Demonstrating Intelligent Design from the Principle of Sufficient Reason
PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason/explanation/ground for its existence or occurrence.
The reasons that fulfill the PSR are divided into 3 types as listed below. By laws of logic, the list is exhaustive.
A full description and defense of the PSR can be found in this post.
APPLICATION OF THE PSR IN HISTORY:
In the pre-modern period, before the 1600's:
People did not know about atoms and laws of nature (e.g. laws of physics, biology, chemistry, and evolution), and thus did not explain the existence of things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). They also understood that they did not inherently exist (type 3) because things would come and go out of existence by transforming into other things. E.g. water transforms into vapour and vice versa. Therefore, they concluded that all things in the world were designed (type 2).
With that, the existence and behaviour of things were described using Aristotle's four causes:
1. Efficient cause: what we now simply call "cause" as in cause and effect.
2. Material cause: what it is made of.
3. Formal cause: the identity or design of a thing.
4. Final cause: the purpose or function of designed things.
For example, the existence of water is caused by vapour or clouds (efficient cause), is made of a certain amount of matter because it has a certain mass (material cause), is a substance designed to be fluid and fall to the ground (formal cause), and must have a purpose because all designed things have a purpose even if we don't always know what that purpose is (final cause).
Since the modern period, starting in the 1600's:
Aided by the rise of scientific instruments, we now know about atoms and laws of nature. Thus, we explain the existence of most things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). With that, we no longer need four causes to describe the existence and behaviour of things but only two:
1. Efficient cause: what caused it.
2. Material cause: what it is made of.
For example, both water and vapour are composed of the same molecules H2O and energy (material cause), and their existence and behaviour are explained by the laws of physics and chemistry (efficient cause).
THINGS MADE BY INTELLIGENT DESIGN:
Despite our understanding of modern physics, are there still things in the world that fit the old Aristotelian model of having a formal cause and final cause, i.e. of being designed with a purpose? I can think of three groups of things:
1. The fundamental laws of nature: Most things in the world are explained by causal necessity because they obey the laws of nature. But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). They also do not exist inherently (type 3) because they are not tautologies. E.g. Law of Inertia: "An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion" can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction. Furthermore, if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose.
The next two groups of things are true only if we presuppose that we have free will. If you don't want to accept that presupposition, then they can be dropped.
2. Man-made things: This presupposes that free will exists, because if not, then we fall back into causal necessity. Whatever is man-made is designed, and designed with a purpose in mind. E.g. a paper-cutter is a man-made device designed to cut paper. A house is a man-made structure designed for humans to reside in. A painting is a man-made thing designed to be appealing to our sense of sight. Etc. There is no man-made thing that is not designed for a purpose.
3. Man itself: A process that is fully determined cannot give rise to a non-determined thing (and quantum should not be used as an objection because even physicists claim they do not fully understand it). Thus, the existence of humans with free will cannot be explained by causal necessity with laws of nature alone (type 1). It is also not explained inherently (type 3) because humans did not always exist. Thus, the existence of humans is designed (type 2). And if so, they have a purpose. Man's purpose is what is usually called the meaning of life.
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): For every thing that exists, there is a sufficient reason/explanation/ground for its existence or occurrence.
The reasons that fulfill the PSR are divided into 3 types as listed below. By laws of logic, the list is exhaustive.
- Type 1: External necessary reason: The existence of a thing is explained by causal necessity. E.g. a rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry.
- Type 2: External contingent reason: The existence of a thing is explained by a free choice or by design, and for a specific purpose. E.g. a paper-cutter exists because man designed it, for the purpose of cutting paper.
- Type 3: Internal reason: This applies to all tautologies. The existence of a thing is explained inherently or by its own objective definition. E.g. the formula "2+2=4" exists necessarily because II and II are inherently found in IIII. Or, should there be a certain being who has existence inherently, then the statement "this being-that-inherently-exists exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.
A full description and defense of the PSR can be found in this post.
APPLICATION OF THE PSR IN HISTORY:
In the pre-modern period, before the 1600's:
People did not know about atoms and laws of nature (e.g. laws of physics, biology, chemistry, and evolution), and thus did not explain the existence of things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). They also understood that they did not inherently exist (type 3) because things would come and go out of existence by transforming into other things. E.g. water transforms into vapour and vice versa. Therefore, they concluded that all things in the world were designed (type 2).
With that, the existence and behaviour of things were described using Aristotle's four causes:
1. Efficient cause: what we now simply call "cause" as in cause and effect.
2. Material cause: what it is made of.
3. Formal cause: the identity or design of a thing.
4. Final cause: the purpose or function of designed things.
For example, the existence of water is caused by vapour or clouds (efficient cause), is made of a certain amount of matter because it has a certain mass (material cause), is a substance designed to be fluid and fall to the ground (formal cause), and must have a purpose because all designed things have a purpose even if we don't always know what that purpose is (final cause).
Since the modern period, starting in the 1600's:
Aided by the rise of scientific instruments, we now know about atoms and laws of nature. Thus, we explain the existence of most things in the world by causal necessity (type 1). With that, we no longer need four causes to describe the existence and behaviour of things but only two:
1. Efficient cause: what caused it.
2. Material cause: what it is made of.
For example, both water and vapour are composed of the same molecules H2O and energy (material cause), and their existence and behaviour are explained by the laws of physics and chemistry (efficient cause).
THINGS MADE BY INTELLIGENT DESIGN:
Despite our understanding of modern physics, are there still things in the world that fit the old Aristotelian model of having a formal cause and final cause, i.e. of being designed with a purpose? I can think of three groups of things:
1. The fundamental laws of nature: Most things in the world are explained by causal necessity because they obey the laws of nature. But what about the fundamental laws of nature themselves? They cannot obey more fundamental laws by definition of them being fundamental. Thus, they do not exist out of causal necessity (type 1). They also do not exist inherently (type 3) because they are not tautologies. E.g. Law of Inertia: "An object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion" can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction. Furthermore, if the fundamental laws of nature existed inherently, this would result in a modal collapse, which is usually frowned upon. Therefore, the existence of the fundamental laws of nature are explained by design (type 2), and for a specific purpose.
The next two groups of things are true only if we presuppose that we have free will. If you don't want to accept that presupposition, then they can be dropped.
2. Man-made things: This presupposes that free will exists, because if not, then we fall back into causal necessity. Whatever is man-made is designed, and designed with a purpose in mind. E.g. a paper-cutter is a man-made device designed to cut paper. A house is a man-made structure designed for humans to reside in. A painting is a man-made thing designed to be appealing to our sense of sight. Etc. There is no man-made thing that is not designed for a purpose.
3. Man itself: A process that is fully determined cannot give rise to a non-determined thing (and quantum should not be used as an objection because even physicists claim they do not fully understand it). Thus, the existence of humans with free will cannot be explained by causal necessity with laws of nature alone (type 1). It is also not explained inherently (type 3) because humans did not always exist. Thus, the existence of humans is designed (type 2). And if so, they have a purpose. Man's purpose is what is usually called the meaning of life.
Comments (503)
- Sufficient means that the explanation accounts for or covers all the things that are inquired about.
- Reason/explanation/ground do not need to be defined because they mean exactly what is understood when using them in the common language. An example will be enough: the reason/explanation/ground for why I exist is because of my parents.
- Existence and occurrence, again, do not need to be defined for the same reasons. Here are examples instead: horses exist; unicorns do not. Caesar crossing the Rubicon is a real occurrence; Caesar surviving the Ides of March is not.
If you want a full defense of the PSR, you can see this post.
Similarly, the supposed "laws of nature" might simply be arbitrary. There is no need at all to suppose them to be necessarily true, and so invoking modal collapse is muddled.
Perhaps the supposed laws are simply descriptions of the consistency we find around us.
There are good reasons to think physics is not "determinate".
Basic theistic bullshit. Confirmation bias dressed as philosophy.
Type 4: Random.
The divine hippopotamus explanation does not fulfill the PSR because it is superfluous. The PSR, on the epistemology side, is also called Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one. Simpler explanations exist (at least by dropping the hippopotamus part of it), and therefore it is not the most reasonable one.
Quoting tim wood
Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the general behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or general behaviours.
Quoting tim wood
This is a minor point but I don't understand it. Bombs are man-made things designed to explode and destroy things; and that's what they do.
Quoting tim wood
As per the PSR, every thing that exists demands an explanation. There are only 3 types of explanations: types 1, 2, and 3 as described in the OP.
The fundamental laws of nature (whether these are compelling or descriptive) need a reason to exist. The OP shows that they cannot exist out of causal necessity (type 1), or inherently (type 3). Therefore, by process of elimination, they exist by design (type 2).
It is not defended in the OP and only presupposed. But you can find a defense of the PSR in this post. (I also added the link in the OP for clarity).
Quoting Banno
You can check the link above, or else we can simply suppose the PSR to be true for the sake of this discussion, to see what conclusions can be drawn from it.
Quoting Banno
That's fine. Whether laws are things that compel objects or they merely describe the consistent behaviours of objects, either way, they require an explanation. The PSR covers everything and does not discriminate between objects or behaviours.
Quoting Banno
Physics seems to me to be pretty determinate; otherwise, planes would not fly.
However, this would not change the conclusions, as there would still only be 3 types of explanations for things existing in the world: causal necessity, design, or inherent existence.
Randomness is not a valid type of reason under the PSR. A behaviour is random if it occurs without reason, and this runs in direct contradiction with the principle that demands sufficient reasons.
Now, some people claim that quantum mechanics has some randomness to it. But as per the OP, quantum should not be used as an objection because even physicists claim they do not fully understand it.
Yep, this seems to be making a come back. When we all thought Hume buried the design argument, philosophers are starting to defend it again, see Chalmers, Reality+: virtual worlds and problems of philosophy. Since virtual reality is simulated to resemble our reality maybe we are just simulation ourselves. But now this demands a simulator. While this concept does not resemble the Christian concept of God, it opens the door yet again.
There's too much confusion in that OP and the subsequent thread to make much of interest. That you think of "defending" the PSR is curious. At the very least, the idea is controversial, certainly not generally accepted. It simply will not do to take it as granted.
That someone wants there to be an explanation simply does not imply that there must be one. It remains that there might well just be stuff, without explanation.
Might leave it there.
@Banno - in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus we find:
Why do you think Wittgenstein describes this as an illusion?
The usual response is denial, as .
But I want to be clear about the reply I'm giving: it is not that there are counter-instances to the PSR; although I think there are. Rather the argument is that there is nothing impossible, inconceivable, or irrational involved in denying the PSR. The PSR supposes that there must in every case be a sufficient reason, that there is no alternative. And yet, we have a case in which the explanation given is possible, indeed actual, and hence conceivable, and rational.
The PSR claims that for every fact or event, there must necessarily be a sufficient reason. But there are possible (indeed actual) caseslike quantum outcomesfor which we can rationally conceive of there being no sufficient reason. These cases are coherent, intelligible, and not contradictory. Therefore, the PSR is not a necessary truth of reason.
I think the point Im driving at, is that whilst phenomena can be explained in terms of natural laws, the nature of the laws themselves are not self-explanatory. That I also take to be the point of Wittgensteins remark (although Ill defer on that.) But I take the OPs point that the while the laws of nature explain phenomena, they are not themselves explained with recourse to something further. So the argument then contends that they are so by design. Perhaps they are not, but science itself doesnt have an alternative. Science is not, as it were, self-explanatory, in that sense.
Quoting Banno
But isnt the efficacy of mathematical physics and scientific method generally owed to the ability to apply logical laws to empirical observation? That was a large part of Galileos genius arising from his re-statement of physics in quantifiable terms. It enables the application of mathematical logic to observations and conjectures, providing a bridge between logical and natural.
See 6.37. Looks contrary to causal determinism to me.
Natural laws describe, rather than explain - don't you agree? Sure, there are patterns and regularities in how things happen. Bit it doesn't follow at all that every... whatever... has a sufficient reason.
"God did it" applies to everything - it is compatible with any occurrence. And so explains nothing.
And further, the PSR is a haunted universe doctrine, unfalsifiable and unprovable. A piece of myth.
Can you set out your point more clearly?
Understanding the nature and scope of reason is a monumental undertaking. (See for instance video on Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason.)
The point I was pressing was in response to:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Theyre not logically necessary, since they can be denied without contradictionbut if they are said to exist necessarily in a metaphysical sense, that would eliminate contingency altogether (hence the risk of modal collapse). So a teleological or purposive explanationdesign in the broader senseis at least implied by the argument.
So: I agree that the existence of the fundamental laws of nature is not something science itself canor even needs toexplain. As Whitehead notes in Science and the Modern World, science assumes the order of nature, but it need not (and cannot) provide a reason why the laws are as they are, or why there are any laws at all. To attempt that is to cross the threshold into metaphysicswhich is exactly what many poor atheist arguments fail to recognise. They try to argue from the empirical to the metaphysical without acknowledging the logical distinctions involved.
In reality what happens is that we introduce intentions into the events. But what we introduce (an intention) is never proven, not even a posteriori. When a technological apparatus works, it does so to the extent that we have expectations, but the technological apparatus can always fail. The question is: Where is the intention and the final cause in the technological apparatus that works differently from our expectations? If everything has a reason it should also have a reason for failure too, and we would have to say that we also intended it to fail. This implies that you can introduce any final cause to objects or events as you see fit. Which makes the final cause arbitrary. Actually Ontologically there is a gap between the supposed final cause (our intention) and the caused object. No object or events possess a final cause that passes mysteriously from cause to effect.
Quoting tim wood
Hence the various issues with causation, noted previously. What we have is a description of what happens, variously modified to be a better and better. The apple drops, as noted, and accelerates at a uniform velocity, except when it's not an apple but a balloon full of hot air, which instead rises, and this too can be calculated quite well. We exclude the hot air balloon from the things that fall, and don't claim it as a falsification of the Laws of Gravity. Then the predictions and observations get very accurate, and folk start to ask how it could be that the descriptions we make up turn out to be so accurate, as if it were a mystery...
They are accurate becasue that's what we did. It's like being amazed that Philip's head screwdriver just happens to fit a Philip's head screw.
Modal collapse occurs when a possibility is taken as a necessity. If you were to suppose that some contingent natural law was true in every possible world, you might be able to build up a case for modal collapse. As it stands, it's a simple misapplication. That is, assuming that PSR is a necessary truth might lead to modal collapse. The OP has it arse about.
Quoting JuanZu
Interesting point. The intent is not a thing in the way that an object or event is. Again, the problem might be that overly simplistic Aristotelian approach.
A response to your objection on quantum is provided in this post (scroll down to the last paragraph). The response first shows that quantum physics cannot go against the PSR, and then shows that the phenomenon is in fact compatible with the PSR.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
If every possibility is compatible with PSR, then PSR is methodologically useless. Kinda the point. WHat you are saying is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason. Bland faith.
Further, as pointed out above, physicist do not look for, nor expect to find, any cause for such results. They are not needed; and physics does not fail as a result of this failure of PSR. PSR is not needed, and indeed not useful.
Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous.
Quoting tim wood
I'm unclear on your position. Do you believe that nothing requires an explanation or do you observe the principle of reason?
Quoting tim wood
Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3).
Interesting. I'll check it out!
I admit I have a bit of trouble understanding your comment. Perhaps the following example will help, and hopefully, you can build on it if it does not address your objection.
Consider a paper cutter. It's a man-made device designed for the purpose of cutting paper (its final cause). That is the reason why we brought it into existence. Suppose that, over the years, through wear and tear, the device is no longer able to cut paper. At that point, it is no longer correct to identify it as a paper cutter. It is now junk or recycling material. Thus, the existence of a thing as a paper cut is determined by its function which is the ability to cut paper.
If you invented the law of the excluded middle, then all I can say is you haven't received the recognition you so plainly deserve.
For what reason would you say that?
Quoting JuanZu
Not at all. We regularly distinguish between success and failure precisely because we know what the intention was. If a machine fails to perform its intended function, we dont say there was no reason; we say it didn't work as intended.
In fact, your very example relies on final causality: you speak of expectations, failures, and introducing intentionsall of which presuppose directedness or purpose. If final causes were truly arbitrary or non-existent, those distinctions wouldnt make any sense. They only make sense against a posited outcome which they have (or haven't) achieved.
Is it realy necessary to point out the difference between "There might be a reason" and "There must be a reason"?
PSR says the latter. That's another step too far...
Yep.
Ok lets talk about scissors.
What I'm saying is actually quite simple. Think of other uses we can put those scissors to - which indeed it has. Those different uses are part of its existence and being. So linking a specific intention to its being is arbitrary. In this case, existence surpasses intention. It does not matter if when you created the scissors you were thinking of a purpose, what matters is also the becoming of the scissors that you were not thinking of, that is, not a purpose. In this sense the existence and being of the scissors surpasses the final cause that supposedly gave rise to it.
If you give an alien a pair of scissors, he might not know what to do with them. Or it could be that it would give them an extraordinary and different use than the great creator of the scissors. That is something that cannot be denied. The being and existence of the scissors surpasses purposes and final causes. So, literally, when we create scissors, we do not know what we create and the supposed main reason for the great creation of the scissors does not saturate the becoming of the scissors.
Something only reason could differentiate.
But scissors only have extrinsic causes whereas life is self-organizing, it has intrinsic reason
Well, that's a concept. But I'm afraid experience contradicts it. We can give many uses to a scissors, why discriminate between one and another more than by an anthropomorphism?
Anyway I claim that scissors are more than scissors. And this "more" has to be explained, but it cannot be explained by the purpose.
Theres an objective distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causation. Organisms are self-organizing and perpetuating in a way that artifacts are not. Its an Aristotelian principle.
So you are not talking about scissors determined by the external agent, the great creator of scissors. You are talking about self-organizing systems. Is the universe a self-organizing system? But that excludes God, as the external cause of the organized being of the universe. So what is your point?
But in any case the distinction between the intrinsic principles of living organisms and the extrinsic principles of designed artifacts nevertheless points to a real ontological distinction.
It's not a matter of what I want. There is such a thing as logical necessity, and not as a matter of belief. If you don't accept the facts of logic, then you have no basis on which to argue.
Seems to be just that. The belief that there must be a reason for each thing is wishful thinking on your part.
At least part of 's point is the opacity of intent. The intent with which the scissors are made is not a part of Quoting Wayfarer
Youll need to justify that. The Principle of Sufficient Reason doesnt mandate complete determinism: theres room within it for hazard and chance. PSR is a principle of intelligibility, not of mechanical causation. That things are explainable doesnt mean theyre determined by prior causes in a strict mechanistic sense. For instance, in quantum mechanics, the outcome of a specific measurement may not be predetermined, but the probability distribution within which it falls is governed by well-defined lawssuch as the Born Rule.
But if the idea that thingscircumstances, happenings, eventsoccur for a reason is denied altogether, doesnt that open the door to relativism, which our friend @tim wood seems to be gesturing toward? That facts are merely a matter of personal predilection?
No, I don't. That's the point. Justification ends wherever we want. If you need a stronger account of that, see the various discussions concerning hinge propositions, status functions, haunted universe doctrines and so on. These are very far from relativise ideas.
I claim that it is an argument against intelligent design. We can talk about the creator of the scissors or the creator of the universe. In both cases the becoming outweighs the intention or purpose. And the example of the scissors is important because it refers to the only case where purpose and intention seem to be present and can function as evidence for understanding intelligent design. That is, human action. And I say "seems" because in reality intention and purpose are not really able to saturate the being and existence of things created by man. Or created by God, as its first analogy. We can speak of scissors as of laws of nature, there is no distinction.
But by saying 'justification ends wherever we want', you're explicitly relativising it. And hand-waving to boot. Youre making a claim about justification, while denying the need to justify it.
A very large part of this disagreement is that the idea of justification is so ambiguous
Or being obfuscated by you, more likely.
Isnt that just simple relativism? If reasons are nothing more than accepted utterances, and truth has no role except as a vague "sense," then theres no fact of the matteronly what people happen to accept. But if thats the case, whats the point of argument at all? On that view, argument becomes persuasion, not inquiryand justification collapses into convention. Thats not just deflationary; it prescinds all rational argument.
Quoting tim wood
Isn't a reason the connection between cause and effect? ('Ah, I can see why that is so!') Isn't the role of reason to discern such connections, and the progress of reason the continual enlargement of the scope of those connections? If it is not, do you have an alternative definition?
If there is an almighty god, what is the reason, explanation, ground for his existence or occurrence?
Who designed god?
Who designed the designer of god?
I'd say reason is a logical, timeless context; for example: The sum of all angles within a triangle is always 180 degrees. There is a reason that the value is always 180. But the triangle doesn't "cause" this value; the value is not an "effect". The time dimension has nothing to do with that logical context.
Cause and effect, on the other hand, require a time axis. A cause is an event in time, and the effect is an event as well. A cause always happens before the event.
The triangle is not an event. And the value 180 is not an event either. Geometry contains reasons. Causality contains events.
You probably knew this already and I was just misunderstanding your questions. I'm posting my reply anyway, just to be on the safe side, hehe ...
I agree with that statement, but I disagree with your conclusion. I think a mathematical description is just that: a description; the description itself is not the described physical phenomenon itself. The symbolic description "3 apples" are not the three physical apples themselves. When a fourth physical apple occurs, the description "3 apples" won't be updated automatically. Vice versa, when I write "4 apples", those three physical apples remain just three. I can't see any bridge here. Besides, being a fallibilist, I doubt that inductive descriptions (theses) about empirical observations are necessarily true. They may be wrong. I can't be sure if all swans are white. I haven't seen other places yet, and I can't predict the future. Einsteins's descriptions showed that Newton's description was inaccurate.
I'm hungry. This box contains an apple, that second box is empty. As I'm hungry, I have a good reason to take the first box. That's a reason.
(This example doesn't show any "cause and effect"; it's not a "when"-event. It's an "if"-reason.)
But it's also predictive. Mathematical modelling has enabled the discovery of many phenomena which otherwise could have been known at all. The history of modern science is evidence of that.
Quoting Quk
That was the subject of 'Kant's answer to Hume'. Too big a digression to pursue here.
Yes, we can assume that the mathematical and logical laws will be valid forever, so we can use them in our prediction models. But that's just the skeleton. The flesh comes from the values that you feed into the formula, and these values may be wrong or variable or not relevant at all. We can't know for sure if the values are accurate.
We can for practical purposes. Agree that numerical values dont describe or capture everything but that theyre obviously effective within specific ranges of application.
Being that the PSR is categorized as a first principle of metaphysics, it's expected that it should cover everything in reality, actual and possible. But I don't see why that would make it useless. Let's compare it with the laws of logic. Being that logic is also a first principle of metaphysics, it also covers everything in reality, i.e., nothing can break logic. Yet, applying the laws of logic is not useless.
Quoting Banno
Correct. Reality exists even if we don't know the specific about it. But we can often find the specific reasons or explanations. That's the job of abductive reasoning: inference to the best explanation. We would not start looking for explanations if we did not believe that explanations existed.
Quoting Banno
That's fine; that doesn't make the principle false.
Quoting Banno
The PSR can be useful. Among other things, it can be used to draw conclusions about intelligent design as per the OP.
Who designed the intelligent designer?
Who designed the designer of the intelligent designer?
Quoting tim wood
According to Occam's Razor, or the principle of parsimony, or abductive reasoning, or even the duck test. I can understand that you do not accept the PSR, but do you honestly deny all of these other standards?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Quoting tim wood
Why do you say that positing a first cause with inherent existence begs the question? It is not arbitrary if it is derived from the PSR and avoids infinite regress.
Let's take a step back. Purely physical things have only 3 components: matter, energy, and the arrangement of matter. When we speak on man-made things, we really refer only to the arrangement of matter since man did not create the raw matter or energy.
With that, when we say that man creates scissors, we mean that man creates the specific shape of scissors which is designed to cut paper. Even when scissors are used for another purpose, say as a door holder, it retains its shape which is designed to cut paper.
Quoting JuanZu
Even if I were to agree that the scissors lose their identity of scissors as soon as they are used for another purpose, it does not change the fact that were created from intelligent design in the first place.
Quoting Quk
You are asking how to solve the problem of infinite regress. Infinite regress is avoided if we posit that the first cause has inherent existence. In which case, the reason or explanation for the existence of the first cause is an internal one (type 3): The statement "the first cause which has inherent existence exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true. And no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR.
Which doesn't exactly get at the notion of God.
Good. So incausality is possible. Next question: Why should the first cause, of all possibilities, be a god and not the universe itself or chaos itself or any other fluctuation itself? There's no reason to assign this very first function to a god, in my opinion, unless it makes the believer happier.
I'm an agnostic atheist. I'm not an atheistic missionary; everyone should be happy with their personal religion. I just see a problem when someone confuses belief with science. The attempt to prove the existence of god is not a belief and not a religion. The attempt is literally hopeless: It's no hope per se, nor will the attempt be successful. See Münchhausen trilemma. If you need a proof, you don't believe in god.
If we accept the scissors argument, we accept the idea of a universe that is out of the hands of a supposed creator and designer. In other words, God has not foreseen the evolution of the universe. And if this is so then why maintain the idea of a Great Designer? It is like saying that the designer is not such a designer and God who foresees everything does not foresee too much. Do you understand my point?
That is a bland, unjustified assertion.
Further, it is not a law of logic nor of rationality, and so we are not under any obligation to accept it. There are incidents for which it is reasonably and rationally supposed that there is not reason. Sometimes things just happen.
You have not given sufficient reason for us to accept he principle of sufficient reason.
The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?".
A reason is an aitia: an account of why, irrespective of the type of account it would be: e.g., causal, teleological, constitutional, or else formal. More technically, one could also address a reason as an account of what determinants (again, irrespective of type, as per the aforementioned examples) in part or in whole determined that addressed thereby being the reason for the presence or occurrence or being of that addressed.
What is sought to be explained is whatever exists, in particular or in general, in the abstract or in the concrete this in the present, in the past, in the future, or else atemporally (with natural laws being a possible example of the latter type of existence, this if they indeed never change throughout all of time (not my own point of view but all the same)).
Sufficient specifies the following when it comes to causes:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Necessary_and_sufficient_causes
... here, replace "cause" with "reason" and remove the implied necessity that the determinant precedes that which it determines (this not being the case for final causes, material causes, or formal causes). The meaning of "sufficient" will then remain the same for the context of "sufficient reason".
If the PSR does not apply, then at least some occurrences can occur and cease occurring in manners utterly devoid of any conceivable determinants this irrespective of appearances and beliefs to the contrary, for the latter too could of themselves then be events that hold no conceivable determinants for being or ceasing to be. If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: There would then be no means of establishing what, if anything, occurs via some determinants rather than occurring in manners that are utterly magical - to use the pejorative meaning of the word. No justification would then rationally hold any water or carry any weight for that which constitutes the justification could itself in fact be devoid of any substance and, hence, not capable of justifying anything. There could then be no declarative truth, which relies upon justifiability. And there could then be no grounded knowledge or understanding of any sort regarding reality or any aspect of it.
If the PSR does apply, then epistemologies can hold, and thereby knowledge and understanding of what is in fact real and what is not. As too can tychism then cogently hold: the randomness of some events too here will have their reasons, i.e. explanations: for one relatively easy to express example of this, the degree of randomness, if any, in a soccer games outcome will be determined by the skill of the respective team members of each team, with each teams actions being of itself in large part teleologically determined by the final cause here, more specifically, aim of winning the addressed game.
To chose against the PSR is to shoot oneself in the foot in terms of reasoning, philosophy, knowledge, and the like. Or, at best, is to revert to a literal interpretation of "it is so because I so state it is" - which is not any better.
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That offered, the PSR says nothing about there needing to be a first cause to all that is existence could just as conceivably be devoid of any ascertainable beginning, with our current physical universe being only the latest iteration an any number of prior Big Bounces or the like to not even start on the PSR saying nothing about the notion of a grand omni-this-and-that designer deity.
Why?
The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.
You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow.
This very question - the act of asking and expecting a cogent answer or else refusing the offered premise - entails and screams out the underlying presumption of the PSR. Else, there'd be no reason to ask.
Quoting Banno
What I've done is provide a reason for the Principle at hand, and not purport to thereby know the reasons for each and every last occurrence that is, has been, or will be. An extremely major difference in scope.
In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:
We might quite happily ask for and even look for a reason, all the while there not being any. There is simply no guarantee that there must be a reason.
Indeed, that seems to be what is the case.
Is what your reply is. You all of a sudden conflate ontology and epistemology as thought there would be no difference whatsoever between them. And then, instead of giving a reasoned answer to the question placed, reply with what essentially equates to an emotivist "boo".
Yea, rubbish. (I can be emotive too, don't you know.)
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Saying this at large and not to Banno:
If not yet amply clear, the Principle of Sufficient Reason no more entails the necessitarianism of causal determinism than it does there being a "first cause" - which is nil. This as per the previously mentioned example of how tychism (i.e., ontic randomness) in a game of soccer can well occur within a cosmos wherein the PSR applies - as it only can for those who maintain any coherent form of rationality.
Show me to be mistaken. Set out why every whatever must have a reason.
After all, there must be a reason
This, its now worse than rubbish, its bullshit.
Reason provided here.
Unanswered question to justify the point is as follows:
Quoting javra
I can't, and won't, spoon feed you any more than this. Thinking is sometimes far easier said than done.
So your entire argument is that everything has a reason because everything has a reason.
Meh. Silly stuff.
I'll ... um ... endeavor to more strictly communicate which those who are reason-able and thereby give importance to rational thought, this from here on out. Good day, Banno.
Its just hot air.
So in a trivial sense, for any whatever, you can make up some story and call that the sufficient reason for that whatever.
But thats pretty uninteresting.
And I suspect it will not be enough for our Christian friend.
And when you do not have an answer, that is probably a good idea.
I quite agree, but surely it is relevant. It provides, if you like, the nexus between logic and observation. It provides a way to integrate the principles of logic with empirical observation. Aside from that, I agree with @javra.
Why does ...?
Why should ...?
"Why-does" implies a reason or cause.
"Why-should" doesn't imply a reason or cause.
Therefore, it's not paradox if a PSR-denier asks a "why should" question.
