The Forms

Reply to Shawn

The theory of forms is an application of a mistaken theory of reference. That theory holds that names refer to things, and that therefore, if there is a name, then there must be a thing to which it refers; So there must be a thing to which universals and such refer - the forms.

Reply to Shawn I think a case can be made that the forms are nearer to what we would call principles. Have a read of the chapter on Plato in this .pdf book, it will set you straight

Quoting Shawn

Would the irrational number, ?, also constitute some understanding of The Forms?

According to legend, the Pythagoreans—followers of the ancient Greek philosopher Pythagoras—believed that all things could be explained through whole numbers and their ratios. This harmonious view of the cosmos was shattered when it was discovered that some quantities, like the square root of 2, could not be expressed as a ratio of whole numbers. These “irrational numbers” deeply troubled the Pythagoreans, as they threatened the foundation of their mathematical and philosophical beliefs. The story goes that the man who revealed this unsettling truth—often said to be Hippasus—was drowned at sea, possibly by his fellow Pythagoreans, as punishment for exposing a truth they considered too dangerous or sacrilegious to be known.

There were similar controversies over the discovery of zero, which was likewise opposed on dogmatic grounds, holding back progress in arithmetic for centuries, until at last it was imported from Indian mathematicians, via Islamic scholars, who had no such qualms.

Reply to Wayfarer

“….That metaphysics leads to divinity is not an accident of history but is intrinsic to the very enterprise of metaphysics…”
(Link, intro., lower pg 3)

It has been intrinsic historically, but would you agree it isn’t so much anymore? Seems to me the logical ens realissimum doesn’t necessarily indicate a divine being, but merely an irreducible one, re: an ideal.

Might just be me, but when I see “divine” I feel like I gotta say some kinda prayer to it or something. Offer up burning incense.

Be that as it may….good reference material, as usual.

Quoting Mww

It has been intrinsic historically, but would you agree it isn’t so much anymore?

Well, sure, nowadays physics has metaphysics which has not much to do with divinity, although that is rather an old-fashioned word. And yes, that is an excepctionally good book.

Reply to Wayfarer This is not my area but I was kind of interested in Third Man argument as it appears in Parmenides. (Section 132a-133b ).

If we say that all large things are large because they share in the "Form of Largeness," and that the Form of Largeness itself is also large, then there's a problem. The Form must be large for it to be the Form of Largeness, but that creates a need for another Form to explain why both the large things and the Form are large.

This creates a never-ending chain of Forms. We would need a third Form to explain the second, a fourth to explain the third, and so on, endlessly. This is called the "Third Man Argument," where you keep needing more and more Forms to explain the relationship between the first two, leading to an infinite regress.

My understanding is that Plato may consider the theory flawed and incomplete (perhaps the way some physicists feel about Quantum). Any thoughts?

Quoting Shawn

In your own view, what are The Forms, which Plato alluded to?

Like animist / mystical "true names", it seems to me that Platonic Forms – essences, universals – are merely reified abstractions (and therefore a mistaken theory of reference).

Quoting 180 Proof

merely reified abstractions

All of reality is merely reified abstractions.

Quoting T Clark

All of reality is merely reified abstractions.

???

Reply to T Clark If that were so, the notion of 'reification" would be rendered senseless. If nothing is concrete, then there could be no making something abstract more concrete.

This is a tree. "Trees" is somewhat more abstract. Botany, a step further still.

Quoting Banno

?If that were so, the notion of 'reification" would be rendered senseless. I

Correct. Redundent.

Reply to 180 Proof I agree. Nothing to see here.

Reply to Banno well, seeing as Shawn was asking for insight, they're the one doing the digging, nothing being bestowed. You coming here all "nothing to see here folk, I didn't create this thread," is probably the dumbest bit of reification here...

When someone is asking about X Y and Z the proper response isn't "nothing to see here" in an attempt to police the forums from someone asking a question. :lol: The Philosophy Forum's own Cartman. If there's nothing here, why do you need to say anything at all about nothing being here?

Ah because you took his abstract question and attempt to turn into a concrete waste of time. But If Shawn finds even 180's notion on it useful then there obviously is something to see here, as it's their question that they're asking. Somehow you forgot that you're not Shawn.

Reply to Wayfarer

?Shawn I think a case can be made that the forms are nearer to what we would call principles. Have a read of the chapter on Plato in this .pdf book, it will set you straight

That's an excellent source.

I will add another I like:

By calling what we experience with our senses less real than the Forms, Plato is not saying that what we experience with our senses is simply illusion. The “reality” that the Forms have more of is not simply their not being illusions. If that’s not what their extra reality is, what is it? The easiest place to see how one could suppose that something that isn’t an illusion, is nevertheless less real than something else, is in our experience of ourselves.

In Republic book iv, Plato’s examination of the different "parts of the soul” leads him to the conclusion that only the rational part can integrate the soul into one, and thus make it truly “just.” Here is his description of the effect of a person’s being governed by his rational part, and therefore “just”:

Justice . . . is concerned with what is truly himself and his own. . . . [The person who is just] binds together [his] parts . . . and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate, and harmonious. Only then does he act. (Republic 443d-e)

Our interest here (I’ll discuss the “justice” issue later) is that by “binding together his parts” and “becoming entirely one,” this person is “truly himself.” That is, as I put it in earlier chapters, a person who is governed by his rational part is real not merely as a collection of various ingredients or “parts,” but as himself. A person who acts purely out of appetite, without any examination of whether that appetite is for something that will actually be “good,” is enacting his appetite, rather than anything that can appropriately be called “himself.” Likewise for a person who acts purely out of anger, without examining whether the anger is justified by what’s genuinely good. Whereas a person who thinks about these issues before acting “becomes entirely one” and acts, therefore, in a way that expresses something that can appropriately be called “himself.”

In this way, rational self-governance brings into being an additional kind of reality, which we might describe as more fully real than what was there before, because it integrates those parts in a way that the parts themselves are not integrated. A person who acts “as one,” is more real as himself than a person who merely enacts some part or parts of himself. He is present and functioning as himself, rather than just as a collection of ingredients or inputs.

We all from time to time experience periods of distraction, absence of mind, or depression, in which we aren’t fully present as ourselves. Considering these periods from a vantage point at which we are fully present and functioning as ourselves, we can see what Plato means by saying that some non-illusory things are more real than other non-illusory things. There are times when we ourselves are more real as ourselves than we are at other times.

Indeed, we can see nature as a whole as illustrating this issue of how fully integrated and “real as itself ” a being can be. Plants are more integrated than rocks, in that they’re able to process nutrients and reproduce themselves, and thus they’re less at the mercy of their environment. So we could say that plants are more effectively focused on being themselves than rocks are, and in that sense they’re more real as themselves. Rocks may be less vulnerable than plants are, but what’s the use of invulnerability if what’s invulnerable isn’t you?

Animals, in turn, are more integrated than plants are, in that animals’ senses allow them to learn about their environment and navigate through it in ways that plants can’t. So animals are still more effectively focused on being themselves than plants are, and thus more real as themselves.

Humans, in turn, can be more effectively focused on being themselves than many animals are, insofar as humans can determine for themselves what’s good, rather than having this be determined for them by their genetic heritage and their environment. Nutrition and reproduction, motility and sensation, and a thinking pursuit of the Good each bring into being a more intensive reality as oneself than is present without them.

Now, what all of this has to do with the Forms and their supposedly greater reality than our sense experience is that it’s by virtue of its pursuit of knowledge of what’s really good, that the rational part of the soul distinguishes itself from the soul’s appetites and anger and so forth. The Form of the Good is the embodiment of what’s really good. So pursuing knowledge of the Form of the Good is what enables the rational part of the soul to govern us, and thus makes us fully present, fully real, as ourselves. In this way, the Form of the Good is a precondition of our being fully real, as ourselves.

But presumably something that’s a precondition of our being fully real must be at least as real as we are when we are fully real. It’s at least as real as we are, because we can’t deny its reality without denying our own functioning as creatures who are guided by it or are trying to be guided by it.13 And since it’s at least as real as we are, it’s more (fully) real than the material things that aren’t guided by it and thus aren’t real as themselves.

From Robert M. Wallace - Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present

The key thing here is "self-determination." But this can be taken to be "self-determination" in a more abstract, metaphysical sense as well, as it is in other readings of Plato, Aristotle and Hegel (who is in some sense very Aristotelian). For example:

[Hegel] thinks he has demonstrated, in the chapter on “Quality,” that the ordinary conceptions of quality, reality, or finitude are not systematically defensible, by themselves, but can only
be properly employed within a context of negativity or true infinity...

Note: For instance, one cannot understand “red” atomically, but rather it depends on other notions such as “color” and the things (substances) that can be red, etc. to be intelligible. This notion is similar to how the Patristics (e.g., St. Maximus) developed Aristotle in light of the apparent truth that even "proper beings" (e.g., a horse) are not fully intelligible in terms of themselves. For instance, try explaining what a horse *is* without any reference to any other plant, animal, or thing. This has ramifications for freedom as the ability to transcend “what one already is,”—the “given”—which relies on our relation to a transcendent absolute Good—a Good not unrelated to how unity generates (relatively) discrete/self-determining beings/things.

[Hegel] has now shown, through his analysis of “diversity” and opposition, that within such a context of negativity or true infinity, the reality that is described by apparently merely “contrary” concepts will turn out to be better described, at a fundamental level, by contradictory concepts. The fundamental reality will be contradictory, rather than merely contrary. It’s not that nothing will be neither black nor white, but rather that qualities such as black, white, and colorless are less real (less able to be what they are by virtue of [only] themselves) than self-transcending finitude (true infinity) is…

From Robert M. Wallace - Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God

Reply to 180 Proof Reply to Banno

I suppose it's possible to try to psychoanalyze Plato and come up with a theory where the real impetus for the Forms lies in reference, but it would be very hard to claim that this is primarily what he is exploring or what he calls the Forms in to do. The Problem of the One and the Many is rather the framing from which the Forms emerge, and it's also the framing Plato uses to introduce and develop it (as well as the historical context in which the theory emerges; he is responding to Heraclitus and Parmenides as his chief dialectical partners).

Certainly, Plato's theory is open to a number of criticisms. Aristotle mounts a convincing offensive almost immediately, and the theory is significantly different in what becomes "Platonism" (which absorbed a lot of Aristotle's suggestion). But Plato's text itself is also largely consistent with this "later" Platonism (scare-quotes because we don't really have sources to know if this wasn't simply the original interpretation).

Quoting 180 Proof

Like animist / mystical "true names", it seems to me that Platonic Forms – essences, universals – are merely reified abstractions (and therefore a mistaken theory of reference).

Naive referentialism is the belief that every word has a referent, rendering statements about unicorns meaningless. Plato would require that true knowlege of something is knowledge of the form, and with unicorns, there would be no such form, so one's knowledge would be limited. A unicorn would be a mental creation formed of other forms (like horses, horns, etc.), but statements about unicorns are not meaningless according to Plato.

That's my take on this. The suggestion though that Russell arrived thousands of years later and defeated Plato's theory of forms by just saying "'the present king of France' is meaningful but false" doesn't really give Plato his due.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus That the forms rest on a mistaken theory of reference is not a theory about Plato's motivation. It's nto that Plato invented the Forms because he misunderstood language; but that the plausibility of the theory—its intelligibility and appeal—rests on a semantic model that doesn’t hold up. That’s a diagnosis of the theory’s presuppositions, not its origin story.


Quoting Hanover

Plato would require that true knowlege of something is knowledge of the form...

And was he right? I doubt many would now agree.

Quoting Banno

Plato would require that true knowlege of something is knowledge of the form...
— Hanover
And was he right? I doubt many would now agree.

The truest triangle is the form. Real triangles always fail to match the concept due to bumpity parts that have to be overlooked.

Quoting frank

The truest triangle...

One can see and respect the merit of Plato's ideas - and ideals - without accepting them. His is a brilliant account. There is a difference between understanding Plato and thinking that he is correct.

We can ask, does this work for us, now? Do we treat seeking knowledge as seeking to understand a realm of perfect, unchanging, and eternal things which are the true reality, distinct from our physical world? Should we do so?

Is our aim to understand true triangles, or is it to understand real triangles? After all, it's the ones with the bumps and imperfections with which we find ourselves working. So why not both?

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus If the forms (ideas, eidos) are understood as principles rather than as ghostly templates in a mysterious realm then they continue to make sense.

Quoting Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.

Quoting Edward Feser

Consider that when you think about triangularity, as you might when proving a geometrical theorem, it is necessarily perfect triangularity that you are contemplating, not some mere approximation of it. Triangularity as your intellect grasps it is entirely determinate or exact; for example, what you grasp is the notion of a closed plane figure with three perfectly straight sides, rather than that of something which may or may not have straight sides or which may or may not be closed. Of course, your mental image of a triangle might not be exact, but rather indeterminate and fuzzy. But to grasp something with the intellect is not the same as to form a mental image of it. For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one; but the concept of triangularity that your intellect grasps applies to all triangles alike. Any mental image of a triangle is going to have certain features, such as a particular color, that are no part of the concept of triangularity in general. A mental image is something private and subjective, while the concept of triangularity is objective and grasped by many minds at once.

Quoting Banno

Is our aim to understand true triangles, or is it to understand real triangles? After all, it's the ones with the bumps and imperfections with which we find ourselves working. So why not both?

It's both. The math class is the realm of true triangles. The real world works by a margin of error. This is pretty much what Plato said.

Reply to frank He said a bit more than just that. As Hanover pointed out, he held that true knowledge is knowledge of the forms, and developed a proto-scientific methodology based on that notion. He looked at various triangular things and decided that they must have something in common that makes them triangular; then he went the step further. Since names refer to things, if there is a name such as "triangle", then there must be a thing to which it refers, the form "triangularity". He then posited that this "triangularity" is what is important, not the individual instance, which are no more than a shadow cast on a cave wall.


Alternatively, we might understand "triangularity" as a way of grouping some objects, as something we do, and without supposing the existence of a mystic form.

Quoting Banno

Alternatively, we might understand "triangularity" as a way of grouping some objects, as something we do, and without supposing the existence of a mystic form.

Why is the concept of a plane bounded by three sides 'mystic'? I say the problem is in trying to come to grips with the sense in which such concepts exist.


[quote=Bertrand Russell, The World of Universals]Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of whiteness. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ...In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time, also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.[/quote]

Quoting Wayfarer

Why is the concept of a plane bounded by three sides 'mystic'?

It isn't. But reifying it is.

You've had a read, I hope, of Austin's Are There A Priori Concepts?. I've mentioned it so many times over the years. I can quote stiff, too:

Austin, Philosophical Papers, pp 40-41, my bolding:(ii) Finally, it must be pointed out that the first part of the
argument (a), is wrong. Indeed, it is so artless that it is difficult
to state it plausibly. clearly it depends on a suppressed premiss
which there is no reason whatever to accept, namely, that words
are essentially 'proper names', unum nomen unum nominatum.
[b]But why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one
identical' object present which it denotes? Why should it not
be the whole function of a word to denote many things ?
Why should not words be by nature 'general' ?[/b] However, it is
in any case simply false that we use the same name for different
things: 'grey' and 'grey' are not the same, they are two similar
symbols (tokens), just as the things denoted by 'this' and by
'that' are similar things. In this matter, the 'words' are in a
position precisely analogous to that of the objects denoted by
them.

Quoting Wayfarer

I say the problem is in trying to come to grips with the sense in which such concepts exist.

Very much so.

Quoting Wayfarer

I say the problem is in trying to come to grips with the sense in which such concepts exist.

I'd say the best way to work on such a coming to grips, is by developing an understanding of the sort of information processing that goes on in our brains.

There's a lot more information available to enable the development of such underanding than there was in Plato day (or Russell's). It seems a shame to not be take advantage of such educational information.

The abstract notion of a triangle is a recognition of a simple pattern. Our brains are to a substantial degree, pattern recognition engines that develop models of the world.

Forms sure sound to me like Plato's offering of a cognitive science hypothesis. Without a, doubt it's a very insightful hypothesis. There is something there to be explained, which Plato is pointing at with the notion of forms. I'd suggest the reification of forms mentioned by @Banno amounts to looking at the finger that is pointing, and missing out on learning about what Plato was pointing towards.

Reply to wonderer1 On the contrary, I think it clear to what Plato was pointing, but that he was mistaken.

Quoting Banno

And was he right? I doubt many would now agree.

I wasn't offering a general defense of Plato, but just one specific to your objection that he fails due to his belief that every word has a reference. He wouldn't hold that talk of unicorns is meaningless and he wouldn't argue they had a form, meaning an imaginary thing can exist under Plato without a referent.

The lack of ontological status of the unicorn impacts ithe strength of its epistemological status but it doesn't render it meaningless, which would be the result if he held to a naive theory of references.

Reply to Banno

I agree that Plato was mistaken in his hypothesis. I don't see that as contradictory to what I said. Still I have to give him credit for recognizing something important in our thinking, and taking a stab at making sense of it.

Of course fly bottles are an issue.

Quoting Banno

Alternatively, we might understand "triangularity" as a way of grouping some objects, as something we do, and without supposing the existence of a mystic form.

True. It's a matter of taste, though.

Reply to Hanover Thanks for clarifying. It's the general picture to which I would draw attention, much the same as the quote Wittgenstein used as his starting block in Philosophical Investigations.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

I don't know what Plato thought of Pegasus, I don't think there is much in the literature on the topic. Perhaps Pegasus is an example of a form that is not instantiate - possible-but-not-actual; or a "nonexistent object" that nevertheless exists within the realm of imagination and myth. I do think it useful, in understanding were the Theory of Forms goes astray, to consider it in line with assumptions of how language works that, if not evident in Plato's own writing, are nevertheless apparent in others, including Saint Augustine.

Quoting frank

True. It's a matter of taste, though.

More a matter of coherence.

Quoting Banno

More a matter of coherence.

Did you show that the theory of forms is incoherent? I missed that.

Reply to frank apparently you missed quite a bit. Cheers.

Reply to Banno Go to: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy_of_the_divided_line

and click on tabular summary of the divided line.

The 4 levels of knowledge based upon their consistency with the pure form are:

Imagination (eikasia), Belief (pistis), Understanding (dianoia), and Pure Reason or Theoretical Reasoning (nous).

Imagination is the least reliably related to true form, and it's considered perhaps a creation of other parts of true forms (as in Pegasus would be horse, wing, etc, but not an actual thing).

This is my best understanding based on the rabbit hole I went down trying to figure this out.

How this correlates to your linguistic concerns is interesting, but difficult to integrate because Plato, at least here, isn't correlating words to meaning, but knowledge to things.

Reply to Hanover Thanks. A thoughtful reply.

I'm struck by how much this is an evaluation. And an evaluation that debases the physical world. A hierarchy, the commons at the bottom, the few at the top. A defence of elitism. So it would not be a surprise to see forms defended by erstwhile aristocrats. Just an observation.

Ordinary language concerns itself with practicalities. Its concerns are belief and appearance, enabling us to navigate daily life, make things, buy things, survive. Plato sees this as a problem, since truth is to be found in dianoia or no?sis. But that’s also what makes common language powerful—it works. It’s how we build, argue, care, joke, mourn. It may not be about eternal truths, but it's deeply human. And it is where meaning is found - since meaning is the use to which we put our common language.

So as one moves along the line, one moves away from use and practicality, presumably toward misuse and impracticality. There's the link to linguistic concerns.

Not a style of discourse I like much, being more at home in analytic responses. But increasingly folk seem to like this sort of fluff. Perhaps this will show you something of why I find forms somewhat objectionable.

Quoting Banno

Why, if 'one identical' word is used, must there be 'one identical' object present which it denotes? Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things ?
Why should not words be by nature 'general' ? (Quoting Austin)

Words can only be general because they denote universals. But universals are not things that exist. They are not objects as such. Designating them as 'things' is precisely the reification that you and Austin are complaining about. But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

Note again from Russell:

the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. ....it seems plain that the relation subsists

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects, but as the indispensable constituents of the rational structure of reality - the 'ligatures of reason' - grasped by the mind, and necessary for intelligibility, yet not themselves located in space and time.

I'll pick this up later.

Quoting Banno

struck by how much this is an evaluation. And an evaluation that debases the physical world. A hierarchy, the commons at the bottom, the few at the top. A defence of elitism. So it would not be a surprise to see forms defended by erstwhile aristocrats. Just an observation.

I know Plato was opposed to democracy, preferring philosopher kings, so that would be elitist. Traditional theism posits a perfect God, so that too appears Platonic, although the early OT God was very much on an earthly level. Christianity has an all high God, but it also holds meekness a virtue, so that does appear a counter to the suggestion elitism flows from Platonism, considering Plato"s influence on it.

Where Plato specifically addresses words and meaning: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-cratylus/

I found that discussion of little value other than historical. Debating whether words are arbitrary or somehow naturally linked to the form was an odd debate, but perhaps that work was a very early recognition of the tension between meaning and words.

Quoting Banno

as one moves along the line, one moves away from use and practicality, presumably toward misuse and impracticality. There's the link to linguistic concerns.

I see Plato as unapologetically metaphysical, a realm linguistic theory tries to avoid, so I see Kant's noumena in the forms more clearly than your implication. That is, the closer we get to reality, the less we know of it. Kantian phenomena are the shadows on the caves so to speak. See also,
Exodus 33:18-23 for interesting metaphor where God equals truth.

Quoting Banno

may not be about eternal truths, but it's deeply human. And it is where meaning is found - since meaning is the use to which we put our common language.

You live among the trees and that's where real life is experienced, but that doesn't mean recognizing the forest or even tending to it is a lesser good. I realize the analogy fails on an important level: trees are smaller parts of forests, where Plato's images are blurs of forms, but the point remains, life can occur in the foxhole, but wanting to know what the war is about matters too.

But to your specific point, that the emphasis on the most high and unknowable desecrates the truth of the daily experience gets at that vexing question of Truth.

As I'm following, the highest form of knowledge is of the form, not the reflections on the cave or in your imagination. The use of "knowledge" here requires Truth (as in JTB). So when Plato wants higher knowledge, he requires closer Truth (the form).

His is a conservation about knowledge (and so necessarily of truth) and yours of words. But maybe your placement of words at the level of forms is a suggestion that the word"s meaning is the highest truth?

Quoting Wayfarer

Words can only be general because they denote universals

So 'Wayfarer" is a universal? No. Quoting Wayfarer

But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

That doesn't follow, and he doesn't, anyway. Quoting Wayfarer

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects

Back to playing with 'exists'. If a 'ligatures of reason' is logical stuff like quantification and equivalence, then say so and we can have some agreement. Ohterwise, what the fuck is a 'ligatures of reason'?

Quoting Hanover

...a realm linguistic theory tries to avoid..

Well, no, it doesn't. It deals with it by clarifying what's going on in metaphysical chat. That Kant made much the same error as Plato is not all that helpful... and that so much theology is built on Plato furhter complicates stuff.

Form other stuff you have said, you might agree that there only is a "forest" in so far as we interact with it - perhaps in recognising the river and the grassland as not forrest, or in planting seeds in order maintain the forest, and so on. The meaning (use) of "forest" rests on what we do, not on some abstracted forest form in a perfect world.

The picture Plato paints is arse-about.

Reply to Hanover

I know Plato was opposed to democracy, preferring philosopher kings, so that would be elitist

The idea is also situated in a discussion of an ideal city as a model for the human soul. That's why the city is introduced in the first place, as an analogy for self-governance.

I find it ironic that Plato is often called an elitist today because this is very much the model of modern liberalism, at least in theory. There is, ideally, a highly trained, meritocratic elite who governs with the consent of the governed according to what is best for the whole. That's Plato, but that's liberalism from Hamilton writing in the Federalist Papers to modern progressivism, to the ideals of the Neocons.

