Reply to tim wood (I recognize this isn't the engagement you're looking for, and isn't very great for conservation, but) I really love Wolfram's approach to everything in that second link. I line up with him so much.
David Hoffman meets Stephen Wolfram. A long video. Consciouness and a TOE. Fascinating - Wolfram cross-examines Hoffman - in a friendly but challenging wa
Wittgensteins beetle in the box rears its ugly head again. Not sure if Wolfram knows it but he presents this argument from a philosophy of science meets philosophy of language angle.
We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about what it is like to be a bat or when Hoffman talks about the taste of mint, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.
Yep, it is a great discussion. But confusion begets confusion. Notice how Wolfram says to Hoffman you are an N of 1, as if this is reasonable concept to apply to a thing called consciousness. But, in comes The Private Language Argument, how could we make sense of one-hood, thing-hood, truth-hood ascribe to something private like consciousness? The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this knowledge is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept correctly, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept correctly.
I'll get around to watching these. I assume Wolfram is still promoting his ideas about Cellular Automata as a foundation for science and math. I bought his enormous book when it first came out, but flamed out of reading it after several hundred of the thousand pages or so. It did encourage me to write several computer programs and experiment developing the patterns he alludes to.
It became a joke at scientific cocktail parties that almost everyone had a copy, but no one had completed reading it.
As an advocate for idealist philosophy, I hoped that Hoffman would provide grist for that particular mill. I've purchased and read parts of his The Case Against Reality, listened to quite a few interviews, and discussed his ideas here on philosophyforum.
Hoffman's idea is that evolutionary development favours adaptive fitness over perception of reality as it is. We have evolved to see the world in a way that helps us to navigate it successfully enough to survive and propagate. He then develops his theory of conscious realism, which is the idea that what we see are icons or visual representations
[quote=Hoffman, Donald D. (2019). The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (Function). Kindle Edition.]How can our senses be usefulhow can they keep us aliveif they dont tell us the truth about objective reality? A metaphor can help our intuitions. Suppose youre writing an email, and the icon for its file is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your desktop. Does this mean that the file itself is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your computer? Of course not. The color of the icon is not the color of the file. Files have no color. The shape and position of the icon are not the true shape and position of the file. In fact, the language of shape, position, and color cannot describe computer files.
The purpose of a desktop interface is not to show you the truth of the computerwhere truth, in this metaphor, refers to circuits, voltages, and layers of software. Rather, the purpose of an interface is to hide the truth and to show simple graphics that help you perform useful tasks such as crafting emails and editing photos. If you had to toggle voltages to craft an email, your friends would never hear from you. That is what evolution has done. It has endowed us with senses that hide the truth and display the simple icons we need to survive long enough to raise offspring.[/quote]
I think there is some truth in that, indeed I argue something very similar in the OP Mind-Created World. But the problem I have with it is the implicit presumption that reason is also something that can be understood in terms of visual perception. As many reviewers have noted, if the argument applies to reason and mathematical logic as well as visual perception, then how is Hoffman's book not also an illusory artefact of the selfish gene?
In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between Hoffman's argument, and arguments from (among others) Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, and C S Lewis. These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought.
In short, I think Hoffman's idea of 'truth' (as in 'the truth that is hidden from our eyes by evolution') is philosophically naive. Later in the book, he talks a lot about mathematical models which purport to demonstrate the veracity of his central argument, which culminates in the idea that reality comprises solely conscious agents. Again, an idea I'm sympathetic to - think Liebnizian monads -but the meaning of that claim is left open. The maths seems to be aimed at creating the image (ironically) of scientific versimilitude, as if any theory is not justified by mathematical models will lack credibility.
That's my two bobs, granted, I haven't finished the entire book, I like Hoffman's persona and am probably more open to his kind of argument than anyone who holds to physicalism, but those aspects of his project give me pause.
I think there is some truth in that, indeed I argue something very similar in the OP Mind-Created World. But the problem I have with it is the implicit presumption that reason is also something that can be understood in terms of visual perception. As many reviewers have noted, if the argument applies to reason and mathematical logic as well as visual perception, then how is Hoffman's book not also an illusory artefact of the selfish gene?
In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between Hoffman's argument, and arguments from (among others) Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, and C S Lewis. These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought.
Really good point and one that is missed - it seems to be a blindspot in Hoffman's work. Quoting Wayfarer
Later in the book, he talks a lot about mathematical models which purport to demonstrate the veracity of his central argument, which culminates in the idea that reality comprises solely conscious agents. Again, an idea I'm sympathetic to - think Liebnizian monads -but the meaning of that claim is left open. The maths seems to be aimed at creating the image (ironically) of scientific versimilitude, as if any theory is not justified by mathematical models will lack credibility.
Hoff's implying that maths has some kind of transcendent quality that can demonstrate truth outside of our false reality. Like he's a mathematical Platonist by default.
which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason?
I've always found this point quite strange because from what I see, people reason "badly" and get things wrong literally all the time, including scientists and academics. I feel like, even though we are very smart, human progress in terms of knowledge is not some direct consequence solely of our ability to reason but this long process of trial and error where people throw stuff at the wall and get it wrong all the time, and some stuff just sticks for one reason or another and we remember it over the generations. Its like a another form of Darwinian selectionism.
My private hobgoblin in this kind of discussion is to establish some kind of ground, at least, for the terminology: in this case for "reality." What, exactly (for present purpose), do you say reality is?
I completely understand your concern. My off-the-cuff answer is that reality is lived. That response is more in keeping with European philosophy, and also with religious philosophies. You can create and call into doubt all kinds of complicated theories but existence has a visceral, felt quality that is before or prior to all such verbal rationalisations. How this relates to philosophical idealism, is that idealism doesn't ultimately comprise a 'theory about mind' but a recognition of the sense in which the mind constructs the reality in which we live (that's the part that Hoffman gets right). But in philosophy, this requires insight into that process. Buddhism is also grounded in that kind of insight.
What with the total dominance and pervasiveness of science and scientific technologies in life today, it is natural to presume that scientifically-based reasoning is as it were the arbiter of reality. But science by its very nature leaves something out, which is the subjective, visceral sense of lived reality. That's what existentialism and phenomenology is about. So whatever truth is to be sought, it has to be sought in that context. Pierre Hadot is an exemplar:
[quote=IEP]Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ....According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing.[/quote]
I'm not claiming by any stretch to have mastered or to be able to demonstrate these qualities but I believe this is the direction in which the answer lies.
I've always found this point quite strange because from what I see, people reason "badly" and get things wrong literally all the time, including scientists and academics.
Well, probably unlike most, I put some stock in spiritual insight. The archetypal sage - whom is most likely not an actual person - has the ability to see 'how things truly are', which exceeds the scope of mere objectivity. Again from the entry on Pierre Hadot:
The philosophical Sage, in all the ancient discourses, is characterized by a constant inner state of happiness or serenity. This has been achieved through minimizing his bodily and other needs, and thus attaining to the most complete independence (autarcheia) vis-à-vis external things. The Sage is for this reason capable of maintaining virtuous resolve and clarity of judgment in the face of the most overwhelming threats, from natural catastrophes to the fury of citizens who ordain evil . . . [or] the face of a threatening tyrant. In the different ancient schools, these characteristics differentiating the Sage from nonphilosophers mean that this figure tends to become very close to God or the gods, as conceived by the philosophers. The Epicurean gods, like the God of Aristotle, Hadot notes, are characterized by their perfect serenity and exemption from all troubles and dangers. Epicurus calls the Sage the friend of the gods, and the gods friends of the Sages. Aristotle equates the contemplation of the wise man with the self-contemplation of the unmoved mover.
Well, probably unlike most, I put some stock in spiritual insight. The archetypal sage - whom is most likely not an actual person - has the ability to see 'how things truly are', which exceeds the scope of mere objectivity. Again from the entry on Pierre Hadot:
On "The Concept of the Ruliad", Stephen Wolfram's idea of the "entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of the following all possible computation rules in all possible ways." Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. He goes on to claim that Ruliad explains why we have the perception that universe has these specific laws that it does. Well his answer is that "we are bounded observers, embedded within the Ruliad. But we don't fully see the Ruliad but only see in the lens of our particular methods of perception and analysis. Here he shares some similarity with Hoffman's views.
This is my first time reading of such a theory but I have to say that I am a bit suspicious of its lofty claims. I think I can summarize around two points:
1. I can imagine him sitting a front of a computer and being overcome by an analogy, as Paley did when being entranced of the inner workings of a watch. Wow, by simply programming steps on a computer, I can simulate an object on a screen to move at a rate across a screen like an object in the real world. Therefore, all laws of physics must be founded on computational principles. Where is Hume when you need him?
2. Stephen, I presume, he is also a "bounded observer who has his own particular method of perception and analysis." If that is the case, does not this idea come from his particular method of perception and analysis? Or, does he have some Platonic insight into of realm of perfect ideas he only sees? I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations, "47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair."
Which is to say an entirely subjective admixture of judgment and perception,
Not in the least. You ask 'what is reality', my answer is intended to convey that it has to be meaningful as a lived reality, not as an abstraction or theory. Philosophy as 'love of wisdom' as a quality of being, not as a theoretical abstraction.
without benefit of Kant's practical reason (as I understand that).
On the contrary:
[quote=Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant's Ciritque of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter]Despite its apparent absence from modern academic philosophy, the notion that one might turn to philosophy in pursuit of inner illumination and transformation, similar to that found the church and the lodge, was taken for granted in Kants milieu and formed a key part of the reception of his philosophy. ...
The decisive distinguishing feature of Western philosophical spirituality is that it does not regard the truth as something to which the subject has access by right, universally, simply by virtue of the kind of cognitive being that the human subject is. Rather, it views the truth as something to which the subject may accede only through some act of inner self-transformation, some act of attending to the self with a view to determining its present incapacity, thence to transform it into the kind of self that is spiritually qualified to accede to a truth that is by definition not open to the unqualified subject. ....[/quote]
My own would be that which is left on stage when the actors have left, that in being provides the ground/basis/opportunity for perception/judgment/experience.
How does that sit against Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', and his claim that we don't see reality as it is, but only as evolution has shaped us to see it? It seems to me that from such a perspective nothing could be ventured as to 'what is left on stage', as 'the stage' is constructed by the actors. Indeed Hoffman says that reality is conscious agents 'all the way down'.
Reply to Wayfarer if evolution has shaped us to see reality in a particular way, that implies there was a reality there prior to evolution.
I mean, scientifically speaking, the history of life on earth starts a few billion years after earth came into being. If it's "consciousness all the way down", what does that say about those billions of years prior to life?
I accept that the way WE see reality wasn't "reality" back then (and arguably isn't "reality" right now either), but we still have sufficient evidence that "back then" was as real as right now. So with no conscious agents around to create that reality, what's the story?
if evolution has shaped us to see reality in a particular way, that implies there was a reality there prior to evolution.
I mean, scientifically speaking, the history of life on earth starts a few billion years after earth came into being. If it's "consciousness all the way down", what does that say about those billions of years prior to life?
I accept that the way WE see reality wasn't "reality" back then (and arguably isn't "reality" right now either), but we still have sufficient evidence that "back then" was as real as right now.
That's a really excellent question, and a topic that is near to my heart. I've debated it up hill and down dale for years, but I'll try and sketch out a quick response in the few moments I have now.
