in the progress of history. Things can get bad, but they lead to what is best. I would say Hegel believed in Leibniz's best of all possible worlds, but in a world that evolves into the best, the perfect. A current contemporary philosopher who has similar views is Tim Freke
Of course. Hegel claimed Aristotle as his own, but his logo-becoming theology is the reverse of Aquinas's world view. Kant is opposed to it too. Kant kind of just rests on morality and says "let's 1) be moral, 2) do science to figure out the assumed (critique of judgment) to be designed world. Aquinas says "the perfect is in every way first". For Hegel it comes last (so history has importance. The potential that is actualized!). Kant can't prove that the perfect is real. Plato's "good" alludes him, except in that he contemplates his own conscience
I sense that you do get the scope of conscience in the Protestant rejection of authority outside the voice of reason or faith. Kant advocates for a specific code of conduct as difficult as many others that have been proposed.
The laws of the heart are hard to decifer, so i can't declare i know Kant's inner reflections, but his system for me leaves something missing.
I am not arguing for his system. I left that long ago.
But I can argue what is an accurate account of it.
Which system?
How does the suggested contradiction in his worldview relate to something missing in his system?
Just curious.
He has the 1) unknowable, 2) the knowable by science, 3) those things known by faith without a consulting reason (laws of the heart), 4) and ethical life. None of them relate by causality to another one. "Cause" is only in the scientific realm. Hope and faith are left to stand on their own along with a moral life goal. The unknowable stands as something enticing for the intellect and is described dualistically as noumena and the -thing-in-itself (i have yet to grasp the distinction). But we can never reach it. We are to pretend there is design in beauty even while not allowing the mind to really believe this. All that is just disconnected for me personally. Some people regard him as the greatest philosopher ever
Rosen says it is impossible to understand Hegel without understanding Plato and Aristotle. Do you agree? Why is it the case?
Ok Thanks.
Quoting Gregory
They shouldnt; he was adamant that there is no such thing as a philosopher. (A839/B867)
Speaking of contradictions albeit regardless of worldview ..
He takes great pains to qualify several well-known individuals as philosophers, yet, given the above, questions the existence of philosophers as such, rather denominating them as teachers, and the rest learn, not philosophy, which cannot be taught, but, merely to philosophize.
Not as important as it is interesting, I guess.
Hegel uses terms from Aristotle and Platonism all the time. The "universal" he speaks of often. He turns things around though. In the Science of Logic you have there he says quality comes before quantity, which is the reverse of how Aristotle is usually interpreted. Aristotle seemed to think, in thought, there is first quantity or "matter" and that it is marked and structured by a form, which in turn is derived from a Form which is in the mind of the Prime Mover (or Movers). Simple, right? Hegel's take is influenced by Kant; quality is phenomena. Yes the world is matter. The Left Hegelians were correct! And so were the Right Hegelians after him. They both took part of the paradox and ran with it. Hegel tried to bring contradiction into a non-dual unity where there is no room left for contradiction. The latter becomes paradox, mystery, miracle, and we learn what is truly worth knowing.
I have read two of those and a portion of another.
The point I was making regards standards of citation. If, for instance, you want to cite from The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by Miller, you could say that, and people would be able to find pages on that basis. If it is a less known book, one can find either a vendor or free text version to point to.
For example, here is the above-mentioned book at a vendor.
I see Science of Logic on your pile. That is quite a different book from Logic, Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences I have owned the latter book for decades and have had only brief glimpses of the other.
/rant on the value of good citations.
It seems that such understandings are based on thinking about and generalizing from experience. Thus, we are said to know a priori what characteristics anything which qualifies as experience must have, in accordance with the most general characteristics all our past experiences are revealed by analysis, to have had.
When you say that principles and mathematical axioms are the transcendental constructs of reason alone, I am not sure what you mean. Those principles, it seems to me, at their most basic are abstracted from reflecting on an analyzing our experiences, and then once established may be elaborated in accordance with the entailments implicit in them, entailments which are discovered progressively by doing (experience) as seems to be the case with mathematics.