*

Quoting Wayfarer

Words can only be general because they denote universals. But universals are not things that exist. They are not objects as such. Designating them as 'things' is precisely the reification that you and Austin are complaining about. But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

Note again from Russell:

the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. ....it seems plain that the relation subsists

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects, but as the indispensable constituents of the rational structure of reality - the 'ligatures of reason' - grasped by the mind, and necessary for intelligibility, yet not themselves located in space and time.

So, there are things that exist and things that do not exist. If those things do not exist, it might subsists. If it subsists, it is real. If it does not subsists, it is not real.

The question I have, if it does not exist and does not subsists, and thus not real, what is it? Can you provide an example of something not existing or subsisting?

It reminds me of what Quine said in "On what there is", "Wyman's overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst of it. Wyman's slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in the doorway; and, again the possible bald man in that door way. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men. How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another?"

Quoting Richard B

there are things that exist and things that do not exist. If those things do not exist, it might subsists [sic]. If it subsists, it is real. If it does not subsists [sic], it is not real.

I’m differentiating the sense in which particulars exist from the sense in which universals are real. Particulars exist in a phenomenal sense, but universals are real in a different sense. I think Russell uses ‘subsist’ to try and articulate this distinction, and while I don’t think that term provides a very elegant way of expressing it, at least it recognises there is a distinction to be made.

An archetypal example of a universal can be found in the argument from equals in the Phaedo. You will recall that in it, Socrates discusses the nature of 'equals' with Simmias, saying that unless we grasped the idea of 'equals' then we wouldn't recognise that two things of different kinds were of equal lengths. (Of course in the context Socrates argues that this must be because of knowledge the soul has before birth, but that is not relevant for my purposes.) So one might feasibly imagine an addendum to that dialogue:

Socrates: “This 'Equal' that you agree is essential to our judgments — can you show it to me? Can you point to it as you would point to a piece of wood or a stone?”

Simmias: “No, Socrates. 'The Equal' is not something we perceive with our senses. It is something that only reason (nous) can grasp.”

Thus, Socrates draws Simmias to recognize that the Equal — and by analogy, all such intelligible Forms — does not exist as a physical thing, but subsists as an intelligible reality, knowable only to a rational soul (psuché).

A fuller elaboration of this point is provided by Eric D. Perl in "Thinking Being: An Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition":

[quote=Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28] Forms...are radically distinct, and in that sense ‘apart,’ in that they are not themselves sensible things. With our eyes we can see large things, but not largeness itself; healthy things, but not health itself. The latter, in each case, is an idea, an intelligible content, something to be apprehended by thought rather than sense, a ‘look’ not for the eyes but for the mind. This is precisely the point Plato is making when he characterizes forms as the reality of all things. “Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?—In no way … Or by any other sense, through the body, have you grasped them? I am speaking about all things such as largeness, health, strength, and, in one word, the reality [??????, ouisia] of all other things, what each thing is” (Phd. 65d4–e1). Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason. If, taking any of these examples—say, justice, health, or strength—we ask, “How big is it? What color is it? How much does it weigh?” we are obviously asking the wrong kind of question. Forms are ideas, not in the sense of concepts or abstractions, but in that they are realities apprehended by thought rather than by sense. They are thus‘separate’in that they are not additional members of the world of sensible things, but are known by a different mode of awareness. But this does not mean that they are ‘located elsewhere'...[/quote]

Thus, when we distinguish between particulars that exist phenomenally and universals that are real intelligibly, we are making precisely the kind of distinction Plato articulates, and which later philosophy (including thinkers like Russell, despite his awkward terminology) recognizes as crucial to any coherent account of universals (not that he elsewhere defends scholastic realism).

As for Quine, that is a vulgar caricature.

Looks like there was something to see here after all...

Quoting DifferentiatingEgg

Looks like there was something to see here after all...

Yeah, look at all the scribbled forms on this web page form.

In considering Plato, we might ask: "In virtue of what are all just acts called 'just' or all round things called 'round?'" If there are facts about which acts are just, or which things are round, etc., in what do these facts consist?

If our response is that there are social rules for making vocal utterances, assertability criteria for declaring something 'just' or 'round,' I am not sure this gets us very far, since the most obvious response to: "when is it appropriate to assert that something is round?" is "when it is round, as opposed to say, square." It will be hard to trace back a rule for "round" that has nothing to do with round things (indeed, the rule would have to create roundness instead of vice versa). In order for something to "count as" "round" or "a fly" it seems there must be something identifiable by which all round things are round, all flies flies, etc. If there wasn't, no rule identifying these instances from any others would be possible. Plus, there is the further difficulty that when round things cease being round, roundness itself does not change.

Plato is certainly concerned with language, but the more primary concern is how anything is anything at all and how particulars instantiate universals. Language is downstream of this concern for Plato. In his letters, where he is more explicit, he specifically suggests that language only deals with relative truths, not the truths of metaphysics. Plato is living in a period where languages do not extend very far and are unstandardized, and where dialects vary from valley to valley. He is well aware of barbarians who use different tokens to represent things, have different customs, and "different concepts."

Nonetheless, if things can truly be just, round, cats, red, etc. then some explanation is needed. It will not do to simply point out that things are called "just," "round," "cats," "red," etc. by men, since presumably men do not call things such for no reason at all, or for no reason outside the rules regarding their own utterances. This would imply:

A. That the utterances and their rules generate themselves, as opposed to being caused by the presence of round things, cats, trees, etc. The utterances would be constitutive of anything being anything determinant. A ball would be round because it is called "round," as opposed to being called round because it is round.

B. Presumably, facts about what is taller than what, what is round and what is not, what is just or good, are not solely about the vocalizations some community tends to make in response to given sense stimuli. If it was just this (the behaviorist approach), the behaviorist theory itself would be contentless. Understanding would play no role in knowledge, and all facts would be mutable.

Given the extreme dominance of nominalism in our era, I think it's very easy to accidentally beg the question against Plato. One might point out that things like "water" "have changed." Now water is known as "H2O." Whales are no longer considered "fish," etc. However, these sorts of changes are only a challenge for universals if one has already decided that the universal just is the word in question, which is the very thing the realist denies.

A realist might object that the "water" we see today is very much the same water our ancestors dealt with when it rained, or when they came to ponds, rivers, etc. It's the same concept, it has the same quiddity. Our intentions towards it have just become more refined. Nothing about realism entails that one fully grasps a universal and all of its relations. According to Plato, we don't. If, as St. Thomas says, the collective efforts of man have yet to fathom the full essence of a fly, it should hardly be surprising that new intentions are developed of flies. The question is more: "is the fly prior to human language?" Or "does man have a name for flies because there are flies, or are there flies because man has a name for them?" If the latter, the realist challenge is "why does man create a name for flies?"

A "co-constitutional" approach that splits the difference runs into the problem of the naturalist observation that flies appear to be far more ancient than human language.

Quoting Shawn

As I see it, the only way to perceive The Forms, is through mathematics. Thus, if one were to try and describe in mathematics, what Plato alluded to The Forms, then, would it be tantamount to the very mathematical identities which one encounters in the study of mathematics?

Would the irrational number, ?, also constitute some understanding of The Forms?

How does one perceive mathematics? When did homo sapiens sapiens perceive mathematics? What is a mathematical entity? When dividing 10 by 3, what is the form of the infinite number of 3s that is part of the quotient?


I think of Plato's forms as informational templates - mental categories that take the visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gustatory, etc. forms our senses provide. While all things are unique, they may share many properties with other things or not share many things. Think of a document template like a resume. All resumes are unique but follow a template. There are certain properties that make a document a resume and some properties that play no role in whether or not it is defined as a resume (like the language or the font used) but play a role as the variety in resumes.

Since everything is unique, I would say that forms are secondary to particulars. Minds conceive of forms only after observing multiple particulars.

Those things that are more similar than dissimilar are grouped together for the purpose of communicating them to others. Which forms we communicate is dependent upon our current goal. When telling you about an animal I had seen, I will refer to the template and not the particular when the distinctions between the particulars are irrelevant to the current goal - what it is I'm trying to communicate.

Quoting Shawn

In your own view, what are The Forms

Essences, or universals, or ideas - intelligible/mental stuff.

Or in art, you have the medium (paint, bronze) and the particular form the artist gives them (Starry Night, The Thinker).

Plato’s theory has a lot of issues, as he recognizes in the Parmenides. That only gives him more credibility. And he was having the same conversation we are right now, but about 2500 years ago. So he must have been prettty smart. Not just “a mistaken theory” at issue.

Plato's "Symposium" is a very good source as a tutorial for understanding "Forms" through the theory of participation.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

In considering Plato, we might ask: "In virtue of what are all just acts called 'just' or all round things called 'round?'" If there are facts about which acts are just, or which things are round, etc., in what do these facts consist?

Acts are called just when they seem to the one doing the calling to be fair. There is no necessity that everyone will agree with the assessment of justice. As to roundness, it is a perceptible quality and most people will agree, so no mystery there.

Reply to Shawn I wonder how would an elemental form could be. For it being elementary, it should be everywhere right? In flavours, in sounds, in sight. I think there should be some starting from, from where our mind builds representations, otherwise our mind must be as complex as universe

Quoting Shawn

In your own view, what are The Forms, which Plato alluded to?
As I see it, the only way to perceive The Forms, is through mathematics. Thus, if one were to try and describe in mathematics, what Plato alluded to The Forms, then, would it be tantamount to the very mathematical identities which one encounters in the study of mathematics?

I agree. Some on this forum are uncomfortable with the concept of Ideal Forms, because it's a non-empirical metaphysical notion. But then Mathematics is also abstract and intangible. For example, there are no numbers in the real world, only multiple things that can be counted by a rational Mind. And logical relationships are mental, not physical phenomena. Besides, the Greek word Mathema simply refers to knowledge in a mind, not to physical things in the world. Moreover, the Greek word Thema means the Idea of something, not the actual thing itself.

And yet, physical science has found metaphysical Mathematics to be useful, perhaps indispensable, for learning how the world works. And modern Math includes the concept of Zero --- symbolic of Nothingness or Absence --- which the ancient Greeks, including Aristotle, considered to be impractical, and even dangerously metaphysical --- in the sense of spookily unreal. Even so, we can see, with the mind's eye, a resemblance between real physical beauty and ideal metaphysical perfection, to which we may attach a number for relative perfection. {image below}

Moreover, the modern philosophical resistance to the very notion of Metaphysical Forms may stem from their implication of supernatural objects that can only be known subjectively via imagination. In fact, a common explanation for the theory of Forms is that they are Ideas, Concepts or Designs in the Mind of God. And that notion is, for some, unacceptably transcendent of material reality.

Yet, where in the material world can we find instances of Numbers & Mathematical Principles, except in a human mind? Likewise, abstract, in-corporeal, non-empirical Forms can only exist in an imaginative mind of some kind. And the God-Mind, or Form-Realm, could be viewed as simply a hypothetical locus of Forms such as Beauty, Perfection, Infinity, Zero, Unity & Multiplicity, that we can access only via rational inference, or idealization from empirical evidence, not by means of physical senses. :smile:


Plato's Theory of Forms, which posits a separate realm of perfect, eternal ideas or Forms, faces several criticisms. Some philosophers argue that it is too abstract, lacks empirical evidence, and raises logical problems in explaining the relationship between Forms and the imperfect world of appearances. Additionally, questions arise about the nature of Forms, their accessibility, and the implications for ethics and knowledge.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=the+problem+with+platos%27s+forms

IS IT REAL, OR IS IT A.I., OR IS IT IDEAL?

I hadn't noticed Reply to Tim's post.

Here's a potted history of some of the main arguments from the last century of analytic thought.

“In virtue of what are all just acts just, or all round things round?”—is itself misleading. It presumes there must be some essence or metaphysical commonality underlying all uses of a term. But why should this be so? Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? Why should we not, for example, use the same word to name different things? And if one looks at the uses to which we put our words, it seems that this is indeed what we do. The red sports car and the red sunset are not the same colour, despite our using the same word for both. The round hill and the round ring are quite different.

There simply need be nothing common to all red or round things. And perhaps the same is true for the Just. Rather there may be many, diverse and overlapping similarities. The classic example here is of a game: we use the word "game" quite successfully despite not having at hand a rule that sets out for us what counts as a game. And indeed, it seems that were any such rule proposed, it would be a simple matter to find or invent a counter instance, a game that does not fit the rule. Yet we manage to use many, many words without access to such rules.

One approach leads us to suppose that there is a thing called “roundness” that exists apart from round things, a thing called "redness" apart from cars and sunsets. There's then the problem, central to this thread, of what sort of thing redness or roundness might be, if it exists over and above round or red things.This is hypostatisation, the act of treating an abstract idea or concept as a real, tangible thing or entity. It's what leads Reply to Shawn to asking what the forms are. But perhaps they aren't.

We might see this more clearly by asking how we learn what is red, what is round, or what is just. We don't learn to use these words by becoming familiar with a form for each. We learn to use these words by engaging in the world and with those around us. By using language. And here we will not be just learning to use a rule, since the application of any rule requires a background of practice and training against which to stand. We learn how to use "red" not only by talking about red things, but also by being told that the sunset is not red but pink, the car not red but orange, and so becoming able to use these words to act with others in a community. Learning is not an abstract process, but an engagement with the world.

We would do well not to sit back and consider such issues in the abstract, but instead to take some time to observe what happens around us. “Don’t think, but look!”. "We are not looking merely at words... we are looking at what we do with words." We should examine what words do in the wild, as well as in philosophical captivity. In what situations do we say something is "round", or something is "just"? And what do the misuses of such terms look like, and what do they tell us?

Most of all, we should have the humility to admit that these words work very well, thank you very much, without, and sometimes even despite, the interventions of philosophers.

Quoting Banno

Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word?

Again that is the very reification that you previously criticized. ‘Reification’ is derived from the root ‘res’ which means ‘thing’ (it is also the root of 'reality'.) And forms (or universals) are not things. Nor are they thoughts, although when they appear, they appear as thoughts (per Bertrand Russell, previously quoted.) But if they are principles that operate in reality and are grasped by reason, then they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects. That is the nub of the issue.

And furthermore, being round or being red are not very good examples of forms (principles or ideas). That they can easily be regarded as attributes or properties of particulars is not an argument against the idea of forms. Better examples are those debated in the original texts - such as the form ‘equals’ in the Phaedo. What attribute or shape does 'equals' correspond to? None that I can think of. Yet you and I can both grasp what it means, because we’re possessed of rational skills and the ability to apprehend abstractions. Is 'equals' a thing? Perhaps in the modern vernacular, (‘when did that become a thing?) but not in any other sense. But without the concept equals, verbal communication and certainly basic arithmetic would be impossible.

The difficulty is, we’re some centuries removed from the cultural milieu in which forms were part of philosophy (then known as "realism" with quite a different meaning to what it has today). And they were then part of an alternative conception of knowledge, which provided the broader context within which they were meaningful:

[quote=Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong with Ockham?]Ockham (a principle instigator of nominalism) did not do away with objective reality, but in doing away with one part of objective reality—forms—he did away with a fundamental principle of explanation for objective reality. In doing away with forms, Ockham did away with formal causality. Formal causality secures teleology—the ends or purposes of things follow from what they are and what is in accord with or capable of fulfilling their natures. In the natural world, this realist framework secures an intrinsic connection between efficient causes and their effects—an efficient cause produces its effects by communicating some formality: fire warms by informing objects with its heat. ....

A genuine realist (concerning forms) should see “forms”...as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom[/quote].

@Count Timothy von Icarus

Reply to Wayfarer It's not clear to me what I am to conclude from your reply.

to be sure, there is a worthy area of study that seeks to understand the forms as they are found in various worthy historical works. Please, if that is the task here, go ahead.

But if the forms are to be taken as serious contenders for an account of how things are, then there might be a reckoning with the criticisms given above. If "they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects", then an account of this different existence might be offered, and a reason given as to the need for such a thing, especially in the light of what was said above.

And I don't see such a thing here.

Quoting Banno

If "they exist in a different manner to phenomenal objects", then an account of this different existence might be offered, and a reason given as to the need for such a thing, especially in the light of what was said above.

You won't see it because you're representing a philosophical attitude (analytic philosophy) which has long since eschewed any idea of an hierarchical ontology, which is what is required to make sense of the idea that things and principles are real in different ways or exist on different levels; there can be no 'levels'. The default view is that existence is univocal, there is only one meaning to 'it exists' and something either exists or it doesn't. But that sense of univocity, and the corresponding loss of an hierarchical ontology, is itself a subject for metaphysics. And as metaphysics is a dead subject - why, then, there can be no account!

Reply to Wayfarer Analytic philosophy may be broader than you seem to suppose. I'll be happy to accept some "hierarchical ontology", if you can demonstrate the need. As things stand you appear to be indulging in some sort of special pleading rather than engaging with the very direct and explicit comments above.

I'm somewhat surprised to see you accept such an authoritarian stance.

As things stand, I think I have presented very good reasons not to make use of forms in any worthwhile ontology, but instead to look at how we make use of words. You haven't provided much by way of a reason to supose otherwise.

Analytic philosophy doesn't eschew metaphysics so much as insist that it be done well. Here, it suggests that we not introduce unnecessary entities such as forms. Can you show that they are needed?

Thanks, Banno. I appreciate you pressing for clarity. Let me try to make my position more explicit.

The real issue here is not whether we can use words like “game,” “red,” or “round” without reference to forms—we obviously can, as you say. The deeper question is what makes such uses possible in the first place. What makes it possible, for instance, for different people in different times and places to agree that 2+2=4, or that a circle is defined as form with all points equidistant from a center? These aren’t just verbal habits or social conventions; they are stable, objective insights that transcend their pragmatic use.

On your view, meaning arises from use. Fair enough. But that already presupposes that all meaning is socially constructed or linguistically mediated, which is already nominalist. The trouble with that is that it fails to ground the stability and universality of many basic concepts—not least those in mathematics, logic, and ethics.

For example, the concept 'equals' does not arise from observation. It isn’t the property of any object we can point to. Yet without it, as I said, both language and mathematics would not be possible. So what grounds the universality of this relation? Saying “it’s just how we talk” sounds more like an attempt to dodge a metaphysical question than to account for it.

As I said, I think the origin of forms and universals was as explanatory principles that account for why the world is intelligible in the first place. Forms are not things alongside other things. They are the reason why things are what they are and why we can know them as such. Eliminating them may appear to simplify your ontology, but it actually leaves you with no account of meaning other than habit or social practice, leaving only a consensus reality.

So the choice is not between “plain speech” and “unnecessary metaphysics.” It’s between two competing worldviews—one that treats intelligibility as real and one that reduces it to a social artifact. I’m inviting you to consider that the first may have more going for it than analytic fashion currently allows. And also that the historical reasons for the current ascendancy of plain language and analytic philosophy are plainly discernable.

Reply to Banno [

“In virtue of what are all just acts just, or all round things round?”—is itself misleading. It presumes there must be some essence or metaphysical commonality underlying all uses of a term. But why should this be so? Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word? Why should we not, for example, use the same word to name different things? And if one looks at the uses to which we put our words, it seems that this is indeed what we do. The red sports car and the red sunset are not the same colour, despite our using the same word for both. The round hill and the round ring are quite different.

Yes, those would be instances of equivocal predication or pros hen predication, etc. What's the claim here though, that all predication is equivocal? Then you don't have logic. That terms are never predicated univocally? Then you also don't have logic.

But a basketball and baseball are not spherical in different ways, nor is red paint splashed on a wall here a different red than the a hockey stick painted with the same red paint. "Some predication is equivocal" is not a good argument for "no predication is univocal."

Who in "analytic logic" says otherwise?

There simply need be nothing common to all red or round things. And perhaps the same is true for the Just. Rather there may be many, diverse and overlapping similarities. The classic example here is of a game: we use the word "game" quite successfully despite not having at hand a rule that sets out for us what counts as a game. And indeed, it seems that were any such rule proposed, it would be a simple matter to find or invent a counter instance, a game that does not fit the rule. Yet we manage to use many, many words without access to such rules.

Is all predication supposed to be vague in this way? That seems pretty problematic. That'd be supposing all terms are vague.

A basic syllogism such as:

Socrates is a man.
All men are mortal.
Therefore Socrates is a mortal.

Would be in jeopardy if "man" is some vague notion of this sort. Certainly, one couldn't do geometry this way. Imagine trigonometry with a triangle defined in this way.

We might see this more clearly by asking how we learn what is red, what is round, or what is just. We don't learn to use these words by becoming familiar with a form for each. We learn to use these words by engaging in the world and with those around us

This is simply question begging if taken as an argument against realism though. Perception, including perception of language, involves forms in realism. The form is what is transmitted to the intellect. As an argument (as opposed to say, just laying out an alternative theory, I'm not sure of your goal here) this would be akin to: "nominalism is correct because nominalist theories say so."

Anyhow, how does one figure out how to "apply a rule for the word round," if there are not first round things? The form is, first and foremost, called in to explain the existence of round things, second our perceptions of them, and then language. It is not primarily about language because language was never considered "first philosophy" before the advent of analytic philosophy (i.e., "being and thought are prior to speaking.") People must be able to identify roundness to use to words to refer to it.

Quoting Banno

As things stand, I think I have presented very good reasons not to make use of forms in any worthwhile ontology, but instead to look at how we make use of words.

If there is any truth to what a thing is, then there is a need for forms. The form of a thing is what it is. If a thing has no form then there is no such truth, as what the thing is. So we need to allow that a thing has a form, if we want to allow that there is truth or falsity about what a thing is.

I believe that an ontology which holds that there is truth to what a thing is, is a worthwhile ontology. Therefore I find that there is good reason to make use of forms in a worthwhile ontology.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover

Right, but it's worth pointing out that this is sometimes denied (i.e., there is no truth about "what a thing is") and people still try to do ontology with this assumption. Although, when they—as they often do—appeal to "regularities," "patterns," and "constraints," that are prior to the act of "naming things what they are," I do think there is a problem, since these terms themselves either have some form or are simply contentless hand-waving to avoid a slip into an absolute volanturism (where the will makes anything what it is by a bare act of choice).

IMO, this mostly comes down to the elevation of potency over actuality. When the order is inverted, then one always has limitless possibility first, and only after any (arbitrary) definiteness. Voluntarism plays a large role here. It becomes the will (of the individual, God, the collective language community, or a sort of "world will") that makes anything what it is through an initial act of naming/stipulation. But prior to that act, there is only potency without form and will.

Presumably though, you need knowledge of an object in order to have any volitions towards that object. This is why I think knowing (even if it is just sense knowledge) must be prior to willing, and so acquisition of forms prior to "rules of language," and of course, act before potency (since potency never moves to act by itself, unless it does so for no reason at all, randomly).

Edit: I suppose another fault line here that ties into your post (which I agree with) is: "truth as a property of being" versus "truth solely as a property of sentences." In the latter, nothing is true until a language has been created, and so nothing can truly be anything until a linguistic context exists. That might still require form to explain though, because again, it seems some knowledge must lie prior to naming.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, but it's worth pointing out that this is sometimes denied (i.e., there is no truth about "what a thing is") and people still try to do ontology with this assumption.

I agree, and I believe that this as well, is a worthwhile ontology. I was just responding to Banno's implication, that an ontology which held that there is truth and falsity to what a thing is, is not a worthwhile ontology.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

IMO, this mostly comes down to the elevation of potency over actuality. When the order is inverted, then one always has limitless possibility first, and only after any (arbitrary) definiteness. Voluntarism plays a large role here. It becomes the will (of the individual, God, the collective language community, or a sort of "world will") that makes anything what it is through an initial act of naming/stipulation. But prior to that act, there is only potency without form and will.

The problem I have with this sort of ontology, the sort that assigns priority to potency, is that the patterns and regularities become chance occurrences. Then there is no way out of this highly improbable, chance occurrence ontology, so God becomes the only alternative. But if we do not proceed in that way, we can focus directly on the potency/actuality relation.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Presumably though, you need knowledge of an object in order to have any volitions towards that object. This is why I think knowing (even if it is just sense knowledge) must be prior to willing, and so acquisition of forms prior to "rules of language," and of course, act before potency (since potency never moves to act by itself, unless it does so for no reason at all, randomly).