The key point I make is that all judgements about the age of the universe, including all of the scientific evidence (which I fully accept) is interpreted by us. And that act of intepretation is mind-dependent. So, sure, we know prior to h.sapiens that the earth exist for 4 billion years odd, and a pretty good account of evolutionary development. But there is always an implicit perspective in that understanding, namely, that of yours and mine and humans generally. We don't really see it as it would be without any perspective whatever, becuase without any perspective, there would be no time or space which provides the framework within which all such knowledge is meaningful.
So there are two levels: first, there's the empirical facts, disclosed by science, which are inter-subjectively verifiable. But there's also a sense in which that is disclosed and understood by us in terms of the framework of understanding that we bring to the picture. But we generally don't take that into account, because science generally brackets out the observer, so as to arrive at what is considered to be the view from nowhere, which it takes to be synonymous with how things truly are. But it's not.
This goes back to Kant, of course, but it's an understanding that has also penetrated many schools of modern philosophy and even cognitive science. See The Blind Spot of Science for a more detailed account (Aeon essay).
Reply to Wayfarer That honestly feels like a cop out. Of course it's interpreted by us - everything we know and think has to come through a filter of us first. That doesn't mean we have to conclude reality is mind-dependent.
Imagine cockroaches gain sentience in 10,000 years. Everything cockroaches believe will also have to come through their filters, their interpretations. Should they believe reality is cockroach-dependent? I don't think so.
Reply to Wayfarer let me put it another way: your support of mind dependence comes from the fact that everything we know has to come through a filter of human consciousness. But that would be true even if the world really existed in a mind independent way.
So since it would have to be true either way, it doesn't support the case for mind dependence.
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DifferentiatingEggMay 04, 2025 at 13:54#9859570 likes
Reply to flannel jesus Nah, the superficial reality is created from a profundity of depth which ultimately seeks to express itself. What you see is what you get, in a manner of speaking.
Every book, the superficial mask of its author... every painting and every song too.
We're not like a car that just uses a shell to look cool.
We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about what it is like to be a bat or when Hoffman talks about the taste of mint, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.
I think the point is that, even if we can't understand or express what the taste of mint is, we know we taste it. We know we have various, and various kinds of, subjective experiences. Every waking moment is filled with them. And they are everything. Who would give up their subjective experiences, and exist as a p-zombie or robot, receiving all of the same input, but having no experience of them? That would be the equivalent of suicide.
The only one we can really consider is taste. We don't need tastebuds at this point, I don't think. We can buy food that we know is edible and nutritious. We don't need to rely on taste to keep us safe. Or someone could prepare all of our food for us. But who would agree to have their tastebuds removed, or made non-functional? Such preferences have no pactical bake.
Removing any of our other senses would make us less safe.
I assume there are people who don't think bats are conscious. But, assuming they are, Nagel means there's something it's like to [I]be[/i] a bat, [I]for[/I] the bat. There's nothing it's like to be a rock, for the rock. A rock doesn't have a pov. A bat does. We can't really imagine what it's like to be as bat, because they are so different from us. Flight, echolocation, etc. But we don't need to know what it's like to be a bat to consider that there is something it's like for the bat; that it has a pov. It is subjectively experiencing, whatever that feels like to the bat.
I think the point is that, even if we can't understand or express what the taste of mint is, we know we taste it. We know we have various, and various kinds of, subjective experiences.
Well, I know you taste food if you put it in your month and you say that was good not too spicy or I know when you dont taste your food if you say I got a bad head cold and I cant taste anything. And I presume when you say subjective experience this may be demonstrated by saying this food you gave me is too spicy while I may feel it is rather mild.
Knowledge is a social phenomenon which is conveyed by language about a share world. A private language used to describe a private world is not a language at all. It is as if we came across a solitary being making occasional sounds and claiming it is a language used to describe the environment. That would be quite a stretch.
And that is the point Wolfram is trying to make against Hoffmans idea that one can start with conscious as fundamental. Science starts with observers sharing similar reactions and judgments to a public world. Not an unknown private world of a conscious being.
As above you appear to agree that there is a reality, then I'm at a loss trying to understand just what your point is. Maybe you mean subjective or experiential reality? That we might call affective reality? These being the reality of how we feel about something? Which of course is not any part at all of the object experienced. If indeed we may say that we experience objects. Thus without some waypoints in the way of preliminary understandings, we sail into confusion.
First, Donald Hoffman - his theory of cognition is given in his book The Case Against Reality: How Evolution hid the Truth from our Eyes. The post of mine you quoted was my description of the theory in that book. From the book description:
Do we see the world as it truly is? In The Case Against Reality, pioneering cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman says - No, we see what we need in order to survive. Our visual perceptions are not a window onto reality, Hoffman shows us, but instead are interfaces constructed by natural selection. The objects we see around us are not unlike the file icons on our computer desktops- while shaped like a small folder on our screens, the files themselves are made of a series of ones and zeros too complex for most of us to understand. In a similar way, Hoffman argues, evolution has shaped our perceptions into simplistic illusions to help us navigate the world around us.
I have the book but there are some aspects of it I don't understand. I was initally attracted to Hoffman's ideas because of their apparent convergence with the kinds of idealist philosophy that I'm drawn to. But I have doubts about the philosophical merits of Hoffman's argument in some respects (even if in agreement in others).
Whitehead, who taught at Harvard University from the 1920s, argued that science relies on a faith in the order of nature that cant be justified by logic." Exactly so! Per Collingwood it is the absolute presupposition (AP) that nature is the creation of the Christian God and therefore perfect, and therefore a fit subject for scientific inquiry - which it was not for ancient science. But to say it cannot be justified by logic is at very best misleading, and on plain understanding, wrong.
This is a large subject in its own right, but I wouldnt interpret Whiteheads or Collingwoods positions as arguments for divine creation per se. Rather, both are pointing to a more subtle and important issue: that science rests on presuppositionssuch as the uniformity and intelligibility of naturethat it cannot establish from within empirical method. Whiteheads term for this is faith in the order of nature, and Collingwood, similarly, uses the idea of absolute presuppositionsnot to promote theology, but to expose the philosophical scaffolding science quietly relies on.
In other words, their concern is with the limits of empiricism, not with the promotion of theism. That said, both thinkers were also historically conscious: they understood that the emergence of modern science was neither philosophically or culturally neutral, but shaped by a preceding worldview in which the cosmos was understood as rationally orderedwhether by divine decree or metaphysical structure. But in no way were they proposing any kind of 'God of the gaps' argument. It's rather that 'naturalism assumes nature', but when it then takes the further step of attempting to explain nature that it ventures (or blunders!) into the territory of metaphysics.
As above you appear to agree that there is a reality, then I'm at a loss trying to understand just what your point is. Maybe you mean subjective or experiential reality? That we might call affective reality? These being the reality of how we feel about something? Which of course is not any part at all of the object experienced.
Better, easier, simpler, more to the point for you to develop in a few well-crafted sentences of your own your own thinking.
I think what this touches onwhether through Hoffmans meta-cognitive theories, or through earlier thinkers like Whiteheadis a broader shift that's now underway in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences: a convergence around the idea that experience isn't just a passive reflection of an already-existent material world, but the active structuring of it. This is where cognitive science (especially its enactive and embodied cognitive science), phenomenology, and forms of idealism converge: not in denying the world, but in recognizing that the mind plays an indispensable role in how the world appears and makes sense to us. (I've tried to explore this in a bit more depth in The Mind Created World).
As for existence is experiencedit is precisely the experiential dimension of existence, 'reality as lived', that modern natural philosophy has tended to bracket out or exclude. That is the background of David Chalmers Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, and a key motivator of Hoffmans book. Thats also why I brought in Pierre Hadot: the original conception of philosophy wasnt theoretical but lived. We ourselves have to see the way the mind constructs our world. It may become an abstraction when we talk about it (theory) but what it points to is something actually happening, moment by moment, in our own awareness (practise). A large part of philosophy is the cultivation of that awareness.
Accordingly, in classical philosophy, theoria and praxis werent opposed, but deeply connected. Theoria meant contemplative insightthe act of seeing realityand praxis was the way of life that arose out of that seeing. So even talking about these things wasnt 'just theory' in our modern sense, but part of a process of gaining and deepening insight.
Science starts with observers sharing similar reactions and judgments to a public world. Not an unknown private world of a conscious being.
It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes. I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say: you exist independent of me; you exist independent of me and you're not a p-zombie; you're not a p-zombie and your "red" is the same as my "red", etc. None of these assumptions can be empirically justified or verified. Science has nothing to say about whether solipsism is false.
It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes. I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say: you exist independent of me; you exist independent of me and you're not a p-zombie; you're not a p-zombie and your "red" is the same as my "red", etc. None of these assumptions can be empirically justified. Science has nothing to say about whether solipsism is false.
Private world, an interesting idea, a devise to have a conversation about something that is imagine but like a work of fiction, neither true or false. But for the sake of further discussion, let us give it a little more precision. Because most us react and judge the world most of the time in a similar fashion, we can generally say we experience the world in a similar fashion. But this harmonization has another benefit, we can start to recognize when some of us do not experience the world like most. For example, we can start to recognize when someone is red/green color blind by administering the proper tests. But this is a standard test recognize by a community, not a private testimony by an individual on what the privately experience, that determines whether someone is red/green colorblind.
That said, I am not sure what sense I can make of saying my experience of red is different than your experience of red if we dont appeal to some outer criteria.
Reply to flannel jesus Would you say that what we see is a part of reality? Would reality "as it is" for you equate to what exists unseen or beyond or beneath what is seen?
I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say
Is this sort of like when someone watching the same sunset next to you says it makes them feel "happy" and "at peace", despite the two concepts being universally known and recognizable, there may still be intricacies and subtleties that can vary greatly to the point of changing one's definition or idea of either quite significantly? For some, "at peace" may mean one feel's content in life and the world around them and thus fosters a strong urge to face tomorrow. For others, at peace" may mean one is comfortably resigned to the idea of one's own mortality and wouldn't mind (or perhaps even would wish) that particular day to be their last. Or something else altogether?
While few things are truly equal and relatable, what about say (and forgive me in advance for being unpleasantly or unnecessarily graphic, it's simply the most straightforward example that comes to mind) two people being burned alive? Surely there can't be much difference in what the two experience, at least in the physical and most prevalent sense? Sorry if that's a bit of a derail or shimmying from your point or line of argument altogether, I've just always been curious and frankly a bit fuzzy on the whole qualia/"is my red your red" debate and would appreciate your remarks if you have the time.
Is this sort of like when someone watching the same sunset next to you says it makes them feel "happy" and "at peace", despite the two concepts being universally known and recognizable, there may still be intricacies and subtleties that can vary greatly to the point of changing one's definition or idea of either quite significantly? For some, "at peace" may mean one feel's content in life and the world around them and thus fosters a strong urge to face tomorrow. For others, at peace" may mean one is comfortably resigned to the idea of one's own mortality and wouldn't mind (or perhaps even would wish) that particular day to be their last. Or something else altogether?
No, I'm talking about something much more fundamental. If we're both watching a sunset, and you're talking about it and I'm listening, how do I know you even exist? When I dream, there are almost always "other people" in my dream who are interacting with me, but of course they're just aspects of me. But while I'm dreaming, they seem totally real and independent from me. So, the question naturally arises in the "waking world": how do I know that when we're watching a sunset together and talking about it, I'm not dreaming? From a materialist perspective, how do I know I'm not a Boltzmann Brain that popped into existence two seconds ago and is hallucinating everything?