So, I don't see reason as a disembodied thing that can stand alone.
Kant seemed to do this 'removal of the mind from it's environment' thing. Reason can twist inward where it can no longer feel truth. This is why The Critique of Judgment is sentimental. He misses certainty that doesn't rely on a spurious infinity
:100:
Yes, I agree. Detailed and accurate source info for the quotations and citations are important and critical in the postings. Without them, some readers might accuse you for plagiarism.
Why does Hegel try to avoid contradiction and dualism? Are contradiction and dualism unacceptable faults in philosophy?
Well sure; thats so easy to say, when there is already so much mathematically-inclined experience. Weve all been exposed to number systems since a very early age. It doesnt take long to learn that counting to 7, then continuing the count by another 5, gets you to a total of 12. From there, you easily see those two counts can never ever get you to any other number but 12.
I submit that it is from the most basic reflection and analysis of our counting experiences, that only the philosophically-inclined appreciate the apodeictic certainty, that it is impossible to arrive at 12 when all you have is a 7 and a 5. There is nothing at all contained in a 7, nor in a 5, which further authorizes you to do anything at all. From which it follows, even with experience of the existent numbers themselves being given, that whatever principle there may be regulating the use of that experience, is not contained in it. Hence the claim that while experience itself is conditioned by such principles, experience is not the condition from which they are given.
Might be easier this way: how many attempts, given only two straight lines, would it take to experience an enclosed space?
Now, before you laugh ..or maybe before you laugh any harder ..ever wonder how the very first ever farmer recognized, rather than have his sons stand guard all night, that to keep the indigenous fauna out of his wintertime food-stocks, it was necessarily required of him that he enclose such area, which he immediately and unquestionably realized to be impossible except under one and only one condition. In other words, he did NOT need the experience of destroyed crops, nor, insofar as he was the first ever, did he need the experience of other existent enclosed spaces, to know with apodeictic certainty, not so much how many lines do enclose a space, but how many do not.
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How bout this: as soon as you imagine a triangle, that is, construct a three-sided figure in your head, so to speak, youve destroyed the very idea of a triangle in general.
There are things a human just knows, merely for being human. At this level, knowledge indicates that of which the negation is a contradiction.
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Quoting Janus
I rather think reason is certainly not a thing, and I think reason as certainly being disembodied, insofar as there is no place in any possible body in which reason as such is to be found. Nor any other abstract theoretically-constructed intellectual faculty.
Still, even granting to it greater import, does not mean reason stands alone. Reason is part of a system, after all, however speculative that may be. While it may do things of such greater import by itself because of what it is thought to be and thereby the powers thought as belonging to it, its importance is only manifest in relation to something else.
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Granting there are things a human just knows merely because hes human, neglecting, or even in spite of, natural instinct ..how do we talk about it?
That's right. Counting begins with objects. Fingers and toes, grazing animals being hunted, heads of corn or whatever. Calculating was practices with an abacus. It's all based on experience of actual things,
Quoting Mww
Enclosure I would say is a very simple idea that we learn for example by experiencing our own bodies. Opening and closing our eyes, our mouths and our hands.
Quoting Mww
by 'thing' I meant 'process' not 'perceptible object'. Reasoning goes on in the brain and is felt in the body in my view, and in that sense it is perceptible. We know when we are reasoning about something even if only inwardly. We visualize what we are reasoning about or hear an inner voice, or at least I do.
