Beliefs as emotion

Quoting Banno

Rather I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings.

Very interesting. I can't say I have much to add to this, except that I've often thought people are drawn to beliefs that are emotionally satisfying. I recall Steven Pinker stating that we justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world.

Quoting Banno

Rather I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings.

This is a fact rather than an idea. Reason and emotion are not discrete entities. This is a hurdle it will probably take several more decades for people to get over in all academic fields and likely a century more before in bleeds into common public knowledge.

In philosophical parlance it might be better to frame this all as 'intentionality'? Or maybe not.

Quoting I like sushi

Rather I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings.
— Banno

This is a fact rather than an idea. Reason and emotion are not discrete entities. This is a hurdle it will probably take several more decades for people to get over in all academic fields and likely a century more before in bleeds into common public knowledge.

If one is to take this fact seriously, then one has to understand what we call affect (including mood, emotion and feeling) and what we consider Reason (including logic, cognition and representation) as inseparable aspects of the same phenomenon, and not as separable states, such as the cognitive and the non-cognitive.

Reply to Banno This is an interesting way of helping us see how "belief" really refers to many things, in various combinations. I will definitely read the McCormick piece, thanks.

Quoting I like sushi

This is a fact rather than an idea. Reason and emotion are not discrete entities.

Uhh . . . how do we know it's a fact? Even allowing that "entities" probably isn't the best word. Is it falsifiable?

Quoting Banno

Miriam Schleifer McCormick has made some interesting suggestions, the substance being that we would do well to treat beliefs as an emotion.

The idea sits in a nuanced understanding of emotions as a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states…

…I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings.

Everything in our minds is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states.

Quoting Tom Storm

I recall Steven Pinker stating that we justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world.

I sort of agree with this, although rather than affective, I would say intuitive. Of course, intuition is a thorough mixture of thinking and feeling.

Reply to T Clark Yes, and the whole belief-forming process, as @Banno reminded us, is different depending on the object of the beliefs; what would lead us to form them; how we decide we must justify them; and much more. To me, this leaves room for saying that some beliefs may be formed strictly by rational process, some may be formed strictly by affective/intuitive relations, and many (most) are some combination.

Quoting Tom Storm

Very interesting. I can't say I have much to add to this, except that I've often thought people are drawn to beliefs that are emotionally satisfying. I recall Steven Pinker stating that we justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world.

I think this is true and it has implications for p-zombies. ChatGPT helped me formulate this:

Premise 1:
Humans form beliefs not solely by reason, but through affective (emotional) relationships with the world.
(Empirical claim supported by cognitive science and philosophers like Pinker.)

Premise 2:
Beliefs play a central causal role in human behavior.
(When I say "it's going to rain," that statement reflects a belief that influences whether I grab an umbrella.)

Premise 3:
A p-zombie is defined as being physically and behaviorally identical to a human, yet lacks any subjective experience (qualia), including affect.

Premise 4:
If beliefs are formed and regulated in part through affect, then a creature without affect cannot genuinely form beliefs.

Conclusion 1:
Therefore, p-zombies cannot genuinely have beliefs.

Conclusion 2:
If p-zombies cannot have beliefs, they cannot be behaviorally identical to humans, whose behavior depends on beliefs.

Final Conclusion:
P-zombies are logically incoherent. There is no possible world where a being is both behaviorally identical to a human and completely lacking in consciousness.

Reply to RogueAI This is a good challenge to P-zombies. Notice, though, that an advocate for the possibility of P-zombies would deny Premise 2: "Beliefs play a central causal role in human behavior. (When I say 'it's going to rain,' that statement reflects a belief that influences whether I grab an umbrella.)".

The argument here would go: "What you're calling a belief plays no role whatsoever in human behavior. A 'belief' is epiphenomenal; what causes things to happen is entirely explainable at the level of physics (and brain chemistry). When you say 'It's going to rain," that statement may well reflect a belief, but you're mistaken if you think the belief influences your grabbing an umbrella. Sorry, it's all physical."

I vote for keeping P-zombies to help us understand some of the implications of hardcore physicalism, this being one of them. Personally, I'm committed to beliefs (and reasons) as having an explanatory role, but we can tolerate the zombies as we look into the question. Besides, they're kinda sweet! Like my Roomba.

Quoting J

This is a good challenge to P-zombies. Notice, though, that an advocate for the possibility of P-zombies would deny Premise 2: "Beliefs play a central causal role in human behavior. (When I say 'it's going to rain,' that statement reflects a belief that influences whether I grab an umbrella.)".

The argument here would go: "What you're calling a belief plays no role whatsoever in human behavior. A 'belief' is epiphenomenal; what causes things to happen is entirely explainable at the level of physics (and brain chemistry). When you say 'It's going to rain," that statement may well reflect a belief, but you're mistaken if you think the belief influences your grabbing an umbrella. Sorry, it's all physical."

It's like that old saw: who am I going to believe, the eliminative materialists or my own lying mind? It seems like a desperate move to make to rescue p-zombies.

Reply to RogueAI And yet it's standard physicalism -- Dennett, the Churchlands. I don't believe P-zombies could exist either, but we ought to allow them in our thought experiments since they show what would have to be true if they existed, and that's worth knowing. Eliminative materialists don't see it as a desperate move at all, just science. We need to understand why.

Reply to J "but we ought to allow them in our thought experiments since they show what would have to be true if they existed"

I started a thread here about that awhile back. I keep trying to picture my pzombie equivalent getting shitfaced after a stressful day and not being able to. I get wasted because it feels good. But that motivation isn't available to my pzombie counterpart, so why on Earth would he do it? Also, let's suppose there's a possible world Earth populated by pzombies. Consciousness just never happened in this world. Woudn't the vocabulary of pzombieEarth be radically reduced? How and why would pzombies have words for consciousness? Or any emotions? I suppose their vocabulary would reflect mental states that have obvious physical analogues, like screaming during intense pain, but what about mental states that don't get physically expressed, like boredom or contemplation or mild enjoyment? Why would they have words for any of that?

ETA: Also, would pzombie world have tortures?

Quoting RogueAI

I keep trying to picture my pzombie equivalent getting shitfaced after a stressful day and not being able to. I get wasted because it feels good. But that motivation isn't available to my pzombie counterpart, so why on Earth would he do it?

Let's imagine something more on the lines of Roomba. We could, I suppose, install a program in a Roomba-like robot that would respond to "hard day" (vacuuming!) by "drinking some oil" to loosen the tired ball-bearings. Or whatever, I'm not going take much time on the details. Point is, the robot would still not be feeling anything, but a sort of evolutionary reason has been given to them for engaging in the things that would make them feel good if they had that ability. As it stands, all that happens is that Roomba is better able to do their job; all the action is at the physical level.

You see, it forces the question, Why does getting wasted make you feel good? The argument here would be that the good feeling of being wasted is quite ancillary to the real work being done, namely some kind of resetting of brain activity so as to better cope with life . . . not sure what actually does happen, chemically, but we agree that something does. Mother Evolutionary Nature has cleverly tricked you into thinking that her point is for you to feel better -- ha! As if! The same thing would happen if there was no (conscious) you!

In short, I think we still haven't eliminated P-zombies on purely logical grounds. The story I just told is no more absurd than the one about how my beliefs don't really do the heavy lifting I think they do. There is nothing so implausible that a P-zombie couldn't partake, I'm betting. The only way to get rid of P-zombies is to get rid of the physicalist premise on which they're based.

Reply to Banno The examples of these blended beliefs given in the article are:

"The following examples point to states which are difficult to characterize given the standard view: Anna, who suffers from [1] Capgras syndrome, believes her husband is an impostor even though she has no evidence for it and much against it; she also fails to take the kind of actions one would expect with such a belief such as running away or calling the authorities. [2] Balthasar believes the glass skywalk is safe and yet trembles as he tries to walk on it. [3] Charu believes that their lover will keep their promise to not betray them again even though past evidence indicates that they will, and [4] David believes that the God as described in the Bible exists, though he is aware of the evidence suggesting that such a God does not exist and claims his reasons for believing are not based in evidence."

Breaking then down:

1 appears to be a delusion coupled with irrationality, suggesting general confusion. It's not clear really what she "believes." Perhaps she doubts her delusion. Don't all beliefs contain doubt? We often do speak of the reliability of our beliefs, some more doubtable than others (particularly Descartes).

2 could be considered the same as 1 to the extent he doubts his belief as evidenced by his conduct. On the other hand, I'm not sure this one has much to do with belief. That is, his fear is just an emotional reaction. A person fearing heights doesn't stand away from the rail because he thinks he'll fall. It's just that heights scarec him. Stage fright isn't a belief you'll die. It's just misplaced fear.

3 is hope. It's what makes us take chances, to gamble, to chase dreams. It's the belief that belief makes things possible. Tracht gut vet zein gut as they say (and by they, I mean me). Of course, in the example given, it might be foolish belief.

4 sounds Kierkegaardian as a leap of faith, or perhaps James' pragmatic will to believe. The will to believe is an explicit combination of desire and belief and really forms the basis of his theory as to certain matters.

And Hume explicitly stated that reason is the slave to the passions. As in, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." Which i take to mean emotions set things in motion and we use reason to justify them. This would mean that our reason based beliefs had to start with some emotion.

I suppose my greater point is that I think McCormick is correct in her observation, but what's she's saying is fairly obvious generally and something historically recognized. That it is being treated as a revelation might speak to the rigidity of certain anglo analytic systems, where emotion had been extracted from the hyper logical methodology.

As in, we in the regular world knew all along our beliefs were messy.

Quoting Tom Storm

I recall Steven Pinker stating that we justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world.

Yeah, pretty much. The belief is prior to the argument. But are we amenable to rational persuasion with regard to our beliefs? And to what extent? Should a mental state that is not amenable to persuasion based on evidence or justification properly be called a belief? That's the direction this discussion might go.

Quoting I like sushi

This is a fact rather than an idea.

Quoting T Clark

Everything in our minds is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states.

