Two ways to philosophise.
When I participated in the profession, as a student or as a tutor, folk would often ask me what I do. When I said I studied philosophy, more often then not the question would be asked Well, whats your philosophy, then?
And this was always a puzzle to me, because although that is how philosophy is often seen by the public, it didnt match my own perspective. Not only did I not have a philosophy, I wasnt even looking for one.
Having a philosophy is commonly seen as having some set of beliefs, hence doing philosophy must be developing such sets of beliefs. Philosophy, on this view, consists in developing a certain sort of narrative, one that is presumably coherent and logical and explains various things from the practical to the esoteric.
This is reinforced in the bookshops were the very few books on philosophy, on the single labeled shelf between religion and self help, suggest in their titles that they are texts on how the customary historical figures insist we ought live our lives.
But in my studies, I spent very little time making stuff up about how things are. Instead, I found myself reading many, many papers, delving in great detail into the logic and language of each, looking for where what was said hung together and where it fell apart, and how it sat in relation to all those other papers. I was not learning a set of beliefs so much as learning to apply various tools, tools for conceptual analysis, logical scrutiny, and linguistic clarity. My task was choosing the right one for the task and learning how to use it to the best effect, prising apart the various bits and pieces of each text and examining them for their beauty, utility and faults.
Much the same difference can be seen in the threads of this forum. There are those who arrive with their Philosophy, and expound it at length, explaining The Way The World Is, to the benefit of every one of the unenlightened. They often seem shocked into incomprehension when someone comes back with a quibble about how their story doesnt quite follow, contradicts itself, doesnt match what is plain to all, or derives an ought from an is. They will complain of straw men, of trolling, or simply of rudeness, apparently being astonished that folk could be so discourteous as to be critical of their work.
But this is a philosophy forum, not a Vanity Press. If you present your thoughts here you must expect them to be critiqued. In a very central and important sense, this is what we do.
What I want to propose is that there are two different ways of doing philosophy. There are those who do philosophy through discourse. These folk set the scene, offer a perspective, frame a world, and explain how things are. Their tools are exposition and eulogistics. Their aim is completeness and coherence, and the broader the topics they encompass the better. Then there are those who dissect. These folk take things apart, worry at the joints, asks what grounds the system. Their tool is nitpicking and detail. Their aim is truth and clarity, they delight in the minutia.
The discourse sets up a perspective, a world, a game, an activity, whatever we call it. The dissection pulls it apart, exposing its assumptions, underpinnings and other entrails. Perhaps you can't have one without the other, however a theory that explains any eventuality ends up explaining nothing, and for a theory to be useful it has to rule some things out.
Further, a theory that explains, for anything that is the case, why it is the case, can't by that very fact take anything as granted - to do so would be not to offer an explanation. If it takes nothing as granted, how does it link into the world? So, if for instance the theory can explain why my wasabi plants are thriving, doesn't it have to take it as granted that my wasabi plants are thriving? There has to be something outside the theoretical construct in order that the activity of explanation has a place... along the lines of hinge propositions. A difference between the explanation and the explanandum that cannot happen in a theory that explains everything. Gödel showed us that no sufficiently complex formal system can be both complete and consistent. If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossibleit may be misguided.
Completeness for it's own sake is a problem. Much better to have an incomplete theory that is right that a completely wrong theory...
Philosophy is not marked and differentiated from other subjects by it's making shit up. It is marked and differentiated by knocking things down. The better Socratic dialogues are those early disagreements in the market that end without a conclusion. Philosophy is not about amassing propositions, but about unearthing presuppositionsoften to reject them.
And this difference can be seen in the difference of approach between various threads around the forums. There are those that set out almost uncritically to explain the finer points of the Doctrine of this or that philosopher, and there are those that mention an issue and seek to examine it by bringing to play the may critical tools developed over the years.
I hope its clear that my preference is for dissection over discourse.
Ive been discussing this with @Moliere and @J for a few weeks. Thanks to both of you for your thoughtful responses.
_______________________________________
Added: See also this post and the discussion of The Great List. The conversation goes somewhat astray after about page eight, but the discussion of philosophical methodology continues in a thread about Williamson's paper Must Do Better, as well as in @Moliere's thread on the aesthetics of philosophy, A Matter of Taste.
And this was always a puzzle to me, because although that is how philosophy is often seen by the public, it didnt match my own perspective. Not only did I not have a philosophy, I wasnt even looking for one.
Having a philosophy is commonly seen as having some set of beliefs, hence doing philosophy must be developing such sets of beliefs. Philosophy, on this view, consists in developing a certain sort of narrative, one that is presumably coherent and logical and explains various things from the practical to the esoteric.
