Property Dualism

There is something it is like to be a human.

'a kitten' exhibits both bodily (such as chasing string, meowing/purring) & mental (such as instincts, playfulness) properties.

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean?

zombie kitten

Proto-consciousness is not consciousness, as the "proto" should make clear. Still, what does it mean?
— Patterner

That's a good question. I can find no coherent difference. If something experiences anything, however 'proto', it's fully and totally conscious in the phenomenal sense. Differences are always a matter of content, not degree of consciousness.

You've set out your view well. What do you want us to talk about? Anything in the OP?

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me:

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me:
— 180 Proof

I think this is really at the center of a lot of disagreement in these types of conversations. Things often are very much unlike the things that make them up.

Macro things cannot be explained by properties the building blocks do not possess.

Instead, I think a lot of high level things are explained by the processes that are happening at a lower level, processes that are enabled perhaps in part by properties.

Macro things are regularly explained by properties that the building blocks do not possess. For example bits of iron don't float on water, yet iron (as steel) is regularly formed into ships that float on water.

My views changed as I contemplated the idea of higher consciousness, as it relates to various fantasy/sci-fi beings. Like Star Trek's Organians, Metrons, Q, Prophets of Bajor, etc. Such beings are often said to be of higher consciousness. I wondered what that might mean. Greater intelligence doesn't seem to equal greater consciousness. Nor do more extensive sensory capabilities, abilities to mentally manipulate reality, or an awareness that might be said to encompass a larger area.

I came to think there's no such thing as higher consciousness, and I don't think I have higher consciousness than anything else. I am just conscious of things, capabilities, I possess that other things do not.

Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things. Although liquidity is not a characteristic of particles, the properties of particles are responsible for liquidity, once enough particles of certain types join together in certain ways. The fact that particles join together in certain ways at all, so we have physical objects with any characteristics, is due to the properties of the particles.

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true

Sounds like "smallism" to me. The problem is, there is no prima facie reason for smallism to be true. A sort of "bigism" where parts are only intelligible and definable in terms of the whole seems to have at least as much to recommend itself.

Anything that helps me clarify my thinking, or even my writing. I don't know if there are ways to prove or disprove various theories of consciousness. But any theory should at least be internally consistent. Pointing out anywhere that I am not is appreciated.

Seems like a (grandiose) composition fallacy to me:

atoms which constitute strawberries do not themselves in any way taste, smell or feel like strawberry, for example

just as particles of (any) X are not "proto-conscious".

No, they are not proto-conscious. One of their properties is proto-consciousness, which means they have subjective experience.

Our ability to communicate in this way also requires an understanding of EM fields, which are universal and not "composed of electrons" (rather electrons are the activity of the field, at least on many understandings).

Semantics

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.

Perhaps the fallacy of division is more apropos to panpsychist thinking than the fallacy of composition?

I think his mistake is to believe that 'experience' is something that can be known in the third person. In other words, experience is not an object of cognition, in the way that an electron or particle or other object can be. We don't know experiences, we have experiences; so any experience has an inescapably first-person element, that is, it is undergone by a subject. So we can't objectify 'the nature of experience' in the way we can the objects and forces that are analysed by the natural sciences.

Now, in one sense we can be very clear about our own experiences - we certainly know what an unpleasant or pleasant experience is, and we know that some experiences have specific attributes, across a vast range of experiences. But in all cases, we know those things experientially - we know about those attributes, because they are the constituents of our experience, in a way very different from how we know and predict the behaviour of objects according to physical laws.

We can see others having experiences, and infer what they're experiencing, but again, we only know experience by experiencing. Experience is never a 'that' to us.

The difference between proto-consciousness and consciousness is this: Proto-consciousness is the subjective experience of an individual particle.
— Patterner

Isn't mind a necessary condition for subjective experience?

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.

The reason I go this route is, of course, that the particles we are made of are indistinguishable from any other particles in the universe. So what is in us that makes us conscious must be in all the other particles.
— Patterner
Hasty generalization & compositional fallacies. :eyes:

What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems

Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all.

What property of matter is such that it spontaneously assembles itself into sentient life-forms.

spontaneously assembles itself

I don't think that's the right question.

Why not? What’s the matter with the question? Surely it’s germane to the subject.

I'm not sure it's established that there's anything "spontaneous" about it. And once you realize that, the rest of your question is just... chemistry. Literal chemistry. Like, if you want to understand how life forms came about from non life, that's a question for science, and you can take classes on chemistry, bio chemistry, maybe even early life chemistry.

