What is Time?
In this thread, I am interested in discussing time. I know that there was recently another thread on the ontology of time that I closely followed. It seems to me that people in that thread did not reach any agreement on what time is, though. I posted in that thread, but my posts mainly went unnoticed, so here I collect my posts in that thread and other threads in a single thread for reference and also as a base for further discussion.
There are three types of time, namely subjective time, objective time, and psychological time. I start with subjective time since it is useful for our discussion and easy to understand. I then discuss objective time, and finally discuss psychological time, which is hardest to understand.
Subjective time is a substance:
P1) Subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in a physical#1 (please see the Argument below)
P2) Any change requires subjective time (please see the Argument below)
C1) Therefore, we are dealing with an infinite regress since subjective time is required to allow a change in subjective time (from P1 and P2)
C2) If so, then there must exist the Mind that is a substance#2 with the ability to experience and cause subjective time
C3) So, subjective time is a substance
Objective time:
P1) Subjective time is subject to change
C1) If so, then subjective time is moved#3 from one point to another point by the Mind
C2) So, there is objective time that accommodates subjective time
Psychological time is a substance:
Psychological time is also necessary since most of our experiences are subject to change (please see the Argument below). Our perception of psychological time is subject to change depending on the subject of focus of the conscious mind#4. For example, we don't perceive psychological time when the conscious mind is very busy processing information and producing thoughts with the help of the brain. We, however, experience the passage of psychological time, and this passage can look very long when there is nothing that can entertain the conscious mind. We, however, cannot experience the subjective time since we exist within each instant of it (see thought experiment below), and we do not have any sensory system for it either. Therefore, Psychological time is not subjective time. If so, then psychological time is directly caused by the conscious mind. So, psychological time is also a substance since it is caused by the conscious mind and experienced by the conscious mind.
Argument: Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lie on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously, and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lie on different points of a variable; let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow Y to come after X. This variable is called time (time here refers to both subjective and psychological time).
Thought experiment: Consider a building with two identical rooms so similar that you cannot distinguish them from each other when you are inside one or another. Suppose you are held in one room, which I call room one for the sake of discussion. Suppose that the building owner moves you from room one to room two when you are asleep. Can you tell whether your room has changed when you become awake? Sure not. Therefore, we cannot possibly experience subjective time since all points of it are similar.
#1 Consider an electron as an example of a physical.
#2 By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties.
#3 By move I mean that subjective time is experienced at one point and caused at another point.
#4 By conscious mind, I mean a substance that experiences and causes another substance.#5
$5 By the substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties and abilities.
There are three types of time, namely subjective time, objective time, and psychological time. I start with subjective time since it is useful for our discussion and easy to understand. I then discuss objective time, and finally discuss psychological time, which is hardest to understand.
Subjective time is a substance:
P1) Subjective time exists and changes since there is a change in a physical#1 (please see the Argument below)
P2) Any change requires subjective time (please see the Argument below)
C1) Therefore, we are dealing with an infinite regress since subjective time is required to allow a change in subjective time (from P1 and P2)
C2) If so, then there must exist the Mind that is a substance#2 with the ability to experience and cause subjective time
C3) So, subjective time is a substance
Objective time:
P1) Subjective time is subject to change
C1) If so, then subjective time is moved#3 from one point to another point by the Mind
C2) So, there is objective time that accommodates subjective time
Psychological time is a substance:
Psychological time is also necessary since most of our experiences are subject to change (please see the Argument below). Our perception of psychological time is subject to change depending on the subject of focus of the conscious mind#4. For example, we don't perceive psychological time when the conscious mind is very busy processing information and producing thoughts with the help of the brain. We, however, experience the passage of psychological time, and this passage can look very long when there is nothing that can entertain the conscious mind. We, however, cannot experience the subjective time since we exist within each instant of it (see thought experiment below), and we do not have any sensory system for it either. Therefore, Psychological time is not subjective time. If so, then psychological time is directly caused by the conscious mind. So, psychological time is also a substance since it is caused by the conscious mind and experienced by the conscious mind.
Argument: Consider a change in the state of something, X to Y, where X and Y are two states that define the change. X and Y cannot lie on the same point since otherwise these states occur simultaneously, and there cannot be any change. Therefore, X and Y must lie on different points of a variable; let's call these points tx and ty. ty, however, comes after tx to allow Y to come after X. This variable is called time (time here refers to both subjective and psychological time).
Thought experiment: Consider a building with two identical rooms so similar that you cannot distinguish them from each other when you are inside one or another. Suppose you are held in one room, which I call room one for the sake of discussion. Suppose that the building owner moves you from room one to room two when you are asleep. Can you tell whether your room has changed when you become awake? Sure not. Therefore, we cannot possibly experience subjective time since all points of it are similar.
#1 Consider an electron as an example of a physical.
#2 By substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties.
#3 By move I mean that subjective time is experienced at one point and caused at another point.
#4 By conscious mind, I mean a substance that experiences and causes another substance.#5
$5 By the substance, I mean something that exists and has a set of properties and abilities.
Comments (161)
Maybe we, as humans, are simply overcomplicating something very fundamental. Time is inherent to reality, like space. We call it 'spacetime' for a reason. Time can be viewed as a 'dimension' but it is not a dimension like height, depth, or width. For example, we know that time slows down when you travel at extremely high speeds, or when the gravitational pull becomes supermassive.
You are spot-on with your dissections of subjective and psychological time. We all understand and feel what you mean, and we've all had these experiences. It is not possible for human beings to experience the naked reality as it is, because everything (including time) is filtered through our mind and senses. That's why the passing of time becomes kind of nonsensical when you are asleep. We still do have a 'sense' in this regard, we know how long we've slept (generally), but while asleep, we are not conscious, so we do not experience time. Yet, time always is. Time is just like space and life: it just is.
Sometimes, there is truth in simplicity.
Consider a ball rolling down a hill. The ball moves from moment to moment always downwards in relation to the hill, which remains constant. Strictly, it is a matter of our convenience and habit to say that the ball moves and the hill is still. They move relative to each other.
But imagine, that halfway down, the hill tuns into a bucket of water and the ball becomes a fish, and the movement becomes the fish swimming round in the bucket. Now there is only one thing tying this moment to the previous one; which is the constancy of the observer, in this case the imaginer - you.
If everything changes, there is nothing to tie one moment to another; time would fall apart if it was just one damn thing after another. Everything is tied together by order, and kept distinct by change, and this is the nature of space-time.
Conservatives like order, and liberals like change, and neither notices that they are inseparable.
This is to say that if the ball becomes a fish becomes water, and it's not the lack of a conscious observer being unable to understand the progression that collapses time, but it's the lack of ontological structure that does it, you've created an untestable theory because it's possible laws exist that just can't be understood.
On the other hand, if a conscious observer arrives at a narrative that explains the plank state transitions, you now have meaningful time, even if the conscious observer is entirely wrong in his explanation.
This seems to suggest the only reliable description of time requires a conscious observer, right?
Well no, it doesn't. You have there a constant 'plank' and a change from 1 to 2. That is an ordered change. To the extent that if the plank were to change back and forth from 1 to 2 to 1 to 2, one would have a clock - tick, tock, tick, tock.
Quoting Hanover
Up to this point I haven't promoted a theory as such; I have rather proposed a meaning for the concept of time - the necessary ingredients as it were, particularly taking account of Einstein's theory that space and time are in some sense equivalent. But bringing the observer more into the picture, if the observer is placed in a sensory deprivation tank, then he is obliged to observe himself, his breathing his heartbeat, and the flow of his thoughts. This is an experiment you can do for yourself, and some people find it a wonderful way to relax, and others a frightening claustrophobic out of control panic. But either way, one of the things that many report is the weakening of the sense of time, somewhat as the sense of time in a dream is weakened. This suggests, as one might have expected, that the sense of time involves a calibration of internal and external regularities - heartbeat with music or the swaying of the trees, or whatever. Without that ongoing calibration, the sense of self - one's very identity - starts to dissolve, with relaxing or frightening results.
If one takes the point of view of god, which I can best describe by means of analogy with a programmer creating a digital world, one can see that the characters within the world cannot be aware that the programmer is starting and stopping the program as he develops his world according to his whim. He can quite easily make the program at some point transform every aspect of the digital character's world at a stroke. This would correspond to death and afterlife, assuming the character did experience it and connect his afterlife to his previous life in 'his' memory.
The observer's sense of time can be seen to depend on memory, an observer with no memory has no past and therefore no sense of time. Memory is the subjective continuity, regularity is the objective continuity.
Quoting Hanover
What other kind of description, reliable or unreliable can you suggest for anything whatsoever, other than that of an observer? Perhaps a stick insect constitutes a description of a stick? And a bird might mistake the description for reality? It's a stretch...
You recently went through a portal and ended up in Egypt where you've found yourself employed in a rock moving gang. Everyone pulls their ropes at the same time, and this is coordinated by a song that sounds amazingly like Delta blues.
As you prepare for the next pull, which kind of time are you experiencing? Subject or objective?
Thank you very much for your interest and understanding.
Quoting Martijn
Correct, time slows down when we are close to a supermassive object. However, time does not slow down from your perspective, no matter how fast you move. Other clocks that move relative to you slow down depending on their speed.
Quoting Martijn
Correct. That source of confusion for many philosophers and scientists. The confusion is how we could experience time if we don't have any sensory system for it!
Quoting Martijn
I have to say that I don't understand the unconscious state now. How could a mind become unconscious and not experience anything at all? That is the subject of my current investigation.
Quoting Martijn
Very correct. I think that the truth is plain and simple.
That is a definition of a process, not time.
Quoting unenlightened
Quite oppositely, time is needed for any change, as I argued in the OP.
Neither. I experience psychological time only.
Yet everyone on the team anticipates the same moment in time. This is verified by their pulling in unison.
Bertrand Russell thought the same but changed his mind following Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity.
What do you think of Bertrand Russell's views on time: https://archive.org/details/jstor-27900529/page/n21/mode/2up?view=theater
Some thoughts:
In "Critique of Pure Reason" Immanuel Kant wrote.
Quoting Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Kant's Views on Space and Time
I interpret this in the light of Konrad Lorenz's explanation in two publications - "Behind the Mirror" and "Kant's Doctrine Of The A Priori In The Light Of Contemporary Biology."
I find these explanations plausible when taken together.
Perhaps the only reason we recognize time as a separate entity is because it has a direction - past to present to future. In general, the laws of physics do not require or specify this directionality. As I understand it, the explanation for this lack of symmetry is the second law of thermodynamics. Closed systems tend to develop from conditions of lower entropy to higher. Another way to say this is that interactions move in the direction of the most probable outcome. Broken eggs don't spontaneously repair themselves because the unbroken condition is very, very unlikely.
Then there are the consequences of special relativity in regards to time. The rate of the passage of time and the relative simultaneity of events depends on the observer's frame of reference. And then general relativity defines time as a dimension equal to the three spatial dimensions.
What does this all mean in respect to the OP? I'm not sure.
Quite oppositely, time is needed for no change.
Just nit picking, but "reliable description" implies conscious observers. If no observers then reliable description is meaningless.
Your thought experiment is clever for illustrating our inability to perceive subjective time directly. I think this would be a fascinating topic to expand with perspectives from process philosophy or modern physics
I sent the document you linked to my Kindle. Thanks.
What does measure the time then?
Thats someone trying to formulate a logical language that explains things about time. The problem with logic is it can be difficult to relate it to things outside the mind. Our mind was born into a place with time (and space) therefore time was a priori to mind. So our mind and its contents are a peculiarity, a product of, time (and space) and other aspects of that existence. To make any progress outside of our mind we must find a metric independent of mind. Hence science and we know what science has found out about this existence.