But that is not what is being claimed.
Hypothesis: "All random events so far were not really random but triggered by a hidden, deterministic program."
Mindset 1 says: This hypothesis must be true.
Mindset 2 says: This hypothesis may be true.
The difference between the two mindsets is this:
Mindset 1 needs the PSR and is thusly caught in the infinite regress which contradicts with the idea of a "first cause".
Mindset 2 needs no PSR; hence it's nonparadoxical and open in all directions.
Therefore:
Mindset 1 is erroneous due to its self-contradiction ("infinite regress" versus "first cause").
Mindset 2 is error-free because it doesn't claim a "first cause" nor an infinite regress; mindset 2 allows the possibility of either or neither, but not necessarily both at the same time.
Overall, I think that receptivity or hostility to the principle of sufficient reason might be closely tied to theist or non-theist views of the Universe. For the religious believer, which the OP obviously is ('A Christian Philosopher') it is natural to believe that the Cosmos is an expression of divine reason. Conversely that is just the kind of attitude that secular philosophy disdains. Hence
Quoting Banno
Which I'm sure forecloses the possibility of any interesting discussion, so I'll see you elsewhere ;-)
You're living the grand illusion, I see. Corporeal you, here, being utterly unreal to begin with, this physically, as equally applies to everything and everyone else. Save for the reality of the atomic-scale "spaces of profound emptiness". Okay. Just as long as it ain't spiritualish in its implications, such as might apply to the Eastern notion of maya, right?
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Quoting tim wood
Here are some not too hard to look us references for this information:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/
more specifically as to Leibniz and sufficient reason:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/#Leib
Or, as a far more laconic article:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason
At least according to these two references, the PSR was indeed endorsed as such by Leibniz, as per:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason#Leibniz's_view
There is a text by Heidegger in which he speaks of the principle of reason and criticizes it in a certain sense. In the text he speaks of something more fundamental of the being of things than their casual reason. There appear phenomenological notions about light in which something is given and appears. Something more proper to the thing (its being) that is differentiated from the reference to something else (a cause or a reason). That is to say the criticism is made that when we speak of reason or cause we speak of something else other than what we should speak of. I recommend reading it. Especially because it is indirectly a critique of the notion of causality and the ontotheology of a causal God.
Can you give it a name?
Quoting tim wood
That was something played up in Sir Arthur Eddingtons Two Tables.
The principle of reason.
The OP argument only concludes that something designed the universe. It does not extend so far as to claim that the designer or the first cause is God. I happen to believe it is God, but that will be an argument for a later post, to not derail the current discussion.
That if we accept the PSR as a valid first principle of metaphysics, then we infer the existence of a designer and of a first cause with inherent existence (which may or may not be the same). Now, this is still far from the notion of God, but it is a step towards it.
A full defense of the PSR is provided in this post under the section called "Argument in defense of the PSR". But here is a summary:
There is a strong parallel between logic and the PSR. They are both first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.
We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
Quoting Banno
Being that logic and the PSR are both first principles of metaphysics, they stand side by side; one is not underneath the other. Thus, we cannot derive logic from the PSR or vice versa. However, it is a law of rationality on the epistemology side, called induction or abduction.
You've asked other questions but I'll stop here for now for the sake of brevity.
The OP does not evidence this claim.
For instance, try to evidence that natural laws are not in fact the global result of all cooccurring existents acting as their material, bottom-up, cause which, as global laws, then simultaneously in turn formally cause their respective constraints to apply in a top-down fashion to all individual existents in the cosmos.
Note that this reasoning for the occurrence of natural laws dispels the requirement that natural laws occur due to the intentional creation of an intellect just as it dispels the requirement for a first efficient cause to all that exists as their reason for being.
While it might be true that humans design things, so too do some species of termites intentionally create termite mounds, intentional creation being a from of designing (the list of intentional creations in the spectrum of lifeforms is vast).
And there is no noted reason for why evolution cannot of itself serve as sufficient reason for this ability to intentionally create within the domain of life. If one likes, one can then find reason to expand this same notion of evolution to the cosmos itself such as via the notion of a cosmically evolving logos. Teilhards metaphysics serving as just one example of such an understanding of cosmic evolution; in Teilhards view, this cosmic evolution moves toward the omega point. C.S. Peirces metaphysics of evolution via Agapism, replete with the evolution of natural laws as cosmic habits, as yet another example of such a perspective. Neither of which logically require there being such a thing as a first efficient cause as intentionally creating intellect to all existents, one that is thereby itself other relative to these existents. (Teilhard's notions are more akin to God being within all beings throughout all time as a perpetually driving force of cosmic evolution toward the omega point). *
As to the question of how it all began, Ill again mention the possibility that although the cosmos might have a contingent end as per, for one example, Teilhards notions of the omega point it could nevertheless potentially be utterly devoid of any beginning: such as would be the case were this known universe to be just the latest iteration of a Big Bounce process.
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* to make this more explicit:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Teilhard_de_Chardin#Teachings
... of note, for Teilhard, who was a devout Christian, this omega point was interpreted a cosmic unification with Christ.
As to Agapism:
Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agapism
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All this isn't to argue for any specific metaphysics, but, again, to illustrate that the OP does not evidence the necessity for a first efficient cause as designer of existence. This very much granting the reality of the PSR.
You asked as to where the Principle of Sufficient Reason originated. And to this I replied.
Cool, but no need to be sorry. Even a broken clock can be right twice a day, as the saying goes.
Bearing mind that both Du Chardin and Peirce were believers. Peirce obviously not of a conventional type, but makes it clear often enough that he has no intention of disputing the reality of God (per his book A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God). Peirce deliberately posed his agap?-ism (awful word, by the way) in opposition to what would become the later selfish gene outlook of the new atheism.
The universe is infinite and very old so any form of life is possible within!
Yes, very much so.
Quoting Wayfarer
From my scattered readings, Peirce equated God to necessary being - such that God thereby occurs throughout all of existence and time, being for one example an aspect of us humans. This rather than being an intentionally creating intellect which served as first efficient cause to existence, and hence to existence's being, at large - one that thereby created us and is therefore as separate from us as we are from a scissor of our own creation and design.
If there are any references to the contrary, I'd be grateful to learn of them.
That said, neither was Teilhard Du Chardin much of the conventional type, devout Christian though he was. As an aside to this, I find interest in his notion of the Omega Point - which gets defined by him as, generally speaking, an ultimate single point of global consciousness devoid of anything else that becomes perfectly unified (for him, furthermore, in perfect convergence with Christ) - which at least seems to share many an aspect with the Neoplatonic notion of the One. It would be differently interpreted, of course, and this in a manner that encompasses the sciences known in his day, that of biological evolution much included, but - at least arguably - both the One and the Omega Point might as terms and concepts hold as referent the same ultimate ontic (though non-physical) reality of "pure/transcendental ego as perfectly unified and sole essence". Anyways, for what its worth, thought I'd mention this.
And, of course, one can easily translate both their metaphysics into one of cosmic logos - a cosmic logos, however, that can at the very least just as well be utterly devoid of a first efficient cause as designer.
Well no, it isn't. Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Is this supposed to be an appeal to authority? PSR is not a principle of logic. Nor is it the case that in order for reason to take place, one must assume the PSR. Quite simply, we can look for a reason, but there is no guarantee either that we will find the right reason - whatever "right"" might be - nor that there must be a reason. Further, and infamously, induction is not logically grounded - see Hume and Popper and most of the subsequent work on scientific method. Abduction - forget it.
The "strong parallel" isn't there.
Notice that you have not actually set out the how in your claim that PSR is supported inductively. Were is the inductive (or abductive, whatever that might be) argument?
The trouble is that it remains unclear when a reason is sufficient, and what a reason is. Analysis of the PSR over the last hundred years has turned up problem after problem, as the quite sympathetic SEP article shows.
All this before we address the unintelligible notion of intelligent design.
There's much more going on in these arguments than has been discussed in your posts.
Bell's theorem, and the overwhelming experimental evidence since, strongly support the view that there are no local hidden variables. That is, the behaviour of particles like electrons isn't determined by any deeper, pre-existing local properties that we just haven't discovered yet.
You know that.
And the point here is not that Bell is correct. The point is that the Strong version of the PSR being used in the OP (and by ) says that we cannot even contemplate Bell being right without dismantling the entire edifice of epistemology, ontology, physics and science...
And yet we do.
The idea that PSR is a law of rationality or whatever is bullshit.
As do I. But you take things a step too far - as is your want.
That we look for, or expect to find, a reason simply does not imply that there MUST be a reason.
This is basic modality.
And again, it remains unexplained what it is that makes something a reason, and what makes that reason sufficient.
Yes, this sort of analytic work is a pain in the arse. It's meant to be, to goad you into thinking this through properly.
I also smiled when I saw @javra refer to that article. It's good work, and surprisingly sympathetic to what in the end is a bad idea.
I'mm quite happy with PSR as a methodological maxim: we can look for a reason. What's not guaranteed is that there must be a reason.
And the "sufficient reason" for (every instantiation of) the "PSR" is what exactly? :chin:
This cycle of "bottom-up cause to top-down natural laws" does not seem to have inherent existence (reason type 3 as described in the OP) since it can be denied without contradiction. If so, then it needs an external reason to explain its existence (reasons type 1 or 2).
Quoting javra
Real metaphysical intentions imply free will, since an intention must be freely chosen. So, if animals do not have free will (which I believe most people accept), then this apparent intention from termites is not a real intention, and can be reduced to mere instinct.
Quoting javra
I accept that the laws of nature, including evolution, can explain the existence of life forms. But I don't believe it can explain the existence of freely chosen intentions. As described in the OP, a process that is fully determined cannot give rise to a non-determined thing.
Quoting javra
An infinite regress of causes does not fulfill the PSR. Like chasing a carrot on a stick, every prior cause adds the need for one more explanation, and the gap to fulfill the PSR never closes.
I accept that the laws of nature can explain the existence of life forms. But we need a reason for the existence of the laws of nature in the first place.
Why?
continuation of ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/981975
Cool.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I agree that the laws of nature are enforced by an entity called the Mind, but I wonder how this can be called intelligent design. In fact, I can argue that given any laws of nature and considering that the universe is infinite, one can expect a form of life soon or late so I wonder what the design is about.
Fundamental physical regularities are not legistlated "laws" that need to be "enforced" but are mathematically derived from countless, extraordinarily precise observations (measurements) of the most explanatory physical theories available (SR, GR, QFT, Standard Model, etc). The term "laws of nature" is a metaphorical shorthand that it makes no sense to attribute some hidden (occult) agency such as "the Mind" to which only begs the question 'and whence the Mind?' leading either to an infinite regress or unwarranted, arbitrary terminus (e.g. "first cause", "unmoved mover", "intelligent designer", "creator", etc).
What twaddle. "Laws" of nature are just ways of talking about the way things are, ways that have been shown to work. They are not "enforced" - as if one were fined for braking the law of gravity... or sent to jail for creating a perpetuum mobile.
Yep. What nonsense.
It remains that the OP does not present anything like the "demonstration" indicated in the title.
Yes it does imply "that there MUST be a reason", because the necessity of logic is based in the human need to make sense of things. Logic is a product of human minds, and logical necessity is a type of human need. Therefore, if we look for, expect to find, or in any way need a reason for X, this implies that there MUST be a reason for X. "MUST" means means nothing more than we need a reason for, and we would not look for the reason unless it was deemed as needed.
To believe that "MUST" could be based in anything other than human need is what is nonsense.
Very good.
Of course. How could one look for the Loch Ness Monster unless that is something which could be looked for?
You fall into the atheist trap of self-contradiction, if you try to deny that God who is defined as the necessary being, is not a being.
You must play the game by the rules of the definitions, or else you equivocate.
:smirk:
Why is that different from saying:
"Let 'Fido' mean 'the dog whose existence is necessary,' therefore Fido exists." Have I just created Fido? Or did Fido exist before the definition?
Surely God's necessity should depend on his other characteristics, no? Shouldn't God's necessity be in virtue of, say its timelessness, or infinity or something?
Your understanding of necessity is nonexistent. If you want to create a definition of "necessary" which is based in something other than logic, or reason, then let's see your principles. Otherwise your use of "MUST" when you say "That we look for, or expect to find, a reason simply does not imply that there MUST be a reason", is self-contradictory nonsense.
It's quite obvious to anyone with a reasoning mind, that if we are looking for something, then there is a reason for us to be looking for it. If what we are looking for is the reason why we are looking, this does not imply that there may be no reason. It only implies that the reason is unknown. You jump to the unsupported conclusion, that there may not be a reason. However, all evidence indicates that if someone is looking for something, there is a reason for that activity, so your insinuation, that there may not be a reason is nonsense.
Quoting bert1
I didn't say it is different. When you say "Let 'Fido' mean 'the dog whose existence is necessary,' therefore Fido exists.", you provide no time constraints. Therefore your question of "before" is not relevant, and not answerable from the information provided.
There is a difference between accepting a premise for the purpose of a logical proceeding, and questioning the acceptability (truth or falsity) of the premise. The premise is what is necessary for the procedure, and when accepted, what is stated is a necessity, as what is necessary for the logical procedure. If the premise is not accepted it is considered to be a possibility.
Banno appears to be proposing an interpretation of "modal logic" by which accepting the premise provides us with something that is possible, rather than something which is necessary for the logical procedure. But of course that is just a trick of sophistry. The premise states what is necessary, and even if we put the name "logical possibility" to that necessity, it doesn't change the fact that what is now called a "possibility", is the thing which is necessary for the proposed logical procedure. Therefore the "possibility" is taken as a necessity, necessary for the logical procedure, despite being assigned the name "possibility".
I have a thread on the topic that the physical cannot be the cause of its own change here. If we agree on this then it follows that there must be an entity, so-called the Mind, that is in charge of change in physical. Once, this is accepted then it follows that it is the Mind who is in charge of enforcing the laws of physics.
I have a thread on the topic that the physical cannot be the cause of its own change here. If we agree on this then it follows that there must be an entity, so-called the Mind, that is in charge of change in physical. Once, this is accepted then it follows that it is the Mind who is in charge of enforcing the laws of physics.
Quoting 180 Proof
The style of that OP is not one I could take seriously.
It is acknowledged that the PSR is not derived from logic. As previously said, logic and the PSR stand side by side; one is not underneath the other.
Likewise induction/abduction is a separate type of reasoning than deduction (i.e. logic). But induction/abduction is also necessary to find truth. Using logic or deduction alone would only result in empty formulas in formal logic and mathematics. For concrete truths about the actual world, we also need to use induction/abduction.
Quoting Banno
My argument in this comment is not an inductive argument. Rather, it says that since induction/abduction is necessary to find truth, and since it is equivalent to the PSR (inference to the most reasonable explanation), then we can trust our voice of reason when it says that everything must have an explanation. Logic can be defended the same way.
Quoting Banno
A reason is sufficient if it covers all the data in the topic inquired. It also should not be more than sufficient, i.e. it should not explain more than what the data can support, otherwise it is superfluous.
A reason is what can explain the existence or occurence of a thing. E.g. the reason for the existence of a chicken egg is a chicken.
A full defense of the PSR is provided in this post under the section called "Argument in defense of the PSR". But here is a summary:
There is a strong parallel between logic and the PSR. They are both first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.
We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
In this context, what is directly designed are the laws of nature. The things that result from the laws of nature would not be directly designed.
Must be a Christian thing.... "It is written..."
Wishful thinking on your part. Certainly not of much real interest.
I am afraid this is not a counterargument, so I cannot comment on it further.
Disregarding your insults, I didn't find anything valuable in your post so I won't comment on it further.
I already changed the OP in the syllogism form. You are welcome to read the new form of the argument and comment on it if you wish.
But life is possible whatever the laws of nature are! So my objection about the design is valid.
I don't think it's a matter of "trust" here, it's a matter of having nothing else to go on. If we want n explanation of things, we must assume that the things are explainable. To assume otherwise, even the possibility that something is unexplainable, would be an attitude of discouragement.
One could adopt the attitude "it is possible that there are things which cannot be explained", but such an attitude is not conducive toward producing knowledge. This attitude would provide a reason not to seek knowledge of things which are difficult to explain. It would give the premise required to conclude that there is no explanation for X, and that conclusion provides the required reason not to seek the explanation for X. Therefore the possibility of "no explanation for X" must be excluded if one is to have the desire to explain X.
In everything which we seek an explanation for, (and there is no reason to exclude anything here), we must maintain the premise that there is an explanation for that thing. If we allow the possibility that there is no explanation for something, then we also allow the possibility that we would stop seeking the explanation of that thing, and this is counterproductive to the quest for knowledge, and the application of the principle of "infinite", which allows no end until completion.
Simply put, denial of the PSR is unphilosophical. The philosophical mind seeks knowledge of all things, and the proposition that some things may not be knowable implies that philosophy is misdirected.
That's what the quest for knowledge is, "wishful thinking". Denying the PSR is demoralized thinking.
This statement caught my eye, looking over this thread. Isn't it too strong? If philosophy should discover that some things aren't knowable, at least by us, wouldn't that be worth knowing, part of "all things" philosophy is interested in? Maybe the word you want is "limited" rather than "misdirected."
An invalid argument is an argument that its premises are false. Could you point to a premise in my argument which is false?
Sure I know the difference between facts and beliefs. What does this have to do with my argument?
I don't think that my argument is based on beliefs and assumptions. Here is my argument in syllogism form for further consideration:
D1) Consider two states of a physical (consider an electron as an example of a physical), S1 to S2, in which the physical exists at time t1 first and t2 later respectively
D2) Now consider a change by which I mean that physical moves from the state S1 at time t1 to the state of S2 at time t2
A) Assume that the physical in the state of S1 has the causal power to cause the physical in the state of S2
P1) Physical however does not experience time
P2) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot know the correct time, t2, to cause the physical in the state of S2
P3) If so, then the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2
C) So, physical cannot be the cause of its own change
What do you mean?
The physical neither has a sensory system to experience time nor has a memory to estimate the passage of time through the accumulation of memory, as humans do. In fact, saying that the physical can experience time is absurd since the physical including us exists within each instant of time only and each instant of time is similar (please consider my thought experiment).
So you agree that the physical, a cup of tea for example, does not have subjective experience at all, including experiencing time.
Quoting tim wood
I think that anything that is changing is subject to the passage of time.
Quoting tim wood
My thought experiment in fact is very demonstrative. Philosophers use examples all the time to demonstrate something that is difficult to grasp.
I don't know how to understand your supposed argument, even giving a generous interpretation. You have a change from one physical state to another over a time, but claim physics doesn't "experience" time... and does nto "know" time. what does that mean? Physical states certainly include time. And there is an odd jump from "the physical in the state of S1 cannot cause the physical in the state of S2" to "physical cannot be the cause of its own change". I don't understand what that phrase is trying to do.
Despite you, and best attempts there's precious little here supporting sufficient reason as a principle, intelligent design or god.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/982416
:up: :up:
How do you think it could be possible to discover that something is not knowable? I think it is impossible to know something as not knowable.
I'm not really interested in the intelligent design aspect, and I really don't understand the claimed relation.
However, sufficient reason, as a principle, supports the will to know, as I explained, and is therefore a very a valuable principle.
Sure, a valid question. Depends how much certainty you want to pack in to the concept of "knowing" something. I can say I'm certain that my cat will never comprehend general relativity (I barely do myself), though I can't prove it. Likewise, we may discover the limits of our own comprehension -- not provably, perhaps, but beyond a reasonable doubt. We would then know that something is not knowable.
I bolded "is" and "as" in your quote because I think what you're pointing to may be the idea that to know "something" as unknowable, is already to know something about it, hence a sort of contradiction. I wouldn't necessarily disagree with that, but there are other ways of being unknowable.
Even if that is true, it is also true that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds. So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed.
I agree with your defense of the PSR. But I think we can build a stronger defense by showing that the way we infer that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics is no different than the way we infer that logic is a first principle of metaphysics. What do you think of the following argument?
On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.
We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Correct. To draw a parallel with logic again, we sometimes encounter situations that seem illogical, called a paradox. We could adopt an attitude that not all outcomes are logical, or we can hold on to the belief that nothing stands outside of logic and make an effort to solve the paradox.
THe questions being asked in the OP are not ones which have answers, generally. Nor could they. The explication cannot support much of anything.
I haven't been discussing modal logic because it's not relevant. As I explained, you use reference to modal logic as a trick of sophistry. This trick allows you to name as "possible", what the logician takes as necessary for the logical procedure. Therefore you can portray what is required by (necessary for) the logician, as a "logical possibility", instead of portraying it as it truly is in the logician's use, a necessity. Premises are required (necessary) for logical procedure, even if they are called "possibilities". Your reference to modal logic is nothing but a smoke and mirrors linguistic trick.
Quoting J
This is not applicable. That a cat cannot understand something, is a deficiency of the knower. You cannot conclude that the object is unknowable, based on the capacity of the knower, because a more capable knower could know it. Likewise, even if we determine the limits of the human capacity of knowing, and discover that some objects are beyond our ability to know them, this does not imply that they are unknowable.
Quoting J
No, that's not really what I meant. I was asking directly, how could you determine that a specific thing, X, is unknowable. Finding out "I can't know X" doesn't mean X is not knowable. Even determining that X is beyond the capability of all human knowers doesn't imply that X is not knowable. This is because there are other types of knowers, like your cat example demonstrates. Living beings evolve, and knowledge evolves. So reference to the current condition, and knowing ability of life on earth, cannot be used as an indication as to whether X is knowable. So, I asked the question, how could you determine that X is not knowable? Wouldn't this actually require knowing X? I cannot look at a thing and say that since it is impossible for me to understand it, it is therefore unknowable. What type of information about that object can I use to draw that conclusion?
I look at logic as a procedure, an activity, something we do. We cannot accurately portray it as "a first principle" because it consists of a number of principles which are applied. We can describe human beings as using logic, and use that as a first principle, i.e. human beings use logic.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Here is the difficulty. Deduction, induction, and abduction, can all be said to be types of logic. Or, we could restrict the meaning of "logic" to deduction, and class the other two in a broader category, as reasoning, along with deductive "logic" as a different form of reasoning. However, no matter how we define the categories of classification, we cannot avoid the fact that there are different forms of reasoning, which employ different principles.
So, if we place severe restrictions on "logic", we cannot say "everything must necessarily be logical", then we exclude the things which are understood by other forms of reasoning. This is why the PSR employs the most broad term, "reason". Then even if we restrict "logic" to a specific form of human reasoning, and we find that some things appear to be illogical, this does not imply that these things are unreasonable, and vise versa.
For example, logical conclusions are judged for validity and soundness. And, basic deductive logic often proceeds from premises which are produced from induction. This means that if we restrict "logic" to refer to the validity of the deduction, an unsound conclusion would still be "logical", yet unsound. So false premises could produce very absurd conclusions, which appear to be very illogical, but we'd still have to say that they are logical conclusions no matter how absurd they are. (Zeno's for example)
Furthermore, we still need to allow ourselves the capacity to judge the principles employed in reasoning. If we allow a more general definition of "logic" and the use of any system of reasoning is called "using logic", then we still need to be able to judge faulty applications. There are many specialized forms of modal logic, and we need to be able to judge the modes of application according to acceptability. This is how I judge Banno's reference to modal logic as unacceptable in the context of this thread.
The PSR, as a principle can be judged similarly. We cannot judge it as to whether it is logical or not, because it says something about logic, and the way that we apply logic in general. That's why I judged it as a valuable principle.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Paradoxes are generally produced from the misuse of reasoning. One might apply logic to faulty premises, or misuse the modes of modal logic as Banno does in the context of this thread.
Quoting J
To understand what is meant, we need to consider the context. The PSR says that everything has a reason. So "unknowable" in this context means having no reason. Having no reason would make it fundamentally unknowable.
So the question is, how would we be able to determine that there is no reason for something. If we cannot find the reason, or even judge ourselves as incapable of finding the reason, that does not mean that there is no reason. Making the judgement "there is no reason for X" would only put an end to the search for that reason. Clearly, to the philosophical mind which desires to know, such a judgement would be counterproductive. Therefore the possibility of making this judgement must be excluded. We exclude this possibility with the PSR, which states that there must be a reason for everything.
Every serious philosopher knows that instantaneous velocity is a nonsensical idea. So you are just making a fool of yourself by bringing this up, over and over again in a philosophy forum.
SUBTOPIC: Metaphysics of the Question
?? et al,
Our friend "Tim Wood" pointed out that there are many entanglements here that confuse the multiple central issues.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is neither a "theory" nor a "logic pattern" in and of itself. It is one of many logical approaches (a tool) within the framework to study the question under examination.
The original question is an examination of the concepts and superfactors (including a consciousness) that drive what is behind "Intelligent Design."
Embedded in the application of the PSR (For every inferred action ? there must be a reason why
the inferred action happened) is the concept of "first" causation. And as everyone here knows (already), the implication is a "First Cause," a "Creator," an "Ultimate Power," ? a "Supreme Being" (or any other supernatural entity or deities) (AKA: God).
The question of "Demonstrating" Intelligent Design is a huge question that needs to be broken down.
Most Respectfully,
R
The context is helpful. Youre not concerned so much with things that might be unknowable in principle, such as the complete decimal expansion of pi. What you want to know is, Is there a class of things that a) have reasons which b) must remain unknowable by us? And if such a class exists, how would we know what the members were? I wonder, though, whether youve defined such a possibility out of existence, by stipulating that the PSR is and must be true, so that the idea of a thing without a reason is already impossible.
I guess Im not sure whether youre offering this connection of reasons with what can be known as a demonstration that the PSR must be true, or as an entailment of what must follow if the PSR is true.
BTW: Theres a provocative book called No Way: The Nature of the Impossible, edited by a mathematician and a physicist, that collects instances of the debate over whats possible (including in epistemology) from a wide variety of disciplines, from medicine to music. With a question as big as this, its really helpful to hear from people whove encountered the problem in a specific situation related to their expertise. Well worth finding a copy if you can.
:rofl:
Folk can Google it, Meta. Cheers.
Total non sequitur.
I think the point he's driving for is that for a philosopher, the term is ridiculous. It's a totally reasonable and real physics thing though. I suggest his point is irrelevant anyhow, But this seemed to me the crossed purpose there. "instantaneous" doesn't hold it's standard meaning in that phrase.
A waste of time.
Yes, I think that is the very point of the PSR. By making a thing without a reason impossible, by definition (actually 'by law', the law being that principle), we do not consider the possibility of a thing which has no reason. Such a thing has been outlawed. Therefore, the enquiring (philosophical) mind will not be discouraged from seeking the reason for things, when the task gets tough, and something appears to be without a reason. The possibility that it really is without a reason has been outlawed so that we do not get discouraged in this way.
Quoting J
The PSR "must be true", to support the philosophical mind, and the desire to know. If we allow that it may not be true, then we allow that we may become discouraged from the task of expanding knowledge to cover all of reality, and then designate particular things as occurring without reason. That is an unreasonable point of view to the philosophical mind with the desire to know.
Quoting J
I'll keep that in mind.
Quoting Banno
Yes, folk can Google it. But I referred to serious philosophers, and Google does not do the studying for serious philosophers. So again, your claim is irrelevant. At least you are consistent in irrelevance.
Quoting AmadeusD
Correct, a misuse of the term. We all know that velocity is always an average and therefore no velocity is ever properly "instantaneous". Any measurement of velocity is derived from at least two instants. Banno however, seems to actually believe (or at least argues for) the literal meaning of "instantaneous", just like he seems to believe that what are termed "logical possibilities" are not actually treated as the necessities of modal logic. It appears to be a matter of Banno simply assuming that a word has a specific meaning, without taking the time to adequately understand what the word really means, within the context which it is used.
I believe the first three laws of logic combined, "a thing is what is it, not what it is not, and there is no in-between", constitute the first principle. The other laws of logic, like modal logic, are sub-branches of this first principle, much like the laws of causality are sub-branches of the PSR.
Logic is not only a first principle of epistemology (i.e. deduction) but also of metaphysics. This is why we can speak of possible worlds. E.g. a four-sided triangle is a contradiction and thus cannot exist in any possible world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I'd prefer to restrict "logic" to deduction to clearly differentiate it from the other two types of reasoning. This leaves the other types of reasoning, induction/abduction, to be associated with the PSR, because they aim to find the best or most sufficient explanation to account for the data, i.e., they appeal to the PSR. Then, the general term that covers all types can indeed be called "reasoning".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
We must clarify a possible confusion here. Things can be non-logical (they can be reasoned without deduction but with induction/abduction instead) but not illogical (they violate the laws of logic). Thus, inferring the existence of a fire from the existence of smoke is not strictly speaking "logical" because the smoke could be caused by something else, but it is also not "illogical" like inferring the existence of something that is both a fire and not a fire.
With that, since both deduction and induction/abduction are first principles of epistemology, and these types of reasoning appeal to logic and the PSR respectively, then correspondingly, both logic and the PSR are first principles of metaphysics.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I suppose we could identify every possible cause of a given outcome and eliminate them by testing them individually. But this could still leave room for a possible non-physical cause that could not be identified in the field of physics.
Can you point to where, in the conversation between me and MoK, there is a non sequitur?
Why? There are possible worlds in which there is no life. Why not possible worlds in which life is not possible?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Pretty clear this does not follow.
is correct.
Fine.
Can there be a necessary being? The answer turns on whether youre working within S4 or S5. Lets map this out carefully and then draw a reasoned conclusion.
Here's the difference:
S4:
Axioms:
?p ? p (if necessarily p, then p)
?p ? ??p (if necessarily p, then necessarily necessarily p)
Accessibility relation: transitive, but not necessarily symmetric.
???x does not entail ??x.
The system is more modestly modal: it allows nested possibilities without flattening them.
Therefore, even if a necessary being is possible, it doesnt follow that it necessarily exists.
S5:
Axioms:
Everything in S4
Plus: ?p ? ??p
Equivalent to: ?p ? ??p
Accessibility relation: equivalence relation (transitive, symmetric, reflexive).
If it's possible that a necessary being exists (???x), then it must necessarily exist (??x).