As Reply to J says, how do we know? Let's aim not to make pronouncements but to map out the territory - what part of belief is cognitive, what is connotative, and how do they relate? Quoting Joshs

...we consider Reason (including logic, cognition and representation) as inseparable aspects of the same phenomenon, and not as separable states

The obverse and reverse sides of a coin are inseparable, but that does not prevent us considering them separately as required. we might map how they relate and how they differ. We take the blanket statements and map out the where or how.

Quoting Banno

But are we amenable to rational persuasion with regard to our beliefs? And to what extent? Should a mental state that is not amenable to persuasion based on evidence or justification properly called a belief? That's the direction this discussion might go.

If Bob has an irrational fear of snakes, does he believe snakes are dangerous?

Reply to Hanover Thanks for this reply.

You ask if all beliefs contain doubt. The obvious counterexample is the hinge beliefs @Sam26 has urged on us, and with which I mostly agree. Do we say that, because these are undoubted, they are not genuine beliefs? Or do we separate the cognitive view that such hinges are indubitable from the connotative view that nevertheless, I might be wrong...

So if someone does not doubt that 2+2 is 4, do we discount this as a belief becasue it is indubitable?

How do we represent that Balthasar agrees the glass skywalk is safe but refuses to walk on it? If we say that since he holds that "the skywalk is safe", that he believes the skywalk is safe? Or do we say instead that because he will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?

Charu's decision, let us supose, is against the odds - a bookmaker would say the lover will stray again. But Charu wants the bookmaker to be wrong, and so apparently acts irrational. Except that there is no possibility of the bookmaker being wrong if Charu does not trust her lover. Given her desire to stay with her lover, the decision to trust is rational.

David's belief is not to be subjected to doubt. What are we to say here - again, that it's not a proper belief becasue it is indubitable? Or is it, as is so often supposed, the very epitome of belief precisely becasue it is undoubted despite the evidence?

Plenty of material here, plenty to consider.

Quoting frank

If Bob has an irrational fear of snakes, does he believe snakes are dangerous?

If his fear is irrational - he refuses to touch a Child's Python, perhaps - despite knowing that he will not be hurt - then isn't he is afraid, but does not believe the snake to be dangerous?

Reply to Banno When he's panicking, he definitely thinks the snake is dangerous.

Other times, he may know the fear is irrational. He may even be a little baffled that this fear can take over in spite of his rational mind's insight.

Quoting J

You see, it forces the question, Why does getting wasted make you feel good? The argument here would be that the good feeling of being wasted is quite ancillary to the real work being done, namely some kind of resetting of brain activity so as to better cope with life . . . not sure what actually does happen, chemically, but we agree that something does. Mother Evolutionary Nature has cleverly tricked you into thinking that her point is for you to feel better -- ha! As if! The same thing would happen if there was no (conscious) you!

So under that logic, when someone’s being tortured, the screaming, the begging, the sheer mental agony—that’s all just “ancillary”? The real story is just neurons firing and behavior patterns playing out? That’s absurd. You're telling me the conscious experience of extreme suffering isn’t actually doing any of the work—that it's just along for the ride while the “real” causal machinery is physical brain activity? Come on. If you actually believed that, you'd have to say the same torture could happen to a philosophical zombie with no inner life, and it would be just as tragic. But you don’t believe that. Nobody does. The experience is the point. The suffering is not a side effect—it's the core reality. It's why the torture victim breaks.

I'm not claiming that that's your position, you're just telling the eliminative materialist side of the story. It's not a compelling story.

Quoting Banno

sushi
Everything in our minds is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states.
— T Clark
As ?J says, how do we know? Let's aim not to make pronouncements but to map out the territory - what part of

This is from a review of a book from 2007 by Antonio Damasio, a well known neuroscientist. It’s from Vanderbilt University, but I can’t find a specific source or an author for it.

In his book, Descartes’ Error Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Antonio Damasio discusses the connection between feelings, reason and the body. His hypothesis is that the three are completely interconnected and that it is impossible to discuss the functions of one without realizing that the other two play a role. This is an important idea as for centuries, scientists considered the body to be a separate entity from the brain.

So the answer to your question about how we know about the interaction of emotion and thinking is that it is a subject of studyby neuroscientist. and psychologists.

Reply to T Clark There's no conceptual work to do here?

But what of the issues raised in Reply to Hanover and Reply to Banno?

And in the cited articles? Or the SEP articles on belief and emotion?

Quoting Banno

There's no conceptual work to do here?

I’m not sure what you mean by “conceptual work.” If you mean I think all of the aspects of the question being studied by Damasio and others have been addressed, that’s certainly not true.

Quoting Banno

But what of the issues raised in ?Hanover and ?Banno?

You and he are talking about completely different aspects of emotion and reason than I am. From where I stand, the issues I was discussing are much more fundamental. I looked at the abstract of the article you linked.

Quoting RogueAI

I keep trying to picture my pzombie equivalent getting shitfaced after a stressful day and not being able to. I get wasted because it feels good.

Think of an AI simulating human behavior. This ai would get shitfaced, because humans get shitfaced and it's been trained to do what humans do. Somewhere internally to the AI there is a decision being made, the neutral network takes in all data and internal states, and this time "get shitfaced" comes on top with the highest weight. So the AI goes to the liquor cabinet and starts doing whisky shots. All without the slightest affective state.

we are driven by affective states, but why is this necessary? It's not for AI, it's not for amoeba, and presumably it's not for p zombies.

Quoting T Clark

You and he are talking about completely different aspects of emotion and reason than I am.

Yep. That'll be 'cause we're on the topic. And read more than just the abstract.

The following examples point to states which are difficult to characterize given the standard view: Anna, who suffers from Capgras syndrome, believes her husband is an impostor even though she has no evidence for it and much against it; she also fails to take the kind of actions one would expect with such a belief such as running away or calling the authorities. Balthasar believes the glass skywalk is safe and yet trembles as he tries to walk on it. Charu believes that their lover will keep their promise to not betray them again even though past evidence indicates that they will, and David believes that the God as described in the Bible exists, though he is aware of the evidence suggesting that such a God does not exist and claims his reasons for believing are not based in evidence.

To me the natural conclusion from examples like these is that we have propositional attitudes and we have affective attitudes, and these do not always coincide. To say that beliefs are emotions just muddies the water. We just don't always feel the way they think, humans are built such that these are autonomous enough to disagree sometimes.

"Belief" sometimes refers to propositional attitudes, and sometimes propositional and affective attitudes together. But that's is nothing essential, it's just how we use language. Beyond mere language use, affective attitudes are not propositional attitudes, as these examples clearly indicate.

Reply to hypericin Checking if I've understood... are you suggesting that belief is a propositional attitude, and that we also have affective attitudes, and that these are unrelated?

Quoting hypericin

Think of an AI simulating human behavior. This ai would get shitfaced, because humans get shitfaced and it's been trained to do what humans do. Somewhere internally to the AI there is a decision being made, the neutral network takes in all data and internal states, and this time "get shitfaced" comes on top with the highest weight. So the AI goes to the liquor cabinet and starts doing whisky shots. All without the slightest affective state.

we are driven by affective states, but why is this necessary? It's not for AI, it's not for amoeba, and presumably it's not for p zombies.

That's true, but remember pzombies are supposed to be identical to us except for lacking subjective experience. Humans aren't ai's.

Would a rational AI, one with a programmed “drive” for self-preservation, ever choose to do something totally reckless—like snort fentanyl—knowing it could likely die from it? No. Not unless it was explicitly programmed with some bizarre override to ignore its self-preservation "instinct". But if that’s the case, you’ve stopped modeling a rational agent and started writing sci-fi code. That’s not a human—it’s a toy robot with bad instructions.

Quoting Banno

unrelated

That is too strong. Nothing in the same brain is unrelated. Affective and propositional attitudes inform one another, and they coincide with one another more often than not. Rather than"unrelated" I would say "distinct".

Quoting hypericin

That is too strong.

Yeah, agreed.

So can we always seperate out the affective and cognitive aspects of a belief? Is there a method, rule or algorithm that does this for us? I'm thinking not.

Quoting Banno

So if someone does not doubt that 2+2 is 4, do we discount this as a belief becasue it is indubitable?

"Indubitable" summons Descartes, so from Mediations:

“I clearly and distinctly perceive that existence is contained in the idea of God, just as clearly and distinctly as I perceive that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle.”

This speaks to the logically necessary and therefore indubitable (which he includes geometry and God), which i suspect is different from a Wittgensteinian hinge indubitable, meaning those things we can't question in a game playing arena. Those would be foundational rules. And I think of Kantian intuitions, also indubitable (e.g. time and space), but only insofar as necessary to provide us any ability to understand the world.

The point is you're asking about "on certainty" and how that is a different category than belief, and this question seems central to Western philosophy in terms of asking what we can debate and what we cannot across different founding father philosophers (as it were).

But nothing is straight forward because some do challenge whether the indubitable can be doubted. Consider transubstantiation, that miraculous concept pondered for thousands of years how the trinity can be a unity, leaving us with a word called 'triunity."

And I do think the major challenges will come from religion because it posits a very different view toward knowledge justifications (i.e. faith versus rationalism/empiricism).

Quoting Banno

Or do we say instead that because he will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?

My father, despite his very scientific background, would not fly on airplanes, would not ride glass elevators, and insisted upon lower floors in hotels so he could make it out before being consumed by the one in a million hotel fire. I truly don't know what he believed. Curiously, he died a fiery death when an airplane struck him on the 40th floor of a hotel while, you guessed it, in a glass elevator (a joke). Phobias don't strike me as beliefs as much as just irrational fear, rooted in the psyche, maladapting to something in the past. I once asked him why he'd get on a ship and not a plane. He told me he could swim but couldn't fly, and he was super proud of that retort. Beats me.

Quoting Banno

Given her desire to stay with her lover, the decision to trust is rational.

Playing the lotto is rational if you wish to win because you can't win if you don't play. Believing you will win is a different matter. Maybe some believe they'll actually win, like some believe they'll one day become a princess or rock star or whatever fantasy one might have. And let's not overlook the pessimists who are sure they'll fail despite all they have going for them.

I suspect this has to do with the J of K=JTB, where it is inherently subjective. That is, if I give a justification for my belief, it can count as knowledge, and my justification is valid if I subjectively accept it. If I believe I'll win the lotto because I believe myself God's special creature, then it's belief. I dont think McCormick can deny certain justifications for belief as invalid justvbecause they contain an emotive basis. I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. . That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief. But a belief nonetheless. Quoting Banno

David's belief is not to be subjected to doubt. What are we to say here - again, that it's not a proper belief becasue it is indubitable?