You seem to have smuggled in the concept of substance here. Does substance describe a thing, something that has objective existence? Or is substance a substance of mind, or intellect, or something immaterial?
Does something exist if it is an invention of thought?
Quoting T Clark
Got Russell on the brain at the moment. I'm starting reading his autobiography again - I think the last time I read it was around 2019.
Don't forget simultaneity.
It takes a while to get to the pub (duration), where we meet to solve the world's problems (simultaneity).
Duration and simultaneity together suggest dimensionality.
On another note, asking "What is Time?" is present tense, like "What was Time?" is past tense.
I'm unsure if examining time requires untensed language to avoid presupposition; it's a potential pitfall.
Not according to Kant, and I have some sympathy with his way of seeing things. In my interpretation of what he said, time is something we bring to the world.
I also have some sympathy with this, but I suppose I lend more weight to ideas that the external world is more external than that and has an existence apart from our minds. Although I dont see an either/or dichotomy here. Both things could be so and our reduction to either/or, where this happens, as a limited interpretation.
Or maybe it's irreducible and hence not explainable by anything else other than our interpretation and experience of it.
What does that ever mean, a unit of measurement?
Each person in the team has access only to his or her psychological time. As I argued in the OP, we cannot experience subjective time since we don't have any sensory system for it.
Thank you very much for the reference. I will read it when I have time. I am very busy with many things right now. Could you please tell me what he is trying to discuss briefly?
We experience psychological time occasionally when our conscious mind is not busy. We live in the present. The past is part of our memory, and we await the future.
Quoting T Clark
The time that is involved in the laws of nature is subjective time.
Quoting T Clark
The laws of nature are time-reversal. When it comes to a system with many parts, as you mentioned, the system changes toward a state with higher entropy.
I have an argument for it. Please read it and tell me what you think about it.
I discussed the problem with time being as an emergent thing elsewhere, so I just repeat myself: Three main theories of quantum gravity are widely accepted: 1) String theory, 2) Loop quantum theory, and 3) AdS/CFT, each has its own problems. This article nicely discusses these theories in simple words and explains the problems with the string theory and AdS/CFT theory. This wiki page discusses the problem of loop quantum theory.
Quoting Areeb Salim
Thank you very much for your understanding. That is not the only argument for our inability to perceive subjective time. We don't have any sensory system for it either.
Yes.
Quoting Punshhh
I believe in substance pluralism in which the mind is an immaterial substance, whereas the physical is material substance.
Quoting Punshhh
All our experiences are due to existence of a substance that I call object for the sake of discussion. This is discussed in my other thread that you can find it here.
Time cannot be an emergent thing. I discuss this in this post.
You're welcome. I know what you mean about being pressed for time, but I had to share the article.
He says:
"It is of the utmost importance not to confuse time-relations of subject and object with time-relations of object and object; in fact, many of the worst difficulties in the psychology and metaphysics of time have arisen from this confusion. It will be seen that past, present, and future arise from time-relations of subject and object, while earlier and later arise from time-relations of object and object. In a world in which there was no experience there would be no past, present, or future, but there might well be earlier and later".
He then defines his terms and goes into more detail on each of the two.
So why do they pull at the same time?
I have read it. I think I will leave you to it.
Sure but you are assuming we have a final theory of physics. We don't.
What does he mean by this? Do you mind elaborating?
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
I don't understand what he means by this. Do you mind explaining?
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
I am sorry, but I don't understand how this follows.
Each individual experiences his or her psychological time only. The passage of psychological time is the same for all of them. That is why they can sync and pull at the same time.
They sync because they're listening to the same music. They're experiencing time.
The mental time (subject-object) contains a past, present, and future, due to our experience and memory. The essence of physical time (object-object) is succession; therefore earlier and later.
For example, there is no "now" unless someone is experiencing it, and there is no "past" unless someone is remembering it. It's kind of hard to articulate, but do you get the gist of it?
While it's not mentioned in the article, I think by this point he was aware of Relativity - so succession is not necessarily fixed - and can be relative to the observer.
Your point about there being no now without a conscious observer ties into whats sometimes called the specious present in philosophy. And yes, relativity further complicates things, since simultaneity isnt absolute, the sequence of events can vary between observers.
So even the succession of object-object time isnt as fixed as it seems. It raises fascinating questions about whether time is a fundamental feature of the universe or a mental construct tied to consciousness
Useful post. I can agree that there is objective time and psychological time, but I am unsure that there is subjective time.
P1 - Objective time is inferred to exist in the world.
P2 - Psychological time exists in the conscious mind, in that we are conscious that at one time we were driving in the city and at another time we were walking through a forest. As you say, "We, however, experience the passage of psychological time".
P3 - The conscious mind is a physical substance that changes with objective time.
P4 - If there was a subjective time, it would exist in the conscious mind.
P5 - At one moment in objective time, subjective time cannot change.
P6 - Between two different objective times, subjective time would change.
C1 - But as you say "We, however, cannot experience the subjective time since we exist within each instant of it"
C2 - We can experience psychological time and we can infer objective time, but as we cannot experience subjective time, then the concept of subjective time becomes redundant.
Objective time and psychological time are sufficient. Subjective time is a redundant concept. This avoids your problem of infinite regress with subjective time.
Again, how do we sync our actions if time is a product of consciousness? Maybe we're telepathic?
Quoting RussellA
Kant's transcendental philosophy includes a well-known perspective on subjective time and its mode of existence. Kant argues that time (and space) are not properties of the external world that we can empirically discover. Instead, they are a priori forms of intuitioninnate to the very structure of human cognition and perception. It means that time and space are conditions for the possibility of experience, fundamental to how we reason and perceive the world. Through his transcendental inquiry, Kant concluded that we could not have any organized experience without time. He writes: "Time is not something that exists in itself, nor is it a concept derived from experience. Rather, it is an a priori intuition, which serves as the condition for the possibility of experience" (CPR, pg.32). Thus, time is subjective in a sense that it is the mental framework through which we make sense of our involvement in the world. It does not require a substance (the mind) to "experience" or "cause" it. Therefore, subjective time does not exist as though it is a separate, independently existing entity.
Yes, Kant in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in his CPR argues that time and space are not properties of the external world, but are a priori forms of intuition that allow for the possibility of experience.
@MoK refers to subjective time, objective time and psychological time.
The question is, is @MoK's subjective time and Kant's time as an a priori form of intuition referring to the same thing. I don't think that they are.
@MoK writes that subjective time exists and changes when there is a change in the physical
However, on the one hand, Kant's time is not something that exists, but is something that allows for the possibility of experience, and on the other hand, is not something that changes as the physical changes.
Kant's time as an a priori intuition is neither psychological time not objective time, but is something that allows for the possibility of experiencing psychological time.
Let me consider your argument in P4. It implies that if subjective time exists, it would be contained within the conscious mind, as though its something that is "added on" or superfluous. However, subjective time is likely inseparable from the experience of being conscious. In fact, Kant demonstrated that without subjective time there could be no coherent experience of existence or consciousness. This is because consciousness involves an organized and complex awareness of changewhether that be the passage of moments, thoughts, sensory experiences, or even changes in internal states (such as emotions). If time did not flow subjectively in some form, there would be no way for a conscious being to differentiate between one moment and the next or to form a continuous narrative of self. Therefore, your argument in P1 could be problematic since it is not clear what stands for is inferred. Evan Thompson points out Bergsons position regarding a relation between subjective and objective times: Each successive now of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks dont measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time measurement presupposes duration, but duration ultimately eludes measurement. This position challenges the premises of your argument P1 as well as P5 and P6. While objective time refers to a measurable and external progression of events (e.g., seconds, minutes, hours), subjective time is about our inherent experience of that progression. Our internal experience of "flow" and "duration" is directly related to the notion of subjective time. It is not something that can be reduced to a mental state or an objective process, but constitutes a fundamental dimension of the conscious experience of continuity, memory, and change.
:up: I've quoted that exact passage a number of times recently, because it makes a crucial point: that subjective awareness cannot be eliminated from any meaningful concept of time. Also agree that Kant makes a similar point in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In other words, there is no 'objective time' per se - time itself is inextricably linked to the subjective awareness of it. This is true even though we can obviously measure time as if in the absence of any observer, and knowing that there were aoeons prior to the advent of conscious beings. Yet outside conscious awareness, there is nothing that provides the relational perspective that any measure of time must assume. (Hence the expression 'the land before time' to refer to ancient or primeval landscapes. See also Schopenhauer: How Time Began with the First Eye Opening.)
It is a problem of terminology.
In my P4, I was thinking about @MoK's use of the terms "subjective time", "psychological time" and "objective time". My thought was that @MoK's use of the term "subjective time" was redundant, as "psychological time" and "objective time" should be sufficient as concepts.
However, it seems that your use of the term "subjective time" is the same as @MoK's use of the term "psychological time".
The question is, do we call our conscious experience of time "subjective time" or "psychological time"?
I'm not sure that this is exactly what Kant was proposing.
He writes about time and space in The Transcendental Aesthetic, B46 of the CPR.
Space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences. But what kind of experiences is he referring to? He must be referring to experiences involving space and time.
As you say "It means that time and space are conditions for the possibility of experience, fundamental to how we reason and perceive the world"
In other words, space and time are pure forms of intuition that enable the possibility of our being able to have experiences involving space and time.
I can only conclude that different things are being referred to here. There is "time as a pure form of intuition" and there is "the experience of time". "Time" in ""time as a pure form of intuition" cannot be the same thing as "time" as in "the experience of time".
I don't think that Kant is demonstrating that without subjective time there could be no coherent experiences, but rather that without the a priori conditions that enable us to experience time, we would not be able to experience time.
There is the question as to how "subjective time" relates to time.
We have a memory of driving through the city and we are aware of presently walking through the forest. But even our awareness of presently walking through the forest is a memory, because the transfer of information from the forest to our mind is limited by the speed of light.
Therefore, the conscious mind is always comparing two memories, the memory of driving in the city and the memory of walking through the forest. The conscious mind is aware that these two memories are different, and the conscious mind understands that memories that are different have different "times".
Yet, as the clock only exists in the "now", the conscious mind can only exist in the "now". As you wrote about the clock Each successive now of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct". Exactly the same applies to the mind, such that Each successive now of the conscious mind contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct".
The conscious mind, which only exists in the "now", can compare two memories, which also only exist in the "now". The conscious mind can be aware that these memories are different, and this difference is labelled as "time".
For the conscious mind, "time" is something that can only exist in the "now" as a difference in memories, which also can only exist in the "now".
In effect, a difference in memories that are both in the "now" can be labelled "a change in time".
Subjective time in the conscious mind is something that can only exist in the "now".
Some mathematicians see geometry as space and mathematics as time. Time is simply the mathematics/logic according to which change happens.
In this sense there can be different kinds of time: physical time, mental time, logic, mathematics, eternal 'time' etc.
So time is mathematics. It doesn't require change or our experience of it to exist. It is the 'way' of things.
Any!
Does mathematics describe change or does it in fact describe difference?
The conscious mind as well as the clock can only exist in the "now". As @Number2018 wrote about the clock, the same argument can apply to the conscious mind as a physical mechanism.
We can only infer that there is an objective time, in that not only is there a "now" but there was also a "past."
In the "now", I have memory P that the clock shows 10 minutes, and I have memory Q that the clock shows 30 minutes. Mathematics describes the difference between 10 minutes and 30 minutes, which equals 20 minutes. We name this difference "a change in time". As mathematics is part of the conscious mind, mathematics can also only exist in the "now". Therefore, the difference that mathematics is describing also only exists in the "now". The concept of objective time, as something that exists between different "nows", is redundant as far as the mathematical equation that (30-10) = 10 is concerned.