I’m asking, what causes that ‘rare arrangement’

At the micro level, matter has various physical properties. Mass, charge, spin, color, whatever else we're aware of. These properties determine how particles combine and interact, which determine the physical objects, energy fields, and everything else we see all around us, and their macro characteristics.

You're not intelligent because of the properties alone of the chemicals in your body. You can't skip the middle step. You're intelligent because of the processes that that specific arrangement of chemicals allows to happen. And those processes AREN'T in all the particles. Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all.

Right - so what is it a matter of?

Well you skip the question about spontaneous generation of sentience, and just ask, why is it that this hunk of smushy pink wet matter has an experience?

Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach.

But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping?

But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.

Where am I leaping

Where am I leaping?

well if physicalism is true, then at what point does matter go from just matter to matter with experience?"

You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes.

Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things.

In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter.

Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance.

Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life.

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.

Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.
— Patterner

So, you're disproving what you are asserting?

An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect,

H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells.

Or point me to any other macro characteristic that is not explained by how the micro properties of its constituents behave under the conditions it is in.

You argue that the macro is nothing other than a composite of the parts in an arrangement, but now you qualify with "under the conditions it is in",

And when i use the word consciousness, I'm not talking about higher order thinking, or complex thought, or things that we think of in terms of human consciousness. But when I use the word consciousness I'm talking about consciousness in the most fundamental sense. Um, this, this bare fact of felt experience.

Thoughts are not the same.
— Patterner

Yes, describing things from the outside seems so far removed from what it feels like to be inside. Experience does seem drastically different, hence the hard problem.

I've been listening to a new audio book, a so called "audio documentary" that touches on this. It's called Lights On by Annaka Harris. Perhaps not up your street because she's an unabashed physicalist, but she explores concepts of fundamental consciousness because she's become increasingly convinced that that's more the right approach to talking about experience.

But then we could also suggest that mass is a pervasive, fundamental field, and that's why all particles have mass.

Although as you get later (spoiler alert), you discover that she DOESN'T think mass is fundamental, primarily because she doesn't think space-time itself is fundamental (and mass is itself defined in relation to space time)

Depending on definitions, many or all species are intelligent, though none with our abilities. So there can be consciousness without our intelligence on par with ours.

I think intelligence and consciousness are different things. I think all conscious things are conscious of whatever intelligence they possess.

An AI program could well be argued to be of greater intelligence than a human, to at least have the capacity to simultaneously apprehend far more information than a human, and so forth … but, until it obtains the faculty of understanding, if it ever will, it will not be defined by consciousness. Thereby making the human of a far greater higher consciousness than the AI program, despite having a lesser intelligence, etc.

Are you then maintaining that "consciousness in its most fundamental sense" can well be fully devoid of all understanding/comprehension - irrespective of how minuscule - regarding that of which it might be aware/conscious of?

OK, but then you might want to explain what “subjective awareness” can possibly mean when completely devoid of any kind of tacit understanding*.

I’m not antithetical to panpsychism, btw, but if it were to be real, I don’t so far deem it possible that a rock, for example, would have a subjective awareness of its own and thereby be endowed with subjectivity - this for reasons previously mentioned.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.)

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

The property dualism although it can explain bottom-up causation, the existence of experience for example, cannot explain top-bottom causation, for example, how a single experience like a thought you have can lead to you typing the content of your thought.

(Not that I currently have any informed understanding of how panpsychism might in fact work.) — javra

You and everybody else in the world. :grin: All speculation.

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be (this having read the OP's quotes - thanks for reposting them) - such as when devoid of any sense of self (which, as a sense of self, would then proto-experience or else be proto-conscious of that which is not self). But I'll here put those questions aside.

Still have my questions about what proto-experience or else proto-consciousness might be

"Less heat" means the conditions have changed. The degree of heat is a condition. Initially, I described liquid water. Then I mentioned different conditions - less heat - under which the hydrogen bonds don't break as easily.

I think, though, that I can imagine there is something it is like to be, let's say, a worm, but that the worm has no sense of self. Does a worm know it is not the dirt through which it digs? I'm not saying it thinks it is the dirt through which it digs. I'm saying maybe it doesn't have any concept of itself, the dirt, or anything else.

In short, the worm, just like any other organism (even prokaryotic ones), does have a (non-conceptual) sense of self. This as is empirically verifiable (at least when granting that no lifeform is an automaton).