This is faith based belief, the topic of a whole other thread. Those of certain religious worldviews would see this one as so obviously intertwined with the mystical, the emotive, the super rational, that McCormick 's thesis would appear elementary. That is, no kidding, my belief in God relies upon justifications a non-believer would never accept?

Reply to Banno Everything that is consciousness is directedness. Ergo, there is always emotional content. What we feel is driven and what is driven is felt.Reply to J

Quoting Banno

what part of belief is cognitive, what is connotative, and how do they relate?

You believe this is a valid question. I do not believe it is a valid question. I may be taking the 'part' as a literally distinction. Do you you believe the left hemisphere of your brain is logical and your right hemisphere is emotional? Some people still believe this. It is massive misrepresentation of brain function.

If I attempt to read into what you are asking as meaning "what is it that moves us more towards logical analysis than to listen to our intuition" I would probably say the novelty of the experience and the time we have to think about it play a major role in this. Low resolution heuristics that work on multiple fronts are a good stop gap. With more time to mull over and get to the bottom of something undoubtedly we apply more rigour if the set of circumstances allow.

Maybe you are referring to unconscious brain activity? Even there I would be sceptical, but a little more open maybe (not a lot).

If I am way off the mark of what you are asking questions about let me know. Good chance I am :)

Quoting I like sushi

Everything that is consciousness is directedness. Ergo, there is always emotional content. What we feel is driven and what is driven is felt.

Does my air conditioner fit that, then? It intends to keep the room at 22ºc. Does it feel satisfied when it achieves it's goal, and frustrated by the frost?

A hackneyed argument to be sure, but it carries some import.

Perhaps we might avoid equating some brain state to "believing that..." at least until we have a clear way of setting out what a brain state is? No need to jump the gun.

Reply to Banno So you are asking about what consciousness is then? I have no answer for that.

This from the link:

What does it mean to believe? The traditional philosophical view of belief is that it's a rational cognitive affair, evidence based and directed toward truth. According to this account, things like delusion and religious belief are "edge cases", exceptions that prove the rule. But this week we're considering not only that belief may be closely tied to emotion, but that it may actually be a form of emotion itself.

Is gibberish. No neuroscientist would pay any real attention to what is being said here because it is so wide of the mark.

The hidden premise is that rational thought and emotional thought are separate entities. This is, as I said initially, equivalent to people believing the left hemisphere is rational and the right is emotional.

Reply to Hanover Lots in that.

So if something... some statement, be it form Descartes, Kant or Wittgenstein, is indubitable, will we count it as a belief? Seem to me we do. Should we? I'd have supposed that the statements of which we are certain form a subset of the statements which we believe. Am I mistaken?

You father seems an eminently sensible fellow. If being in an upper room causes anxiety, it would not be conducive to a good night's sleep. It would be irrational to do so.

I had hoped to keep the god bothering at bay.

Quoting I like sushi

emotional thought

Not too sure what that is.

Why should we give the last word on this to neuroscience?

Quoting Banno

Why should we give the last word on this to neuroscience?

Because it makes us feel better about the argument. :wink:

Quoting RogueAI

I'm not claiming that that's your position, you're just telling the eliminative materialist side of the story. It's not a compelling story.

Right on both counts. But I think part of a philosopher's job is to understand, not merely refute. To me, eliminative materialism/physicalism is not compelling, but Daniel Dennett (to pick one) was an extremely smart guy, and if we don't put ourselves in his mental shoes and try to work out his perspective, we'll just be creating a strawman to call "not compelling." We'd also be committed to the position that Dennett was the sort of thinker who is compelled by something obviously not compelling . . . hmm, not too likely.

So, no offense, but "That's absurd" and "Come on!" and "But you don’t believe that. Nobody does" doesn't get us very far. You raise an interesting point about the ethical implications of possible P-zombie-hood: Is it tragic (and morally abhorrent) when a zombie is tortured, if the creature can't feel anything? Well, let's say the answer is no. What would you say should follow from that, about the plausibility of physicalism?

Reply to T Clark I don't really object to the idea that what goes on in the mind is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states. @i like sushi's position was stronger: They claimed it to be a fact that "Reason and emotion are not discrete entities." That is quite different, indeed contradictory to your position. You can't have a blend of A and B if they are aren't discrete in some way. Similar to the point Banno makes here:

Quoting Banno

The obverse and reverse sides of a coin are inseparable, but that does not prevent us considering them separately as required. We might map how they relate and how they differ.

A possible middle ground might be that there are no "entities" called reason and emotion, and that we can separate them only conceptually, not physically. If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond?

Quoting J

If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond?

Are you going to ask for the conceptual distinction between Hesperus and Phosphorus too. I am not being facetious here, maybe there is value in this? I have been interested in phenomenology for a long time now.

Quoting J

Right on both counts. But I think part of a philosopher's job is to understand, not merely refute. To me, eliminative materialism/physicalism is not compelling, but Daniel Dennett (to pick one) was an extremely smart guy, and if we don't put ourselves in his mental shoes and try to work out his perspective, we'll just be creating a strawman to call "not compelling." We'd also be committed to the position that Dennett was the sort of thinker who is compelled by something obviously not compelling . . . hmm, not too likely.

So, no offense, but "That's absurd" and "Come on!" and "But you don’t believe that. Nobody does" doesn't get us very far.

No, but eliminative materialism is just so out there you reach an axiomatic level where further argument is pointless. What more can you say when someone denies consciousness, other than 'you can't actually believe that?' There's no evidence or arguments you can muster at that point. The person is denying one of the few indisputable truths about reality.

ETA: And an eliminative materialist, if they're being honest, would get the eyeroll. They would know it's coming. They know what they're proposing is extremely counterintuitive. They might then say, "wait, think about these intuition pumps" and to give Dennett credit, he is very clever.

Quoting RogueAI

Would a rational AI, one with a programmed “drive” for self-preservation, ever choose to do something totally reckless—like snort fentanyl—knowing it could likely die from it? No. Not unless it was explicitly programmed with some bizarre override to ignore its self-preservation "instinct". But if that’s the case, you’ve stopped modeling a rational agent and started writing sci-fi code. That’s not a human—it’s a toy robot with bad instructions.

AIs simulate, they aren't rational agents outside their ability to simulate of agents who may, sometimes, be rational. If we made AIs that modeled the range of human behavior, there would absolutely be AIs that snort fentanyl.

Quoting hypericin

AIs simulate, they aren't rational agents outside their ability to simulate of agents who may, sometimes, be rational. If we made AIs that modeled the range of human behavior, there would absolutely be AIs that snort fentanyl.

But a pzombie is supposed to be a non-conscious duplicate of me, and I am a rational agent, so if the pzombie isn't a rational agent, it's not a pzombie.

Quoting Banno

So can we always seperate out the affective and cognitive aspects of a belief? Is there a method, rule or algorithm that does this for us? I'm thinking not.

Maybe not a failsafe rule. But I think we can reasonably analyze many cases.

Anna cognitively believes her husband is an impostor, in a way that is inflexible to evidence. But affectively she does not, since she does not behave accordingly.

Balthazar cognitively believes the skywalk is safe. But affectively, at least when he is on it, he does not.

Charu cognitively and affectively believes their lover, despite evidence.

David cognitively and affectively believes in his god, despite evidence.


But generally, no. That is why we pay therapists for years to try (and usually fail) to figure out this kind of stuff.

Reply to RogueAI If it is a p-zombie of you, then presumably it wouldn't snort fentanyl either, just get shitfaced.

Quoting J

A possible middle ground might be that there are no "entities" called reason and emotion, and that we can separate them only conceptually, not physically.

But that’s the way it works. We humans create entities with fixed boundaries while the world moves around like a swirl. Much of the thinking we do is going back and reworking some of those boundaries.

The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao.

Quoting T Clark

The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao.

So even the eternal Tao is not the eternal Tao.

Quoting Jamal

So even the eternal Tao is not the eternal Tao.

You betcha.

McCormick's paper reminds me a lot of the distinction between Bayesian prediction and Bayesian decision theory. (Very briefly: In all statistical inference there is a parameterized model and some data. From these we can make a likelihood. Frequentist statistics stops here and does what it can with the likelihood. Bayesian prediction adds a prior. Bayesian decision theory adds a prior and a utility function.)

There's a lot of talk these days about Bayesianism in relation to the brain by neuroscientists and psychologists and some AI researchers. Bayes' theorem provides a way of updating your prior beliefs when given new evidence. We're told the brain is a prediction machine. And so on.

A lot of this talk ignores the utility function that is essential for Bayesian decision making. The brain is NOT a prediction machine. It is a decision machine. The brain must have something which serves the same kind of purpose as a utility function. It seems that when we are conscious of a value that is calculated by this utility function it is experienced by us as a feeling. I do not know the answer to the question "How does something compute so hard it begins to feel?". But I'm pretty sure I do know the nature of the computation that is taking place when we feel.

This means I kind of like the direction in which McCormick is going in her paper.

I don't like the notion of a 'blend' of cognition and feeling. In Bayesian decision theory the posterior is analogous to cognition or knowledge, and the utility function to feelings. They are both essential to the decision making process in the same way that the rim and the spokes of a bicycle wheel are both essential to the proper functioning of the wheel. But we are not talking about a puree of rim and spokes. Their roles are very distinct. I do not expect the brain, a complicated, messy product of the very inefficient optimization process known as evolution, to contain any nice neat separations, but just calling it a blend is not good enough.

There is something - you might call it "a subjective justification for a decision" - which combines cognition and feelings. I don't know (and I don't much care) whether 'belief' is a sensible name for this something.

Quoting J

A possible middle ground might be that there are no "entities" called reason and emotion, and that we can separate them only conceptually, not physically. If that's what sushi meant, I'd to hear more about the conceptual distinction. To what does it correspond?

The idea that we can seperate reason and emotion physically is surely a category error?

Reply to I like sushi Hesperus and Phosphorus rigidly designate Venus. Two names for the same thing. Is the suggestion that reason and emotion are the same thing?