When we talk about "a change in time", this is a figure of speech. It is no different to when we talk about "the wind whistling through the trees" or "she is like a star in the sky". "A change in time" is a figure of speech for this difference of 20 minutes, as it exists in the "now". It is not about any inferred objective time.
Mathematics describes difference. Only when "change" is used as a figure of speech does mathematics describe change
It also means you don't miss your bus.
Thanks for the elaboration. I distinguish between psychological/mental time and subjective/physical time, but I think that both have the same features. Although psychological time is caused by the mind, subjective time is caused by the Mind.
Quoting Down The Rabbit Hole
As I mentioned in the OP, the subjective time is experienced by the Mind.
As I mentioned in the OP, any change requires time, whether it is physical or mental. In the first case, we need subjective time, and in the second case, we need psychological time. Subjective time is caused by the Mind (capital M), whereas psychological time is caused by the mind.
A clock shows 2pm and then the clock shows 3pm. There is a physical change in what the clock shows.
You say that physical change requires subjective time, and subjective time is caused by the Mind.
In what sense is the physical change in the clock first showing 2pm and then showing 3pm caused by the Mind?
Thank you for your thoughtful responses to my post. Your argument highlights that our experience and awareness of time are rooted in the present moment, or the 'now,' and that the relationship between two distinct 'nows' is mediated by the mind through memory. Let me address the crucial role of this mediation.
In Bergsons example, when the mind contemplates the sounds of the four o'clock strikes, each stroke or excitation is logically independent of the others. One instance does not appear until the other has disappeared. Yet, something qualitatively new happens in the contemplating mind. When the first stroke appears, I anticipate the second, and with the second, I retain the first. There is a synthesis of time that operates through the repetition of independent and homogeneous instances. Unlike any mere memory of distinct elements, we contract them into an internal, qualitative impression within the living present. In this way, Bergson distinguishes between duration and a measured, objective time. Duration cannot be quantified or divided into discrete units like clock time. Instead, it constitutes a continuous flowa multiplicity of moments that are not separate but interrelated.The argument you provided suggests that the conscious mind exists only in the "now," comparing two memories that are themselves always part of the present moment. However, subjective time refers to a flow of past, present, and future that are inextricably interconnected. Therefore, your examples of driving through the city or walking through the forest cannot represent two distinct moments stored in memory. Rather, they designate a continuous flow of experience. Time is not merely the gap between two moments (the memory of the city vs. the memory of the forest). A leisurely walk in the forest after driving there for a hike feels completely different from rushing through the forest to save a life while being chased by gangsters. The intricate interplay between virtual pasts, the actual present, and future anticipations constantly evolves, shaping and influencing all aspects of our temporal experience.
You are correct that no measurement exists outside of conscious temporary awareness. However, Bergson did not completely reject objective time. He differentiated between 'measured time' and 'lived time,' arguing that time cannot be fully captured by concepts or categories alone. Instead, there is likely a complex interplay between these two forms of time.
@Number2018 makes the point that clocks don't measure time, as each successive "now" of the clock contains nothing of the past.
By the same argument, as the clock is a physical mechanism and only exists in the "now", the brain can only exist in the "now", as the brain is also a physical mechanism.
Suppose I have the memory of a clock showing 2pm and the memory of a clock showing 3pm. As my mind can only exist in the "now", both my memory of a clock showing 2pm and my memory of a clock showing 3pm exist in my "now".
If there is nobody to have a memory of the clock showing 2pm, then as before, it remains the case that the clock exists in its "now".
The problem with defining "now" as the moment information reaches our senses is the use of the word "moment". "Moment" assumes the existence of time, which "now" specifically excludes.
The definition of "now" cannot include the word "moment".
But what if we leave out 'moment' and instead say that light beams arrive simultaneously at a certain location. Isn't that a 'now'? We can even, in principle, predict where a now will be if we forecast when the information/light beams will arrive at a specified location. Or, more simply, we can say there is a unique "information set" at a certain location in space and that information constitutes a 'now' at that location.
Surely. But to say that time has a subjective element, does not therefore say that it is simply subjective. All subjects can measure time according to an objective measurement, but it regardless will always involve a subject. Its a mistake to think of it as wholly subjective or wholly objective; it is what could be called co-arising.
A clock strikes four times. There is the quantitative. In the world, each strike is independent of the others. As you wrote Each successive now of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct.". There is the qualitative. In the mind, the four strikes are inextricably connected as part of a continuous flow of experience from past, present and future.
As I understand it, subjective time is the mind's consciousness of the relation between the four strikes, and objective time is the relation between the four strikes in the absence of any mind.
I know subjective time because it is in my mind. However, I can only infer objective time because it is outside my mind.
Let the clock strike four times.
At the moment I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, I have the memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time. When I hear the clock strike for the fourth time, for me, this is my "now". My memory of hearing the clock strike for the first time is also in my "now". In my "now" are both the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time. The relation between the memory of the clock striking for the first time and hearing the clock strike for the fourth time comprises my awareness of subjective time. But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all.
In other words, subjective time requires no objective time.
You say that "subjective time refers to a flow of past, present and future that are inextricably interconnected".
I agree if you are saying that the past exists in our mind as a memory.
However, I may be wrong, but I infer that by past you are referring to an objective past, a past that exists independently of any observer. If that is the case, in order for the mind to have a consciousness of a subjective time, how exactly does the mind connect an objective past to an objective present?
1) Do people exist in both the objective past and objective present, thereby allowing them
an awareness of the flow of time?
2) Does the person only exist in the objective present, the "now", but their mind is able to go back to an objective past, thereby allowing them an awareness of the flow of time?
How exactly does a person connect an objective past to an objective present if not by a memory that exists in the objective present?
That's how I see it.
Suppose a photon of light leaves an object and arrives at an eye 100 metres away. On its way to the eye, the photon passes through every point between the object and the eye, of which there are an infinite number. As the photon can only be in one place at one time (ignoring complexities of quantum mechanics), at each point the photon passes through, it exists in the present time, it exists in the "now". Either there are an infinite number of "nows" between the object and the eye or there is only one "now", where the photon happens to be at any moment in time.
As the photon can only be in one place at one time, and at each place the photon is in the "now", this means that there can only be one "now".
That picture of the photon passing through every point on a classical trajectory assumes a deterministic path and a continuous sequence of objective instants. But Wheelers delayed choice experiment casts serious doubt on whether such a path can be meaningfully assigned at all. In quantum mechanics, the photon doesnt have a definite position at each moment unless measured.
In fact, what counts as the history of the photon (did it take one path? both? neither?) can depend on a measurement made after the photon has already passed the apparatus. This suggests that there is no determinate series of spatial locations or temporal nows that the photon occupies independently of the measurement context.
So nowe cant ignore quantum mechanics here, because it challenges the very assumptions that underlie the idea of a photon existing at some location at each moment in time. Meaning the example of a photon does not serve the argument (ref).
It's also worth remembering that special relativity already showed us that time is not absolute. The rate at which time passes depends on the observer's frame of referencewhat counts as now for one observer is not now for another moving at a different velocity. There is no single universal present in relativity. (Hence the name ;-) )
Why should it be that because a photon's path through space and time is unknowable to an observer, that its path is not spatially and temporally objectively deterministic?
A photon of light leaves the Andromeda Galaxy and enters a person's eye 2.537 million light-years later.
The photon must have had a path, because it made its way from the Andromeda Galaxy to the Earth, even if the path cannot meaningfully be assigned by an observer.
In having a path, the photon must have had a spatial location at each moment in time, even if in the absence of any measurement by an observer its definite position was unknown and even if each moment in time is unknown because it depends on different observers' frame of reference.
Perhaps, as for Kant, even though he argued for the unknowability of noumena, he still believed in the objective existence of a world independent of any subjective observer.
The objective present you speak of is complicated, not simple.
What this is, is hard to say because language itself it performed in sequential thinking, I mean, to think at all has its superficial analysis always already IN objective time, as when I note how 'in' "follows" 'already' in the preceding phrase. But this does not at all imply that such sequential thinking is primordial (any more that "things fall downward" exhausts the basic analysis of gravity). All one has to do is take a closer look at the apriority of time: What is it to engage the past? To recall itself is an event in the present act of recalling, and one cannot even conceive of the past qua past, as an independent event or body of possibilities or some stand alone condition. No, the past is only the past IN the recollection that is performed in the present; but then, this leaves the present in question: can the present be regarded as some "stand alone" supposition? One has to examine the present's apriori structure: In order for the present to be more than just some abstract concept lifted from ordinary time-talk, it must be understood in terms of its actuality: to recall is to recall something, and this something can only be of the past (keeping in mind that the intent here is to be "descriptive" of the apriori structure of time, putting speculation on hold), and the past is the totality of events of the having-been (to borrow a phrase). So the present as such cannot be understood apart from the past--the past is analytically IN the present, meaning it is nonsense to speak of the present as some fleeting movement forward that carries nothing at all but itself. The present is inherently historical. The future: In the event that a future is imagined, conceived, understood, etc., it is anticipated. All events are future looking, even as I lift this coffee cup, the familiarity of coffee cups immediately takes control, and this belongs to the past. the future is literally nothing without the past, not can it be conceived apart from the present act that anticipates it by drawing upon the past's totality of possibilities. Call it the "not yet" of any given conscious moment.
This kind of thinking leads here: The three modalities of time are really one. One cannot isolate any one modality and speak of it as such, for this analytically carries along with it the other two. Everyday time, and Einstein's space time, and all that physics can say about time, presuppose this analysis.
It is also what can properly be called metaphysics, simply because this apriority is not witnessable empirically, quantitatively. It is "about" the world", yet it is apriori! It is what I call good metaphysics, not the nonsense we associate with medieval theology. Analytically responsible metaphysics. It belongs to phenomenology.
Quoting RussellA
Let me clarify my view on the relationship between subjective and objective time. Subjective time highlights the minds role in constructing and experiencing temporal flow. Hume and Bergson used the example of a clock to show how subjective time allows the mind to transcend a fleeting, current moment of experience. You are correct that all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time. However, the contents of memory do not coexist in the same way that physical objects like furniture in my room do. Instead, memories form an evolving, continuous whole possessing all dimensions of time. For Bergson, the actual refers to the reality we directly experience in the present moment, while the virtual designates past experiences or memories that are not immediately present but exist in a latent state. They have distinct ways of existing. Virtual memories are not separate from our actual state since memory continuously reactivates past experiences and integrates them into the ongoing flow of the present moment.
On the other side, when we experience subjective time in consciousness, we cannot separate this process from external temporal processes.
Objective time involves a framework for measuring time and organizing the external procedures that mediate and shape our temporal consciousness. Our time-related tools and activities, such as clocks, schedules, and social or technological rhythms, are embedded within our practices and guide our memory. For example, when one remembers the clock striking for the first time, this memory is not merely a mental image. It is connected to the external structure of the clocks strikes; discrete, periodic sounds mark time in everyday life. Mechanical and tower clocks constructed external dimensions of time by aligning them with visible and audible signals. They structured collective activities as well as individual temporal experiences. By marking regular intervals through mechanical sounds and visual cues, tower and striking clocks imposed an external memory framework onto daily practices. It created a shared rhythm that synchronized individual experiences and embedded a collective temporal memory into social practices and personal routines. Without these measurable objective markers, the flow of subjective experience might lose coherence or structure. Since our temporal consciousness now adapts to different temporal cues, one is unlikely to perform the clocks exemplary synthesis of retention and anticipation. Subjective time structures are not fixed; they evolve with the events themselves.
You write that the three modalities of time, the past, the present and the future, are really one, and are to be understood within metaphysics, about the world yet outside the world.
I suggested that my subjective time only exists in my present.