I agree with this.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Edit: I suppose another fault line here that ties into your post (which I agree with) is: "truth as a property of being" versus "truth solely as a property of sentences." In the latter, nothing is true until a language has been created, and so nothing can truly be anything until a linguistic context exists. That might still require form to explain though, because again, it seems some knowledge must lie prior to naming.

I look at "truth as the property of sentences" as naivety. All sentences must be judged for meaning, prior to being judged for truth, and it is the meaning which is judged for truth. Truth and falsity are judgements bout meaning, This implies that the judgement of truth is dependent on the interpretation. Now we have an issue of subjective vs. objective interpretation, and the possibility of objective truth tends to get lost.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus It's not that all predication is equivocation, but that ordinary language is flexible and dependent on context. This is not a threat to logic, which can happily rely on univocal terms. Our understanding of words is shaped by practical use, not metaphysical essences. In this view, terms like "round" or "red" don't require metaphysical forms to function meaningfully in context, nor does logic.

Reply to Banno

It's not that all predication is equivocation, but that ordinary language is flexible and dependent on context.

Right, but if one does not distinguish between univocal and equivocal usage then common facts such as "running involves legs," become unequivocally false because refrigerators, rivers, roads, and noses all "run." Ordinary language involves equivocal, analogical, and univocal predication. Form, the actuality of things, relates to the latter two.

This is not a threat to logic, which can happily rely on univocal terms.

Maybe not to formal logic, but the primary use of logic, including in the natural sciences, uses natural language. So, it would be problematic if equivocity rendered something like natural language syllogisms invariably subject to vagueness.

But would this leave formal logic in a good place? Any term used in formal logic, say M for "man," couldn't correspond univocally to any natural language usage of "man" if all terms were subject to the same vagueness as "game." Formal logic and natural language would be talking about different things.

Our understanding of words is shaped by practical use, not metaphysical essences. In this view, terms like "round" or "red" don't require metaphysical forms to function meaningfully in context, nor does logic.

And what determines practical use? Here is the argument, existence is prior to speech. There are round things, ants, trees, etc. prior to speech, and prior to the existence of any "language community." For example, the Earth is spherical and it was spherical prior to man deciding what the token 'spherical' should mean. It was true that the Earth was spherical prior to any man declaring it as such.

Unless "practical use" is determined by nothing at all, or by nothing but the sheer human will, as uninformed by the world around it, then it will be informed by the being of things (through the senses). A term like "round" is "practically useful" precisely because round things exist prior to the creation of the term (or of language itself). Children who have not learned the word "round" presumably still experience round things (and indeed they are capable of of sorting shapes prior to learning their names). Experience is prior to naming. But the form is called in to explain how things are round, ants, trees, etc., not primarily to explain how words work.

Nor does realism suppose any sort of metaphysical super glue between tokens and forms in the way you present it. Indeed, Plato has Socrates spend a lot of time exploring how people mean quite different things by using the same token. If Plato held the naive view you attribute to him, then the opening books of the Republic, where "justice" is being defined and used in radically different ways, shouldn't exist.

Quoting Banno

Why should there be a thing that is common to all our uses of a word?

As Reply to Wayfarer pointed out, there is no universal or general or essential THING to which our words point. What is "common" to words is meaning, not matter. And meaning is mental, not physical ; it's abstract, not concrete. So your "why?"question only makes sense from a materialist perspective, in which ideas, thoughts, feelings, etc are made of material atoms, similar to those that compose physical objects. Please pardon the "Materialism label", you may have a somewhat different meaning in mind for your "Thing".

Universal refers to a whole integrated system, not its parts. Generalization is a mental act that goes beyond empirical evidence to imagine all Things that have some common essence. The Essence of a Thing is not another thing, but the defining Quality of the thing. The atom of Qualia is a subjective, experiential, conceptual relationship between things & observers, and their meaning in a broad context. The "problem of Universals" is that they are not real things*1.

Empirical Science does not evaluate Qualia (meanings ; forms) , it counts Quanta (things). It's the job of Philosophy to seek-out the Forms that are common to all uses of our words, and then to describe the specific Meaning that applies to the topic under discussion. The philosophical quest is not for the particular Thing, but for the essential ding an sich.

But, you probably know all of this, and just need to be reminded, that this is a philosophy forum, where we do not dissect Things, but Ideas. Why should such non-specific Universals exist? Because we humans aspire to a god-like top-down view of the world. And we have the mental power to imagine*2 things that do not exist in the physical world, but subsist in the metaphysical ream of ideas & qualia. :smile:


*1. Universal Concepts :
In philosophy, universals are abstract qualities or characteristics that are shared by multiple objects or things, existing independently of specific instances. They are often seen as the fundamental building blocks of knowledge, explaining why things are similar and allowing us to categorize them. The "problem of universals" delves into the nature and existence of these shared characteristics, asking whether they are real entities, mind-dependent concepts, or simply names for similar things.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophy+universals

*2. It wasn't Elon Musk who imagined an American-made electric car for ordinary people, but a couple of visionary entrepreneurs. They eventually realized an ideal concept.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=origin+of+tesla+electric+car

Up to interpretation, but as I take it, it's an attempt to make sense of concepts which we experience in individualized actualizations: we see a horse, or horses, flowers, a book, etc.

But how can we recognize these things as such without having an idea of them, more perfect than what we encounter in real life (which are defective: the book may be worn out, the horse may look a bit ugly, etc.)?

You postulate an idea to explain how many things can be one, in a sense.

This may not be scholarly interpretation, but certainly appealing, if not correct as originally stated. Its influence has been astonishing.

Reply to Manuel

Principles might be a better way to understand it.

The epistemic issues raised by multiplicity and ceaseless change are addressed by Aristotle’s distinction betweenprinciples and causes. Aristotle presents this distinction early in the Physics through a criticism of Anaxagoras.1 Anaxagoras posits an infinite number of principles at work in the world. Were Anaxagoras correct, discursive knowledge would be impossible. For instance, if we wanted to know “how bows work,” we would have to come to know each individual instance of a bow shooting an arrow, since there would be no unifying principle through which all bows work. Yet we cannot come to know an infinite multitude in a finite time.2

However, an infinite (or practically infinite) number of causes does not preclude meaningful knowledge if we allow that many causes might be known through a single principle (a One), which manifests at many times and in many places (the Many). Further, such principles do seem to be knowable. For instance, the principle of lift allows us to explain many instances of flight, both as respects animals and flying machines. Moreover, a single unifying principle might be relevant to many distinct sciences, just as the principle of lift informs both our understanding of flying organisms (biology) and flying machines (engineering). 

For Aristotle, what are “better known to us” are the concrete particulars experienced directly by the senses. By contrast, what are “better known in themselves” are the more general principles at work in the world.3,i Since every effect is a sign of its causes, we can move from the unmanageable multiplicity of concrete particulars to a deeper understanding of the world.ii

For instance, individual insects are what are best known to us. In most parts of the world, we can directly experience vast multitudes of them simply by stepping outside our homes. However, there are 200 million insects for each human on the planet, and perhaps 30 million insect species.4 If knowledge could only be acquired through the experience of particulars, it seems that we could only ever come to know an infinitesimally small amount of what there is to know about insects. However, the entomologist is able to understand much about insects because they understand the principles that are unequally realized in individual species and particular members of those species.iii

Plato's Theory of Forms is a particular metaphysical explanation of unifying principles. Whether it was even originally intended as the sort of naive "two world's Platonism" that is often associated with Plato today is an open question (I for one am doubtful). But either way, Aristotle and then the Neo-Platonists make some useful elucidations of the theory (how much they are really altering it is also an open question).

Plato didn't think there was a form for every generalizable term. This is why examples using artifacts are not good counterexamples for pointing out problems with the Theory of Forms. One of the points of the theory is to be able to distinguish between substance and accidents/relation, but in artifact examples these become easily confused. Hence, books might not be a great example. Plato's student Aristotle rejects the idea that Homer's Iliad would have a definition and also casts doubt on even simple artifacts having essences, and I think he is in line with his old master here. If there has to be a form for every term, and there are potentially infinite, relatively arbitrary terms, then the forms would be useless for doing what they are called in to do.

Plato rejects materialist attempts to explain everything on the basis of that of which it was made. According to Plato, the entities that best merit the title “beings” are the intelligible Forms, which material objects imperfectly copy. These Forms are not substances in the sense of being either ordinary objects as opposed to properties or the subjects of change. Rather they are the driving principles that give structure and purpose to everything else. At Sophist (255c), Plato also draws a distinction between things that exist “in themselves” and things that exist “in relation to something else”. Though its precise nature is subject to interpretation, this distinction can be seen as a precursor to Aristotle’s distinction between substances and non-substances described in the next section, and later followers of Aristotle often adopt Plato’s terminology.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus
[quote=SEP. 'Substance';https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/]Plato rejects materialist attempts to explain everything on the basis of that of which it was made. According to Plato, the entities that best merit the title “beings” are the intelligible Forms, which material objects imperfectly copy.[/quote]

This definition seems to blur two quite different senses of the term being. In contemporary English, "beings" typically refers to individual entities—what we might call things or particulars—especially living or sentient beings. But in the context of Plato’s metaphysics, "being" refers not to discrete entities, but to what most truly is—that which grounds the very reality and intelligibility of particulars.

The Forms, in Plato’s view, are not "beings" in the same sense as horses or trees. They are not rival “things” set over against the sensible world. Rather, they are what makes the sensible world intelligible and real at all. As Eric Perl puts it:

Quoting Eric Perl - Thinking Being p25

Plato’s understanding of reality as form, then, is not at all a matter of setting up intelligible forms in opposition to sensible things, as if forms rather than sensible things are what is real. On the contrary, forms are the very guarantee of sensible things: in order that sensible things may have any identity, any truth, any reality, they must have and display intelligible ‘looks,’ or forms, in virtue of which they are what they are and so are anything at all. It is in precisely this sense that forms are the reality of all things. Far from stripping the sensible world of all intelligibility and locating it ‘elsewhere,’ Plato expressly presents the forms as the truth, the whatness, the intelligibility, and hence the reality, of the world.

Think about this way - take any object. The very first thing you need to do, is identify it. 'Hey, it's an 'X'. If you can't identify it, then you don't know what it is.

I notice in the opening of the SEP article Substance, the description of Brahman as “some fundamental kind of entity” seeks to impose a thing-like characterization on a concept that, in its original context, is expressly beyond all such determinations - which is precisely what the term 'reification' means.

An entity, after all, is typically understood as a bounded, identifiable thing. But Brahman, like Plato’s Being or Heidegger’s Sein, is not an entity among other entities. It is that which makes beings possible, while itself transcending all objectification. The tendency to treat foundational metaphysical principles as “things” or “entities” characterises what Heidegger criticized as 'ontotheology'.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus Being univocal is something we do, not something found in a name. That the p in is univocal is no more than how we are treat the p. One could also treat the two "p"'s as quite different, in which case the MP may not follow.

The use of a word is the simplest example of our differentiating amongst the things in the world. Someone who does not know the word "round" perhaps differentiates marbles from blocks, and in doing so shows their understanding. Again, look to what they are doing, to use, to see if they understand the concept, and show your understanding by acting in ways that are dependent on that understanding. Language is just an easy to use sub-class of the things we do.

I'd prefer to say that practical use is determined by intent rather than will.

Still no need to invoke forms.


Reply to Gnomon If you are saying that meaning is seen in what we do, then we agree. There's no need to invoke forms to explain what we do. We can just act.

Quoting Banno

There's no need to invoke forms to explain what we do.

You can't explain what we do without using universals. Try it.

Reply to frank So what. Fill out your argument.

At issue is how predicates and universals and forms and so on are related and what they amount to. Calling predicates "universals" or "forms" doesn't do much of anything.

But also, doing is not explaining.

So fill out your argument.

Reply to Banno

1: You said there's no need to invoke forms to explain what we do.

2: Forms and universals are the same thing

3: You asserted that there's no need to invoke universals to explain what we do

4. In fact, you can't explain anything at all without using universals. You certainly can't explain what we do without using them.

What I did there was highlight your use of "explain" to lead into reflections on how we're all bound to universals because we can't think or speak without using them. So I was criticizing your attempt to frame priorities in terms of actions.

Yes, we certainly do things. This was never in question. But without conscious thoughts about actions, there would be nothing. Nothing acknowledged. Nothing remembered. Nothing asked. Nothing answered. And definitely nothing explained. Because you can't think without universals. They are on the table and you can't sweep them off.

There is a pathway from here to Gnosticism. Let me know if I need to flesh that out.

Quoting frank

2: Forms and universals are the same thing

Not so much. Forms might be a type of universal, or a theory about universals. But universals need not be perfect or idealised, nor exist in a world distinct from our own, nor cause the properties of particulars.

Quoting Banno

Not so much. Forms might be a type of universal, or a theory about universals. But universals need not be perfect or idealised, nor exist in a world distinct from our own, nor cause the properties of particulars.

Nit picking.

Reply to frank Not at all.

Forms are only one of a variety of ideas about the nature of universals, which are in turn just one of many approaches to predication. Other approaches include pragmatism, speech act theory, formal semantics, and particularised properties.

Reply to Banno As @Metaphysician Undercover recently noted, Plato obliterates his own theory of forms in Parmenides. Do you think you might be attacking a strawman?

Reply to frank And yet there are folk here who stand behind that straw man.

So if I am, more fool them.

Reply to Banno :grin: :up:

Reply to frank
Nevertheless, Aristotle went on to demonstrate how forms are necessary to support the law of identity, and the idea that there is what a thing is. This was a modified theory of Forms, required after Plato obliterated the old one.

Reply to frank There's one now.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover
Can't live with them. Can't live without them.

Reply to frank
It's just a matter of having an adequate understanding. Something the vast majority will never take the time to develop. Look at how many dialogues Plato wrote before he got to the Parmenides. It's not something that comes easy.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover
You should conduct a reading of Parmenides. That would be awesome.

Reply to frank OMG, interpretations could go on forever. But you're right, it would be awesome because it's incredibly difficult. Maybe later.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a much better way of understanding the issue and I think your explanation is quite sensible. Of course, it becomes very tricky to argue that certain artifacts (or all of them) should not be thought of in terms of forms or ideas, because one can easily reply, "Ok, no books, but why a horse and not a donkey?"

It's true that the problem then becomes, well if everything has to have a form we will have infinite forms. Then we'd have to say something like certain ideas are the basis for other ideas. And we'd want to have a fixed number of ideas.

So, principles do make more sense, albeit still problematic.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Anyhow, how does one figure out how to "apply a rule for the word round," if there are not first round things? The form is, first and foremost, called in to explain the existence of round things, second our perceptions of them, and then language. It is not primarily about language because language was never considered "first philosophy" before the advent of analytic philosophy (i.e., "being and thought are prior to speaking.") People must be able to identify roundness to use to words to refer to

But anyone using the word 'round' is using it because they are engaging with the world around them and they see 'round' things.

Imo, if we want to explain the actual reasons why we use the word 'round', you have to talk about an immensely complicated brain and how it interacts with the rest of a very complicated world in an intractable manner - from the perspective of our own intelligibility - to infer something about how it represents or embodies structure out in the world.

We can't actually do that, and for any intelligible investigation of that we must presuppose our own concepts to know what we are looking for.

So when someone says that you need 'roundness' to explain why we use the word 'round'. What are you actually saying? Because none of us actually know how or why we personally are able to perceive and point out 'roundness' in the world, all you have really done is re-assert your own word use. You haven't actually explained anything and so your perspective ends up being vacuously the same as the word-use one which additionally wants us to say stuff like 'oranges are round iff oranges are round' which is asserting that 'roundness' is the case in conjunction with what is seen in the world - which we can point at, also communicating what we are pointing at to other people who use the word in the same way.

So by invoking forms have you meaningfully added anything? Not really - nothing that has not already been asserted by someone capable of using sentences like 'oranges are round iff oranges are round'. I can asser that round things exist without dressing it up in "forms" or "universals". Fine, we can call it that if you want, but I don't know if there is anything more interesting to say about that which wouldn't end up on someone falling back on and taking for granted their own exceptional abilities to make distinctions in the world and use words without really knowing how they do it.

And my own views - about what we might see as 'real' in the world or engagement with a world that 'real-ly' exists independent of us - fully acknowledges this, because the most generic way I think we can talk about the world is in terms of structure...
But what does that word actually mean? Because it is so generic, its very difficult to describe and elaborate on what that word actually means. Nonetheless, I have learned to use this word effectively in virtue of a brain that can make abstract inferences and predictions about my sensory world, and can use the word intelligibly to tell a story about the world which I think has less caveats than certain other stories. But in telling this story, I am still somewhat taking for granted the fact that I don't really know the specific details of how I am doing this. No matter how hard I try, I cannot elevate the kind of metaphysical meat of my word-use of 'structure' here into something which is actually explanatorily useful beyond being a kind of component of my story that relates to other parts of the story.

Neither can I elevate various other concepts like, say, "red" or "being", "same" or perhaps even something like "plus"... I am sure, many others. To me, simply re-asserting these latter examples as if there is something else additional to say isn't interesting (even if these are all useful words about stuff), especially when clearly what makes the world tick is to be found in our physical theories that predict what we see - and in theory, an understanding of brains that might give us some understanding into how we see those what we see, and make use of what we see in intelligent ways. Again, the useful way of talking about our theories of the world, with the least caveats, may be in terms of structure and brains' inferences about structure - useful words for my story without needing to elaborate those words in some additional, excessive way. Is there actually much difference between my 'structure' and your 'forms' (in the most generic sense of structure)? Maybe I just prefer the former word without the connotations of the latter... other similar words might be 'patterns', 'regularities', etc, etc.

There is necessarily a strange loop here of sorts in the sense that: understanding and using theories is also something we do. But I do not need to redundantly inflate ontologies that are explantorily useful beyond just how my brain works, resulting in word use. Sure, I will say there are 'round' things, but there are things much more interesting that make 'round' things and everything else tick. Again, even with "what makes the world tick" has limits in the sense that I cannot give you an interesting elaboration on what structure means. I don't need to arbitrarily and redundantly lay out a list of all the of these "forms" that "exist" and try to elevate them in some way, even though I don't really have anything interesting to say about them other than I see stuff with these properties. And because that is all I can say, I am effectively just re-asserting my own word use which renders any attempt to point out something salient about "forms" vacuous and effectively no different than re-asserting the notion that word-use is what is fundamental about concepts.

So I guess my conclusion is that appealing to forms and word-use is not meaningfully different. They are only different when trying to inflate stuff unnecessarily, which cannot be done in an interesting, intelligible way imo. The explanatory importance of concepts is how they relate to other concepts, and I think a theory of "forms" would place some overly abstract concepts or "universals" in a central role amongst our ontological concepts about the world where they have no business being. At the core and center is our best scientific theories, not the patterns that "supervene" at a higher level of description. "Roundness" exists, but lets not make it out to be something more important than it really is.

Reply to Apustimelogist

But anyone using the word 'round' is using it because they are engaging with the world around them and they see 'round' things.

Indeed, that was precisely my point.

Imo, if we want to explain the actual reasons why we use the word round, you have to talk about an immensely complicated brain and how it interacts with the rest of a very complicated world in an intractable manner - from the perspective of our own intelligibility - to infer something about how it represents or embodies structure out in the world in the world.

I don't think neuroscience is any more properly first philosophy then philosophy of language, particularly if it leads to the radical skepticism you lay out in the rest of the post (a skepticism at odds with plenty of neuroscience itself).

For instance, the claim that "none of us actually know how or why we personally are able to perceive and point out 'roundness' in the world," is simply not one many people, including scientists, are going to agree with. There are great mysteries related to consciousness, but how (and that) things possess shape and how their shape in communicated through intervening media to a person, and how the sense organs engage this information, is well understood in some respects. At any rate, doubts that "anything is really round" involve a quite expansive skepticism.

However, even if we grant this skepticism, it wouldn't follow that the very diverse, well-developed tradition of metaphysical theories endorsing a notion of form would be rendered contentless. I'm not following this jump at all. This would be like saying that, because different interpretations of quantum mechanics are not currently decisively testable against one another, they fail to say anything unique about the world at all. A metaphysics of form might be wrong (although skepticism precludes even saying this much), or it might be unjustified, but it isn't "not saying anything," or a theory about word use.

So I guess my conclusion is that appealing to forms and word-use is not meaningfully different.

One might indeed criticize a metaphysics of form in any number of ways, but to say that such a broad and well-developed area of philosophy is contentless would seem to simply demonstrate a total lack of familiarity with it.

C.S. Peirce, John Deely, John Poinsot, etc. have very well developed theories of the causality particular to signs and the way in which form is communicated. These theories might be misguided, but they are not reducible to "word use." Indeed, the most popular criticism of the via antiqua by those who were well acquainted with it (e.g. William of Ockham) was that it was too complex, not that it failed to say anything.

For example, Nathan Lyons "Signs in the Dust:"

[The] particular expression of intentional existence—intentional species existing in a material medium between cogniser and cognised thing— will be our focus...

In order to retrieve this aspect of Aquinas’ thought today we must reformulate his medieval understanding of species transmission and reception in the terms of modern physics and physiology.11 On the modern picture organisms receive information from the environment in the form of what we can describe roughly as energy and chemical patterns. 12 These patterns are detected by particular senses: electromagnetic radiation = vision, mechanical energy = touch, sound waves = hearing, olfactory and gustatory chemicals = smell and taste.13 When they impinge on an appropriate sensory organ, these patterns are transformed (‘transduced’ is the technical term) into signals (neuronal ‘action potentials’) in the nervous system, and then delivered to the brain and processed. To illustrate, suppose you walk into a clearing in the bush and see a eucalyptus tree on the far side. Your perception of the eucalypt is effected by means of ambient light—that is, ambient electromagnetic energy—in the environment bouncing off the tree and taking on a new pattern of organisation. The different chemical structure of the leaves, the bark, and the sap reflect certain wavelengths of light and not others; this selective reflection modifies the structure of the energy as it bounces off the tree, and this patterned structure is perceived by your eye and brain as colour....

These energy and chemical patterns revealed by modern empirical science are the place that we should locate Aquinas’ sensory species today.14 The patterns are physical structures in physical media, but they are also the locus of intentional species, because their structure is determined by the structure of the real things that cause them. The patterns thus have a representational character in the sense that they disperse a representative form of the thing into the surrounding media. In Thomistic perception, therefore, the form of the tree does not ‘teleport’ into your mind; it is communicated through normal physical mechanisms as a pattern of physical matter and energy.

The interpretation of intentions in the medium I am suggesting here is in keeping with a number of recent readers of Aquinas who construe his notion of extra-mental species as information communicated by physical means.18 Eleonore Stump notes that ‘what Aquinas refers to as the spiritual reception of an immaterial form . . . is what we are more likely to call encoded information’, as when a street map represents a city or DNA represents a protein. 19... Gyula Klima argues that ‘for Aquinas, intentionality or aboutness is the property of any form of information carried by anything about anything’, so that ‘ordinary causal processes, besides producing their ordinary physical effects according to the ordinary laws of nature, at the same time serve to transfer information about the causes of these processes in a natural system of encoding’.22

The upshot of this reading of Aquinas is that intentional being is in play even in situations where there is not a thinking, perceiving, or even sensing subject present. The phenomenon of representation which is characteristic of knowledge can thus occur in any physical media and between any existing thing, including inanimate things, because for Aquinas the domain of the intentional is not limited to mind or even to life, but includes to some degree even inanimate corporeality.