"Kant rated dialectic higher- and this is among his greatest merits- for he freed it from the seeming arbitrariness which it possesses from the standpoint of ordinary thought and exhibited it as a necessary function of reason. Because dialectic was held to be merely the art of practising deceptions and producing illusions, the assumpton was made forthwith that it is only a spurious game, the whole of its power resting solely on concealment of the deceit and that its results are obtained only surreptitiously and are a subjective illusion. True, Kant's expositions in the antimonies of pure reason, when closely examined as they will be at length in the course of this work, do not indeed deserve any great praise; but the general idea on which he based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations: primarily, it is true, with the significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things in themselves; but their nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to what is intrinsic or in itself. This result, grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life." Science of Logic, Introduction
Anyway, Ill stick with the affirmative regarding your are (there) any "a priori cognitions in general" which do not have their genesis either in experience or in rules that are at their basis derived from experience.
Would it be the criticism on Kant from Hegel's point of view?
"self-moving soul, the principle of all natural and spiritual life" needs explanation for its meaning and ontological and metaphysical nature. Does Science of Logic do that?
The Science of Logic is very difficult. I love it but I have yet to finish it lol. And Ive never read a commentary on Hegel so I can't recommend one. You should read the Phenomenology of Mind [Spirit] however. I have not found anything in Hegel that doesn't make sense to me. No contradictions. It does take a lot of reading and also a lot of mental work to start to get what he is saying because he doesn't spell his whole philosophy out right away. Only those willing to run with him will win his prize
Yes. You should know some of Kant before reading Hegel
My fault for not putting up a convincing argument; nevertheless .
Quoting Janus
.we agree on that.
In that case, I am not sure if Hegel was understanding Kant properly. Because from my view, it is not clear that Kant's world view was dualism. What Kant said was that our knowledge can only give us understanding to the point of our experience, and that is the limit our reason.
It was rather setting the limit of our reason in dealing with the world, rather than claiming that the world is divided into two different worlds. That is no contradiction. Hence it appears to be misunderstanding on Kant to say that Kant was a dualist, and his world view has a contradiction.
I am reading the thin book with tiny printing "Science of Logic" - it hurts eyes due to the small prints in the pages but makes the book cheap, thin and light. This book has no information on the book apart from it says "Science of Logic by Georg Hegel, Printed by Amazon". For the commentaries, Rosen and Painz books seem good.
It will be very slow progress due to my intermittent and sporadic reading on them because I am also reading on some other subjects for my works which is ongoing. The Hegel books were dug out from the cupboard because of this thread just to see what Hegel books I got. I forgot even I had them, but nice to know I still got them. :)
Kants worldview is a dualism. Clarity comes with the fact there cannot be a view, that isnt itself a judgement, that is, some determined relation between the world and an understanding of it. The dualism resides in world on the one hand (as it is given), and judgement on the other (representing how the given is understood).
Quoting Corvus
He admitted to being a dualist, so it isnt a misunderstanding to say he was. But it does not follow from his being an admitted dualist, that his worldview has a contradiction, although misunderstood, hence mistaken, worldviews are certainly possible.
Why would it be the case?
Quoting Mww
What was his exact words?
The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist, or, as he is called, a dualist, that is, he may admit the existence of matter ( ) From the start, we have declared ourselves to be in favor of this transcendental idealism; and our doctrine removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the existence of matter .
(A370, in Kemp Smith, 1929)
. The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter ( ) Now we have already declared ourselves for this transcendental idealism from the outset. Thus our doctrinea removes all reservations about assuming the existence of matter
(A370, Guyer/Wood, 1998)
Quoting Mww
Are they direct claims of Kant? Or are they interpretations of the commentaries? Anyhow, they both sound unclear and ambiguous on their claims.
Just because someone admits the existence of matter doesn't entail that he is a dualist, does it?
It would help if you could define what dualism is in philosophical sense, and elaborate under what account / sense Kant was a dualist.
Of course not. Hes dead.
It seems daft view to say there are two worlds. I don't believe Kant would have said it.
There were miriad of Kant commentators who were making unfounded interpretations on Kant's ideas.
It boils down to a simple common sensical logic that just because we see the world in two i.e. the known and unknown, the world itself is two is not the case.