And then, if I get past that issue, how do I know I'm not in a simulation? Nick Bostrom argues that it's actually likely we're in a simulation. Well, if that's true, and we're watching the sunset together, doesn't simulation theory beg the question: are you just a mindless zombielike bit of code? I know I'm not, obviously, but how can I be sure about you? If it's likely I'm in a simulation, it's just as likely I'm the only conscious being in the simulation.
And it I get past all that, there's the inverted spectrum problem.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/
So, when two people talk about their mental states, there are a whole lot of implicit metaphysical assumptions going on.
It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes.
Empathy is a sure antidote to solipsism. True, you don't literally experience the other's mind, but it's as close as we can get. The idea that 'consciousness is mine alone' is really characteristic of the individualism of modernity. And a flaw, if I might say.
Reply to Janus I would say we see stuff, we experience stuff, and actually I think Mr. Hoffman is right to call our experience a "UI" or "desktop" - but the stuff we're experiencing still *comes from somewhere*.
UIs aren't the same thing as the data they represent, but they still are a representation of the data, from a particular point of view.
Our experience isn't reality itself, but I think it is still caused by reality itself. It's said by Hoffman that we evolved to have this particular UI - that must mean there's a pre-UI context in which evolution can happen. What is that pre-UI context if not reality itself (or some emergent facet of reality)?
It's said by Hoffman that we evolved to have this particular UI - that must mean there's a pre-UI context in which evolution can happen. What is that pre-UI context if not reality itself (or some emergent facet of reality)?
Perhaps reality itself is what Kant means by the in itself.
These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought.
It would seem to me that survival within your environment is a selective pressure that promotes accurate perceptions over inaccurate ones.
We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about what it is like to be a bat or when Hoffman talks about the taste of mint, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.
But what about Hoffman and Nagel's speech and written words? Are they something, nothing, or somethings?
Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do.
I don't think we "see reality as it is". I don't think "reality as it is" is a visual experience. But I still think there is a reality.
So we can accomplish all these tasks that we set out to do through the day, but we don't see reality as it is? We can build computers, program them, build rockets to the Moon, get to and from work every day, type a response to a philosophical post we read, etc. - many tasks that do not directly involve survival at all, yet we accomplish our goals.
Are the words on this page experienced as they are?
Is your mind experienced as it is? Do we experience the UI as it is?
So we can accomplish all these tasks that we set out to do through the day, but we don't see reality as it is? We can build computers, program them, build rockets to the Moon, get to and from work every day, type a response to a philosophical post we read, etc. - many tasks that do not directly involve survival at all, yet we accomplish our goals.
That's right.
We know we don't experience reality "as it is" for same very basic reasons - our visual and auditory ranges are rather arbitrary. Why do you think your vision starts at red wavelengths and ends at violet? Other creatures colour wavelength sensitivity ends at different places, so they're experiencing something different from us - are they also experiencing reality "as it is"? How can we be experiencing drastically different experiences, and yet still be experiencing reality "as it is"?
And consider the colour wheel itself. We experience colours, not as a linear spectrum but as a loop. That's not "reality at it is", wavelengths don't loop. Your brain is fabricating that experience for you, it's not out there in the real world.
And I presume when you say subjective experience this may be demonstrated by saying this food you gave me is too spicy while I may feel it is rather mild.
I think it is demonstrated by the fact that we can study things like the pain receptors in our mouths, and the TRPV1 gene, and explain why we have different opinions of how spicy something is in purely physical, objective terms. But we cannot explain the experience of the spiciness in any terms that will let someone who can't feel it know what it feels like.
Although that's not the best example, assuming they can feel burning on their skin, and we could compare it with that. A better example is you and I can have different opinions of how's sweet something is, but we cannot give someone who does not have taste buds any hint of an idea what sweetness is.
I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say
RogueAI
Is this sort of like when someone watching the same sunset next to you says it makes them feel "happy" and "at peace", despite the two concepts being universally known and recognizable, there may still be intricacies and subtleties that can vary greatly to the point of changing one's definition or idea of either quite significantly?
I don't think we even have to worry about not being able to compare our experiences to see if they match. We don't need to know if my red is the same as your red. I think the idea is demonstrated more easily. We cannot make a blind person understand red, or sight in general. We cannot make a deaf person understand hearing. No physical description will give them any understanding whatsoever. Even someone who can see, but only in black and white, or even every color but red, will be unable to understand red. They know what green, blue, and yellow are, and can know that red is yet another color, but literally cannot imagine what it looks like.
We cannot explain "happy" and "at peace" to ChatGPT so that it feels those things. We can't even explain them to each other. Let's say Bach's music makes me happy, and I have heard you say it makes you happy. If you ask me how something you haven't experienced makes me feel, and it makes me feel happy, I might tell you it makes me feel the way Bach's music makes me feel. That might give you an idea of how it would make you feel. But I haven't described happiness, nor could I.
But what about Hoffman and Nagel's speech and written words? Are they something, nothing, or somethings?
Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do.
The Cartesian theater and Plato's cave are very dark places, but if the occupants still have their sanity and astuteness, they may notice light emanating from an entrance. So, when they boldly choose to exit, they will not find absolute certainty or those majestic eternal forms, but discover a chaotic, treacherous world that brave and ingenious people strive to cope and overcome by sharing their experiences, thoughts, and creations through the vehicle of language.
Reply to flannel jesus What we experience is part of what actually happens, no? Even our imagining of stuff actually happens, although what we imagine might not. What other cogent definition of real as distinct from imaginary is there? So, is all you are saying that there are some parts of what actually happens that we cannot access, or are you saying something else? Do you really believe that the things we see have no reality apart from our seeing of them?
Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do.
While what you say is true. Language is expressed in physical ways, so we perceive it the way we perceive everything else. Everything is party of the danger works.
Still, language is different from anything else in ways. The physical means of its expression are irrelevant to, and separate from, the meaning of what is being expressed. We can see an apple. It never means anything, and is always the physical object. We can see written words. They always mean something other than the physical marks we see.
Waves crashing on the beach cause vibrations in the air that we hear. But the sound doesn't mean anything. It doesn't even mean waves crashing on the beach. It's just an effect of the physical interaction of waves and beach. Air passing through vocal cords that are manipulated in certain ways cause vibrations in the air that we hear as words. Those words mean something beyond just the effect of the physical interaction of the air and vocal chords.
So no, not separate from the shared world we live in. But different from most things in that shared world.
but in recognizing that the mind plays an indispensable role in how the world appears and makes sense to us.
Wayfarer
Now this I buy. Is this what you mean by "structuring? But of course this presupposes a - the - entire world.
I commented on the convergence of cognitive science, phenomenology, and philosophical idealism. What they're converging on, is some form of Kant's 'copernican revolution in philosophy' - that 'things conform to thoughts, not thoughts to things.'
The reason we find that preposterous, is because 'everyone knows' that the Universe and the earth are far older than h.sapiens, and that we have evolved within that pre-existent reality, which we now seek to understand and adapt to by all means including science.
But it's important to see that even the purportedly mind-independent nature of the world 'before man existed' is still constituted in our grasp of that world. If that seems absurd it is only because we have a mental image of 'self in the world' - as if from a perspective outside of both world and subject. That is the way scientific culture has trained us to imagine it, but in what does that understanding inhere, if not in the mind?
Again, I'll turn to a passage from the great Arthur Schopenhauer, who articulated this paradox with clarity. (Notice that he is fully cognizant of the general idea of evolutionary development, although he published 60-odd years before the Origin of Species. There's no hint of theism or theistic argument.)
the law of causality and the treatment and investigation of nature which is based upon it, lead us necessarily to the conclusion that, in time, each more highly organised state of matter has succeeded a cruder state: so that the lower animals existed before men, fishes before land animals, plants before fishes, and the unorganised before all that is organised; that, consequently, the original mass had to pass through a long series of changes before the first eye could be opened. And yet, the existence of this whole world remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that of an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it is not even thinkable. The world is entirely idea, and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence. This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared,this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all.
It seems paradoxical, and in the next paragraph, Schopenhauer acknowledges this:
Thus we see, on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it, and in which it itself appears as a small link. These two contradictory points of view, to each of which we are led with the same necessity, we might again call an antinomy in our faculty of knowledge The necessary contradiction which at last presents itself to us here, finds its solution in the fact that, to use Kants phraseology, time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its phenomena, of which they are the form; which in my language means this: The objective world, the world as idea, is not the only side of the world, but merely its outward side; and it has an entirely different sidethe side of its inmost natureits kernelthe thing-in-itself But the world as idea only appears with the opening of the first eye. Without this medium of knowledge it cannot be, and therefore it was not before it. But without that eye, that is to say, outside of knowledge, there was also no before, no time. Thus time has no beginning, but all beginning is in time.
The mistake we make is to understand ourselves as a result of an unguided and unintended process of change, as if the mind is a latecomer to the grand spectacle, somehow thrown up by it, by means as yet unknown, without seeing that in another sense, the mind is the means by which the whole process is coming to understand itself. Even Julian Huxley, no friend of theism or idealist philosophy, for that matter, came to a similar realisation:
[quote=Julian Huxley]Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately.[/quote]
(Although personally I'm more drawn to the philosophical attitude of his brother, Alduous.)
Reply to Janus I'm saying our conscious experience is constructed by our brains. We aren't just raw experiencing reality as it is, we're experiencing a fabricated interface - fabricated from real events, yes, but the experience should never be confused for the real events themselves.
Even our experience of time and the chronological order of events is constructed in our brains: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2866156/
Reply to Janus If you don't understand the difference between naive realism and indirect realism, the questions you're choosing to ask aren't going to help you
Reply to Janus good, and you understand that indirect realists aren't saying "brain processes aren't real", right?
Because that question that you asked makes me think you're completely confused about what indirect realists mean when they say we don't "experience reality as it is".
Because that question that you asked makes me think you're completely confused about what indirect realists mean when they say we don't "experience reality as it is".
Do neuroscientists observe brain processes as they are according to you? If our experiences are real then why should we say we are not experiencing reality as it is? Are you simply saying that we don't experience those aspects of reality which we cannot experience? If so, that would be a tautology, no?
Or perhaps I should have just asked what you think indirect realists mean when they say we don't experience reality as it is.
Reply to flannel jesus A very poor response that assumes I don't understand what indirect realists propose, which of course I do. I want to know what you think in your own words. I'm not interested in trying to discuss with someone who hides behind labels. The ball's in your court. Do you have anything interesting or informative to say?
Reply to Janus you're asking me questions that have nothing to do with anything I said. Your questions are confused. Do you have anything interesting to ask?
Reply to Janus I don't even think I'm saying something controversial when I say we don't experience reality as it is.
Think about a piece of shit on the ground. It smells viscerally disgusting to you. And yet to a fly, it smells delicious and appetising.
Are you experiencing that shit as it is? Is the fly? What I am saying, and I believe Donald Hoffman semi agrees, is that the shit really exists, but both I and the fly are experiencing it in ways that make contextual sense for us to experience it. It smells viscerally disgusting to me because it's beneficial for me to be disgusted by it, because I could get sick eating it. It smells delicious to the fly because the fly gets nutritional value from it and doesn't get sick.
So we have our own unique experience of that shit, but really the shit is neither disgusting nor delicious "as it is", it's just a piece of shit.
How can questions be confused? Perhaps you meant confusing? Did you not understand them? The questions are designed to find out if your position is confused...I'm not claiming anything at this stage.
Are you experiencing that shit as it is? Is the fly?
Is it not part of the piece of shit being what it is to be attractive to the fly and disgusting to you, or to provide a suitable environment for egg-laying for the fly and be such as to make you sick if you ate it? Are those not all real attributes of the piece of shit and its relations with you and the fly?