This is the core move in Plantingas modal ontological argument; if God (as a necessary being) is possible, then God exists necessarily. So in S5, possibility implies necessity in this special modal sense. This is too strong, allowing the modal collapse of possibility into necessity.
So:
If S5 is correct, and if a necessary being exists, then everything that exists does so necessarily.
But this erases modal distinctions and makes contingency illusory. Therefore, even if a necessary being exists in S5, the result is metaphysically unstable or unattractive not because the being itself is suspect, but because necessity becomes bloated and indiscriminate.
If S4 is correct, a necessary being may exist without collapsing contingency. But since S4 lacks the machinery to promote possibility to necessity, we cannot infer the existence of such a being from modal possibility alone. Thus, the modal route to a necessary being is blocked.
Either way, there are profound problems for necessary beings.
To clarify, the OP only aims to defend the existence of intelligent design, not the existence of a necessary being. Having said that, I accept your demonstration that Plantinga's ontological argument is not valid. So, if we were to defend the existence of a necessary being, we'd need to use another argument.
I think you mean that the last sentence in the above comment does not follow from the first sentence alone. I agree, but it was in reference to the whole discussion with MoK, not in reference to this comment alone.
I agree about this difference in the meaning of "instantaneous". But Banno does not accept that difference of meaning, and equivocates in his complaints about my explanations. This is a common, recurring problem I have with Banno, which became evident when I demonstrated that he equivocates with the use of "same" in his interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Instead of acknowledging the tendency to equivocate, Banno doubles down and makes fun of my arguing technique.
Notice that's exactly what Banno was attempting in this thread. Instead of looking at defining "necessary" in a rational, intelligent and meaningful way, as I proposed, Banno attempted to change the subject to discuss modal logic, which excludes "necessary" to some ideal Platonic realm. This leaves "necessary" without any practical import. But then, Banno will continue to use "necessary" in the normal, practical way, while insisting on that ideal definition. That is equivocation.
So in he case of "instantaneous", there is an ideal "instant" which refers to an assumed point in time. I say it's assumed because time flows, and there is no real point in time. So that point in time, the "instant" is an ideal only. In practise, in physics with the use of calculus, a person might determine an "instantaneous velocity". Of course, that so-called "instantaneous velocity" is really the velocity over a period of time, because the instant in time is an ideal, and the accuracy of the determination is dependent on the parameters of the calculation.
For a simplified example, suppose I take a five second period of time, and determine that the velocity of an item in that time period was 5m/s. I could insist that at every "instant" of time in that five second period, the item had that 5m/s velocity. But of course that would be meaningless, and actually false. An "instant" in this sense is an ideal only, so it is meaningless when applied toa physical object, and it is false because I determined the five second period, and divided it evenly, assuming another ideal, perfectly constant motion. Of course that is a simplified example but it applies to accelerated and decelerated motions as well, which assume constancy.
Now we have the same sort of situation in this thread. Banno wants an ideal definition of "necessary", which he represented with "MUST". Of course such an ideal form of "necessary" does not enter into any practical application, just like the ideal "instant" does not enter into the practise. The important point is that just like with the mathematics, we may represent the ideal, and claim that it enters into the practise, with the mode of representation employed, but this claim is actually meaningless and false. The real form of "necessary" which enters into our practise of logic is our decisions as to what is "necessary for", or needed for, our purposes. And this varies according to the situation and principles applied, just like the meaning of "instantaneous" varies according to the application.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I would disagree with this, placing metaphysics as necessarily prior to logic. The reason for this, is that as we come to understand the nature of reality it becomes apparent that there are aspects which escape the applicability of those primary three laws. Aristotle described this class of aspect as "potential", and matter is placed in this category. His solution was to allow for a violation of the third law, excluded middle, to accommodate for what may or may not be. The problem is deep though, because the proposal of "prime matter", pure potential, violates the law of identity, because pure potential could not have any form therefore no identity. Aristotle rejected the proposal of "prime matter" in his metaphysics, but if we accept that proposal, then we also allow violation of the second law, noncontradiction, by avoiding identity. This is the case with dialectical materialism, and dialetheism.
So the issue is that we need to adapt our principles of logic to conform to our understanding of reality, and this is why metaphysics is commonly placed as prior to epistemology. The conventional approach has been to produce forms of modal logic, and these roughly follow Aristotle's lead, as exceptions to the third law, being systems to deal with possibility. Notice that I say "systems", plural, because there is a number of possible ways to approach the reality of possibility. This is why metaphysics must be understood as prior to epistemology, because we need principles to choose which system of logic is applicable to the circumstances.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This exemplifies the problem of definition. The truth of this statement requires a specific definition of "triangle". Someone could propose a possible world in which "triangle" is defined as four-sided, and this possibility renders your statement as false. So that statement places the definition of "triangle" as something completely outside the system of logic, and somehow fixed, thereby creating the necessity of "thus cannot exist in any possible world".
Clearly this is a false necessity, because words can be defined as we please. So in classical logic, definitions enter into the system, being premises, and the necessity is created by acceptance of the definition. So your example really requires another premise, which would define "triangle" as three sided, and by that premise, a four-sided triangle is excluded.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I agree with this, but the problem is to determine which principles are applicable in which circumstances. This is where metaphysics and epistemology interact. Take your example, someone sees smoke, and concludes that there is fire where the smoke is. If the person used the premise "where there is smoke there is fire", this would be a deductive conclusion. Therefore by your definition the conclusion is logical. However, we can see falsity in the premise, and in the formulation of the premises is where we find the nuances of reasoning.
If we have found fire in every situation that we have found smoke, we still cannot derived the certainty required for "necessary", as explained by Hume. So the truth of inductive premises escapes the certainty for "necessary". Further, we have to look at what "every situation" means. If the person has only seen smoke twice, and each time there is fire, this clearly is insufficient to support the premise. Furthermore, we sometimes loosen up the rules to accept probability. Perhaps seeing fire associated with smoke 99% of the time allows one to accept the premise. Also, there are nuances within the description of "smoke" which need to be considered. A person might have noticed that black smoke is always associated with fire, and white smoke often has no fire, and so the person might be using a more nuanced premise. In short, there are many factors involved in the creation of a premise, and unless the premise is a simple definition, necessity is not provided for. And even with a definition, the defining terms are not themselves defined, because this would produce an infinite regress, so necessity is not absolute even in the case of definition.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Yes of course, this is the base of the problem, and why dualism forms the foundation for many metaphysicians. There is a fundamental difference between efficient causation which is studied by physics, and final causation which is studied in social studies, and by metaphysics. Since there is a gap between the two, meaning that we do not understand how one acts on the other, the designation of "every possible cause" is sort of meaningless or misleading. The PSR allows for both principal types of cause as "the reason". So if we determine "every possible cause" of the physical type, and are inclined toward concluding 'no reason', this still does not exclude the possibility of a cause of the non-physical type. Therefore the PSR gives us encouragement to keep on seeking the reason for an occurrence even after it has been proven that there is no physical cause for it.
Quoting Banno
Good, we agree on something. That gives us a starting point. Care to join me on a learning experience, or is it too late to teach an old dog like yourself, new tricks?
By experience, I mean a conscious event that contains information. By know, I mean being aware of through observation, inquiry, or information. Generally, the physical does not have the capacity to know. Even if we grant this capacity for the sake of argument, it cannot know the correct time that the causation is due to, since it does not experience time.
Quoting Banno
Most people have difficulty seeing how P3 follows from P2. C follows from P3. By "physical cannot be the cause of its own change" I mean that the change in physical assuming that it is due to cause and effect cannot occur.
By experience, I mean a conscious event that contains information, such as percepts, feelings, thoughts, etc.
How do you know?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
That does not follow from the previous statement.
I assume that all possible worlds are infinite in size. Of course, if a possible world is finite in size, then life may not be possible within the world.
A thing exists out of "design" (reason type 2 in the OP) if it is the result of a free choice. The alternative is that the existence of a thing is explained inherently by its own definition (reason type 3), e.g. a necessary being; or it exists out of causal necessity (reason type 1), from the progress of processes. A design is conventionally called "intelligent design", where I believe the term "intelligent" means that the thing designed is created deliberately for a purpose.
Quoting tim wood
This is what I attempted to do in the OP. If you think some of the propositions in the OP come from mere belief, you can point them out.
I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system. Much like how there are many branches of mathematics (calculus, statistics, etc.) that are compatible with each other and mathematics as a whole is one coherent system.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Indeed. Unless the premises are based on tautologies or pure mathematics, then they are based on induction/abduction. This makes the premises uncertain, but they are the most reasonable given the information we have.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Final cause, also called function, purpose, motive, or end, only applies to things that are designed by an agent with free will. In which case, the efficient cause is called a designer, agent, or thing with free will or free choice. E.g. I choose to go to work instead of staying in bed in the morning for the purpose of making money. In this example, "going to work" is the thing that exists or occurs, "making money" is the final cause, and "the chooser (me)" is the efficient cause. I made a video about this if interested.
Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they do not exist necessarily, and therefore do not exist in all possible worlds.
Quoting MoK
That's fine. The conclusion is not based on the previous statement alone but from the discussion as a whole.
These various systems are not necessarily compatible with each other, that's why they are useful in different situations, for different purposes. One works where the other one doesn't. For a simple example, imaginary numbers have a square root of a negative and that's incompatible with the classical understand of negative numbers.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Mathematics is not based in tautologies, it's based in axioms, which are a sort of definition which acts as a premise. The certainty here is based in memory and application, usefulness not truth, and that's why various systems, being useful for various purposes, have differing axioms. Some will argue that the axioms are not even based in usefulness, being purely creative expressions. But even so they get accepted and become conventional because they are useful.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
The point I was making is that there is a gap in understanding between the two. If we assume that you, as the person going to work, is the efficient cause of you creating the desired end, making money, the gap in understanding is the question of how your desire to make money causes you to get out of bed and go to work. In all cases of final cause, there is this gap of understanding, of how the final cause (a desire for something), causes the physical activity which is the efficient cause designed to produce the end.
So what?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I am afraid that does not follow.
As a counter argument to your line of argument, one could argue that there is no necessity of understanding the cause of something. Maybe humans just can't understand some things.
This argument also presupposes the existence of free will, which is itself disputed.
I still think that the only thing that's for sure is that something exists without cause in some mysterious fashion. It could be that impersonal laws of physics exist without cause. Or it could be that the laws themselves came from a being whose existence has no cause. Or reality could be circular (like somebody goes back in time to start the big bang). Or it could be some other option which we can not comprehend.
I don't see this. I think Banno can be a total dick, so I get the conclusiory notes here, but I cannot see this happening. Sorry mate.
We need to take care to seperate logically possible worlds form physically possible worlds. There are finite possible worlds, logically speaking, if there is no contradiction in supposing a finite world. There seems no reason to supose that a finite world could not sustain life, and no logical contradiction in
a finite world that contains life.
Quoting A Christian PhilosophyThat's a point of some debate. It will not do simply to assert that this is so, and the arguments thereabouts are a topic of much recent work.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Yep.
Quoting AmadeusD
Yep. Folk don't much like their errors being set out for them
You must pay close attention to notice Banno's equivocation, because equivocation is an interpretive error, rather than a direct error of usage. So the recognition of one's equivocation is dependent on your interpretation of one's interpretation. His latest reply to you is a clear indication that Banno is prone to misinterpretation.
To your list I would add the possibility that the universe has always existed and always will. But my personal choice is the last. I would phrase a bit differently tho: We have no idea what the f**k is going on - and may never will.
It is unnecessary to define terms that are already clear. We only need to define terms that are unclear or used in a specific sense; otherwise, we'd get infinite regress in demand for definitions. The term "explanation" means exactly what it means in the common language. It is almost synonymous with "cause" except an explanation can also be internal (reason type 3).
"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry": I think most people would agree that this explanation is clear and scientifically correct. So I am not quite sure what your objection is about.
Based on some (admittedly little) research, my understanding is that aside from classical logic, all other logical systems (e.g. intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, fuzzy logic) are not systems dealing with reality as such but dealing with computer programming. That's fine, but this so-called "change in axioms" is merely a change in the fundamental command lines in the program, and it does not remove the laws of classical logic underneath the programming itself.
As an example, let's take a program using paraconsistent logic where a command line sometimes excludes the law of noncontradiction, so that a database can accept contradicting entries without crashing. E.g., entering datapoint "Patient A has allergy B" and datapoint "Patient A does not have allergy B" will not crash the program. Fine; but if the datapoints are entered, it is false to state that the datapoints are not entered, and it still remains a true fact in reality that Patient A cannot both have allergy B and not have allergy B at the same time.
If that's okay, I'll drop the efficient cause/final cause cause topic to avoid going off on a tangent.
This says something about the type of thing that "allergy B" refers to. It is a property, and we have categorized the aspects of reality so that things known as properties obey the fundamental rules. The issue is that there are aspects of reality which do not necessarily obey those rules.
So Aristotle propose another category, known as "potential", to classify the aspects of reality which do not obey those rules. The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present.
You can see that these aspects of reality are not accurately called properties. They are better known as concepts or ideas. The future event decided by choice, exists as an idea in someone's mind. And "matter" is a concept which Aristotle used to substantiate the reality of bodies in their temporal extension.
For a modern example of why we must allow violation of the fundamental laws of logic, you could investigate Peirce's triadic system.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Sure, but final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door, as what substantiates the efficacy of ideas and concepts, confirming their reality. This will be required to demonstrate that potential is something real. Otherwise one might simply deny the reality of the things in this category, possibility, potential, ideas, matter, etc., calling them imaginary or fictional, and insist that all reality must obey the laws of logic.
You asked here how do I know that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds, and I answered.
I accept that humans can't understand everything. However, as per the OP (if there is no error), the PSR must be fulfilled and there are only 3 types of reason. By eliminating 2 types, we conclude that the laws of nature must be explained by type 2, i.e., explained by design. That said, the argument does not go so far as to claim that the designer is God.
Quoting Brendan Golledge
True, but that only applies to explaining man-made things and man, not to explaining the laws of nature.
Quoting Brendan Golledge
As per the PSR, the fundamental laws of physics must be explained; and they do not exist necessarily because they are not tautologies.
Quoting Brendan Golledge
Circularity in cause and effect violates the law of causality that an effect cannot occur before its cause.
Correct. I am talking about physical worlds.
Quoting Banno
Physical worlds could be finite or infinite.
Quoting Banno
Correct. The finite world could sustain life.
I said that given an infinite world, whatever the laws of nature, life is possible in this world, so no design is involved.
Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules.
I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
For sure - I believe in final causes. As per reason type 2 described in the OP, a thing that exists by design is designed with a purpose, i.e., it has a final cause.
It is not necessary to know the "how" in order to know the "why". For a simpler example: Ball A hits Ball B which then moves. We don't know exactly how the cause transitions into the effect because there is no inherent logical necessity between the two. Yet, clearly, Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.
Quoting tim wood
Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact that they cause the rock to exist. To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules.
If we allow the fundamental laws of logic to change and not be part of fundamental reality, wouldn't that make all mentions of possible worlds meaningless? Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Think on that for a bit. Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why?
This actually an open discussion in contemporary logic, one I tried to address in this thread: . Curiously, it seems to be those of a theistic bent who have most trouble with such thinking.
In this example, the law of excluded middle is violated. The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is neither true nor false. We do not say that it is both true and false, so non-contradiction is upheld. You express this as "it is possible", and this is an expression which violates the law of excluded middle. The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Well, it's beyond the scope of this thread, but if I remember correctly, firstness is the realm of real possibility, potential, where the law of excluded middle is not applicable, as demonstrated in your example of "possible" above. Secondness is the realm of actual occurrence where the law of identity and the other laws of logic are all applicable. Thirdness is the realm of generality, universals, which unites the first and second, but this is only done through violation of the law of non-contradiction.
There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.
In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.
So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.
Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on.
It would be nice to see a post on the tension between temporal possible world semantics and scientific determinism. Or maybe there was?
Fascinating stuff
David Foster Wallace gives a very original analysis of the sea-battle problem in his "Richard Taylor's 'Fatalism' and the semantics of physical modality." (Before he turned to fiction, Wallace was on track to be a professional philosopher.) Wallace uses Taylor's canonical essay Fatalism as his target to contest the apparent contradiction in the sea-battle problem. Taylor believes that the logical and semantical premises of the problem do indeed force an acceptance of determinism. But Wallace makes this distinction:
Wallace constructs an entire toy modality system, based on Kripke and Montagues work, to demonstrate how this works. He also offers an ordinary-language way of capturing a critical modal difference in how we think about tensed operations:
In the rain example, the tense-markers (and concomitant physical conditions) of last night vs. right here now determine how we evaluate the modal possibilities. And the sea-battle's possibility will change, depending on whether we're looking forward or looking back. Strictly logical modalities don't work this way; logical form doesn't occur in physical space/time at all.
That's an issue of accessibility, it seems to me. So the day before the battle might occur, the possible world in which it takes place and the possible world in which it does not take place are accessible. If it occurs, then the day after, only the possible world in which it did occur will be accessible.
Quoting J
Not following that. Seems I just showed this to be mistaken, by showing how logical modalities can be used to describer physical states.
Yes, a perfectly good way of putting it.
Quoting Banno
I'll try to put it more precisely. A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. That form is unaffected by tense. A physical impossibility, on the other hand, may be so by virtue of a host of stipulations about the physical world, including temporal ones. I found a helpful paraphrase in the Wallace essay:
The sea-battle problem, if it is a problem, depends on a variety of stipulations, including tense, about the world in which it occurs. I didn't mean anything more metaphysically dodgy than that.
That form is unaffected by tense is impossible because by virtue of form? If so, does that really say anything at all?
See the example I gave @Banno from Wallace.
We should also keep clear the distinction between volition and physics. Giving an order involves volition, on the part of the order-giver and the order-follower; it is possible not to follow an order, and that sort of possibility is not a physical possibility.
So we have at least three sorts of implication - logical, volitive and physical.
And I dare claim only the first involves what might be called determinism.
I agree. And "might be called" is a good way of saying it, because logical or semantical determinism is peculiarly arid and sui generis, and doesn't really scare us in the way that the other kinds do -- or at least it never has for me. One more quote from Wallace:
"Taylor was offering a very curious sort of argument: a semantic argument for a metaphysical conclusion. . . . If Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics."
PS -- You could also divide physical determinism into two classes: Things that are necessary/ impossible for everyone under all circumstances, and things that are so only for me. Class one: It's impossible for humans to flap their arms and fly -- no one can. Class two: I can't be in Australia tonight -- but you can. Are these things "determined"? I don't think so, but the question is probably an open one, depending on usage.
Right on! I am following and have very similar thoughts/notes on this take myself:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting A Christian Philosophy I agree that no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR and PSR is able to defend intelligent design this way by avoiding (infinite regress) those whom question the cause of the creator as needing to be or as being created.
If a creator was born and their ideas came at a later time [of life on earth,humanity,and the balance of it in mother nature] it was not about who, what, why, when, how they were created but how the ideas came to be...To question the creator at all, we are assuming they exist to begin with right? So I see why the claim you make regarding Inherent existence is relevant here. Otherwise, bringing up the infinite regress aspect of design vs designer arguments as an acceptable position is assuming the existence exists in the first place..or is questioning how the existence was created apart of it's inherent nature?
Is this questioning, the same or similar to what was previously mentioned in the thread as "the will to know" by Metaphysician Undercover in response to Banno's comment expressing their displeasure in the attempts others made to support the principle, ID, or god thus far....? Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What is to be created at the moment of conception is to be after birth and ought to be at death. After death though is different, as in order to be THAT it ought to be confirmed as such. Who is in place to judge? [ This place is important, to judge from--I CAN EXPLAIN LATER ITS NOT NECESSARY NOW] To be dead, is impossible but not after verification of what it was to be alive as that. We can verify the life and what is gathered from credible sources. From this, what is accepted by the seeker, is now the knowledge that can be used for further guidance into the mystery or unknown as our intelligence is updated as one maneuvers through life one day at a time...
Look in the mirror....watch and learn. As the being is actively creating a cause, again. Then, in a moment of realization that is fleeting and fleeing towards another moment, to become what it always was to be....full of ideas, thought-like, intelligent...of an unnecessary necessity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A breakdown of the quote above from my understanding of it (my response in brackets) and for further clarity:
MU-of how the final cause (a desire for something), causes the physical activity which is the efficient cause designed to produce the end
[designed to produce the end, created and caused from desires, intentions, expectations, of the aware being, of the consciousness co-creating the human experience in/with/from/of time and another.]
MU-of how your desire to make money, causes you to get out of bed and go to work
[ I think the final cause, if linked to desire can be known by acknowledging intentions and allowing verification process of them to unfold naturally...a desire for something (to know ones purpose) is driving (causing) the activity in the physical to occur, which also causes other interactions unknown at the moment a decision was made and acted upon] (randomness exists here perhaps...randomness can exist with or without assuming free will is true as it is linked to time, place,and/or state in decision making moments-- random, timing constraints, chance, accidents, coincidence, patterns, probability?)
I wonder now, if the moment of/in/with/from time measured is (in itself) creating a constraint linking the mental decision and physical activity? Relevant, how??? (time between moment (thought) to moment (activity) from the mind to reality. What does it look like? IS this the vision? Memory? Impressions. Forgetting on purpose?
HOW a final cause, causes the act -which is the cause designed , prior to the act, [in thought, mind, before cause is unfolding in reality*] before it was caused accordingly [to what?**] to our desires being tickled, it was a mere thought....thoughts create action from what?Baseless ideas or the grounding of them in reality? The chance [s]for them[/s] to become grounded from the caused design that was created, caused prior to the act.
We create from the act that was caused prior to it, from a desire or final cause that offers nature an active experience in/of motion towards an end designed, NOT prior to the "act of thinking"*** - still a physical activity, id argue - as a result, in the thought of acting on these reactions, feelings, emotions, reality plays out with the chance to ground self (as a functioning design) and give (create) purpose (drive, causing desires, goals, ends) in the way you move thru day to day tasks/survival needs.
*SEE QUANTUM ZENO EFFECT and compare notes linking concepts of "feeling/being stuck" or "in your head" to an act or event from thinking thoughts. I could use MU's backdoor reference here perhaps???
**INTENTIONS that KNOW the nature of
***if this act is of focus, attention driving force or the brain being a brain...both physical activities. If its necessarily true of the latter, the effort required and awareness is measured - outcomes that form the future possibilities from intel gathered - using knowledge to update or effect how we act from that point onward...
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Interesting.....I am thinking now more about this**** re-entry mentioned regarding "final cause"
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover I am with Metaphysician Undercover when they say, "future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present." and my contribution/s at large do reflect that.
Beyond the scope of this thread or not, It's clear to me as I re-read this draft of words once thought, now expressed and typed out because it is not just here where I have felt and seen these words. WE'VE been here and there before. Do know, I am always pleased to revisit and move onward to the next thread...for this moment alone is worth another lap.
It seems like I am consistently coming in through the back door just to make an Irish exit out the front.
Reveal ONLY to SEE one of my personal notes from the past on similar topics relevant to points made in this thread by multiple people, as I am only sharing them for credibility purposes. The note is for me to reflect upon, to see my thoughts that were real before, compared to how they exist in me today 4/29/25 838pm. and again at 935pm, as I re-read this another time before I post.
Contents were always subject to change as I do with/in/as time does. BUT what is more interesting [to me] is to see what does not....
[hide="Reveal"]1/23/24 1052am cvt from dvd stickynote see entry from 1 year 1 month and 3 days ago
" 2/26/23-God could have had the baseless thought that WAS TURNED INTO an INTELLIGENT DESIGN.[with will?].....together WE as HUMANS are "perfecting" this design through trial and error, as we are ever changing and moving with time.... "
-together WE as HUMANS are "perfecting" this design through trial and error, as we are ever changing and moving with time.... "
.together WE as HUMANS are "perfecting" this design through *1trial and error, as we are ever changing and moving with time.... "
HUMANS are "perfecting" this design through EVOLUTION, as HUMANS are ever changing and moving with AND IN time.... "
WITH T= NOT CLOSED OFF
IN T=CLOSED OFF
evolution>WITH T= NOT CLOSED OFF
humans>IN T=CLOSED OFF
evolution>WITH T= NOT CLOSED OFF ---moving towards, moving from/to, placement/ leads path with self tailing behind, growing expansion no loops, tangles
humans>IN T=CLOSED OFF---moving along, pace on path, place on path/laps self on path loses front/back, swallowedself, looped, no tangles...q1;when is it possible to become unaware of the time?
-from another note [seedates]:
"SAY IFFFFF.......time is closed off... if you are inside it, when is it possible to become unaware of the time...? how can time be made up? speed, quality, force, both, some, all, balanced one out of the 3? Sure. but how much or little does it Depends on where it was lost or how it was lost or when it was lost? Can it be stolen? What does a born date and a death date of one person tell another person? Does that knowledge occur at a certain time or the seeking of that knowledge emerge at a certain time or in a certain time frame or within a frame of time? Obviously i can see the birth and death date of Michel de montaigne and it can become a generalization of character based on the specific time line of his existence NOT HIS relevance, HOW can that be measured TODAY? [relevance] THOUSANDS OF YEARS LATER? HOW IS IT RELATABLE AND DOES THAT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT THE SPEED OF UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE THAT WE THINK WE ARE SPECIAL FOR BEING AWARE OF BUT WIHTOUT ACTUAL KNOWING OF THE SUBJECT MATTER BUT JUST KNOWING YOU "CAN" KNOW THE SUBJECT MATTER IN GOOD TIME, BC OF GOOGLE AND SMART PHONES AND ACCESS TO INFO BOOKS AND WHATEVER WE DECIDE TO GET INTO... SEE STICKYNOTE ON "he was ahead of his time" "it" being time.....what if you are living in the wrong time but at the right place , the only place , and the knowledge only spreads as far as time allows, the force with or without TIMING may be more important than the speed in relation to TIMING....speed and timing arent compatible but they are blendable, like a black hole and a black hole merging, loss of information and gaining surface area larger than the sum of the 2....its like the perfect team, unknowing of the capabilities to win every game as the underdogs is almost too good to be true by chance but by merging COMPATIBLE abilities internaly to making a new capability or version ( a new separate energy behind feelings in actions) externally into its own force but as separate beings playing the right position, taking on different roles doing things the wrong way or right way IN TIME can make the time can take the time can steal the time but only if they do it TOGETHER AT THE SAME TIME IN TIME......
,
EG "losing track of time" becomes reality, eg missing a flight or talking all night on the phone with a lover or crush and not realizing how much time passed and that you didnt even sleep before you notice its time to go to work and its already morning...felt like 20 mins. What caused the distraction ? What caused the realization or snap back to reality? Where did you go? Can we multitask together and separately at the same time moving through time to merge or collide with an attractive mate......magnets[/hide]
You say here:
Quoting Banno
But you say here: Quoting Banno
I personally side with the second claim.
That ought confuse you even more...
In a world in which the LNC is contravened, anything goes.
But there is a shwack load of situations with real possibilities. This would make the application of the law of excluded middle to be so infrequent that it would be no law at all. Which sounds absurd.
Here is my alternative solution: There is ambiguity in the terms "there will be".
The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" either means "there will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow". Both statements are either true or false.
Thanks for the summary of Peirce's triadic system! I'll dig further someday.
I'm pretty sure most people agree that causes are real. And this statement "causes are real" can be understood exactly as what is meant when used in the common language. No need to complicate things without necessity.
And you know this I presume a priori.
I'm interested to know what's caught your attention here. Sometimes the most obvious construals can be wrong, so by all means tell me what you're thinking.
Just exploring this idea of tense and affecting logical form.
I will stop my inquiry into this since this may take the conversation in a direction the post may not have intended.
The concept of "possible worlds" itself violates the fundamental laws of logic. To predicate of "a world" that this world is possible violates the fundamental laws of logic. "Possible" implies that the world neither is nor is not and that is a violation.
Quoting Banno
That's the best conclusion. But, if in fact determinism is false, then either the law of non-contradiction, or the law of excluded middle, both, or even identity, do not apply toward things of the future. This produces an important ontological question of what does the future consist of.
Quoting Kizzy
An infinite regress signifies a logical impasse, a point where logic fails us. Assuming a final cause, as first cause, breaks the infinite regress of efficient cause, thereby pointing the mind in a different direction, allowing the logic to go to work from a different perspective, and possibly avoiding that failure.
So when I mention "the will to know" it involves the will to get beyond the logical impasse presented by things like infinite regress, (which appear to indicate that the object is impossible to know), and derive a new approach toward knowing it.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
When you think about it, the law of excluded middle has very limited applicability. It's incompatible with probabilities. That's why modal forms of logic were invented.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Ambiguity just brings the violation of to a different level. Which of the two statements is true, and which is false? If we say "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, then the being or not being of that event, the referred sea battle, violates the law. This is exactly the tactic of Banno, by making "sea battle" a logical subject instead of an objective occurrence being referred to, it's existence becomes irrelevant, and the world of the sea battle is simply a possible world. Then whatever is said about it must follow the rules of that form of logic, rather than the rules we are discussing.
That's fine, within that logical structure which respects the fact that the subject, the sea battle tomorrow, is not a real object, but an idea created by a mind. The three laws, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, make statements concerning what we can say about real objects. They do not apply to imaginary (or possible) objects, because we can say anything we want about these. The imagination is inherently unlimited. And since these imaginary subjects are beyond the applicability of those laws, we can just make up other laws, axioms, definitions, etc., which these imaginary things must obey.
Good grief.
Ok. There's not much point in reading your post any further.
Your replies are very predictable. When you do not understand the concept, walk away instead of learning.
LOL.
"Although possible world has been part of the philosophical lexicon at least since Leibniz, the notion became firmly entrenched in contemporary philosophy with the development of possible world semantics for the languages of propositional and first-order modal logic. "
The basic laws of logic apply to the the way the world is. They are rules concerning what we can say about things. Adding to this, "or could have been". is a violation.
I don't think earlier Wittgenstein would exactly go along with this line of thought. Consider these sections from Tractatus,
3.02. The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible.
3.03 We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically.
3.032 It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an unlogical world how it would look.
And
2.014. Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.