@Number2018 wrote about subjective time
The past, present and future certainly exist in language and thought. For example, "last year I visited Paris, today I am in Seville and next year I will visit Reno.".
However, the fact that I can talk and think about the future is no reason to believe that this future will ever exist. Similarly, that I can talk about the past is no reason to believe that this past ever existed. That I can think and talk about the past and future is no reason that this past and future ever existed or will ever exist.
I agree that the three modalities of time in thought and language are inextricably linked. I can only talk about visiting Reno in the future if I am not in Reno at the present, and I can only talk about having visited Paris in the past if also I not in Paris in the present. Talk about the past and future only make sense in relation to the present.
In thought and language there is an inevitable flow of past, present and future that are inextricably connected. In my conscious mind there is a subjective temporal flow between the past, present and future. Last year I visited Paris, I am now in Seville and next year I will be in Reno.
I think, therefore I am in the present.
But it is in this present that I talk and think about the past, present and future. It is accepted that it is not necessary to teletransport to a future existence in order to be to talk or think about it. Similarly, it is also not necessary to teletransport to a past existence to be able to talk or think about it.
But this talking and thinking about the past, present and future is the foundation for my conscious experience of subjective time. As my talking and thinking exists in my present, my conscious experience must also exist in my present.
My present is momentary, neither in the past nor the future. In effect, timeless. My subjective time, which also exists in this momentary present, must therefore also be timeless.
My subjective time flows from the past to the present to the future. All these exist in my present when I talk and think about them, meaning that my subjective time is also something that only exists, metaphysically speaking, in my present.
As you wrote, Bergson believed that subjective time ("duration", "lived time") of the conscious individual is able to transcend the objective time of the current moment of experience. I don't disagree with that, but it all depends on the meaning of "transcend".
Evan Thompson in his article Clock time contra lived time wrote that the difference between Einstein and Bergson as regards the nature of time has narrowed in the intervening years.
I tend to agree with both Einstein and Bergson, as two different approaches to the same problem.
Einstein's approach is that of objective time. His approach is that of physics and mathematics. In his special theory of relativity, the time measured by a clock is no longer an absolute because simultaneous events are only simultaneous in one frame of reference.
Bergson's approach is that of subjective time. His approach is that of the psychologist. It is about human experience, the lived experience of the passage of time and the experience of duration. Things that cannot be measured as they elude the possibility of measurement.
Objective time independent of an observer and subjective time dependent upon an observer are two aspects of the true nature of time, and it for the the philosopher to unite them into a single cohesive whole. But this is problematic, as Kant showed in his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant may believe in the existence of an external world, yet never able to know the noumena that inhabit this external world. The clock may be part of an objective time, but only a subjective observer is able to read what the clock shows. As Thompson says "Clocks dont measure time; we do." We may live in a block-universe, where the passage of time from past to present to future is an illusion. However, we could only know this if we were able to stand outside our own frame of reference, which is logically impossible.
I agree when you say that "all mental operations, including memory, occur within a single moment of objective time". I think that this has important and relevant implications, but not discussed within the Thompson article. As I wrote before "But this subjective time only exists for me in my "now", meaning that my subjective time is an instantaneous thing that requires no objective time at all." I agree with Bergson that the subjective time of our conscious mind is different to the objective time of the clock in the world, and we feel that our subjective duration of lived experience transcends the objective single moment of "now". Yet this subjective duration of time exists in a single objective moment of time.
For me, philosophically, an interesting question not raised by Thompson's article is how we are able to subjectively feel the duration of time within a single momentary objective instant of time.
You should really take a look at the article I linked earlier about John Wheelerit directly challenges the idea that a photon must have had a definite path.
Wheelers cosmic delayed-choice experiment involves light from a quasar billions of light-years away being bent around a massive galaxy en route to Earth due to gravitational lensing. The light can reach Earth by two different pathsleft or right around the lensing galaxy.
But heres the twist: if we set up the experiment to detect which path the photon took, it behaves like a particleone path. If we instead set it up to detect an interference pattern, it behaves like a wavetaking both paths.
And this choice of how we observe the photon is made now, on Earthlong after the photon has supposedly taken its path. The implication is that the photon didnt have a determinate path until we made a measurement. So the assumption that it had a single, objective, space-time trajectory just doesnt hold up under quantum scrutiny.
And really, that same principle has been illustrated with the much smaller-scale versions of the delayed choice experiment e.g. here
Yes, but when you speak of 'now' you are simply localizing subjective time, and the concept remains abstract. Analysis shows that what we call 'now' is really an ecstatic relation between temporal categories and there "really" is no boundary at all. Time is a pragmatic language imposition that is essentially social (Rorty), that is, talk about events before, after, until, prior, next week and all the rest are FIRST ways of taking up the world that "works" and as such are entirely contingent, as all are taken up as and in language. Our existence is essentially historical (our historicity, as Heidegger calls it) and so, even this analytic of time sketched out above (it is, of course, derived from a course of thought, starting with Augustine's Confessions, then others: Brentano, Husserl, finally, Heidegger. that put forth here is from his Being and Time, Division 2, starting at section 65 or so) because language is historical.
But when you say, your subjective time is instantaneous and requires no objective time, I DO think you are on to something because I am convinced since language and its pragmatics, its historical nature, which is culture and all of its institutions (everything you can "say") is THE contingency that produces the linear and sequential "sense" of time, is, as the Hindus say, the binding illusion, maya (heh, heh--Kierkegaard called this inherited sin in his Concept of Anxiety. You see his idea: we are far more interested in our own affairs than we are about the existential crisis of separation from God. Tillich will call this a matter of ultimate concern), then this, as you call it, subjective 'now' is a radical liberation.
Consider what serious meditation is really about: the cessation of thought, of language, of the "attachments" that create and bind our desires, and the grip it has on defining the world.
It is beyond my comprehension that in a Universe 93 billion light years across that has existed for around 13 billion years, the determinacy of the path of photons throughout this Universe is dependent on a few scientists making measurements on the 3rd rock from the Sun.
Tim Folger in his article "Does the Universe Exist if We're Not Looking?" mentions Wheeler's idea that the principles of the two-slit experiment can be applied to the Universe.
However, there are doubts about the implications of this two-slit experiment. For example, Sabine Hossenfelder, asks Did We Get the Double Slit Experiment All Wrong?
She also poses the idea Why This Nobel Prize Winner Thinks Quantum Mechanics is Nonsense
My knowledge about quantum mechanics is insignificant when compared to that of Sabine, but at the least she is pointing out that there is still much to learn about quantum mechanics, including about the path of photons.
There are articles that describe how meditation can alter how we perceive the passing of time, for example "Meditation May Change the Way We Perceive Time"
I sit staring into space for ten minutes and feel that it was a long time. I read for ten minutes and feel that it was a short time. My subjective feeling about the duration of an objective period of time does change depending upon circumstances.
At the start of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 10.55. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 11.05 will be in my future. At the end of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 11.05. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 10.55 was in my past. Throughout this ten minute period I am only conscious of being in the present, of my being in the "now". I am never conscious of being either in the past or if the future.
If my "now" can never be in the past and can never be in the future, does this not mean that my "now" is a distinct boundary between my past and my future?
Rather, your now always already IS the past and future. The past, of course, is not a place or something that can be visited awaiting recollection that "takes one" there. The past IS the recollection itself, and recollections are present events, but as I recall yesterday's event, say, I am actively anticipating what this recollection will be as-it-is-recalled; that is, as one recalls one is doing so in the anticipatory structure of those past events being recreated. So recollection is the ecstatic unity of the recalled, being recalled in the forward looking of the present event, an event that is continuously on the threshold of anticipating what comes next. As i am sitting here, I look up and note the time from the clock on the wall. How is it that I implicitly know everything about time and clocks and the conventions of telling time? I recall this, tacitly, from a living memory in the immediacy of the moment. But this moment also has this forward looking dimension, forprior to looking at the clock, I anticipated what it all would be like. In a very meaningful way, the "looking" was already done! It is repetition! (See Kierkegaard's book of this name). Thus the recollection, the not-yet of the future, and the present actuality are an all-in-one event.
Even when one seems to be clear of recollection, attending explicitly to the presence of things, there is "behind" this intention a foundation of tacit recollection that gives the present its stability, its fixity. This is, in simple terms, familiarity. So as the meditation takes one to a certain detachment from all that is there "behind" the sitting quietly, from familiarity itself, this familiarity is MOST stubborn. It is a lifetime of education and conditioning that one is trying to "still". Serious meditation is a matter of giving up life as one knows it, literally! The "now" that is achieved is most radical. It is another now altogether. See the way Levinas and other post Husserlians (like Michel Henry) are talking about this "extreme phenomenology". They are closer to Meister Eckhart's "On Detachment":
[i]Perfect detachment
is not concerned about being above or below any creature; it does not wish to be below or above,
it would stand on its own, loving none and hating none, and seeks neither equality nor inequality
with any creature, nor this nor that: it wants merely to be.[/i]
Of course, Eckhart holds that God and one's own divinity appears when this space of detachment opens and yields. To his credit, he does not dogmatically tell us what this "is".
The problem is with taking scientific realism at face value. I watched Sabines presentation on THooft. Likewise Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein said they thought quantum physics is radically incomplete. And they too were scientific realists. Penrose says in an interview:
[quote=Sir Roger Penrose, Interview, Discovery Magazine] It (quantum mechanics) doesnt make any sense, and there is a simple reason. You see, the mathematics of quantum mechanics has two parts to it. One is the evolution of a quantum system, which is described extremely precisely and accurately by the Schrödinger equation. That equation tells you this: If you know what the state of the system is now, you can calculate what it will be doing 10 minutes from now. However, there is the second part of quantum mechanics the thing that happens when you want to make a measurement. Instead of getting a single answer, you use the equation to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes. The results dont say, This is what the world is doing. Instead, they just describe the probability of its doing any one thing. The equation should describe the world in a completely deterministic way, but it doesnt[/quote]
The question is, why should it? What if reality is not completely determined by physical principles?
In my present, my "now", are not only my recollections of the past, but also my anticipations of the future. In this sense, my "now" does include the past and future.
Meister Eckhart writes in "On Detachment" that God, in his immovable detachment, which he has had since all eternity, has no past and future and does not see in a temporal fashion.
But he also writes that man is not God. Not being God, man does not have this detachment, does see in a temporal fashion and does have a past, present and future.
So man does have a present, a past of recollection and a future of implications.
For man, unlike God, recollection and implication can only exist in the present, can only exist in the "now".
If man can only exist in the present, in the "now", yet can think about recollections from the past and can think about implications concerning the future, then these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now".
You say "your now is always already in the past and future". Perhaps, however, it is more the case that "your past and future is always in your now"?
What is the physical reality of time?
Let us start by ignoring quantum mechanics contribution to this problem, because as you wrote "Likewise Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein said they thought quantum physics is radically incomplete."
Consider the equation [math]{d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}[/math], which very accurately and very successfully predicts the position of a stone falling in a gravitational field .
This equation represents a physical principle, that [math]{d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}[/math], and the undoubted success of equations such as this strongly suggests that reality is founded on physical principles.
It is not so much the case that reality has been determined by physical principles, but rather that reality is physical principles.
But in what sense is the reality of space understood by "d", and in what sense is the reality of time understood by "t"?
Equations such as the above are part of the undoubted success of science. They are able to very accurately predict future events in the observable world. This naturally leads to the principle of Scientific Realism, the philosophical view that the world of space and time exists independently of any observer (Wikipedia - Scientific Realism). Such a world would also exist independently of any scientific theory developed by these observers in their search to better understand this world.
But "t" is not time, it is a letter, a symbol. It is certainly not time as it exists in a physical world, even though it can be successfully used to accurately predict future events .