If we do it, then it would be because of the faults in our perception or the limit of our reasoning which gives us that illusion. The world is one, and there is only one world and one universe. I believe this is what Kant meant.
If you say so.
I read the books, not the commentary on them. Skip the middle-man, donchaknow. Translators being subject to peer-review critique, so out of my cognitive jurisdiction.
That is just my view which might not be 100% correct. I invite counter arguments on it as always. :)
I try reading them both, but try to come to my own interpretation from my own reasoning which may or may not be correct. But if it is not resonating with my own reasoning, then I just move on.
Same with any of us, I should think.
It does seem daft that Kant said there were two worlds, although he did say there is no purely logical condition under which a noumenal world is impossible. But saying such a thing is not impossible is not tacit affirmation of its reality.
Quoting Corvus
As do I, and everyone else. One persons lack of comprehension is not necessarily anothers ambiguity or lack of clarity.
Lol i have that copy too. It doesn't even have page numbers
I think Kant is a dualist because there is the "I think therefore I am" thinking person, and the thing in itself that is unknowable. Kant fails to get rid of the thing in itself. He wants to know more, but can't. Kant can't. Poor Kant
I don't think your quotes from Kant on matter fully establish dualism. Substance is part of the categories and the only thing we know phenomenally is matter. The unknowability of noumena in this life is what makes his philosophy dualistic. Oddly
They weren't supposed to. They serve only to affirm, that because he favored transcendental idealism, by implication he considered himself a dualist. He does explain what he means by being a dualist, which would establish at least what he means by dualism itself.
Noumena have nothing whatsoever to do with his philosophic dualism; as a general conception, it is merely an inevitable consequence of a faculty professed to be legitimately capable of thinking whatever it wants, which just means any of us is capable of thinking whatever he wants.
Kant was not interested in dualism or transcendental idealism. His main aim was to prove that metaphysics was possible as a science. In order to do that, he was arguing that reason has its limits to the boundary where experience is possible. Within the boundaries of reason and experience, metaphysics as science is possible. Objects belonging to outer boundaries of reason and experience are not legitimate objects of science or metaphysics.
That is not a proper foundation for dualism. Remember he wrote different versions of CPR. Brining in some minor unclear remarks on dualism in CPR doesn't mean he was a dualist. He also wrote many other original texts apart from CPR, and his academic life gets divided into different stages during his life.
His ideas and thoughts have gone through different forms and beliefs. It would be too simple and naive to claim Kant was a dualist or idealist or realist just by citing a few ambiguous quotes from CPR.
Kant was very much into Newtonian Physics too. Believing in two different worlds for Kant would have been impossible for his academic interest and beliefs.
Neither the matter nor the noumena establish something for dualism? I dont get your point
Wow i had a revelation. If the thing in itself doesnt cause phenomena, because casuality is in phenomena, then the thing in itself is just within the phenomena and is that which we can't psychologically get to. Kants sounds like a materialist then.
Rather confusione
I'm wondering what the ISBN of that book is in your picture? I want to look it up and see what the difference is.
And @Mww
I don't believe that Hegel cared to understand Kant in the "proper" sense --i.e. in the sense that he'd count as a Kantian -- he only riffs on Kantian ideas to do his own thing.
But whether or not Kant was a dualist I think is still a matter up for debate because it sounds like the question of whether or not Kant was a one-world or two-world theorist. (Theorist isn't the right word -- these are two competing interpretations in the literature): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#TwoAspInt
You asserted your idea of what made his philosophy dualistic, but this question only relates conceptions to each other, both of them .matter and noumena .implied as being real things, hence not establishing anything for dualism per se. Matter being necessarily real stuff we can experience, noumena being not-impossibly real stuff we cannot.
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Quoting Moliere
Only those on top of the heap are worth the trouble of removing; posterity says whether and how much the trouble was worth.