This is reinforced in the bookshops were the very few books on philosophy, on the single labeled shelf between religion and self help, suggest in their titles that they are texts on how the customary historical figures insist we ought live our lives.
But in my studies, I spent very little time making stuff up about how things are. Instead, I found myself reading many, many papers, delving in great detail into the logic and language of each, looking for where what was said hung together and where it fell apart, and how it sat in relation to all those other papers. I was not learning a set of beliefs so much as learning to apply various tools, tools for conceptual analysis, logical scrutiny, and linguistic clarity. My task was choosing the right one for the task and learning how to use it to the best effect, prising apart the various bits and pieces of each text and examining them for their beauty, utility and faults.
Much the same difference can be seen in the threads of this forum. There are those who arrive with their Philosophy, and expound it at length, explaining The Way The World Is, to the benefit of every one of the unenlightened. They often seem shocked into incomprehension when someone comes back with a quibble about how their story doesnt quite follow, contradicts itself, doesnt match what is plain to all, or derives an ought from an is. They will complain of straw men, of trolling, or simply of rudeness, apparently being astonished that folk could be so discourteous as to be critical of their work.
But this is a philosophy forum, not a Vanity Press. If you present your thoughts here you must expect them to be critiqued. In a very central and important sense, this is what we do.
What I want to propose is that there are two different ways of doing philosophy. There are those who do philosophy through discourse. These folk set the scene, offer a perspective, frame a world, and explain how things are. Their tools are exposition and eulogistics. Their aim is completeness and coherence, and the broader the topics they encompass the better. Then there are those who dissect. These folk take things apart, worry at the joints, asks what grounds the system. Their tool is nitpicking and detail. Their aim is truth and clarity, they delight in the minutia.
The discourse sets up a perspective, a world, a game, an activity, whatever we call it. The dissection pulls it apart, exposing its assumptions, underpinnings and other entrails. Perhaps you can't have one without the other, however a theory that explains any eventuality ends up explaining nothing, and for a theory to be useful it has to rule some things out.
Further, a theory that explains, for anything that is the case, why it is the case, can't by that very fact take anything as granted - to do so would be not to offer an explanation. If it takes nothing as granted, how does it link into the world? So, if for instance the theory can explain why my wasabi plants are thriving, doesn't it have to take it as granted that my wasabi plants are thriving? There has to be something outside the theoretical construct in order that the activity of explanation has a place... along the lines of hinge propositions. A difference between the explanation and the explanandum that cannot happen in a theory that explains everything. Gödel showed us that no sufficiently complex formal system can be both complete and consistent. If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossibleit may be misguided.
Completeness for it's own sake is a problem. Much better to have an incomplete theory that is right that a completely wrong theory...
Philosophy is not marked and differentiated from other subjects by it's making shit up. It is marked and differentiated by knocking things down. The better Socratic dialogues are those early disagreements in the market that end without a conclusion. Philosophy is not about amassing propositions, but about unearthing presuppositionsoften to reject them.
And this difference can be seen in the difference of approach between various threads around the forums. There are those that set out almost uncritically to explain the finer points of the Doctrine of this or that philosopher, and there are those that mention an issue and seek to examine it by bringing to play the may critical tools developed over the years.
I hope its clear that my preference is for dissection over discourse.
Ive been discussing this with @Moliere and @J for a few weeks. Thanks to both of you for your thoughtful responses.
_______________________________________
Added: See also this post and the discussion of The Great List. The conversation goes somewhat astray after about page eight, but the discussion of philosophical methodology continues in a thread about Williamson's paper Must Do Better, as well as in @Moliere's thread on the aesthetics of philosophy, A Matter of Taste.
Comments (786)
I think it is deeply misguided too. As you may have noticed I get a little concerned when philosophy ignores scientific evidence, or is simply ignorant of it. That said, it can serve us to look twice and rethink how we look at certain pieces of evidence rather than just taking them at face value.
With many advances today in various fields it is probably asking much for anyone to fully understand the intricacies of each field of interest. I have always felt that if there is one particular use of philosophy it is its ability to narrow this gap of understanding between widely dispersed areas of study.
This seems more and more important as technology propels us onwards with increasing speed.
As in, of course you have a cohesive worldview, and it's not close to what I've said. Worldview is not a philosophical concept as much as a psychological one, and despite one's belief that the intellect of a philosopher can trascend the limitations of others, we needn't kid ourselves.