Cat Gillen in his article "Hossenfelder vs Goff: Do electrons exist?" refer to Scientific Realism, Scientific Antirealism as well as Structural Realism.
Hossenfelder and Goff argued whether electrons exist. Are scientific theories true and show us how the world really is or just useful tools for making predictions about events in the world. Even though Bohr's atomic model can make fantastically correct predictions, as a theory it is incorrect. Scientific Antirealism says that we should not ascribe truth to a scientific theory just because of its predictive success. But this misses an important point, that there must be some underlying truth to a scientific theory that is predicatively successful. Structural Realism may be a better approach, as it argues that even though we may overlay a semantic story onto a scientific theory, there must be an underlying structure from which it gains its predictive abilities. This underlying structure maps with the reality of the world. Both scientific theory and the reality in the world that it predicts must share the same inherent realism.
Superficially, "t" is the semantic overlay to the reality of time in the world, where "t" may be a symbol, figure of speech, metaphor or simile. But in order to account for its predictive success, "t" must share with time an unobserved yet common underlying structure as proposed by Structural Realism.
Therefore, if the symbol "t" and time share an underlying reality, it must be the case that the symbol "t" is able to give us insights about the nature of time.
Because of the predictive success of equations such as [math]{d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}[/math], and of scientific theories in general, the reality of time must have consistent and unchanging principles.
This question is indeed both interesting and important. Gilles Deleuze elaborates on Bergsons notion of duration in a way that may help us understand how subjective time exists within a single moment of objective time. The mind performs a synthesis consisting of retention (memory), anticipation (future), and contraction. Retention holds the nearest past, expectation anticipates an immediate future, while contraction unites these and brings them together into a lived present existing within the objective moment.
When the mind contemplates the sounds of the four o'clock strikes, each stroke or excitation is logically independent of the others. One instance does not appear until the previous one has disappeared. Yet, something qualitatively new happens in the contemplating mind. When the first stroke occurs, I anticipate the second, and with the second, I retain the first. The next moment will be different since it will retain all previous ones. There is a synthesis of time based on the repetition of independent and homogeneous instances. Unlike any mere memory of distinct elements, we contract them into a living temporal flow that is dynamic and continuous, differing from a mechanical sequence of moments. For Deleuze, the synthesis of the contemplating mind operates like a living organism integrating past and future states. Both do not simply register a sequence of discrete sensory inputs but synthesize time, creating a continuous living flow. At microscopic or quasi-living levels, organisms operate time internally so they can remember, anticipate, and adapt. For example, bacterial quorum (population) demonstrate duration rather than just mechanical repetition or a simple stimulus -response reaction. Quorum sensing integrates multiple past chemical signals and anticipates future collective actions to coordinate behavior. Bacterial life creates a kind of a continuous temporal process that cannot be reduced to isolated moments of objective time.
Deleuze demonstrates that subjective time, while unfolding within the discrete and measurable moments of objective time, nevertheless possesses a unique and irreducible mode of existence.
This present becomes the most contracted state of successive elements that are themselves independent of one another The synthesis of time constitutes the present in time. It is not that the present is a dimension of time: the present alone exists. Rather, synthesis constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as dimensions of this present (Deleuze, DR, p76).
Let's leave God out of it. It can be such a distraction and the same issues that turn up here also turn up there, trying to explain God and, what, divine temporality?? What good is this if the temorpality itself is not made ontologically clear? Keeping in mind that God is first a term that occurs to us, and thus, whatever can be said of it, goes through the structure of our time. Beyond this, just bad metaphysics.
'Perhaps' is an invitation to speculation. This is really has no place here. It is an apriori argument, that is, it deals with the way time can work given its own nature or essence.
But yes, you nearly have it here: "these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now"," but for one important matter: The now cannot be understood as a place where all things temporal intersect or settle. There is no now apart from the not yet and the having been. Conceived like this one becomes either a mystic or an abstractionist. If one turns to the eternal now as a kind of nirvana, then one is just being loose with descriptive language, and I suppose one is forgiven for this, seeing here the now is not a theoretical term looking to be cleearly understood, but rather a place holder for something sublime and alien to common sense. That is, 'now' is a term borrowed from everyday language, and in grasping for expression, one does what one can.
But the abstraction of the now is really not tolerable. Putting aside the way our time words "work" we are of course bound to contests of usage and this deals exclusively with linear time that is so familiar. But a phenomenological analysis of time, time conceived for what it IS apart from the free talk about various affairs, is analytic: One cannot conceive of any of time's modalities apart from the others. Even in a profound mystical state in which time seems to vanish, such a state can only be understood AT ALL as an anticipatory event, I would argue, for no anticipation, no agency to "be there" to be in a mystical state.
Agency is almost always overlooked in analysis, whether one is in the anglo american tradition or the continental condition; most poignantly in ethics and aesthetics and religion.
Well said. And yes, very intriguing. The question is, does this make any difference in one's (genitive) "objective" time? That is, Husserl's reduction takes one to the radical subjective end, where one faces an inexorable givenness (reading now Jean Luc Marion's Reduction and Givenness), and once one has pushed this "method" to its limits a very different world appears, that of givenness "as such". Heidegger famously doesn't buy it, but others, neo Husserlians, take it as momentous. This analysis of time, Bergson (haven't read), Deleuze, Husserl (The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time) , does invite a violation, if you will, of objective familiarity, such that time as sequential events yields to the more basic analysis.
I agree.
Quoting Number2018
It seems so. When I hear the clock strike for the second time, I have the retention (memory) of the clock striking for the first time and the anticipation (future) of the clock striking for the third time. In objective time, each stroke is independent of the others, in that each successive now of the clock contains nothing of the past because each objective moment is separate and distinct. In subjective time, each stroke is also independent of the others, in that we are able to distinguish them.
Quoting Number2018
I don't understand Deleuze's explanation of "synthesis". On the one hand, the present alone exists. On the other hand, within this present there is a "temporal flow".
How can there be a flow of time within a single moment in time?
Recollections of the past and implications of the future must exist in the present, in the "now".
But doesn't that mean that it is in the present where all things temporal (recollections, implications, the "now") intersect or settle?
Depends on what you mean by 'present'. As a meaningful concept, it is only an pragmatic modality, meaning when we think of the essence of the present, what it IS, past, present and future are discovered first, and these are found in the everydayness of affairs, where the world is divided up into a second ago, right now, and a second from now, say. But this is the way things go when we are talking in a rough and ready way about normal things, like when things have to be done, come before and after, and on and on. Look closer, and you find a rather simple analysis discovers serious structural problems very quickly. This is has been around a very long time; see Augustine's confessions chapter 11 where he says of the present, " Whatsoever of it hath flown away, is past; whatsoever remaineth, is to come." Impossible to make sense of the present as a stand alone concept, because it doesn't stand alone, but is bound to past and future analytically. The moment a moment arrives, it is both past and future in that moment.
But if you mean the present to be an experiential clarity in which lived and deeply rooted habits and familiarities that spontaneously rise in every perception, turn all things into the "potentialities of possibilities" established in the totality of the "having been" (Heidegger. He calls this "the they" and holds that this is what we are, mostly. Our "thrownness" is discovered only when one is already entirely IN a language and culture), fall away, to reveal pure givenness of the world (Husserl, Jean Luc Marion, Michel Henry, et al, say various things along these lines), then this analysis of time and the ecstatic unity of these three modalities (as Heidegger puts it. Obviously, the things I have been talking about are derivative of continental philosophy) has to yield, for now the whole matter is in the hands of this phenomenological givenness, and the world is seen "as if for the first time". Time as a pragmatic imposition on the world (what time is it? You're late! It should arrive early. Come here, now!) loses meaning.
Heidegger was no mystic, but Husserl and neo Husserlians lean this way. It is what happens when one takes the present and attempts to "observe" the bare presence of things. This Husserl argues is achievable in a phenomenological reduction. See his "Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology".
There is the present within the mind of an observer. Thinking about present experience, past memories and future implications.
There is the present in the absence of any observer. The Earth as part of a Solar System, preceded by the Big Bang and followed by the Big Freeze.
The present within the mind of an observer exists as a subjective duration. The present in a world absent of any observer exists as an objective instant.
However, the observer, where the present exists as a subjective duration, exists within this world, where the present exists as an objective instant.
One asks how subjective duration relates to objective instant.
Perhaps in order to answer this question, we should take on board Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction. We should attempt a meditative approach, fully grounded in the present, absent of any preconceptions from our past and absent of any implications about our future.
Well, this is exactly how to go, asking just that question. The hard part is to affirm the very difficult, yet inexorable, premise that the latter, the objective instant, presupposes the former, the subjective duration. Then the world is turned upside down as one encounters Kant's Copernican Revolution.
You are correct. For example, Deleuze's analyses of time do involve a violation. His syntheses of time operate as a framework in which subjective time is passively synthesized with objective time. These syntheses are passive because they occur beneath active conscious thought. The first synthesis shows how subjective time incorporates the objective succession of moments, transforming it into a continuous subjective experience. The second synthesis demonstrates how subjective time contracts or dilates objective time through memorynot only retaining the immediate past but encompassing the entirety of the past, with all its layers and interrelations. The third synthesis refers to the creation of the new, the unfolding of the unknown future.
Deleuzes three syntheses reveal that time is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. Instead, it is constituted by a dynamic interaction of different facets of time. Particularly interesting is Deleuzes third synthesis, where he elaborates on a contemporary, objectified mode of existence, showing how time and being become externalized beyond the self. This third synthesis is based on an interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of eternal return. It functions by fracturing the subjective unity of the Self and the I, creating a space for a dynamic multiplicity without fixed identity.
As @Asthrophel noted, there are different perspectives on the nature of the present moment. For Deleuze, the present moment is the result of a synthesis of time. This present indeed corresponds to an instant in objective timethe now that can be measured. Yet, this present is not simply that isolated instant. It is formed through the passive synthesis of past and future moments, which are contracted and integrated into it. The synthesis constitutes a continuous temporal flow within the present; it is making it not just a single point but a dynamic duration where moments are interconnected and experienced as a unified flow of time.
The question as to how the subjective duration of time in the mind relates to objective moments of time in the world has been around since at least Kant's Copernican Revolution, and his concept of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.
Kant presented the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as a fact in his Critique of Pure Reason without explanation, and the problem is still awaiting an explanation more than two hundred years later.
In the Transcendental Unity of Apperception there is a unity of consciousness resulting from the coherent synthesis of a succession of different contents. This act of synthesis is not experienced. Only the consequence of this acts of synthesis is experienced, the unity of different contents.
Kant in his Transcendental Unity of Apperception is finding a necessary connection between different contents, whereas Hume only found a contingent connection through a constant conjunction of different events.
The problem is in part discovering necessary connections between different contents.
From 1), the present is an instant. From 2), the present is a duration.
Many words have more than one meaning. For example, "bank" may mean a) a financial institution b) a raised area of land alongside a body of water. "Train" may mean a) a series of connected cars or carriages b) to teach or prepare someone for a specific task or skill.
Linguistically, I agree that in different contexts, the same world may have more than one meaning. In one context, that of the world, "present" may mean an instant. In a different context, that of the mind, "present" may mean a duration.
However, this is a different problem to the metaphysical problem as to how a duration can exist in an instant.
You might want to read the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason for a close look at the way Kant thinks. It has to be understood that whatever one can say about objective time presupposes subjective time. The former is always already the latter, at a more basic level of analysis. Not unlike, on the one hand, observing an object fall to the ground, and on the other, giving a quantitative equation in physics for such a thing. Does this mean the object no longer falls? Of course not, but the account by the physicist is taken to be integral to this and more foundational. The phenomenologist's Time does not say normal talk about time is wrong; it just says there is a more foundational account, something that goes all the way down to the essential givenness of the world, and thus is presupposed even by physics.