There you go. Automatons. What's the line between automatons and ... not automotive?

How about single-celled organisms? I don't think archaea or bacteria have a sense of self.

Microbial intelligence (known as bacterial intelligence) is the intelligence shown by microorganisms. This includes complex adaptive behavior shown by single cells, and altruistic or cooperative behavior in populations of like or unlike cells. It is often mediated by chemical signalling that induces physiological or behavioral changes in cells and influences colony structures.[1]

[...]

Even bacteria can display more behavior as a population. These behaviors occur in single species populations, or mixed species populations. Examples are colonies or swarms of myxobacteria, quorum sensing, and biofilms.[1][3]

[...]

Bacteria communication and self-organization in the context of network theory has been investigated by Eshel Ben-Jacob research group at Tel Aviv University which developed a fractal model of bacterial colony and identified linguistic and social patterns in colony lifecycle.[4]

But I really don't know what you mean by "non-conceptual sense of self", so not sure where we agree and disagree.

Physical connections aren't enough.

Under panpsychism, nothing would be an automaton, right? - for everything would in one way or another be endowed with psyche (rather than being a psyche-less mechanism).

If one entertains some form of proto-experience for subatomic particles and the like (this proto-experience being a something which we hardly can comprehend) why then necessarily exclude the possibility of a "proto-understanding" which would be innate to this very proto-experience?

Physical connections aren't enough.
— Patterner

Perhaps it's more like "some, or even most, kinds of physical connections aren't enough".

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of.

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. Just as there is an explanation for wet in the properties of the particles that whatever the liquid in question is made out of.

What is the explanation of wetness in the properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms?

You haven't answered the question. I'm asking about atoms not molecules. I could be asking about what properties of electrons, protons and neutrons or even quarks give rise to wetness.
All you're telling us is that wetness emerges at the molecular level. What you've given is just description of what happens not explanation.

ah the plant chapter, that was honestly fascinating.

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles.

And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring..

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does.

Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing.

So what is the difference between consciousness and "proto-consciousness?

Does the latter just mean "potential for consciousness"

It's the difference between the subjective experience of an information processing system and the subjective experience of a particle.

No. Proto-consciousness is subjective experience, not the potential for it. I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness to refer to the collective subjective experience of groups of particles that process information. But whether it's a particle's consciousness or a human's, the consciousness is the same. The difference is what is being subjectively experienced. A particle is not experiencing thoughts, hormones, vision, hearing, being alive, or anything other than being a particle.

I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles,

And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. Emergent properties don't come about for no reason. The explanation for them is down there somewhere, starting with the particles that everything is made of

…the background assumption behind all of it is still reductionist, in the sense that it is assumed that the fundamental constituents of beings exist on the micro level, and gradually combine to form greater levels of complexity.

Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

But what if it's not the properties alone that explain it, but instead the processes that the properties enable?

Properties alone should, I think, not be seen as the place for all explanations.

And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences, then there must be one or more properties that we don't know of.

Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36:The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them.

Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.

Why not just use 'consciousness' to denote subjective experience? There is no "collective subjective experience of groups of particles" there is just subjective experience.

Can’t you see that this still holds to the basic premises of materialism - that what is real must be understood in terms of ‘the particles that everything is made of’?

Without wanting to sound facetious, it is like an example of the old saying about the drunk looking for his keys under a lamp post. He’s joined by an onlooker, and they both search for the keys but to no avail. ‘Are you sure you lost your keys here?’, says the onlooker. ‘No’, says the drunk, ‘but the light is better here.’

I suggest that likewise, you’ve painted yourself into a corner, because of the inability to conceive of the nature of mind in any sense other than that of a combination of particulate matter. And I understand that, because it is pretty well the mainstream view. But I think it’s a dead end: that the nature of mind can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter, because it operates according to different principles altogether.

What they might be - well, that’s the question!

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness...

It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing.

All [parts] of what you quoted are exactly what I'm saying.

I'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of.

But there must be a property there (i.e. of particles) that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason

The properties of particles, forces, and laws of physics dictate how things are.

I do believe it's understood in terms of the particles. (In conjunction with the forces, laws of physics, and anything else anyone would care to mention.) But it involves non-physicsl properties of the particles. So it's not materialism or physicalism. It's panpsychism.

So the question is, what if consciousness has no basis in particle physics whatever? What if it is of a completely different order to the entities of physics?