2.0141 The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object.
And
2.201 The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.
2.202. The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.
Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'.
Yeah, there it is. A relatively new type of logic which is not based in the fundamental three laws, and openly averts these laws. It's really not a big deal, but to deny that modal logic intentionally avoids those laws, because of a perceived need to violate those laws, is to demonstrate a basic misunderstanding of logic.
Quoting AmadeusD
I am not saying it's illogical. No principles dictate that all forms of logic must obey those three basic laws, to be classed as "logic". Those three laws are ancient, and concern what we can say about a thing, starting with the law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. If, for some purposes, we find that we need a logic which applies to possibilities (possible worlds), then we would need a different set of laws, because possibilities are categorically different from actual things. However, the fact that one set of logical laws is not compatible with another, because the two apply to completely different aspects of reality, does not imply that one or the other is illogical. It simply demonstrates that there is a significant difference between the different aspects of reality.
If I understand correctly, the fundamental laws of logic exist in all possible worlds, and they are contravened only in impossible worlds. Is that right?
My point is that most people do not question that causes exist and do not ask what causes are because the word is already clear. I don't see a reason to defend a belief that is uncontroversially accepted. If you have a solid reason to defend the claim that causes are not in fact real, I'm ready to hear it. But if not, then I don't see a point of investigating this issue further.
Not quite. Running the statement through the law of excluded middle gives: "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will not possibly be a sea battle tomorrow (i.e. a sea battle tomorrow is impossible)". If, in reality, a sea battle is possible, then the first statement is true and the second one is false.
An odd wording, but not wrong. It gets complex, of course.
As shown in the links above, the logic of possibility and necessity - modal logic - has a strong standing in modern logic. Those who restrict themselves to Aristotle still have difficulties.
The issue, is that you are making "possibly be" into a predicate. By doing this you violate the law of excluded middle, because the meaning of "possible" (what may or may not) is a violation.
The law of excluded middle is a law concerning predication. Now, we introduce a very special predicate named "possible", which we accept as being excluded from the applicability of this law. My argument is that we must respect the fact that this is an exclusion, and not attempt to represent "possible worlds", or "modal" logic as consistent with the fundamental three laws.
Quoting Banno
No one here is suggesting that anyone ought to restrict themselves to Aristotelian logic. What I am recommending is that we acknowledge the inconsistency between modal logic and the fundamental three laws, and not attempt to argue that there is consistency between them. Arguing for consistency signifies misunderstanding.
In ancient Greece the three laws were applied religiously, modal logic did not exist. Aristotle demonstrated how sophists (like Zeno who proved that motion cannot be real), could prove absurdities when those fundamental laws were strictly adhered to. He proceeded to expose the root of the problem as being the reality of potential, possibility, as the basis of change and becoming, and showed that we need to allow violation of either non-contradiction or excluded middle to understand this reality.
Aristotle's best examples were future possible events, which needed to be decided upon by human choice, like the sea battle. He determined that the way we understand human choice implies that the law of excluded middle must be violated to enable that understanding. However, he insisted that the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to avoid absolute unintelligibility. This violation of excluded middle, proposed by Aristotle, is the foundation of modern modal logic which is the manifestation of that violation.
Hegel's logical dialectics, on the other hand, allows that being and not being are subsumed within becoming. This is a violation of non-contradiction, which provides the foundation for dialectical materialism. Notice, that Aristotle's violation of excluded middles is based in the potential associated with human choice, while Hegel's violation of non-contradiction is based in the potential of matter.
Modal logic has been demonstrated to be consistent. You are simply mistaken.
You seem to have a limited capacity for understanding.
What I said was:
I then proceeded to explain the reason why the two are inconsistent.
If that produces for you, the conclusion that I am restricting myself to one or the other, then you have a significant problem in your ability to interpret a simple piece of writing.
Well, to be sure, I do not understand how you can maintain such views. There are formal proofs of the consistency of S5, for example. Google it. So again, I'll leave you to it.
Cheers.
I don't doubt the consistency of S5. Did I say that one system of logic, or another is not consistent? No, I pointed out two systems of logic which are not consistent with each other.
It's good to see that we agree, once in a while.
We are not talking about the situation after a future reduction though, we are talking about the current situation now. At the present time, neither "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" nor "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" is true. "It is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, but obviously this violates the law of excluded middle. However, under the principles of determinism, one or the other is considered to be true, even at the current time. But this leaves "it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" as false. (Note to Banno: this use of "possible" is not consistent with modal logic, but there is a number of different ways "possible" is commonly used). Also, determinism leaves deliberation as superfluous, so only a fool would accept that perspective.
The problem though is that "Rhetoric" is not necessarily logic, it is language intended to persuade. If we class the language which deals with what is possible, and this includes what is named "modal logic", as simple rhetoric, @Banno will not be happy. However, "rhetoric" is the larger category, and logic can be used as rhetoric. But this leaves your statement as meaningless.
You are the one who said "the right logic for this is Rhetoric", implying that rhetoric is a form of logic. It's clearly not.
And, as I said, logic can be used as rhetoric, because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be?
As you can see, I don't like.
Rhetoric employs a number of different means, some logic, some not, depending on the circumstances. We cannot class appealing to another's emotions "logic".
I'd still argue that adding the mode "possibly" does not violate the law of excluded middle (LEM). LEM says "either P or not P, and no third option". Granted, we can have "possibly P" or "possibly not P". But this is different than "P" or "not P" because "P" and "not P" are saying different things, where as "possibly P" and "possibly not P" are saying the same thing in different ways. E.g., the statements "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" and "there will possibly not be a sea battle tomorrow" have the same meaning.
I don't get your point. Of course "P" and "not P" say different things, they are opposed in meaning. And, LEM says one or the other must be true.
Yes, "possibly P" has the same meaning as "possibly not P". And, this meaning is that neither P nor not P is true, which is a violation of the LEM.
Consider, what is known by us as "possibility" could be understood in another way. It appears as an aspect of reality which violates those three fundamental laws. It could be understood as a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Then when someone says "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" we would understand it as both "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", and "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" are true. But this is not the way that we are taught to understand it. We are taught to understand it as neither one is true. If we understand them both as true the result is unintelligibility. If we understand neither as true, the result is a new form of logic, modal logic, which deals with those aspects of reality which violate the LEM. This indicates that when something appears like it might be unintelligible, we might just need to look at it in another way.
Quoting A Christian PhilosophyBoth statements,regardless of the outcome, tell us what? The statement ought to explain itself, if the outcome t or f [which for it requires the question to be asked-the measurement is occurring] means nothing...What we can get out of the t or f result except more intel? More input, updating our knowledge using what we know now from experience or memory in order to organize thoughts in our mind*. Our beliefs, intuition, and faith in statements alone mean nothing but in statements to be true....we ought to give everything, even our word. What is a statement without connection to who it matters to and how so? It's connection to truth?
This extra level of info comes from the statement/s which as is should be informative enough alone in them, in how such statements provides the sufficient reason to believe but with t or f outcome we may use that intel to confirm or link a source to the time and state / condition / credibility of it while making statements and how they figure such statement is relevant to anything besides their knowings.
We know the tense of statement and its truth value, but what of that needed/ought to be questioned? Judgement call, do you trust your judgement? Or is it whom is making the statements, sentences, themselves ought to be what is questioned, despite what it is the statements are made about. Statements that are said aimlessly, for open ended answers vs said to be determined one or the other, a definite answer out of options? how many possibilities exist for this multiple choice and were they specifically chosen on purpose? We can boil it down to two, t or f? "IF" instead of "either, or" changes everything. If needing to prove a statement by disproving another, including "if" or "when" with the true or false outcome, if true...this (when true, this), if false...that (when false, that), therefore means, this and that are neither t or f, but t and f is because this and that. The answer is reached for, we make statements as a tool in uncertainty to predict future potentials and in that use, shows that they doubt the very judgement they have made,ought to be making and are lacking faith in that very judgement. [to a certain degree/s.]
Patterns to be noticed in this from t or f result are bound to the type of character or of the source/person making statements. Now, do they know they are being measured aka questioned? Indirectly measuring & the secret awareness of this is of personal interest, entertaining past ideas now...thankful for the reminder.
*I began thinking about this here, continuing an existing thought from before-- how brain organizes thoughts vs how we as people are at organizing or being organized in general as opposed to being scatter brained, clutter prone, messy, etc. Some are better than others at organization, at multiple levels. Work, home, balancing the two in your personal space. Room, car, desk-- is it clean or messy? Do you task yourself with organizing to avoid the real work? Is it a waste of time organizing the space of someone who is scattered brained as it wont last a week being organized? Is this a form of procrastination? I am curious at how I may be able to link procrastinating to organization to learning styles to the brain
As I understand:
"?P" = P might be true.
"?¬P" = P might be false.
Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing.
We were talking about "possibly P", and "possibly not P" as having the same meaning. Each means that neither "P" nor "not P" is true.
Quoting AmadeusD
How can two phrases tell us the same thing without meaning the same thing?
The same way "its not raining" and "its not not raining" do.
Things tell us things in orthogonal ways all the time. A certain smirk might tell me the same thing as a sentence. A statement about the shape of a knife might tell me the same thing as the shape of the smiths anvil etc... Transitivity, I guess, bluntly.
P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM.
I really don't see the difference. By the fundamental laws, there are only two possibilities, true or false. Therefore "P might be false" means the very same thing as "P might be true". They both imply that there is a correct answer, (as there must be by the laws) but we do not know which is the case. So in the context of those laws they both mean the very same thing.
However, if we allow that there actually is no correct answer (as in the case of the sea battle), then we allow violation of those laws. It is only after we allow this violation that we can say that the two mean different things. But then we've put them into a different context, where the fundamental laws are not relevant, because we've allowed violation to put them into that context.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Ok, I see what you're saying, but I don't see the relevance. Each, "possibly P", and also "possibly not P", both inherently contradict LEM. Therefore to allow that they say something meaningful we must remove them from the context of the fundamental laws, as explained in my reply to Amadeus above. Since those laws must be violated to make the statements meaningful, placing them back into the context of those laws is pointless. We've already declared that the laws are inapplicable, in order to make sense of those propositions. So it's a demonstration of arbitrary application of the laws.
Ah, I don't think that's right. The former is about the possible failure and the latter is about the possible success of the proposition (orthogonality!)
I understand what you're saying though, as i noted - they tell us the same thing (in practice).
I don't think you quite get what I\m saying. In the context of applying the fundamental laws, the phrases tell us the same thing. That's theory, not practice. Theoretically they say the same thing, if the fundamental laws provide the theoretical context. In practice they tell us something different, depending on the context of the practice. In one context it might be something about success and failure of action, as in your example. In another context it could mean something different, like statements about what a person believes.
I have explicitly pointed out why this is not the case. The speak about two different things, so could not, in theory, tell us hte same thing. In practice they do. If you don't agree, fine. I cannot understand how. We need not labour htis further. I understood what you were saying, responded in kind. I don't see furthering the discussion happening..
They don't speak about different things, they both speak about the very same thing, P. One says P might be false, the other says P might be true. Within the context of the fundamental laws of logic, they both say the same thing about P.
Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone.
As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words.
We are taking about P and not P therefore the LNC and LEM apply. The qualification of "possibly" creates an exception, a violation. Why do you see the need to persistently argue against this? I don't understand, it's a very simple matter. There is an aspect of reality, which we call "possibility", which those laws do not apply to. So we've developed a different type of logic, modal logic, to deal with this aspect.
And, like I explained to Banno, it's not the case that any specific system of logic is inconsistent, but it is the case that they are inconsistent with each other. This ought not be surprising because there are aspects of reality which are incommensurable with each other. That is why there is a need for dualism in ontology. The problem is that many people are inclined to reject dualism and attempt to reduce everything to a form of monism, and this is impossible because the two aspects are incompatible.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I can't see the relevance. To make the example comparable you'd have to say "half full" and "not half full". What you present, "half not full", is meaningless. Either the glass is full or not full, and half full qualifies as not full. "Half not full" is nonsensical, meaningless, as if there could be half of nothing.
I really do not understand this drive to make all aspects of reality fit into one category, so much so that you would make up nonsensical phrases in an attempt to justify this motivation.
Right. My last comment could have been clearer. What I meant was "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half empty", where empty is contradictory with full.
Anyway, I don't want to linger on this topic for too long, so I'll leave it here. Thanks for the chat!
Your new example, "empty" and "full", only shows that these two do not properly qualify as contradictory terms, in the context of those fundamental laws we've been discussing. If those two qualified as contradictory, in that sense, then the glass would have to be either full or empty, excluding any middle terms like "half".
This reality is readily understood by recognizing that there is a multitude of states of "not-empty" which also qualify as "not-full", these are the degrees of the intermediate. Because of this, the contrary of "empty", "not-empty", cannot be truthfully said to be "full". Nor can the contrary of "full", "not-full", be said to be empty. Empty and full are distinct concepts which cannot be defined as opposite to each other.
We find this in every case of ideals which act as the extreme limits to a scale, hot and cold, big and small, good and bad, etc.. Each of these is not actually the contrary of the other, in the sense expressed by the law of non-contradiction. They all allow a range of intermediates and the degree may be measured by some sort of scale, warm, medium sized, indifferent acts, etc.. These ideal extremes are the defining boundaries of categories, and this is completely different from "contradictory" as employed by those laws.
What this demonstrates is that our common intuition, or inclination, to judge two terms as opposite, or "contradictory", is not consistent with "contradictory" as stated in those fundamental laws. And, in the activities of the real world, there is a whole slew of intermediates which violate the law of excluded middle, when we assign the contraries to real substance. This is what Aristotle demonstrated as the fact that the physical world of "becoming" is incompatible with the logical opposites of "being and not-being".
To be honest, I still don't fully agree with your view on the fundamental laws of logic. But I enjoyed the chat. Cheers!
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_(SQL)
In particular you might want to check out the section Law of the excluded fourth (in WHERE clauses)
The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent.
I believe this depends on how modal logic is interpreted and applied. So we can say that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle. If we assume "it is possible that X" implies that the truth or falsity of X is simply unknown, and there is necessarily a truth or falsity to X, then the law of excluded middle may be upheld, and this use of modal logic would be consistent. This is an epistemic possibility, there is an actual truth which is unknown. It requires that of all possibilities one is necessarily the actual, and true.
But if we allow for the real ontological possibility of future events, such as the sea battle example, then as Aristotle explained, the law of excluded middle must be violated in this case. A proposition about a future event will be neither true nor false because there is real possibility concerning this. To think that there is an actual truth or falsity would necessitate determinism and negate the possibility of any actual choices. To maintain the possibility of choice, excluded middle must be violated.
The problem with modal logic is that it provides no principles to distinguish one type of possibility from the other, and the common possible worlds interpretation does not necessitate that one possible world must be what is actually the case. And if we extend modal logic to deal with the probability of a future event, then the law of excluded middle is clearly violated in this application.
So the possible worlds interpretation, in conjunction with the common belief in the human being's capacity to choose, indicates that most interpretations of modal logic assume a violation of excluded middle. This is regardless of the fact that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle, many of its common applications do.
You appear to lack an understanding of the different senses of "possible".
Are you forgetting the law of identity? A thing is the same as itself. The idea that a thing has "multiple possible futures" is a violation of that law. You are allowing that a thing has a multitude of possible identities, in relation to the future. This is why I say that there is a choice, either violate noncontradiction, or violate excluded middle, when dealing with the future. We can say that a thing has contradictory futures, or we can say "possible futures" and interpret this as a violation of excluded middle. Aristotle insisted we maintain noncontradiction, and violate excluded middle. Therefore the concept of "possible" was developed from study of Aristotle. Some modern philosophies propose a violation of noncontradiction.
Quoting Banno
This appears to be irrelevant. The question is whether the fundamental three laws can be maintained when dealing with future possibility, and the answer is no. Pretending that this is possible is self-deception.
Yes, just so. Again, Aristotelian logic takes on metaphysical presumptions not found in PWS - essentialism, that misunderstanding of "a thing is the same as itself", for example. Such ideas are instead dealt with in the discussion of transworld identity and counterpart theory. PWS gives clear truth conditions, is logically consistent and is extensible, unlike Aristotle's simple syllogisms.
As I explained, it avoids fatalism by violating the law of identity. The "multiple possible futures" proposed by Banno are a blatant violation.
That's just a misunderstanding of what it is to be an individual. Rigid designation and counterpart theory both deal with this. PWS at least shows the issue, whereas Aristotelian modality is incapable of even framing it.
In rigid designation (Kripke), names refer to the same individual in every world where that individual exists. Identity is preserved; variation in properties does not threaten self-identity, so long as essential properties remain fixed. In counterpart theory (Lewis), identity is world-bound; talk of Socrates in another world means someone like Socrates. The law of identity is untouched, because Socrates is never numerically identical to his counterpart.
Well, if being an individual defies the law of identity, then so be it. We still have the same conclusion, the fundamental laws are violated by this conception of "individual".
Quoting Banno
OK, so identity is preserved, even though the same thing, according to that identity, may have contrary properties in different worlds at the same time. If it's the same thing, i.e. the same identity, then noncontradiction is violated. The same thing has contrary properties at the same time.
So you've just moved from the Aristotelian definition of "possible" where excluded middle is violated because "possible" means neither has nor has not the property, to a definition of "possible" where noncontradiction is violated because "possible" means that the same thing (by the law of identity) has contrary properties at the same time, according to the various possible worlds.
Then it's not identity, and the fundamental laws would not even apply to "similar things". Which is it, identity or not?
You keep repeating this absurdity. PWS logic is consistent with a=a. End of story. The rest is in your imaginings .
Further discourse is only encouraging your confabulations. Cheers.
Basically, if Aristotelian logic is incompatible with PWS then so much the worse for Aristotle.
But that's not what happens in the real world, as opposed to the simple world of PF. Rather that the absurd assertion that PWS is inconsistent, Aristotelians reinterpret Aristotle's ideas so as to maximise compatibility with PWS. But that would requirer understanding modern modal logic, so it's not happening on PF.
Could you say what you have in mind by something being in a different world "at the same time"? The same time as what? It's a different world, isn't it?
Thank you for confirming what I already knew. When someone produces a strong argument against what you already believe, you cease communications.
Quoting J
No, I'm not familiar with that. I may take a look when I get a chance but I'm really not interested in fatalism.
Quoting J
This was in relation to Banno's explanation: "Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS) avoids fatalism by allowing multiple possible futures, each with fixed truths...". The different possible futures, each with its fixed truth, would all refer to the same future time. So the same item would have contradictory properties, at the same time, because that same item would have existence in a multitude of different worlds, with different properties, at the same time.
When I informed Banno that this is a violation of the law of identity, because the same item would have a multitude of distinct identities, all at the same time, Banno suggested that maybe the item in different possible worlds is not the same item, but similar items. But this doesn't jive with different possible futures of one item. How could one item divide itself into a multitude of future similar items, each with its own truth, at the moment of the present? That's nonsensical.
And again showing that you have not understood possible world semantics.
Meh.
Well, you refused to explain yourself.
Is it the case that the same object maintains its identity as itself throughout the multitude of possible worlds (Kripke), or is it the case that the multitude of possible worlds each have similar objects (Lewis)?
The first case (Kripke) violates the law of noncontradiction. The second case (Lewis) violates the law of identity, the same object becomes a number of similar objects at the moment of the present, when looking toward future possibilities.
You can dismiss those fundamental three laws as "a group of Aristotelian syllogisms that assume individuality requires an essence", but that does not change the fact that there is inconsistency between that system of logic, and the common interpretations of modal logic.
By not admitting that each is a useful system of logic, and yet there is inconsistency between the two, it is you who is restricting yourself to one of the two.
This was the original idea though, natural laws were "active." Hence the change in philosophy of nature/natural science from a language of "desires," "inclinations," etc. to one of "laws" and "obedience," (which as you might suppose had strong theological undertones and motivations). Part of what made Hume's initial attack on causality and induction more effective was that the dominant view at the time was one of a sort of "active laws" that were the source of regularity in nature. Hence, we see Hegel writing to contest this issue a few decades later, pointing out the preposterousness of the idea of some "natural law" shooing the planets into their orbits like rambunctious school children who would otherwise go shooting off any which way.
Part of this was the occult nature of the early mechanistic picture. Gravity was itself "spooky action at a distance," as was electromagnetism later. Life and conciousness also posed difficulties. The corpuscular metaphysics of the day needed [I]something [/I] to account for this non-locality.
"Things act the way they do because of that they are," is a later reintroduction of material causation, while information theory helped bring back a sort of formal causality. This has helped causation make a robust comeback from the death Hume (and later Russell and others) wanted to pronounce over it.
A lot has been written on the old sea battle. I think it might be more helpful to look at how Aristotle defines chance in the Physics. There, chance arises out of a confluence of the actions of discrete, relatively self-determining natures as they attempt to attain their natural ends. Contingency exists because of the locus of self-determination in things as they exist at some point. We don't have fatalism here, but neither do we have more expansive notions of libertarian free will. Beings' actions are what determine future moves from potency to actuality and modality is primarily handled in terms of potentiality.
Aristotle also has falsity related to truth as contrary opposition as opposed to contradictory opposition (i.e. as affirmation and negation) and this opens up reformulations of LEM that potentially resolve some of the issues here.
That isn't what it means to have a potential though. Consider Aristotle's theory of the acquisition of knowledge in De Anima. A human infant potentially knows French. The reception of form through the senses allows this potency to move to actuality (first actuality). A rock, by contrast, cannot learn French. It lacks that potential. This does not require both having and not having the same property without qualification (which would be a contradiction, not an excluded middle at any rate).
A person who doesn't know French has the power of learning French, they potentially have knowledge of French. The person who speaks French but is not currently speaking French has the property of being able to speak French at will (first actuality), whereas the person who is actively speaking French is actualizing that power (second actuality). These distinctions exist, in part, to avoid the excluded middle and to solve the Meno Paradox without Plato's implausible recollection theory.
Nor does the notion of a possible world necessarily violate the law of identity. If identity were defined by accidents then you would be a different person when you were to the west of your house as opposed to the east. Indeed, if relation defined identity you could stay the same and still become a different person if something else changed relative to you.
Arguably, the most expansive conceptualizations of possibility can start to erode identity, but this is because they end up collapsing any distinction between substance and accidents. So for instance, if we say "a frog can potentially turn into a rabbit,' we might ask "does a frog have the potential to become a rabbit?" It would seem not, in which case this "possibility " would really just be an act of sorcery, replacing one thing (a frog) with a different thing (a rabbit). But some thinkers (e.g. Ockham) were uncomfortable with even this sort of distinction, because it seemed like a limit on divine sovereignty (i.e., "things are whatever God tells them to be"). I'll allow that a sort of maximalist conception of possibility can run into trouble here, but a notion of possible worlds need not have this problem.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The bolded sentence is what I'm asking into. Do you conceive of possible worlds as sharing an actual, existential timeline? Such that event A in world W literally happens at the same time as event B in world Y? I remain troubled about what "sameness" would be here. The two events, being distinct, can't share the same space, so why would we imagine they could share the same time?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not as Kripke understands "same object" -- and I would argue that this is the common-sense understanding as well. You've read Naming and Necessity, I suppose? In his example, "Richard Nixon" is a rigid designator; thus, Nixon remains Nixon -- the "same object" -- regardless of whether he wins or loses the 1968 election. For this to violate some law of non-contradiction, you'd have to maintain that every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is. Do you really want to do that?
Yes, I think it is necessary to conceive of it as the same time, because it is referred to as "the future". So, we have one present, now, and one item at the present now. The multitude of possible worlds is a description of the time after now, which is the future, and all those possible worlds must share in the same future, or else the model would be useless.
Quoting J
Space hasn't been mentioned, but the space would be limited by the possibilities. They all must share the same time, because that's what is being modeled, a specified time, "the future". If we are modeling the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow, for example, it doesn't make sense to say that one of the possible worlds models yesterday as tomorrow.
Quoting J
I haven't read Kripke, I'm just going on what Banno said: "In rigid designation (Kripke), names refer to the same individual in every world where that individual exists." Obviously, if it is the same individual in every possible world, the law of noncontradiction is violated every time that the individual has contradictory properties between two different possible worlds. In your example, Nixon both wins and does not win the 1968 election. Therefore the law of non-contradiction which says that a thing cannot both have a property and not have that property, at the same time, is violated.
Also, I think it's very obvious that "every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is". If any object could be different from what it actually is, then it could be two different objects at the very same time. That's nonsensical to say that one object could be two different objects at the very same time.
Naming and Necessity is a transcription of lectures that Kripke gave, very informal and accessible.
The concept of "rigid designator" is very simple. Banno and I were discussing the situation when "possible worlds" refers to future possibilities.
You seem to be hung up on the idea that every property of an object is essential to that object's identity. If not, then two distinct objects could have the same identity. Why is this difficult for you to accept?
It leads to implausible claims. Joe has the property of being awake at T1, and the property of being asleep at T2. These are certainly not trivial properties, yet does anyone claim that Joe is not the same person? And this line of thought leads inevitably to the tensed character of such statements, which is why Kripke and possible worlds becomes important. I'll take your word for it that "rigid designator" seems very simple to you, but its use in understanding the issues here is not. At the risk of being a nag, could I suggest again that you actually read one of Kripke's lectures?
How does this appear to be implausible to you? Why would anyone claim that Joe is not the same person at the two different times? The individual named as Joe has the property of being awake at T1 and the property of being asleep at T2. These two properties, and all the other properties of Joe are necessary (essential) to the identity of the unique individual known as "Joe".
Quoting J
You haven't given me any good reason to do this. You've provided no good argument against what I am saying. If you understand Kripke, and he has an argument against my points, I'm sure you could provide it. But you are not providing anything, so I'm quite sure that reading Kripke would be a waste o mine time. He would just be proceeding onward from premises which I do not believe in, without any real justification for those premises.
Odd, that it's apparently OK to index a proposition in time: "Joe was asleep at 4 am but awake at 4 PM"; but to refuse to index a proposition in reference to possible worlds: "Joe was asleep in w? but awake in w?"
Anyway, there may be a way of parsing @Metaphysician Undercover's account into modal logic with a possible worlds semantic, so as to clarify the consequences. His core claim is "every single property, action, and attribute of a given object is essential to its being what it is".
This is modal collapse. There are no possible worlds. It imposes metaphysical essentialism on the system. Metas view amounts to a denial of genuine modality.
Recapping, for any individual x, and any property p,
p(x)??p(x)
On this view:
So how are we to understand modal sentences? That "the table could have been red instead of blue" is an impossibility, since then it would not have been that table. Even taking it that "the table could have been red instead of blue" amounts to "there might have been some other table that was blue" fails, because that other table would not be this table. Any variation in property means we are talking about a different object.
The upshot is that while in Meta's system we might be able to say "Meta might have read Kripke", this cannot be more than a string of words. We cannot make any deductions therefrom, like "If Meta had read Kripke then we might not be having this conversation". And there is no basis for assigning truth values here. Deliberation becomes meaningless, there's nothing to decide, since we only ever do what we in fact do. Prediction loses grip, since we can't consider various potential futures. Explanation and understanding suffer, since we can't ask why something happened instead of something else because nothing else could have happened.
So Meta can go ahead on this path, but the results are somewhat catastrophic.
Actuality trumps all "What ifs", although 'if' finds use on the simulation of scenarios; otherwise 'if' but points to a fantasy world. What if Biden had run? He didn't; the end.
I'm not sure about this. We make deductions from hypotheticals where we openly acknowledge loss of identity. As in, "if I were you, I'd have read Kripke." Can't I make deductions therefrom while admitting me being you is not something that could exist in a possible world to the extent it contradicts identity of objects?
Or, ironically, isn't your analysis of Meta's argument a contradiction of your argument. You asked "if Meta is correct, what would the consequence be?" Do you suggest you were only able to assess Meta's statement if Meta were correct in a possible world, even though Meta says he can't exist but in this world?
Not that I agree with Meta's other thoughts on hyper-strictnesss of identity, but I don't know a consequence of it is the inability to assess hypotheticals entirely. And I do agree there are consequences to modal practice if one accepts @Metaphysician Undercover, but maybe not as severe as stated.
Then, by p(x)??p(x), I would be you in the actual world, which is false. So I don't see that Meta can get even to this.
Quoting Hanover
Well for Meta, it must be, since it supposes the possibility that he is correct, and it must follow from p(x)??p(x) that he is necessarily correct...
What other folk do is imaging a possible world in which Meta is correct and work out what the consequences would be in that world. So yes, we look to see what a possible world in which Meta is correct would be like. Meta says we can't do that. I think we've shown that he is mistaken. Even by this very conversation, in which we consider what a world in which he was correct would be like.
Can you see another way to save Meta from modal collapse? Is p(x)??p(x) too strong a rendering of his account?
Edit: What p(x)??p(x) says is that if (x) has the property p, then (x) has the property p in every possible world. It supposes only that if a property is essential to an individual, then that individual will have that property in every possible world. He said "every property of an object is essential to that object's identity". Tricky to see another interpretation.
There is no problem with time. The law of noncontradiction is clearly qualified with "at the same time". If you interpret different times as different possible worlds, you have no principles which would even allow you to talk about the future. You could not relate one as future and another as past without invoking another principle of causation or something like that to place them in relation to each other, but what would this be based on?
Quoting Banno
No, this is incorrect. As you and I discussed the "possible world" is how we relate to the future. The spoken about object has no existence in the future yet, therefore there is no such thing as "what it is" in the future. We can talk about the object's future with "possible worlds" so long as we recognize that that there truly is no such thing as "that object" in the future, and the set of fundamental laws, identity, noncontradiction, and excluded middle, are violated. It is merely a possible object therefore it has no identity, which is the defining feature of an object.
The further point I made, is that we need to be clear to distinguish between the "ontological possibility" of the future, within which those laws are violated because there is no object, and the "epistemic possibility" of the past, within which the three laws are upheld, and there was an actual object, but its properties were unknown, or we're applying counterfactuals, etc.. Obviously, these are two very different meanings of "possibility", and we ought to be sure not to equivocate. The future object violates the fundamental laws, while the past object does not.