Quoting RussellA
This is an issue that phenomenologists take seriously, as to analytic philosophers. Stanley Fish wrote "Is There a Text in this Class, the essential idea of which is the ambiguity of the term 'text': is it a book? A concept assumed? This paper weight holds down paper, but it can be a weapon, a doorstop. Language is throughout, like this, and to try and pin it down is futile: everything is context, or as Derrida put it, there is nothing outside the text. So yes, duration, instant, have only "regional" meanings, and so in one context the instant's analysis is ignored, this, the "vulgar" (Heidegger) everydayness of the term's usage; in another, Derrida's post modern analysis of language, 'instant' becomes variable, without any final context (final vocabulary, as Rorty put it). Quine said the same thing, essentially, in his Indeterminacy of Translation. And Heidegger, who is by my thinking that greatest philosopher, resolved this ambiguity in hermeneutics. His analysis of Time in Being and Time is just an extraordinary read.
Anyway, in the everyday sense of the terms, things are taken differently in different contexts, but Heidegger does ontology, which is meant to be the analytic context where things are understood in their "equiprimordiality" He holds that there is no finality is language's taking up the world, but this does not mean there is no, if you will, equiprimordial ontological analysis, that is, where inquiry leads to the foundational issues, where empirical science cannot go, because it cares nothing for this.
There is the metaphysical problem of the possibility of subjective duration in the mind within an objective moment in time in the world. In Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of perception, a unified and simultaneous consciousness derived from different and successive experiences.
There is the necessity to clarify the meanings of objective and subjective time.
As regards what I call objective time, this is time external to any observer, and therefore not subjective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B276 The Refutation of Idealism
As regards what I call subjective time, this is time internal to an observer, and therefore not objective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B140 of the CPR.
However, when he refers to the objective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a priori within the mind, the pure form of intuition in time and the pure synthesis of the understanding. When he refers to the subjective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a posteriori representations and appearances, also within the mind, the empirical synthesis and the inner sense.
One problem with the CPR is that Kant states what is the case, but not how it is the case. We may agree that it the case that we do have a transcendental unity of apperception, but we also want to know how this is the case.
Quoting Astrophel
There is the metaphysical problem as to how a subjective duration can exist in an objective instant.
Equiprimordial means that two or more different equal phenomena can only be understood in relation to each other, and are not based on another common fundamental phenomena.
It is true that duration and instant are different phenomena that can be understood in relation to each other, in that duration and instant are mutually contradictory, and that a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant.
But they do have something in common and that is they are both temporal events, so in this sense are not equiprimordial.
However, what is more important is the law of non contradiction. By this law, a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant. It follows that it is logically impossible for a subjective duration to exist in an objective instant
Then how to explain Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception?
I would question the truth of this proposition. What is perceived is change, not persistence, and the supposed "persistent thing" which is required for time-determination, could very well be something within the perceiver. The "thing outside me" represents the persistence which is supposed to be perceived. But it may be the case that this persistence is only within me, and projected onto the outside, creating the illusion of a thing outside me.
It depends what is meant by perceive. It can mean to see something, such as "I perceive a tree in the distance". It can mean to know something, such as "I perceive that you are curious." Kant in B276 of the CPR talks about perceiving a thing outside me that is persistent, inferring by perceiving he means seeing rather than knowing.
It is not the case that I see a tree and a moment later I see the same tree, but rather I see a tree persisting through time.
The tree doesn't need to change in order to be persistent through time.
But I only exist at one moment in time, meaning that I can only be conscious of my present, my "now". It follows that it would therefore be impossible to project my consciousness of the persistence of objects onto the world outside me.
Therefore, the consciousness of my existence in time is possible only by the persistence through time of actual things outside me, thereby proving the existence of objects in space outside me.
That is what I dispute. We can only see at the moment of the present, so that there is something there which persists through time, a tree in your example, is a conclusion drawn with the aid of memory.
Quoting RussellA
That's not true, because we have memory. So we are conscious of the past. Also, we anticipate the future, so we are conscious of the future too.
The question is, whilst there is probably general agreement that we can perceive (see) a tree at one moment in time, can we perceive (see) a tree persisting through time, what Bergson calls "duration"?
Is what Kant calls the Transcendental Unity of Apperception a valid concept, where we can have a unity of consciousness about successive moments in time.
At this moment in time in the present I see a tree and a clock showing 2pm, and I have the memory of seeing the tree in the past when the clock showed 1pm.
I agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of my memory of the tree in the past, but this is not to agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of the tree in the past
It seems to me that we exist at one moment in time, including our mind and brain, as well as everything else in the world, including trees, tables and chairs.
That being said, I also feel that I am conscious of the persistence and duration of time. This raises the mysterious metaphysical problem of how a duration of time can exist at a moment in time. Kant thought it could, and he called it the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.
The Transcendental Unity of Apperception does not mean that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the tree in the past. It still means that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the memory of the tree in the past. But it does mean that at this moment in time I perceive that time persists and has a duration.
Suppose you are correct and we can only see a moment of the present. Let us say that in this present moment we see a tree and a clock showing 2pm and we have the memory of a tree and a clock showing 1pm.
How do we know that the tree we see at 2pm is the same tree we saw at 1pm?
It is a general problem. How do you know that the chair in your memory is the same chair you are now looking at. Only by inference, and if only by inference your inference could be wrong.
This is Hume's problem where we have to infer they are the same tree because of constant conjunction.
Kant's solution is we know that they are the same tree because we are conscious of the persistence of time, what Bergson calls the duration. Kant called it the Transcendental unity of Apperception.
You say that we can only see a moment in the present, which I agree with, but even so, even in this moment in the present, don't you feel the persistence of time?
The mind not only causes subjective time but also causes the physical (this is discussed in my other thread here), so it is no surprise that there is synchrony between the passage of subjective time and changes in physical.
P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience.
I agree with P1)
As regards P2), "experience is due to the existence of physical", I can understand that I may experience happiness because of the physical existence of my dog.
I can understand the existence of an experience is due to the change in state of physical, in that the existence of my experience of sorrow is due to the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead.
But as regards P2) "the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience", I don't understand how the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead is due to my experience of sorrow.
And now, it always will be. Infinite time.
Since the moment we first clocked the first moment,
We touched infinitely in all directions, before and forever after, all at that first instant of time.
Once we timed something.
Once we set a limit in the prehistoric limitlessness.
Once we minded the time that humankind first minded.
Doesn't this lead to a logical contradiction? In an instant of time, by definition, there is no before or after. That is why it is an instant of time.
Im just glad you saw the point, because that question means you saw infinity where I did.
Whats a better word for a duration?
It was more like a poem, and a duration just sounded wrong for it.
A moment of time, since it is of time must have some duration, and once you have a duration you see the infinite.
Would instant work ant better thanmoment? I didnt think so. Maybe second because that certainly has a duration.
Suppose a stationary snooker ball on a snooker table is hit by a snooker cue at position zero and travels 1 metre in 2 seconds.
When the snooker ball passes through a location exactly 50cm from where it was hit, the time will be exactly 1 second.
As the ball can be exactly at 50cm, the time can be exactly 1 second.
There is no duration of time the moment, the instant, the ball is at 50cm.
I would not argue with anything you are saying.
I dont think there is a poetic way of saying what I said, and I was trying to be poetic. Basically, I am a bad poet. Also, basically, I dont mean moment or instant literally.
Because we both seem to recognize that if a single instant in time has absolutely no duration, it is like a point in geometry, and does not exist absent its conceptual existence as a marker, not as naming a physical duration that takes time.
So, taking for granted that it takes a few brief moments to say the word instant, then the moment instant is said, we have a duration long enough to find infinity.
Yes, it is hard to imagine that if time exists there would be any reason for it to end.
I cannot envision the meaning of "time" in a changeless or frozen world.
Time it seems to me is a concept derived from change, from the process of the universe.
I suspect both time and space are quantum in their true naturre and the notion of time without change and space as infinitely divisible are both mere abstractions of thought.
By P2 I mean that your experience is due to neural processes in your brain.
I really disagree that time is eternal and infinite, the arguments against infinite time are fairly solid on all fronts- cosmological, mathematical, metaphysical etc.
No matter how you slice it, infinite time has a contradictory, ghostly sort of pseudo-being without any substantial existence.
Non-being masquerading as process.
I would argue that perhaps you have this backwards. I think of time as a unit of measurement for change. If nothing changes, there is no way to tell time.
:up:
Change, process is primary. Time is a derived abstracted concept.
What do you mean by time being a unit of measurement for change?
Quoting MrLiminal
If nothing changes, then you perceive time!
What I mean is that even things that seems still are still moving on a sub-atomic level. Degenerating into baser elements, electrons moving in the body, etc., We see these changes happening in our reality and use time as a socially constructed metric for comparing what we perceive as the "original state" to the "current state."
If everything in the universe were to suddenly and completely stop moving down to the sub-atomic level, all of reality would grind to a halt, and time as we know it would cease to exist. Not only would we be unable to tell that time is passing, there would be no state change to indicate time has passed at all. And a world where time cannot be measured is arguably a world without time. Ere go, time is a way to measure change.
So things just exist and move and the velocity changes we recognize which we call the adjustment of time. Is really just matter and forces interacting on the capacity to move. Just like matter affects matter with gravity. So does matter affect matter by changing it's capacity to move. Movement creates time. Time need not and doesn't exist separately without movement. Unlike matter or space. Hence I don't think that time is part of the fabric of space. I think matter just affects things such as matter and space which then affect their ability to move through gravity or other means
I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct.
If there is no moment in time, then I cannot exist at any particular moment in time
If there is a duration of time, then I can only exist within this duration of time.
If I exist within a duration of time, this would explain how I am able to perceive a duration of time.
But how long would this duration of time be?
For example, I have the awareness of an event happening now, the memory of an event that happened 1 second ago and the memory of an event that happened 10 years ago.
Would the duration of time be quite short, such as 1 second, or limitless, which would presuppose there is no time at all.
How can we find out how long this duration of time is?
I don't think there is any science which truly reveals how long the present is for a human being, but I've seen reports of lengths up to a couple seconds. This is not the duration of the present, in any objective sense, because human experience is. purely subjective.
Also, I think that when you speak of your awareness of an event which just happened, as part of your experience of the present, I think you need to include your awareness (anticipation) of an event which is about to happen, as part of your awareness of the present.
How can I perceive a duration if I exist within this duration?
I have an experience of the present, and this experience might be a moment of time or might be a duration.
Prior to this moment in time or duration is the past. My memories of past events must be part of my present experience. My anticipation of future events must also be part of my present experience.
I am aware of my existence.
If I existed outside a duration, then I could be objectively aware of it.
In order to subjectively perceive a duration, I cannot exist at only one moment in time, but must exist within this duration.
But if I existed within a duration, then my awareness, which has a duration, cannot be aware of its own duration. My only awareness could be of a timelessness.
It seems that our perceptions may not be of duration but of timelessness.
So I walk. My friend walks two meters away from me..the space we occupy and between is. Is secondary to my friend and I?
What would that mean. That first matter existed and space is just something that existed afterwards as a result from matter existing and changing?
I get that there is a relationship between them. In the traditional sense. in space exists matter and it changes. But I can't imagine matter existing first. It seems more that the relationship is interdependent or that space is primary.
Newton thought of space like an rigid empty box into which events and matter were placed.
Einstein modified space into a deformable box more like a trampoline or sponge, deformable by matter.
Without events (in a completely empty universe) what would the meaning of space be?
Without events in relations to each other how would we measure, experience or conceive of space?