Galen Strawson:My intuition says there is no way in which you can just put completely non-experiential things together to cross into [can't make out a word] this other realm. So, if you can't do that, some of the experiencing stuff must be right there, down at the bottom, right from the beginning.

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness ...

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences?

an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences?

We are physical beings, and we are conscious. Which means it is impossible for physical and consciousness to be mutually exclusive. If it is an undeniable fact, then why claim it cannot be possible at that level?
— Patterner

Please re-phrase that. I don’t understand it.

I think the universe has physical and non-physical elements. There can't be a problem with the two things working in conjunction, because we are physical beings and we are conscious. They are working in conjunction. I'm just saying this is how I think it all comes about.

So the question is, what if consciousness has no basis in particle physics whatever?

Proto-consciousness (or just call it consciousness) has no basis in particle physics whatever, and is of a completely different order to the entities of physics. No physics can explain it, define it, describe it, or even detect it. It "can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter."

But thinking in this way complicates things unnecessarily. How do physical and non-physical elements interact? Would it require positing a third element, or how does that work?

Brian Greene:What I do know is that mass produces and responds to a gravitational force, and electric charge produces and responds to an electromagnetic force.

Why do you think there are physical and non-physical things when the only way you "know" of "physical" things is the way they are represented by the non-physical mind?

Minds cause bodies to move. It seems to me that both you and physicists are wrong. I think that we have a better term to use here instead of "proto-consciousness" and that is "information". Information is the property of causal interactions and information is the basis of the mental.

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness.

A vacuum Higgs field is responsible for spontaneous symmetry breaking the gauge symmetries of fundamental interactions and provides the Higgs mechanism of generating mass of elementary particles.

In the Standard Model of particle physics, the Higgs mechanism is essential to explain the generation mechanism of the property "mass" for gauge bosons. Without the Higgs mechanism, all bosons (one of the two classes of particles, the other being fermions) would be considered massless, but measurements show that the W+, W?, and Z0 bosons actually have relatively large masses of around 80 GeV/c2. The Higgs field resolves this conundrum. The simplest description of the mechanism adds to the Standard Model a quantum field (the Higgs field), which permeates all of space.

the paucity of objective data.

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?

Is the world really made up of particles (naive realism) or [are] physical particles merely a mental representation of what is out there that is not physical or particles?

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?

Is the world really made up of particles (naive realism) or [are] physical particles merely a mental representation of what is out there that is not physical or particles?
— Harry Hindu

Good question! That is an idealist perspective on the issue.

I’ve been arguing that this is based on a principle that something can be understood solely in terms of constituent parts. This is why I’m saying you’re still thinking about the problem in a basically materialist way.

You’re positing that there must be some unknown property because we’re ‘thinking matter’, also a materialist assumption.

What if what you’re calling ‘proto-consciousness’ has a causal role in the emergence of organic life?

If physical and particles don't exist, why would our minds concoct this interpretation of reality, extraordinarily detailed, every second of our lives, that is all about physical and particles, rather than show us actual reality? Inventing a false reality to hide the real seems extremely odd.

I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences?

You’re not seeing the point of the article. It’s not a matter which can be assessed objectively.

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness.

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?

Because I don't see why a non-physical mind in a non-physical reality would interpret and represent things in a way that doesn't exist. Fabricating a system of interpreting reality that has no basis in reality doesn't make sense. Why fabricate a system that doesn't exist to interpret reality, instead of interpreting reality in a way that reflects the true nature of reality and/or the mind?
— Patterner
I don't understand this. Are you saying that things that are non-physical don't really exist? Are you not also saying that the mind is non-physical? Does that mean that minds do not exist? If the contents of the mind do not exist then how can "it go in both directions" where the contents of the mind cause changes in matter outside of it? If you have an idea and that idea causes you to change your behavior, how can you say the idea does not exist? What caused your change in behavior?

This idea that the contents of the mind are non-existent stems from the faulty idea of dualism (existence vs non-existence). Non-existence is one of those things that exists as a idea but not in any other form, but it can cause you to do things like typing scribbles on the screen about it. Non-existence exists - as an idea. There is nothing that does not exist because any time you think about it you bring it into existence. The only question is what is the nature of its existence (what are its properties). Is it just an idea, or something more?