It would be interesting to see this filled out.

Quoting T Clark

A possible middle ground might be that there are no "entities" called reason and emotion, and that we can separate them only conceptually, not physically.
— J

But that’s the way it works. We humans create entities with fixed boundaries while the world moves around like a swirl. Much of the thinking we do is going back and reworking some of those boundaries.

The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao.

Well, yeah, but . . . at the level of the Tao, of course all the boundaries and categories are arbitrary. More mundanely, we're happy to talk about some things being physical entities and others not. It may not be eternally true, but it's how we do business, so to speak. At that level, I'm suggesting that rational processes and emotions could be discriminated either as actual physical events, or as "two sides of one coin"-type events, with only conceptual discrimination. I don't think jumping to the Tao level is much of an answer, since it would settle any question whatsoever about discrimination, and we're wanting something more specific.

Quoting J

I don't think jumping to the Tao level is much of an answer

Yes, as per our PM conversation. Quoting T Clark

The Tao that can be named is not the eternal Tao...

...says nothing. In explaining everything, the Tao explains nothing. There's still the work to do; we still carry water, gather wood. That's why this:Quoting T Clark

Everything in our minds is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states.

contributes nothing.

Quoting Banno

In explaining everything, the Tao explains nothing. There's still the work to do; we still carry water, gather wood.

Sure. The Tao Te Ching is metaphysics, not science. Metaphysics doesn't explain anything. Good metaphysics gives us hints about where to look for answers. By your logic, materialism, idealism, realism, anti-realism, and all the other isms also explain nothing.

Quoting Banno

That's why this:
Everything in our minds is a blending of cognitive and non-cognitive states.
— T Clark
contributes nothing.

No. As I noted above, Taoism is metaphysics. The way our minds work is science. I'll repeat part of the quote I used in an earlier post in this thread:

Antonio Damasio discusses the connection between feelings, reason and the body. His hypothesis is that the three are completely interconnected and that it is impossible to discuss the functions of one without realizing that the other two play a role.

If you think this incorrect, fine. It's still a statement of fact. Science. If it is true, it provides a pretty good answer to your question.

Are beliefs emotions? Of course not. That doesn't even mean anything.

Quoting T Clark

By your logic, materialism, idealism, realism, anti-realism, and all the other isms also explain nothing.

Now you're getting it.

Is Damasio's idea an hypothesis, as your quote says, or a fact, as you claim?

Quoting J

Well, yeah, but . . . at the level of the Tao, of course all the boundaries and categories are arbitrary.

It was probably a mistake for me to bring up the Tao in this thread. It sometimes, often, throws a monkey wrench in the machinery of discussions, but I have a hard time helping myself. I recognize that's not much of an excuse.

No, the boundaries are not arbitrary at all. Setting up distinctions and boundaries is something humans do.

Quoting J

I'm suggesting that rational processes and emotions could be discriminated either as actual physical events, or as "two sides of one coin"-type events, with only conceptual discrimination.

You've identified two unrelated possible solutions to this question 1) rational processes and emotions are physical events and 2) they are two sides of one coin.

If 1) is the right answer, I'll repeat what I just responded to @Banno.

Antonio Damasio discusses the connection between feelings, reason and the body. His hypothesis is that the three are completely interconnected and that it is impossible to discuss the functions of one without realizing that the other two play a role.

If the position I attributed to Damasio in previous posts is correct, they can't be discriminated at all, at least not when they function as mental processes.

As for 2), isn't this just another way of saying what I did with different words?

Quoting J

I don't think jumping to the Tao level is much of an answer, since it would settle any question whatsoever about discrimination, and we're wanting something more specific.

I can find quotes from the Tao Te Ching and Chang Tzu that address this issue, but they would likely confuse things more and I've already gotten in enough trouble. Any distinction, not matter how specific, is made, as I said, by humans.

Quoting Banno

I’m interested in the idea of a blended state, where a belief is seen as consisting of both cognition and feelings.

I have yet to read the article, but, as just an initial response, I would think we need to consider the topic in relation (say apart from) the classic, problematic division of (certain) knowledge and (irrational) “belief”, also termed “emotivism”. I do think there is a distinction (and thus a connection) to be made between what is believed and something more, say, our relation to it.

I appreciate @Hanover pointing out that “belief” is used as a catch-all phrase for what is actually different things (hope, resolve, etc.). Wittgenstein claimed that belief works as a hypothesis (I believe it is raining), PI pp. 190-192. In relation to the discussion @Banno brings up, I would suggest that the “emotionality” of belief, put another way, is that something matters to us, because one thing belief is singular for is that it is me that is believing in it (my reasons is categorically different than the idea of rationality). So the way it works is that: I will stand up for my beliefs, I can be compromised in relation to them, I must evidence my faith in them by my actions; I am responsible for what I belief in a different way than a fact, which is true without me. The “truth” of belief is my willingness to remain true to it.

Quoting Banno

Is Damasio's idea an hypothesis, as your quote says, or a fact, as you claim?

I used the wrong words. I meant it is subject to being judged as true or false.

Quoting Banno

Is Damasio's idea an hypothesis, as your quote says, or a fact, as you claim?

My use of words was unclear. What I meant to say was that what Damasio claims is subject to judgment as true or false as opposed to metaphysical statements that have no truth value.

Reply to T Clark Ok, that makes more sense.

Frankly I'm not sure we have a point of disagreement. I'd put silentism were you put the Tao.

I don't think we would have the terms cognitive and the connotative if there were nothing to be saidhere. And that 's what this thread is about mapping out.

Quoting Banno

Frankly I'm not sure we have a point of disagreement.

Reply to T Clark No, no thumbs up. Its not a good thing. Disagree with me! Show me were I'm wrong!

Quoting Banno

No, no thumbs up. Its not a good thing. Disagree with me! Show me were I'm wrong!

I was going to make a smart alec report in that same general vein, but I thought I would give us both a victory instead.

Reply to Antony Nickles Good to see you here.

Those different things – hope, resolve, and so on – are they but species of belief?

The standard analysis has three parts: attitude, the believer and the statement believed. A simple account might have the cognition found in the statement, the emotion found in the attitude, and as you suggest the responsibility in the individual. Bringing in responsibility is a neat twist.

I'm plotting a post linking belief to action, something only addressed obliquely in the article.

Hope you have time to read an consider the article.

Quoting Banno

Hope you have time to read an consider the article.

Flip, flip, flip

Reply to Banno My point was although these terms are referring to the same physical item it is referring to it in different states.

All of this does remind me of a discussion I tried to start over a decade ago about 'belief' and its various uses and connotations. It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context.

In the article the argue a point that is applicable to every facet of human experience. Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something. What is attended to falls into the realm of 'belief' what is out-of-sight is assumed as too rigid to require our attention.

An example would be the Earth under our feet. We can attend to the idea of the planet Earth, but for the vast majority of the time we certainly do not. The 'belief' in Earth is only apparent once we attend to it.

What I read in the paper is someone's take on some degree of belief rather than seeing this as ubiquitous in all cognitive activities. Meaning, if they think belief is neither purely cognitive nor connotative, then where is the distinction between anything else going on in the brain? Nothing happening in our brains is one or the other.

The differences being talked about can only be abstractions.

4 CONCLUSION

It has been recognized that certain states are hard to categorize, that even though they are belief-like, they do not behave as the standard philosophical view of belief says they should. I have proposed instead that we view these examples as exposing that this view of belief is overly narrow and that we explore ways of theorizing about belief that does not force us to exclude these states as real beliefs. I have here argued that a way of addressing the problem is to conceive of beliefs as kinds of emotions, where emotions contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. Even if one has not been convinced, I hope the discussion has revealed that reflection on these problematic states should push us to explore belief's complexity.

If anyone is not convinced all they need to do is study the cognitive neurosciences. No need to conceive of beliefs as emotions, just understand that all brain states can be expressed as emotional.

Quoting I like sushi

these terms are referring to the same physical item

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things?

Quoting I like sushi

It did shock me how many people took 'belief' to mean 'unsubstantiated' irrespective of the context.

Yeah, I concur. But we have agreement that the topic is wider than that, including at least substituted statements that are held to be true.

Quoting I like sushi

...all brain states can be expressed as emotional.

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience.

Quoting Banno

Hang on - again, is the suggestion that reason and emotion are physical things?

No. I imagine there is something to looking at physical evidence. I am sure someone with a materialistic stance would hold that view though.

Quoting Banno

Care to fill this out? It doesn't match my understanding of the state of neuroscience.

My mistake. Conscious and attentive states. Obviously there are automated states, but as we are talking about affective states (belief and general cognition) then it is true enough.

This is why I was curious as to your interest here as being about what consciousness is.

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content.

Brain States are attended to by Conscious States > affective states. On their own a Brain State is pretty meaningless. This is the general consensus.

In a rough attempt to explain this more clearly, it aligns with what I was saying earlier regarding our appreciation of being on Earth. We do not walk around with the concept of The Earth disentangled from our being, yet when attended to we cannot do so without emotional context, because everything we attend to requires emotional context. We can possess a Brain State that 'pushes' the concept of Earth into the background to the point that 'belief' no longer has meaning. It is just part of the mapping we've done left unattended. I know my name (Conscious State) but I do not always attend to it (Brain State).

Of course, there are alternative ideas like global network theory, but that is seemingly irrelevant to this line of discussion as it frames such as physical only - that is not to say such data cannot verify certain ideas expressed here. Mental-to-mental causation is probably where GWT has some legs.

@Banno @Hanover

I take it McCormick wants to find a way out of the categorization of belief as only rational, without part of it being cast out as irrational, which is the classic derogation of it as opposed to everything that is certain, logical, or true/false (knowledge). However, I find they are fighting too close in, and so their solution is tangled up by the confused framework. Instead of seeing past (Hegel style) the cognitive/non-cognitive misconception, they are attempting to resolve it with a different “mental state”, a feeling of belief. The funny part is that it does “feel” close to true. But I would argue that is because it captures the sense that part of what belief is are things like conviction or resolve or hope—which I wouldn’t characterize as species of belief @Banno, but that they show that belief is about what is important to us (what we might get emotional about). There is something like a feeling we must have in them, because it is a position (Wittgenstein’s “attitude”) we take towards them, what we are willing to do for them. Part of its workings as a practice is not the judgment of beliefs (or feelings), say, as right or wrong. We hold a person to their beliefs; we judge them. We can call them delusional, puppets, ignoring the facts, convinced by emotion, righteous, courageous, etc. “do we say instead that because [Bathasar] will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe?” @Banno Well, we would say they do not have the courage of their convictions perhaps.