Why not? You have a multitude of senses, a brain, and all sorts of tools within your body, which could enable you to experience the very duration which you live in. Your question is like asking how can I experience the same world which I exist within?
Quoting RussellA
I do not see the logic here.
I exist within a world of trees and mountains, but I am external to these trees and mountains.
The problem arises when I am not external to what I experience.
Can an experience experience itself. Can a thought think about itself.
Can a duration be aware of its own duration?
You're really not making sense Russel. People are not external to their experiences. Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being. It doesn't make sense to talk about experiences which you are external to, or which are external to you.
Quoting RussellA
Sure, Aristotle claimed that thinking about thinking is the highest virtue. Why would you move to exclude the possibility of such activities?
Quoting RussellA
Isn't this the only way that a duration could be accurately measured? The thing experiencing duration must be aware of its own duration in order to measure that duration. This is the case of all measurements, they are inherently subjective, being interpretations made by a subject, of the subject's experience.
That is what constitutes "empirical science", human beings being aware of their own sense experiences, and using conventional tools, established standards, to measure these sense observations. The conventional standards which are applied, are said to be "objective", because they have been justified, but the thing measured is subjective, as a sense observation, and the act of measurement is also subjective, as an act of the subject. So the subject is aware of its own subjectivity, and making measurements of that subjective experience, using objective standards.
Therefore we ought to conclude that a subject can be aware of its own duration, just like it can be aware of any sense experiences, and proceed to make measurements of that duration in a similar way to the way that it makes measurements of any sense observations, by being aware of them, and applying "objective" standards to measure them.
Probably so, in that I am not explaining myself very well.
Trying analogies: i) can one hand wash itself, ii) can a snooker ball at rest start to move without any external force, iii) can the mind be conscious of its own consciousness, iv) can something arise from nothing, v) can there be an effect without a cause, vi) does an evil person think that they are a good person.
Suppose I experience an object moving from right to left. What is the relation between "me" and "my experience"? Is "my experience" external or internal to "me". "My experience" cannot be external to "me", otherwise I wouldn't know about it. Therefore "my experience" must be internal to "me".
However, if "my experience" is internal to "me" but separate to "me" then this is the homunculus problem (Homunculus argument - Wikipedia).
Therefore, "my experience" must be "me", in that I am my experiences rather than I have experiences.
So, if I am my experience, there are not two things, "me" and "my experience", but there is only one thing, "me", where "me" and "my experience" are one and the same thing.
I agree when you say "Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being."
But that means there exists only one thing, "me" This one thing can be called either "me" or "my experience", as they are one and the same thing.
My question is, accepting that one thing can be aware of a second thing, how can one thing be aware of itself?
This takes me back to my analogies, how can one hand wash itself.
How can a single thought think about itself?
How can a single thought that has a duration think about its own duration?
I would answer "yes" to some , "no" to others, so I don't see the relevance.
Quoting RussellA
You are repeating the same basic mistake. You have an experience, within yourself, and you interpret the significance of that experience, as an object moving from right to left.
Notice how your description leaves out a key aspect, the means of sensation by which you drew that conclusion. So instead, your description would be more accurate if you said, I saw something move from right to left, or I heard something move from right to left, or I saw and heard something move from right to left.
When you include this, the means of sensation, you indicate that this part of your experience, seeing that, or hearing that, is not your complete experience. So "an object moving from right to left" is not what you experience, it's an interpretation of a part of your experience, what you saw, heard, etc. The interpretation itself is another part of your experience.
Quoting RussellA
I didn't say it is separate, I said it is "is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being". This means that it is a part of being human, not something separate.
Quoting RussellA
No, my experience is not "me", it is a part of me, just like my heart is, and my brain is, except it is a different type of part of me, a different category.
Quoting RussellA
Do you understand what "an aspect" means? It is impossible that the aspect is the same as the thing it is an aspect of, or else it wouldn't be "an aspect"?
Quoting RussellA
I really do not understand why you think that self-awareness is impossible. Are you not aware of yourself? If you think that you are not self aware, maybe you cold explain why?
Quoting RussellA
A hand can easily wash itself, it uses tools, wash basin, scrub brush, etc.,. You may have experienced this if you've injured a hand. I really think you are placing undue restrictions, and trying to make a problem where there is none to be found. Why do you limit yourself to "a single thought" when you are thinking about duration?
Have you ever noticed that you can think a number of different thoughts at the same time? When you count the number of chairs in a room, you must think about what qualifies as a chair, and also count at the same time. That's how we measure, and make comparisons in general. So, you can see the object move from right to left, and also watch your clock, at the very same time, to measure how long it took. This is because the human experience is made up of many different aspects, all occurring at the same time.
I agree that "my experience" is a part of my being human, not being something separate.
But is it the case that my experiences are a part of me as my heart is a part of me?
My experiences being a part of me suggests that "I" could exist without them. But is this true?
"I" can exist without a heart, as long as I am on a life-support machine, but can "I" exist without my experiences. If "I" had no experiences, would there be an "I"?
"My experiences" are fundamental to the possibility of there being an "I" at all.
As there cannot be an "I" in the absence of experiences, my experiences cannot just be a part of what "I" am.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The words "experience" and "perceive" need to be defined. The word "experience" as with the word "perceive" has more than one meaning.
One meaning is independent of the senses and another meaning involves the sensations.
In the first meaning, contained within the mind, I am experiencing fear and I perceive their fear. In the second meaning, dependent upon the senses, I experience something moving from right to left and I perceive something moving from right to left.
When talking about being able to perceive duration, I would say that perceive is being used in the first sense.
===============================================================================
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am still interested in how we are able to perceive duration.
If I existed at one moment in time, I could not perceive the duration of time.
It is true, however, that if I did exist at one moment in time, I could compare my memory of the object being to the right at time 2pm and being to the left at time 2.05. This would allow me to perceive that there had been a duration of time.
Therefore, in order to be able to perceive the duration in time, it cannot be the case that I exist only at one moment in time, but in some way exist throughout that duration.
I can judge a duration from the viewpoint of one moment in time, but how can I judge a duration when I am part of that duration?
This isn't really true, if it is what is called an essential part. This means that it is a necessary part,
Quoting RussellA
I think it has to do with what I said about being composed of different parts, and comparison between them. The brain compares information from various senses for example. This is like comparing different, yet concurrent experiences. So for example, you see something in the distance, and hear the sound a bit later, you can know from watching your watch how long it took for the sound to arrive relative to the visual image.
Quoting RussellA
That is not perception, it is a deduction. Deduction does not qualify as "perceive" in either of your definitions.
Quoting RussellA
"Judge" is a much better word to use here than "perceive". The problem is that your preferred definition of "perceive" allows ambiguity in the division between what is sensed, and what is produced by judgement. So for example, if you say that you perceive a tree, that there is a thing you perceive, and it is a tree, is actually judgement. Judgement inheres within the perception. The actual sensation is just information. However, the information is always mediated through the brain, and therefore some degree, or form of judgement applied, before it is even present to the conscious mind.
You may want to excluded all judgement from sense perception, and ask whether we can perceive temporal duration. But that is not a realistic version of perception. Then if we allow judgement to inhere within perception, we have the problem of drawing the boundary between judgement prior to conscious judgement, and posterior to conscious judgement.
In other words, it appears to me, that you want to design your definitions of "judge" and "perceive", to allow that you can judge duration if there are moments in time, and deny that we could perceive duration if there are no moments in time. What's the point to this?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
From the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" can mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of, ii) to become aware of through the senses.
As regards sense ii), I perceive something and judge that it is a tree.
As regards sense i), I perceive not a moment in time but a duration of time. Judgment doesn't come into it
In order to be able to perceive not a moment in time but a duration of time, I must exist not at a moment in time but within a duration of time.
If I exist within a duration of time, how can I know that I exist within a duration of time?
The meaning of space if there was no matter? Meaning as in what it IS. Or what the purpose of it would be? If purpose. Does it need a purpose? If you mean what would space be without matter. Space. Rather than the three-dimensional thing we would point to in which matter is. It would be that same thing without matter.
If it is possible for it to exist without matter. As I said I would assume space to be primary or interdependent to matter (including quantum fields and so on) But not secondary.
Time I find to be harder. I don't know. Is it really some "thing" part of space or is it just something that helps us explain motion across extension. And which only emerges because of motion conceptually. And is there in some ultimate sense no time. That sounds very stupid even if I say it myself. But I don't know. Maybe our intuition is just of. Maybe we are bringing something to reality. Maybe everything just happens at the same moment. On the other hand it feels not intelligent to think that even though I am currently home. That when I was at work that it was just happening at the same moment and any notion of past and present and even moment is just arising from motion but isn't really there.
If there was no motion anywhere in the universe. Does time still exist? (Remind yourself if you imagine that scenario that you observing that state assumes motion and you'll probably assume as a result that time would still exist. But does it really since there would be no observer?)
yes I agree. I think time isn't a thing part of space. It's just what we use to explain motion across extension (space). And motion and the natural ability to move is affected by the lack of or presence of other matter and forces. So if nothing moved at all, no time would exist.
As I said, it's basically the same way that you can know anything about the environment which you live in. You can be an extreme skeptic, and deny that you can know anything, but what's the point?
I know about my environment because I can see trees and mountains. But my experience of temporal duration only exists in my mind, and is not something that I can see in my environment.
Therefore, I cannot know about temporal duration in the same way that I know about my environment.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A sceptic may deny that trees and mountains exist in the world. However, a sceptic cannot deny that they experience a sense of temporal duration.
Even for the sceptic, there is a difference between what exists in the mind and what exists outside the mind.
When you look at a tree, do you not see the leaves moving in the breeze? When you look at a mountain, do you not see clouds moving? These activities are indications of temporal duration. In the very same way that you deductively conclude that you can see things called "trees" and "mountains", you can also deductively conclude that you are seeing temporal duration.
The problem here seems to be that you are not allowing that seeing activities qualifies as evidence of seeing temporal duration, yet you do allow that seeing something relatively static, an object, qualifies as evidence of seeing objects like trees and mountains. Therefore I insist that you are being inconsistent in the premises which you accept as true, in producing your deductive your conclusions. You allow that staticity is evidence of something, but you do not allow that activity is evidence of anything.
Quoting RussellA
As explained above, you appear to be biased in your skepticism. You allow that perception of staticity is evidence of something real in the world, objects like trees and mountains, but you disallow that perception of activity is evidence of something real in the world, like temporal duration.
I am assuming by temporal duration we mean that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment in time. As the Planck length is the smallest measurable unit of length, there is a smallest unit of time. ie, a duration.
As you wrote:
I look at the world and can see a tree, static at one moment in time. I can also see the tree bending in the wind, an activity through time.
The static tree is evidence of there being an object, a tree, in the world. The tree actively bending in the wind is evidence of there being temporal duration in the world.
However, I believe that we approach this from different philosophical positions. I assume that you support Direct Realism (though I may be mistaken), whereas I support Indirect Realism.
From your position (if you do support Direct Realism), we perceive the world as it is, where trees and trees bending in the wind exist independently of our perception of them. From my position, the world of trees and trees bending in the wind exist in the mind.
From your position, within the world independent of any observer is temporal duration. From my position, as the world exists in the mind, temporal duration exists in the mind.
Therefore from your position, as the world exists independently of the mind, the temporal duration observed in the world exists external to any observer. From my position, as the world exists in the mind, the temporal duration observed in the world exists in the mind. It follows that for the Indirect Realist, whether there is or there is not temporal duration external to any observer is unknowable.
There is a further problem involved, if we assume that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment. There is then the question of what exactly is a moment. If time itself is continuous duration, then "the moment" is artificial, fictitious, something just made up by us for practical purposes. For example, we assume "a moment" which separates before 7:00 AM from after 7:00 AM, and this moment provides the foundation for measurement. Therefore, if time itself is actually continuous, without moments, yet our measurements of time are dependent on the use of such moments, then our measurements are fundamentally flawed, because they employ a concept which is not representative of time in reality.