This interpretation of intentions in the medium in terms of information can be reformulated in terms of the semiotics we have retrieved from Aquinas, Cusa, and Poinsot to produce an account of signs in the medium. On this analysis, Aquinas’ intentions in the medium, which are embeded chemical patterns diffused through environments, are signs. More precisely, these patterns are sign-vehicles that refer to signifieds, namely the real things (like eucalyptus trees) that have patterned the sign-vehicles in ways that reflect their physical form.24 It is through these semiotic patterns that the form of real things is communicated intentionally through inanimate media. This is the way that we can understand, for example, Cusa’s observation that if sensation is to occur ‘between the perceptible object and the senses there must be a medium through which the object can replicate a form [speciem] of itself, or a sign [signum] of itself ’ (Comp. 4.8). This process of sensory semiosis proceeds on my analysis through the intentional replication of real things in energy and chemical sign-patterns, which are dispersed around the inanimate media of physical environments

Or there is John Deely's work, or something like Robert Sokolowski's "Phenomenology of the Human Person," etc., all of which include quite determinant statements on how form ties into perception (and language downstream of perception).

Anyhow, take a gander at: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/987328 and I'll ask, "how is scientific knowledge possible if principles don't exist?"

Second, do things have any determinant being? If so, that's all form, in the broadest sense, is saying. To be skeptical about form in this broad sense seems to entail radical skepticism, it's to say "the properties of all things are unknowable, and indeed we cannot know if they have any determinant properties at all." But to the skeptic, I'd ask: "if things have no determinant properties, why should they cause determinant perceptions?" Particularly, given the appeal to "brains" (which does not ever produce consciousness without constant interaction with a conducive environment), why should brains ever produce one sort of cognition instead of any other if brains do not possess a determinant nature/properties? There can be no "neuroscience" if there is nothing determinant that can be said about brains.

Is there actually much difference between my 'structure' and your 'forms' (in the most generic sense of structure)? Maybe I just prefer the former word without the connotations of the latter... other similar words might be 'patterns', 'regularities', etc, etc.

Form is often described as "intrinsic structure" or "organization." Appeals to "regularities" are often reductive though, tending towards smallism. While some invocations of form are reductive, many are not.

Paul Vincent Spade's article "The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics" is a pretty good introduction on Aristotlian essences (an example of intrinsic structure) and how they tie in to predication for instance: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/WarpWoo1.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjt6su-mqGNAxWaw_ACHUQVOqQQFnoECCgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1XwkMjcPAAZ0aM2Ne2b-c-

I actually mentioned the common use of "regularities" and "patterns" (always in scare quotes!) earlier in this thread. Either the Kant-like (Kant-lite?) skepticism here is absolute, and we get subjective idealism, or it isn't, and those terms must have some determinant form and content.

Reply to Wayfarer

Right, Perl is very good on this. I suppose one of the difficulties here is the modern phobia that appearances might be arbitrarily, randomly related to appearances. Now, to appear a certain way to man is to act in a certain way, and since "act follows on being," we might suppose that things must reveal something of their reality in their appearances. The classical assumption here is that if something acts (interacts) with man in some particular way, then the definiteness of this interaction, that it is one way instead of any other, must be attributable to some prior actuality in both the thing in man. Otherwise, the phenomenological elements of the experience would be what they are "for no reason at all," or, on the side of the acting thing perceived, it would be acting for "no reason at all."

But I feel pretty safe in this assumption. If things do happen for no reason at all, if the world is not intelligible, then philosophy and science are a lost cause. However, they certainly do not seem to be lost causes.

One interesting thing to note is that this fear of arbitrariness and randomness is almost always placed on the "world/thing" side of the ledger. Yet the elevation of potency over act such a fear presupposes could apply just as well to man himself. Maybe man, his perceptual organs, his cognition, etc. is what acts entirely arbitrarily in relation to the world? We would each be "hallucinating our own world" for "no reason at all, according to not nature or prior actuality." If this seems implausible, which I think it does, I am not sure why flipping the same concern over to the "world" should be any less implausible though.

Quoting Banno

?Gnomon
If you are saying that meaning is seen in what we do, then we agree. There's no need to invoke forms to explain what we do. We can just act.

Since I have no formal training in philosophy, many of its technical terms*1 are fuzzy for me. I'm pursuing this Idealistic angle on Forms*2 for my own benefit, not to convince you. Hence, my impractical question, inspired by your pragmatic/analytic*3 approach : why do some of us feel a need for Universal Concepts, when others find Particular Percepts sufficient for survival? What we sense is what is real, what we imagine is fictional. Why then, are some people motivated to seek-out feckless Fiction, when placid animals seem to be content with pragmatic Facts? In other words, Why do Philosophy?

The concept of ideal Forms is not necessary or useful for Scientific purposes (doing ; acting on the world). But Philosophy (thinking ; understanding the world) goes beyond what is apparent & obvious, to discover the broader (general ; universal) meaning underlying the specific Things we see around us. For those of us who want to take meaning & significance to the limit, we quickly run into the physical restrictions of the Real world. In order to get around those barriers to liberal wisdom, we rational animals can imagine a meta-physical realm of Ideal entities, such as Gods & Forms & Mathematical Types {image below}, that are not bound by natural laws; only by abstract Logic. Such notions may have no practical applications in the Material world, but they do have profound effects in the shared Mental world of cultural concepts & beliefs, such as religions & philosophy & scientific theories.

Both Religion and Philosophy have been developed to enhance our ability to cope with the perplexities of human culture, and the complexities of the social milieu. The primary difference seems to be that Religion advises us to put our faith in the wisdom of others : Priests & Gods, while Philosophy is more of a self-help guide to personal wisdom : Stoicism & Buddhism. And Wisdom is more than a collection of Facts, it's the ability to see invisible inter-relationships, from which to create a mental map --- from a bird's perspective --- to help us navigate that labyrinthine terrain. If you can get around without a map, then you don't need that unreal imaginary fictional stuff.

For me, Meaning is not what we do (act on things), but what we think (manipulate imaginary notions). :smile:


*1A. Nominalism :Forms are not Real, in that they have no objective existence, apart from their utility for describing the objects & actions we experience. Yet we use names to efficiently communicate meanings.
B. Epiphenomenalism : Mental states are not real, but merely byproducts of brain processes.But in order to communicate those states, the physical patterns must be translated into abstract Ideal information : concepts, words, names.
C. In the context of philosophy, an epiphenomenon is a phenomenon that is caused by a primary phenomenon but does not itself cause anything. In philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism is the view that mental states are epiphenomena, meaning they are caused by physical states in the brain but don't cause any physical events themselves.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophy+eiphenomenon
D. Realism and nominalism are philosophical stances that differ in their view of abstract concepts or universals. Realists believe that universals, like "redness" or "humanity," have an objective, independent existence. Nominalists, on the other hand, assert that universals are merely names or concepts created by humans, and they don't represent an external reality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=realism+vs+nominalism
Note --- Human History is a record of Ideas that cause change in the world. Communication of information is a causal force, not in Nature, but in human Culture. Apparently, I am a nominalist : "The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their proper name" ___Confucius

*2. Platonic Forms, in essence, serve as a foundation for understanding and accessing true knowledge and moral ideals. They provide a framework for identifying what is truly real and valuable in a world of constantly changing appearances. Forms, according to Plato, are not merely mental concepts, but have a real existence in a separate, more real world, and they are the ultimate objects of knowledge.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=why+do+we+need+platonic+forms
Parmenides, a Pre-Socratic philosopher, argued that reality is a unified, eternal, and unchanging whole, while the perception of change and multiplicity is an illusion of the senses. He proposed that "Being" is the ultimate reality, and that "non-being" is either unknowable or non-existent.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=parmenides+philosophy
Note --- Apparently for Plato, True Knowledge is universal, eternal, unchanging & rational as opposed to the local, imperfect, evolving & neurological knowledge of the physical senses. I don't know if he actually believed in a perfect Parmenidean realm, but he probably thought there ought to be something better than our directly-experienced Reality, that leaves much to be desired. Human cultural progress is based on the belief that we can make it better. Is that an impossible dream, or an inspiring aspiration?

*3. Analytic and Continental philosophy represent two distinct approaches to philosophy, primarily differentiated by their methods and areas of focus. Analytic philosophy emphasizes clarity, precision, and logic, often focusing on language, logic, and the analysis of concepts. Continental philosophy, on the other hand, is more concerned with the broad history of philosophy, human experience, and the interconnectedness of ideas.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=continental+vs+analytic+philosophy
Note --- My upbringing in the US was in the pragmatic & protestant heritage instead of the continental/catholic tradition. But in my later years, I am trying to learn about other worldviews, including the ancient Greek foundations of philosophy. In another post, I may attempt to make sense of 50,000 year old Aboriginal philosophy, with its otherworldly Dreamtime.


IDEAL FORMS ARE IMAGINARY & MATHEMATICAL, NOT ACTUAL & MATERIAL
The postulated elements are symbolic not physical

Reply to Apustimelogist Thanks for that post. A different take, but perhaps not too dissimilar to what I have been suggesting.

Interesting that you mention strange loops. You've read Hofstadter, I presume?

Quoting Gnomon

...why do some of us feel a need for Universal Concepts, when others find Particular Percepts sufficient for survival?

This might be the key here. Those who "feel an need for Universal Concepts" will make an unjustified jump to them. It'll be a transcendental argument: things are thus-and-so; the only way they can be thus-and-so is if this Universal Concept is in play; therefore...

Btu that's perhaps psychology rather than philosophy. The philosophical response will be limited to showing that the second premise is mistaken, that there may be other ways that things can be thus-and-so, or perhaps that they just are thus-and-so, without the need for further justification.

Quoting Gnomon

For me, Meaning is not what we do (act on things), but what we think (manipulate imaginary notions). :smile:

The admonition is that in order to understand meaning, look to use. In order to understand what folk think, look to what they do. And here, include what they say as a part of what they do.

So it's not either-or; not a choice between what we do and what we think. Rather it's a method to clarify and clean up the mess of words that constitutes philosophical conversation.

See Reply to Apustimelogist's post, which brings out further your observation that forms do not much help us.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed, that was precisely my point.

Sure, and I think part of my point is that this kind of thing is already inside the kind of perspectivr related to word-use. So invoking forms doesn't add anything.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

"none of us actually know how or why we personally are able to perceive and point out 'roundness' in the world," is simply not one many people

Well, I think my claim is not quite what you had in mind. What I was thinking of is more along the lines of how someone performs a skill but the performance is automatic. People very skilled at playing the piano and sight-reading can just play the notes straight off the sheet music of a very complicated song. They will then memorize thr song as second nature and br able to play it almost without thought. I don't think anyone in these moments has conscious understanding or insight into what they are actually doing. They have just learned to do it and do so automatically. Do you think Novak Djokovic actually knoes why he was such a good tennis player? Do you thi k these tennis players actually have a strong understanding of why they were just able to beat all the other kids growing up? Not long ago I saw a video of Magnus Carlson beat someone at chess while blindfolded; do you think he really knows how he is able to do this? I think we can say similar for all skills - reading, facial recognition, any kind of knowledge. Sometimes I recall facts or events in memory and I don't even know how I learned them. They just come.

I think you know about as much about why you can perceive roundness as how much an agnosiac with brain damage would know about why they couldn't perceive or distinguish certain shapes. Sure, a scientist can explain to an agnosiac some information about brains, cognition, the psychology of perception. But at some point, from your first person perspective it boils down to just - you can do some stuff, you can't do some other stuff; you aren't exactly sure why in terms of your own personal insight.

What I am saying here is not a scientific claim about facts related to the brain or cognition. Its a claim about people's personal insight into their own behavior and cognition, which I think most people don't even realize much of the time.

There is no skepticism about science here, just that we cannot realistically get a precise explanation of how these things work without presuming our own use of words. For instance, how a neuroscientist or psychologist cannot study how people see color without relying on people's self-report about color. If you aren't building these things from the ground up, you are to some extent relying on how scientific, empirical facts and models are related to your use of words or perceptual abilities that you may not quite understand. So my point is that if I invoke "forms", I am just re-asserting that fact that I can see stuff without actually explaining what that means. So to me, that's not really interesting, and I know what is happening when my brain perceives stuff is probably a bit more interesting and informative.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

These theories might be misguided, but they are not reducible to "word use."

I think they are when you view word-use as not in a vacuum. We use words in response to things that are happening in the world, coming from what we see and hear, including from inanimate objects and other people that shape eachother's use of words.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

One might indeed criticize a metaphysics of form in any number of ways, but to say that such a broad and well-developed area of philosophy is contentless would seem to simply demonstrate a total lack of familiarity with it ... ... There can be no "neuroscience" if there is nothing determinant that can be said about brains.

This whole section was informative, which just leads me to re-assert the next quote you take from my original post:

Is there actually much difference between my 'structure' and your 'forms' (in the most generic sense of structure)? Maybe I just prefer the former word without the connotations of the latter... other similar words might be 'patterns', 'regularities', etc, etc.

Quoting Apustimelogist

So I guess my conclusion is that appealing to forms and word-use is not meaningfully different. They are only different when trying to inflate stuff unnecessarily

Quoting Banno

Interesting that you mention strange loops. You've read Hofstadter, I presume?

I actually haven't! I just like the phrase in order to describe the inability to get out of a perspectival context - this constant tension between trying to give descriptions of what is the case and the fact that this can effectively be deflated in terms of word-use and enactive cognition, which itself is a description of what is the case, which brings us back to the beginning (in the sense that describing or giving a story about what is the case regarding how cognition works is itself word-use and enactive cognition).

Quoting Apustimelogist

if we want to explain the actual reasons why we use the word 'round', you have to talk about an immensely complicated brain and how it interacts with the rest of a very complicated world in an intractable manner - from the perspective of our own intelligibility - to infer something about how it represents or embodies structure out in the world.

But we're not required to know that. It's not necessary to know anything of the complexities of neuroscience to understand the principle of intelligibility. Here, you're simply projecting the inherent limitations of materialist philosophy of mind onto the whole issue.

Quoting Apustimelogist

But anyone using the word 'round' is using it because they are engaging with the world around them and they see 'round' things.

That's the empiricist argument in a nutshell. The problem is, many animals other than h.sapiens see round things, but they never form a concept of 'round'. LIkewise with my quoted example of 'equals'. 'Equals' is obviously fundamental to rational argument, symbollically denoting 'the same as'. But how is equality discerned? When we say that two objects are of equal weight or length, we must already possess the concept 'equals' to make that judgement. And no amount of sensory experience will convey that to a subject incapable of grasping the concept. Hence the argument that 'equals' (and other universals') are discerned by reason and cannot be derived from experience alone (a point which Kant elaborated at tiresome length in his master work.)

It's worth repeating the quote from Eric Perl again:

[quote=Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28] Forms...are radically distinct, and in that sense ‘apart,’ in that they are not themselves sensible things. With our eyes we can see large things, but not largeness itself; healthy things, but not health itself. The latter, in each case, is an idea, an intelligible content, something to be apprehended by thought rather than sense, a ‘look’ not for the eyes but for the mind. This is precisely the point Plato is making when he characterizes forms as the reality of all things. “Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?—In no way … Or by any other sense, through the body, have you grasped them? I am speaking about all things such as largeness, health, strength, and, in one word, the reality [??????, ouisia] of all other things, what each thing is” (Phd. 65d4–e1). Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason. [/quote]

This applies to 'roundness' as much as any other universal. (Eric Perl's book, Thinking Being, is a well-regarded current textbook on classical metaphysics, unfortunately out-of-print, although I've managed to acquire a .pdf copy.)

Other than that, I quite agree with @Count Timothy von Icarus's post above, especially this:

Eleonore Stump notes that ‘what Aquinas refers to as the spiritual reception of an immaterial form . . . is what we are more likely to call encoded information’, as when a street map represents a city or DNA represents a protein.

It's not too far of a stretch to see how this suggests biosemiosis (signs and sign relations) as fundamental to cognition (and indeed to organic processes generally.) So here we're encountering the metaphysics of meaning, to which Platonic and Aristotelian principles still have considerable relevance.

Reply to Apustimelogist

Seeing is a power of humans, one every sighted person is innately familiar with. I don't think a reductionist account is the only true account of sight, nor necessarily the best. Perhaps more importantly, I don't think one must "know everything[/I] in order to know [i]anything." The continued existence of [I]some[/I] mystery vis-á-vis a phenomenon does not preclude us having any knowledge about it.

But why appeal to the complexity of the brain in particular? Sight also involves light, and the light wave/photon have more than enough mystery to make the same sort of argument. This is the problem with "neuroscience as first philosophy." It's an even worse candidate than epistemology because it is itself reliant on the principles of other sciences (e.g. physics).

Anyhow, this still seems to be misunderstanding the concept of form. The form is, in part, the actuality in things that is responsible for their appearance. Being is prior to interaction. Something needs to first exist in order interact so as to appear a certain way. Appearance—perception—is also prior to the development of language. Form is not primarily about explaining language, although it might do that to. It's about what must lie prior to language and perception (else our determinant perceptions would be caused by "nothing in particular," in which case they essentially wouldn't have causes at all). The form of things isn't just their appearances though (which you seem to be suggesting), nor what is said of them, but rather is upstream of each of those, because being (existing) is a prerequisite for interaction and being known.

In the broadest sense, a thing's form is what makes anything any thing at all, it's particular actuality or "act of existence" by which it is some thing and not "nothing in particular." If form were instead, as you seem to suggest, merely "what brains perceive and talk about," then "brains" themselves would have no true existence as anything distinct, and so would have no determinant powers, ruling out the very possibility of a "science of brains." Brains themselves would be merely "something brains perceive and talk about." This appears to me to be a rather vicious circle.

Besides this, as Reply to Wayfarer points out, form doesn't just explain perception, but the ability to reason about things and to attain [I]intellectual[/I] knowledge (as opposed to sense knowledge). Things are not just perceivable, they are also intelligible. Form is what is communicated to the intellect such that things are known as more than mere collocations of sensation.

But, perhaps more to the point, even if one rejects any notion of form, it still wouldn't be the case that form is just about what is perceived and spoken of. Metaphysicians might be wrong, but they would be wrong about form as a basic metaphysical principle, not as a property of perception.

Quoting Wayfarer

But we're not required to know that

Yes, my point is just that if we don't know that then we are just re-asserting the way we use words in response to what we see without any deeper explanation. If that's all you're saying, fine. My point was more aimed at kinds of inflations of concepts to platonic realms.

Quoting Wayfarer

Here, you're simply projecting the inherent limitations of materialist philosophy of mind onto the whole issue

Not at all, and whatever limits there may be here are not transcended by any other purported view.

Quoting Wayfarer

That's the empiricist argument in a nutshell. The problem is, many animals other than h.sapiens see round things, but they never form a concept of 'round'. LIkewise with my quoted example of 'equals'. 'Equals' is obviously fundamental to rational argument, symbollically denoting 'the same as'. But how is equality discerned? When we say that two objects are of equal weight or length, we must already possess the concept 'equals' to make that judgement. And no amount of sensory experience will convey that to a subject incapable of grasping the concept. Hence the argument that 'equals' (and other universals') are discerned by reason and cannot be derived from experience alone (a point which Kant elaborated at tiresome length in his master work.)

Well, seeing 'round' things and inferring things about them is mediated by your brain. All concepts are to some extent abstract. A 'stone' or a 'particle' is an abstract concept as much as 'money' or 'health', all inferred through how the brain interacts with the world, but at the very core and central place that makes this universe of stuff tick is physical concepts.

Reply to Wayfarer

It's not too far of a stretch to see how this suggests biosemiosis (signs and sign relations) as fundamental to cognition (and indeed to organic processes generally.) So here we're encountering the metaphysics of meaning, to which Platonic and Aristotelian principles still have considerable relevance.

There is a historical relation too in that biosemiotics and the invocation of semiotics in physics almost always involves the tripartite semiotics received through Charles Sanders Peirce. But Peirce was himself a lifelong student of the Scholastics, and received his semiotics through them. His model, although it has some very important new developments, still looks just like Saint Augustine's semiotic triad in De Dialectica in its main structure and elements.

John Deely's "Four Ages of Understanding" traces this history. It's an interesting work, although it is pretty deficient as a history of philosophy outside of tracing the history of semiotics. He writes off Neoplatonism entirely despite it's huge influence on the reception of Aristotle he is speaking to, which I found sort of odd.

Quoting Apustimelogist

A 'stone' or a 'particle' is an abstract concept as much as 'money' or 'health', all inferred through how the brain interacts with the world, but at the very core and central place that makes this universe of stuff tick is physical concepts.

But I say that concepts are not physical - they're the relations of ideas. And the idea that concepts or rational inference can be understood as physical is the central myth of philosophical materialism, which by tying rational concepts to 'brain function' seeks to give them a physical grounding. But that is neural reductionism:

Neural reductionism asserts that psychological phenomena (like perception, cognition, and consciousness) can be explained in terms of the workings of the nervous system, particularly at the neural level. In essence, it argues that understanding the brain and its neural processes is sufficient to explain mental states and behaviors.

Proponents include Australian philosopher D M Armstrong, and also the recently deceased Daniel Dennett.

But I say that there is a vicious circularity in the reductionist view, because in order to interpret neural data, or to say how, or whether, 'the brain' is the source of reason (as distinct from an interpreter of it), we must rely on concepts. Not just the advanced concepts required to understand neurobiology (which is an astoundingly complex science), but those very basic conceptual structures such as 'same as', 'different to' and so on. You won't see anything in the kinds of data that can be observed through fMRI and so on, unless you're a highly trained specialist deeply versed in neuroscience. On which basis, you will then say 'well, this scan shows activity in this area of the brain, which means that....' So again, you're relying on the very faculty of rational inference (if: then) to establish the claim which you're wishing to demonstrate. And it's not something you can see 'from the outside'.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps more importantly, I don't think one must "know everything in order to know anything." The continued existence of some mystery vis-á-vis a phenomenon does not preclude us having any knowledge about it.

Sure, but if you can't articulate what you mean, then you are just effectively circularly re-asserting how you use words and behaving in response to something you can't elaborate on.

I don't know what you mean by reductionist account or what the alternative is.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

But why appeal to the complexity of the brain in particular? Sight also involves light, and the light wave/photon have more than enough mystery to make the same sort of argument.

Its all included.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

Anyhow, this still seems to be misunderstanding the concept of form. The form is, in part, the actuality in things that is responsible for their appearance. Being is prior to interaction. Something needs to first exist in order interact so as to appear a certain way. Appearance—perception—is also prior to the development of language. Form is not primarily about explaining language, although it might do that to. It's about what must lie prior to language and perception (else our determinant perceptions would be caused by "nothing in particular," in which case they essentially wouldn't have causes at all). The form of things isn't just their appearances though (which you seem to be suggesting), nor what is said of them, but rather is upstream of each of those, because being (existing) is a prerequisite for interaction and being known.

Well, I think what I am mainly resisting is the notion of inflating this stuff beyond me saying something like "I see stuff"or "I see a 'round' thing".

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

In the broadest sense, a thing's form is what makes anything any thing at all, it's particular actuality or "act of existence" by which it is some thing and not "nothing in particular."

I mean, why do I have to unnecessarily flower up the fact that I can see 'round' things like this? I don't even really understand ehat this sentencr is saying.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

"what brains perceive and talk about," then "brains" themselves would have no true existence as anything distinct, and so would have no determinant powers, ruling out the very possibility of a "science of brains." Brains themselves would be merely "something brains perceive and talk about." This appears to me to be a rather vicious circle.

Well I think there is always going to be a circularity of some sort imo, like my own quote here:

I actually haven't! I just like the phrase in order to describe the inability to get out of a perspectival context - this constant tension between trying to give descriptions of what is the case and the fact that this can effectively be deflated in terms of word-use and enactive cognition, which itself is a description of what is the case, which brings us back to the beginning (in the sense that describing or giving a story about what is the case regarding how cognition works is itself word-use and enactive cognition).

And our conceptual networks all run i to places wherr we can't articulate things so well. There are always limits to what we can explain or describe. The biggest tension is that stuff exists in the world clearly independently of us, yet we can only engage with stuff from within a perspective through what a brain does in terms of predictions, word-use, etc. And its the same for the study of our own brains.