Reply to flannel jesus
This is a good point that made me think and want to look up about how smell works more, but couldn't you also say we can distinguish our emotional reactions about something from our ability to identify it through the senses? Albeit, maybe they interfere.
I think color has good points too. Nervous system structure will affect how we detect color, albeit one might still say all the distinctions we make map to physical events in the world. Maybe this needs to be unique to be realist? Rather than a brain that may be structured in a way to do the job more efficiently, resulting in possibly more convoluted or context-dependent ways of mapping to the world. There is also the sense that if one identifies blue colors more similarly than yellow or red or whatever then this seems also some added kind of detection of similarity purely a byproduct of the cone system - but then again, greens will also be more similar than reds because they are mapping to physical structures that are more similar. I guess would need to explore what is going on more though maybe. I could make an argument that maybe the ways different cones affect perception just can be seen similarly to how we might bound the same events in the world in different ways. But then maybe to some this is quintessential antirealism.
Maybe one could say perceptual differences reflect the fact we see different parts of the same reality, obtaining different partial information about actual physical events, but animals with different cones or more resolution of vision are just detecting more stuff or different stuff than we are. I guess this again is a very weak realism still.
Ultimately there always does seem to be some kind of arbitrariness somewhere. For me its a question of whether that still preserves reliable information, which albeit is always depends on whether you happen to live in an environment where your senses are reliable. In other contexts they may not be (i.e. light [in the correct ambient environment reflecting off objects] is not the only thing that can stimulate a retina).
I have said in other threads I think indirect vs direct realism is actually arguably kind of ambiguous. And I feel comfortable with some kind of minimal realism I think because maybe I think a fundamental metaphysical characterization of intrinsic reality is unintelligible. The best imo we can do is some weak floppy notion of structure, perhaps informational structure. While intrinsicness isn't accessible at all, and perhaps fundamentally meaningless, I think structure is accessible by us, even if in a convoluted or perhaps idealized or compressed way. The issue is that no creatures have access to all the kind of structure in reality that one might be able to plausible detect.
But maybe reality "as it is" is nothing more than the structure of reality "as it is" which we can access to some extent because we can all navigate the world correctly - but maybe my ability to find my way home was in fact some kind of accidental heuristic - we just don't have access to all of the structure. My thoughts are that phenomenal experience is just informational structure (or isomorphic to it if you want to be more precise) which itself maps to the world structure at least partially. When we see the world "not as it is" we have different mappings that miss stuff out.
Maybe one could say perceptual differences reflect the fact we see different parts of the same reality, obtaining different partial information about actual physical events, but animals with different cones or more resolution of vision are just detecting more stuff or different stuff than we are. I guess this again is a very weak realism still.
I don't understand why you say this is a "weak realism". Are perceptual organs and the experiences they enable not as real as that which they sense and that which is experienced?
Reply to Janus
Because when people say realism they tend to mean a completely unique God's eye view of reality, which is a much stronger realism. Once you start to be able to view things in different perspectives then people start to use that as arguments against realism.
Reply to Apustimelogist Are you referring to naive realism which, as it is commonly characterized, thinks that the things of the world are just exactly as we perceive them to be? Do you think anyone who had done even a little intelligent reflection and critical thinking would hold such a view? There is a reason it is called naive realism.
Do you think anyone who had done even a little intelligent reflection and critical thinking would hold such a view? There is a reason it is called naive realism.
Oh, so you are saying people tend to be weak realists instead? What a coincidence, chimes right in with my thoughts just there, thank you!
Reply to Apustimelogist I'm not sure now whether you are referring to what I would characterize as relational realism as weak, or whether you mean naive realism is weak. I wouldn't call sophisticated realism 'weak". I think naive realism is weak realism, because it allows only how we perceive things to be real.
A good question for Hoffman would be: "could there be a perceptual/cognitive system (a mind) that was 'selected for' or 'engineered' based on 'truth instead of fitness?'" If so, "would this represent a privileged viewpoint on reality? Would the thoughts of such a mind be 'more real' (less illusory) than our own?"
I think the obvious answer from his perspective would be: "no, I am not saying that some one special 'really real' mind can evolve or be engineered." But then what is he talking about? A reality/illusion distinction only makes sense if there is something other than illusion, some mind that knows "reality in itself" as opposed to fitness. If it is just "fitness all the way down," then fitness is reality and his argument is based on a false distinction.
I suppose that's somewhat the point he makes in the last chapter when he calls his previous position self-refuting and argues for idealism, but arguably the problem is that his previous position (which is a popular sort of view in materialism) is incoherent. The final chapter's argument is something like: "A or B, but not A, so B" yet it's never made clear that A (representationalist materialism) or B (idealism) are the only options. The whole "user interface" analogy also seems to presuppose some sort of Cartesian theater. My conviction is that materialism/physicalism is really defined by a sort of insolublein its termsdualism, that dresses itself up monism by attempting a "reduction" of this dualism. Hoffman seems trapped in this model and simply flips towards trying to "reduce" in the other direction.
"Everything is received in the manner of the receiver" is a very old idea. The more I learn, the more I think that Kant's "revolution" only makes sense in terms of a pretty narrow period in the history of philosophy, rather than being an effective criticism of "all prior metaphysics." It's more a making explicit of the dualism at the heart of modern materialism, and the consequences of a "metaphysics of appearances" where appearances are arbitrarily related to an 'objective reality' set over an against them.
A reality/illusion distinction only makes sense if there is something other than illusion, some mind that knows "reality in itself" as opposed to fitness. If it is just "fitness all the way down," then fitness is reality and his argument is based on a false distinction.
I quite agree, that is what I suspect about Hoffman's book. He does discuss various objections to FBT theory around pages 44-45 in the ebook edition I have. He quotes Steven Pinker, saying
We are organisms, not angels, and our minds are organs, not pipelines to the truth. Our minds evolved by natural selection to solve problems that were life-and-death matters to our ancestors, not to commune with correctness.
However as I've noted elsewhere this is a similar argument of Plantinga's, the evolutionary argument against naturalism - that if naturalism is true, then it undermines the trust we have in reason.
But then, he says on p 66
what about our perceptions of math and logic? Doesnt the theorem assume math and logic, and then prove theres almost no chance that our perceptions of math and logic are true? If so, isnt it a proof that there are no reliable proofsa reductio ad absurdum of the whole approach?
Fortunately, the FBT Theorem proves no such thing. It applies only to our perceptions of states of the world. Other cognitive capacities, such as our abilities with math and logic, must be studied on their own to see how they may be shaped by natural selection. It is too simplistic, and false, to argue that natural selection makes all of our cognitive faculties unreliable. This illogic is sometimes floated to support religious views believed to be incompatible with Darwinian evolution. But it wields too broad a brush.
My bolds. Which again makes me think the title is a misnomer - it should be 'the case against cognitive realism' or something of the kind. After all ancient philosophy was always inclined to suspect that sense perception was or might be a grand illusion.
Could you be so kind as to specify where he says that?
I wish I could be more helpful, but IRCC it's all in the last chapter, where he presented his "agential realism" as an alternative to the intractable problems he has hitherto been describing. Basically, "everything I've said had something wrong with it, so we need to start over."
I recall he name drops a number of figures as doing something similar to him, Spinoza, Hegel, (maybe Aristotle), but I don't recall thinking his "solution" was actually all that similar to these because he seems to still be wedded to reductionism and mathematization (as opposed to "the truth is the whole" of Big Heg). The higher levels of reality, the more intelligible, must still be "reduced" to the lower (a key conceit of materialism, which is the elevation of potency above actuality, or difference over identity).
I think the modern fetish for mathematization is probably what leads him in this direction.
As I said in the shoutbox:
Interesting comment I saw that isn't worthy of its own thread:
In the commentary on the Metaphysics St. Thomas says: " However, the objects of mathematics neither are moved nor cause motion nor have a will. Hence in their case the good is not considered under the name of good and end, although in them we do consider what is good, namely, their being and what they are."
Basically, mathematics is about bulk quantity (magnitude and multitude, as opposed to the "virtual quantity" of intensity in quality) as abstracted from things' definitions. Hence, it doesn't include ends. Hence, it cannot include any notion of final causality and telos. Thus, the mathematization of science, the demand that all of being be reduced to mathematical physics itself contains the demand that the world be "valueless and meaningless" and devoid of good and intentionality.
Hence, the birth of the much maligned but oft-recreated "Cartesian dualism" and "Cartesian anxiety."
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And this goes right with the evolution of modern nominalist thought. Things are just math, and so things have whatever telos (and this ultimately whatever form) we give to them. Indeed, strictly speaking there aren't things at all, but our only our purposes for declaring some mathematical patterns to be "things"). This is how man's mind becomes the sui generis source of all meaning and value in some philosophies, or God's sheer will in others (with even man himself lacking any telos and nature, instead generating his own telos out of a sheer act of will). I think there is probably a relationship between the mathematization of being and the triumph of volanturism here. With all consideration of form and intrinsic telos excluded, the sheer will is all that is left to bestow purpose and meaning (first God's will, and later in history man's).
But, is this correct? Does a bee truly have no intrinsic telos? Man? Are there no such things as bees and ants but for the volanturist declarations of man, who slices up the world-as-mathematical-object based on utility? I tend to think not.
At any rate, radical nominalism certainly does seem to have a fetish for mathematization, and wants to reduce the emergence of "things" to "mathematical patterns," "regularities," "information," etc. But I think there will also be some bare remainder here, because mathematics cannot generate the purpose by which any "pattern" might be declared a thing or quality. Hence, the volanturist will is always lurking in the background of nominalism. There is a reason why, historically, nominalism and volanturism went together hand in glove. In post-modern thought, there is a turn against the individual as the seat of the volanturist will, but this isn't really a turn away from volanturism, so much as its globalization in a diffuse "ocean of will/intention."
Agential realism, as a reduction of being to mathematized sheer will, goes along with this.
Reply to flannel jesus No I tend more towards direct realism than indirect. That said I also think their differences are largely on account of linguistic framing.
I think the modern fetish for mathematization is probably what leads him (Donald Hoffman) in this direction.
He has to be able to express his theory in mathematical terms for it to be credible. Science relies heavily on quantitative analysis. As you say, that is at the heart of, not just modern nominalism, but modern science generally. The scientific revolution was owed in large part to the ability to identify precisely the quantitative attributes of objects of analysis, and to remove those fuzzy qualities of ends and purposes and intentionality that still underwrote Aristotelian physics. This is what gives rise to what René Geunon describes as the 'reign of quantity' in which we're all immersed.
Oh - and that last chapter (10) in Hoffman's Case Against Reality - I just don't get it, from the point where 'conscious agents' are introduced. I so thoroughly don't get it, that I put the book down, and do something else. I think for the last time.
Reply to Apustimelogist To frame it simply naive realism thinks that the eyes are windows onto a world; we look out through them and see exactly what is out there. Indirect realism says we see mental models assembled form sense data and that we don't see objects as they are. Direct realism can admit that we don't see objects just as they are in all their ways of being (colours for example are not inherent in objects, even though the property of reflecting particular wavelengths is) but we do actually see objects not mental models. It has a lot to do with linguistic framing though. So I would say that mental models of objects just are seeing the objects, rather than saying that we see mental models.
Indirect realism says we see mental models assembled form sense data and that we don't see objects as they are.