What I do say, is that what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. To clarify — I’m not suggesting we invent a false reality, nor that the physical is an illusion. What I’m questioning is the assumption that the appearance of a world with particle-like structure entails that the physical structure is primary, or exists independently of the mind that apprehends it.

I do not think the physical and conscious properties of what exists can be separated. No more than the mass and charge of a particle can be separated

And it is impossible for the physical structure to exist independently of the mind that apprehends it.

The solution I like is that there is another property of particles, in addition to those science has discovered.

big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things

But the attributes of particles can easily be separated. Particles can have an identical mass and a different charge. And a corpse can easily be differentiated from a living subject.

You’re all over the place!

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.

they think the flash came before they pressed the button.

I suspect AI needs to do things in order to be like us. Maybe it can't understand like we do if it it only has theoretical understanding.

Well yes, and it does. I'm pretty sure the process of training is involves a whole lot of asking the ai for an output given some input, and giving rewards as they give more of the right kinds of outputs.

I'm not completely sure I agree that a person born locked in wouldn't ever be able to make sense of their sensory inputs, but his reasoning makes complete sense and I wouldn't be massively surprised if he were right.

Ogas and Gaddam:A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind.

What I do say, is that what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. To clarify — I’m not suggesting we invent a false reality, nor that the physical is an illusion. What I’m questioning is the assumption that the appearance of a world with particle-like structure entails that the physical structure is primary, or exists independently of the mind that apprehends it.
— Wayfarer
I agree with all of this, but I think it has a different explanation. I do not think the physical and conscious properties of what exists can be separated. No more than the mass and charge of a particle can be separated. And, just as it doesn't make sense to say either mass or charge are more important than the other, it doesn't make sense to say either or both are more important than consciousness. So no, what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. No, the appearance of a world with particle-like structure does not entail that the physical structure is primary. And it is impossible for the physical structure to exist independently of the mind that apprehends it.

If mass and charge are properties, then how many properties of physical structures are there? It seems to me that there would be far more than just two to claim property dualism, or you are focusing only two types of "properties" - physical and non-physical while ignoring the rest to be able to claim property dualism.

How are mass and charge physical and not informational?

I'm only mentioning the two a) to try to give an idea of what I'm getting at, and b) because I don't know house many we know about. Spin and charm are two more I've heard of.

I call these "physical" properties because they are studied and quantified by our sciences, and we call everything that we can study and quantify "physical". Hence physicalism. Things that cannot be studied and quantified, or even detected, are not physical. Terrence Deacon's absential features.

Can you explain? I've been involved with someone on another site who says things like that. For example, "At the most micro-level you can imagine, matter does not seem to be anything other than information." I haven't gotten a real handle on the idea.

Then we are not discussing property dualism, are we? We are discussing substance dualism.

Does this mean that once we are able to properly study consciousness and quantify it, it becomes physical?

Maybe you should try to explain to yourself what you mean by "matter". Is not matter really the interaction of smaller particles, which are themselves the interaction of ever smaller particles, all the way down? If all we ever get at is interactions when observing reality at deeper levels, then where exactly is the matter?

I don't think so. One substance (that which makes up the universe) has two kinds of properties (physical and experiential). If that's not property dualism, then what is?

If we ever come to study and quantify consciousness, then it will be revealed that it is a physical property, and I'm wrong.

I define it as that which makes up the universe. I don't know if there is a bottom. Perhaps the vibrating strings of energy that some physicists speak of. In which case, it would seem the bottom of matter is energy. Are you saying this energy is more properly called information? I suspect that's not what you mean, but don't know what you do.

Because you're also talking about a multitude of properties (mass, charge, etc.), not just those two. You are positing property dualism by asserting that there is something special about two properties and all the rest are not special (You're essentially invoking a third property - "special", which is a mental projection). Why are just those two properties so special? If there are more than two properties then property dualism is inherently false.

That's strange that you are asserting that you can study and quantify the world via your consciousness that cannot be studied and quantified. If you can't study or quantify the means by with the world is studied and quantified then what does that say about your actual understanding of the world? It's like you're saying you can measure the length of a stick without understanding how a ruler works.

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops.

I'm not talking about the number of properties. I'm talking about the number of kinds of properties. The ones we can detect, manipulate, and measure on the one hand, and the one we cannot on the other.

I'm not saying we can study and quantify the world via our consciousness. Consciousness is our subjective experience of our studies and quantifications. (And our subjective experience of everything else we subjectively experience.)

Where are you saying information is?