Quoting Wayfarer

But I say that concepts are not physical - they're the relations of ideas.

You could say that but then again, many of our concepts are about physical things, many of our abstract concepts are about things that "supervene" on physical stuff, and concepts themselves can be explained in terms of what we do or think which can be explained in terms of a physical brain. The entire universe and everything in it is a physical system.

Quoting Wayfarer

we must rely on concepts

But again, concepts can be explained in terms of brains. Now, just because I think the universe is just a physical system doesn't mean I need to explain everything going on all the time in terms of particles or physical stuff. I can still talk about art, literature, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology without mentioning physics or chemistry.

Reply to Apustimelogist Perhaps Davidson's Nice derangement of epitaphs goes here. Linguistic competence, and hence our explanations of how things are, cannot rely on fixed conventions or shared meanings, but depend on radical interpretation and charitable understanding in particular contexts.

And this in turn is a corollary of PI §201: '...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it"
in actual cases.'

Quoting Apustimelogist

But again, concepts can be explained in terms of brains ....the entire universe and everything in it is a physical system.

Can they? Is it? Those are assumptions - the central assumptions of scientific materialism. And you don't present arguments for it: you present it as a foregone conclusion, something that is 'of course' the case. I don't think it has seriously occured to you that it can be questioned, how it can be questioned, and who questions it.

Quoting Apustimelogist

I can still talk about art, literature, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology without mentioning physics or chemistry.

But here we're discussing philosophy, Plato's forms, universals, and nature of mind.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

There is a historical relation too in that biosemiotics and the invocation of semiotics in physics almost always involves the tripartite semiotics received through Charles Sanders Peirce.

I have read that Peirce held to realism concerning universals. There's a tantalising fragment in a review of a book about Peirce and the 'threat of nominalism':

[quote=Peirce and the Thread of Nominalism (review); https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/peirce-and-the-threat-of-nominalism/]Peirce understood nominalism in the broad anti-realist sense usually attributed to William of Ockham, as the view that reality consists exclusively of concrete particulars and that universality and generality have to do only with names and their significations. This view relegates properties, abstract entities, kinds, relations, laws of nature, and so on, to a conceptual existence at most. Peirce believed nominalism (including what he referred to as "the daughters of nominalism": sensationalism, phenomenalism, individualism, and materialism) to be seriously flawed and a great threat to the advancement of science and civilization. His alternative was a nuanced realism that distinguished reality from existence and that could admit general and abstract entities as reals without attributing to them direct (efficient) causal powers. [/quote]

That mention in passing of the distinction between reality and existence is one which I will guarantee you, nobody (or almost nobody) on this forum will recognise. (And I know this from long experience.)

Quoting Banno

This might be the key here. Those who "feel an need for Universal Concepts" will make an unjustified jump to them. It'll be a transcendental argument: things are thus-and-so; the only way they can be thus-and-so is if this Universal Concept is in play; therefore...

That sounds like a negative assessment of theoretical Philosophy compared to empirical Science. Scientists "justify" their work by getting observable physical results. But Philosophers by giving intellectual logical reasons. For example, Descartes' Mind/Body dualism, and cogito ergo sum have no material evidence, and ultimately only a transcendental argument : God. Yet, if the philosopher gives valid reasons for his postulated Universal Concept (e.g. God ; Forms), then he feels justified for his if-then conclusion. Ooops, there's that non-factual "F" word again*1.

Einstein used logical mathematical arguments to deduce that gravity could bend the path of massless photons*2. And his seemingly illogical conclusion was later justified by astronomical evidence. Unfortunately, Philosophers have no recourse to such evidence. So their justification is in accepted beliefs. For example, Plato & Aristotle were successful in the sense that their Universal Concepts (e.g. four Causes) were accepted as logically useful notions for millennia after their publication.

Yet, Aristotle tried to have it both ways, by asserting that Transcendent universal properties were also Immanent, as instances in material Things : Immanent Realism. The latter can be "justified" scientifically, but the former (the Forms) can only be supported by their acceptance in the minds of other philosophers. Therefore, he implicitly accepted the Mind/Matter relationship that we still argue over 2500 years later. Today, some philosophers feel justified in using Universal arguments, but some don't. To each his own. :smile:

*1. To Feel vs to Know : both are mental impressions, but feeling is General while knowing is Particular.

*2. Einstein sometimes used the transcendental term "aether" within his general relativity theory, but he was referring to the mentally-inferred properties (qualia) of spacetime, not to the measurable stuff of a material medium.

Quoting Banno

The admonition is that in order to understand meaning, look to use. In order to understand what folk think, look to what they do. And here, include what they say as a part of what they do.

That's an objective practical (scientific ; material) way to look at it. But a subjective theoretical (philosophical ; mental) perspective might include personal experiences that are meaningful, even if not practical . So, the physical Utility of a thing is a different conceptual category from the Meaning of the thing, relative to the observer. Hence, we are back to the old Mind/Body duality. :wink:


PS___ The fact that Philosophy is based more on Feelings & Beliefs is why ancient Greeks developed the Skeptical method of judging proposed ideas about the Nature of Reality and of Knowledge. The average person in those days made no distinction between physical Science and metaphysical Religion. But our modern separation of empirical Science and theoretical Philosophy has drawn a hard line between the Material world of tangible stuff and the Mental world of intangible ideas. All too often, the successes of Doing have allowed haughty Cynicism to supplant modest Skepticism.

Skepticism involves questioning or doubting claims, especially without sufficient evidence, but it's open to being persuaded with evidence. Cynicism, on the other hand, is a pervasive distrust of others and their motives, often expecting the worst and viewing them as selfish or malicious, and it doesn't rely on evidence or rationality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=origin+of+skepticism

PPS___ I'm currently reading Thomas Mann's WWI philosophical novel The Magic Mountain. No magic in the story except one late scene involves a seance, where most of the attendees seem gullible, but the ignorant & modest young protagonist remains somewhat skeptical of the manifestations of a ghost. Modern skeptical magician Randi, would have exposed the medium's sleight-of-hand tricks, in part by noting not what she said, but what she did.
Note --- Gnomon may come across as a gullible believer in unreal ideality to you, but he has subscribed to SKEPTIC magazine and Skeptical Inquirer for over 5 decades.

Quoting Wayfarer

That mention in passing of the distinction between reality and existence is one which I will guarantee you, nobody (or almost nobody) on this forum will recognise. (And I know this from long experience.)

Nobody here. I feel you. My worldview evolved from tepid Spiritualism as a child, to agnostic Materialism as a young adult, to a variety of -isms as a mature philosophical seeker. Since my knowledge & understanding of the worldwide variety-of-views is minimal, I cannot be dogmatic about any of them.

Although I can't accept hard-line Materialistic beliefs about the physical substance of my concepts, I also can't imagine that Plato's Ideal realm is an actual place. Instead, it's an as-if metaphor (a name), not to be taken literally. So, earlier in this thread, I admitted to being a Nominalist regarding the reality of your experiences & concepts. My directly experienced shadow ideas are not out-there in the real world, where you can find them, but in-here where I can express them in metaphorical labels & common names, as short-cuts to help you re-experience my feeling.

My personal worldview is BothAnd. It accepts imaginary mental representations of external reality as categorically different in essence from material things out there. But both inside and outside are real to me. The supposed "distinction" is necessary only for Metaphysical Ontology, not for practical Science. :smile:

Reply to Gnomon Well, philosophy tries to get at the underpinnings of empirical thoughts and thoughts in general. That makes it different to the empirical sciences, and also considerably more difficult. Unlike scientists, philosophers don't have the benefit of being able to look around to see if they are right.

Or perhaps they do. The language and logic uses in philosophy is there for all to see.

Quoting Banno

?Gnomon
Well, philosophy tries to get at the underpinnings of empirical thoughts and thoughts in general. That makes it different to the empirical sciences, and also considerably more difficult. Unlike scientists, philosophers don't have the benefit of being able to look around to see if they are right.

Yes. Even the scientific "underpinnings" for some counterintuitive conclusions remain debatable, long after they are accepted as doctrine. For example, some of Einstein's worldview shattering "facts", although supported by mathematical & physical evidence, still must be somewhat taken on Faith, because for Reason it doesn't add-up. We may not understand how invisible intangible insubstantial causal Energy can transform, like alchemical magic, into passive massive Matter. But much of modern science is grounded in that equation. For doers, it works. But for thinkers, it's still only a theory. :wink:


While Einstein's mass-energy equivalence equation E=mc² is widely recognized and used in physics, its derivation and interpretation have been subject to ongoing debate and criticism. Some critics argue that Einstein's original 1905 paper contained logical flaws, such as circular reasoning, and that alternative derivations based on momentum conservation are more accurate. Additionally, some argue that Einstein's "proofs" were limited to low-speed approximations and didn't adequately address general cases. Despite these criticisms, the equation itself remains a cornerstone of modern physics and is supported by extensive experimental evidence.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=einstein+mass+energy+equation+controversial

Reply to Wayfarer

Good recommendation. From the introduction:

A philosopher may wonder whether true statements are true because they faithfully represent the world as it is or merely because they cohere with a vast range of other accepted statements. Charles S. Peirce was the philosopher who realized that that dilemma was badly misconceived because it induces us to think that truth is either a relation between a statement and an independent, extra-mental fact or else a relation between a statement and other statements. The dilemma seduces us into thinking, on the epistemological plane, that truth is either a matter of evidence-transcendent facts about correspondence or else a matter of mere acceptability (or rational acceptability), and on the ontological plane, that reality is either absolutely independent of how we experience it and conceive of it or else is a mere construct of our experience and discourse.

Peirce thought that the dilemma is deceptive on both planes. He also thought that he knew a good way out of this dilemma and, generally, out of the grand controversy between realism and idealism. In fact, he attempted a breakout twice, and it was the second time, I believe, that he was quite successful.

Of course, the author strangely spends a lot of time arguing that Peirce is not a scholastic realist, even though he allows that this is how Peirce himself saw himself. I am not totally sure from the parts of the book I've read what he thought scholastic realism is, because he seems to be ascribing to it positions I've never seen in scholastic realists (who tend to be very positive on CSP). At any rate, he also spends a lot of time trying to prove that Peirce is not an idealist, but I think (and he does allow this at times) that it would be better to say that Peirce dissolves the idealist/materialist distinction (which makes sense since the distinction didn't exist in scholasticism itself).

This is precisely why Aristotle can be plausibly claimed as an "idealist" while he might also plausibly be claimed as the father of empiricism and "objective science." It's really both and neither because the distinction makes no sense for him. The world cannot be made of either physical or mental substance because for Aristotle substances are just things, unities.

BTW, I don't know if I would wholeheartedly endorse CSP. He is very concerned to make his thought consistent with science, which is indeed important, but 19th century science tended pretty hard towards reductionism and smallism, and sometimes his moves seem to be in line with this (perhaps because of the quite dominant idea that to be "scientific" is to be reductive. He has a reductive account of essence and substantial form, or of natural kinds, but I don't think one actually needs to be reductive here and loses much if one is. This perhaps has to do with his sources (mostly late-medievals) who had begun to badly misunderstand and then start excising the Neoplatonist elements in high-scholasticism, which are what allowed for a non-reductive account of the logoi of changing beings and their relation to Logos.

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know if I would wholeheartedly endorse CSP. He is very concerned to make his thought consistent with science, which is indeed important, but 19th century science tended pretty hard towards reductionism and smallism, and sometimes his moves seem to be in line with this (perhaps because of the quite dominant idea that to be "scientific" is to be reductive. He has a reductive account of essence and substantial form, or of natural kinds, but I don't think one actually needs to be reductive here and loses much if one is.

I don't know much about CSP, and his abstruse philosophy & vocabulary, but I am generally familiar with his most famous ideas*1. However, I get the impression that his general worldview is similar to my own pragmatic-theoretic BothAnd philosophy*2. It attempts to reconcile reductive realistic Science with holistic idealistic Philosophy, and sensory Materialism with experiential Idealism.

My wishy-washy understanding of Platonic Forms accepts both sensory senses and logical definitions*3. I don't know if there is an objective Ideal realm out-there, but subjective Ideas are certainly in-here. And how sensory Percepts transform into extra-sensory Concepts is a moot question. Also, viewed through my personal Frame of Reference, the world out-there does not measure up to my standard of perfection.

Hence, the abstract notion of a human-mind-independent-perfect-world is a useful aspiration that humans have taken for granted over millennia. For example, the Aboriginal DreamTime has provided a sacred context for imperfect reality over 50,000 years of cultural evolution. :smile:


*1. C.S. Peirce's philosophy involves both realistic and idealistic elements, particularly his concept of objective idealism. He believed in a real, mind-independent world, while also arguing that the ultimate nature of reality is experiential and mind-like. This view distinguishes him from both naive realism and panpsychism.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=c.s.+pierce+realism+idealism

*2. Both/And Principle :
[i]My coinage for the holistic principle of Complementarity, as illustrated in the Yin/Yang symbol. Opposing or contrasting concepts are always part of a greater whole. Conflicts between parts can be reconciled or harmonized by putting them into the context of a whole system. . . . .
Conceptually, the BothAnd principle is similar to Einstein's theory of Relativity, in that what you see ? what’s true for you ? depends on your perspective, and your frame of reference; for example, subjective or objective, religious or scientific, reductive or holistic, pragmatic or romantic, conservative or liberal, earthbound or cosmic. Ultimate or absolute reality (ideality) doesn't change, but your conception of reality does. Opposing views are not right or wrong, but more or less accurate for a particular purpose.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

*3. Forms :
Platonic Forms are Archetypes : the original pattern or model of which all things of the same type are representations or copies. Timeless metaphysical Forms are distinguished from temporal physical Things. These perfect models are like imaginary designs from which Things can be built.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page13.html

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know if I would wholeheartedly endorse (C S Peirce). He is very concerned to make his thought consistent with science, which is indeed important, but 19th century science tended pretty hard towards reductionism and smallism, and sometimes his moves seem to be in line with this perhaps because of the quite dominant idea that to be "scientific" is to be reductive. He has a reductive account of essence and substantial form, or of natural kinds, but I don't think one actually needs to be reductive here and loses much if one is.

I don't think that's correct. He's an exceedingly complex writer with a vast corpus of work which is still being sorted and edited. But he (along with his contemporaries or near-contemporaries William James, Joshia Royce, Bordern Parker Bowne, et al) were all idealist in some sense - this was before the great rejection of idealism by Moore and Russell. In their day, idealism was mainstream.

I haven't yet really grasped Peirce's ideas of firstness-secondness-thirdness, nor his tripartite relation of sign, signified etc - but I think it's fair to describe it as an attempt at a fully-fledged metaphysic and one which is not at all friendly to materialism in any way shape or form. But he also spent decades as a working scientist and surveyor and was scrupulously empirical in such matters. So I don't think it's all fair to describe Peirce as reductionist.

(In many discussiones with Apokrisis, where I really first encountered Peirce, I would emphasise his idealist side, while Apo would deprecate it as due it being a 'man of his times', and lacking our more-sophisticated grasp of systems science. I never quite bought that, as I think that Peirce was a thoroughgoing idealist in his philosophical views. To this day, if you google the term 'objective idealism' C S Peirce is one of the top names on the returned list - 'matter is effette mind'.)

Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus

This is precisely why Aristotle can be plausibly claimed as an "idealist" while he might also plausibly be claimed as the father of empiricism and "objective science." It's really both and neither because the distinction makes no sense for him.

I've tried to make the point before, that for Aristotle, and also for the Scholastics, 'idealism' wasn't necessary, because they had a completely different orientation or way-of-being in the world. Theirs was a 'participatory ontology', exemplified in Aristotle's maxim 'the soul is in a way all things'. So our sense of separateness, and the idea of the universe as a vast impersonal aggregation of material objects, wasn't real for them. The world was an expression of a higher intelligence, with which the individual had an 'I-Thou' relationship (per Martin Buber) rather than the 'me-it' relationship that characterises modernity. When that started to be called into question, about the time of the Renaissance, was when idealism began to make its appearance, as a kind of corrective to the emerging modern materialism.

(That incidentally is what makes the 'analytical thomists' so interesting, in their attempts are reconciling or comparing Aquinas and Kant, although it's a pretty recondite subject.)

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus Reply to Wayfarer

Interesting thoughts. I would say that Peirce is a significantly unique thinker, in that he defies a lot of the standard categories. He is certainly a mediator between contemporary philosophy and Aristotelian realism. I also tend to see him as transcending the idealism-materialism dichotomy, although here we run into the difficulty of slippery definitions, particularly with respect to idealism.

Reply to Leontiskos Reply to Gnomon Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus https://aeon.co/essays/charles-sanders-peirce-was-americas-greatest-thinker

Quoting Apustimelogist

this constant tension between trying to give descriptions of what is the case and the fact that this can effectively be deflated in terms of word-use and enactive cognition, which itself is a description of what is the case, which brings us back to the beginning (in the sense that describing or giving a story about what is the case regarding how cognition works is itself word-use and enactive cognition).

It’s a zen koan!

Quoting Leontiskos

Interesting thoughts. I would say that Peirce is a significantly unique thinker, in that he defies a lot of the standard categories. He is certainly a mediator between contemporary philosophy and Aristotelian realism. I also tend to see him as transcending the idealism-materialism dichotomy, although here we run into the difficulty of slippery definitions, particularly with respect to idealism.

Apparently CSP's philosophy divides the conceptual-symbolic world into three categories instead of the "standard" dualities. I haven't been able to overlay (without overlaps) his triads onto my simpler & more traditional Real vs Ideal classifications. For example : 1) Firstness = Potential, Possible, Ideal? ; Secondness = Causation, Actualization, Realization? ; Thirdness = Mind, Ideas, Concepts, Symbols, Patterns?

More to the point of this thread, where would Plato's ideal Forms fit into CSP's tri-partite categories? How about Aristotle's ten categories? :smile:


Aristotle's Theory of Categories classifies the ways in which we can speak about things into ten fundamental categories : substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and passion. These categories help to understand the different ways things can be predicated of a subject, providing a framework for logical analysis and understanding of the world.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=categories+aristotle+dualities

Reply to Banno
Yes, I think for me this is the kind of view of language that should go there. Itsthe kind of view that speaks to my inclinations and provides important nuances that seem to often be missed by various other essentialists on the philosophy forum.

Reply to Apustimelogist Cheers.

Quoting Apustimelogist

...other essentialists...

Is that "other" advised? As in, would you consider yourself an 'essentialist'? If so, may I ask what would that involve - that things have a set of characteristics which make them what they are, and that the task of science and philosophy is their discovery and expression? Or that essence precedes existence?

Reply to Banno
Aha, no that was a mistaken phrase; I did not mean to imply essentialism for myself!

Reply to Apustimelogist Cheers.

We have a plague of them at present. Glad to see some nuance.

Reply to Wayfarer Reply to Leontiskos

To be clear, when I say he has reductionist tendencies, I don't mean "materialist reductionism." That substantial form is built up from other "regularities" can seem reductionist, without implying anything about materialism. Maybe it isn't though; this might just be an expression of something like Thomistic virtual quantity (qualitative intensity). His thought is sort of opaque at times, so I am not confident in that judgement.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus - I agree. That "reductionism" is a large part of why his thought is more amenable to modern man, and why he is a good mediator.

Quoting Banno

...other essentialists... — Apustimelogist
Is that "other" advised? As in, would you consider yourself an 'essentialist'? If so, may I ask what would that involve - that things have a set of characteristics which make them what they are, and that the task of science and philosophy is their discovery and expression? Or that essence precedes existence?

I wouldn't call myself an Essentialist in any formal or doctrinal sense. But I do think modern science has come close to functionally defining the essences of material things in the Periodic Table of the Elements. Each element has properties*1 that are both necessary to the functions (e.g. human uses) of the element, and that are mentally meaningful (as qualia) to the scientists who make practical use of those essential patterns of properties, and their functional relationships to other elements (H + O + O = H2O). Such practical & aesthetic essences describe their role in Physics, Chemistry, and sometimes even in Psychology.

The unique Properties of an element are conceptual characteristics inferred or attributed to a class of material forms by human observers. Some can be quantified, like weight (how Mass is experienced), but others are mental Qualia, like color which exists in the mind not the matter. So, the properties, by which we differentiate material objects, are abstractions in the Mind of the observer, not dissections of the matter. Those mental images are Patterns, Designs, Models, Archetypes, or ding an sich, not actual things. Ironically, the table of elements has empty boxes for functional elements that should exist (ideally), but have not yet been found in nature (e.g. Technetium 43).

Hence, if a physicist (or a god) wanted to create a new material with specific properties, she would begin with an Ideal "set of characteristics" (a formula)*2 to aim at. Plato's "essence precedes existence" may refer to how Nature evolves novel things, such as Life & Mind & diamonds, that presumably did not exist at the Big Bang beginning. Only the Potential*3 for such abstract or concrete things necessarily pre-existed in the form of immaterial statistical Possibilities or Probabilities. :smile:


*1. Property dualism is a philosophical view within the philosophy of mind that asserts the existence of both physical properties and non-physical, mental properties.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=property+dualism+philosophy

*2. A formula {essential Form} is a symbolic expression, often in mathematics or chemistry, that represents a relationship, a rule, or a chemical composition. It can also refer to a fixed method, a plan, or a set of instructions.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=formula

*3. In philosophical discussions, potentiality refers to the inherent capacity or possibility within something to become or do something else. It's the "what could be" aspect of a thing, contrasted with its current state of being (actuality). This concept is closely linked to Aristotle's philosophy of nature, where things are understood as having potential to develop and fulfill their entelechy (their natural purpose).
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=potential+philosophy

Reply to Gnomon In Kripke - that is, in the standard accepted modern model of modal logic - the essential properties of some thing are those had by it in every possible world.

The tension here is that this is a different definition to that found in Aristotle, and held by most philosophers up until the seventies.

Aristotle's definition is along the lines of an essence being something like "what it is to be the thing it is and not another thing..." As you can see this is a comparatively vague notion, and no doubt others will be able to finesse it in various ways, but it makes use of notions of hylomorphism and teleology somewhat foreign to science.

The tension is that these two definitions have somewhat different consequences.

So it's not that modal logic rejects essentialism, as some supose. But it treats it in a very different way. There are a couple of other threads right now that are dealing with these issues.

Reply to Count Timothy von Icarus Agree that Peirce's prose can be very obscure.

Quoting Gnomon

I do think modern science has come close to functionally defining the essences of material things in the Periodic Table of the Elements.

It is no coincidence that Greek science and philosophy laid the earliest foundations for the 'scientific revolution', so-called.

Quoting Banno

?Gnomon
In Kripke - that is, in the standard accepted modern model of modal logic - the essential properties of some thing are those had by it in every possible world.

Thanks, but I'm not familiar with Kripke, and Modal Logic is over my head. Aristotelian Logic is more like common sense (the actual world) to me. He simply wants to define a Thing in a way that won't be confused with another Thing : its conceptual Essence*1. Physicists & Chemists are content to define a Thing by its unique physical characteristics (periodic table). But shouldn't Philosophers be more concerned with a Thing's abstract conceptual features (Form), and their meaning to a regular person?

Therefore, I would think Aristotle's Essence would be appropriate for a philosophy forum frequented by amateurs. The notion of "qualities that make it what it is"*2 is straightforward enough for even us simple-minded non-professionals*3. So, I'll leave the complexities of all-possible-modes to the pros. :smile:


*1. [i]Aristotle's work doesn't explicitly explore the concept of "all possible worlds" in the way modern modal logic does. . . . .
Aristotle was primarily concerned with understanding the actual world, its structure, and the nature of things within it. He focused on the principles of causation, change, and the inherent potential (entelechy) of things to become what they are meant to be.[/i]
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+all+possible+worlds

*2. In Aristotelian philosophy, essence (Greek: ousia, meaning "being" or "substance") refers to the fundamental, defining nature of a thing, the qualities that make it what it is. It's the "what it is to be" a particular type of thing, like the essence of a human being is their capacity for rational thought and reason. Aristotle believed that every individual entity, including things and living beings, has an essence that determines its identity and purpose.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+essence

*3. In art and design, "form" can refer to the overall shape, structure, and appearance of an object or composition. When applied to abstract conceptual features, it suggests that the visual form is used to represent or evoke abstract ideas, concepts, or emotions, rather than representing tangible objects.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=form+%3A+abstract+conceptual+features

PS___ I suppose Aristotle's notion of Purpose could refer to a God's intention for creation, or to a human's adaptation of that Functional Design (by Evolution) for his own goals.