Is where I get ambiguous or perhaps ambivalent over indirect or direct realism. I can see arguments in both directions. From my perspective which is less object-centered, I think the color thing you talk about would be less of an issue for direct realism if it still is mapping to actual physical behavior or structure in the world.
We know we don't experience reality "as it is" for same very basic reasons - our visual and auditory ranges are rather arbitrary. Why do you think your vision starts at red wavelengths and ends at violet? Other creatures colour wavelength sensitivity ends at different places, so they're experiencing something different from us - are they also experiencing reality "as it is"? How can we be experiencing drastically different experiences, and yet still be experiencing reality "as it is"?
And consider the colour wheel itself. We experience colours, not as a linear spectrum but as a loop. That's not "reality at it is", wavelengths don't loop. Your brain is fabricating that experience for you, it's not out there in the real world.
How can any of this be said if we do not see reality as it is? In one breath you make all these claims about how reality is, and in the next breath claim we do not see reality as it is.
How do you know we are experiencing reality differently if you do not see reality as it is? How can you say that your brain is fabricating the experience if you don't see reality as it is?
Do you experience your mind as it really is? If so, does that not lend one to believe that the world is like one's mind being that the mind is part of the world? If so, does this not mean that you experience (at least part of) the world as it is? And finally, does it matter that we don't see the world "as it is", but know the world as it is? If we can know the world well enough to land rovers on Mars, then we know the world as it is.
While what you say is true. Language is expressed in physical ways, so we perceive it the way we perceive everything else. Everything is party of the danger works.
Still, language is different from anything else in ways. The physical means of its expression are irrelevant to, and separate from, the meaning of what is being expressed. We can see an apple. It never means anything, and is always the physical object. We can see written words. They always mean something other than the physical marks we see.
Waves crashing on the beach cause vibrations in the air that we hear. But the sound doesn't mean anything. It doesn't even mean waves crashing on the beach. It's just an effect of the physical interaction of waves and beach. Air passing through vocal cords that are manipulated in certain ways cause vibrations in the air that we hear as words. Those words mean something beyond just the effect of the physical interaction of the air and vocal chords.
So no, not separate from the shared world we live in. But different from most things in that shared world.
Hoffman, Donald D. (2019). The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (Function). Kindle Edition.:The purpose of a desktop interface is not to show you the truth of the computer
The Cartesian theater and Plato's cave are very dark places, but if the occupants still have their sanity and astuteness, they may notice light emanating from an entrance. So, when they boldly choose to exit, they will not find absolute certainty or those majestic eternal forms, but discover a chaotic, treacherous world that brave and ingenious people strive to cope and overcome by sharing their experiences, thoughts, and creations through the vehicle of language.
and other people are part of the shadows one experiences. Other people's existence is questioned by questioning the idea that you see the world as it is. Once you start to question your experiences, you question everything's existence - including words and the people that use them. Solipsism logically follows from unfettered skepticism about the reality of an external world.
Well, regardless of the question "how", it's not controversial to state that we DO experience illusions, and somehow we have ways of figuring out they're illusions. That's not controversial at all. It sounds like a failure of your intellectual creativity if you can't figure out ways to determine if any of our experiences are illusory.
and other people are part of the shadows one experiences. Other people's existence is questioned by questioning the idea that you see the world as it is. Once you start to question your experiences, you question everything's existence - including words and the people that use them. Solipsism logically follows from unfettered skepticism about the reality of an external world.
Metaphysical theories like this are hopeless, no evidence can be presented to cure this mental disease, and only demands some sort of persuasion to cure it. I find a good dose of humor can do the trick to expose the absurdity of such a position.
As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.
Well, regardless of the question "how", it's not controversial to state that we DO experience illusions, and somehow we have ways of figuring out they're illusions. That's not controversial at all. It sounds like a failure of your intellectual creativity if you can't figure out ways to determine if any of our experiences are illusory.
I don't deny that we do experience illusions, but then to know that you are experiencing an illusion means that you have some sense of how the world is.
Besides, illusions are misinterpretations of sensory data. Our senses never lie, but we can misinterpret what they are telling us, just as you can misinterpret what someone is saying even though they are being truthful.
For instance, mirages and "bent" straws in water, are only illusions if you do not understand the nature of light. When you do not take into account that your eyes see light, not objects, then your direct-realist self is going to assume that you see objects as they are and then get confused with these illusions. But if you understand the nature of light, and that you see light, not objects, then mirages and bent straws is exactly what you would expect to experience. Your experiences become predictable.
Metaphysical theories like this are hopeless, no evidence can be presented to cure this mental disease, and only demands some sort of persuasion to cure it. I find a good dose of humor can do the trick to expose the absurdity of such a position.
As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.
To keep yourself from sliding down the slope into solipsism, you need to come up with an explanation as to how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is".
As my eyes scan across the image, I'm convinced shapes are moving and shifting. Of course they aren't, and I can figure that out analytically, and yet it seems so deeply true of my experience of the image, that I'm experiencing looking at moving shifting shapes.
Some illusions are perhaps conscious misinterpretations, but our experience of the world comes through a lot of filters before it becomes a conscious experience. The existence of those pre-experiential filters, which I think unambiguously exist, prove that we can't just be "experiencing reality as it is".
As my eyes scan across the image, I'm convinced shapes are moving and shifting. Of course they aren't, and I can figure that out analytically, and yet it seems so deeply true of my experience of the image, that I'm experiencing looking at moving shifting shapes.
Some illusions are perhaps conscious misinterpretations, but our experience of the world comes through a lot of filters before it becomes a conscious experience. The existence of those pre-experiential filters, which I think unambiguously exist, prove that we can't just be "experiencing reality as it is".
This is due to a conscious effort of shifting one's attention to a specific area of the picture to the picture as a whole and back.
What does that even mean, "experience reality as it is"? Is your mind part of reality? Do you experience your mind as it is?
The fact that you know that there are unconscious filters is evidence that you are experiencing reality as it is.
You need to provide an explanation as to how we can still know reality as it is when we cannot experience or see the world as it is.
To keep yourself from sliding down the slope into solipsism, you need to come up with an explanation as to how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is".
Since you are asking "how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is", I will assume you could not keep yourself from sliding, and so you believe solipsism is the case unless demonstrated otherwise.
Ok, if that is your belief, I think we need to get some things straight before we can converse about this topic.
1. Please do not address me as if I exist independent of your mind. According to you I am only an aspect of your mind/consciousness. As such, think of me as another voice in your head. Some psychiatrists would call this auditory hallucinations, but they do not know what they are talking about because they probably are unable to grasp these fundamental rigorous logical arguments about reality.
2. Please do not flirt with indirect realism and say the cause of me exists outside your mind/consciousness because then you are admitting there could be something more than just your mind/consciousness. Remember, I am part of your mind/consciousness.
3. Do listen to what anybody who says you might have a dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder. Those folk don't understand the logical implications that we need to accept when Solipsism is the case. Remember, those folk are just parts of your mind/consciousness as well.
4. To think of it, what if I convinced you that I exist apart from your mind/consciousness, This sounds like I am a contradiction, both existing independent of your mind and dependent on your mind at the same time. And we know contradictions can't exist therefore I only exist as part of your mind. That said, I think I also proved that any argument that would convince you of the opposite could also not be formulated. So, you cannot be convinced to give up solipsism with logic either.
Since you are asking "how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is", I will assume you could not keep yourself from sliding, and so you believe solipsism is the case unless demonstrated otherwise.
I'm not a solipsist so the rest of your post is irrelevant. The fact that you did not answer the question is indicative that you do not have an answer yet you keep claiming that we do not see the world as it is, so my point was that YOU are the solipsist, not me.
To even attempt to answer the question, how about you start off by answering whether you experience your mind as it is or not.
Thats good, at least we both believe solipsism is a untenable position.
You made solipsism a tenable position by saying things like, "we don't see the world as it is". I'm now asking you how you can then say "solipsism is an untenable position" after saying "we don't see the world as it is". How can you be so sure there is even an external world if you can't trust what your senses are telling you? Do you even have senses?
I have not said we dont see the world as it is in this post. I don't believe I have commented on this, that said, I can.
When someone uses such a phase, I think the onus should be on the asserter as what would the world look like as is vs not as is. They need to set up the contrast. Descartes demon may be able to perfectly duplicate a world, but runs into the problem of distinguishing between the two. Better yet why not say that we have more of the same world in that case.
In terms of trusting senses, you trust your senses until there is a reason not too. This reason is not to reach some abstract position of absolute certainty but to successful cope with the world around you.
When someone uses such a phase, I think the onus should be on the asserter as what would the world look like as is vs not as is. They need to set up the contrast. Descartes demon may be able to perfectly duplicate a world, but runs into the problem of distinguishing between the two. Better yet why not say that we have more of the same world in that case.
Where would this duplicate world be relative to the original? It appears to me that the duplicate would be part of the greater reality that includes the original and duplicate, just as heaven and hell, along with the universe is all part of one reality as the events in one can affect the events in others.
If the duplicate mirrors the original, then it would be a world as well.
The problem appears to be a misuse of language more than anything else.
The issue isn't that our senses are wrong. An original table will look just like a duplicate table, even for the demon. The difference is our knowledge of another world - the original that we have yet to observe - that is lacking, not that our senses are lying to us.
Comments (105)
Wittgensteins beetle in the box rears its ugly head again. Not sure if Wolfram knows it but he presents this argument from a philosophy of science meets philosophy of language angle.
We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about what it is like to be a bat or when Hoffman talks about the taste of mint, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.
Yep, it is a great discussion. But confusion begets confusion. Notice how Wolfram says to Hoffman you are an N of 1, as if this is reasonable concept to apply to a thing called consciousness. But, in comes The Private Language Argument, how could we make sense of one-hood, thing-hood, truth-hood ascribe to something private like consciousness? The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this knowledge is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept correctly, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept correctly.
Donald Hoffman. His book.
I'll get around to watching these. I assume Wolfram is still promoting his ideas about Cellular Automata as a foundation for science and math. I bought his enormous book when it first came out, but flamed out of reading it after several hundred of the thousand pages or so. It did encourage me to write several computer programs and experiment developing the patterns he alludes to.
It became a joke at scientific cocktail parties that almost everyone had a copy, but no one had completed reading it.
Hoffman's idea is that evolutionary development favours adaptive fitness over perception of reality as it is. We have evolved to see the world in a way that helps us to navigate it successfully enough to survive and propagate. He then develops his theory of conscious realism, which is the idea that what we see are icons or visual representations
[quote=Hoffman, Donald D. (2019). The Case Against Reality: How Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes (Function). Kindle Edition.]How can our senses be usefulhow can they keep us aliveif they dont tell us the truth about objective reality? A metaphor can help our intuitions. Suppose youre writing an email, and the icon for its file is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your desktop. Does this mean that the file itself is blue, rectangular, and in the center of your computer? Of course not. The color of the icon is not the color of the file. Files have no color. The shape and position of the icon are not the true shape and position of the file. In fact, the language of shape, position, and color cannot describe computer files.
The purpose of a desktop interface is not to show you the truth of the computerwhere truth, in this metaphor, refers to circuits, voltages, and layers of software. Rather, the purpose of an interface is to hide the truth and to show simple graphics that help you perform useful tasks such as crafting emails and editing photos. If you had to toggle voltages to craft an email, your friends would never hear from you. That is what evolution has done. It has endowed us with senses that hide the truth and display the simple icons we need to survive long enough to raise offspring.[/quote]
I think there is some truth in that, indeed I argue something very similar in the OP Mind-Created World. But the problem I have with it is the implicit presumption that reason is also something that can be understood in terms of visual perception. As many reviewers have noted, if the argument applies to reason and mathematical logic as well as visual perception, then how is Hoffman's book not also an illusory artefact of the selfish gene?
