Is to not confess irrational? (Prisoner's dilemma)
Doesn't rationality depend on your metric?
If the metric is to minimize personal loss or get the most benefit for you realistically in that moment then confess is better. But if the goal is to work towards the best possible outcome over time regardless of momentary personal loss then it is rational to not confess. (Imagine not working towards an ideal just because others aren't. Good luck changing anything)
But if we consider carbon neutrality goals. I assume that the country that doesn't transform loses less money. So if all countries pointed towards the others for not transforming. We'd have a nastier planet but we we'd not have lost a financial advantage.
To me it always felt much more rational to go for carbon neutrality regardless of others. As it is a move towards a better world. Which is rational if the goal is to do what's right. It seemed to me that those that pointed fingers at eachother were irrational and unable to deal with their fears and as a result got the worst outcome.
If the metric is overcoming fear and moving towards what's right and most beneficial in an ideal situation and then over time getting others to follow because you and others gave the example. Then it is more rational to take the lead and keep doing so then not.
(If Socrates died for the sake of argument for his questioning then that could be considered irrational. But only to an assumed metric. I say Socrates was equally rational to the metric for dying for what's right. Being principled , being ahead of your time. Being a non fool among fools)
If the metric is to minimize personal loss or get the most benefit for you realistically in that moment then confess is better. But if the goal is to work towards the best possible outcome over time regardless of momentary personal loss then it is rational to not confess. (Imagine not working towards an ideal just because others aren't. Good luck changing anything)
But if we consider carbon neutrality goals. I assume that the country that doesn't transform loses less money. So if all countries pointed towards the others for not transforming. We'd have a nastier planet but we we'd not have lost a financial advantage.
To me it always felt much more rational to go for carbon neutrality regardless of others. As it is a move towards a better world. Which is rational if the goal is to do what's right. It seemed to me that those that pointed fingers at eachother were irrational and unable to deal with their fears and as a result got the worst outcome.
If the metric is overcoming fear and moving towards what's right and most beneficial in an ideal situation and then over time getting others to follow because you and others gave the example. Then it is more rational to take the lead and keep doing so then not.
(If Socrates died for the sake of argument for his questioning then that could be considered irrational. But only to an assumed metric. I say Socrates was equally rational to the metric for dying for what's right. Being principled , being ahead of your time. Being a non fool among fools)
Comments (4)
Yes, this is a difficulty with the application of game theory. It must assume "benefit" and pay-offs in ways that sometimes do not conform to life. Utility is sort of a black box in economics, and it is often assumed that people are simply appetite machines attached to calculators, which might sometimes be a useful simplifying assumption, but obscures much.
One might argue that justice demands confession and that justice is always preferable to injustice, thus confession should always be chosen. But that's not really the point of the model. We could exclude this problem by supposing that the players are actually innocent of the crime.
So, what you say about climate change is true. The prisoner's dilemma only highlights one tension in resolving issues like climate change, but it is not the full picture.
There is some interesting research on how economics classes make students at least temporarily more selfish in this regard.
A person can be rational and yet be unable to calculate the odds accurately. Indeed, I'm pretty sure no prisoner worked it out as the philosophy students were required to. That's part one.
Quoting Jack2848
part two: Some decisions with which humans, and most other creatures are faced are long term: whether to start a trust fund for a newborn child; where to store enough nuts for the winter, etc. But the majority of our choices of action have fewer variables to consider and require a single, immediate decision based on limited information. We evolved to make very fast, uncalculating decisions, because the ones who couldn't, didn't live long enough to reproduce.
Both long- and short-term decisions can be equally rational in their own context, and in each context, we are equally open to reflexive, emotional, sentimental or faith-based, irrational decisions.
Of course it would be smarter in the long run to follow the science and avoid disaster, but it's all too common for humans to choose short-term goals over long-term on the rational assumption that the short term objective is to our own immediate benefit, while from the long term one, we probably won't get any in our lifetime; it's only for the benefit of our descendants. Let them figure it out.
Game Theory assumes purely self-interested agents, and with the knowledge of all possible states following the given actions, it would be irrational for a self-interested agent to not confess.
If the game is played iteratively, then the tit for tat method is shown to be the most successful and long-term cooperation becomes rational.
However, game theory is not meant to map onto reality in the way that you seemingly provide examples of.