Quoting Banno
Your examples are of epistemic possibility, past realities, and as I said already the fundamental laws are not necessarily violated in this application. What we were talking about earlier is future possibilities, and the need to allow that those laws are violated when talking about the future, to avoid fatalism.
Quoting Hanover
What I have been complaining about is the way that modal logic is interpreted and applied. To avoid determinism, (fatalism), we must allow that any spoken about object has no existence, or true identity, in the future, and therefore the fundamental laws are inapplicable. It is a possible object, and this means that it cannot have a true identity. But in the past, the object had existence, therefore identity, and the laws are applicable. If we do not respect this difference, that modal logic can be applied consistently with the three laws toward the past, but it cannot be applied consistently with the three laws toward the future, equivocation of different senses of "possible" is implied, along with significant misunderstanding.
Alright, I'm following along here.
If all we wish to do is save any aspect of modal reasoning so as to avoid absolute collapse, we have to show such a thing as modal reasoning exists in impossible worlds.
This is so because under the hyper-essentialsm advanced "if I were wearing a blue shirt" is logically equivalent to 2×2=5.
So, if 2×2=5, then i am the king of France.
Or, if God is not omni-benelovent, then there is no problem with evil (assuming we are taking a classic definition of God here).
That is, we've entertained what might happen in the impossible world, which is modal reasoning.
Clearly something feels different here, as our hypothesizing is purely analytic. This differs from me saying "If I were wearing a blue shirt, it would better match my pants."
This strikes me as what we discussed a while back regarding if a then not a, the vacously true. But is this modal reasoning? Maybe in some form. We're entertaining hypotheticals, but not in a world that exists.
At a minimum, this does show that extreme essentialism limits modal reasoning to the logical fringes at best.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If it rains, I'll get my umbrella is modal logic, and it may or may not be raining at the moment or ever again in the future. Why do these temporal issues of what is happening now or later interfere with our ability to logically assess? That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is.
This is what haecceity is called in to do (although, a lot of philosophy of quantum mechanics denies particles' haecceity, e.g. Wheeler's idea of there just being one electron in the whole universe that is in many places at once).
It's a tough issue. What individuates things is a matter of much discussion, and ties into the difference between "what they are" and "that they are."
Indeed. The same sort of thing happens when all properties are said to be accidental (which seems to be the much more common claim in contemporary philosophy and on TFP). I will give credit for embracing the more unique formulation. It sort of reminds me of Parmenides in a way.
But surely , there is a way to do counterfactual reasoning, right? So, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown." But the plant in question has to be, at least in some sense, the same plant, or else we would just be saying that if the plant was a different plant it might not have grown.
On this point:
Maybe you would be more amenable to this framing:
Now, in the present, certain things have certain potentials. Joe might potentially be asleep at 10 PM or be awake then. A rock, by contrast, cannot be asleep or awake. So, we can speak about possibilities in the future according to the ways in which things in the present possess potentiality.
Likewise, in counterfactual reasoning, we speak to the potencies that some thing possessed in the past, and then discuss what would be true if they were actualized differently. IDK if this works without at least some differentiation between substance and accidents, but it might at least resolve some of the concerns.
The past is, in some sense, necessary, having already become actual. But when we speak to "possible worlds" with a different past, we are simply talking about different potentialities becoming actualized.
I know you meant to imply this, but just to keep things straight: What's implausible here is that Joe is two different objects at these two times, not that he could have these two properties.
Of course. And it is also, after Kripke, clearly qualified with "in the same possible world". To ask what might have happened if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon is not to ask what might have happened if Caesar had both crossed and not crossed the Rubicon.
That's the point. You allow indexation for time, but not for possible worlds. Why?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I hope it is clear, and as the Roman example given above exemplifies, possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future. If we accept rigid designation, the possible Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is the very same as the actual Caesar who did. That that is, "what might have happened if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon" is a question about Caesar, and not about some other person in some other possible world who happens to have the same name.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As previously explained, this is addressed in a Kripke-style answer to the sea battle problem. Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Two possible worlds are accessible, one in which the sea battle occurs, the other in which it does not. As things stand, today we do not know which is the actual world, tomorrow night we will. But the accessibility response is not limited to temporality, in the way your response is.
In trying to throw out the bath water of fatalism, you have wholly thrown out the babe of modality. And needlessly, since accessibility allows us to make choices.
You really would benefit from reading a bit of the modal logic done in the last hundred years.
An unusual phrasing, but I supose modal logic apples to impossible worlds and is what shows them to contain the contradictions that render them impossible.
Quoting Hanover
Yep.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Better: now, in the present, certain states of affairs might be accessible. One accessible word is that in which Joe might be asleep at 10 PM, another accessible world is that in which he is awake at 10 PM. A rock, by contrast, cannot be asleep or awake. So, in no possible world is there a rock that is asleep or awake, and so no world is accessible in which the rock is awake. We can speak about possibilities in the future according to the ways in which things in the present are accessible. But that is only a small part of what we can do with PWS.
And to be clear, accessibility is a formally defined, semantic notion, and part of the possible worlds modelling of formal modal logics, avoiding any messy ontology of potential and actual.
And far more flexible than the Aristotelian model. It handles a wider range of modalities, cleanly avoids category mistakes, and is rigorous enough for computation.
This is nitpick, but is the definition of "rock" so clear and tight that it cannot allow for the logical possibility of a rock being asleep or awake? I'm thinking of Rock Biter in the movie The NeverEnding Story.
Is Pyornkrachzark a rock? Well, we have a choice here. We might say that while Pyornkrachzark is made of stone, he is not a rock, but perhaps a silicon-based life form, and no more a rock than you and I are pools of water.
Or alternately we might say that Pyornkrachzark is a rock, and that therefore the assertion "rocks do not sleep" is incorrect.
That is, we might re-asses Tim's assertion that rocks neither sleep nor wake. We have a choice here, not about whether rocks sleep so much as about how we use the word "rock".
I don't think this has an affect on the argument given, which is that accessibility does what Tim tried to do with potential, only more clearly and with less metaphysical baggage.
I have no problem with modal logic. It is obviously very useful and I'm not arguing against its usefulness. What I am arguing is that when it is interpreted and applied in a way which is inconsistent with the three fundamental laws of logic, we ought to respect this inconsistency, and not try to argue that it is consistent.
So for example, "if it is raining at 7 AM tomorrow I will be carrying an umbrella" signifies a future condition which could be represented as distinct possibilities, one in which I am carrying an umbrella, one in which I am not carrying an umbrella. To accept these two propositions (possible worlds) as both true, would be a violation of the law of noncontradiction, what is designated by "I" is both carrying an umbrella, and not carrying an umbrella. Under Aristotelian terms, we would represent such cases of future possibility, as neither/nor, a violation of excluded middle. This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle.
However, you can see how some "possible worlds" interpretations, would say that somehow, both possible worlds must be real, due to a sort of splitting of multiverses, and I will experience one of them, but some form of "I" will also be experiencing the other. What is evident, is that if we accept the reality of "future possibility", we also must allow that the future involves a violation of the fundamental three laws of logic. That is simply the nature of "future possibility". I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility.
Now, for comparison, lets look at "If it was raining at 7 AM yesterday, I was carrying an umbrella". Again, we have two possible worlds, one in which I was carrying an umbrella, and one in which I was not. But in this case, we accept that one is true, and the other is false. So in this case, there is no violation of the fundamental laws. We allow that the possible worlds are simply a representation, and there is an independent "actual world", and only one possibility corresponds with the actual, as the truth. This interpretation is implied by terms like "counterfactual". The counterfactual is accepted as other than the truth. The point though, is that we cannot extend this independent "actual world" into the future without the assumption of determinism or fatalism, and this would deny the reality of "future possibility".
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm fine with counterfactual reasoning, along with all sorts of applications of modal logic, and even statistics and probabilities, which with the aid of computers has become extremely useful. What I think though, is that we need to maintain a separation between ontology and epistemology, by embracing some fundamental ontological principles, so that we do not allow ontological problem to contaminate our epistemology. In other words, we should attempt to limit uncertainty to metaphysics and ontology, allowing epistemology to obtain a higher degree of certainty.
So to look at your example, "if this plant was not watered, it would not have grown", it really tells us nothing but an assumption that plants need watering to grow. This principle could be backed up and supported with evidence, but it would still not tell us whether we should water plants or not. Whether we ought to water plants is dependent on whether it is desirable to have plants grow.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
But what use is there in talking about different ways of actualizing things, unless we have principles as to what is good and not good?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Isn't this self-contradicting? If the past is necessary, then talking about the possibility of a different past is inherently contradictory. We can learn from our mistakes and produce principles like 'plants need watering to grow', but we cannot realistically talk about the past being different than it was, only about what we might do differently in the future.
Quoting Banno
I explained this, it is a problem with the interpretation, the "rigid designator" interpretation.. If there is one possible world in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and another in which he did not, then you have two distinct items with the same name "Caesar". They must be distinct items because they have contrary properties. In reality Caesar did one or the other. If Caesar did in fact cross the Rubicon, then the person in that possible world is correctly named "Caesar", and the other is named "counterfactual Caesar". You can see how it would be false to say that they both have the same identity. And if it is not known whether Caesar crossed the Rubicon or not, then they are both "imaginary Caesar". And by the law of identity imaginary things do not have an identity.
Quoting Banno
To give both Caesars the same identity is a violation of the law of identity. I hope you understand this by now. However, as I explained above, it is necessary to violate the law of identity to speak about future objects. The reality of future possibilities makes it impossible that an object has an identity beyond the present in the direction o the future. But it is not necessary to violate the law of identity when talking about past objects. How could anyone think that it would be advantageous to violate the law of identity when speaking about past objects, just for the purpose of being able to talk about future things and past things in the same way? Since it is very clear that future things and past things are ontologically different, future things being imaginary with no identity, while past things are not real, this could only be a mistaken proposition. What beneficial purpose could it possibly serve?
Quoting Banno
If you think I have thrown out modality, then you completely misunderstand. What I've been arguing against is specific interpretations of modality. I believe the concept of "accessibility" is completely misguided. Future possibilities have no truth value whatsoever, due to the incompatibility I described. And choices are based in what is designated as good, what is desired, not in what is determined to be "accessible". The issue here being that the strong willed person can make accessible what others designate as inaccessible so accessibility is dependent on the way that one apprehends the facts.
Quoting Banno
When you say that " possible worlds can be about the past as well as the future", it's very clear that you do not avoid category mistakes. As I explained, past possibilities are categorically different from future possibilities. Placing them together under the same heading "possible worlds" is a category mistake.
There's an article on everything:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/#CouRea
If any one else sees a problem so far unaddressed, let me know.
One example I came across was Goldbach's Conjecture, which states " that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers." This theory is not proven, thus a "conjecture."
So, consider this statement, "if Goldbach's theory is false, there is an even integer greater than 2 that cannot be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers."
This is a potentially impossible antecedent that offers a logical piece of information in the consequent.
It is modal in the hypothetical form, yet an impossible antecedent, yet not a vacously true consequent.
To the extent it might be suggested that an impossible world antecedent renders a meaningless or a vacuous consequent, I think has to be reconsidered.
The counter to this is perhaps these impossible antecedents are only resulting in definitional consequents and are obscured tautolgies, but, honestly I haven't thought long enough on it. But that feels like a possible lurking response and goes back to my prior comment about the seeming analytic quality of these statements.
That is, is the Goldbach consequent stated above synthetic or just analytically derived from the antecedent?
I'm sure someone has hashed this out somewhere.
Perhaps logical space is broader than just consistency? It seems we might be able to wander away from the safe shore of possible worlds out on to the ocean of impossible worlds.
Beyond the pale for some, no doubt.
But before we go there, perhaps there are two completely consistent mathematics, the one on the left in which Goldbach's Conjecture is true; and the one on the right in which it is false.
Which one is true? Which one is right? Those question ceases to make sense. They are both true and yet incompatible. Logical space ceases to look like a unified whole, resembling instead a patchwork of frameworks, each with its own truths, rules, and meanings.
I think that's wonderful. @Count Timothy von Icarus won't like it.
Okay, that makes sense!
Now if we could relate that back to your OP...
That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. You have a metaphysical demand you're placing upon a linguistic/logical function. You're playing the language game of classic logic and refusing to speak modal logic. That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning.
This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another.
I'd also wonder what Lewis' response would be to counterpossible worlds, as in are there ontologically real impossibilities? Not only are there worlds where I wear a green hat, but there are worlds where I wear a green hat and not a green hat.
I think this kind of thinking does a disservice to the enterprise by inserting hopelessly confusing notions, but maybe it can be explained to me why modal realism beats modal abstractions.
Can we agree there's a first cause and an irreducible bottom layer of reality? If we start with that assumption - and call it the "ontolgoical ground" (OG), we can then entertain some possibilities. But first, let's consider whether or not the OG exists contingently or necessarily. (in all cases, I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/contingency, not to confused with conceivability or conceptual modality).
If the actual OG is contingent, then an alternative OG could have existed instead - or perhaps there could have been no OG at all.
Whatever it is, the OG cannot have been caused, because it's a first cause. Can an uncaused thing be contingent? To be contingent, something must account for that contingency - such as its cause (whatever caused it, might have not caused it). But if it exists uncaused then I suggest it must exist necessarily - any OG must exist necessarily.
You believe God is the OG, and probably agree it's existence is necessary, but there's no reason why it couldn't be something natural that includes the fundamental laws of nature in its structure. You alleged this entails "modal collapse", and dismiss this because it's "frowned upon". But how is it any different from a God existing necessarily? The only difference I see, is that a God is infinitely more complex (possessing infinite knowledge that is not the product of learning or experience) than an natural OG - which is a good reason to think it's natural.
Lewis was a somewhat eccentric chap. From what I can work out he thought that possible worlds were no different to the actual world, but to the extreme that he concluded that they must therefore also be actual. It's an interesting idea, but I don't agree with it.
Instead I think there are a multitude of possible worlds, but that there is one possible world amongst them that is actual. I take this to be the most common view, almost to the point of a consensus.
In this possible world we can discover things - like that the table is red. We get to talk about other possible worlds by stipulation. So "what if this blue table had been red" stipulates a possible world in which this very table - the blue on - is instead red. The possible world comes about in virtue of the stipulation. That's how I think of them.
An alternative is to think of a logical space containing all the possible worlds, and understanding "what if this blue table had been red" as picking out some world in which this table, which is blue in this world, is red. This is probably the way most logicians think of possible worlds.
My reason for preferring stipulation is simple parsimony. Where the logical space folk list uncountably many possible worlds, I list only those that are explicitly stipulated.
You may be right that Lewis would have a problem with counterpossibel worlds - an interesting point. A counterpossible world cannot be actual. Good argument. The world in which you wear a green hat and not a green hat cannot be this world.
The fun here is in taking "hopelessly confusing notions" and un-confusing them. Something I take as central to the whole enterprise of doing philosophy.
Why?
Seems to me the following sentence answered your question.
Quoting Relativist
That's right, what I am saying is that modal logic is not consistent with classical logic. But there is a further point. If modal logic, which is necessary for making decisions about the future, is not consistent with classical logic which produces the basis for what is, in what has been, then there is a gap in our decision making process because we use two distinct types of logic which are inconsistent with each other. This is similar to, or even a form of, the is/ought gap.
Quoting Hanover
No, I'm not saying that we cannot logically consider it. I am saying that it violates classical logic, therefore we cannot consider it in relation to the premises classical logic.
Quoting Hanover
That's not true. I am very clearly talking about violations to classical logic. Therefore I am objecting to classical logic. And I accept that modal logic was developed to deal with these aspects of reality which classical logic cannot address, due to that deficiency in classical logic. Look at your above quotes from me, I explained how Aristotle showed that future possibility violates classical logic. He described it as a violation of excluded middle. I describe it as a situation where the law of identity does not apply. The fact that future possibility violates classical logic is ancient knowledge. We probably all take it for granted. Modal logic is an attempt at a different logic to deal with this problem. What I complained about, in this thread, is people who insist that modal logic is used in a way which is consistent with classical logic.
Quoting Hanover
It is not a rejection of modal logic, it is a rejection of the way that modal logic is often applied. To apply logic correctly requires ontological principles. Demanding ontological clarity of the meaning of propositions before performing logical functions is not a matter of rejecting the logic. It is a matter of requesting an adequate explanation of the premises, similar to asking for definitions. If an important term like "possible" is left with ambiguity between two very distinct senses, this is cause for concern, because it allows for the possibility of misuse.
The potential for misuse of logical reasoning is obvious from the ancient knowledge which shows us that applying classical logic to future possibility is a misuse. In a like way, I insist that applying modal logic to past possibilities (counterfactuals) and applying it to future possibilities, in the very same way, according to the same rules, is also a misuse of logic.
Quoting Hanover
The first sentence is correct, the second is not. I went through this with Banno earlier. I had to explain that I am not claiming that modal logic is inconsistent internally, I am saying that it is often applied in a way which is not consistent with classical logic. What I point out is the inconsistency between classical logic and modal logic. That inconsistency ought to be obvious, because classical logic is violated by future possibility, and modal logic is applied to future possibility. Banno first did not accept this inconsistency, then accused me of rejecting modal logic completely. When I pointed out that I was only distinguishing an inconsistency between these logical forms, Banno finally said "fine", and seemed to agree.
The second sentence is false, because I am in no way refusing to accept modal logic as a mode of reasoning. Again, that it is a mode of reasoning is obvious. However, I am pointing out that if we do not distinguish between applications of modal logic which are consistent with classical logic from applications which are inconsistent, and we interpret applications which are inconsistent as if they are consistent, that is a form of misuse of this mode of reasoning. So the misuse is multifaceted. First, there is misuse of modal logic if future possibility is treated in the same way as past possibilities. Second, there is misuse of classical logic when future possibility in the application of modal logic, is interpreted as consistent with classical logic. The latter misuse propagates determinism and fatalism.
Quoting Hanover
The "actual world" is the grounding for a judgement of truth in the sense of correspondence. Judgements of truth are necessary for judgements of the soundness of the logical conclusions. As I said, I do not reject the application of "possible worlds" and model logic in general. But since the "actual world" exists at the present time, and past possibilities are substantially different from future possibilities, then "possible worlds" when referring to the past must have a substantially different meaning from "possible worlds" when referring to the future, in order to maintain truth, and sound conclusions.
Quoting Banno
This is the problematic statement right here. In the case of "possible worlds" referring to the past time, the past has already been determined by the passing of time, and it is correct to say that of all the possible worlds, "one represents the actual", or even (depending on one's ontological stance) "one is the actual". However, when referring to future time, that time has not yet passed, and the actual has not yet been determined, therefore it is incorrect to say that one of the possible worlds is the actual, or even that it represents the actual. This is what leads to determinism and fatalism. In order to allow for the reality of real choice, there is no such things as "the actual".
Trouble is that modal logic includes propositional logic and predicate logic. Every valid proposition in propositional logic and in predicate logic is valid in modal logic. And for every valid syllogism in classical logic there is an equivalent valid formulation in propositional or predicate logic.
So again, you are just mistaken about this.
And your other errors follow on from this.
In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object.
IQuoting Banno
Think about what you are saying Banno. All propositional, predicate, or classical logic can be expressed as modal logic. This does not mean that all modal logic can be expressed in the terms of those other forms of logic, and that is where the problem lies. The three fundamental laws are not sound when applied toward future possibilities, but modal logic is. Concluding that because modal logic is applicable to past possibilities, and is consistent with classical logic in this instance, therefore classical logic must also be consistent with modal logic when applied to future possibilities, is what supports fatalism.
Quoting Hanover
I don't claim that. What I claim is that classical logic fails when applied to the future. Modal logic is designed for future possibility and does not fail.
Quoting Hanover
It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem.
Quoting Hanover
This is the point you are missing. My claim is that classical logic fails, not that modal logic fails. However, interpretations of modal logic which attempt to understand it in the terms of classical logic (i.e. make the two compatible) are themselves a failure. So I am saying that it is not modal logic which fails, but certain interpretations of it which fail. For an example o this failure, just look at what Banno has written.
Because he's a Christian, he believes there is an OG. I am arguing that an OG does not entail a God.
Can you show that there is no OG?
No, that's not at all what I said.
It really would help if you were to read about and try to understand logic rather than just dispensing your wisdom.
Quoting Relativist
I don't know. What's an OG? An ontological grounding...?
And wouldn't it be incumbent on those positing an OG to demonstrate the need for one?
I gather it's some form of foundation on which things are, in some fashion. ut as I said in my first post in this thread,
Quoting Banno
Yes: OG = ontological ground. I don't need to demonstrate there is an OG to someone who already believes there is one.
Hey, if I've got wisdom, it's best that I dispense it. And it would be best for you to pay attention. Fuck the logic, it doesn't qualify as wisdom so why waste time trying to understand it, when all that has ever done is produce faulty interpretations. It's best to leave logic as it is, impossible to understand.
Ok. I do not.
Well, then, best you stop posting about logic, don't you think?
Yes, I agree that there is an OG.
Quoting Relativist
I am unclear from your comment whether you agree with the conclusion from the OP, that the fundamental laws of nature must be designed. If so, then we can infer that the OG has the faculty of being a designer; which in turn implies a free will, because beings that are not free cannot produce things out of design.
On your other point: If there is a designer with free will, it could design creatures that lack it, so it seems irrelevant whether not the designer has free will.
That's a good example. What is impossible/contradictory is not always obvious. That is one of the risks when talking about potential/possibility in lose terms. We end up affirming the "possibility" of any words we can smash together without obvious contradictions.
This can get sort of out of hand in "bundle" and "pin cushion" theories of predication. E.g. a subject just is a "bundle of predicates," or "predicates attached to some bare haecceity" (the pin cushion that makes things individual). It would seem that anything can become anything else here, because the subject is completely bare.
Anyhow, an interesting thing is that "the first number that violates the Goldbach Conjecture" is a rigid designator. It uniquely specifies a number (if it exists). You could think of such a designator in terms of the shortest program that would retrieve a number too (it is easy to check if a number fits the criteria). But, strangely, this ability to uniquely specify the number fails to reveal its identity. It's a sort of recreation of the Meno Paradox. You don't really know what you're looking for until you've found it.
Alright, I'll set out the basics and tell me where we disagree:
The fatalism issue arises in classic logic and is cured by modal logic. As in:
Classic Logic:
1. If it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It rains tomorrow
I get wet
The fatalistic issue arises from fixing #2 as certain
Modal Logic (assuming both premises apply within the same possible world):
1. It is necessary that if it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
It is possible I will get wet.
There is no fatalism because #2 is possible, not necessary.
Modal logic adds in two new qualifiers ((1) it is necessary, and (2) it is possible) that allows for the avoidance of fatalism. This cures the limitation of classic logic.
Are you saying that Banno is denying fatalism within classic or modal logic? I'm just trying to figure this out because you referenced Banno's other comments generally and I have no way of really figuring out what that refences because I've been bouncing in and out of this thread.
Nice.
No, this is how we move forward by degrees, through an exchange of ideas. And opinions about logic are just as informative as opinions in other subjects, even though my opinion is that no one really understands logic.
Quoting Hanover
I don't think we disagree. The fatalism issue may be cured by modal logic. However, if one interprets modal logic as consistent with classical logic (as Banno seems to), then the fatalism issue reappears.
Quoting Hanover
So, depending on how "possible" in #2 is interpreted fatalism may or may not be implied. If fatalism is not implied by one's interpretation, the three classical laws are violated in one way or another.
If we interpret "possible" when referring to the future, in the same way that we do with past possibilities, where we assume that one of the possible worlds is actual, as in the "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" example, then we have fatalism.
If we interpret two possible worlds, one with rain, and one without rain, with "I" as a rigid designator, then the law of noncontradiction is violated, because "I" gets wet and does not get wet, at the same time. The qualification of "different worlds" is just a facade to hide the contradiction. If we look at what Banno called "counterpart theory", then we have no continuity of the object "I", from the present time into the future, only possible similar objects in the future, therefore the law of identity is not applicable.
The conclusion therefore, is that modal logic provides an escape from fatalism, but only if it is applied and interpreted in a way which is conducive to this escape. That way of interpretation is to recognize that the classical laws of logic are not compatible. This is because it is the idea that these classical laws are applicable to the future which produces the fatalist mentality.
This is what Banno said:
Quoting Banno
What I say is that the meaning of "possible" in #2 "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" indicates that "it will rain tomorrow", cannot have a truth value. It could have a probability, but not truth. This is because the corresponding reality referred to by "possible" in this usage does not admit to truth or falsity. Therefore modal logic and propositional logic are not consistent.
Must be the fifth or sixth time this has been pointed out to you. In no possible world does it both rain and not rain. That only happens in impossible worlds.
Added: "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" just says that there is a possible world in which it rains tomorrow. And this is true, and therefor "It is possible that it will rain tomorrow" has a truth value.
"It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false, since there is no possible world in which it both rains and does not rain.
And this adds to your idea, @Hanover, in that such things only ever happen in impossible worlds, and so "It is possible that it will rain and not rain tomorrow" is false in all the possible worlds, but perhaps true in some impossible world...
Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they are contingent facts that need an explanation outside of themselves, i.e., a cause. As such, the OG which has no cause cannot include the laws of nature in its structure.
Additionally, if the OG has necessary existence, it must be the OG in all possible worlds. Thus, if the OG included the laws of nature in its structure, then the same laws of nature would exist in all possible worlds and this would result in a modal collapse.
Quoting Relativist
Agreed, but what I meant was that the OG is a designer that designs the laws of nature, not that the OG is designed.
Quoting Relativist
I agree that a thing with free will can design creatures that have or lack free will. I'm not sure what this is in response to.
But what it does put the lie to are ideas along the lines that logical impossibilities are unthinkable or even inconceivable. Impossible worlds can be conceived of, thought about and put into formal systems.
Tautologies are statements that are necessarily true. The term doesn't apply to existents, like an OG. The question is whether or not there is an ontological basis for an OG being contingent- meaning that it could have not existed.
If X is caused to exist, then it is contingent on it's cause, if the cause could have failed to produce X. That can't be the case for a first cause, so how else can it be contingent? You can't just assert it, because you are claiming to have a proof.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Modal collapse pertains to propositions - it means that every true statement is necessarily true. From the perspective of ontology, necessitarianism would entail modal collapse. Necessitarianism means everything that exists, exists necessarily. You seem to think necessitarianism is false. Why? Provide your proof (dismissing it based on the assertion it's "frowned upon" carries no weight).
Regardless, a necessary OG does not entail necessitarianism - other sources of contingency may exist, such as quantum indeterminacy.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You are claiming to prove there's a designer, so you can't just assume it. A natural OG accounts for laws of nature which exist necessarily. This remains a live possibility (thus defeating your argument) unless you can show this is impossible - or at least, less likely than a being of infinite complexity with magical knowledge (not the product of learning or experience).
If there is a rigid designator, such as "I" who gets wet, and I who does not get wet, then there is contradiction. If, W? and W? are distinct subjects, one with the property of rain, and one without, then the law of identity no longer applies to "our world", which is the actual world from the past to now. It divides into a multitude of possible worlds at the moment of the present, so there can no longer be identity. Without an object with identity the other two laws do not apply.
It's not the first time I've pointed this out to you.
Quoting Banno
That's an absolutely meaningless sense of "truth". By this standard, I could make any combination of words and claim this is true therefore it has a truth value.
The issue is that the meaning (content) of the words must be distinguished from the form of the proposition. So, "possible" must be assigned a meaning, in order that we do not equivocate between "past possibility", and "future possibility", which leads to fatalism. I'm accustomed to your response to this criticism, which is to deny a distinction between words and meaning, form and content, but that's nonsense as the reality of ambiguity and equivocation demonstrates.
Quoting Banno
That's an arbitrary designation. As explained above, a "possible world" cannot have identity as an object because it represents one of many possible contradictory states of an object which has identity. It's simply an imaginary entity, without an identity, therefore the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle cannot be applied, and any designations as to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable are arbitrary.
Quoting Banno
Again, that's an arbitrary designation of impossibility. If we analyze this supposed impossibility, we will see that any possible world must divide into further possible worlds at the moment of the present, as we do with our actual world to account for the reality of the future. Therefore, any possible world could be divided into two further possible worlds, one in which it rains tomorrow, and one in which it does not. And so, your designation which states that it is impossible to have a possible world in which it both rains and does not rain tomorrow, is a completely arbitrary restriction which you apply to the understanding of possible worlds. You allow the actual world to divide into possible worlds, to account for future possibilities, but you do not allow a possible world to divide into further possible worlds to allow for future possibilities in that possible world. What sense does it make to deny the reality of the future from all possible worlds? In reality, the only true restrictions to possible worlds are the limitations of the capacity of imagination. Those are restrictions of content and ought not be confused with formal restrictions.
I wouldn't have to repeat myself if you could show me where I am wrong, instead of just insisting that I am wrong. In fact I would greatly appreciate it. Clearing up errors is always a good thing.
I, and others, have. You can't see it. Indeed, you have quite explicitly refused to see it.
Not our problem.
Even an OG needs to fulfill the PSR. This is done by the OG having existence inherently, such that the statement "this being-that-inherently-exists exists" is a tautology, and is therefore self explained. I presume you agree with that given what you said:
Quoting Relativist
This self explanation does not apply to the laws of nature because they are not tautologies, i.e., they can be denied without resulting in a self-contradiction.
Modal collapse: Modal collapse is often used to critique arguments like the ontological argument for the existence of God (source), which shows that it is commonly agreed to be a weakness.
Quantum indeterminacy (QI): QI is incompatible with the PSR. QI allows for outcomes to occur without reason, and this goes against the PSR that demands a sufficient reason for everything that exists or occurs. I presume you agree with that as well based on your statement quoted above. Indeterminate outcomes are contingent, and thus something must account for that contingency.
That's logically impossible. There can be no explanation for an OG. It must exist autonomously - not dependent on anything else. But since the OG is not contingent, it exists necessarily, consistent with some versions of the PSR.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Autonomous is a better descriptor.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Category error. Tautologies refers to PROPOSITIONS, not to existents.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Since quantum indeterminacy is likely to be real, you have a choice: reject the PSR outright, or accept the probabilistic result of a quantum collapse as adequately explained.