Quoting RussellA
I am very skeptical of this statement, and I would ask you to reevaluate. If you saw a tree at a moment in time, how could you ever determine whether that tree is static or not? If activity requires passing time, and there is no passing time in a moment, you would not be able to determine whether the tree is static or active without watching it for a duration.
I do believe that if you reflect on your actual experience, you'd recognize that you do not ever see a tree at one moment in time.
Quoting RussellA
This makes no sense to me.
This is the same problem with space as there may be with time.
The Planck length is the smallest unit of length, approximately equal to 1.616 x 10^-35 meters.
In a sense, our measurements of both space and time may be fundamentally flawed, in that, as there is no position in space, there may be no moment in time.
However, this is not a problem in practice, as the minimum length and duration are so small. The standard metre bar introduced by the French more than 200 years ago has done pretty well at introducing a practical and usable system of linear measurement.
Our measurements may be approximate, but for most situations, approximate measurement are good enough
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Even if time is just moments in time, we still have our memories.
Suppose time is just moments in time and has no duration. When I look at a tree in the present, I see the tree at only one moment in time, and I can only see a static tree.
However, at that moment in time in the present when looking at the tree, I also have a memory of the tree in the past. By comparing the state of the tree in the present to my memory of the tree in the past, I know that the state of the tree has changed, meaning that the tree has moved.
Even if time is just moments in time, because of my memories, I can still distinguish between a static tree and a moving tree.
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Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One's opinion as to whether or not there are fixed moments in time in a large part depends on whether one believes objects such as trees exist independently of being observed (Direct Realism) or objects such as trees only exist in the mind. (Indirect Realism)
In part, when talking about a tree being static or moving, for the Direct Realist this tree (and the space and time it exists within) exists in a world independent of any observer and for the Indirect Realist this tree (and the space and time it exists within) only exists in the mind.
Direct Realism and Indirect Realism are obviously mainstream philosophical positions.
Which bit makes no sense.
Actually, the Stoney scale is roughly 1/10 the duration of the Planck scale in time measurements. These are simply units of measurements, not ultimate bounds in a some philosophical sense. If you were to ride on that photon as it traverses a Planck length, time would vanish completely for you.
I have wondered why certain physical facts about time have not entered into these discussions. For example, as you stand on the side of the road and someone passes you in a car going 60mph, time is measured infinitesimally slower for them compared to you. And someone drifting above you in a balloon measures time infinitesimally faster than you. In the calculus of physics an instant of time is a limit concept, not an established fact.
I don't think these two are similar at all. When we look at things in space, we see all sorts of boundaries, the edges to objects, etc., but we do not find any such boundaries in time. All boundaries in time, except the boundary between future and past, are completely arbitrary. And the boundary between future and past is very indefinite because it's always changing.
So, putting change first, i.e. going by change then trying to work out time.
Kind of rudimentary I suppose.
If so, then it might be possible to formalize duration as a metric, a positive number, and simultaneity as a relation, reflexive, symmetric, not transitive.
(Non-transitive because two simultaneous changes need not have the same duration, but I'm just throwing it out there.)
Time as an abstract could then be the pair metric and relation operating on change.
Don't know if that works, but it seems fairly close to what we do.
I have taken the following from an article by Zhen Liang - IS SPACE DISCRETE? AN INQUIRY INTO THE REALITY OF PLANCK LENGTH AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
For time to vanish sounds philosophical.
Philosophically, in the past, space has been considered infinitely divisible.
Einstein's theory of relativity has changed our conception of space, time and motion, but does not refer to whether space is continuous or not.
As the metaphysical reality of the Planck length is problematic, whether space is infinitely divisible or not, the same seems to apply also to time, whether time is infinitely divisible or not.
Imagine an object moving through space.
Suppose at t = 75 seconds the edge of the object is at x = 1.2 metres. Suppose at t = 80 seconds the edge of the object is at x = 1.6 metres.
As the edge x = 1.2 metres is a boundary between less than 1.2 m and more than 1.2 m, t = 75 seconds is a boundary between less that 75 seconds and more than 75 seconds.
And the point?
There are boundaries in time as well as space. Including the boundary between the present and past.
Your example doesn't show that, because "1.2 metres" requires two boundaries which are determined empirically, and "75 seconds" is designated arbitrarily.
The spatial boundaries are determined by empirical principles, while the temporal boundaries are stipulated arbitrarily.
Yes, we can only know the object the edge of the object is at x = 1.2 metres empirically.
But how can we know that this happens when t = 75 seconds, if not empirically?
Yes, x = 1.2 metres is arbitrary, but also t = 75 seconds is arbitrary.
The spatial measurement is not arbitrary because it must be determined relative to two empirical boundaries, as the distance between them, although the choice of things to measure from may be arbitrary, making the determination arbitrary in a relative sense.
The temporal measurement is completely arbitrary because there are no boundaries within time, so the choice, which designates a spatial positioning as starting and ending point is arbitrary in an absolute sense.
It is interesting that since 2019 the metre has been defined as the length of the path travelled by light in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299 792 458 of a second.
Even distance cannot escape from time.
I think you're missing the point. It's not an issue of whether distance can escape from time. It obviously cannot, as things move therefore distances change, with the passing of time. Nevertheless, things in space have definable position, even if moving, and that provides the basis for spatial measurement. On the other hand, the points in time which serve as the boundaries for measurement are totally arbitrary. So, for example, 1/299 792 458 of a second is completely arbitrary.
An object, or a particle, in space and time can only be at one position at one time (ignoring any debate in quantum mechanics). In other words, a particle in space and time at one moment in time can only be in one position.
I am using the word "arbitrary" as used in your post.
At one moment in time, if a particle is at position A in space then it cannot be at position B in space.
As position A is not position B, there is a spatial distance between A and B. This spatial distance is real, and therefore not arbitrary.
A particle cannot be at position A and B at the same time
Let the particle be at position A at time C and be at position B at time D
There is a temporal duration between C and D. This temporal duration is also real, and therefore also not arbitrary.
That a particle cannot be at two different positions at the same time means that neither spatial distance nor temporal duration are arbitrary.
As I explain, that duration is arbitrary, because C and D are arbitrary points in time. You assume moments in time, but there are no real moments. Therefore, you could have chosen the duration between C and E or C and F or an infinity of other choices. That makes the choice, which determines th e length of duration, arbitrary in an absolute sense.
The supposed object, the particle, is a real empirically observable object, therefore it's position cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real spatial parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of location.
Do you see the difference? The length of the duration is the product of choice in an absolute sense, because the supposed "moments" which constitute C, when the object is at A, and also D, when the object is at B, are inserted by choice (seemingly randomly). On the other hand, the supposed position of the object is restricted by real observations, i.e. truth.
Quoting RussellA
Quantum mechanics is actually very relevant because your chosen object was "a particle". Notice, that in quantum physics, the position of the particle is restricted by the truth of observation (where it is emitted and where it is detected). However, there is time between emission and detection when the particle cannot be said to have a location. This is because spatial location is restricted in the way I described. However, since temporal duration is not restricted in this way, we can still affirm that there is temporal duration during which the particle cannot be located. The arbitrariness of the temporal duration allows that there is a time period when the particle has no location, or every possible location, or however you want to interpret the consequence of this arbitrariness.
I agree when you say "The supposed object, the particle, is a real empirically observable object"
This particle can only exist at one position at one time.
I also agree when you say " therefore it's position cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real spatial parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of location". I agree that when observed, as this particle can only exist at one position, its position has not been arbitrarily chosen.
However, I don't understand why one cannot equally say "therefore it's time cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real temporal parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of time". When observed, as this particle can only exist at one time, its time has not been arbitrarily chosen.
I still don't see the difference you are trying to explain, in that distance is not arbitrary yet duration is arbitrary.
The particle is observed at a position and at a time. Neither are arbitrarily chosen. The position is the position I observe it to be at, and the time is the time I observe it to be at. As I cannot arbitrarily change the position I observe the particle to be at, I cannot arbitrarily change the time I observe the particle to be at.
What would those real temporal parameters consist of? If you think about it, they are all reducible to relative positions. So your starting point, t1, is completely arbitrary. You choose a specific position, and begin. The time itself has nothing within it to indicate to you what position is the starting position.
Quoting RussellA
I don't know, maybe I'm the one who is wrong, who misunderstands. But you haven't been able to explain to me why what I'm saying doesn't jive with your belief, so we're both just not making sense to the other.
Quoting RussellA
I don't believe this, you choose (arbitrarily) what time to observe it. What, do you believe, restricts your choice of when to observe?
No expert on the general theory of relativity or QM here but I think you will find the mathematics in GR does assume space is a continuous entity and that everything works well in the realm of the large but when one tries to apply GR to the smaller scales at which QM works the equations begin to give dubious (infinite) results. We currently work with 4 fundamental forces (strong nuclear, weak nuclear, EM and gravity). There are compatible mathematics for the first 3 which are essentially quantum (discrete not continuous and thus GR is the outlier. The most productive path for the TOE (theory of everything) or Universal Field Theory would seem to be some form of Quantum Gravity (loop, string, etc.) This would imply that neither time nor space are continuous but both would have some kind of discrete quantum formulation.
I am not sure philosophical discussions of time and space which precede our modern physics and which choose to ignore the seeming implications are relevant or reliable. There is no empty space. Space is a Dirac sea of virtual particles which appear and disappear on extremely short time scales. So the notion of empty space (devoid of matter) is purely an abstraction not a realty. There is clearly process and change in the universe (assuming we are not all brains in vat or being deceived by evil demons) but as for some universal fixed absolute time, there is no evidence. All our measures of time depend on some other process, the earth moving around the sun, the earths rotation of its axis, the sun rising and setting, the oscillations of watch spring, or vibrations of a quartz crystal or oscillations of cesium atoms and none of these are absolute all subject to the effects of acceleration or gravity (special relativity). So it would appear there is no absolute time, and time is an abstraction from change. No dimensionless points and no instants of zero duration.
I must be missing what you are saying.
As time is relative, space is relative.
As there is no absolute point in space, there is no absolute point in time.
Therefore, as any starting point in time is arbitrary, then any starting position in space must also be arbitrary.
I agree that philosophy should not ignore modern physics, but this is not necessarily the case with quantum mechanics, where there is still much disagreement.
After just a quick look on the internet:
Sabine Hossenfelder. Did We Get the Double Slit Experiment All Wrong?
Sabine Hossenfelder. Gamechange: Theories Of Everything Cant Exist, Physicists Show.
Sabine Hossenfelder. Why This Nobel Prize Winner Thinks Quantum Mechanics is Nonsense
Sean Carroll. Even Physicists Dont Understand Quantum Mechanics. Worse, they don?t seem to want to understand it.
As you said yourself, the mathematics of General Relativity breaks down at smaller scales.
Philosophy should take into account modern physics, but not those parts of modern physics that remain contentious, such as quantum mechanics, where there is even disagreement amongst the physicists themselves.
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Quoting prothero
Putting what you say into premises and conclusion:
Premise 1 - there is change in the universe
Premise 2 - the measurement of time depends on change
Conclusion - time is change
Premise 2 is a definition, where time is defined as change.
Putting this definition into premise 1, there is time in the universe
The conclusion that time is change is more a premise than it is a conclusion.
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Quoting prothero
It may be that in the future there is a TOE, and even if there is, it may be that this implies that neither space not time are continuous but discrete.
However, so far, this is not the case, so does not tell us at the moment that there are no dimensionless points and no instants of zero duration.
I'd have to present my proposition on that to explain.