Of course, that belief works this way also means people may abuse the practice and only judge the belief, thus moralizing the person away before considering them, their interests, their reasons, their context. “I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief.” @Hanover

Part of the issue is with a lot of moral theory before Nietszche: it is thought of as before an act or statement. As casual or considered (or felt)—which they can be—but we actually consider most of this only afterwards. We judge a statement as true based on our criteria for knowledge. We judge the other for their act and ask for their reasons. Deontology overlooks the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses (here I nod to Austin’s work on action @Banno). Still, despite all your evidence to the contrary, I may be willing to die for my belief. We may not come to agreement, but to call that irrational or an emotion, misunderstands how belief works, cutting off the possibility of common ground before we begin.

Reply to T Clark Let me just say, I sympathize with your mixed feelings about bringing in the Tao for a subject like this. On the one hand, it's an important reminder that what we're doing here may not have any ultimate metaphysical validity -- that there is such a thing as a world beyond words and categories. But then, if we stayed with that insight, we'd probably not be on TPF at all.

Quoting T Clark

No, the boundaries are not arbitrary at all. Setting up distinctions and boundaries is something humans do.

OK. Better say "contingent" or "contextual," perhaps. Just trying to get across the idea that the Tao's-eye point of view, if there could be such a thing, wouldn't include such discriminations.

Quoting T Clark

If the position I attributed to Damasio in previous posts is correct, they can't be discriminated at all, at least not when they function as mental processes.

Still not clear on this, though. How does it mean the same thing as:

His hypothesis is that the three are completely interconnected and that it is impossible to discuss the functions of one without realizing that the other two play a role.

Maybe I should be clearer about what I mean by "discriminate." I think of it as a rock-bottom term, one that would apply even when objects or processes are "completely interconnected" and "impossible to discuss" without awareness of the role each plays. "Discriminate," for me, means whatever it is that you and I are both doing when we make sensible sentences using the terms "rational processes" and "emotions." I don't have any big stake in that usage, though -- if you have a preferred way to divvy up the vocabulary, I'm open to it.

Quoting I like sushi

Let us be clear. There are no Conscious States that appear to be wholly absent of emotional content.

I feel a little dense, but what does that mean exactly? We're talking phenomenology here, right, not science? (I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.") Are you saying that any conscious experience I have will, upon examination, reveal something emotional? Or that it presents as emotional? Not sure I'm getting the picture.

@Banno @Hanover

I tried to read a paper recently that discussed the difference Wittgenstein makes between sensations (toothache) and “dispositions” (PI #149-154) which would be knowing, thinking, understanding, etc. It is a little confusing because disposition also sounds like some internal state. However, he says “ 149. If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is thinking of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. Such a state is called a disposition. But there are objections to speaking of a state of the mind here, inasmuch as there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does. (Nothing would be more confusing here than to use the words "conscious" and "unconscious" for the contrast between states of consciousness and dispositions. For this pair of terms covers up a grammatical difference.)” (Bold emphasis added)

The “difference” is that dispositions are not determined by attending to brain processes (or mental states), because they are classifications judged by external criteria. #154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?”

I would classify belief as this type of “disposition”, externally judged on its “manifestations”, or, in this case, what we are willing to stand up for. Judging belief as an emotion is an attempt to capture this “non-cognitive” nature of belief, but still being trapped in the picture that it is an internal state. As I said, however, there are obviously emotions involved in or accompanying belief, even “wrong” ones such as arrogance, misplaced righteousness, etc. But, again, to lower belief to that level (although possible) is to dismiss the person, not solve the “irrationality” belief is characterized as.

Quoting Antony Nickles

#154 “Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.— For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?”

I've pondered this one before. Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt.

@Banno @Hanover

Quoting J

Would you say that dispositions, possibly including beliefs, can be distinguished from thoughts on the basis that they may affect our actions, our "going on," without having to be consciously entertained? And in that sense, are not "mental processes" at all? Something like this seems a plausible reading of Witt.

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more.

Quoting I like sushi

Nothing is purely emotional or purely rational. It is more or less about whether or not we are attending to something.

We may not know our reasons before we act, but only because we only make ourselves intelligible to others afterwards, not because they were in us already but unknown/unattended. Now, we can reflect on what we are going to do, and we can justify our act to ourselves ahead of time (with a belief), but those are not, nor do they determine, the criteria we share to judge an act.

Reply to J I am talking about both. The main thrust of my point being that the evidence provided by science is sometimes too easily left on the sidelines.

Quoting J

(I'm assuming there is no scientific description of "emotional content.")

There is plenty of research into how emotions present themselves in brains. A specific description is part and parcel of how phenomenology has impacted cognitive science - in fact it is the very reason I started reading philosophy more frequently!

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution, but such a process easily see the difference between someone thinking about being chased by a scary dog, and someone thinking about a gift they received from a loved one. They are able to get a gist of what the person is thinking about and how they feel about it too.

So, description? Not exactly. They have a low resolution picture. I believe with multiple readings form the same person across a variety of contents it provides a better resolution picture of what they are thinking and feeling - if my memory serves me?

Although it might sound like sci-fi, it is not that mind-blowing when you consider they can see certain parts of the brain stimulated for motor functions and such.

Quoting Antony Nickles

We may not know our reasons before we act

Then we had no reason. If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything?

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act.

This is the more sketchy area of autonomous decisions and what that means. It is not really an area I like to delve into too deeply as I do not think we are in a position to place a line between 'action' and 'reaction,' only a vague no-man's land of "I don't know?".

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all.

Quoting Antony Nickles

As I said up here, the category of dispositions are not judged prior to an act, and so do not “affect” them, say, in a causal way. They are determined afterwards by external criteria such as whether I do in fact continue (this distinction separates someone judged to be thinking from the internal self-talk commonly taken as “thought”; or demonstrating my understanding as different from picturing it as a lightbulb that goes off in my head). So the distinction of conscious or unconscious does not apply (PI #149); it is an entirely different matter than turning inward more.

Good stuff. But some questions:

- Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.)

- My distinction of conscious and unconscious wasn't necessarily pointing to some subconscious mental process going on when we believe or understand something -- the "turning inward more". Rather, I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time. This might include a disposition to act on that belief, again without requiring some conscious mental event called a "disposition." This seems different from a "thought", which we do want to say is a particular mental event at a particular time (Fregean "thoughts" aside). If I have a thought at T1 and am no longer having it at T2, we say "You're no longer thinking thought X." This is clearly different from how we talk about beliefs and dispositions.

So I'm agreeing with you (and perhaps Witt) that we need a separate account of what beliefs and dispositions amount to.

Quoting I like sushi

Right now it is possible to read someone's brain and have a general idea of what they are thinking about and feeling. It is still low resolution,

I agree with the thrust of this, though even "general idea" seems too high a resolution. Let's just say that Chalmers' "easy problem" -- mapping mental events to areas and activities of the brain -- is a doable project, one of these days.

But this still leaves the issue of what we now know about emotions. I'll repeat my question:

Quoting J

Are you saying that any conscious experience I have will, upon examination, reveal something emotional? Or that it presents as emotional?

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing?

Quoting J

Has that been shown somehow in the research you're describing?

I very many cases, yes. There are more subtler forms that could be called 'emotional content' that cannot easily, or cannot be pinpointed. All evidence points towards this being the case, hence it is the general consensus among cognitive neuroscientists.

The paper seems to be trying to push philosophers away from classical models of cognition. My point is that most neuroscientists dropped that idea literally decades ago. I do not know of any that hold to such a dated model of cognition today? Undoubtedly there are probably one or two?

Quoting J

Why would it follow that, because we don't judge a disposition prior to an act, said disposition could not affect whether the act took place or not? (And yes, I'm with you in believing we need to be very careful about invoking "cause" here.)

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs. So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”. Thus why Wittgenstein acknowledges that something “has occurred” to us (#154); but it is the “manifestations” that matter (#149).

Quoting Antony Nickles

I would extract “disposition” farther away from anything like a sensation, emotion, or internal predilection. I would look at it as a circumstance (PI #149), like a possible state of affairs.

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything.

Quoting Antony Nickles

So when I understand, it is not a change in my body (that “affects” it), but an opportunity. I may continue or not, but it is only when I do, that we (and even me) can actually judge that I “understand”.

But this still seems murky to me. Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be?

Reply to Antony Nickles A well-rounded account. Of course deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses", and a deontology that can at least account for these might be an improvement.

Reply to Antony Nickles The warning against treating beliefs as mental or brain states is well made, and part of what is being addressed somewhat obliquely in Reply to I like sushi's account. The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be.

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered. One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.

Lurp

@Banno @Hanover

Quoting J

I'm thinking of what are often called background beliefs. It's a truism that I continue to believe in, say, the theory of evolution regardless of whether I happen to be thinking about it at the time.

There is no need for a background. I could say a fundamental part of who I am is my belief in Jesus, but that doesn’t mean there is something that “continues” in me, other than how I act and what I focus on and how I respond to others (say, in “putting God first”). Any of these if questioned could be answered with, “Because I believe in Jesus”, and that is the extent of its function: as the expression of our willingness to stand for something.

I am arguing that belief (believing) is a disposition, as understanding, knowing, or thinking. These are judged positions (and only thus “states”) that are demonstrated by the circumstances. We are disposed to do something because the possibility is there, not because of some thing in us, or behind us, or, say, unattended to. Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object”; again, differentiating the common parlance of “thoughts” as the talking that you do with yourself, from “thinking”, which is judged as problem solving, or attending to something in depth, or considering various future consequences, etc. Not to be cryptic, but not every thought is an instance of thinking.

Quoting Banno

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief.

Quoting Banno

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be.