Actually, Hanover clearly agreed with me, that modal logic when applied to future possibility is not consistent with classical logic. So it is really you who refuses to look at your own errors, which have been pointed out to you. Instead, you simply assert that I am wrong, and that it is a waste of your time discussing this with me. While we could be progressing toward discussing the actual points of understanding/misunderstanding where we disagree, and hammering out what that difference amounts to, you simply refuse to accept fundamental facts, leaving us unable to proceed.
The claim that "I get wet and do not get wet" violates the law of noncontradiction misunderstands how modal logic works. These are not simultaneous truths in a single world, but distinct evaluations across possible worlds, which is actually the reason modal logic exists. The law of noncontradiction applies within worlds, not between them.
Additionally, the entirety of the "different worlds" enterprise must be jettisoned and the resultant collapse of modal logic as well if we follow out your logic. The term "different" as applied here by you includes any dissimilarity whatsoever, even the simple fact they are in different locations. That is, it is impossible under your reasoning to have any metaphysically related universes because everything within each one would be relevantly different.
To make my point clearer: Suppose you had Universe #1, and within it you get wet and in Universe #2, you also get wet. In fact, every single thing within #1 and #2 are the "same," they would still not bear any metaphysical relationship to each other because they are all necessarily different since they occupy different time and space. That is, #1 and #2 do not collapse into being the same thing because they are not identical under your view. They are just curiously similar.
When we chart out all possible worlds, under your reasoning, an infinite number could be the same in every apparent regard because you deny the concept of rigid designation in theory.
This is to say that if you deny a rigid designation for "I," you must do it for all things. That means that not only does the fact that you're not the same you in #1 and #2, the rain isn't the same in #1 and #2. They must be different. You can't have a different you in #1 and #2 and share the same rain. When we say it will rain in #1, while that sounds like any old generic rain will do, if we were being more precise, we'd describe the exact identity of the rain that would strike you in #1 versus #2.
This I suggest is the logical consequence of demanding cross universe consistency.
This is why @Banno brings in counterpart theory, which holds there is a similar counterpart in another universe that satisfies the conditions needed to perform the modal logic. It dispenses with the impossible mental gymnastics needed to comprehend what it could possibly mean to have identical entities in different locations at the same time, when location is a component of identity. This concept of possible worlds is injected to expand our epistimological understanding of the hypothetical, but, if taken literally, it cannot be sustained because there really aren't multiverses outside of science fiction.
All of this is just to say:even if we allow for a rigid designator of "I" across multiverses, that does not create a contradiction as long as we assume contradiction applies only intra-universe and not inter-universe.
But back to the classic versus modal logic discussion:
If in classic logic I say:
All glurgs are glogs
I am a glurg
Therefore I am a glog
That is true, despite the fact there is no referent for any of this gibberish. That is why we can use symbols to represent these entities because their existence is irrelevant for the analysis.
Under modal logic we say:
It is necessary all glurgs are glogs
It is possible I am a glurg
It is therefore possible I am a glog
This is true as well, purely from a formal level, despite there are no glogs here, there, are anywhere.
The issue then becomes providing a definition of "possible," as you allow for pure meaningless formality under classic logic but not under modal logic. Since "possible" is the only new thing inserted, that must be the reason you treat these two systems different. What you then do is require metaphysical grounding in order for the possible to occur, but that I challenge. You no more need semantical validity for modal logic to work than classic. It's good to have semantically meaningful statements, but not required.
That is, the same tension occurs in classic logic. Typically those syllogisms do more than just mindlessly maintain truth value through vacuous symbols. Typically they have semantical truth, but not always. I would say the same of modal logic as well. But to demand that modal logic always be semantical results in its collapse, despite its pragmatic value. I think the discussion of impossible worlds makes that clear. You can use modal logic to consider events that did not and cannot occur.
My position is that we must fictionalize the idea of multiverses for the purposes of gaining epistimological clarity, without regard to whether they really exist. Maybe explain what is gained or lost by this approach.
Thank you. This is the basic insight, as you go on to explain, "which is why modal logic exists."
Quoting Hanover
Right. The point is that nothing is the same in different worlds. Trying to import something that's the same automatically dissolves what "possible world" means in this discourse, if I can put it that way.
In short:
Quoting Hanover
Not so much, it seems.
But also, if what I have said erroneous, as you supose, then they are not my errors, since all I have done here is present the Kripkean view that is the established interpretation of modal utterances.
So my my view, but that agreed to by the body of people who have looked into such issues.
Some of them even read books about logic, unlike you.
...on the counterpart interpretation. If one accepts rigid designation, then there are things that are the very same in different possible worlds. Which is the advantage of Kripke over Lewis - when we ask "what if this post had been about the weather?" we are talking about this post, in the actual world and in another possible world.
"Possible worlds" is an interpretive term, and it's really irrelevant. It makes no sense to speak of a world which is possible. They are not actually distinct worlds, just distinct possibilities. And it is the human mind which conceptualizes distinct possibilities from the realm of future possibility. The employment of distinct imaginary "worlds" does nothing but add confusion.
So, let's look at these possibilities without the confusion created by that nonsensical idea of "possible worlds". Banno suggested two possible modes of interpretation. One had a rigid designator, in which case "I" in each possibility (or possible world, if you really must) signified the very same individual. This clearly violates the law of noncontradiction because we are talking about the same object at the same time, tomorrow. In the other case, the two instances of "I" are not the same, but similar. In this case we have no identified object, only similar objects and the classical rules are simple not applicable.
Quoting Hanover
"Different worlds", and "different universes", are nonsensical and misleading conceptions. "Universe" by definition includes all that is. "Possibilities" are completely distinct, and categorically different from the world, or the universe. It makes no sense to talk about possibilities as if they are real beings, living somewhere in different worlds. The different worlds referred to here as "possible worlds" are nothing but conceptual structures, designed to deal with the reality of possibility. Possibility is something general, and when we conceptualize it as distinct possibilities, those specific determinations, this possibility and that possibility are purely conceptual. Speaking of a possibility as existing somewhere as a world, is no different from speaking of numbers, and other conceptions as existing in some Platonic realm of Forms somewhere. This is totally misleading and confusing. As distinct possibilities is not a realistic representation of "future possibility", it is a product of the imagination
Quoting Hanover
This interpretation makes the problem even worse. We have truth about the past, and the actual world, as well as the actual universe, and truth about now. One world, and one universe. From what you are saying, the future consists of a whole multitude of universes, possibilities. You say the separate universes would bear no metaphysical relationship on each other, but this is not true. They must all relate to the one actual (true) world at the present, or else they are simply arbitrary fictions. But possibilities are not arbitrary. Therefore they must share a time and space, as they all must relate to the true here and now.
The reason why I say it makes the problem worse, is because now we need to define how these many possibilities (universes) relate to the here and now (the true). The principle which relates them must be absolutely fair and equal to all of them, or else we'd be assigning arbitrary, or subjective preference, to one over the others. But this is logic, so it needs to be objective, therefore the relationship between the actual, true, here and now, and those other universes, must be based in principles which are fair and equal. Clearly it makes no sense to talk about these distinct possibilities as different universes in different time and space, because all the possibilities must be directly related to the true universe, here and now through equal principles. And, it would be very misleading, if not downright false to speak as if there is no metaphysical relationship between them.
Quoting Hanover
I suggest that denying rigid designation is what allows for the reality of different possibilities. This is what you would call inconsistency between distinct universes, which is not actually inconsistency if it's not actually the same object across distinct possibilities. So, what appears like inconsistency, when we apply rigid designation, is not inconsistency if we remove rigid designation.
What I propose is that there is no individual, no object, indicated by "I" in any described future possibility, just like there is no world in "possible world". Since this is a an imaginary scenario, everything about it is a possibility, even the existence of I, and the supposed universe or world. What "I" or "universe" indicates is a possible entity, and that means it is a concept only. And, a concept does not have identity like an object, nor do the same laws of truth or falsity apply to concepts, which apply to objects with an identity. The laws which apply to conceptions are axioms which are designed for the specific system of logic, like those of mathematics. So there are different types of logic which deal with building conceptual structures like mathematics, modal logic, etc., and these types are completely different from propositional logic which is applied toward describing and understanding empirical objects. The two are not at all compatible, because the former is based in truth, the latter possibility. This is because empirical observations are always in the past, and possibilities are in the future, and there is a substantial difference between these two. Relating these two at the present is a significant philosophical problem which has one form of manifestation as the is/ought gap.
Quoting Hanover
We ought to distinguish "true" from "valid" here. The argument is valid, but we still need to question the truth of the premises. If we accept the first as true, we still need to assess the second. This is where the law of identity, and the other two laws come into play, in assessing the truth or falsity of the premises. We have an object signified by "I", and the premise states "I am a glug". By the law of identity, there is a truth to what "I" is, which inheres within that object itself. . So there clearly is a referent, and the soundness of the conclusion is very much dependent on the accuracy of the description of the referent.
If we change the second premise to "tomorrow I will be a glurg", then my argument is that the referent is swallowed up by possibility, such that there is no referent. I can say "yesterday I was a glurg", and there is an actual truth or falsity, a referent at that time, but that is not the case with the future. Any supposed object signified by "I" may be annihilated before tomorrow, so "I" does not signify an object with identity in this case. Now, the logic of truth and falsity cannot serve us.
Quoting Hanover
The issue is not the validity of the logic itself. The question is one of truth and falsity. That is why I keep insisting it's a problem of interpreting and applying the logic, not a problem of the logic itself. And, truth and falsity are metaphysically grounded in the object spoken about. That is what the fundamental three laws are concerned with, what we can say truthfully say about objects.
We can remove all metaphysical grounding from "possible", but that's what I explained to Banno would produce complete arbitrariness. To produce the conceptual structure of possibility (possible worlds if you wish), we must remove the grounding of truth and falsity. But then Banno wanted to sneak truth and falsity back in, as applicable within possibility (a specific possible world), and this is an arbitrary rule. If we remove the metaphysical grounding of truth and falsity, to create a logic of possibility, then we need some other form of metaphysical grounding for this realm of possibility. To go back to truth and falsity is a step in the wrong direction. So we start with something like absolute equality and fairness (as in mathematics) between all possibilities, the we need to weight them according to the truth of here and now. And in decision making, principles of preference.
Quoting Banno
I think you know by now, that I tend to disagree with a good number of so-called bodies of people. I don't follow mob rules, nor do I blindly accept authority.
What kind of necessity are you referring to? There are only two kinds of necessity: internal and external; that is, logical (or inherent) necessity and causal necessity. You correctly reject causal necessity because the OG has no cause. It follows that it has existence by logical or inherent necessity. Existence by inherent necessity fulfills the PSR and is not dependent on anything else.
Quoting Relativist
It's both. Tautologies are necessarily true, and truth means conformance to reality. Thus, the outcomes from tautologies occur in reality. E.g. "2+2=4" is a tautology because II and II are inherently found in IIII. And sure enough, two and two of anything results in four of that thing in reality. Not just in our world but all possible worlds. On the other hand, outcomes described by the laws of nature also occur in reality, but these laws are not tautologies and so these outcomes do not occur in all possible worlds.
Quoting Relativist
The solution to the QI vs PSR problem is discussed in this post. There is a long and a short answer. The short answer is that quantum experts themselves claim "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics", and something that nobody understands cannot be used as a valid argument for or against anything.
It sounds like you believe in the PSR but allow some exceptions. This is problematic because how do we decide when exceptions are made? You made an exception for the OG, but could have just as easily made one for the laws of nature directly, which would end the discussion right there.
~~
If we presume the accepted modal logics with a possible worlds interpretation, what can we say about ontological grounding and the principle of sufficient reason?
First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is.
Hence any explanation strong enough to constitute an ontological grounding must thereby fail to explain why the world is as it is.
Next, the principle of sufficient reason. Much the same argument holds here. Either the sufficient reasons are necessary but too weak to explain why the actual world is as it is; or the reasons explain why the world is as it is, but are contingent, and so are insufficient to explain why out of all the possible worlds, this is the actual world.
I'm referring to metaphysical necessity/possibility, which pertains to existence. Logical possibility pertains to the semantics of logic. Conceptual possibility refers to what we can conceive. Epistemic possibility refers to what is logically possible per the logical implication of a body of facts. That's the broad set of modalities.
There is no "internal" possibility - although it may refer to something like (Christian Philosopher) Alvan Plantinga's "de re necessity" -wherein he proposes "necessary" to be an intrinsic property of God. It's a contrivance to "prove" what he already believes: God exists. You're doing the same thing: contriving a metaphysical framework that entails God.
[Quote]You correctly reject causal necessity because the OG has no cause. It follows that it has existence by logical or inherent necessity. Existence by inherent necessity fulfills the PSR and is not dependent on anything else.[/quote]
My position is that X exists contingently (meaning it is metaphysically possible for X to have not existed) IFF there exists some C, such that C accounts for (X or ~X)
Laws of nature are typically necessitations; if C causes X, then C necessarily causes X. I.e. there are no exceptions*. Quantum mechanics seems to entail a contingent outcome: Q (a quantum collapse) results in X, but there's a suite of other results (a probability distribution) that it might have collapsed to. In this case, X is contingent; the other results that might have happened are non-actual possibilities..
* C may itself be contingent, but the outcome of its instance of caustion is necessary.
--------------------
Because nothing accounts for the OG, there are no non-actual possibilities.
You don't have to accept my account of metaphysical contingency/possibility - but this demonstrates that your proof depends on a metaphysical framework that you cannot show to be true. Your proof is thus epistemically contingent on that questionable framework.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
The statement "The morning star is the evening star" is a tautology because both the morning star and the evening star refer to the same object. This is semantics, with no ontological implications about necessary or contingent existence. So substituting tautolgy for necessity is misleading, such as your next error:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
For there to be a "possible world" in which it is not the case that F=ma, there would have to be some C that accounts for the truth of F=ma, and C could have accounted for ~(F=ma) - some non-actual possibility. Here's a case where I think you're conflating metaphysical possibility with conceptual possibility (i.e. you can conceive of F=ma being untrue).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Actually, there are multiple coherent interpretations of QM. Some treat quantum outcomes as contingent (as I described). Others treat it as a necessary outcome. My earlier comments are based on the premise the outcome is contingent. My purpose was to illustrate the concept of contingency, not to insists there is true, metaphysical contingency.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I consider the metaphysical basis of necessity/contingeny that I described to be the correct principle. The PSR generally conforms to it, but it is more vague.
Several issues.
1. An OG exists autonomously. This means without dependencies of any kind (causal or otherwise). If it had such a dependency it could not be the OG
2. For an object, X, to be ontologically contingent, there must be some C that accounts for X, but C could have accounted for ~X. Example: assume quantum collapse is not determinate, and C is a quantum collapse in which X emerged. X is contingent because C could have collapsed to Y. I express this as:
C accounts for (X or Y), or more generally: C accounts for (X or ~X).
3. If an object is not contingent (as identified in #2) then it is necessary.
4. Compare this to the outcome of a deterministic law of nature: the law: C causes X. Because it's deterministic, it means: C necessarily causes X. If C is contingent, then there X inherits this contingency (whatever accounts for the contingency of C, also accounts for the contingency of X).
5. An OG is not contingent because there is no C that accounts for the OC (that would entail a dependency - see#1). Therefore it exists necessarily.
You have 2 general choices:
6. If you embrace a version of the PSR that requires everthing to have an explanation, then you are committed to an infinite series of dependencies, and should reject the existence of an OG.
7. If you are committed to an OG, then you should reject any version of a PSR that requires everything to have an explanation. You could accept "necessary" and/or "autonomous" as sufficient explanation.
IMO, possible world semantics can obfuscate the issues. It's valid, but one should avoid conflating conceivability with metaphysical possibility. IOW, you could conceive of possible worlds with OG1, OG2, OG3 as their respective ontological grounds, but per my analysis the actual OG is the only METAPHYSICALLY possible one.
You can, of course, reject my view of contingency. But this is my basis for rejecting the theistic argument that was presented.
It is necessarily true that if someone is a person, then they are a physicist.
Einstein is a person.
It is necessarily true that Einstein is a physicist.
This is modal logic. See what just happened? If we necessitate a rigid designator across all worlds onto a non-essential trait, we elevate a contigent statement into a necessitated one and we destroy modal logic by eliminating hypothesizing what Einstein might have been in another world.
What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways.
I'd caution agains attempting to show that there is an inconsistency in Meta's logic. He may simple add ad hoc hypotheses in order to escape.
But also, his premise, p(x)??p(x) does not lead to an inconsistency within the logic.
it does lead to modal collapse. There can be no modal statements in such as system.
p(x)??p(x) says that nothing can be other than it is. It describes a world in which there is no change.
Also, p(x)??p(x) ???p(x)?p(x), so all truths are necessary truths. All truths in this system are necessary, and all falsehoods are impossible.
There are no counterfactuals, no contingency and as a result, there can be no free will. Given that maintaining free will was one of the reasons Meta gave for adopting this system, that's a big problem for him. Look out for the ad hoc reply.
So his system is consistent, but useless for any sort of modal reasoning, and leads directly to fatalism.
Quoting Relativist
You introduce "autonomous" and "dependent". Perhaps we can get more clarity by sticking to truth functional operatives.
So you have here something like that nothing implies an OG; that nothing else has to be true in order for an OG to be true. That is, for any fact p, both p and ~p imply the OG.
This gives us (p v ~p)?OG. That is, regardless of what other states of affairs hold, OG will be true. Stated otherwise, OG is a necessary truth. So you do not need to show that OG is necessary, since you have assumed it. ?OG. See the tree proof.
All that just for Point one.
Now look at point two.
Quoting Relativist
Here you have C?(X v ~X). Now (X v ~X) is a tautology, and so necessarily true. If the consequent of an implication is true, then the whole implication is true. That is, ?( X v ~X), and so ?(C?(X v ~X)).
So again you do not need to demonstrate that C?(X v ~X) is necessary. You have assumed it. But you cannot conclude that C is necessary. Nor that it is contingent. See the tree proof.
Quoting Relativist
Take care here. Contingency is not the same as possibility. An object that is not contingent may also be impossible.
Quoting Relativist
Here we run into the problem of what it is for A to cause B. IF it's just A?B, then all sorts of things we would not usually call causes will count as causes. So "cause " is not often understood as "implies".
We do not know if C is necessary or contingent or impossible.
So you cannot get to your point five.
Quoting Relativist
But that doesn't matter, since you assumed that OG is necessary at step one.
What this shows is that you haven't proved ?OG, but assumed it.
Now, was that worth my time?
No. IMO, that obfuscates the ontology. I did not assert the OG exists necessarily as a premise. Rather, it's necessity follows from my ontological account of contingency and the nature of the OG (here, you could refer to the facts about the OG).
Many philosophers treat contingency as the default: X exists contingently unless provably necessary. I believe this is wrong. Contingency should be accounted for ontologically. What is actually contingent in the world? Classical laws of nature necessitate the outcome, so they don't introduce contingency. If everything in the universe were a consequence of classical laws of nature, where would contingency come in?
Quantum collapse seems to have contingent outcomes (deterministic interpretations notwithstanding). But in these cases, the contingency is accounted for as I described: the thing that accounts for the outcome could have NOT produced that specific outcome. There could be other sources of contingency operating similarly.
By definition, an OG is not accounted for by anything ontologically prior, so it can't fit my assumption that contingency must be accounted for as I described.
When you translate this to facts and apply logic, it risks collapse the reasoning into the entailment of those facts.
But you could cut through all this and focus on the OG: either it is contingent or necessary. Either it's contingency needs to be accounted for or its necessity. Ignore my arguments and its a coin toss. But BECAUSE of my arguments (I have more supporting arguments, BTW). I'm on the side of it being necessary.
Ok. Then we'll leave it there. Seems you haven't followed what I wrote anyway, so I'll cut my losses.
I don't think I agree with this. The nature o time explains both, why things could have been otherwise, and also why whatever is, is necessarily the case. Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. The past cannot be changed. However, the future is full of possibility, so there was the possibility that before the last bit of time passed, different possibilities could have been actualized, therefore things could have been otherwise.
Quoting Hanover
Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. So, all you are saying is that the so-called "rigid designator" does not identify the same individual, but similar individuals, individuals of the same type, sharing essential properties. Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual.
But what I've been telling you is that it's not a problem for modal logic. It doesn't mean modal logic collapses, it just means modal logic inconsistent with those other three laws of logic which stipulate what we can truthfully say about a thing. But modal logic is intended to be applied toward possibility, not truth, so they have different fields of application. So there is no problem. That is, unless someone wants to try and make them consistent with each other, conflate the fields of application, then that person creates an unnecessary problem for oneself.
Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, because it's just a distraction, and get right to the point. Let's consider the reality of decision making, when a person considers distinct and contrary possibilities in the act of deliberation. When I deliberate, I put myself into distinct and contrary situations, as distinct possibilities (possible worlds). I consider myself bringing an umbrella, and I consider myself not bringing an umbrella. Clearly I am considering two contradictory scenarios, which I mull over at much the same time. In my deliberation, it makes no sense to ask which one is the case, which one is true, because it is my decision which will determine that. I am not concerned with what is true.
What I think, is that it's not really me, in either one of those contrary scenarios, it's just an imaginary me. Therefore the supposed person in the two contrary scenarios, really has no identity at all. Identity is something which things have. Imaginary things do not have an identity. This is similar to the "me" in a dream, it's not the real me, it's an imaginary me. The two versions of "me", in tomorrow's scenario, are in no way the real me, with my identity, as they are just imaginary, no different from if I imagined that tomorrow I was the president of the United States. The mistaken interpretation of modal logic is in the assumption that the objects in these possible scenarios have identity as real objects.
If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, (the me of tomorrow who in one version carries an umbrella, and in another does not carry an umbrella, or could even be the PotUS), then it's very easy to understand the real nature of possibility, and the usefulness of modal logic. What we are considering is possibilities, and identity, along with truth and falsity have no bearing whatsoever. And when we work with the logic of possibilities what guides the decision is what we ought to conclude, not what is true or false.
Events in the past are not necessarily true. They still might have been otherwise. You might not have written the thread to which this is a response, for example. It makes sense to discuss such possibilities, and to make inferences about them. So if you had not written that post, I would not be writing this reply. That's a sound argument. The sort of sound argument that your system denies.
Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds .
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella.
Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:
@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)??p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?
If not, fill in the blank. if something is true, then _________.
In order to properly represent the true nature of time, there are subtle differences of language which we must respect. "X could have been otherwise", and "X is necessarily true" are not inconsistent. This is because "could have been" refers to the past, and "is" refers to the present time. So, at that past time referred to by "could have been", things could have happened differently. But now, 'that ship has sailed' (as they say), and what occurred is necessarily the case.
Quoting Banno
Why do you think I deny that? I haven't proposed a system. I'm just pointing out potential problems of application and interpretation of modal logic.
This is the difference between applying modal logic to the past, and applying it to the future, which I have been explaining. We can talk about the possible different pasts, like if I had not written the last post, but we respect the fact that I did write that post. So there is an actual past, which I described as "necessary", and we respect that as a true fact. This is not a "system", it's just a description of how we understand the nature of time.
However, I can look to the future, and consider the possibility of deleting, and therefore not posting this post. In this case, looking toward the future, there is no actual 'necessary' fact, no truth to the matter. I might either post or not post. Therefore the application of modal logic toward the future must be interpreted in a way which is completely different from the way that the application of modal logic to the past is interpreted.
Quoting Hanover
I'm just adhering to the law of identity, (a thing is the same as itself), and I am attempting to maintain its intended meaning. In the meantime, I ought to out that many common modern definitions of "identity" by logicians, are inconsistent with the law of identity. There are some people on this forum for example, who argue that "=" in mathematics signifies identity, such that "2+2" has the same identity as "4".
To take your example, the object referred to by "me", takes off the red shirt, and puts on the blue shirt, and you maintain your identity as the same object. "Identity", by the law of identity, allows for changes over time, because it puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself. If we make identity what we say about the thing, rather than placing it within the thing, then we can arbitrarily decide which features are essential to the thing, such as wearing a red shirt perhaps. Then we might distinguish the person with the red shirt, from all the others with different coloured shirts, and 'identify' the person that way. That's a pragmatic sense, it serves the purpose. However, if someone else comes along with a red shirt, then there is a problem. So, the law of identity provides a much more rigorous form of identity by putting the identity right into the object itself, the substance, and so we general identify through the observed temporal continuity of the object.
I do not see why you think that insisting on proper adherence to "identity" removes the possibility of modal logic. As I've been arguing, it's only a matter of how modal logic is interpreted. Even in traditional propositional logic, the name is a subject, not an object, and predication involves a subject and predicate. If our subject is "Hanover", we can make all sorts of predications, and there is no need for an object which conforms. Hanover could be imaginary. It's only in the interpretation, when we judge for truth, that we take an object which is supposed to correspond with this subject. The fundamental three laws apply to how we judge for truth, this means that they apply to the interpretation of the premises.
So, all that matters is that we maintain the proper separation between subject and object. In the case of modal logic, the subject is completely abstract, imaginary. There is no corresponding object, as I explained in the last post, and relations to any true existing object must be established by other premises, which escape the judgement of truth or falsity. That's the principal point, we cannot judge the premises by truth and falsity, because they are possibilities.
Rather than saying it is a problem of modal logic, I believe it is a problem to be found more in the way that traditional propositional logic has been corrupted in many interpretations. Many interpretations do not make the subject/object distinction, assuming that the name is an object, and truth is taken for granted. Then interpretations of modal logic are confused with interpretation of propositional logic because there is no more subject/object distinction. Once this happens we have no way to distinguish imaginary conceptual "objects" from real substantial "objects".
Quoting Hanover
The interpretation of "separate worlds" is irrelevant. If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated, regardless of how you want to attempt to justify it. That is the purpose of the law of identity, it puts identity into the substance, and puts an end to all such sophistry. You can continue in your description of same person in different worlds, and deny the law of identity. Some philosophers, like Hegel, denied that law's usefulness usefulness, and simply proceeded without it. But I think it's a good idea to recognize the difference, and understand when the law of identity is being followed, and when it is not.
Quoting Hanover
The assumption of separate worlds is not at all necessary for the purpose of the logic. It is assumed for interpretive purposes only. We can assume separate possibilities instead of separate worlds, and this is a more appropriate interpretation, because it doesn't give a specific possibility the status of being a world.
Quoting Hanover
The formal logic which deals with possibilities does not require that we interpret each specified possibility as a distinct world. That is what produces the interpretive problem, because then you want to put the same object (rigid designator) into different worlds, and that's nonsense. We need to respect the reality that these are simply distinct possibilities, not separate worlds. It creates the interpretive difficulty, because then you want to place the same object (rigid designator) in different worlds. But that's inconsistency, because if its different worlds it ought to be different objects as well. And this is only overcome by employing arbitrary principles of sameness.
Quoting Hanover
It doesn't really frame the issue, because I have no system here, I am simply pointing out the difference between two distinct systems, not promoting one or the other. One system leads to fatalism, yes, but that's not "my system".
I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". Banno wants to ignore the reality of the difference between past and future, and make "could have been different" equivalent to "could be different", such that what is the case, what is true is not necessarily true. This leads to a lack of distinction between future possibilities, and past necessities, which could also be represented as possibilities, such as in the use of counterfactuals.
No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.
Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.
So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.
And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.
But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)??p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence.
You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity.
You're just performing a reductio of your own position and spelling out the consequences. If you're arguing against free will, then just be clear about it.
(I stopped following this carefully, so if what I'm saying has already been addressed, please ignore)
About the "law of identity": You do realize you're begging the question of what the entity is that's supposed to be "the same"? If you understand "Jill" to refer to every single component and property of the person designated as Jill -- "all properties, essential and accidental" -- at the time of designation, T1, then yes, anything that isn't that "Jill" will not be "the same." But that isn't in any way a proof that there are no other ways to understand what "Jill" refers to. You can't say this is true "by the law of identity." And indeed, this extreme version -- molecule-to-molecule identity -- is most unlikely to be invoked in any ordinary discourse I can think of.
I think you've been seduced by the apparent simplicity of the Law of Identity (capitalized, to indicate its usual formulation) that says only "A = A" without any further indication of what can count as an A.
It's up to us; the so-called Law is neutral on the subject. The problem is that, depending on the context, what counts as an A in good standing will vary quite a bit. With persons, the variation is enormous, though as you know, I think Kripke got the right handle on it with his idea of what a proper name may be said to name.
Yet
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is.
The bit where I said:
Quoting Banno
Again, there is a point wee our conversation becomes too ridiculous to continue.
Because you sad as much.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You have proposed a system. We've been pointing out that the consequences of that system.
What has been shown is that you have a profound misunderstanding of modality, that you are incapable of recognising.
Oh, well.
I agree that the ontological grounding (OG) must exist necessarily and so it is the same in all possible worlds. But now we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), and have a possible explanation for the actual world (it was freely chosen) even if the specifics of that explanation are not known to us.
I agree with your points 1, 3, 4, and 5.
I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion.
I choose point 7 over 6 but I must change it slightly:
Quoting Relativist
I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier.
You've got bigger problems than that.
The OG is supposed to explain why things are as they are. If the OG is compatible with every possible world, it can't do this. If, the reason any particular university is as it is, is the OG made it so, then the OG can't explain why this universe rather than some other.
Quoting Hanover
You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic?
Quoting Hanover
It's not determinism at all, it's what you called "temporal necessity". You are the person who actually wore the red shirt. That is true fact, which cannot be otherwise. This does not imply that it could not have been otherwise. You having worn the blue shirt is an imaginary scenario. And, we can talk about that imaginary scenario as a counterfactual. This is a statement about the past, at the present time, and the fact that you wore the red shirt cannot be changed at this time. This does not imply that at that past time, before you chose which shirt to wear, you were destined to wear the red one. You had free choice and possibility at that time. Just because it's a true and necessary fact right now, which cannot be changed, that you wore the red shirt yesterday, does not imply that you were destined to wear that shirt. The nature of time is relevant.