In fact, an interesting comparison can be made between Hoffman's argument, and arguments from (among others) Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, and C S Lewis. These philosophers all propose various forms of 'the argument from reason', which says that, were reason to be understandable purely in naturalistic terms, as an adaptation to the environment, then how could we have confidence in reason? Of course, that is a very deep question - rather too deep to be addressed in terms of cognitive science, I would have thought.
In short, I think Hoffman's idea of 'truth' (as in 'the truth that is hidden from our eyes by evolution') is philosophically naive. Later in the book, he talks a lot about mathematical models which purport to demonstrate the veracity of his central argument, which culminates in the idea that reality comprises solely conscious agents. Again, an idea I'm sympathetic to - think Liebnizian monads -but the meaning of that claim is left open. The maths seems to be aimed at creating the image (ironically) of scientific versimilitude, as if any theory is not justified by mathematical models will lack credibility.
That's my two bobs, granted, I haven't finished the entire book, I like Hoffman's persona and am probably more open to his kind of argument than anyone who holds to physicalism, but those aspects of his project give me pause.
Really good point and one that is missed - it seems to be a blindspot in Hoffman's work. Quoting Wayfarer
Hoff's implying that maths has some kind of transcendent quality that can demonstrate truth outside of our false reality. Like he's a mathematical Platonist by default.
I've always found this point quite strange because from what I see, people reason "badly" and get things wrong literally all the time, including scientists and academics. I feel like, even though we are very smart, human progress in terms of knowledge is not some direct consequence solely of our ability to reason but this long process of trial and error where people throw stuff at the wall and get it wrong all the time, and some stuff just sticks for one reason or another and we remember it over the generations. Its like a another form of Darwinian selectionism.
I completely understand your concern. My off-the-cuff answer is that reality is lived. That response is more in keeping with European philosophy, and also with religious philosophies. You can create and call into doubt all kinds of complicated theories but existence has a visceral, felt quality that is before or prior to all such verbal rationalisations. How this relates to philosophical idealism, is that idealism doesn't ultimately comprise a 'theory about mind' but a recognition of the sense in which the mind constructs the reality in which we live (that's the part that Hoffman gets right). But in philosophy, this requires insight into that process. Buddhism is also grounded in that kind of insight.
What with the total dominance and pervasiveness of science and scientific technologies in life today, it is natural to presume that scientifically-based reasoning is as it were the arbiter of reality. But science by its very nature leaves something out, which is the subjective, visceral sense of lived reality. That's what existentialism and phenomenology is about. So whatever truth is to be sought, it has to be sought in that context. Pierre Hadot is an exemplar:
[quote=IEP]Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ....According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing.[/quote]
I'm not claiming by any stretch to have mastered or to be able to demonstrate these qualities but I believe this is the direction in which the answer lies.
Quoting Apustimelogist
Well, probably unlike most, I put some stock in spiritual insight. The archetypal sage - whom is most likely not an actual person - has the ability to see 'how things truly are', which exceeds the scope of mere objectivity. Again from the entry on Pierre Hadot:
What's your point?
On "The Concept of the Ruliad", Stephen Wolfram's idea of the "entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of the following all possible computation rules in all possible ways." Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. He goes on to claim that Ruliad explains why we have the perception that universe has these specific laws that it does. Well his answer is that "we are bounded observers, embedded within the Ruliad. But we don't fully see the Ruliad but only see in the lens of our particular methods of perception and analysis. Here he shares some similarity with Hoffman's views.
This is my first time reading of such a theory but I have to say that I am a bit suspicious of its lofty claims. I think I can summarize around two points:
1. I can imagine him sitting a front of a computer and being overcome by an analogy, as Paley did when being entranced of the inner workings of a watch. Wow, by simply programming steps on a computer, I can simulate an object on a screen to move at a rate across a screen like an object in the real world. Therefore, all laws of physics must be founded on computational principles. Where is Hume when you need him?
2. Stephen, I presume, he is also a "bounded observer who has his own particular method of perception and analysis." If that is the case, does not this idea come from his particular method of perception and analysis? Or, does he have some Platonic insight into of realm of perfect ideas he only sees? I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations, "47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair."
Not in the least. You ask 'what is reality', my answer is intended to convey that it has to be meaningful as a lived reality, not as an abstraction or theory. Philosophy as 'love of wisdom' as a quality of being, not as a theoretical abstraction.
Quoting tim wood
On the contrary:
[quote=Spirituality and Philosophy in Kant's Ciritque of Pure Reason, Ian Hunter]Despite its apparent absence from modern academic philosophy, the notion that one might turn to philosophy in pursuit of inner illumination and transformation, similar to that found the church and the lodge, was taken for granted in Kants milieu and formed a key part of the reception of his philosophy. ...
The decisive distinguishing feature of Western philosophical spirituality is that it does not regard the truth as something to which the subject has access by right, universally, simply by virtue of the kind of cognitive being that the human subject is. Rather, it views the truth as something to which the subject may accede only through some act of inner self-transformation, some act of attending to the self with a view to determining its present incapacity, thence to transform it into the kind of self that is spiritually qualified to accede to a truth that is by definition not open to the unqualified subject. ....[/quote]
How does that sit against Donald Hoffman's 'conscious realism', and his claim that we don't see reality as it is, but only as evolution has shaped us to see it? It seems to me that from such a perspective nothing could be ventured as to 'what is left on stage', as 'the stage' is constructed by the actors. Indeed Hoffman says that reality is conscious agents 'all the way down'.
I mean, scientifically speaking, the history of life on earth starts a few billion years after earth came into being. If it's "consciousness all the way down", what does that say about those billions of years prior to life?
I accept that the way WE see reality wasn't "reality" back then (and arguably isn't "reality" right now either), but we still have sufficient evidence that "back then" was as real as right now. So with no conscious agents around to create that reality, what's the story?
That's a really excellent question, and a topic that is near to my heart. I've debated it up hill and down dale for years, but I'll try and sketch out a quick response in the few moments I have now.
The key point I make is that all judgements about the age of the universe, including all of the scientific evidence (which I fully accept) is interpreted by us. And that act of intepretation is mind-dependent. So, sure, we know prior to h.sapiens that the earth exist for 4 billion years odd, and a pretty good account of evolutionary development. But there is always an implicit perspective in that understanding, namely, that of yours and mine and humans generally. We don't really see it as it would be without any perspective whatever, becuase without any perspective, there would be no time or space which provides the framework within which all such knowledge is meaningful.
So there are two levels: first, there's the empirical facts, disclosed by science, which are inter-subjectively verifiable. But there's also a sense in which that is disclosed and understood by us in terms of the framework of understanding that we bring to the picture. But we generally don't take that into account, because science generally brackets out the observer, so as to arrive at what is considered to be the view from nowhere, which it takes to be synonymous with how things truly are. But it's not.
This goes back to Kant, of course, but it's an understanding that has also penetrated many schools of modern philosophy and even cognitive science. See The Blind Spot of Science for a more detailed account (Aeon essay).
Imagine cockroaches gain sentience in 10,000 years. Everything cockroaches believe will also have to come through their filters, their interpretations. Should they believe reality is cockroach-dependent? I don't think so.
So since it would have to be true either way, it doesn't support the case for mind dependence.
If you were to see the world as it is, independently of any mind - what would you see?
I don't think we "see reality as it is". I don't think "reality as it is" is a visual experience. But I still think there is a reality.
Every book, the superficial mask of its author... every painting and every song too.
We're not like a car that just uses a shell to look cool.
The only one we can really consider is taste. We don't need tastebuds at this point, I don't think. We can buy food that we know is edible and nutritious. We don't need to rely on taste to keep us safe. Or someone could prepare all of our food for us. But who would agree to have their tastebuds removed, or made non-functional? Such preferences have no pactical bake.
Removing any of our other senses would make us less safe.
I assume there are people who don't think bats are conscious. But, assuming they are, Nagel means there's something it's like to [I]be[/i] a bat, [I]for[/I] the bat. There's nothing it's like to be a rock, for the rock. A rock doesn't have a pov. A bat does. We can't really imagine what it's like to be as bat, because they are so different from us. Flight, echolocation, etc. But we don't need to know what it's like to be a bat to consider that there is something it's like for the bat; that it has a pov. It is subjectively experiencing, whatever that feels like to the bat.
Well, I know you taste food if you put it in your month and you say that was good not too spicy or I know when you dont taste your food if you say I got a bad head cold and I cant taste anything. And I presume when you say subjective experience this may be demonstrated by saying this food you gave me is too spicy while I may feel it is rather mild.
Knowledge is a social phenomenon which is conveyed by language about a share world. A private language used to describe a private world is not a language at all. It is as if we came across a solitary being making occasional sounds and claiming it is a language used to describe the environment. That would be quite a stretch.
And that is the point Wolfram is trying to make against Hoffmans idea that one can start with conscious as fundamental. Science starts with observers sharing similar reactions and judgments to a public world. Not an unknown private world of a conscious being.
First, Donald Hoffman - his theory of cognition is given in his book The Case Against Reality: How Evolution hid the Truth from our Eyes. The post of mine you quoted was my description of the theory in that book. From the book description:
I have the book but there are some aspects of it I don't understand. I was initally attracted to Hoffman's ideas because of their apparent convergence with the kinds of idealist philosophy that I'm drawn to. But I have doubts about the philosophical merits of Hoffman's argument in some respects (even if in agreement in others).
Quoting tim wood
This is a large subject in its own right, but I wouldnt interpret Whiteheads or Collingwoods positions as arguments for divine creation per se. Rather, both are pointing to a more subtle and important issue: that science rests on presuppositionssuch as the uniformity and intelligibility of naturethat it cannot establish from within empirical method. Whiteheads term for this is faith in the order of nature, and Collingwood, similarly, uses the idea of absolute presuppositionsnot to promote theology, but to expose the philosophical scaffolding science quietly relies on.
In other words, their concern is with the limits of empiricism, not with the promotion of theism. That said, both thinkers were also historically conscious: they understood that the emergence of modern science was neither philosophically or culturally neutral, but shaped by a preceding worldview in which the cosmos was understood as rationally orderedwhether by divine decree or metaphysical structure. But in no way were they proposing any kind of 'God of the gaps' argument. It's rather that 'naturalism assumes nature', but when it then takes the further step of attempting to explain nature that it ventures (or blunders!) into the territory of metaphysics.
Quoting tim wood
Quoting tim wood
I think what this touches onwhether through Hoffmans meta-cognitive theories, or through earlier thinkers like Whiteheadis a broader shift that's now underway in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences: a convergence around the idea that experience isn't just a passive reflection of an already-existent material world, but the active structuring of it. This is where cognitive science (especially its enactive and embodied cognitive science), phenomenology, and forms of idealism converge: not in denying the world, but in recognizing that the mind plays an indispensable role in how the world appears and makes sense to us. (I've tried to explore this in a bit more depth in The Mind Created World).
As for existence is experiencedit is precisely the experiential dimension of existence, 'reality as lived', that modern natural philosophy has tended to bracket out or exclude. That is the background of David Chalmers Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, and a key motivator of Hoffmans book. Thats also why I brought in Pierre Hadot: the original conception of philosophy wasnt theoretical but lived. We ourselves have to see the way the mind constructs our world. It may become an abstraction when we talk about it (theory) but what it points to is something actually happening, moment by moment, in our own awareness (practise). A large part of philosophy is the cultivation of that awareness.