Your judgement is better almost every cognitive neuroscientist alive today? This view was not widely held in the 80's and 90's. Since then the evidence coming in has forced the vast majority to reject the classical model of cognition.

There has been a swathe of studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years. I task you with finding a single one that did not find a connection between emotion and belief. I will be bold enough to put forward that you will not find a single one showing zero emotional content.

Quoting Banno

deontology doesn't have to overlook 'the human practices of mistakes, reconsideration, excuses",

All I meant was its nature is the desire to determine what is right ahead of time, so it has no use for how we mop up afterwards when the rules are not enough (or steer us wrong).

Quoting Banno

The neuroscience is not yet up to the task, and may never be.

The problem here is that it’s apples vs the concept of justice. There is the “knowledge of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does.” (PI #149). It’s perfectly fine to learn how the brain works; it facilitates the possibility of our lives. But it doesn’t come into consideration as a criteria for how belief works, or our interests in claiming them.

Quoting Banno

I'm not sure I follow your idea of "lowering" a belief from a disposition to an emotion, although treating them as dispositions may overcome one objection to treating them as emotions - that an emotion is an occasional thing, I am angry now, and will calm down later...whereas a belief endures even when not considered.

I only said “lower” because emotion is traditionally, pejoratively deemed irrational, subject only to persuasion, etc. What I was trying to hang onto is that a belief maintains its rationality not because of its structure or nature, but because I claim responsibility for it. It is my reason, even if it comes from my being afraid, or delusional, or parroting someone else. That it is mine, that I own up to it, is what makes it intelligible. Yes, my anger may fade, but what really “endures” is that I am answerable for what I have said I believe, or what that leads to.

Quoting Banno

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.

Get @Sam26 in here why don’t you. Not to stray off topic, but, of course, we can agree we don’t (can’t) “know” the earth is round (except scientifically). I would argue we would be hard-pressed to believe the earth is round, but only because: who would we make that claim to? Now, I could believe the earth is flat, because there is some responsibility in holding that position.

Quoting J

Pretty much what I was getting at with "background belief," wouldn't you agree? The important thing is that a background belief really can't be said to cause anything.

Granted; but the nomenclature is misleading (behind what?). The circumstances for a belief are in the world, at a time, and may define who I am. Also, all this may in fact “cause” me to do something (what I believe is my duty), and may be the culmination of my life, or maybe just a moment.

Quoting J

Let's say someone tells a joke, and at first I don't "get it." Then all at once, I do. I have now understood the joke. Are you saying that until I continue in some fashion -- perhaps by making a witty reply -- I can't judge that I have understood the joke? Why would that be?

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something, nor is it demonstrative that we do understand (“I’ve got it! Wait, darn it.”) It can accompany understanding, but it is not the criteria for understanding. In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about. But, maybe more interestingly, someone may not understand a joke, and no amount of explanation might get them to.

Quoting Tom Storm

justify beliefs using reason, but we form them based on our affective relationships with the world.

I think this is the correct framework. What to do with the words is another issue.
Explicit acceptance of X seems to be a fine way to characterize belief. I don't find much here to suggest otherwise. That said, it does seem weird not to mention the pre-and-post cognitive states as directly related to the belief, so definitely more to be said. Very interesting thread.

@Banno

Quoting I like sushi

If you do not know why you did something what makes you think your justification for something you did means anything?

Well I would hope we can agree that, out of everything we do, not all of it we know why. And, even if we do consider something beforehand, as you say, it may not matter, or mean anything, to others; maybe never need justification. But also, something I did may be asked to be explained afterwards to others, and those possible questions could never all be considered beforehand. But we can fill in the blanks for others (even ourselves) without reasoning out every possibility ahead of time.

Quoting I like sushi

We can automatically react to something and try to understand why, but that is not the reason 'we' did it because 'we' didn't do it. This is not to say there is not an underlying process, just that it was not a conscious one and therefore not an act.

That seems to be both brushing off basic individual responsibility (“we” do it all, outside of mitigating circumstances) and granting me too much control over what is considered an act (only those I am conscious of). Perhaps we believe an act doesn’t reflect who we truly are, or that we shouldn't be judged by everything we do (both understandable desires).

Quoting I like sushi

I do not want to get bogged down in arguments about free-will and what that means to different people at all.

I think for our purposes it’s just a matter of reimagining intention as not accompanying everything we do, and seeing that an action is based on classification not individuality. They are labels that are judged externally after something is out of the ordinary or brought up. Every movement is not an action, and every action is not intended. “Were you [completing the act of] hailing a cab, or just raising your arm?” “Did you intend to run that red light?”

Reply to Antony Nickles All good points. I think if we are looking at what we mean by 'belief' then we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence. Then there is the justification for beliefs we provide, or even the kinds of beliefs we do not even consider offering justification for.

If a belief is questioned I cannot see how anyone can react completely devoid of emotion. All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world.

Beliefs can be something taken-to-be-true (we are on Earth or The Earth is Flat), that can be questioned but is not normally questioned by those holding the belief, or something regarded as unknown (Life After Death) which is more or less a clinging to sceptical ideas with a strong inclination towards some conclusion - absent of objective evidence.

None of the above can be absent of emotional content. If you believe it can I would really like to hear why and how this is at all possible given that the classical cognitive model has been pretty much dead and buried for a couple of decades now.

Maybe this is a useful link for the discussion: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/index.html#RatiEmot

Quoting Antony Nickles

Yes we have “a-ha” moments, but that does not happen every time we understand something,

This suggests to me that we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it.

Quoting Antony Nickles

In what circumstances is someone said to get a joke? They laugh, they could tell it, paraphrase what is funny about.

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand. Are you saying that translating it into behaviors and having others see them makes them more reliable? That others would be less likely to be fooled, or mistaken? Hmm, maybe, but it sounds a little thin. The possibility of error is always there, and I don't see that "going on" in some way, as opposed to just thinking about it, increases or reduces the possibility.

We have to remember that the question isn't -- or shouldn't be -- "When do we say that someone has understood?" It's "When has someone understood?" You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say.

Quoting I like sushi

One still believes that the Earth is round, even when not giving it conscious consideration.
— Banno

How so? How can you believe something if you are not consciously (as in the agent) believing it. That seems to fly in the face of how we use language in a rational manner. I think 'background belief' might be a better term for that, but it could possibly give the wrong impression of what we generally mean when talking about belief.

I'm not an ordinary-language-first guy, but this is a case where I think we have to start by considering what we do say.

If you ask me, "Do you believe the Earth is round?" my answer is yes. I don't think anyone who speaks English would misunderstand this to mean that, at the very moment I was asked the question, something occurred in my brain/mind that constituted "belIeving Earth is round," whereas before it wasn't there and I didn't believe it. We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says.

Now you may feel this isn't a good way to talk. You may feel the ontological commitments are suspect, and we can do better with our terminology when it comes to a big concept like "belief," which has to contain so many different usages and interpretations. And you may be right. But I don't think you can begin by denying that we do talk this way about some beliefs, and are virtually never misunderstood.

Quoting I like sushi

. . . studies relating to political beliefs over the past few years

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra? I'm still dubious about the claim that there is a necessary connection between all beliefs and emotion. Have there really been studies of that?

Reply to J I would go further and say there is nothing whatsoever included in the notion of belief that it be consciously considered at the moment:

"Are you currently considering that the earth is round?" No.
"Do you believe the earth is round"? Yes.

You might ask the same person these two questions in a row, and they are likely to give these answers. This is not bad language at all, rather it is bad philosophy to confuse the one for the other, or to insist that the second mean the first.

Quoting hypericin

You might ask the same person these two questions in a row, and they are likely to give these answers.

I think so. I could imagine something like a "moment of belief" and/or a "moment of consideration" that might actually present to consciousness in that way, but it would be unusual, and not how we ordinarily speak about such matters.

Quoting hypericin

This is not bad language at all . . .

Maybe it's fine. But it's always appropriate for a philosopher to suggest that some example of language use could be ameliorated. If that's what @i like sushi has in mind, I'd welcome hearing why.

Quoting J

But it's always appropriate for a philosopher to suggest that some example of language use could be ameliorated.

I guess when it comes to language I'm in the "describe, don't prescribe" camp. Which is not to say that ordinary language use doesn't conceal a raft of errors.

@Banno @Hanover @J

Quoting I like sushi

All intentions are driven by a feeling-about-something. All conscious experience is - in some form or another - a judgement-about-something as a means to navigate the world…. None of the above can be absent of emotional content.

I think you’ve gotten at the crux of the matter. I suggest that a better term for this “feeling-about-something” is our “interest”. And this has the ever-presence (of a kind) that you claim for “emotional content”. I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest).

What Wittgenstein did is recognize that we share interests, and they form into practices (“concepts”). More importantly, we share the standards, or criteria, that judge one thing from another, their workings, or: what is essential to us about it (PI #371). Our criteria codify what matter to us (or interests us) in a thing (thus why his method of looking at how we talk about a thing, shows us our shared interest in that thing).

Quoting I like sushi

we need to distinguish between beliefs held in the face of evidence and beliefs held without any concern for evidence

And this is the classic philosophical framework, denigrating anything that doesn’t involve criteria that removes any human involvement. Our interest in evidence is that it can be certain without us (thus the power of science, whose conclusions would be the same no matter who conducts the experiment). But evidence is just one kind of interest among all others, which are not simply opposed to evidence, either as irrational or individual. Belief is not a lesser form of knowledge, they simply work differently.

The point here is that the individual (their “emotion”, or anything else thought to be internal to them) is not the arbiter of our acts—I apologize for the same reasons everyone else does, so no need for “me” to be involved at all, and, when I am, it is only to explain myself as the exception to the rule.

Quoting Antony Nickles

I would suggest that our actual emotions are just one subsection of the expression of our interests, and that they belong to only part of them, which we could classify or at least characterize as “individual” interest (normally only considered “self” interest).

Yes, this is more like it. I wasn't comfortable with privileging "emotions" quite so centrally.

Shank

Reply to hypericin At least start with "describe," especially if some analysis and discrimination of terms is likely to be needed. Having done that as best we can, I'm fine with suggestions for improving how we talk about difficult subjects. What I particularly don't like, in contrast, are endless wrangles about what is the "right term" or the "correct definition" for something that's been used in countless different philosophical traditions . . .