Quoting Moliere
Id be surprised if you were not with the familiar 1783 passage regarding dogmatic slumbers. THAT .is the root of Kantian dualism, the unity of rational vs empirical doctrines prevalent in his time. The two-world or two-aspect-of-one world confabulation was the illegitimate, red-headed stepchild of a veritable PLETHORA of successors, except Schopenhauer, methinks to be the foremost immediate peer that actually understood wtf the noise was all about.
Noise. Including, but not limited to .whether or not that which can be treated as a science, actually is one.
Heh, fair. I'm familiar, but undecided on the right way to read.
My preference is actually for the one-world interpretation, though it may only be a prejudice extending from my way of reading Pluhar's translation.
I think it gets along with the anti-metaphysics Kant espouses -- if there were two worlds then we could say there is a noumenal and phenomenal world, which looks a lot like a knowledge claim to me. Rather than two-worlds I think the two-aspect view gets along with the notion that we cannot know the noumenal -- it could be a second world, but it could also just be the things we can't know about the world we are in. Only God knows.
There are (nudgenudgewinkwink) maybe 300 pages of CPR Ive read 1000 times, and with which I cant for the life of me agree or disagree. Bottomless pit of noise that, I must say.
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Yes, one world, for which the empiricists are right.
Yes, the representations of whatever the constituency of that one world, which is all we are ever going to possibly know anything about, for which the idealists are right.
Let the dualist games begin.
I get that. It seems Kant wanted to disprove metaphysics as a science with Newtonian materialism. What do you think?
Not quite.
@Jamal robbed me of this notion once upon a time -- it's not Newtonian mechanics as much as the basis of natural science which contrasts with the philosophical history of metaphysics.
To break it down it's more like: Hey, you notice how we know shit about the world? And can predict it? And that the history of metaphysics, in comparison, is nothing but verbal disagreements?
Must be that the metaphysicians don't know as much as the scientists -- at least they can agree upon things I can't disbelieve, unlike the metaphysicians.
I think he wasnt trying to prove yea or nay, regarding metaphysics as a science, which presupposes it is one. He wanted to find out if it was possible for it to be a science in the first place, where such presupposition is lacking. Given a set of criteria for what science is, whether or not metaphysics exhibits those same criteria will determine whether metaphysics can be a science. Then all thats left, is to figure out what kind of science it would be should the criteria be met, and dismissing it as a science if it cannot.
Turns out, metaphysics cannot be a proper science given the empirical criteria of Newtonian materialism, nor can it be a science given the Kantian rational criteria of pure synthetic a priori principles, insofar as, first, Newtonian materialism already refers to the science of physics thus to attribute to it metaphysics at the same time is self-contradictory, and second, those principles belong to reason alone, and science cannot be justified by any domain the only objects for which are transcendental ideas.
Metaphysics is then relegated to a natural disposition of the human intellect, merely that to which we as humans are generally and inevitably inclined toward, but for which no satisfactory justifications are afforded beyond pure transcendental logic. Which is an altogether crappy way to do science, right?
. Respecting these sciences**, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible?for that they must be possible is shown by the fact of their really existing. But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence .
(**physics and mathematics)
(B21)
But never fear: just because metaphysics as a science lacks justifications, doesnt negate the validity of a form of knowledge determined metaphysically, that is, in accordance with the pure a priori principles resident in and determined by nowhere else than in reason.
Besides miserable progress implies that just because metaphysics wasnt justifiable as a science in 1787 doesnt mean it cant be later. But then, theres still those sets of criteria, which one would suppose would also have to become different. Good luck, I say.
Sure.
Didn't Kant say that Metaphysics is possible as Science as long as it deals with the objects in our experience? For instance we can think and discuss about ideas, matters, logic and reasoning from metaphysical point of views. Physics cannot deal with these concepts. Metaphysics can. They are different types of Science.
Or it may be that an argument strong enough to convince you may not work on meor vice versa.