Quoting Wayfarer

I do think modern science has come close to functionally defining the essences of material things in the Periodic Table of the Elements. — Gnomon
It is no coincidence that Greek science and philosophy laid the earliest foundations for the 'scientific revolution', so-called.

Yes. Aristotle may have created the one of first Tables of Elements : Gas, Liquid, Solid, Interactive. Perhaps the 'scientific revolution' has merely added footnotes to Aristotle : Atomic Number. :nerd:


Aristotle's table of elements, or rather his theory of elements, proposed that all matter was composed of four fundamental elements: earth, water, air, and fire. He believed these elements combined in various proportions to form all things in the world.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+table+of+elements

Reply to Gnomon So you prefer simple over correct? :wink:

Possible worlds are not so hard to understand. They are just stipulated models of how things might have been. So I might not have written this post - that can be modelled as that there is a possible world in which I didn't write this post. It's that simple. We can then go on to think about the consequences - like, in that possible world, since I didn't write this post, you didn't read it. But Charlie would still be King of England.

Using this, an essence can be seen as the properties a thing must have in every possible world in which it is found.

In most cases, that definition is much the same as the "qualities that make it what it is" version. But there are important differences.

And if one is going to play with philosophical concepts, understanding logic generally, including modal logic, is going to stand you in good stead.

Basically, if you are going to follow only logics from 2000 years ago, you will not be able to engage effectively with more... recent material.

Up to you, of course.

Quoting Gnomon

Perhaps the 'scientific revolution' has merely added footnotes to Aristotle : Atomic Number. :nerd:

I watched an exceedingly interesting documentary on the way that the basic outline of the Table of Elements was constructed in a single weekend by Dmitri Mendeleev.

Quoting Banno

Using this, an essence can be seen as the properties a thing must have in every possible world in which it is found.

I think all of this David Lewis 'possible worlds' and a considerable amount of modern modal metaphysics are purely verbal exercises with no traction in reality. Empty words. At least in classical metaphysics, there was something real at stake, even if we no longer believe in it.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think...

You'd be wrong. And not just in laying the blame on David Lewis.

Modal metaphysics revives and deepens problems that are as real as any in classical thought. It offers precise tools for exploring essence, necessity, and counterfactuality—concepts classical metaphysics also wrestled with. And the charge of being "verbal" reflects a deflationary bias that the modal tradition explicitly resists.

But Banno's Rule applies: It is always easier to critique something if you begin by not understanding it. Your dismissal of modal metaphysics as “verbal” is a textbook case of strategic misunderstanding. You are trying to cut off a conversation that makes you uncomfortable, that cuts against your own views.

Quoting Banno

Basically, if you are going to follow only logics from 2000 years ago, you will not be able to engage effectively with more... recent material.

That's OK by me. I am not a professional philosopher, or an academic logician. So I have no need or desire to engage with "more recent material". On the forum, I am content to let better informed (erudite) posters, such as yourself, dumb it down for me.

Yes, the KISS principle*1 may apply even to logical analysis ; because it allows you to focus on core values, instead of straying into off-shoot dead-ends. Complexity is often used to cover-up non-sense*2. As to which is "correct" --- Aristotle or Kripke --- I suppose it depends on the application. And my amateur use of Logic is pretty basic. :smile:


*1. The "KISS principle," which stands for "Keep It Simple, Stupid," is a design principle that emphasizes simplicity in systems and processes. It suggests that most systems function best when they are kept simple, making them easier to understand, maintain, and troubleshoot. This philosophy is widely used in various fields, including software development, engineering, and even business strategies.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=keep+it+simple+philosophy

*2. W.C. Fields — 'If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with bullshit.'

Quoting Banno

Possible worlds are not so hard to understand. They are just stipulated models of how things might have been.

The notion of Possible Worlds*1 is way off my radar. But I Googled the term, and Lewis' definition seems to imply that the biblical Heaven is a logically possible, and "real concrete", place in the conceptual cosmos. If so, then Pascal's wager would make practical sense : to bet on heaven, as the payoff for long-suffering Earthly faith & worship. How else could you manage to leave the imperfect phenomenal world behind, and transport to a perfect noumenal world : a stipulated model? Don't bother to correct me, if I misunderstood. I'm content with my so-so Actual World. :joke:

*1. Possible Worlds :
David Lewis, a prominent philosopher, is best known for his modal realism, which posits that all possible worlds are real, concrete entities that exist in the same way as the actual world. He argues that these possible worlds are not mere abstract ideas or thought experiments, but rather they are real, concrete places just like our own.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=david+lewis+possible+worlds

Quoting Banno

But Banno's Rule applies: It is always easier to critique something if you begin by not understanding it. Your dismissal of modal metaphysics as “verbal” is a textbook case of strategic misunderstanding. You are trying to cut off a conversation that makes you uncomfortable, that cuts against your own views.

I apologize for sticking my modular brain into modes that I have little interest in or understanding of : e.g. Modal Metaphysics*1. But this post was inspired by an article in the April/May issue of Philosophy Now magazine. It's a review of a book by Phil. professor James Tartaglia : Inner Space Philosophy. "Inner Space" of course refers to Consciousness, with its metaphysical ideas & subjective abstractions, as contrasted with the Real World out there, and its physical things & material objects. This thread seems to have split along the typical adversarial lines of real Physics (outer) vs ideal Metaphysics (inner), each of which may make some of us "uncomfortable" due to opposing worldviews, or indifferent due to irrelevance.

The reviewer says "the dominant style in philosophy today is one of dry, detailed analysis and argumentation, filled with technical terms that only specialists --- and often very few of them --- can get through". He goes on : "since the beginning of the twentieth century, academic philosophy is meant to be (or has aspirations of being) a science". Then notes : "Many of the philosophical topics that are most important from the perspective of the non-professional . . . . are not considered worthy of discussion within so-called 'scientific' philosophy, because they are ontologically suspect, meaning they require that materialism is false".

Materialism, as a generalization, is a metaphysical concept which cannot be scientifically falsified. So its validity must be established by denigrating that which is immaterial. This is not just a divergence in style or fashion, but in substance. The Forms in this topic are obviously abstract, un-real, immaterial, and in-substantial, hence of little interest to the materialist mind. On the other hand, some attempts to treat such metaphysical topics as-if they can be infinitely dissected into atoms of meaning, may seem adventurous to some, but dry & boring to others. Hence, attempts to "cut off" or redirect a dialog onto more amenable lines. Both sides do it, until the conversation becomes a shouting match, or a mutual retreat.

Personally, I am interested, and have some amateur understanding of both physical Science and metaphysical Philosophy. But when those modes get confused, I either don't understand, or lose interest, or both. For me, the Theory of (infinite possible) Forms*2 is not a scientific hypothesis, and cannot be analyzed by reductive means. So, attempts to do so, may quickly sound boringly verbose*3. Please pardon the lack of understanding, but from my indifferent perspective, MM seems to be searching for an island of certainty within infinite possibility. Is that an impossible dream? :smile:


*1. Modal metaphysics concerns the metaphysical underpinning of our modal statements. These are statements about what is possible or what is necessarily so.
https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/
Note --- Medieval Scholasticism was criticized by Protestants for metaphysical over-reaching with absurd hypothetical possibility questions such as "how many angels could dance on the head of a pin".

*2. Platonic forms, in the context of physics, explore the idea that the fundamental nature of reality is not merely physical but also abstract and mathematical, much like Plato's Theory of Forms. This concept suggests that the laws of nature and the structure of the universe are governed by underlying, unchanging, and perfect "forms" or principles, rather than just the observable physical world.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=platonic+forms+in+physics
Note --- Can you dissect a Principle into its parts or modes?

*3. Verbal or Verbose : [i]using or expressed in more words than are needed.
"much academic language is obscure and verbose"[/i]
___Oxford Dictionary

PS___ Don't get me wrong, Modal Metaphysics may be a valid & valuable area of research, but it won't prove or disprove the existence or hypothetical utility of Plato's Theory of Universal Forms.

Reply to Wayfarer

Quoting Banno

You are trying to cut off a conversation that makes you uncomfortable, that cuts against your own views.

Not at all. There is a practically infinite number of textbooks and philosophers nowadays. (I read in Nous magazine the other day that at any given moment there’s a backlog of 10,000 philosophy papers awaiting publication.) So one is obligated to decide which subjects to pursue. Granted, I’ve only made the most cursory study of modern modal metaphysics, but going on, for example, the IEP article on the subject, it corresponds to the criticism @Gnomon gives above - ‘the dominant style in philosophy today is one of dry, detailed analysis and argumentation, filled with technical terms that only specialists --- and often very few of them --- can get through’. All of the works mentioned in that article are by, about, and for academic philosophers, with practically no audience outside of that. Whereas the classical tradition of philosophy does at least concern practical wisdom and a deeper understanding of life as lived. Like, the fact that reality extends far beyond what we moderns assume as its limits. I’ll never obtain real scholarly knowledge of Platonist philosophy either, but at least it has some real juice and is part of a living cultural tradition, not an academic parlour game.

Reply to Gnomon Very few folk agree with Lewis. But explaining why he is mistaken is what is so interesting. We do not need to say that possible worlds are also actual.

Reply to Wayfarer, Reply to Gnomon Ok, so you both will ignore the limits of Aristotelian modal logic becasue understanding the wider formal modal logic would require some effort.

It might be worth pointing out that modal logic is not speculative, but an accepted part of formal logic and of mathematics. It's as accepted as studying topology.

So be it.

Quoting Banno

?Wayfarer , ?Gnomon
Ok, so you both will ignore the limits of Aristotelian modal logic becasue understanding the wider formal modal logic would require some effort.

Yes. For the same reason I ignore 99.99 percent of all technical philosophical papers.

However, if I thought it might shed some light on the OP question --- "what are The Forms?" --- I might expend the effort necessary to dissect abstract Logic and ideal Forms as-if they were physical objects. Your own response*1 to the OP erroneously implies that Plato was talking about Ideal Forms as-if they were real physical objects*2. I never interpreted his theory that way*3.

Instead, he was using as-if philosophical Metaphors*4 to create conventionalized images (names ; labels) of abstractions that non-experts can understand. There is no Ideal realm that we could get to in a space ship. Instead, it's a hypothetical construct that exists only in rational minds as an abstraction from places & domains in sensory reality.

For Plato, names are conceptual labels, referring to meaningful essences*5, not to physical instances of things that you could just point to. For example "dog" refers not to the de-legged Dachshund over there, but to the qualia of "dogginess" everywhere : what all dogs have in common.

I've noticed that philosophical Materialists on this forum tend to interpret Metaphors as-if they refer to Real objective Things, perhaps because they cannot conceive of a dis-embodied (abstracted) Ideal notion. Hence, they misinterpret almost everything that Plato wrote using his hypothetical "rhetorical devices". :smile:



*1. "The theory of forms is an application of a mistaken theory of reference. That theory holds that names refer to things, and that therefore, if there is a name, then there must be a thing to which it refers; So there must be a thing to which universals and such refer - the forms." ___Banno

*2. Thing : In a philosophical sense, "real" and "ideal" represent distinct realms of existence. Real things are those that exist in the physical world, while ideal things are abstract concepts or perfect models, often considered in philosophical contexts like Plato's theory of Forms or in science as ideal gases. The key difference lies in their nature: real things are concrete and subject to change, while ideal things are eternal and unchanging abstractions.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=%22thing%22+real+vs+ideal

*3. "In essence, the critique suggests that Plato's Theory of Forms misinterprets the nature of reference by treating abstract concepts as if they are concrete objects in a separate realm, rather than recognizing them as the abstract principles that give rise to the multiplicity of the physical world."
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=The+theory+of+forms+is+an+application+of+a+mistaken+theory+of+reference.

*4. "Philosophical metaphors are not just a rhetorical device but a crucial tool for understanding and communicating abstract ideas. They serve as simplified representations or "stand-ins" for complex analyses, making them vivid and accessible. In essence, they are a way to think about and express philosophical concepts that might be difficult to grasp otherwise."
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophical+metaphors

*5. In Plato's "Cratylus", the character Cratylus says that Objects aren't named arbitrarily. Rather Names originate from the nature of Objects, thus they have an intrinsic connection to the essence of Named Objects. This comes in opposition to Hermogenes Conventionalist theory of Naming.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+names+refer+to+things

Reply to Wayfarer

Reply to Banno
Reply to Wayfarer
Quoting Gnomon

Your own response*1 to the OP erroneously implies that Plato was talking about Ideal Forms as-if they were real physical objects*2. I never interpreted his theory that way*3.

Plato sometimes referred to his Ideal realm as "more real" than material reality. His cave & shadow metaphor illustrated that concept. But I interpret his "eternal realities", not to mean more material & physical, but as more important for the theoretical purposes of philosophers.

The excerpt below may seem off-topic to some, but I interpret A.N. Whitehead's Process Philosophy to be an update of Plato, in view of 25 centuries of philosophical haggling. But even that update is now out of date, since it predated the Big Bang theory and Quantum Physics. So, Process Philosophy may not be the last & final word on the Matter v Mind relation between Things & Essences, Objects & Processes, Realities & Idealities.

Still, the time-tested notion of Ideal Forms may be useful for understanding the distinction between unchanging eternal Potential and evolving temporal Actuality. Evolution can be imagined (philosophically) as the gradual actualization of unformed possibilities (Ideal Forms). Ontological BEING in the process of Becoming. :smile:


Whitehead's Forms :
[i]Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy, process philosophy, uses the concept of "eternal objects" as a parallel to Plato's Forms, but with a significant inversion. While Plato viewed the Forms as ultimate, eternal realities, Whitehead sees them as dependent on actual occasions of experience for their actuality. Eternal objects are patterns and qualities, like "squareness" or "blueness," that are potential and become actual within specific events.
Here's a more detailed breakdown:

Plato's Forms:
Plato believed that the physical world is a mere copy or shadow of a realm of perfect, eternal Forms.
These Forms, like Beauty or Justice, are the true, unchanging reality, while individual objects in the physical world are imperfect reflections of them.

Whitehead's Eternal Objects:
Whitehead's eternal objects are similar to Plato's Forms in that they are abstract, unchanging qualities or patterns.
However, Whitehead argues that eternal objects don't have their own independent existence, but rather depend on "actual occasions" for their actuality.
An actual occasion is a moment of experience, a specific event in the process of becoming.
Eternal objects become actual when they are "selected" or "realized" by an actual occasion.

Actuality:
For Whitehead, the world is not a copy of a higher realm, but a dynamic process where actuality arises from the interaction of eternal objects and actual occasions.
Hierarchy:
Plato's theory is hierarchical, with the Forms at the top of the reality scale. Whitehead's system is more egalitarian, with both eternal objects and actual occasions playing crucial roles.

In essence, Whitehead inverts Plato's hierarchy, arguing that the process of becoming is more fundamental than the eternal objects themselves.[/i]
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=whitehead+platonic+forms

Reply to Gnomon Meh. This just looks lazy. "I'll only consider stuff that reinforces the views I already have".

Quoting Gnomon

Plato sometimes referred to his Ideal realm as "more real" than material reality. His cave & shadow metaphor illustrated that concept. But I interpret his "eternal realities", not to mean more material & physical, but as more important for the theoretical purposes of philosophers.

As I’ve mentioned several times in this thread and elsewhere, this depends on the understanding that there are degrees of reality (or realness?) I suppose you could illustrate that with reference to a subject undergoing psychotic delusions - they would have ‘lost their grip in reality’, we would say. They would interpret their thoughts as demonic voices and perhaps suffer from hallucinations. Obviously the great majority of us are not delusional psychotics, but perhaps our grip on reality is still less that optimal, due to the way in which we habitually misinterpret or misunderstand the nature of existence. According to the Greeks, the philosopher has an enhanced understanding of the nature of being, superior to that of the ordinary uneducated man (the hoi polloi) because s/he is able to see more truly by virtue of the power of reason and mastery of the passions. So we’re in the middle, between rank psychosis at one end, and enlightened wisdom at the other. (And it’s a bell curve.)

The origin of Greek metaphysics is with Parmenides. In his prose-poem, Parmenides says that the great majority of people fall under the sway of illusory opinion, whereas he has been shown ‘the way of truth’ (by the goddess, as it happened, but then, this was the ancient world.) Parmenides’ successors, including Plato, sought to reconcile his vision with the facts of existence. This is the subject of an enormous body of arcane literature any fluency in which presumes knowledge of Ancient Greek (which could be expected in the days when students received an education in the Classics.)

Suffice to say, the idea of the forms in Plato are usually dismissed by current philosophy. But in my view, this is because they have been passed down through generations of classroom practices and their meaning has been lost or misinterpreted. This is why I keep referring to a fairly slim academic text book, Thinking Being: An Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition, by Eric Perl. It summarises Parmenides and Plato very effectively in the first couple of chapters. (It’s out of print but I’ve managed to get that .pdf copy.)

But in the examples you’ve given, I already see the kinds of mistakes that I think have crept in to the interpretations of Plato through centuries of interpretation. Chief amongst them is the idea that the ‘forms’ exist in some ‘ethereal realm’, a ‘Platonic heaven’ which is ‘separate’ from the ‘real world’, and also that ‘form’ can be understood as an ideal shape, which I think is completely mistaken. Perl explains the mistake of that in the chapter ‘The Meaning of Separation’ (see this post).

I’m not saying you or anyone should believe it, but that it’s important to recover the original vision of these texts as distinct from the many (often conflicting) interpretations that have grown up around them. Perl is a good starting point for that, as are books by Lloyd Gerson who is a recognised leading scholar of Platonist philosophy in the contemporary world.

Quoting Wayfarer

As I’ve mentioned several times in this thread and elsewhere, this depends on the understanding that there are degrees of reality (or realness?)

I wasn't familiar with the notion of "degrees of reality", so I Googled it*1. I had always assumed only two degrees : Real or Ideal, Actual or Possible. Multiple in-between degrees seems overly complicated ; like Many Worlds models of reality. What do we gain by sub-dividing Reality into multi-level hierarchies? Doesn't that notion make pragmatic Scientific work into guesswork? It certainly confuses me. Maybe this neither-here-nor-there (watered-down reality) interpretation of Plato is what causes Reply to Banno to exasperate "Meh!". Does my stubborn two-degree worldview mean that "I'll only consider stuff that reinforces the views I already have"? :smile:

PS___ Banno's two-value worldview seems to be : it's either Real or Wrong.

*1. Plato's theory of Forms posits that there's a hierarchy of reality, with the most real entities being the Forms (like the concept of "justice" or "beauty"), while physical objects and particulars are seen as imperfect copies or representations of these Forms. Plato suggests that physical objects have a "half existent, half non-existent" state compared to the Forms, indicating a lower degree of reality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=degrees+of+reality

Quoting Wayfarer

But in the examples you’ve given, I already see the kinds of mistakes that I think have crept in to the interpretations of Plato through centuries of interpretation. Chief amongst them is the idea that the ‘forms’ exist in some ‘ethereal realm’, a ‘Platonic heaven’ which is ‘separate’ from the ‘real world’, and also that ‘form’ can be understood as an ideal shape, which I think is completely mistaken.

One common interpretation of Plato seems to be that Forms exist as abstract ideas in the Mind of God*2, not as surreal things or ghostly shapes in a Platonic Heavenly place. This metaphor of a two level hierarchy is easier for me to understand : it's either Real (objective ; physical) or Ideal (subjective ; metaphysical). Am I missing something important in-between those philosophical categories? :smile:


*2. Plato's concept of the Forms, or Ideas, is not directly equated with God in the traditional Christian sense, but they are often interpreted as reflections of God's mind. In Plato's philosophy, the Forms represent perfect and eternal archetypes of things, existing outside of the physical world. The Form of the Good is considered the highest Form, and some interpretations see this as analogous to the Christian understanding of God. Christian thinkers like St. Augustine interpreted the Platonic Forms as God's ideas, suggesting they exist within God's mind.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+forms+mind+of+god

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Reply to tim wood Too late. It's not mine to change. These is the accepted term. Not mine to change.

Quoting Gnomon

Am I missing something important in-between those philosophical categories? :smile:

I think you’re making an honest attempt.

Plato certainly would not entertain the later, Christian dogma of ‘ideas in the mind of God’, but due to the assimilation of Greek philosophy with biblical revelation, this became foundational to the Christian worldview for centuries. It was displaced in the late medieval and early modern periods. Modern ontology tends to be ‘flat’ - there is only one real existent, that being matter (or matter-energy-space-time). Consciousness is a result or product of undirected physical causes. ‘

But heirarchical ontology is making a comeback. Deacon refers to Aristotelian ideas in Incomplete Nature.

Quoting Wayfarer

As I’ve mentioned several times in this thread and elsewhere, this depends on the understanding that there are degrees of reality (or realness?

Sorry to come back to this mind-warping concept, spinning off from Plato's spooky Forms. But how does the notion of "degrees of reality" differ from the "stipulated models" & "possible worlds" in Banno's post*1 to tim wood? Also how does Lewis' notion of Possible Worlds as "real concrete places"*2 compare to "degrees of reality"? Are they the same "possible worlds" that populate the MWI model*3 of pop-up Possible universes created by quantum measurements? Are they all Real to the same degree?

I'm just expressing my layman befuddlement. So, I won't mind if you choose not to address these mind-muddling infinities and hierarchical realities, in the forum format. Are the thinkers who explore such meta-physical "logical possibilities" trying to out-metaphor Plato's Cave, or to water-down the notion of a Real Heaven with infinite Realities? Is our own 21st century Possible Reality a recapitulation of the rational excesses of medieval Scholasticism*4? :chin:

PS___ Metaphysical reasoning does not play by the same rules as Physical reality. So, it seems that anything logical is Possible, and almost impossible to contradict.

*1.Quoting Banno

[i]They are just stipulated models of how things might have been. So I might not have written this post - that can be modelled as that there is a possible world in which I didn't write this post. It's that simple.

Note --- The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real . . . . at least in our little corner of the Multiverse.[/i] :cool:

*2. David Lewis, a prominent philosopher, is best known for his modal realism, which posits that all possible worlds are real, concrete entities that exist in the same way as the actual world. He argues that these possible worlds are not mere abstract ideas or thought experiments, but rather they are real, concrete places just like our own.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=david+lewis+possible+worlds
Note --- Like Multiverse and Many Worlds models of abstractly logical possibilities, his Modal Reality does not seem to be in danger of empirical falsification or actual contradiction. Unless, of course, I meet myself crossing-over from a parallel universe. :joke:

*3. The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), also known as the many-worlds theory, suggests that every quantum measurement causes the universe to split into multiple parallel universes, each representing a different possible outcome of the measurement. In other words, rather than a single outcome being determined, all possible outcomes exist in their own separate universes.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=many+worlds+theory

*4. Scholasticism, while influential, faced criticism for its perceived excesses, particularly its focus on abstract reasoning and detailed argumentation at the expense of practical application and genuine moral and ethical concerns. Critics, including humanists, pointed to a tendency to prioritize legal, logical, and rationalistic issues, potentially overshadowing more profound ethical questions
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=excesses+of+scholasticism

Quoting Gnomon

The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real

Not always. They might come to pass. They do this when the possible world is the actual world.