Accordingly, in classical philosophy, theoria and praxis werent opposed, but deeply connected. Theoria meant contemplative insightthe act of seeing realityand praxis was the way of life that arose out of that seeing. So even talking about these things wasnt 'just theory' in our modern sense, but part of a process of gaining and deepening insight.
It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes. I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say: you exist independent of me; you exist independent of me and you're not a p-zombie; you're not a p-zombie and your "red" is the same as my "red", etc. None of these assumptions can be empirically justified or verified. Science has nothing to say about whether solipsism is false.
Private world, an interesting idea, a devise to have a conversation about something that is imagine but like a work of fiction, neither true or false. But for the sake of further discussion, let us give it a little more precision. Because most us react and judge the world most of the time in a similar fashion, we can generally say we experience the world in a similar fashion. But this harmonization has another benefit, we can start to recognize when some of us do not experience the world like most. For example, we can start to recognize when someone is red/green color blind by administering the proper tests. But this is a standard test recognize by a community, not a private testimony by an individual on what the privately experience, that determines whether someone is red/green colorblind.
That said, I am not sure what sense I can make of saying my experience of red is different than your experience of red if we dont appeal to some outer criteria.
Is this sort of like when someone watching the same sunset next to you says it makes them feel "happy" and "at peace", despite the two concepts being universally known and recognizable, there may still be intricacies and subtleties that can vary greatly to the point of changing one's definition or idea of either quite significantly? For some, "at peace" may mean one feel's content in life and the world around them and thus fosters a strong urge to face tomorrow. For others, at peace" may mean one is comfortably resigned to the idea of one's own mortality and wouldn't mind (or perhaps even would wish) that particular day to be their last. Or something else altogether?
While few things are truly equal and relatable, what about say (and forgive me in advance for being unpleasantly or unnecessarily graphic, it's simply the most straightforward example that comes to mind) two people being burned alive? Surely there can't be much difference in what the two experience, at least in the physical and most prevalent sense? Sorry if that's a bit of a derail or shimmying from your point or line of argument altogether, I've just always been curious and frankly a bit fuzzy on the whole qualia/"is my red your red" debate and would appreciate your remarks if you have the time.
No, I'm talking about something much more fundamental. If we're both watching a sunset, and you're talking about it and I'm listening, how do I know you even exist? When I dream, there are almost always "other people" in my dream who are interacting with me, but of course they're just aspects of me. But while I'm dreaming, they seem totally real and independent from me. So, the question naturally arises in the "waking world": how do I know that when we're watching a sunset together and talking about it, I'm not dreaming? From a materialist perspective, how do I know I'm not a Boltzmann Brain that popped into existence two seconds ago and is hallucinating everything?
And then, if I get past that issue, how do I know I'm not in a simulation? Nick Bostrom argues that it's actually likely we're in a simulation. Well, if that's true, and we're watching the sunset together, doesn't simulation theory beg the question: are you just a mindless zombielike bit of code? I know I'm not, obviously, but how can I be sure about you? If it's likely I'm in a simulation, it's just as likely I'm the only conscious being in the simulation.
And it I get past all that, there's the inverted spectrum problem.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/
So, when two people talk about their mental states, there are a whole lot of implicit metaphysical assumptions going on.
Empathy is a sure antidote to solipsism. True, you don't literally experience the other's mind, but it's as close as we can get. The idea that 'consciousness is mine alone' is really characteristic of the individualism of modernity. And a flaw, if I might say.
UIs aren't the same thing as the data they represent, but they still are a representation of the data, from a particular point of view.
Our experience isn't reality itself, but I think it is still caused by reality itself. It's said by Hoffman that we evolved to have this particular UI - that must mean there's a pre-UI context in which evolution can happen. What is that pre-UI context if not reality itself (or some emergent facet of reality)?
Perhaps reality itself is what Kant means by the in itself.
It would seem to me that survival within your environment is a selective pressure that promotes accurate perceptions over inaccurate ones.
Quoting Richard BBut what about Hoffman and Nagel's speech and written words? Are they something, nothing, or somethings?
Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do.
Quoting flannel jesus
So we can accomplish all these tasks that we set out to do through the day, but we don't see reality as it is? We can build computers, program them, build rockets to the Moon, get to and from work every day, type a response to a philosophical post we read, etc. - many tasks that do not directly involve survival at all, yet we accomplish our goals.
Are the words on this page experienced as they are?
Is your mind experienced as it is? Do we experience the UI as it is?
That's right.
We know we don't experience reality "as it is" for same very basic reasons - our visual and auditory ranges are rather arbitrary. Why do you think your vision starts at red wavelengths and ends at violet? Other creatures colour wavelength sensitivity ends at different places, so they're experiencing something different from us - are they also experiencing reality "as it is"? How can we be experiencing drastically different experiences, and yet still be experiencing reality "as it is"?
And consider the colour wheel itself. We experience colours, not as a linear spectrum but as a loop. That's not "reality at it is", wavelengths don't loop. Your brain is fabricating that experience for you, it's not out there in the real world.
Although that's not the best example, assuming they can feel burning on their skin, and we could compare it with that. A better example is you and I can have different opinions of how's sweet something is, but we cannot give someone who does not have taste buds any hint of an idea what sweetness is.
Quoting OutlanderI don't think we even have to worry about not being able to compare our experiences to see if they match. We don't need to know if my red is the same as your red. I think the idea is demonstrated more easily. We cannot make a blind person understand red, or sight in general. We cannot make a deaf person understand hearing. No physical description will give them any understanding whatsoever. Even someone who can see, but only in black and white, or even every color but red, will be unable to understand red. They know what green, blue, and yellow are, and can know that red is yet another color, but literally cannot imagine what it looks like.
We cannot explain "happy" and "at peace" to ChatGPT so that it feels those things. We can't even explain them to each other. Let's say Bach's music makes me happy, and I have heard you say it makes you happy. If you ask me how something you haven't experienced makes me feel, and it makes me feel happy, I might tell you it makes me feel the way Bach's music makes me feel. That might give you an idea of how it would make you feel. But I haven't described happiness, nor could I.
The Cartesian theater and Plato's cave are very dark places, but if the occupants still have their sanity and astuteness, they may notice light emanating from an entrance. So, when they boldly choose to exit, they will not find absolute certainty or those majestic eternal forms, but discover a chaotic, treacherous world that brave and ingenious people strive to cope and overcome by sharing their experiences, thoughts, and creations through the vehicle of language.
Still, language is different from anything else in ways. The physical means of its expression are irrelevant to, and separate from, the meaning of what is being expressed. We can see an apple. It never means anything, and is always the physical object. We can see written words. They always mean something other than the physical marks we see.
Waves crashing on the beach cause vibrations in the air that we hear. But the sound doesn't mean anything. It doesn't even mean waves crashing on the beach. It's just an effect of the physical interaction of waves and beach. Air passing through vocal cords that are manipulated in certain ways cause vibrations in the air that we hear as words. Those words mean something beyond just the effect of the physical interaction of the air and vocal chords.
So no, not separate from the shared world we live in. But different from most things in that shared world.
I commented on the convergence of cognitive science, phenomenology, and philosophical idealism. What they're converging on, is some form of Kant's 'copernican revolution in philosophy' - that 'things conform to thoughts, not thoughts to things.'
The reason we find that preposterous, is because 'everyone knows' that the Universe and the earth are far older than h.sapiens, and that we have evolved within that pre-existent reality, which we now seek to understand and adapt to by all means including science.
But it's important to see that even the purportedly mind-independent nature of the world 'before man existed' is still constituted in our grasp of that world. If that seems absurd it is only because we have a mental image of 'self in the world' - as if from a perspective outside of both world and subject. That is the way scientific culture has trained us to imagine it, but in what does that understanding inhere, if not in the mind?
Again, I'll turn to a passage from the great Arthur Schopenhauer, who articulated this paradox with clarity. (Notice that he is fully cognizant of the general idea of evolutionary development, although he published 60-odd years before the Origin of Species. There's no hint of theism or theistic argument.)
Quoting Arthur Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation
It seems paradoxical, and in the next paragraph, Schopenhauer acknowledges this:
The mistake we make is to understand ourselves as a result of an unguided and unintended process of change, as if the mind is a latecomer to the grand spectacle, somehow thrown up by it, by means as yet unknown, without seeing that in another sense, the mind is the means by which the whole process is coming to understand itself. Even Julian Huxley, no friend of theism or idealist philosophy, for that matter, came to a similar realisation:
[quote=Julian Huxley]Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately.[/quote]
(Although personally I'm more drawn to the philosophical attitude of his brother, Alduous.)
Even our experience of time and the chronological order of events is constructed in our brains: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2866156/
Because that question that you asked makes me think you're completely confused about what indirect realists mean when they say we don't "experience reality as it is".
Do neuroscientists observe brain processes as they are according to you? If our experiences are real then why should we say we are not experiencing reality as it is? Are you simply saying that we don't experience those aspects of reality which we cannot experience? If so, that would be a tautology, no?
Or perhaps I should have just asked what you think indirect realists mean when they say we don't experience reality as it is.
Nope.
I think you should just read about indirect realism for a bit
Think about a piece of shit on the ground. It smells viscerally disgusting to you. And yet to a fly, it smells delicious and appetising.
Are you experiencing that shit as it is? Is the fly? What I am saying, and I believe Donald Hoffman semi agrees, is that the shit really exists, but both I and the fly are experiencing it in ways that make contextual sense for us to experience it. It smells viscerally disgusting to me because it's beneficial for me to be disgusted by it, because I could get sick eating it. It smells delicious to the fly because the fly gets nutritional value from it and doesn't get sick.
So we have our own unique experience of that shit, but really the shit is neither disgusting nor delicious "as it is", it's just a piece of shit.
How can questions be confused? Perhaps you meant confusing? Did you not understand them? The questions are designed to find out if your position is confused...I'm not claiming anything at this stage.
Quoting flannel jesus
Is it not part of the piece of shit being what it is to be attractive to the fly and disgusting to you, or to provide a suitable environment for egg-laying for the fly and be such as to make you sick if you ate it? Are those not all real attributes of the piece of shit and its relations with you and the fly?
This is a good point that made me think and want to look up about how smell works more, but couldn't you also say we can distinguish our emotional reactions about something from our ability to identify it through the senses? Albeit, maybe they interfere.
I think color has good points too. Nervous system structure will affect how we detect color, albeit one might still say all the distinctions we make map to physical events in the world. Maybe this needs to be unique to be realist? Rather than a brain that may be structured in a way to do the job more efficiently, resulting in possibly more convoluted or context-dependent ways of mapping to the world. There is also the sense that if one identifies blue colors more similarly than yellow or red or whatever then this seems also some added kind of detection of similarity purely a byproduct of the cone system - but then again, greens will also be more similar than reds because they are mapping to physical structures that are more similar. I guess would need to explore what is going on more though maybe. I could make an argument that maybe the ways different cones affect perception just can be seen similarly to how we might bound the same events in the world in different ways. But then maybe to some this is quintessential antirealism.
Maybe one could say perceptual differences reflect the fact we see different parts of the same reality, obtaining different partial information about actual physical events, but animals with different cones or more resolution of vision are just detecting more stuff or different stuff than we are. I guess this again is a very weak realism still.