@Banno

Quoting J

we should treat "understanding" as a cluster of concepts and (perhaps) events, and not try to generalize more than necessary about it.

Sure; only to say that what is important about understanding, how it matters to us, is not any process of the brain, as if an internal ability that reaches a conclusion, but the demonstration of it.

Quoting J

But I could do all that to myself, in which case I am the one who gets to say whether I (believe I) understand.

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no less, but no more, reliable or possible to myself than others.

Quoting J

You're right that we couldn't say someone had understood without the behavioral signs, but that doesn't mean they haven't; it just means we'd have no way of knowing; we couldn't say.

This is the classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it). The importance of “saying” something is that we are making a claim, which involves (then) judging whether something is the case, which is based on our shared criteria for it being the case. Our saying we understand (even to ourselves), is to make such a claim. Even the feeling of realization is itself merely the possibility of our understanding. It is not a matter of knowing or not knowing; there is nothing (internal or otherwise) that “is the case” until it is demonstrated (or determined not to be the case), which is also the case with other dispositions, like knowing or, as I am claiming, believing (though belief is not the same type of claim).

Quoting Antony Nickles

Yes, but you would be using the criteria we share to judge whether you get the joke, just as we would. Thus the ability to also use them to demonstrate it to others. This makes it no more, but no less, reliable or possible to myself than others.

Good, I was making the same point -- neither more nor less reliable.

Quoting Antony Nickles

This is classic distinction between saying and knowing, or it being the case, which is tied to the desire for something more certain (ahead of having to demonstrate it).

I don't think so. The distinction I'm making isn't about degrees of certainty. It's much more experiential. I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X," perhaps followed by some performance of this. (As we discussed above, not all types of understanding will fit this, but many do). Certainty aside, I claim them as distinct, based on my own self-reflection, as best I'm able to practice it. It makes me curious: Do you not have these two kinds of experience too? I'm often surprised by how differently thoughtful people experience their "insides."

Quoting Antony Nickles

Part of the problem here is imagining belief or thinking as an “object”

Spot on.

I think you've put your finger on a problem with the article, in that one believes things – holds them to be true – while not holding them in mind; you presumably believe that there are bacteria in the bottom of your left shoe, or any other equal triviality, but until now hadn't given it much thought. Odd, then , to call such a belief an emption.

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria?

Not sure where that leaves the discussion.

Quoting J

I can name two distinct experiences: (purporting to) understand X; and saying (to myself or others), "I understand X,"perhaps followed by some performance of this.

I’m not exactly clear what this is meant to distinguish; certainly there are distinct cases. I can front (lie, bluster… purport) that I understand without knowing if I do; I can believe that I understand but it turns out I don’t; I can “say” I understand and it turns out to be the case, or I can say I don’t understand but then it turns out I did. All seem to be claims “followed by some performance” (whether honest or not or deluded or humble, or denials). What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this?

The “certainty” I mentioned is in comparison to this kind of claim; our desire that knowledge tell us something sure, beforehand, and without us having any part in it. If dispositions were internal states, then they would exist or not, before being tried, judged, demonstrated. We could look in our brain and find our “understanding”; we would “have” beliefs (like emotions).

Quoting J

We know what we mean by such a "background belief": It's part of our web of mental constructs, a set of propositions we assent to if asked -- there may be many other ways of putting it (including more behavioral construals), but the main point is that it is not something that requires "consciously (as in the agent) believing it." The belief remains, in this way of speaking, whether I am conscious of it or not, as Banno says.

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both. There is leeway. The problem begins when we are equating a consciously held and articulated belief as equivalent to a so-called 'background belief'. The use of the term 'belief' is referring to something quite different in each case.

The brain maps the world. The 'we' we call 'we' does not in any way appear to be the whole of the brains content at all! If we take this into consideration I think we can begin to understand that 'belief' is certainly something only felt consciously and that obviously there is some brain stuff going on in the background.

This is more or less an epistemic argument.

Quoting J

Makes sense that these would be quite emotion-laden, but what about studies of beliefs about Chaucer, or algebra?

They are anchored in our understanding of the world. We have emotional attachment to existing. Neither are of any use without value attached to them.

Abstractions like algebra also operate under quite different 'beliefs' (if we are using this word) because they are Rules not Truths. It does not matter if you believe in the Rules of any game, it matter how they are of use to you.

Quoting Banno

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria?

I don’t like the word either. But maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to); for belief (generally), that I can and will answer for it. Though I wouldn’t put this as “confirming” “statements”, as that sounds like having justification to claim a fact (“evidence” as has been suggested), which is the purview of knowledge (acknowledging the long held opinion that knowledge is justified belief, which I would argue against).

Of course we may claim it is raining outside (“I believe it is raining”), even based on x,y,z, but this isn’t a claim to a fact, nor that x,y,z constitute knowledge. Belief (in this case) is a hypothesis; one which is not justified, but tested. I am not putting a “statement” up for confirmation, but putting my word on the line. When we look outside, we know it is raining (or not), but this doesn’t confirm my belief—though the fact is confirmed by our seeing it rain—because I never claimed I “knew”. If it is not raining, you think less of me: in being fooled, or making a ridiculous claim, or lying. I could try to mitigate your low opinion by saying I believed it was raining because the weather report said it would, but in doing so I am not making a claim to knowledge that fell short (was found to be unsubstantiated). I am making an excuse by shifting responsibility (I could be right with ridiculous reasoning too). If I walked into the house through the rain, I might claim I know it is raining. If it had stopped when we went to look, I would be wrong. If it was actually the sprinkler, I would be embarrassed. I didn’t “not know” it was raining, I (personally) was mistaken, but I believed it was.

Quoting Antony Nickles

What other “types of understanding” don’t fit this?

I'm able to distinguish, in my own mental experience, a type of (purported) understanding that is best pictured as "the light bulb going on." It doesn't involve words at all. I was contrasting this with the subsequent possible performances that would attempt to demonstrate this understanding -- and in the course of which I might discover that the understanding was indeed only purported.

It's crucial that we see this "mental experience" type of understanding as not being criterial for understanding, since I may be wrong. The light bulb may be functioning faultily. Indeed, if you wanted to call the experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine. We could just call it "the light bulb experience." But I do insist that the experience occurs, under whatever description, and that it isn't the same thing as talking (to myself or others) about what I believe I've understood.

Quoting I like sushi

Well, a cognitive neuroscientist is happy to talk about conscious and unconscious contents. The word consciousness refers to both.

Yes, but Witt's point, if I'm understanding him, is that we're looking in the wrong place if we look for the location of beliefs in the unconscious. He wants us to break away from the whole idea that a belief refers to a mental content. In the case of background beliefs, I think this is right. That's part of why we're so puzzled about how to talk about all this, as Banno points out:

Quoting Banno

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria?

Quoting Antony Nickles

maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to)

I can't do any better than that either. Or maybe just say that "I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue. "I believe" = "I assert that" seems to work for this kind of belief, but not all.

@Banno

Quoting J

Indeed, if you wanted to call the [a-ha!] experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine.

I of course acknowledge that we have that experience, even would call it a feeling, but, yes, it is not understanding (see PI #323 et seq “Now I have it!”). It is optimism perhaps, a “glad start”, (countered by deflation when we realize we didn’t really understand), but that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us, as belief is not evidenced by emotion (or even interest, because we might not care enough to meet the criteria for believing: to put ourselves out there as answerable for our desires).

Quoting J

"I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue.

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.” Certainty isn’t part of belief (perhaps resolve) and it may not even be possible for knowledge, but it is a desire philosophy has always had for knowledge, thus minimizing anything else as “belief” or “instinct” or “emotion”.

Quoting Antony Nickles

that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us,

Right. One interesting feature of the aha! experience is how strongly it causes us to believe we have understood. I'm guessing this is because, taken all in all, it is usually a good predictor of actually having understood. In my own case, I'd estimate that the times it has led me astray are perhaps 1 out of 10. (Naturally, my aptitude varies enormously depending on the subject!)

"The occurrence of 'understanding' somewhere in us . . ." That can't be right, of course, but the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do.

Quoting Antony Nickles

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.”

Must it be? I'd call that a higher "certainty quotient" than just "There are bacteria on my left shoe." Do you think an assertion must claim knowledge? The difference I'm pointing to would be shown by two different answers: Are there bacteria on your left shoe? "Yes." Do you know there are bacteria on your left shoe? "Not strictly speaking, not certainly. I think so, I believe so, it seems very likely to me. That's why I said they were on my left shoe."

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context.

Cheers, all. Some excellent input.

I take it that we are much agreed that a belief is not, shall we say, present in the mind in the way being angry or being ecstatic are, and that this to some degree counts against their being considered as emotions.

I played with ChatGPT a bit, asking for examples of common ways "belief" is used, and asking for an analysis after the style of Austin. LLP AI would seem to be appropriate for such tasks. HEre's aprt of the result:

ChatGPT:1. Common Uses of “Belief” in Ordinary Language
Here are some typical examples:
• “I believe it’s going to rain today.”
• “She holds a strong belief in democracy.”
• “That’s just your belief.”
• “He acted on the belief that she was in danger.”
• “It’s hard to change someone’s beliefs.”
• “Do you believe in ghosts?”
• “I don’t believe you.”
• “He lost his belief in God.”

These examples show that “belief” functions in a range of settings:
• Everyday judgment or opinion: “I believe it’s going to rain.”
• Doctrinal or ideological commitment: “Her belief in democracy.”
• Disagreement or challenge: “That’s just your belief.”
• Motivating reasons: “He acted on the belief...”
• Existential or religious questions: “Do you believe in ghosts/God?”

2. Observations from Usage
• Belief can be tentative or firm: “I believe it’s raining” is open to correction, whereas “Her belief in democracy” implies stability.
• Belief is not always knowledge: Saying “I believe” often marks uncertainty or lack of certainty—unlike “I know”.
• Belief often contrasts with evidence: “That’s just your belief” can suggest a lack of rational grounding.
• Beliefs can be held unconsciously or unreflectively: “She never questioned her beliefs.”
• Belief is frequently used in both personal and impersonal contexts: from the mundane (“I believe the shop is open”) to the doctrinal (“belief in the resurrection”).