Quoting Gnomon

Sorry to come back to this mind-warping concept, spinning off from Plato's spooky Forms. But how does the notion of "degrees of reality" differ from the "stipulated models" & "possible worlds" in Banno's post*1 to tim wood?

Because it is—or was—embodied in a living philosophy, not merely in the textbooks of scholars. And indeed, the origin of those schools of thought does trace back to the Platonist tradition (in the broad sense), but philosophy as a way of life, not just an academic pursuit.

The idea of hierarchy here is that reality unfolds in levels. A classic example is found in Aristotle’s De Anima, where he outlines a graded hierarchy of soul (or being), corresponding to different kinds of living things. Aristotle was not a religious mystic, and many aspects of his biology are acknowledged today as precursors to modern biology—though of course far less developed.

In De Anima, the soul (psyche) is the form or actuality of a living body, and Aristotle identifies three primary levels:

• Nutritive Soul – possessed by plants; responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction.
• Sensitive Soul – found in animals; includes nutritive functions, plus sensation and movement.
• Rational Soul – unique to humans; includes all prior functions and adds reason and abstract thought (nous).

Each level includes but transcends the previous—forming a natural hierarchy where higher beings realise a greater degree of actuality and potentiality.

These ideas were later woven into the Scala Naturae, or Great Chain of Being—a comprehensive metaphysical synthesis that arranged all beings in a continuous vertical order: from inanimate matter, to plants, animals, humans, celestial intelligences, and ultimately to God. Each level reflected a greater degree of perfection, actuality, and participation in divine being.

(Modern materialism inverts this ontology, treating matter as fundamental and everything else—mind, purpose, value—as emergent or illusory.)

Yet this kind of hierarchical ontology was characteristic of nearly all premodern cultures, as depicted in this schematic image:



The Great Chain of Being reached its apogee in medieval thought and has largely dropped out of secular culture. But the key difference between this and modern modal metaphysics lies in the participatory aspect: in the traditional understanding, the philosophical adept could ascend through these levels of being—gaining deeper insights into higher realities. Knowing was linked to being, and the journey was transformative (hence again the title of the Eric Perl book “Thinking Being”).

A trace of this idea still lingers today, though flattened. We still say that highly trained individuals in academic or scientific disciplines have insights into domains imperceptible to others. But now, these are typically technical or mathematical realities within a naturalist framework—stripped of the vertical, moral, and ontological significance once attached to ‘higher’ levels.

Quoting Wayfarer

Each level includes but transcends the previous—forming a natural hierarchy where higher beings realise a greater degree of actuality and potentiality.

Thanks for the Stairway to Heaven overview. However, I still find the term "degrees of Reality" hard to fathom. It seems to imply that each Stage of Spirituality is a different Reality*1 : subjective state of existence? But, at my advanced age, I can look back and see (imagine) multiple stages of Intellectual (spiritual?) development. But the various phases seem to occur within the same single over-arching Reality : objective sum of all that exists.

Philosophically, I can interpret the mystical logic of the Great Nest of Being chart, as a hypothetical diagram of Spiritual evolution from statistical Potential (divine intention??) to inert Matter, to living Organisms, on up to human Psychology, and ultimately to the Samma-sambodhi state of Enlightenment. In which case, I am stuck on one of the middle rungs of spirituality ; still encumbered by a material body & Western mind.

Perhaps though, from a scientific perspective, the "natural hierarchy" could also be viewed as degrees of systematic development : Darwinian Evolution. Still, our extant Reality --- our 14B year old propagating world --- could be described as a "greater degree of actuality and potentiality". For example, the pre-Bang Singularity (a hypothetical mathematical entity) had little Actual stuff, but Cosmic-scale Potential. So, in retrospect, we now observe a hierarchy of developmental stages, from Math to Matter to Mind to Spirit???

I suppose I'm just showing my ignorance of Eastern philosophy, and my reliance on Western science for understanding how my world came to be what it is : a complex amalgam of Stuff & Sense & Sentience. Which we analyze into a logical progression of emergence. :smile:


*1. In philosophy, "reality" refers to the actual state of things, existing independently of any specific observer or perception. It's the fundamental nature of existence, encompassing all that is not imagined or theoretical. Philosophers explore different perspectives on reality, including realism, idealism, and materialism, each with its own view of what constitutes real existence.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=reality+philosophy

Quoting Banno

The qualification "might have been" seems to imply that the imaginary "things" did not come to be (to exist), hence not ontologically real — Gnomon
Not always. The might come to pass. They do this when the possible world is the actual world.

Sorry for nit-picking. But "might have been" is a retrospective acknowledgement that the Possible world (mode of being) did not, in fact, become an actual world ; hence remains an ontological non-existent no-when non-entity : an immaterial idea. So, we are back to an abstract timeless imaginary scenario.

As I said before, "Like Multiverse and Many Worlds models of abstractly logical possibilities, his Modal Reality does not seem to be in danger of empirical falsification or actual contradiction". So, his Modes are no more realistic than Plato's timeless matterless Forms. It's neither True nor False, but merely an exercise in logical reasoning, from which we may learn some philosophical principles (tools for thinking). You can choose which universal proposition best fits your own belief system. :smile:

Reply to Gnomon You've made your mind up about modal logic, before you understood it. As a result you are "unavailable for learning".

Not much point in my continuing in an attempt to to teach you, then.

So I'll just leave it at "that's not how it works".

Quoting Banno

?Gnomon
You've made your mind up about modal logic, before you understood it. As a result you are "unavailable for learning".
]Not much point in my continuing in an attempt to to teach you, then.

Wayfarer doesn't seem to be offended by my skeptical questions & confused responses, or postulated alternatives. Maybe his pedagogical posts are flexible and open to interpretation, not take it or leave it. However, I do sometimes read a big “sigh” between the lines, when I just don't get it.

It's true that I'm "unavailable for learning" by means of the old unscrew-the-top-of-the-head-and-pour-it-in technique. I learn best by trial & error, and question & answer, and self-teaching methods. Besides, a topic that seems absurd on the face of it does not invite enthusiasm for learning. That's why I asked Wayfarer repeatedly to explain the strange notion of "Degrees of Reality". But he tolerantly offered different ways to interpret that phrase. I still don't get-it, but I appreciate his pedagogical patience. :smile:

Quoting Gnomon

I learn best by trial & error, and question & answer, and self-teaching methods.

yet...
Quoting Gnomon

but I'm not familiar with Kripke, and Modal Logic is over my head. Aristotelian Logic is more like common sense (the actual world) to me.

You said that you are not willing to put any effort into understanding modal logic.

So...
Quoting Gnomon

Like Multiverse and Many Worlds models of abstractly logical possibilities, his Modal Reality does not seem to be in danger of empirical falsification or actual contradiction

...misunderstands modal logic, but in order to see why, one needs first to understand modal logic. And you have said that you are unwilling to do so.


Ok. Cheers.

Quoting Wayfarer

Because it is—or was—embodied in a living philosophy, not merely in the textbooks of scholars. And indeed, the origin of those schools of thought does trace back to the Platonist tradition (in the broad sense), but philosophy as a way of life, not just an academic pursuit.

Due to my academic laziness, Reply to Banno has decided not to take me on as an apprentice in the monk-like vocation of Modal Logic. Which is fine by me, since he never explained what it has to do with the topic of this thread. I am somewhat interested in understanding Plato's Forms in a modern context. But as a retired philosophical dabbler, not a full-time professional scholar, I don't have the time or need or interest to invest in a "more formalized system of reasoning"*1.

Since you have a much broader & deeper knowledge of Philosophy-in-general than me, can you sketch-out --- informally --- what "formalized" Modal Logic has to do with Platonic Forms*2? The Google overview doesn't indicate much overlap between those fields of study. The only commonality that I see is in understanding Probability, Possibility & Potential. But I get the impression that Banno thinks this more refined logic would undermine Plato's (unreal) idealistic reasoning. Do you think Modal Logic would shed light on the relation between Plato's "ultimate reality" (which I call Ideality) and the manifold modes/moods of propositional calculus, or the rationalized categories of mundane reality? In other words : are the Forms simply esoteric BS? :smile:

PS___ Did Plato imagine his realm of perfect Forms literally as the heavenly True Reality, or the best one of many possible worlds? If so, then Modal Logic might establish the odds of such a world being real. But Nominalism might label Form-World as a name without referent. Yet I never thought of Ideality in those terms. Instead, it was more like an as-if metaphor, or a thought experiment, or mythical allegory. Not to be taken literally.

*1. Aristotle is often considered a pioneer of modal logic, exploring concepts of necessity and possibility. However, modern modal logic differs significantly in its formalization, scope, and application of these concepts. While Aristotle laid the groundwork, modern modal logic expands on these ideas to encompass a broader range of modalities and provides a more formalized system for reasoning. . . . . Modern modal logic is highly formalized and axiomatized, while Aristotle's approach was more descriptive and focused on specific syllogistic structures
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=modal+logic+vs+aristotle

*2. Modal logic and Plato's Theory of Forms are distinct philosophical concepts. Modal logic is a branch of logic that deals with concepts like possibility, necessity, and other modalities, allowing for the analysis of statements that are true under certain conditions or could be otherwise. Plato's Theory of Forms, on the other hand, is a metaphysical and epistemological theory that posits the existence of abstract, perfect, and unchanging "Forms" as the ultimate reality, with the physical world being merely a shadow or imperfect copy of these Forms. While both deal with abstract concepts, they differ significantly in their focus and application.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=modal+logic+vs+platonic+forms

Quoting Gnomon

can you sketch-out --- informally --- what "formalized" Modal Logic has to do with Platonic Forms

Modal logic became involved in this thread as soon as it was supposed that things have essences, and we asked what an essence is.

There is a clear way of talking about essences, as those properties had by an object in every possible world in which it exists. We can deal with the consequences of essences using this stipulation.

There are other ways that folk use "essence", and very often they choose not to define it in anything like as clear a way as the above. Now that is fine, so far as it goes. It leaves open the question of what an essence is, and also the question of how the way they are using "essence" fits in with the clear stipulation given by modal logic.

Now since the stipulation of essence as "those properties had by an object in every possible world in which it exists" is consistent with a consistent modal logic, we know that it is consistent.

We can't say that about other proffered definitions.

Unless we can compare them to the modal definition.

But to do that, one has to first have a grasp of modal logic.

So one issue here is, if platonic forms are the "essence" of each... thing..., is it just that the platonic forms set out or embody the properties held by that thing in every possible world?

If so then we can drop the theory of forms and get one with this conversation in modal terms.

and if not, then what more is it that forms contribute to essence?

And it has proves difficult to get a clean answer to this question.

Reply to Gnomon

Take a look at the contents of the SEP article on Metaphysics. It contains two sections:

2. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “Old” Metaphysics
2.1 Being As Such, First Causes, Unchanging Things
2.2 Categories of Being and Universals
2.3 Substance

and

3. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “New” Metaphysics
3.1 Modality
3.2 Space and Time
3.3 Persistence and Constitution
3.4 Causation, Freedom and Determinism
3.5 The Mental and Physical
3.6 Social Metaphysics

It does this becasue what metaphysics is changed somewhat dramatically with the advent of both modern physics and modal logic.

To restrict oneself to the "old" metaphysics is to do oneself an injustice.

Quoting Banno

There is a clear way of talking about essences, as those properties had by an object in every possible world in which it exists. We can deal with the consequences of essences using this stipulation.

Hence the expression ‘true in all possible worlds’?

Reply to Wayfarer Sure.

Quoting Banno

There is a clear way of talking about essences, as those properties had by an object in every possible world in which it exists. We can deal with the consequences of essences using this stipulation.

Since I'm an old fogy, defining Essences in the infinite (undefinable) context of zillions of possible (not yet real) worlds just hyperbolically complicates the concept for me. Why not just define Forms in terms of concepts, patterns & meanings (Essences) in human minds, in the only uni-verse (one world) we know anything about? {i.e. parsimony} Wouldn't plain old Aristotelian Logic suffice to deal with that narrow definition*1?

As I understand it, Plato's allegory of a perfect heavenly realm of ideal Forms was not one of a zillion worlds, but merely a metaphorical comparison to the only world from which we extract Mental images from Material sensations. Aristotle brought the notion of Forms back down to Earth in his theory of Hylomorphism*2 : a combination of Ideal & Real (mind & body). And the informed ideas are those of homo sapiens on planet Earth, not on fantasy planet X007-Stellaris in a parallel world far far away.

Personally, I still don't see any need for logical complications to understand the meaning & application of Essence*3. The philosophy of Materialism seems to have been formulated*4 specifically to deny the existence of immaterial Forms & Ideas & Meanings & Metaphors & especially Souls. But, doesn't that also deny all the features (e.g. abstract reasoning) that distinguish humans from animals? :smile:

PS___ If we actually had examples from each of those hypothetical possible worlds, the preponderance of evidence would get us closer to absolute Truth. Sadly we only have one sample world to study.

*1. In philosophical discussions, "forms" and "essences" are often used interchangeably, representing the fundamental nature or defining characteristics of a thing. Specifically, "forms" are the abstract, ideal, and unchanging essences of things, while physical objects are mere imitations or participants in these forms.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=form+and+essence

*2. While Aristotle also recognized the importance of form, he saw it as residing within things themselves, not as a separate realm. For Aristotle, form and matter are inseparable aspects of a thing, and the form gives the matter its specific characteristics.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=forms+are+essences

*3. Essences :
This term refers to the fundamental nature or defining characteristics of a thing, which gives it its identity. In other words, the essence of a thing is what it is, what it cannot be without losing its identity.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=forms+are+essences
Note --- Where is the material substance in these examples?:
[i]# The essence of love is unselfishness.
# The essence of capitalism is competition.
# The essence of justice is fairness.[/i]

*4. To Form-ulate :
To express (an idea) in a concise or systematic way. ___Oxford dictionary
Note --- in other words, to Formulate means to use words to convey the imaginary idea of the identifying characteristics that are abstractions from what can be known via the physical senses. In this case, the imaginary idea is that Matter is the Essence of everything in all possible worlds.

Reply to Wayfarer

I've returned to this thread after a pause in philosophizing, sorry.

Regarding treating the theory of forms as an attempt to comprehend itself as a form of reference, I would say this is a mistaken view for the following reason:

1. The Forms are a separate domain of discourse, which one is only able to grasp with understanding of mathematics. With regard to mathematics, the OP still is cogent. If one were to render the truths of mathematics in an informal language, then sure, it would be a pointless and futile way to say, "see this doesn't make sense", as the sense of the whole theory lies with apperception of the platonic forms in the domain of discourse of mathematics. The very notion of Truth, which the Forms are placed in is in the domain of discourse of mathematics, and probably nowhere else, (possibly in mathematical-physics perhaps).

SO, what are your thoughts about the ineffability of mathematics and the problematic translation of Truth rendered in mathematics, which is poorly understood as a language that can be seen in informal languages?

Quoting Shawn

1. The Forms are a separate domain of discourse, which one is only able to grasp with understanding of mathematics.

Yes. Plato used the formal structure of geometry (e.g. triangles) to describe the Truth & Utility of immaterial Ideas relative to material Objects*1. Likewise, modern quantum physics deals with the invisible structure of matter that can only be known by means of mathematics*2. Hence, we accept the statistical wave nature of subatomic "particles" as True, even though they don't behave like ordinary matter (e.g. quantum tunneling ; two-slit experiment).

So, Quantum Physics is a "separate domain of discourse", apart from Newtonian Physics of ordinary experience. But quantum truths are useful as tools for manipulating macro matter, only by means of Newtonian mechanics. So notional Forms & material Things work together to make a livable Real World for human animals.

Some relevant domain distinctions are Abstract vs Concrete & Relations vs Things & Ideal vs Real & Mental vs Material & [i]Cultural vs Natural.[/i] The Forms, like Math, are logically true even though materially false. In their relevant cultural domain (psychology ; philosophy), Forms are useful tools for thinking, even though useless for manipulating matter, until trans-formed into a natural domain (physics ; science). :smile:

*1. Math is Form :
Yes, that's a key aspect of mathematics. It's considered a formal science because it deals with abstract structures and relationships, rather than directly with physical objects or the natural world. Mathematical statements are not about tangible objects, but rather about the relationships within formal systems
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=mathematics+is+formal+not+physical

*2. Quantum Math :
Because many of the concepts of quantum physics are difficult if not impossible for us to visualize, mathematics is essential to the field. Equations are used to describe or help predict quantum objects and phenomena in ways that are more exact than what our imaginations can conjure.
https://scienceexchange.caltech.edu/topics/quantum-science-explained/quantum-physics

Quoting Gnomon

Some relevant domain distinctions are Abstract vs Concrete & Relations vs Things & Ideal vs Real & Mental vs Material & Cultural vs Natural. The Forms, like Math, are logically true even though materially false. In their relevant cultural domain (psychology ; philosophy), Forms are useful tools for thinking, even though useless for manipulating matter, until trans-formed into a natural domain (physics ; science).

I believe that string theory is closest one can approach the Forms in terms of mathematics and physics as one would or could imagine. It's the only field in physics that is entirely dependent on mathematical relations.

Quoting Shawn

SO, what are your thoughts about the ineffability of mathematics and the problematic translation of Truth rendered in mathematics, which is poorly understood as a language that can be seen in informal languages?

I think the intuition that animated the Greeks was that mathematical reasoning (Dianoia) provided an insight into a higher level of reality than did sensory perception. Even though it may be true that understanding advanced mathematics is a difficult task (one I’ve never mastered), it’s not that difficult to understand this intuition. After all, numbers never come into or go out of existence, they are not subject to change and decay as are the objects of sense, so surely, the argument has it, they are nearer the source of truth than the opinions we have about the material world. And if you consider the role that mathematics has played in science I think this basic intuition has been amply validated.

The reason that it is at odds with much of what modern philosophers think is because of the cultural impact of empiricism, which, recall, emphasises sense-experience as fundamental:

Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?

And from another source:

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects.

So does the distrust of Platonism really come down to the fact that Plato's 'ideas' are not things that exist in space and time, and that the only reality they could possess are conceptual?

Just a random picture of Platon:

Quoting Shawn

I believe that string theory is closest one can approach the Forms in terms of mathematics and physics as one would or could imagine. It's the only field in physics that is entirely dependent on mathematical relations.

Ironically, although Strings are defined as vanishingly small --- smaller than sub-atomic particles --- they are still assumed to be material & physical, not just mathematical. The image below indicates that some physicists imagine Strings as physical things : building blocks of Quarks, which themselves present no physical evidence to support their theoretical existence.

However, for all practical purposes, String Theory has been criticized as merely a plaything for extreme math aficionados. So in that sense, the String Theory may qualify for the same criticisms of Plato's hypothetical Forms : they're not Real. :smile:

PS___ Since all they do is vibrate, I would equate the mathematical strings with pure matterless Energy.

Reply to Gnomon Werner Heisenberg was a lifelong Platonist. He was known for carrying a copy of the Timeaus with him when a student, and wrote intelligently on philosophy and physics. See his The Debate between Plato and Democritus', a transcribed speech, from which:

...the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.

I find the question of whether sub-atomic phenomena exist 'in the same way' that stones and flowers do very interesting.

I read the first and last pages of this thread and would like to contribute. If any contributor thinks I would learn significantly more by reading some other pages before I post, please just say so. If you choose to do so, please include the relevant pages (even if its all of them) in your recommendation.

I must confess that at times, as I read, I was not sure if I was reading a rebuttal or an agreement. Sometimes the language is fairly obtuse to me. I am familiar with Platonic forms but it has been nearly fifty years since I read Plato and it’s possible I was mistaken about how well I understood it then. Today, I only loosely understand many of the posts here and have considerable uncertainty whether my ideas are relevant or appropriately expressed. If you think my post is not relevant, it’s okay to stop reading at any time and just skip/ignore this post.

In my view the Platonic forms are not dependent on physical manifestation to be real. Their existence is demonstrated/proven mathematically (at least enough for me) as an ideal that we can compare physical objects to. When concepts cannot be understood mathematically, it is difficult for me to consider them real. For example, I cannot prove mathematically or observationally that a teapot is not in orbit around Mars. I require such evidence before I would concede the teapot’s existence. I apply the same principle to string theory and multiple universes. Perhaps some physicist have proven them to their own satisfaction but they have not persuaded me. I am not suggesting that I have to be persuaded of something for it to be real, just that I have to understand the proof or have enough confidence in the claimant to accept the claim.

When Cro-Magnon hunted with spears (perhaps in groups), they understood arc and force enough to kill large animals so they could have lunch. If they failed in their effort they would either go hungry or become lunch themselves. Newton, demonstrated that arc and force could be understood mathematically (Calculus). Even though Co-Magnon did not do Calculus they understood how much force and angle to apply to be successful hunters. I call this Analog Knowledge.

I am of the camp that holds that accomplishments in mathematics are discoveries, not inventions. In other words, the mathematics to understand arc and force existed in Cro-Magnon’s time but was discovered by Newton. In this way, it is the pursuit of the ideal that allows us to calculate the behavior of objects in motion sufficiently enough to visit other bodies in space. In my view, by doing so humanity clearly demonstrated that the ideal was real.

Quoting David Hubbs

In this way, it is the pursuit of the ideal that allows us to calculate the behavior of objects in motion sufficiently enough to visit other bodies in space. In my view, by doing so humanity clearly demonstrated that the ideal was real.

I agree. The ancient Greeks didn't have the technology to dissect real material things into their substantial elements (e.g. Atoms). So instead, they tried to analyze Reality into the Ideal/Mathematical essences of the world (e.g. Forms). We now call that "pursuit" of abstraction Philosophy. Over time though, technological inventions, such as the telescope and microscope, allowed Natural investigators to actually see what before could only be envisioned via Mathematics and imagined by Reason.

However, I still like to maintain the distinction between scientifically Real (material, physical) and philosophically Ideal (mathematical, logical). Otherwise, our forum communication would become confusing. So, I would say that Philosophy has demonstrated that visible tangible material Reality, is fundamentally invisible essential logical Ideality. Plato's Logos & Forms were early allegories (parables?) for understanding essential unseen structures & causes of Matter & Mind. But Materialists tend to interpret those abstract metaphors literally*1.

Some modern philosophers, perhaps envying the practical successes of Physical Science, tend to interpret the world in terms of sensable/material objects (Things), instead of logical/mathematical concepts (Forms). Therefore, we need to be careful to define what Real means to each party. :smile:


*1. For example, Quarks & Strings --- as illustrated in the String Theory image above --- that can only be defined mathematically, are still imagined as geometrical lines & spheres of matter, not mind.

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.

In quantum physics today, the "smallest units of matter" (e.g. quarks, preons) are statistical probabilities rather than physical objects. Yet, the units of Statistics are data : bits of Information. And the four main types of statistical data are nominal, ordinal, discrete, and continuous. All of which are categories of mental concepts, not instances of material objects*1.

The philosophical worldview of Atomism seems to imply that the material world is infinitely divisible into smaller components. The current title-holder of minimal matter is the hypothetical particle labeled Preon*2. Yet, they are only known to exist in the minds of theoreticians as mathematical definitions. Would Plato accept Preon in his realm of ideal Forms?