The idea of property dualism labels both the substance and the property as "physical", which I find odd and would need further explanation from you and others more knowledgeable what that really means by defining "physical" in both terms of property and substance.

Patterner:"Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language.

We are only aware of the studies and quantifications by being conscious of them, which you are saying is subjective.

It seems only logical that the world share more properties/structure of the mind than the way the mind models the world (which is really just part of the mind in the first place). This is not to say that idealism or panpsychism is the case. It is merely saying that the mind and world are informational, not physical or non-physical.

What is a physical structure and how exactly does that differ from a non-physical structure? How are mass and charge physical and not informational? What does QM say the mass and charge, and the particle they are associated with, are when not observing them? Is a wave function physical? Is the observer and the collapse of the wave function a physical interaction?

Are there any books that discuss this specific idea?

Suffice to say that I don’t believe the wavefunction is physical. It is a distribution of possibilities. The observation actualises a specific possibility. Prior to that actualisation, there is no definitely-existing ‘particle’. Atomic entities are nowadays thought of in terms of excitations in fields although what exactly fields are is an open question. In any case, I think the idea of particular atoms as the being what the world is ‘made of’ is no longer tenable.

The idea of ‘mental substance’ is also problematical. (See this OP). I don’t believe that the mind or consciousness can be thought of as something objectively existent, or as any kind of ‘substance’ in the sense we usually use the word.

Upthread, your model had difficulty even distinguishing the living from the dead.

Can you explain?

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

For me, anything objective/existent is something that participates in causal relations.

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key.

The problem I’m finding with your posts, is that you agree with a whole bunch of contradictory propositions.

Bodies and organisms comprise the same materials as inorganic matter, but there's obviously a profound difference in kind between them. As far as their chemical composition is concerned, they're the same, but the processes which characterise organic life have ceased to operate. And there are many specific types of molecules that are only found in the presence of organic life.

What I meant by contradictions - you said

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says:

To which you responded, 'I agree' even though it clearly contradicts what you were arguing.

Should I unpack that at all?

I said the particles in a dead body have the same properties as they had when the body was alive. That may be incorrect. But if so, I don't see how it's a contradiction. Can you explain?

The physical properties of particles cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances. Once they have combined in certain ways, into certain arrangements, the experiential property of particles - which was there from the beginning - causes the emergence of human consciousness.

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.
— Patterner

But apparently not the same relations with one another.

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?
— Patterner

OK, so we know matter can experience, as we and the other animals are material beings and we know they and we experience things. Other emergent properties such as wetness, hardness and so on don't obtain at the level of fundamental particles because they are the result of interactions between particles, so why should we think the case is any different with experience or consciousness?

It's not a matter of saying that it is impossible that particles experience, but that we have no idea how it could be that they experience anything. In other words, we don't know what it could even mean to say that particles are conscious. We are satisfied with saying that particles have the potential, in their interactions with each other, for other emergent properties, so why not think the same for consciousness?

For me, anything objective/existent is something that participates in causal relations.
— Harry Hindu

The point which that completely misses is the subjective nature of consciousness, which is not at all required or implied by calling it 'information'.

Isn't the "point of the article" the same as being "objective"? If there is a point to the article that one is not seeing, isn't that the same as saying the article can be assessed (seen) objectively which you have "seen" and the other has not "seen"? How can we hope to see the point of anything if all we have to go by is "subjective" experiences? It would seem that we have both subjective and objective experiences and the issue is trying to discern which is which.

What exactly is the subjective nature of consciousness and how anyone of us can ever hope to get the point (objectivity) if the nature of consciousness is only subjective?

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience".

If you can't see the contradictions in what you're writing, there's no point in continuing.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

The hard problem is the result of thinking the world is at it appears in your mind, rather than thinking that the way the world appears is actually a mental model of the world.

First, the contradiction. You said:

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says the opposite:

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' - even though it contradicts what you had said. So you are agreeing with both 'X' and 'not X' which is a contradiction

The idea that the physical properties of particles are why particles combine, but are not why certain groups of particles are conscious, is not a contradiction.

The physical properties of particles are why particles combine, and the subjective experience of particles is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness.

There is no contradiction between the two parts of that sentence.

It doesn't need to be contradictory to be fallacious

and you've presented no argument, or any references, for why it should be considered true, beyond your belief that it must be the case. There is no evidence from you as to whether 'certain groups of particles' are conscious, or whether conscious organisms can be considered 'groups of particles'.