Not that Im aware. Metaphysics in Kant does not, in itself, deal with experience or its objects. It deals with how it is possible to know about them, which means, it deals with us and the proper use of our intelligence.
As well, ideas, logic and reasoning are not themselves objects of experience, so could be said to come under the metaphysical explanatory umbrella.
If you find otherwise, Id be interested.
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Quoting Janus
Daccord.
Isn't the whole content of CPR about experience, its objects, and how reasoning and judgements and concepts are related to them? Physics cannot deal with any of these issues. Metaphysics can, and that is what Kant laid out in CPR as the principle of Metaphysics as Science.
The title says something very different. A critique of pure reason wont have much to do with experience or its objects, and as a matter of contextual fact, makes serious effort to distance itself from them.
The origin, and relation to experience, of judgements and concepts, among other factors, such as understanding, intuition, consciousness, are metaphysical studies, Ill grant that.
Is there a place in the CPR where "experience" has a self-evident role such as you describe?
You really need to read much more than just CPR to understand what Kant was up to at the time. Read Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten, then Hume and Newton, and many the other Kant's writings apart from CPR in order to grasp the full picture of what Kant was up to when writing CPR. Possible experience is what Kant regards as the domain of efficacy in our reasoning, where metaphysics is possible as a science.
I am familiar with those authors' participation in the conversation.
Shall I take your answer to be no in regard to the text of the CPR?
I was asking you to support your claims by quoting CPR.
Anyhow, if you are genuinely interested in the topic, you must also do some your own hard work trying to find out about it by your own researches and reasonings, and share the resources and your own arguments on the topic with others, rather than trying to get easy solutions just asking around to other folks. That wouldn't be much meaningful exercise to your own philosophizing.
The point is that it is not a claim that can be supported by quoting a few recondite sentences in CPR. You must read the whole lot of authors involved in the system at the time, and understand the whole picture to be able to understand the claim.
The presumption that I seek only easy answers and have not read a lot is a low effort response on your part.
So far, I have no reason to believe that you have actually read the Critique of Pure Reason.
is possible experience logic, cogito,
It is potential, it is excitment. and logos
and anticipation
How do we find in these books the nous Anaxagoros?
It doesn't matter what you believe in my reading of CPR. It is not a philosophical issue.
It is also not matter how many times one read CPR, if one doesn't understand it correctly, or misunderstand the whole point and picture of it, then it would be blind and empty claims.
CPR is not the only work by Kant. Kant had written many other original texts.
It was a natural inference on your question. Not a matter of effort.
Judging from the quality of his responses I doubt he has read it, or if he has read it, I doubt he has understood it. As usual more posturing than substance coming from Corvus.
Tis most suspicious, to say the inventor of a paradigm-shifting epic, a magnum opus in form and function bequeathed to posterity in its completed form, had no interest in it.
O course, claiming an author wasnt really interested could be simply a novel and daring approach to a not-so-simple work. But I doubt itll catch on.
As usual Janus posts are filled with scorn, anger and hatred towards others, rather than anything philosophical. I was only giving the best answer to Paine, when he asked as if he were a school master interrogating his pupils.
We have had many discussions on CPR itself citing the original texts in CPR for months and months with @RussellA and yourself, if you recall. But the outcome was not very clear, at which point forced me switch to reading the academic commentaries on Kant.
We dont care that metaphysics works as a science just fine with respect to possible experience; wed be in trouble if it didnt. We want to know if it works as a science for everything it is possible to think, insofar as the human being in general thinks ever more, and to a greater depth, than even his possible experiences. And it is just in these more common and deeper exercises of intelligence, that metaphysics, as the science of pure reason, that arena the objects of which transcend even possible experience, is found to be no help at all.
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Quoting Corvus
Ehhhhh ..thats a subjective judgement, better known as mere opinion, to which of course you are entitled. I dont see it, but then, even if it was my opinion, by recognizing the subjective natural of it, Id keep it to myself.
It is not so much of our issue at this time of history whether metaphysics works as science or not.