Since the foundations of modern Quantum Physics are more statistical than empirical, their primary tool today is Mathematics. Yet, practitioners seem to imagine their subject matter as Material (particles) instead of Mathematical (ratios, relationships). However, some theoretical mathematicians may admit to being Platonic Idealists*3. Which is more a matter of Faith : Materialism or Platonism? :smile:


*1. Yes, generally speaking, mathematics is considered a mental process rather than a physical one. Math deals with abstract concepts, numbers, and relationships that exist within the mind, rather than being physically tangible. While we might use physical tools like paper, pencils, or calculators to aid in calculations, the underlying mathematical principles are mental constructs.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=math+is+mental+not+physical

*2. [i]Preon models are theoretical frameworks that propose that quarks and leptons are themselves composed of smaller, more fundamental particles called preons.
Preon models arose from the desire to find a simpler, more fundamental level of building blocks, akin to the periodic table for atoms, and to address certain theoretical inconsistencies within the Standard Model.
While preon models attempt to explain certain aspects of particle physics, they lack experimental confirmation and are considered speculative.[/i]
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=evidence+for+preons

*3. Yes, in a philosophical sense, mathematicians are often described as idealists, particularly within the context of mathematical platonism. This view suggests that mathematical objects, like numbers and geometric shapes, exist independently of our minds and are part of a realm of ideal objects.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=mathematicians+are+idealists

Reply to Gnomon Reply to David Hubbs It’s tempting to draw parallels between Plato’s Forms and modern physics—especially when figures like Heisenberg make explicit reference to Platonic ideas. But we should be cautious about pressing these analogies too far. The concept of Forms in Plato is not about invisible particles or mathematical abstractions per se, but about the intellect’s ability to grasp stable, intelligible principles that underlie the flux of experience.

This ability—what Plato would associate with the logistikon, the rational part of the soul—is foundational to reason itself. The Forms are not hypotheses about what “really exists” in some otherworldly sense, but expressions of the truth that the rational mind is oriented toward what truly is, not just to appearances. We can only recognize something as a tree, as just, as a triangle, because our minds can apprehend something universal, not merely register a bundle of sensations.

This whole conception of reason—as the faculty that “sees” the intelligible—is central to classical philosophy but has largely fallen out of favor in modern thought, due in no small part to the cultural and intellectual impact of empiricism. When knowledge is reduced to sensation and association, the idea that the mind participates in intelligible being comes to seem obscure or mystical - even if we're actually doing it every moment! And then when attention is drawn to that, we can't see it for looking.

But perhaps the real insight in Plato—and what Heisenberg may have been reaching for—is that the intelligibility of nature is not something we impose on the world, but something we discover because of the rational capacity to see what is. That’s a metaphysical claim, not a physical one, but it's crucial to any deeper understanding of what Plato's forms are supposed to mean.

Oh - and welcome to the Forum. :clap:

Quoting Wayfarer

The concept of Forms in Plato is not about invisible particles or mathematical abstractions per se, but about the intellect’s ability to grasp stable, intelligible principles that underlie the flux of experience.

Yes. And the Quantum physics of early 20th century seems to have required a Philosophical return to Platonic logistikon*1 (reasoning ability) after years of reliance on technological m?khanikos*2. When subatomic particles proved to be too small for their devices to resolve, scientists were forced to resort to statistical math*3 to determine the structure & properties of unseen things. Thus, modern Physics became more Theoretical, and less Empirical. For example, Einstein & Planck didn't work in gadget-filled laboratories, but in pencil & chalk provisioned offices.

Ironically, the "seat" of Reason is sometimes referred to as a "part" of the immaterial soul, instead of a specialized function (ability) of the body/brain. I suppose thinking of Logic/Reason as-if a plug-in component is easier than imagining a non-local ghostly Form that mysteriously "grasps" other "intelligible principles".

Even more thought-provoking is the notion that fundamental particles, such as the Higgs Boson*4, are defined as local disturbances in a non-local Field of statistical potential. Underneath its invisibility cloak, the boson masquerades as inertial Mass, which is a mathematical property, not a particular thing. You could say that it is the "intelligible principle" of Gravity. Apparently, Plato took that formal essence of weightiness for granted, without comment. :smile:


*1. The logistikon is the part of the soul that deals with logic, thought, and learning.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=logistikon

*2. As particles get smaller machines get larger :
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is considered the largest machine ever built. It's a massive particle accelerator located at CERN near Geneva, Switzerland. The LHC consists of a 27 km circular tunnel where beams of protons are accelerated to near light speed and then collided to study fundamental particles.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=biggest+machine+on+earth

*3. "Subatomic math" refers to the calculations and concepts used to understand the structure and properties of atoms and their constituent particles. It involves understanding the number of protons, neutrons, and electrons in an atom, as well as the relationship between atomic number, mass number, and atomic mass.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=subatomic+math

*4. God Particle :
The Higgs boson, sometimes called the Higgs particle, is an elementary particle in the Standard Model of particle physics produced by the quantum excitation of the Higgs field, one of the fields in particle physics theory. ___Wikipedia
Note --- Excitation is an exchange of Energy, which is causal potential, not material particle. But where does this mysterious incitement to Gravity come from?

Quoting Wayfarer

So does the distrust of Platonism really come down to the fact that Plato's 'ideas' are not things that exist in space and time, and that the only reality they could possess are conceptual?

Philosophy Now magazine (April 2025) presents the Question of the Month : Is Morality Objective or Subjective? And one writer said "Objective moral principles are necessary to reconcile worldviews". So, it occurred to me that his theory of universal Forms might have been an attempt to objectify-by-edict ("thus saith the Lord") mandatory ethical rules that would otherwise be endlessly debatable.

Yet, those imaginary abstract Forms out there in the intangible-yet-rational Aether are obviously not Empirically real. So it seems we must accept them on Plato's authority, or by agreement of our own reasoning with his. Similarly, the ancient Hebrews were presented by Moses with a compendium of ethical rules, that were supposed to be accepted as divine Laws. And violations would be punishable by real-world experiences, up to and including death & genocide. However, rather than using direct lightening bolts to punish transgressors, Yahweh used the communal belief system of his chosen people to do the job. Moses, like Plato, may have gotten his rules & principles via subjective reasoning (and historical precedent), not by divine revelation. But did P expect people to take them on faith?

Plato's Ethics*1 were based on certain moral virtues (principles) that may qualify as universal Forms. But some of Moses' Commandments, such as "Thou Shalt Not Kill" were in need of nuance. So Plato kept his Virtues general enough to apply to various situations : by interpretation from general to specific. My question is this : did Plato ever imply that his ethical rules (Forms) had something like divine authority*2 and real world enforcement? If not, then we would expect practical Morality to be subjective & disputatious, and oft-broken in deed and in principle. :smile:


*1. In Plato's ethical theory, moral virtues like justice, courage, and wisdom are considered Forms, representing the ideal and unchanging essence of these qualities. Plato believed that moral actions and character are guided by a higher realm of perfect Forms, with the Form of the Good at the apex, influencing the existence and intelligibility of all other Forms, including those of morality.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+morality+forms

*2. Plato believed that forms are divine. Their connection to divinity is what makes forms perfect: they lack the flaws of humans and of the physical realm. They are of a higher order of existence than their physical representations.
https://study.com/learn/lesson/plato-theory-forms-realm-physical.html
Note --- Natural "Laws" (Principles), like Gravity, can be learned by experience, and violations are immediately punished by the physical system of cause & effect. But some of the long-term evolutionary processes, such as Ecology, may take generations to see the objective results. Scientists attempt to see (infer) future states, by application of rationally-acquired general logical & mathematical rules. Perhaps Natural Morality requires more logical insight than the average person possesses. So, maybe we still need those divine edicts.

Quoting Gnomon

So it seems we must accept them on Plato's authority, or by agreement of our own reasoning with his. Similarly, the ancient Hebrews were presented by Moses with a compendium of ethical rules, that were supposed to be accepted as divine Laws. And violations would be punishable by real-world experiences, up to and including death & genocide.

Many would say that Plato and Moses were completely different historical types. After all Plato’s dialogues are meticulously rational albeit with some mythological elements. But Plato’s academy, which operated for centuries and was re-constituted in various ways over nearly a millenium, was the precursor to the modern university. Students were expected to master a comprehensive curriculum of which philosophy was only one part - there were also athletics and other subjects. In any case, rational argument and rhetoric was a major part of it, even though in other respects Platonism seems religious by today’s standards.

Moses was part of the Biblical prophetic tradition relying entirely on the truth revealed by God in the Burning Bush. And there is an inherent tension between those two traditions, one religious, the other rationalistic. (Although early in the Christian era there was a school of thought that somehow Plato had learned from or was an inheritor of the Abrahamic tradition.)

So - I wouldn’t at all agree with this ‘similarly’.

Quoting Gnomon

Philosophy Now magazine (April 2025) presents the Question of the Month : Is Morality Objective or Subjective? And one writer said "Objective moral principles are necessary to reconcile worldviews". So, it occurred to me that his theory of universal Forms might have been an attempt to objectify-by-edict ("thus saith the Lord") mandatory ethical rules that would otherwise be endlessly debatable.

In a culture of revealed truth, the Commandments weren't simply 'objective' principles to be observed from a distance, nor were they subjective wishes. For the believer, they had an existential weight that transcended the subject-object divide. They weren't just rules about reality; they were constitutive of reality itself for those who lived under their sway. They were experienced as demands - on one's being, shaping identity and defining the very framework of a meaningful life.

To violate a Commandment wasn't just to break an external rule; it was to commit an act of self-alienation, a rupture with one's fundamental relationship to God and community. It was a failure of authenticity within that revealed framework, akin to what an existentialist might describe as choosing 'bad faith' – not by denying one's freedom, but by denying the profound, revealed truth that defined one's moral landscape.

While modern existentialism often grapples with a lack of pre-given meaning, it highlights the profound personal commitment required for moral choice. In a similar vein, for those living under divine revelation, the Commandments weren't just intellectual propositions; they were existential imperatives that demand commitment. It’s very hard for us to see that, as embedded as we are in the ‘Self-Other’ paradigm of modern individualism.

While Moses's revelation is of eternal commandments, Plato's noetic apprehension of the Forms (especially the Form of the Good) is more intellectual ascent. Both have a profound, transformative impact on the individual's moral and epistemological landscape, but the path to that is different. Moses's commands are given; Plato's Forms are apprehended through rigorous, self-cultivated effort.

For Plato, too, the "seeing" of the Form of the Good transcends the simple subject-object binary. The individual intellect (subject) doesn't merely observe the Form (object) from a detached distance. Instead, the intellect must become attuned to the Form, participate in its nature, and be transformed by it through participatory knowing. The boundary between knower and known is transcended in this insight. The Form of the Good isn't just "out there" to be observed; it's something that, once "seen," reorders the entire internal landscape of the individual.

This is all very much part of what used to be the Western cultural heritage of Christian Platonism.

Quoting Wayfarer

Many would say that Plato and Moses were completely different historical types

Ha! I didn't mean to equate them as "historical types", such as a messianic prophet. I imagined them as more like analogous divine intermediary types, handing down the Truth of God (Laws vs Forms) to ordinary mortals.

I was just using Moses as an example of a system-maker whose supposedly divine rules were accepted on the basis of his designated authority as an interpreter of divine intentions. A more modern formal system is the notion of Natural Law that is based on the authority of secular Science, not any particular person. Hence, the ultimate authority is Nature (ultimate Reality ; Pantheos) itself, and scientists are merely self-designated interpreters. Moses' system of Divine Laws was built upon the ultimate authority of God (Ideality), and Moses was simply his messenger. Likewise, Plato's system of eternal Forms was also supposed to reveal True Reality (Ideality) that was unknown by ordinary people. So the ultimate author of those Forms was not Plato, but Nature, or God, or Good*1.

Anyway, it looks like I'm forced to answer my own poorly-formed amateur philosopher query : "My question is this : did Plato ever imply that his ethical rules (Forms) had something like divine authority?" Apparently, the answer is a provisional Yes : Plato wrote the books, but implied that the ultimate author is the essential principle of Perfect Good, and Plato is his messenger*2. Just as the Demiurge is the PanEnDeistic builder (enforcer) of our imperfect world, not of Forms, but of Things. Is that a plausible comparison of religious/philosophical system-builder, acting as intermediary for the ultimate law-maker?

Autocratic human rulers have always been aware that subjective rules are hard to enforce in a mob of independent thinkers. So, most societies & civilizations, until recently, have officially claimed that their laws are actually objective, and ideally universal, instituted not by the human on the national throne, but by the supreme God on a heavenly cathedra. Even modern secular societies may play lip service to something like Kant's Categorical Imperative : an objective universal principle that applies to all people everywhere all the time.

Perhaps Plato's perfect Forms were a similar attempt to overrule the varying opinions of quibbling quarreling philosophers with a "buck stops here" set of divine opinions, defined as perfect, unchanging, eternal verities. Surely, an ideal god-mind wouldn't create a not-yet-perfect, evolving, space-time world of relative truths and real things. Hence, the necessity for a subordinate (Demiurge) to blame for screwing-up God's divine plans. 2500 years later many of us still revere Plato as the revealer of the formal structure of the good-God's more perfect realm, for us mortals to strive for and fail. Or did he just make it all up from bits of previous philosophical systems, sans revelation? :smile:

PS___ This rambling notion, of how Ideal Forms were disclosed to humans as a supernatural system, still seems garbled, so I'll blame its imperfections on the semi-divine Demiurge we call material Evolution.


*1. In Plato's philosophy, the term "God" can be understood in a few different ways. Plato believed in a single, transcendent, and all-good being, which he often referred to as the Form of the Good. He also acknowledged the existence of other, lesser gods, often associated with the Greek pantheon, and saw them as divine beings, but not on the same level as the ultimate source of all good. Plato's concept of God also involves a Demiurge, a divine artisan who shaped the universe according to the Forms.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato%27s+god

*2. Islamic Shahada : "There is no God but God, and Muhammed is his messenger"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahada

The distinction between logical reality and physical reality is an important one. Although humanity is not done, we recognize today that more of our view of physical reality is consistent with logical reality. I am hopeful that someday we will discover more laws of nature and not fall into the abyss of superstition. As Richard Feynman said, “I would rather have questions that can”t be answered than answers that can’t be questioned.”

Quoting Gnomon

...the ancient Hebrews were presented by Moses with a compendium of ethical rules, that were supposed to be accepted as divine Laws. And violations would be punishable by real-world experiences, up to and including death & genocide.

If I jumped off a building I would splatter on the street as a result of gravity, not as punishment by an omniscient entity for believing I could fly. Elbert Hubbard said, “We are punished by our sins, not for them.”

Quoting Wayfarer

Plato’s dialogues are meticulously rational albeit with some mythological elements.

In Plato’s era belief in the Gods was assumed. It was normal. Although he teetered on the edge of normalcy I like to think he knew better than to alienate/insult his audience nonchalantly.

Quoting Wayfarer

While Moses's revelation is of eternal commandments, Plato's noetic apprehension of the Forms (especially the Form of the Good) is more intellectual ascent.

What I'm still struggling with is the Subjective vs Objective nature of the Forms. Sure, Plato assures us that there is an ideal Concept, Pattern, Design of everything, but not in the Real world, so why should we believe him? As a professional designer myself, I like the idea that there is a perfect house for this couple, for example. But I've never even come close.

Kant reasoned his way to the Categorical Imperative of morality, and others generalized the Golden Rule. But Plato implies that there is a perfect universal Form, on a shelf in the heavenly treasury, corresponding to every thing and every idea in our imperfect world*1. Carried to an extreme, presumably, there is a perfect Pickle, that is not subject to personal taste. Ideal Perfection is a nice idea, but is it true in any verifiable sense? Why should we "intellectually assent" to his noetic notion of The Good? Was Good/God a poor designer, or is there a good reason for the sorry state of our local world, after 14B years of development?

I suppose the reason I'm quibbling is because an atheist or materialist would deny that anything is perfect in our randomized accidental world. Karl Marx wanted to make the material world better, but did he envision a perfect Utopia? Why is perfection always unattainable? Why is Reality so screwed up? Why did God/Good create an inferior world of shoddy things, and keep the quality stuff for himself in Form Heaven? I'm talking like an a-form-ist here, so I can learn to answer such skeptical questions.

Back to Objectivity, would any two people agree on what constitutes an Ideal Dog? Or an ideal God? :wink:


*1. The Forms are not limited to geometry. According to Plato, for any conceivable thing or property there is a corresponding Form, a perfect example of that thing or property. The list is almost inexhaustible. Tree, House, Mountain, Man, Woman, Ship, Cloud, Horse, Dog, Table and Chair, would all be examples of putatively independently-existing abstract perfect Ideas.
https://philosophynow.org/issues/90/Plato_A_Theory_of_Forms

*2. Moral & Mathematical Forms :
"So I believe that morality is something that's discovered, in the same manner that pure mathematics discovers universal truth : it's not within us but out there."
Philosophy Now magazine p64 (April 2025)

Your depiction of the forms is something of a caricature. All I can say is, do more readings.

Quoting Wayfarer

Your depiction of the forms is something of a caricature. All I can say is, do more readings.

Yes. I'm sure you are not used to thinking of Forms in such irreverent terms. But my ignorant subjective/objective question about ideal Forms vs real Things, is "which is the caricature, and which is the original"? Did Plato discover the Forms, or did he invent them? It's just a rhetorical thought, no need to answer. :wink:

PS___ Did Moses discover God's (formerly concealed) ideal laws on the mountain, or did he invent them? It's a question about authorship. :joke:


Plato's "Forms" are not discovered in the sense of being found by exploration. Instead, they are understood through a process of philosophical reasoning, particularly through dialectical reasoning (questioning and discussion). Plato believed that the Forms are eternal, unchanging, and the ultimate reality, and our understanding of them is a matter of recollection or intuitive grasp, not empirical discovery.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=plato+forms+discovered

Reply to Gnomon Plato’s so-called ‘Forms’ might be better understood as principles of intelligibility —not ghostly objects in another realm, but the structural grounds that make anything knowable or what it is. To know something is to grasp its principle, to see what makes it what it is.

And they’re neither objective - existing in the domain of objects - nor subjective - matters of personal predilection. That is why they manifest as universals

Quoting Wayfarer

?Gnomon
Plato’s so-called ‘Forms’ might be better understood as principles of intelligibility —not ghostly objects in another realm, but the structural grounds that make anything knowable or what it is. To know something is to grasp its principle, to see what makes it what it is.

And they’re neither objective - existing in the domain of objects - nor subjective - matters of personal predilection. That is why they manifest as universals

Thanks for that insight. I hope you'll pardon me for my layman's playful use of less technical terms for discussing "spooky" invisible concepts that are only apparent to highly intelligent beings. Although Principles are of primary importance for philosophers, they may be un-intelligible to non-philosophers. I suppose that all humans have some minimal ability to broadly categorize their environment, but only a few go so far as to break it down into fundamental (essential) concepts for understanding (intellectual comprehension). For example, most people can count up to ten, but only a few can deal with infinities & differentials.

We tend to broadly categorize obvious things, and their essential forms, into either Objective (material things) or Subjective (mental experiences). But, as you implied, Universals may be an overarching third class of knowables, and yet we only know them via rational extrapolation from objective observation. They are not obvious, but must be discovered (revealed) by means of rational work.

In my own profession, engineers view "structure" in terms of invisible force relationships (e.g. gravity, wind, earthquake), while laymen think of "structure" in terms of obvious beams, columns, and bricks. Engineer's design diagrams symbolize those unseen forces with vectors (arrows), which might be called "principles of intelligibility" or symbols (ideograms ; mind pictures) that stand-in for the physical flow of forces that our senses cannot detect directly. Likewise, the Form "Justice" is symbolized by a conventional word, that allows the mind to make invisible political inter-relationships intelligible. :smile:


In philosophical discussions, intelligibility refers to what the human mind can understand, contrasting with what can be perceived by the senses. Intelligible forms, according to ancient and medieval philosophers, are the abstract concepts used for understanding, such as genera and species, as opposed to concrete objects. The intelligible realm, as conceptualized by Plato, includes mathematics, forms, first principles, and logical deduction. Kant's work also explores the relationship between the sensible and intelligible realms, and the principles governing each.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=forms+principles+of+inteligibility

Quoting Gnomon

most people can count up to ten, but only a few can deal with infinities & differentials.

But any normal human can converse in rational language, which relies on abstractions.

Quoting Gnomon

as you implied, Universals may be an overarching third class of knowables, and yet we only know them via rational extrapolation from objective observation. They are not obvious, but must be discovered (revealed) by means of rational work.

I've quoted this previously but it bears repeating:

Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28:Forms...are radically distinct, and in that sense ‘apart,’ in that they are not themselves sensible things. With our eyes we can see large things, but not largeness itself; healthy things, but not health itself. The latter, in each case, is an idea, an intelligible content, something to be apprehended by thought rather than sense, a ‘look’ not for the eyes but for the mind. This is precisely the point Plato is making when he characterizes forms as the reality of all things. “Have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?—In no way … Or by any other sense, through the body, have you grasped them? I am speaking about all things such as largeness, health, strength, and, in one word, the reality [??????, ouisia] of all other things, what each thing is” (Phd. 65d4–e1). Is there such a thing as health? Of course there is. Can you see it? Of course not. This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason.

So much of this has actually filtered through to the way we understand the world today - after all the Greek philosophers are foundational to Western culture. So to understand principles, to see why things are the way they are, is to see a 'higher reality' in the sense that it gives you a firmer grasp of reality than those who merely see particular circumstances. Indeed the scientific attitude is grounded in it, with the caveat that all of Plato's writings convey a qualitative dimension generally absent from post-Galilean science.

Quoting Wayfarer

This does not mean that the forms are occult entities floating ‘somewhere else’ in ‘another world,’ a ‘Platonic heaven.’ It simply says that the intelligible identities which are the reality, the whatness, of things are not themselves physical things to be perceived by the senses, but must be grasped by reason. — Eric D Perl, Thinking Being, p28
So much of this has actually filtered through to the way we understand the world today - after all the Greek philosophers are foundational to Western culture. So to understand principles, to see why things are the way they are, is to see a 'higher reality' in the sense that it gives you a firmer grasp of reality than those who merely see particular circumstances. Indeed the scientific attitude is grounded in it, with the caveat that all of Plato's writings convey a qualitative dimension generally absent from post-Galilean science.

Like Plato & Kant, due to the Materialistic bias of our language, I have been forced to borrow or invent new words (neologisms) to describe Metaphysical*1 concepts that don't make sense in Physical terms. In my Enformationism thesis, I describe those "occult entities" as Virtual or Potential things. I'm appropriating terms that scientists use to describe not-yet-real particles and incomplete electrical circuits for use as metaphors of un-real Forms. At my advanced age, I am still learning the lingo.

The physical focus of ordinary language may be why Plato & Aristotle used allegories & metaphors to convey the idea of unseen things. That's also why Jesus spoke in parables about spiritual notions. Whereas Plato spoke of a "higher reality", I coined the term Ideality*2 to convey the same idea, without confusing it with mundane Reality. You could say, metaphorically, it's a parallel dimension of Qualia, yet it exists side-by-side with the phenomenal world as noumenal notions in rational minds. Unfortunately such abstruse language makes philosophy enigmatic for those who don't speak Jargon or Klingon. :smile:


*1. Meta-physics :
Physics refers to the things we perceive with the eye of the body. Meta-physics refers to the things we conceive with the eye of the mind. Meta-physics includes the properties, and qualities, and functions that make a thing what it is. Matter is just the clay from which a thing is made. Meta-physics is the design (form, purpose); physics is the product (shape, action). The act of creation brings an ideal design into actual existence. The design concept is the “formal” cause of the thing designed.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page14.html

*2. Ideality :
[i]In Plato’s theory of Forms, he argues that non-physical forms (or ideas) represent the most accurate or perfect reality. Those Forms are not physical things, but merely definitions or recipes of possible things. What we call Reality consists of a few actualized potentials drawn from a realm of infinite possibilities.
#. Materialists deny the existence of such immaterial ideals, but recent developments in Quantum theory have forced them to accept the concept of “virtual” particles in a mathematical “field”, that are not real, but only potential, until their unreal state is collapsed into reality by a measurement or observation. To measure is to extract meaning into a mind. [Measure, from L. Mensura, to know; from mens-, mind]
#. Some modern idealists find that quantum scenario to be intriguingly similar to Plato’s notion that ideal Forms can be realized, i.e. meaning extracted, by knowing minds. For the purposes of this blog, “Ideality” refers to an indefinite pool of potential (equivalent to a quantum field), of which physical Reality is a small part. A traditional name for that infinite fertile field is G*D.[/i]
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html