Ultimately there always does seem to be some kind of arbitrariness somewhere. For me its a question of whether that still preserves reliable information, which albeit is always depends on whether you happen to live in an environment where your senses are reliable. In other contexts they may not be (i.e. light [in the correct ambient environment reflecting off objects] is not the only thing that can stimulate a retina).
I have said in other threads I think indirect vs direct realism is actually arguably kind of ambiguous. And I feel comfortable with some kind of minimal realism I think because maybe I think a fundamental metaphysical characterization of intrinsic reality is unintelligible. The best imo we can do is some weak floppy notion of structure, perhaps informational structure. While intrinsicness isn't accessible at all, and perhaps fundamentally meaningless, I think structure is accessible by us, even if in a convoluted or perhaps idealized or compressed way. The issue is that no creatures have access to all the kind of structure in reality that one might be able to plausible detect.
But maybe reality "as it is" is nothing more than the structure of reality "as it is" which we can access to some extent because we can all navigate the world correctly - but maybe my ability to find my way home was in fact some kind of accidental heuristic - we just don't have access to all of the structure. My thoughts are that phenomenal experience is just informational structure (or isomorphic to it if you want to be more precise) which itself maps to the world structure at least partially. When we see the world "not as it is" we have different mappings that miss stuff out.
I don't understand why you say this is a "weak realism". Are perceptual organs and the experiences they enable not as real as that which they sense and that which is experienced?
Because when people say realism they tend to mean a completely unique God's eye view of reality, which is a much stronger realism. Once you start to be able to view things in different perspectives then people start to use that as arguments against realism.
Oh, so you are saying people tend to be weak realists instead? What a coincidence, chimes right in with my thoughts just there, thank you!
I mean, weak realism just means a realism weaker than strong realism, and a naive realism would be a strong realism.
A good question for Hoffman would be: "could there be a perceptual/cognitive system (a mind) that was 'selected for' or 'engineered' based on 'truth instead of fitness?'" If so, "would this represent a privileged viewpoint on reality? Would the thoughts of such a mind be 'more real' (less illusory) than our own?"
I think the obvious answer from his perspective would be: "no, I am not saying that some one special 'really real' mind can evolve or be engineered." But then what is he talking about? A reality/illusion distinction only makes sense if there is something other than illusion, some mind that knows "reality in itself" as opposed to fitness. If it is just "fitness all the way down," then fitness is reality and his argument is based on a false distinction.
I suppose that's somewhat the point he makes in the last chapter when he calls his previous position self-refuting and argues for idealism, but arguably the problem is that his previous position (which is a popular sort of view in materialism) is incoherent. The final chapter's argument is something like: "A or B, but not A, so B" yet it's never made clear that A (representationalist materialism) or B (idealism) are the only options. The whole "user interface" analogy also seems to presuppose some sort of Cartesian theater. My conviction is that materialism/physicalism is really defined by a sort of insolublein its termsdualism, that dresses itself up monism by attempting a "reduction" of this dualism. Hoffman seems trapped in this model and simply flips towards trying to "reduce" in the other direction.
"Everything is received in the manner of the receiver" is a very old idea. The more I learn, the more I think that Kant's "revolution" only makes sense in terms of a pretty narrow period in the history of philosophy, rather than being an effective criticism of "all prior metaphysics." It's more a making explicit of the dualism at the heart of modern materialism, and the consequences of a "metaphysics of appearances" where appearances are arbitrarily related to an 'objective reality' set over an against them.
I quite agree, that is what I suspect about Hoffman's book. He does discuss various objections to FBT theory around pages 44-45 in the ebook edition I have. He quotes Steven Pinker, saying However as I've noted elsewhere this is a similar argument of Plantinga's, the evolutionary argument against naturalism - that if naturalism is true, then it undermines the trust we have in reason.
But then, he says on p 66
My bolds. Which again makes me think the title is a misnomer - it should be 'the case against cognitive realism' or something of the kind. After all ancient philosophy was always inclined to suspect that sense perception was or might be a grand illusion.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Could you be so kind as to specify where he says that?
I wish I could be more helpful, but IRCC it's all in the last chapter, where he presented his "agential realism" as an alternative to the intractable problems he has hitherto been describing. Basically, "everything I've said had something wrong with it, so we need to start over."
I recall he name drops a number of figures as doing something similar to him, Spinoza, Hegel, (maybe Aristotle), but I don't recall thinking his "solution" was actually all that similar to these because he seems to still be wedded to reductionism and mathematization (as opposed to "the truth is the whole" of Big Heg). The higher levels of reality, the more intelligible, must still be "reduced" to the lower (a key conceit of materialism, which is the elevation of potency above actuality, or difference over identity).
I think the modern fetish for mathematization is probably what leads him in this direction.
As I said in the shoutbox:
Agential realism, as a reduction of being to mathematized sheer will, goes along with this.
Can I ask what characterizes the difference between your direct realism, indirect realism and naive realism?
He has to be able to express his theory in mathematical terms for it to be credible. Science relies heavily on quantitative analysis. As you say, that is at the heart of, not just modern nominalism, but modern science generally. The scientific revolution was owed in large part to the ability to identify precisely the quantitative attributes of objects of analysis, and to remove those fuzzy qualities of ends and purposes and intentionality that still underwrote Aristotelian physics. This is what gives rise to what René Geunon describes as the 'reign of quantity' in which we're all immersed.
Oh - and that last chapter (10) in Hoffman's Case Against Reality - I just don't get it, from the point where 'conscious agents' are introduced. I so thoroughly don't get it, that I put the book down, and do something else. I think for the last time.
Interesting; yes, I think this part:
Quoting Janus
Is where I get ambiguous or perhaps ambivalent over indirect or direct realism. I can see arguments in both directions. From my perspective which is less object-centered, I think the color thing you talk about would be less of an issue for direct realism if it still is mapping to actual physical behavior or structure in the world.
How can any of this be said if we do not see reality as it is? In one breath you make all these claims about how reality is, and in the next breath claim we do not see reality as it is.
How do you know we are experiencing reality differently if you do not see reality as it is? How can you say that your brain is fabricating the experience if you don't see reality as it is?
Do you experience your mind as it really is? If so, does that not lend one to believe that the world is like one's mind being that the mind is part of the world? If so, does this not mean that you experience (at least part of) the world as it is? And finally, does it matter that we don't see the world "as it is", but know the world as it is? If we can know the world well enough to land rovers on Mars, then we know the world as it is.
Quoting Richard B
and other people are part of the shadows one experiences. Other people's existence is questioned by questioning the idea that you see the world as it is. Once you start to question your experiences, you question everything's existence - including words and the people that use them. Solipsism logically follows from unfettered skepticism about the reality of an external world.
Well, regardless of the question "how", it's not controversial to state that we DO experience illusions, and somehow we have ways of figuring out they're illusions. That's not controversial at all. It sounds like a failure of your intellectual creativity if you can't figure out ways to determine if any of our experiences are illusory.
Metaphysical theories like this are hopeless, no evidence can be presented to cure this mental disease, and only demands some sort of persuasion to cure it. I find a good dose of humor can do the trick to expose the absurdity of such a position.
As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.
Bertrand Russell
I don't deny that we do experience illusions, but then to know that you are experiencing an illusion means that you have some sense of how the world is.
Besides, illusions are misinterpretations of sensory data. Our senses never lie, but we can misinterpret what they are telling us, just as you can misinterpret what someone is saying even though they are being truthful.
For instance, mirages and "bent" straws in water, are only illusions if you do not understand the nature of light. When you do not take into account that your eyes see light, not objects, then your direct-realist self is going to assume that you see objects as they are and then get confused with these illusions. But if you understand the nature of light, and that you see light, not objects, then mirages and bent straws is exactly what you would expect to experience. Your experiences become predictable.
Quoting Richard B
To keep yourself from sliding down the slope into solipsism, you need to come up with an explanation as to how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is".
I actually agree with you about those, but not all illusions are like that.
Take this album cover for example
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merriweather_Post_Pavilion_(album)
As my eyes scan across the image, I'm convinced shapes are moving and shifting. Of course they aren't, and I can figure that out analytically, and yet it seems so deeply true of my experience of the image, that I'm experiencing looking at moving shifting shapes.
Some illusions are perhaps conscious misinterpretations, but our experience of the world comes through a lot of filters before it becomes a conscious experience. The existence of those pre-experiential filters, which I think unambiguously exist, prove that we can't just be "experiencing reality as it is".
This is due to a conscious effort of shifting one's attention to a specific area of the picture to the picture as a whole and back.
What does that even mean, "experience reality as it is"? Is your mind part of reality? Do you experience your mind as it is?
The fact that you know that there are unconscious filters is evidence that you are experiencing reality as it is.
You need to provide an explanation as to how we can still know reality as it is when we cannot experience or see the world as it is.
Since you are asking "how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is", I will assume you could not keep yourself from sliding, and so you believe solipsism is the case unless demonstrated otherwise.
Ok, if that is your belief, I think we need to get some things straight before we can converse about this topic.
1. Please do not address me as if I exist independent of your mind. According to you I am only an aspect of your mind/consciousness. As such, think of me as another voice in your head. Some psychiatrists would call this auditory hallucinations, but they do not know what they are talking about because they probably are unable to grasp these fundamental rigorous logical arguments about reality.
2. Please do not flirt with indirect realism and say the cause of me exists outside your mind/consciousness because then you are admitting there could be something more than just your mind/consciousness. Remember, I am part of your mind/consciousness.
3. Do listen to what anybody who says you might have a dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder. Those folk don't understand the logical implications that we need to accept when Solipsism is the case. Remember, those folk are just parts of your mind/consciousness as well.
4. To think of it, what if I convinced you that I exist apart from your mind/consciousness, This sounds like I am a contradiction, both existing independent of your mind and dependent on your mind at the same time. And we know contradictions can't exist therefore I only exist as part of your mind. That said, I think I also proved that any argument that would convince you of the opposite could also not be formulated. So, you cannot be convinced to give up solipsism with logic either.
Yours truly, you.
I'm not a solipsist so the rest of your post is irrelevant. The fact that you did not answer the question is indicative that you do not have an answer yet you keep claiming that we do not see the world as it is, so my point was that YOU are the solipsist, not me.
To even attempt to answer the question, how about you start off by answering whether you experience your mind as it is or not.
Thats good, at least we both believe solipsism is a untenable position.
You made solipsism a tenable position by saying things like, "we don't see the world as it is". I'm now asking you how you can then say "solipsism is an untenable position" after saying "we don't see the world as it is". How can you be so sure there is even an external world if you can't trust what your senses are telling you? Do you even have senses?
I have not said we dont see the world as it is in this post. I don't believe I have commented on this, that said, I can.
When someone uses such a phase, I think the onus should be on the asserter as what would the world look like as is vs not as is. They need to set up the contrast. Descartes demon may be able to perfectly duplicate a world, but runs into the problem of distinguishing between the two. Better yet why not say that we have more of the same world in that case.
In terms of trusting senses, you trust your senses until there is a reason not too. This reason is not to reach some abstract position of absolute certainty but to successful cope with the world around you.
Where would this duplicate world be relative to the original? It appears to me that the duplicate would be part of the greater reality that includes the original and duplicate, just as heaven and hell, along with the universe is all part of one reality as the events in one can affect the events in others.
If the duplicate mirrors the original, then it would be a world as well.
The problem appears to be a misuse of language more than anything else.
The issue isn't that our senses are wrong. An original table will look just like a duplicate table, even for the demon. The difference is our knowledge of another world - the original that we have yet to observe - that is lacking, not that our senses are lying to us.