I'm just writing all this as though it's fact. It makes sense to me. But I know it's not verified, and I can't imagine how it could be. It isn't even a theory, unless someone figures out a way to test it. (Although there's no way to test String Theory.)

That is not a description of the hard problem of consciousness, as described by David Chalmer's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. It is a description of your own idiosyncratic philosophy which contains too many sweeping statements and foundational claims to respond to.

ou're welcome. Have a nice life!

What does Nagel even mean by "what it is like"? There is a what it is like to be anything which are the properties of what it means to be that thing. There is a what it is like to be a table that distinguishes it from being a chair, there is a what it is like to be a mind which distinguishes it from being a wave in the ocean.

The hard problem seems to be more of a problem of language - of explaining what the actual problem is.

This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience [I]does[/I] arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an [I]explanatory gap[/I] (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere.

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience?

Chalmers:. "The fire hurts, I take my hand away from the flame.”

Kuhn:. “But if it, if it didn’t hurt, and you had no awareness, you would’ve still taken your hand away because that’s all determined by the physical processes.”

The idea is that there is something it is like to be a bat to the bat, but there is nothing it is like to be a table to the table. If there is something it is like to be something to that thing, then that thing is conscious.

The HP is explaining why the physical activity comes with subjective experience. Why isn't there something it is like to be a table? Or, perhaps more important, why isn't there something it is like to be a robot that has sensors that detect photons, distinguishes between wavelengths, and performs different actions, depending on which wavelength? Does the robot subjectively experience red and blue? Does it subjectively experience anything at all? Does it have a feeling of being?

But how do we know that there isn't something it is like to be the robot? If the robot reacts to the world the same way we do, how would we know whether it has "experiences" or not? How does a physical brain have experiences? You would need to answer this question to then assert what has experiences and what does not.

Working memory is a physical process. So is the mind. Why are physical processes conscious? Why does it not take place without subjective consciousness? Why aren't we P-zombies? Nothing about physical properties or processes suggests subjective experience.

I don't know. We've done very well thinking the world is physical.

But ok, how do we abandon the term physical? What are processes? I mean, a processes of what? What is doing the processing? What is the medium?

Thinking the world is physical is what creates the mind-body problem

You might argue that there are particles and then processes of particles (which is essentially more dualism).

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops.
- Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?
— Patterner

Everywhere causes leave effects.

I like your overall view. But I don't know if I understand aspects of it, because I don't see how it solves the HP. Remove me from the process, and view the remainder as an object. Why is that object - a process that continues without my observation - not conscious?

You may be right. But, so far, I think what creates the problem is our being so secure in our mastery of all things that we think we can know that nothing we are not aware of can exist.

Particles in motion, as opposed to particles not in motion, doesn't seem like dualism to me. How do you mean?

Can we talk about this more? I think of information as something that means something else. A mountain is a big hunk of earth rising above the earth surrounding it. A mountain doesn't mean something it is not. It doesn't even mean 'mountain'. It simply is a mountain.

In information systems, things mean other things; things that they are not. In spoken language, sounds mean things they are not. Because we have all agreed to it, a particular combination of sounds mean 'mountain'. This combination of sounds is not, itself, a mountain. It's just a combination of sounds. But we have all agreed that those sounds mean 'mountain'.

It isn't conscious because there isn't a working memory establishing a sensory information feedback loop. What I mean by "working" is a system whose behavior resembles goal-directed behavior (intent).

The scribbles do not mean the sounds. The sounds and scribbles are different representations of the same thing - that big hunk of earth rising above sea level.

How can you say the rings are not about the rainfall if you can glean information about the rainfall from the rings? What do you mean by "about" and is it any different from what you mean by "mean"? What does "informed" mean to you? How are you informed about anything and what are you informed of if not the causal processes that preceded what it is you are talking about explaining?

It's possible that consciousness emerges at some point in the universe. Either in life, or in some sort of complex processing. That's been the assumption of the sciences this whole time. It was actually my assumption for most of my career. I've been convinced that that doesn't make sense.
...
I see consciousness actually as binary, which is one of the reasons why the series is titled [I]Lights On[/I]. And I actually, now I just believe there is no off. That there's no such thing as off. I shouldn't even say I believe that. I'm convinced that that makes more sense than the alternate view that we have tended to have in the sciences. Which is that it comes on at a certain point.

Whether you're a physicalist or not, those are still the two options.