In a simialr vein i asked for words proximal to believe, and then for words proximal to those words, and had those diagramed. Not all that neat, but here is the result:



Perhaps if nothing else this exercise shows how ill chosen an approach to the analysis of "belief" that presumes it refers to the one thing might be.

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these.

@Banno

Quoting J

the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do.

I’ve been trying to argue that this “what we do” is our individual responsibility, and not anything like “what’s actually going on” that we could “explain”. The “difficulty” is our inability to relinquish control over belief, and yet also our reticence to have it depend on us. The characterization of this as a problem with something “actual” happening is created by this desire for control and inevitability.

Quoting J

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context.

Absolutely the phrasing is loose and the circumstances and responses determine a lot; only to add that those two cases (once differentiated) would be categorically different, with different workings and different criteria, claimed for different types of reasons with different ways of moving forward and resolution (with what mattered about the context being different).

Grk

@J

Quoting Banno

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these.

I’ve learned in this thread that belief does have more involved than I thought. Even though emotion seems to be an accompaniment (and not essential), I had not realized that they reveal what matters to us; they are an expression of our interests. I do still argue the common feature or important mechanics is that it involves me, individually, tied to my responsibility in claiming (or wanting to claim) to believe, and so reflecting or creating me.

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul, as it’s not about an answer so much as an exploration. And I hate, even more, to agree with a machine, but “She holds a strong belief in democracy” demonstrates that belief involves commitment (here a recognition of it actually); the person has done something to demonstrate that they hold fast against some threat.

I hate even worse arguing with one, but “That’s just your belief” is simply sloppy (who even says that?); I only possibly imagine it as a very disrespectful insult, in the vein of “I don’t care about what is important to you”, though that shows that who we are is tied to our interests. p.s. - We of course say “That’s just your opinion.” (which is also dismissive) but opinions and beliefs are not the same thing (as “I believe it’s going to rain” is neither a judgment nor an opinion, but a personal conjecture, a hypothesis, a gamble). Opinions are assessments, of people, or politics, or plumbing estimates (thus the personal nature of the jab about my opinion, and why we consult experts).

“Do you believe in ghosts/God?” is in one sense obtuse, asking for justification (evidence), ignoring this is about living in a way in relation to something other, say, than ourselves.

I do find the example interesting that “He acted on the belief that she was in danger” but isn’t it just qualifying a mistake? Seems it turned out she wasn’t in danger and he perhaps did something bad and is asking to be excused because he had the wrong impression. But is thinking that something is the case and being mistaken really what is at stake? Consider, “Why did you do that?” “She was in danger.” I take an action and when asked say “I did it because I believe x”, which is, again, to say something about me, who I claim myself to be. In this case, the defender of those in danger. And so is the request to be excused about being wrong? or asking that the bad be erased by the (perceived) good?

Reply to Banno Like every word in any language it is context dependent. It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people.

Like I have said, the way I view it is through the lens of 'knowledge' - which I take to mean 'something put under some of consideration' - and that 'belief' is that which straddles our immediate appreciation of the world and our background mapping of the world (world as in "weltanschauung" or "axis mundi").

I grant that knowing what a book is - outside of really paying conscious attention to this understanding of 'book' - can be called a belief in what I book is ... personally I do not see the use in calling that a 'belief' though, any more than would find myself saying a rock believes gravity keeps it on the ground or data stored on the hard drive on my PC can ever constitute a 'belief' from the perspective of my hard drive.

@Banno @I like sushi @J

Looking at the diagram of associated concepts made me think more on the assertion of a claim of knowledge compared to a statement of belief. I want to say we don’t “believe” in facts as some tentative or lesser claim to knowledge. When we say “I believe steel has a high tensile strength”, we might be in a situation where we are trying to calm ourselves before driving a heavy truck over a steel bridge, and we are expressing (reiterating) our trust in a fact. When we say “I believe in global warming”, we are in a sense accepting the consequences of facts. Another general sense is that we are ready to stand behind the science, which simply means that we assess the scientific method was followed competently (which is not to doubt the facts so much as their validity at all).

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works. Of course, our desire to stand for something can be lessened by learning facts, but that is not the same thing. Accordingly, there is no “fact” about us as well. There is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”, which is the desire in the paper: to solve for belief, to find the version of it as a switch that could be flipped. We don’t account for belief through a fact about it, we hold the person to account.

Another feature this brings up though is that there is a scale of attachments; I wouldn’t characterize it as “tentative or firm” but what extent we are willing to go to. It could just be an expression, or “view”, to willing to risk life and limb. So, from the diagram, maybe scaling from suspicion to impression to inclination to assumption to confidence to disposition to attitude to idea to tenet to conviction to creed to dogma to faith. These seem to move between those I hold for myself to those I express or claim to others, thus giving the impression of “emotion” vs “rationale”.

Quoting I like sushi

It just so happens that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to different people.

that's not he point here so much as that this particular term can be used in common parse to mean quite different things to the very same people.

That is, we use the word to perform quite different actions.

Quoting Antony Nickles

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul...

What it is doing here looks to me to be more like a calculator doing a few additions. it's just saving me time in listing groups of words. That and by handing the task over to an automation I might be rid of accusations of bias.

But I see your point, and agree that doing the task is the largest and most important bit. It's putting such a diagram together oneself that instructs about how these words relate.

Quoting Antony Nickles

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works.

Surely this is too strong? At the least some beliefs are about facts - I believed it was warm outside, but it was still below zero...

So while "there is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”in every case, it's not that there are no cases of of something that is “believing”.

The diagram is certainly a confabulation. The double up of "Hunch", "Attitude", "Creedence" and "Feeling" shows a lack if diligence, perhaps - but "Feuth"? Did it misspell "faith" or did it intend "fullness"? But of course it has neither diligence nor intent...

Turnt

@J @I like sushi

Quoting Banno

At the least some beliefs are about facts

Yeah I worded that poorly, making it sound like belief has no relation to the world, which of course is putting too much mustard on it. And having the impression that it is fine out, when it really is cold, I accept is a belief. But is this a matter of actually being correct? Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational? I may even concede the temperature, but maintain my position (unrelated to my sensation even). Then you might think me courageous, or silly, or insane, but not wrong about a fact (unless I am guessing the temperature, which is belief as hypothesis).

It is convenient to have the terms gathered, but I think the important part about OLP is that a human can imagine cases (even fantasies), fill out the context to distinguish (even novel extrapolations), or change the circumstances—even as part of a collaboration with others because everyone has the ability to provide input—which is different than aggregating data and regurgitating analysis.

Quoting Antony Nickles

Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational?

Ordinarily, just talking, I think we would use the word "wrong": "No, you're wrong, it's freezing out!" I hear you asking what, exactly, is being called wrong in such a case. I am wrong on the facts, no doubt of that: "warm" can't mean "freezing." But am I also being told that my belief is wrong? That I am wrong to believe what is not true? Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?

I think all these are possibilities, and I don't have a strong intuition about whether there is one correct usage here. It seems to depend on what the interlocutor assumes I do or don't know: If he assumes I don't know it's freezing out, then he probably thinks I've just made a mistake. If he assumes I do know, but maintain my belief anyway, then "wrong" starts to be replaced with either "crazy" or "lying about what I believe, for some reason". Background assumption: I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true.

Quoting J

Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?… I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true.

That would be the sense that “You can’t be serious!” (Not, denying the fact, but questioning my experience). But I could say, “You should have seen the weather where I grew up” or concede partly “I must still be warm from inside.” Maybe it takes more, better example of when belief absolutely flies in the face of facts, because it is contingent on me, thus the desire to either discount it, or create something to fix it internally, like “emotion”.

Reply to Antony Nickles, Reply to J

Perhaps here we agree that the thermometer reads 0? and yet differ as to the appropriate response?

So the world is constant, yet the utterance changes against the beliefs of the speaker, and is to be triangulated with the beliefs of the interpreter.

Do we then have agreement as to the facts, but not as to what to do about them?

Quoting Antony Nickles

But I could say, “You should have seen the weather where I grew up” or concede partly “I must still be warm from inside.”

Yet more subtleties, but you're right to bring them up. The first response cashes out to "I call this warm, because I'm comparing it to some even colder place." The second response says, "I feel warm despite the temperature, so the reason must be . . . " Both responses propose ways not to be wrong when saying "It's warm out" -- but do they succeed? I think not, because "It's warm out" is taken to be a (more or less) factual description, not a report of how I use words or how I feel.

Also, interestingly, I could make either of the above responses and deny that I believe it's warm out. I could say, for instance, "Yes, I understand that it isn't actually warm, this is just some info about why I use 'warm' differently and/or how I'm feeling right now. If you press me, I don't believe it's objectively warm out; I understand that such a belief isn't consistent with the temp being 0 degrees."

Quoting Antony Nickles

Maybe it takes more, better example of when belief absolutely flies in the face of facts, because it is contingent on me, thus the desire to either discount it, or create something to fix it internally, like “emotion”.

I don't understand this exactly. Say more?

Quoting Banno

Perhaps here we agree that the thermometer reads 0? and yet differ as to the appropriate response?

Another, similar way of saying the above. We concede the fact of the matter but notice that different responses might make sense for different people.

Quoting Banno

Do we then have agreement as to the facts, but not as to what to do about them?

Well, I wouldn't have said "what to do about them," but I think I see what you mean. We differ on what to say about them, perhaps, and certainly on what they feel like.

Do we (not you and me, but the two people discussing the temperature) agree or differ, though, on whether it's actually possible to believe it's warm out? I want to say that agreement as to the facts means such a belief is impossible for either of them. But again, that raises the familiar issue of whether one can be said to believe something one knows isn't true.

Quoting J

Perhaps here we agree that the thermometer reads 0? and yet differ as to the appropriate response?
— Banno

Another, similar way of saying the above. We concede the fact of the matter but notice that different responses might make sense for different people.

In terms of Davidson's triangulation, the temperature being 0? is one vertices, the other two being the bloke not putting on his coat on the one hand and the interpretation of that as a bit crazy on the other.

For folk from Canada, 0? may be balmy. The fact of it being 0? is different to the interpretation given it.