The past has been determined, the future has not been determined. On what premise do you conclude that just because we cannot change that fact, that you wore the red shirt, and this is a necessary aspect of the object I call "you", that you wore the red shirt yesterday, we must also conclude that yesterday, before you chose to do that, it was necessary that you chose the red. There is nothing to support that conclusion unless we premise that past and future have the same type of properties. This is the point, the past is substantially different from the future, we must respect this fact, therefore logic applied to the past must be different from logic applied to the future. They are substantiated differently.
Quoting J
The law of identity refers to the thing, not its parts. It is not proven, but a fundamental assumption, taken as a sort of self-evident truth. However, some philosophers see reasons to reject it. Perhaps you do too. But when it is rejected, individuation becomes arbitrary because we do not allow that there are real, true principles of unity which constitute "a thing". And that is contrary to empirical observation, as we see unified things.
Quoting Banno
That's what you think. Hanover has already distinguished two senses of necessity, and there are more. I think that a proper understanding of contingency will reveal to you that as much as all things are contingent, the past causes, which caused the existence of the current contingent things are necessary for their current existence. And, since all things are contingent, your sense of "necessary truth", as a thing which could not have been otherwise, is an ideal which is irrelevant to actual existence, as something impossible. All things could have been otherwise, unless you conclude a necessary being like God. But this has little, if any, bearing on the fact that they cannot be other than they have been.
No. It's what "necessity" is. Something is necessarily so if it could not have been otherwise.
And more. Check out the SEP article on modal logic and you will see that the modal framework can be use din deontological and temporal situations; indeed, it has a general applicability. So those alternate"senses" you want to appeal to are also well catered for by modal logic.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not if p(x)??p(x), which is what you claimed at the start. :roll:
The bit in which you change your claims, not to correct yourself but to contradict those who point out your own errors.
I don't know if you are sincere or just a contrarian bot.
But there is a reason I usually ignore your posts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There was no ambiguity on my part, and no introduction by me of temporal necessity. That was your doing, and I indicated it had no bearing on our conversation.
My specific question was:
"@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)??p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?"
This question is precise. The symbolic form cannot be interpreted as anything other than me asking your view on metaphysical necessity.
If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. If not, then not. If you think there can't be other worlds even if there are other possible outcomes in any given situation, then you make zero sense because that's what an other world is.
Aren't you contradicting yourself? First you say "It's what necessity is". Then you say that alternate senses are catered to as well. If there are other senses, then clearly that one sense is not "what necessity is".
Quoting Banno
You still don't understand what I am saying about the relevance of time. Looking backward in time, all things are necessary. Looking forward in time, all things are possible. This implies that all things at the present, i.e. "what is", are contingent, meaning dependent on something else, for existence. Being dependent on something else for existence ( a cause) i.e. being contingent, does not imply that once it exists its existence is not necessary. To the contrary, as we say, a contingent thing's existence is necessitated by its causes, implying that once caused, its existence is necessary. The fact that it is necessary once caused does not prevent us from classifying it as a contingent thing, because that cause itself was not necessary at that time.
Quoting Hanover
By your restriction of "necessary", I disagree. I didn't read the symbols, only the interpretation in words, and the sense of "necessary" I was using was what you call "temporal necessity".
But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant.
Well, no. Rather, you haven't been able to understand what is being said.
And again, this is not just my view. It is the standard approach to modality.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think I do. I also think that your view is mistaken. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then it was a necessity that Caesar crossed the Rubicon - it could not have been otherwise. Again, if it is necessarily true, it is true in all circumstances. And if that is so, Caesar had no choice.
You want to claim that it is not necessarily true until it becomes a past event. This is mistaking modality for temporality.
Again, plainly we can consider what might have occurred had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon. Therefore it is possible that Caesar not have crossed the Rubicon. If this were not so, we would not be able to consider the possibility.
But it could not have be otherwise in the actual world. Once he crossed the Rubicon, his, and indeed our, fates were set.
And this is not a contradiction becasue Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the actual world, but we can stipulate another in which he didn't.
All the imagined contradictions you ply us with dissipate when modal logic and possible world semantics are understood.
So again, I think both and I have a very good grasp of what you are trying to claim, but that we have a better grasp of the Possible World Semantics you refuse to read about, and so can see where you are mistaken.
"Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is possible, but not necessary.
That is, there are possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon; and there are possible worlds in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. There are also possible worlds in which there is no Caesar, and possible worlds in which there is no Rubicon.
The possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon include the actual world.
Now from this actual world, in 2025, we can't access any possible world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon.
But from the actual world, in 48BC, prior to his crossing, we could access those possible worlds in which he didn't cross the Rubicon.
And, to top it all off, in none of all of those possible worlds, the ones in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the ones in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, the ones without a Caesar and the ones without a Rubicon, did Caesar both cross and not cross the Rubicon.
So there is no contradiction here.
And notice that, since we can supose "Caesar" to be a rigid designator, we are talking about the very same individual in each of those possible worlds in which he exists. We are not supposing that someone else, who happened to be very much like Caesar, crossed the Rubicon.
Doing that would be to move from a Kripke-style response to Lewis's counterparts.
What of the question: if I'd have missed the train, I'd have never met my future wife.
Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.
We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da!
Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny, and it is critical. I referred to quantum collapse only to illustrate how to apply the contingency principle. Notice that I said, "assume" it is not determinate.Point 5, which you agreed with, depends on point 2.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I reject de re necessity It treats necessity as an ontological property. IMO, an OG is necessary simply because could not have bern otherwise. It could not have been otherwise because there is nothing ontologically prior that accounts for (OG or ~OG) (the principle I explained in #2).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Possible world semantics is just a convenient means of entertaining counterfactuals under some implicit or explicit modality. The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world.
My issue is that IF there is metaphysical contingency in the world, THIS is what needs to be accounted for. @Banno's question (how do we explain why this world is as it is?) has an answer: because it could only have been otherwise if there is metaphysical contingency in the world. But we don't know if there is. It's conceptually possible there's an OG with free will that accounts for contingency. It's also conceptually possible quantum indeterminacy (or perhaps some unknown feature of the world) accounts for indeterminacy.
OK, you are refusing to accept what Hanover called "temporal necessity". This sense of necessity implies that past actions, and the present state of being are "necessary" because it is impossible that they are otherwise.
Also, "true in all circumstances" is a meaningless phrase because "circumstances" refers to spatial temporal context, and truth relates to the particularities of the circumstances. Under no circumstances did Caesar not cross the Rubicon, or else it would be false that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.
You are slipping into nonsensical babble.
Quoting Banno
Nonsense, people can and often do, dream up all sorts of impossible scenarios, in their imaginations. In the following sense, possibilities are no different than truths. Just because people say it is possible (or true) doesn't mean that it is possible (or true). Possibility is limited by what is impossible, just like truth is limited by falsity.
Quoting Banno
Sure, people can stipulate whatever they want, but that doesn't mean that what they stipulate is possible.
Quoting Banno
By what principles do you stipulate that one possible world is actual? This seems to be a categorical difference, so there must be some criteria to be applied. And, if we cannot ( meaning it is impossible to) access any "possible world" in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, what sense does it make to call these "possible"?
Further, we now have the problem I've been trying to bring to your attention. Looking forward in time, there is no such thing as "the actual world" because that would imply fatalism. Therefore if our interpretation of modal logic applied to the past, "include the actual world", we clearly need different system of interpretation for the future which has no actual world.
Quoting Banno
See, this is the point. looking forward in time at 48BC, there is no actual world of 2025. Looking backward from 2025, there is an actual world of 2025. From this, it ought to be very obvious to you, that the limitations placed on possibility (producing what I called impossible) are very different when looking forward in time, from what they are looking backward int time, due to the reality of "the actual world". Once you introduce in "the actual world", you are compelled to abide by the limitations this concept imposes. This implies that we cannot apply the same principles of logic to the past as we do to the future. So any logic which attempts to extend the past into the future must respect this difference.
Quoting Banno
The possibility of contradiction we were discussing, was in the case of applying modal logic to the future. Your example is of the past, and due to the difference I just explained, that example is irrelevant to this matter. So, to put it in plain simple terms, Caesar stands in front of the Rubicon in 48BC, that being "now" for Caesar. Caesar considers the following: "in one world I cross", "in another world I do not cross". The designations of one possible world and another, are irrelevant, because these are not separate worlds, only separate thoughts for that man. Clearly, Caesar considers contradictory thoughts, at the same time, "I cross", "I do not cross". Why would anyone want to place these contradictory thoughts into separate possible worlds, to create the illusion that there is no contradiction going on, just for the purpose of hiding the reality that decision making involves contradiction? The fact of the matter is that contradiction is inherent to decision making and we need to respect this fact, rather than trying to hide it through a separation of distinct worlds.
Quoting Hanover
I agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. I believe though, that they are useful in some form of probability context, producing artificial (AI perhaps) statistics or something like that. But even this is a bit deceptive because artificially produced statistics are not real statistics, therefore that type of use may be misleading.
Anyway, that's a digression. The point I am trying to bring to Banno's attention, is that "possible worlds" interpretation is useful when looking backward in time, to create (supposed) realities which are distinct from the actual reality (therefore actually impossible even though they are called "possible", by my description above), but this usefulness depends on the assumption of an "actual world" for comparison purposes.
But, when we look forward in time, the "possible worlds" interpretation is not at all applicable, and actually might be very misleading ontologically. This is because, amongst the multitude of supposed "possible worlds" there is no actual world, that would be fatalism. Therefore each world must start with a basic objective equivalence to every other world. Then, to weight the worlds according to probability, we must assume an actual world in the past, and apply inductive principles of probability, according to how we understand time to unfold. Further, we must consider what our own freely willed actions can and cannot influence, by way of preference. Therefore the situation is very complex.
The critical point is that our "preference" already enters into the descriptive practices which constitute the described "actual world", as prejudice, and simply the nature of language use and its evolved freedoms and limitations. This means that the basic and fundamental equivalence o the relation between possible worlds and the assumed actual world, which is required as the foundation for future possible worlds, is impossible to establish. The "actual world" is already weighted. Therefore instead of "possible worlds" as the starting point when looking toward the future, we need to hand priority to "preferred worlds" when looking toward the future, because this provides a better representation of reality.
OK, but this again is assuming that what constitutes "thing" and "parts" is uncontroversial and obvious. Do you want to say that Jill is a different "thing" if a couple of the microbes in her biome die between T1 and T2? What would make such an interpretation of "thing" attractive? The point is that we have to interpret it, because nothing in "A = A" will tell us how to do it.
I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance.
I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed.
I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering.
With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it.
An agent having the power of free will implies two things.
1. The agent has many things to choose from (in this case, many possible worlds can be designed).
2. The agent can select one of the many things at will (select to design the actual world).
Quoting Relativist
If the main point of point 2 is to describe out contingency would work, then I accept the description. I would then also add free will as another possible way to get contingency.
Overall, it seems we are almost in agreement, except for the possibility of inherent existence and quantum. I'm not hopeful on reaching an agreement on quantum but it may be worth spending more time discussing the possibility of inherent existence.
Quoting Relativist
How could that be? If we found out that all outcomes in the actual world occur out of necessity, then conceiving a possible world with some different outcome would necessarily have a logical error in it.
Better to see them as stipulated.
But yes, free will implies the capacity to make a choice. What do you want me to conclude from that?
What remains is that the OG (a dreadful phrase) can't do the job it was invented for. That god can create any possible world does not explain why he created this one. And if god created this world out of necessity, then it could not be other than it is. Modal collapse.
That's quite a misrepresentation, given that what I did was to point to how temporal necessity can itself be accommodated by formal modal logic. Here's more on Priors basic tense logic TL from SEP, including a section on how it uses a Kripke-style semantics.
The other supposed objections you raise have either been or can be dealt with within the standard framework. In particular, the treatment of accessibility answers your main misunderstanding. Explaining this repeatedly is tedious.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not me.
I think I indicated that it's not philosophically uncontroversial. The point is that we assume that there are real things, and that the thing's identity, i.e. what the thing is, inheres within the thing itself, not in our descriptions or interpretations of the thing. A thing has temporal extension and changes as time passes, but this does not change the assumption made by the law of identity, that the thing has it's own identity at each passing moment, and always continues to be the very precise thing that it is regardless of how it changes.
Quoting Hanover
I kept telling you that I allow modal logic, I just dispute specific interpretations. So there is no shift on my part. I think perhaps you are just starting to understand what I've been trying to say.
Quoting Hanover
I believe that counterfactuals are useful in the construction of philosophical theories and hypotheses, also in some probability theory, and likely in AI development. But I think counterfactuals generally do not have much of a practical application. However, counterfactuals are only a fringe part of modal logic (more like a curiousity) and modal logic in general has much practical application. I think that you are taking what I said about counterfactuals, as if I said it about modal logic in general.
Quoting Hanover
Interesting opinion.
Quoting Hanover
I think that you and Banno are not interested in discussing the underlying assumptions which support modal logic, and the appropriate interpretations, like I am. Instead you just want to proceed into discussing formal structure, which I am not interested in. So there is a divergence of interest between us.
Quoting Banno
Then why did you give an example of what Hanover called "metaphysical necessity", ("if it is necessary it could not have been otherwise"), and reject my use of temporal necessity, ("it cannot be changed, but could have been otherwise")? You rejected my use of temporal "necessity", saying I must speak in terms of metaphysical "necessity", and now you come back and say that "temporal necessity" is actually provided for in modal logic.
Quoting Banno
I believe, the way that you employ "actual world" in your example of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, is not actually a fair representation of how modal logic would be most useful in the context of that example. Consider the following:
Of all the possibilities (so-called possible worlds) to be entertained, we cannot assume any particular one to be the actual. The only actual world is the here and now, the truth of "what is" in our current condition, at the present. And, we do not have the means to make a direct relation from any assumed actual world of now, to that ancient time. So, we may have one version of history which says Caesar crossed the Rubicon at a specific time. Another historian might say that Caesar was in Rome at that time. Another might put him somewhere else. All of these are possibilities (possible worlds). Then we can collect other evidence of Caesar's movements, and possible whereabouts in that temporal proximity, and treat all the distinct pieces of evidence as further possible worlds. When we relate all these distinct possibilities (possible worlds), we judge for consistency between them, and this gives us the best probability of determining what was actually the case. Notice, that we do not determine what was actually the case, we determine the most probable solution. I believe the best interpretations, and most productive applications of modal logic completely dispense with the idea of an actual world, dealing completely within the possible, making judgements based on probability. This is a completely break from the logical structure which assumes truth value, what is "probable" is based on consistency.
The law of diminishing returns applies. Have fun.
I agree that IF libertarian free will exists, then it is a source of contingency. Would you agree that IF quantum collapse is indeterminate, the it is a source of contingency?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Conceiving of a counterfactual world does not imply that world is physically or metaphysically possible.
Examples:
1.I can conceive of a possible world in which earth has 2 moons instead of 1. Is that world physically possible? No, because the single moon is present as a result of the deterministic laws of nature. There is no source of contingency in the physical world to account for the counterfactual 2-moon earth. Conceivability doesn't align with what is physically possible. In terms of possible worlds: the set of conceptually possible worlds is not identical to the set of physically possible worlds.
2. Assume the PSR is metaphysically necessary. I can nevertheless conceive of a world in which the PSR is false: so there is a conceptually possible world in which the (metaphysically necessary) PSR is false.
Sorry to but in, but surely the number of moons a planet has, and the number of planets a solar system have, is not determined by any laws of nature. What is determined is how they orbit their stars and planets. What could not occur would be an orbital path not determined by those laws.
It's determined by the set of physical steps that led to the existence of the solar system. Each step is necessitated by laws of nature. Laws of nature necessitate their outcome. (We're assuming QM is deterministic). You'd have to assume random things happen for no reason, contrary to the PSR.
But I think that's a huge assumption. Even if it were true the amount of information one would have to have to calculate how many satellites a given planet could have is unknowable in practice, and it is known there are planets with more than one satellite (even other planets in our solar system.) The OP frames the relationship between PSR and determinism as binaryeither every event is strictly determined, or not. But the relationship isnt that simple. The principle of sufficient reason claims that everything has a reason or sufficient condition. However, that reason doesn't necessarily dictate a single, fixed outcome in all cases, it might only provide a range of possibilities (which is exactly what the Schrodinger equation does, come to think of it.) Meaning there can be degrees of likelihood, within a range (like, the particle will be registered, but it won't be a watermelon.)
And furthermore, natural laws are based on idealisations and abstractions - point particles, frictionless planes, and so on - which we don't encounter in reality. So in short, I don't see an a priori reason why a planet such as ours doesn't have two moons - it is a contigent fact.
Not determined so much as described. The motion precedes the "law," and supersedes it, too. The law was decided as a result of looking at the motion, and is changed in the light of further observation.
So which is doing the "determining"?
In the Newtonian frameworkwithin its applicable rangethe laws don't just describe motion, they enable precise prediction. If I know the mass, velocity, and position of a satellite, and I apply Newtons equations, I can calculate where it will be tomorrow, and Ill be right (at least to an excellent approximation). Thats more than just post hoc descriptionit reflects an underlying law-like regularity.
Granted, this breaks down at relativistic scales or in quantum domainsbut thats part of the point. Lawfulness can be domain-specific, and even in more advanced physics, the idea of constraint or structure doesn't vanish. It just becomes subtler. So Id still say theres a real sense in which orbital motion is determinedat least within the scope of classical mechanics.
So: yes, our formulations of the laws are historically contingent and always open to revision. But the regularities they describe are not arbitrary. They're what allow us to build spacecraft that actually arrive at their destinations. The laws of motion can predict how moons orbit planets, once they existbut those same laws dont determine how many moons a given planet will have. That depends on many contingent factorscollisions, accretion history, nearby bodies, etc.that fall outside the scope of deterministic prediction. Theres lawfulness in how systems behave, but not everything that happens is fixed by those laws alone.
I think the interesting philosophical point is precisely the sense in which the laws of nature seem true a priori, irrespective of experience. I mean, whenever something is suggested that might not obey those laws on this forum, merry hell usually follows :-)
Quoting Wayfarer
The law doesn't enable anything much. Except text book, perhaps. They do describe motion precisely, enabling prediction. Best avoid giving then the ontological status of involved in causation. Reification and all that. So better not to talk of enabling.
None of which makes the descriptions arbitrary.
"seem true a priori"?
Surely not. Your intuitions can't be that bad.
Quoting Wayfarer
We're discussing possibility/impossibility of a state of affairs, not the computability.
Quoting Wayfarer
That conflates textbook laws of physics with ontological laws of nature. As you know, I am a law realist. The present discussion is an alleged proof of God's existence, and I'm demonstrating that the proof depends on debatable metaphysical assumptions. I'm not trying to prove anything, other than the fact that conclusion is epistemically contingent on unproveable metaphysical assumptions.
Quoting Relativist
Just remind me again why Einstein said he doesn't believe that God plays dice?
But that's just what I'm questioning. It's precisely our interpretation of what "Jill" is going to encompass that will tell us what the "real thing" is. I assume you're not saying that there is some correct construal of "Jill" that is independent of interpretation. But in any case, I'm glad to see you backing off from the idea that identity has to include "all properties, essential and accidental".
No, that is what I am saying. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself" indicates that there is an identity ("correct construal" if you like), which inheres within the the thing itself, therefore independent of interpretation.
Quoting J
Why would you think that I am backing off from that? It's exactly what the law of identity indicates, proper identity inheres within the thing, as the complete form, all properties, essential and accidental, rather than an abstraction consisting of what is perceived to be essential.
In classical philosophyespecially in Platonic and scholastic traditionsparticulars are not intelligible in and of themselves, but only insofar as they participate in or receive a form or essence. Their identity is not something they generate, but something they manifest - in the theistic traditions, bestowed by the Creator.
This contrasts with modern metaphysical assumptions, which often treat particulars as having an independent reality. Eckhart: creatures are mere nothings. From within this perspective, the mind doesnt impose identity, but recognizes it through a kind of intellectual illumination that reveals a deeper metaphysical order (by recognising the form or what-it-is-ness of the particular being.)
It's Aristotle who designated the identity of the individual as within the individual itself, commonly known as the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This identity supports the reality of primary substance. I think we discussed this before, and you didn't accept that Aristotle recognized the identity of the particular.
The point of the scholastics is that the proper identity of the thing is not intelligible to us, human beings. We can only know things through abstraction, which does not grasp the true identity. The identity of particular things is, however, intelligible to God.
I'm sure that there are better ways of putting this, but the short answer is that Einstein said this because he believed that there was some underlying mechanism that would (in some manner) eliminate the uncertainty from the uncertainty principle. To the best of our current scientific knowledge, Einstein was mistaken in this belief.
As an aside (and apologies if I'm telling you something you already know) Einstein did not have any conventional religious beliefs. He was sort of a Spinoza-ist.
Yes, the law of identity (a=a) is a logical principlea tautology that belongs to the structure of thought and language. It tells us something about the consistency of our terms, but not about the ontological self-sufficiency of particulars. To read it as a statement about the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings is to conflate logic with ontology.
When Aristotle discusses primary substance in the Categories, he's not saying that the identity of the individual particular is simply in the particular in some absolute sense. Rather, he's marking it as that which is neither said of nor in a subjectthat is, the individual concrete thing, like this man or this horse. (ref). But even so, its intelligibility depends on form, not on its specific particularity.
Moreover, Aristotles deeper metaphysicsin the Metaphysics and De Animamakes clear that a substances what-it-is is grasped through form, not through brute particularity. So its not that the individual grounds its identity in itself, but that its being is composed of matter and form, and its intelligibility lies primarily in the formal principle, not in the sheer fact of its being this one.
The law of identity is a logical framework that presupposes ontological groundingit doesn't establish it.
Sure, right on both counts. My bad for introducing it, as quantum weirdness is a gauranteed thread de-railer, except for its undeniable relevance to questions of determinism.
Yes, acknowledge that they're not true a priori. Still struggling to see how the laws of motion would dictate that the Earth couldn't have two satellites, when other planets do.
Actually, you might research this. The law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself", as derived from Aristotle, is completely different from the modern presentation by logicians, of "A=A". How do you interpret "a thing is the same as itself" as being a statement about consistency in our terms, rather than what it obviously is, a statement about things, the intrinsic metaphysical identity of beings?
Quoting Wayfarer
Aristotle's best discussion of identity is in his Metaphysics. There is much to read because it stretches over a number of books. I believe he starts in earnest where he says that the fundamental question of being is not the question of why there is something rather than nothing, but why there is what there is, rather than something else. This amounts to the question of why an individual thing, and every particular, individual thing, is what it is, rather than something else. The law of identity, that a thing is necessarily the thing that it is, and it is impossible that any thing is something other than the thing that it is, provides his starting assumption.
Quoting Wayfarer
According to Aristotle's Metaphysics, each individual thing has a form which is proper to itself and only itself. This form, as the form of the material thing, is complete with all accidentals. Also, he argues that since things are composed of matter and form, and form is what makes the thing what it is rather than something else, substance belongs to the form. Pure matter would have nothing to differentiate itself, providing for no individual things, therefore no substance.
Quoting Wayfarer
I really think you ought to investigate further, exactly what the law of identity is, in its classical form.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle's position is that form is what makes an individual intelligible as a member of a kind. Its not that each individual has a completely unique form proper to itself, but rather that many individuals share a common formwhat wed call a species or essence. What individuates one member of a species from another is matter, not form - matter is what individuates them. To suggest that each individual has a form unique to itself closer to nominalism.
That's as far as I'm going to go. You've been on about this for years, as some kind of self-designated expert, but I'm never persuaded by your polemics, even while I don't claim to be an expert myself.
As per the OP, there are 3 types of reasons that fulfill the PSR. Reasons type 1 and type 3 are necessary reasons. Type 2 is a contingent reason and applies to agents with free will. As long as the agent has a purpose to decide what they decide, then the PSR is fulfilled, despite the choice being contingent. In our case, the OG would have a purpose to stipulate the actual world, even if that purpose is unknown to us.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, I agree with that in theory.
Quoting Relativist
I suppose that's true; just like we are able to talk about impossible worlds. Nevertheless, modal collapse should still be avoided when we talk about metaphysically possible worlds.
Quoting Relativist
Quoting Wayfarer
My two cents. I think what Relativist is saying is that, assuming deterministic laws of nature, then there would have been no possibility of having two moons in the past or in the present because it did not happen. But there could still be two moons orbiting the Earth in accordance to deterministic laws of nature in the future. E.g., the current moon splits in two; another large body passes by and starts orbiting the Earth; etc.
First is the obvious problem: natural laws falling into external contingency. The laws are, as you point out, fundamental. They exist simply by their fundamental nature that need not be an external cause. PSR should also, I believe, not be presupposed by an external contingent reason as it must as well be subject to PSR. This external contingent reason would only exist if it is treated as fundamental.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This is automatically true if you presuppose PSR. This should be true for all types, not necessarily requiring a free-will system.
In addition, I feel there is a lack of distinction between existential reason (reason for existence) and purpose (reason to exist) in "Man itself" section, although I feel that it is irrelevant to the core argument.
I continue to take issue with the notion that "modal collapse" must be avoided. I believe that modal collapse translates to necessitarianism in ontology: the notion that everything that exists could not have failed to exist, and that there are no non-actual possibilities (non-actual possibility= something that could have happened, but did not).
What would prevent necessitarianism from being true is some source(s) of contingency. No proposed source of contingency can be proven. You correctly noted that quantum collapse isn't necessarily contingent, and I pointed out that libertarian free will does not necesarily exist.
This is simply wrong, and not at all representative of what is actually found in Aristotle's Metaphysics. I've provided much evidence for you, in our past discussions on this matter, but you seem to have a strong bias which inclines you to ignore the evidence. It's well known that Aristotle's hylomorphism provides an approach to the substance of individuals, and the form of the individual is responsible for what it is, not just its type, but "what it is" in a complete sense. It would be a significant inconsistency, making Aristotle's metaphysics unintelligible, if form was responsible for the type, and matter was responsible for individual features. Notice that the suggested "prime matter" could have no features whatsoever, and would be absolutely unintelligible. This implies that all features of an individual, including those unique to the individual, which make a thing the particular thing which it is, must be formal.
Quoting Wayfarer
This statement demonstrates a misunderstanding of "matter". Matter itself cannot have any individuating features. That's what makes it fundamentally unintelligible. The separation between matter and form is what provides the distinction between what is in principle intelligible, and what is not intelligible. The fact that some features of an individual are not intelligible to the human intellect does not render them unintelligible in an absolute sense, because a higher intellect might grasp them. Therefore all the features of individuation, which make an individual what it is, whether its genus, species, variety, or the unique features of the particular, must be formal. To maintain consistency, all individuating features must be formal.
Exactly.
Quoting Wayfarer
And this.
"A = A" can tell us nothing about what we ought to substitute for A. It's not about being or ontology at all.
I don't really understand what you are asking but I'll try to answer your questions to the best of my ability.
Quoting tim wood
Form is, as I said, what the thing is. And, since all things have a whatness unique to themselves, it is what individuates one thing from another. It doesn't make much sense to ask what is form because that's like asking what is the form of form. You could ask such a question, but since each form is different from every other form, there cannot be an answer because that would require that all forms are in some way the same. But form is a principle of distinction, not a principle of sameness, while matter is what all material things have in common, so it is the principle of sameness.
Quoting tim wood
Form is what is perceived, we perceive differences. Matter is not perceived. We do not perceive sameness, we infer it through reference to memory, 'things have stayed the same', 'the same things are here that were here yesterday', etc.. However, what I was explaining to Wayfarer, is that we do not perceive the entirety of a thing's form, the complete form in its perfections which are proper to it being the thing which its, we perceive an abstracted form. This is why Aristotle has two distinct senses of "form" corresponding with primary and secondary substance. Form is "actual" and Aristotle outlines two very distinct senses of that word.
Quoting tim wood
Matter is strictly potential, specifically the potential for change. Being the potential for change, it does not itself actually change. Think of concepts like inertia, and the conservation laws of mass and energy. The potential for change does not itself change. In reality, "matter" is purely conceptual, but I believe it refers to something real, something we do not understand, but we know it as temporal continuity. So I think, the fact that many things here in my room today, are the same things which were here yesterday, despite the numerous changes which have occurred in the meantime, is due to their matter. The matter being the potential for change, which does not actually change.
Quoting tim wood
Clearly the difference between a kitten and a brick is a difference of form.
Strictly speaking, matter is potential. What gives it actuality is form. Matter without form, as "prime matter" which Aristotle pondered, is a no-thing, because things have a definite form. In my understanding, Aristotle rejected prime matter as an impossibility, but this is still debated.
Quoting tim wood
Yes, that is what Aristotle says. What you call "by itself" is what would be prime matter. Prime matter was proposed by some ancients, as the fundamental stuff which makes up all reality. It could have any form, infinite possibility, and as such, it cannot itself have any form. It's infinite possibility, and that's what makes it unintelligible. He also provided an argument to demonstrate that it is physically impossible.
Quoting tim wood
I don't quite follow this. But I understand the law of identity as assigning the form directly to the particular, as in the thing itself. That's what Wayfarer seems to disagree with, saying that A was not interested in particulars.
Quoting tim wood
I don't follow this at all.
That's right, withot form, matter would be a no-thing, pure potential. As potential, it neither is nor is not. That's what we were discussing earlier, whether possibility, under the Aristotelian conception, violates the law of excluded middle. This I argue, is what makes it unintelligible.
Quoting tim wood
I don't see how any of this is irrelevant. But form without matter is not left as nonsensical, because form is demonstrated to be prior to matter as cause of a material thing being the thing which it is. Matter is not necessary for particularity, as the essence of a thing is its form. This is what allows for the immaterial forms of Christian metaphysics. That the particulars appear to us as composed of matter and form, does not necessitate that they are not caused by independent forms, prior to material being.
Quoting tim wood
Having problems is not the same as not working. Human knowledge and understanding will likely never obtain the level of perfection. That implies that even though the things we do have problems, they still work for us. We live with problems. One issue which Aquinas took up. is that because the human intellect is united. and dependent on matter, its ability to understand forms will always be impaired.
I believe in a hard version of the PSR: everything must have a reason/explanation/ground. No exception; not for the fundamental laws of nature or for the PSR itself.