We know what science and metaphysics are, and their shortcomings and capabilities too.
But you must be aware of the situation when Kant was alive. At the time physical science was taking over, revolutionizing the world, making the dominant subject metaphysics uncertain for its future.
Kant thought he could make metaphysics a legitimate science as physics or chemistry, by establishing its boundaries and domains where our reasoning can be applied like the other sciences, hence he wrote CPR.
Quoting Mww
Of course you don't see it because you are not named in his scornful posts, and he treats you with respect for your condoning his nonsense. :D
It is not necessary to scorn and belittle others in the posting as he does. It is not the first time, and many folks noticed his problematic posts in that way in the past, and expressed their anger and frustration about the nonsense, but he still seems doing it.
I wouldn't have time to mention his name, if he didn't on mine. But he keeps doing it, hence just pointing it out hoping that he would stop self harming himself wasting his own time. If I find someone's posts poor quality and full posing with no substance in them, I would just walk away stop engaging rather than making any sort of personal comment on the poster. Life is too short for that sort of nonsense.
I only mentioned it only as a response. A regrettable point not initiated by me. However, I welcome all arguments purely on the philosophical point of views supported by reasoning, logic and evidence on the topics and relating to the topics.
Agreed; it is the issue in Kants time. By we is meant humans in general, regardless of time. My fault for thinking this was the accepted implication meant by we.
Quoting Corvus
I think Kant wondered why it wasnt, rather than thinking he could make it so. Before making it so, before he could make metaphysics a legitimate science, he had to think up an experiment along the same lines as that which establishes other domains as legitimate sciences. When he performed that experiment, he discovered he could not make metaphysics a science in the same manner as the established sciences, even while accommodating it under some conditions.
So .what are those boundaries? Therein lay the key.
Doesn't Kant acknowledge that Metaphysics is not the same type of Science as the other Sciences?
To start, Metaphysics doesn't use experiments, observations, testing, measurements for its methodology. The methodology for Metaphysics is reasoning and logical thinking with the categorial a priori concepts.
Quoting Mww
The full detail is in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics.
Sort of, yes. He calls it a vain dialectical art ., but because his version of metaphysics does incorporate synthetic a priori principles for its cognitions, they are to be treated scientifically under some conditions. The point being, that to treat metaphysical cognitions scientifically doesnt mean metaphysics is a science.
But, yes, if it was a science it would be a different kind, that of a pure speculative nature, insofar as it is . more useful in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge .
Prolegomena, huh? What does that essay tell you, such that your argument for metaphysics as a science is shown by it?
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Quoting Corvus
I got to thinking about that, and I think youve come pretty close. What Kant laid out in CPR, are changes in the ways in which philosophers thought about metaphysics, and those changes were, not so much what would make metaphysics a proper science, but rather, why it hadnt ever been taken as such. It does come down to principles, but it turns out that principles are not enough. They elevate metaphysics beyond the established doctrine of the time, insofar as it acts as sufficient ground for all other sciences, it is still left wanting as a science in itself.
The simplified objection for denominating metaphysics as a science in itself is in Prolegomena, sure, but the reason why not, remains in CPR, as well as the proper name under which a scientific version of metaphysics must be known.
The world is human thought- Kant
The world is Divine Will- Schopenhauer
The world is human will- Nietszche
The world is Divine Thought and Will- Hegel
The world is human thought and will- Heidegger
I don't hate anyone on these forums. I just call out poor quality, and especially 'Dunning Krueger' type postings when I see them. Mww seems to know Kant better than anyone else on these forums, and it just seemed ridiculous that an obvious neophyte like Corvus would presume to know Kant better.
I never said I was better than anyone. Maybe that's what you feel for some strange reasons. My postings are not about claiming one is better than the other. They are about the different ideas on the topics from what I read from the other sources.
If you cannot accept that, then you can stop reading my postings. I already have been staying away from your postings.