The fundamental laws of nature do not exist necessarily and so must have an external reason to exist.
The PSR has an internal reason to exist (reason type 3). As defended in this post, the PSR is a principle of metaphysics which means it is part of the fabric of reality. And the statement "a thing that is part of the fabric of reality exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.
Quoting PartialFanatic
A thing that exists or occurs out of necessity (reasons type 1 and 3) do not need a purpose to explain why they exist or occur. E.g., a water stream looks for the path of least resistance, not purposely but simply out of causal necessity from the laws of nature such as gravity and friction.
Quoting PartialFanatic
I believe these are the same as what is described in the OP as efficient cause and final cause. Indeed, if man is designed, then they would have a reason for existence (efficient cause) as well as a reason to exist (final cause). They would also have the other two causes: material cause (a physical body) and formal cause (a design).
My understanding is that modal collapse or necessitarianism is not strictly speaking impossible, but it is undesirable because it leads to absurd conclusions. It trivializes modal reasoning, and modal logic would be reduced to only very specific applications that would not be metaphysically true. As such, necessitarianism is best to be avoided if possible.
Concieiving this way doesn't imply that X was metaphysically contingent. Consider why you made decision to do X. If it was an impulse, then something led to the impulse (e.g. the scent of freshly baked cookies induced an impulse to eat one). If X was a deliberative decision, it was consequence of the factors that came to mind. that you weighed in a certain way. There's no obvious source of contingency, so why believe it was actually contingent? Conceivability can lead to modal illusion.
So I don't think it's reasonable to ever assume contingency, unless one can point to a source of contingency.
"If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred. Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X."
The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion. "I should" becomes "I will (or not)". Why make an effort to learn, grow, or improve if the future is fixed?
So even though we can conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions, I dispute that this would have any use, even for future cases.
If I decide not eat cookies (a "should"), this decision establishes a disposition- a factor that will influence, but not necessitate, my future behavior. The craving induced by the scent may create a disposition that may be stronger. The prior disposition is not an illusion, it was simply ignored and the impulse acted on.
I accept compatibilism- an account of free will that is consistent with determinism. It does not entail fatalism. Fatalism is the view that you have no real choices. Compatibilism is the view that our choices are under our control. Choices are the product of internal factors: knowledge, beliefs, desires, wishes, genetic predispositions, learned conditioned responses, dispositions, impulses, mood...
These factors were all caused, but they are bundled uniquely into each of us. They are what make us who we are.
Under compatibilism, we can still entertain past possibilities - the things one might have done, but it correctly recognizes that something would have had to be different: some missing bit of knowledge, improved impulse control. I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. And new experiences and knowledge change us, so that our future decisions will be made on a different basis.
Quoting Relativist
In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR.
Libertarian free will is defined as: "the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)". Since the "ability to choose freely" is contained in the definition of libertarian free will, then the explanation for our free choice exists inherently in the power of free will (reason type 3 in the OP).
Another way to say the same thing: if we suppose that we have the power of libertarian free will, then how do we explain our ability to choose without being compelled by external factors? Answer: because we have the power of free will; that's precisely what the power is supposed to do.
More details are provided in the following video: https://youtu.be/k_PoOKDVUdc
The full video is 21 minutes long, but you can skip to timestamp 15:28 for this specific topic.
No. I'm pointing out that [U]because[/u] decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. You choose to believe we have it, but I do not accept that as a premise.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Here's the logic you may be applying:
Assume A causes B, and B causes C, then:
A causes C (the logic is transitive)- Implying B is irrelevant. This is a fatalist view.
My point is that B is not irrelevant. Logic is transitive, but causation is not. Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur.
Compare this to a computer: input- processing- output. The processing is a necessary step - essential to producing the output. "A" consists of the physical parts of the computer, the software, electricity running through the circuits, and the specific input it was given. All those components are essential to producing the output ("C").
Sure. I accept the burden of proof to defend the existence of libertarian free will. For now, I'll continue to argue that compatibilist free will leads to fatalism.
Quoting Relativist
B is essential for C to occur, but this does not dismiss fatalism. E.g. cog A is connected to cog B which is connected to cog C. Cog B is essential for cog C to spin, but cog B has no control over the outcome. Adding complexity to the system, like a computer process or a compatibilist mental process, does not change the fact that there is no control from any of the parts.
Two problems with this:
1. We have agency:
- the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions
2. Fatalism entails an attitude of futility in the face of future events. If you're sick, your recovery (or death) is fated to occur - and this will occur regardless of whether or not you seek medical care. This is obviously not the case: we typically choose to act a certain way in order to achieve a desireable outcome. We choose medical care because we anticipate that it will improve our chances of recovery.
I agree that we have real agency, and yet this is not possible under necessitarianism where all actions from every part, like cogs, are necessary.
I agree that fatalism is a wrong view, and yet under necessitarianism, we have no power over future events since the future is fixed.
Assertion without argument. You refuted none of the 3 aspects of agency I identified:
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You're ignoring everything I said. If you're very sick, you choose to seek medical care because you believe it improves your chances of recovery. If you lacked that belief, you wouldn't bother. A fatalist wouldn't bother, because he assumes his outcome is fated to occur and any actions he takes are futile.
Compatilists refer to the "principle of alternate future possibilities" - the set of choices before us. I am free to make a choice among options before me. This is distinguished from the "principle of alternate possibilities" (implying past choices were contingent) that most incompatibilists consider essential to libertarian free will. This principle implies that our past choices could have differed from what they were.
A compatibilist, like me, recognizes that our actions influence the future, and so we make choices accordingly. In one sense, past choices could have been different - but only if there were something different, like a different (or stronger) belief.
Your choices seem free to you, I'm sure. You agreed the decision process is consistent with the PSR, so exactly what can you show to be inconsistent with determinism?
Quoting Relativist
Necessitarianism does not allow for alternate future possibilities, right?
Quoting Relativist
My choices seem free, and compatibilist free will is consistent with the PSR. But under necessitarianism and compatibilism, no choice is actually free. Thus, necessitarianism and compatibilism are inconsistent with the observation that my choices seem free.
You have not identified an inconsistency. Here's how you defined "libertarian free will":
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This definition matches a compatibilist definition of free will. Our choices are entirely the product of internal factors (whims, beliefs, desires, needs...). Surely you don't deny that all these internal factors have causes, do you? [B]What aspect of the decision making process is uncaused?[/b]
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Remember, you said:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Of course you disagree, but my point all along has been that your alleged "proof" of God depends on unsupported assumptions.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Correct, but this overlooks that our intentional acts, help cause the future through the choices we make- through our agency. Our motivations are all real, and they are part of who we are. The knowledge we employ can be true, and our reasoning can be valid.
You have identified no point in the decision making process at which an alternate decision could have been made - given the person's beliefs, perceptions, state of mind, set of factors that happened to come to mind, etc. You obviously want to believe there's something outside the deterministic chain of causation - a soul, for example. Which implies circularity in your argument.
Here is one misunderstanding. When you speak of "internal factors", I think you mean any factors inside the body: beliefs, desires, genes, etc; and by "external factors" you mean things in the environment. I mean something else: Imagine we have a libertarian free will - we can also call it a soul for the sake of clarity. In this context, any cause other than our free will or soul is an "external factor" and it includes not only the environment but also beliefs, desires, genes, etc. In that light, my definition of libertarian free will does not match a compatibilist definition of free will.
Secondly, I dispute that necessitarianism is compatible with intentions, free choice, control, and agency. Consider the statement "water streams look for the path of least resistance". The word "look" is used here in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, water streams do not literally look for anything as they are just molecules driven by gravity and friction.
Likewise, under necessitarianism, we might say we have intentions, free choices, control, and agency; but only in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, there is no real intention, free choice, control, or agency since everything is just a cog in a large system.
So you're simply stipulating that a soul exists, and on this basis - you "prove" a god exists.
To be clear, I have not been trying to convince you that compatibilism is true. Rather, I'm explaining my point of view. You reject it, and that's fine - I realize my position is inconsistent with theism.
However, I would like you to realize that God's existence can only be "proven" by stipulating certain metaphysical assumptions - assumptions that no naturalist would accept.
Embrace your faith, but recognize it depends on FAITH.
Quoting Relativist
The OP does not presuppose the existence of souls. The current discussion on free will is more like a tangential topic.
Quoting Relativist
I understand that your position is inconsistent with theism and that's fine, but as per the second paragraph in my previous comment, your position is also inconsistent with the existence of any real metaphysical agency - which you seem to believe in.
Identify this alleged inconsistency. The comment you referred to doesn't do it:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Water streams are not capable of intentional behavior. Human minds are.
Our minds retain memories, develop beliefs. We perceive needs and develop wants. Streams of water do not.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
It matches the definition you provided:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You may have a different concept of what is meant by "the will", but I regard this to refer to our capacity for intentional behavior - not as some non-physical object. This capacity exists, in varying degrees, in other animals. Example: thirst establishes an intent to drink water, and engage in behaviors to achieve that.
This capacity for intentional behavior, perception, memory etc is the product of evolutionary forces on the development of our central nervous system. Your specific brain was "caused" by the physical development that began with a zygote. From birth, onward- we learn, establishing knowledge that influences our thinking. The collection of all these things (central nervous system, innate cognitive ability, memories, conditioned responses, etc are what makes us who we are. And we are organisms that engage in intentional behavior guided entirely by what is within us. You are trying to define us into non-existence.
Not an argument against compatibilism, but for info, under libertarian free will, all these things are real and they inform and influence our decisions but do not compel - like a king listening to his advisers, the free will has the final say.
Quoting Relativist
In summary, real metaphysical agency (not merely the perception of agency) necessitates freedom, i.e. contingency. Since necessitarianism does not allow for contingency, it is not compatible with real metaphysical agency. I don't believe I can explain why any better than what I have done previously, so if you disagree, we can just agree to disagree.
Either these things necessitate the decision, or there is some randomness to the decision. Consider any deliberative decision a person makes: he evaluates from a set of options that have come to mind; he weighs pros and cons, based on his prior-existing beliefs and dispositions, and finally makes a reasoned choice. How could your "king" make a different choice, given the complete set of mental conditions that led up to it? He couldn't, unless the deliberative process included some random element (e.g. randomness in the set of options that came to mind, the weights assigned, the antecedent beliefs...). If the difference is randomness, that's not a manifestation of some additional control.
So the decision-making process does not seem to be a meaningful point of distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
That is a unique definition of "agency". You're attempting to "win" this debate by creating a non-standard definition of agency that is inconsistent with compatibilism. I previously pointed you to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on agency (again here). As I noted, agency entails
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-reflection on, and caring about, our actions
In the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate among philosophers, the term "agent," is not in dispute. Rather, they debate what sorts of freedoms human agents require (for example) to be held morally accountable.
I'm also curious how you account for free will given God's foreknowledge. You are not free to make a choice other than the one God knows you will make. No alternatives are possible.
Libertarian free will (LFW) and randomness are similar in that they are both free (i.e. not determined), but a free-willed behaviour is ordered towards a deliberate end where as randomness is not. You can see a diagram in this video at time 0:51.
Quoting Relativist
Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.
Quoting Relativist
God's foreknowledge does not entail fate; rather, He observes us in the future as though it is happening in real time. As an analogy ... suppose we have LFW and I videotape your free-willed behaviour for one day. If I watch the video, I foreknow what your behaviour in the video will be since I already observed it. This does not change the fact that we have LFW.
But how can a person have actually made a decision that differs from the one actually made? I have been arguing that, irrespective of LFW or compaitibilism, our choices are made due to a set of mental factors, and that GIVEN those factors, no alternative decisions are possible. Can you falsify this?
You seem to apply this logic:
1. We have LFW (premise).
2. LFW entails our choices are contingent
3. Therefore our choices are contingent (i.e. there are non-actualized possibilities)
I can understand that you believe premise 1, but you haven't provided an argument that establishes this premise. If your logic is different, then please provide it.
[Quote]Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.[/quote]
I choose to lift my arm, and voilà : my arm lifts. I can initiate this action any time I like. [B]I[/b] am lifting it, not forces outside of me. Another example: I am writing this response to you - I initiate every keystroke, not something external to me.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This contradicts omniscience. Omniscience entails knowledge without a process of learning or observing.
I asked the question because I wondered if you embraced Molinism. The Molinist view: God knows every freely-willed choice you will make in every metaphysically possible world. He "chooses" to create the world that results in the best possible world. (God's "choice" is not deliberative; he knows the correct choice through omniscience).
Alternative decisions are possible if we have the power of LFW which gives us exactly that: the ability to make alternative decisions. This power would be irreducible to any underlying mechanism, otherwise it would not be free.
I could provide arguments to defend LFW, but to understand them, it is best to first understand the scope and limitations of LFW. For that, I recommend watching the video on free will. Sorry to keep pushing it, but I think it's the fastest way to describe LFW. It's 20 min long but you can just watch the first 12 minutes.
Quoting Relativist
There are no physical forces outside of you but all the factors that necessitate your actions originate from outside of you.
Quoting Relativist
There are different views on God's omniscience. To obtain omniscience through observing (at least for knowledge about free willed behaviours) is still a form of omniscience. And God can still be omniscient at all times if He stands outside of time.
Thanks for sharing the view about Molinism; I did not know about this. At first glance, it sounds promising.
You've simply restated your assertion, and haven't considered the decision process.
Deliberative decisions entail a series of thoughts that lead to a decision. These thoughts entail consideration of immediate perceptions (sounds smells, tastes, shapes. textures...), beliefs, dispositions, and conditioned responses. All of which are considered within a specific state of mind (e.g. mood, energy, feelings). The particular sequence of thoughts (which even your "king" must go through) leads to a decision. It makes no sense to suggest that the same sequence of thoughts (by the same "king"), in the same state of mind, could have reached a different conclusion, because there can be no reason for it. Simply declaring that LFW accounts for other, non-actual, possibilities ignores these mental processes.
Could one of the intermediate thoughts have differred? No, because each intermediate thought developed similarly, or is simply a recall of a prior belief, disposition (transient attitude, general dispositions, mood), some immediate sensory perceptions (e.g. smell, sight, sound), or a conditioned response to a prior thought or sensation.
So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.
In your video, you claimed that we ought to trust our intuition that we could have made a different choice. My above analysis counters that: when reflecting back, we are considering a past choice from a new perspective. This does not entail winding the clock back to the prior set of mental conditions.
Another issue: you claimed Occam's razor (principle of parsimony) should be applied to this intution of contingency, suggesting it's a "simpler explanation". That is a misstatement of parsimony. Newton's gravitational theory is simpler than General Relativity (GR), but we choose GR because it explains the fuller set of facts.
The fullest set of relevant facts includes everything we know about the natural world, which is mostly a product of science. The success of physics at describing the evolution of the universe through laws, is strong evidence that the universe evolves strictly according to laws - implying determinism is true. So it becomes UNparsimonious to assume humans are an exception to determinism. What could account for this exception? A deterministic universe could not produce an object that behaves INdeterministically.
A theist would reply that God accounts for this indeterminacy - he directly creates a soul/will/"king". That takesGod's existence for granted. To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists. God+LFW is inherently unparsimonious, compared to compatibilism. So your "Occam's razor" argument fails.
I'll defer addressing your moral argument for now, but it will also fail.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You are committing 2 errors:
1) You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd.
2) You ignore the fact that every part of a person has been caused even under your paradigm. You came into existence from the development of a zygote that was created from your parents union (they were each created the same way). This established (i.e. caused) your intrinsic nature.
As you matured, you were shaped by your environment (a causal effect). It influenced what you came to believe and how you think. You are changed a bit by every new experience, each of which you process through the lens of your existing world view- an ever evolving perspective that shapes your subjective interpretations of the experiences.
You can interject your belief that there is a non-physical inner soul/will/"king", that is part of your core identity, but even so - this thing did not pop into existence uncaused. You assume God caused it. So even if your LFW paradigm is correct, everything about you was still caused.
These mental processes are not ignored in LFW. They are part of the decision mechanism but they only serve to inform, not compel. The mental process serves to predict the end goal of the choice, called motive. If there is no conflict between two types of motive, then the decision mechanism is very much as you described under compatibilism, i.e., the strongest motive wins. But if there a conflict between two types of motive, i.e. pleasure vs moral duty, then the agent is free to choose between the two motives.
Quoting Relativist
This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors. As an analogy: In a mathematical formula, the result may change if the variables in the formula change; but for a given set of variables, we do not expect more than one possible result.
Quoting Relativist
This is not necessary. The current topic is only to determine whether LFW exists; and we can know that something exists without knowing where it comes from, which is a different topic. Also, many people who believe in LFW do not believe in God.
Quoting Relativist
I don't dispute that B has causal efficacy. I dispute that B has agency, as agency requires the capacity to initiate an action, and B does not initiate the action.
Quoting Relativist
Yes, there is a cause to our existence, including our power of free will. But once we have it, it gives us the power to initiate an action. LFW allows us to select between choices A and B, i.e., to initiate the action to actualize contingent world A or B.
My point is that the process is identical whether its LFW or Compatibilist. The only difference is that you assume the mind is an actual source of ontological contingency. But you have not established this to be the case through any stated reasoning. You've described your opinion, but not stated an argument that shows why I should accept it.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
That's totally unconvincing. I take exception with both your terminology and your assumptions.
The mental process I described applies whether or not LFW is true, and you've ignored it in your account and simply repeated your overly simplistic description.
A choice can be before us for a variety of reasons, such as the pursuit of a goal, or entering a forced choice situation that requires choosing an option. The end result of the process isn't a "prediction", it's the decision - and I'm referring to the final decision, often immediately preceding the act. There are often many motivations, not just 1 or 2 "motives". I prefer to call them "dispositions", as a more general term than motive. There are conscious dispositions and subconscious ones. A few examples: a preference of color, a pleasant scent, a sense of pride, a desire for pleasure (sexual, aesthetic, comradery...), and even a disposition to do good, among countless many others. Beliefs are closely tied to dispositions, and are critical to the process because they are essential to the thought process.
Some dispositions are stronger than others, and the relative strengths will fluctuate over even short periods of time (example: mood swings). Same with beliefs: some are more strongly held (more certain) than others, and they also vary in relative importance. Some dispositions and beliefs have emotive qualities, meaning that they may trigger happiness, anger, affection, hatred, pleasure, etc. Every emotion is connected to beliefs and dispositions.
Morals are both dispositions and beliefs. One may be disposed to do good things in general, or specific good things in particular. But what we consider to be "good" entails a belief.
Your description omits all these factors, and I think it's self-evident that something like this is going on.
I'll now interject the compatibilist view of moral accountability that I had deferred.
It is appropriate to hold oneself (or another person) accountable for a bad act because we know he could have chosen not to do it. Here's how he could have: if he had a stronger disposition to do good, a stronger belief that the act is bad, had he considered the consequences, been more empathetic, or if he more strongly believed the "sin" could have eternal consequences, he would not have done it (my list is illustrative, not exhaustive). With oneself, there are lessons learned (new, or strenthened beliefs) from the consequences of the act, so future choices may improve.
With regard to misbehavior by others. social approbation is added- public shame or even punishment. To the degree this is public, the observed process influences members of the public to gain similar lessons learned, vicariously.
[Quote]
So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.
Relativist
This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors. [/quote]
Yes it does! It's PRECISELY why we perceive that we could have made a different choice.
To deny this, you would have to assume that fantasizing about a past choice entails a perfect duplication of the mental conditions that led to the decision. If it is NOT perfect, then it is not a valid basis for claiming this is a good reason to believe a different choice was actually possible.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
OK, let's not assume God. Early in the discussion, you agreed that ontological contingency requires a source of contingency. If there's no God, then human life came to exist as a product of deterministic laws of nature. A deteministic law cannot be a source of ontological contingency. Case closed. This is why I said you needed a God who could create beings that behave with true contingency.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
It sounds ludicrous to claim I do not initiate the raising of my arm. You've given me no reason to doubt that I am initiating the action. You just seem to make a personal judgement based on a framework you invented.
That framework simply describes what you believe; you've provided no reason for me to accept it. To do that, you would need to show it's superior to other frameworks.
In other words, we reward and penalize certain behaviours as a form of conditioning, like training dogs to behave a certain way. This objection is addressed in the video. This explains our rules on a societal level but it does not explain why we praise or blame people on a personal level. There's a difference between judging a dog and judging an (adult) human for acting badly. We judge the dog as poorly trained, but we judge the human as being morally wrong or evil.
Quoting Relativist
Conceiving valid thought experiments is not impossible. For one thing, we don't need to simulate every factor; we can just use the mental factors we currently have (current mood, beliefs, etc.) and only need to imagine a simple situation.
Additionally, as described in the video, we perceive freedom differently between cases with only one type of motive (e.g. ice cream vs ice cream) and cases with multiple types of motives (e.g. ice cream vs charity). In the latter, we perceive to be free, where as in the former, we do not.
Quoting Relativist
I can only grant you that LFW came from something other than deterministic laws. After that, to claim that this something must be an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God is jumping to conclusions.
As a side note, would you not agree that an OG would necessarily have LFW? Since it is the first cause, its actions cannot be determined by any prior cause.
Quoting Relativist
Can you further explain what you mean by "initiate"? For example, when a computer boots up because a person pressed the power button, who initiated the eventthe person, the computer, or something else?
Because of our moral sensibilities- the emotions we feel when considering the acts.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Do dogs have moral sensibilities? Do they have empathy? Do they have vicarious experiences? Do they have moral beliefs? I don't think so, and this means it's extrememy different.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You're making excuses for treating the thought experiments as evidence for ontological contingency. "It seems like we could have chosen differently, therefore we could have chosen differently."
We would absolutely need to duplicate it with 100% accuracy- an impossibility. No thought experiment is actually winding the clock back to the exact mental conditions at the time the thought processes occurred.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Your scenario is contrived is ridiculously simplistic and it ASSUMES what you're trying to prove: LFW. You erroneously assume moral "motives" can't exist under compatibilism, you ignore the many complex factors involved with developing our various tastes, wants, and even our beliefs about morality. I described some of the details on my last post, and you simply ignored it. Did you even read it?
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
This is problematic, because there's no evidence of any causally efficacious factors in the world that are NOT deterministic, except for quantum indeterminacy (which you rejected). But if QI is involved with mental processes, it only introduces randomness. So there's no basis to support the claim that we are somehow a source of ontological contingency. This is exactly the reason compatibilism was developed, to show that the perception of free will was compatible with determinism.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Of course not. There's no reason to think an OG has the capacity for intentional behavior and to make decisions.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
I don't know what you're looking for, because it seems self-evident. So it would be best if you describe the process as you perceive it during the act, . Needless to say, don't assume LFW in your description, because that's a post-hoc interpretation. IOW, describe what you are thinking, and the relation between your conscious thoughts and your brain stimulating the nerves in your arm that makes it perform the action.
Quoting Relativist
We can feel emotions about dog behaving badly as well, and judgement does not follow from mere emotions. The fact is that we consistently judge humans to be morally evil when misbehaving (not dogs), and moral evil is not compatible with determinism.
Quoting Relativist
I think you misunderstand my argument, as I do believe that moral motives can exist under compatibilism, and this is not my point. But I don't want to spend more time trying to clarify it, so let's drop it.
Yes, I read all your posts. I don't comment on every line because that would take too long, but in general, my view is that adding more determined factors to the explanation does not resolve the issue. In the end, each factor is nothing but a cog in a large system of cogs.
Quoting Relativist
You forgot your original point of this topic. Pasted below. I'm just responding to the objection that God must exist if we have LFW. After that, yes, LFW is not compatible with determinism and I reject determinism.
Quoting Relativist
Quoting Relativist
The OG's actions cannot be determined from prior causes, being the first cause. So if its actions are also not free, then what are they?
Quoting Relativist
Okay, I will assume determinism and not LFW. When a person raises their arm, all the mental processes originate from factors outside the person, just like the computer booting up originates from a person pressing the power button. In both cases, the event is not initiated by the object acting the event. Under determinism, the only initiator is the OG, and every subsequent object is just a cog.
You must be making some unstated assumption about the nature of morals. The presence of moral intuitions is perfectly consistent with determinism (and materialism).
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You misunderstand. I was giving you a GENERAL account of the mental process we all go through IRRESPECTIVE of whether or not LFW is true. Those factors all apply (beliefs, dispositions, moods...). This should be common ground -I see no reason why you shouldn't accept everything I said.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
My original point was that ontological contingency needs to be accounted for ontologically:
If A accounts for B:
then B is contingent iff A could have account for ~B AND this means A is a "source of contingency"
Otherwise A necessitates B
A second point I made very early is that there doesn't seem to be any sources of contingency in the world except for (possibly) quantum indeterminacy. I believe you agreed, although you deny that QM is indeterministic. So why should we believe minds are a source of contingency - an anomaly? You've given no justification for this.
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Best guess is that it would be a quantum system, so the actions that ensue would be the product of quantum indeterminacy. What that implies is dependent on the actual nature of QM - i.e. which interpretation is correct \
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
You are missing the point! Make no assumption at all, and just explain what seems to be going in in your mind. We ought to be able to agree on what seems to be going on. The question then becomes: how do we explain this sequence of events with LFW vs compatibilism?
This is the same problem in your description of making a decision: you aren't describing observed behavior; you jump straight to a LFW account and then compare it to some strawman distortion that you claim is compatibilist. This is why you get nowhere: you establish no common ground, and just claim your LFW account is better than your strawman-compatibilist account. I tried to establish common ground with my detailed description of the decision process, and you mistakenly treated this as some compatibilist alternative.
Yes, the factors (beliefs, dispositions, moods...) all apply in the decision making.
Yes, LFW implies contingency; and determinism is not compatible with LFW.
Quoting Relativist
I genuinely don't know what you are asking if I did not do it correctly last time. Can you do it first? Then I will do the same.
OK.
3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM. I set an alarm on my phone to notify me the time has been reached.
3:35PM- The alarm is ringing, so I lift my arm.
Some small period of time occurred between the alarm going off and the arm lifting. During this time, my brain unconsciously processed and interpreted the sound - and the fact became part of my conscious awareness. But without giving it further thought, I lift my arm once I realize the alarm is sounding.
We know the arm-lifting action is initiated by the firing of neurons, which stimulate nerves in my arm that cause the muscle to contract.
__________
Is there anything I left out of the process that you think is important? Is there any part of this you disagree with?
I agree with the description up to and including "I lift my arm once I realize the alarm is sounding."
After that, ...
Quoting Relativist
The arm lifting is caused by the firing of neurons. Why do you call it "initiated"? It is not the start of a causal chain, or the start of a branch of a previous causal chain.
I omitted one important thing: this neuron firing had an antecedent in the mind.
At 3:25 I had made the decision to lift when the alarm went off. This established a mental intent (to lift when the alarm sounds) that was dormant until triggered by the alarm going off. No conscious thoughts took place between the 3:25 decision and the arm lifting. So there was a direct causal link between this intent and the arm lifting.
I'll just point out that the arm-lifting was caused by my intent. Therefore the arm-lifting was an intentional act. Acting with intent implies agency.
3:25PM- I read your response and made the decision to lift my arm at 3:35 PM.
Did you have something else in mind? Remember, this is independent of LFW/compatibilism.
Quoting Relativist
Sure. And in a system of cogs A, B, C, cog B is also important for cog C to move; but it is not an initial step.
So...even if LFW is true, there was no initial step?
It seems to me, the natural thing to label as the first step is the decision, which was produced entirely by my mind.
There were external influences, such as the discussion we're having, but no one else demanded, encouraged, or even suggested I raise my arm at that time.
My decision, (and only my decision) was the direct cause of the arm lifting.
My thought processes (and only my thought processes), was the direct cause of the decision.
I thought we were setting aside any mentions of LFW/compatibilism. :wink:
Since you're asking... LFW allows the causal chain to branch out to multiple paths. Making choice A, between A and B, initiates path A.
Quoting Relativist
Not under compatibilism. Since your decision was determined, we could say the factors demanded (better yet, compelled) that you raise your arm.
Quoting Relativist
As previously stated, this does not imply agency. Cog B, and only cog B, is the direct cause of the movement of cog C, yet cog B is not an agent.
I mentioned it only to remind you that we're establishing a scenario that does not presuppose either LFW or compatibilism. You had said, "I still see no distinction in any of the steps to make one of them the initial step."
Are you thinking there's a first step if LFW is true, but not if compatibilism is true? Or are you saying there's no first step, regardless of which is true? If the former, then you're off the track of establishing common ground. The common-ground scenario is intended to describe how things SEEM to us, so we can then analyze more deeply. We need to do that before we jump into comparing a LFW account vs a Compatilist account of the scenario.
Regarding your assertion that there is no agency if compatibilism is true, this displays a misunderstanding. I'm hoping this becomes clear after we establish some common ground and then hone in on what is the same and what is different. In the meantime, I suggest reading the Compatibilism article, in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Throughout the article, there's discussion of what an "agent" does. The issue it discusses is whether or not the agent can be said to be freely willing his actions. The fact that there is agency is not at issue.
LFW or compatibilism are not presupposed. As quoted below, you said that intent implies agency. I responded that it does not if there is no initial step.
Quoting Relativist
We have spent enough time establishing common grounds. You know where my disagreement lies: You believe that compatibilism allows for agency; I believe it does not because agency implies an initial step from the agent as per this article, and I see no initial step under compatibilism. You have attempted to defend it by showing here that the person has causal efficacy, and while that's true, it is different than an initial step. If you can one day defend that there is an initial step under compatibilism, then we can chat again.
You had asked me:
Quoting A Christian Philosophy
Why did you ask this, if you don't believe there is an initial step even if LFW is true? What's the relevance?
I've been attempting to get you to examine the mental processes involved in a decision, and to see that this analysis would not yield an answer to the question of whether the process is deterministic.
Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, I raised my arm because I wanted to.
Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my wants were influenced by my history of experiences.
Irrespective of whether or not we have LFW, my unique genetic material led to the unique structure of my central nervous system, and this influences the way I think and thus, the choices I make.
The only real difference is that LFW depends on the assumption that there is some factor present that is outside the natural, deterministic causal chain. No objective analysis can show that this is the case.