A definition of worldview: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/worldview
So what is your worldview? Heavily analytic, later Wittgensteinian, formally logical, atheistic, progressively liberal (as Americans use that term), academically biased. This isn't meant as psychoanalysis, but simply to point out where you find truth, meaning, and value.
I just find the very concept of anti-worldviewism hopelessly paradoxical because it's a worldview unto itself.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quietism_(philosophy)
Nevertheless I persisted (Im reminded of Alan Watts frequent invocation a fool who persists in his folly will become wise - a vain hope, in his case, as it turned out.) The idea being that not only was enlightenment real but that it would arrive as a kind of lightning bolt which would blast all of the residue of cultural conditioning off of ones inherent Buddha nature. Not so easy, I was to learn. But that, anyway, was what was behind it.
Where that fitted in to philosophy per se, was not at all - at least, since David Hume. David Stove, a well-known lecturer, took me aside after class one day, and said you wont find what youre looking for in this Department, son. (Some healing thing was how he perceived my quest.) Sure enough, I soon absconded to Comparative Religion (emphatically not divinity, as I would tell anyone who asked.) I think thats where I discovered classical philosophy and also what I know of Hegel, who was better represented in that department than in Philosophy proper.
But I still hold to the view that philosophy proper is or ought to be therapeutic - that it is aimed at ameliorating or healing or seeing through an error in consciousness, a deep, pervasive and widely-accepted misunderstanding as to the meaning of being in which practically all of us are unknowingly immersed. I think the nearest source to that in the modern canon is probably Heidegger, although Being and Time wasnt on my curriculum and Ive only read parts of it since. But overall existentialists, phenomenologists, and Buddhists speak to me much more than Anglo philosophers in that regard, as theyre concerned with the meaning, not of properly-formed sentences, but being as such.
Quoting Banno
No such word, according to my dictionary, although I suppose it could be the disciplined study of things said at funerals.
Interesting OP. It does often seem like there are people here who are trying to understand what others think, and others who want everyone to think like them.
Yeah, people seem confused about language and the process of abstraction.
Knowledge is only possible through abstraction. That is trying to go beyond the world of particulars we sense to more encompassing general concepts. Without that there is no knowledge, only particulars. The flipside is that in this proces of generalisation and abstraction we lose information about particulars... and so it tends to become less useful the further we push it.
Since the beginning of philosophy there have been those misvaluating the highest concepts to the point that they were considered more real than the world of the senses, when in reality they were merely the most general, the 'highest' abstractions of that world, and consequently also the most empty.
Those that don't really understands this proces, or the implications thereof, tend to overvaluate what can be done with it.
Ramifications... Reifications and rationalisations.
Quoting Banno
I dont have a philosophy, but this describes me pretty much. I have some beliefs about what the world is and what human experience is, and why we in fact care to discuss it.
So despite your basic denigration of those who might ask and care about what is your philosophy?, and despite the lack of any complete system that is yet to give an answer, I am most interested in pursuing an answer to this precise question. What is your world view and why, despite all of the difficulties with saying such.
Quoting Banno
This is the aspect of philosophic study that makes it a science. Descartes, the mathematician, was skeptical, to the point of seeing nothing certain. He salvaged the seeing. But tried to dissect it all. And Sextus Epiricus, the physician, didnt buy any of it.
This is an important spirit towards rigor in what I see as the science which is philosophy.
Quoting Banno
This was said in passing. But is the heart of the matter to me. You cannot say what the world is without inviting rigorous dissection of what you said, but there is nothing to dissect without human experience spoken of.
Philosophers MUST care about both, or there is no subject of our study.
Quoting Banno
I dont understand the first part of this. Seems like it is missing something. a theory that explains any eventuality ends up explaining nothing [unless it does what?].
I agree with the second part - useful theories rule things out. But the first part says explaining eventualities always explains the same thing, namely, nothing.
Quoting Banno
It may be. But isnt that a complete and consistent reason not to say what Gödel just said. I am happy to be 50% uncertain in the hopes of being accidentally right about the world and human experience, and keep testing and testing the theories. This forum is a laboratory.
Quoting Banno
Theory that is right.
Interesting invocation. Theory about what? Right about what? Theory about theorizing, or about the world theorists need and use to exchange their ideas and theories?
Better to have a theory about theorizing or a theory about the world that is incomplete?
Isnt Godels theory (completed in the sense that it is a theory) simply that theorizing about the world is never complete? That says something universal about human experience. Im interested in that, not just the proofs and analytics that back it up.
Quoting 180 Proof
Me neither. I think this all overlooks philosophys relationship to the mystical. There are forces begging our questions even after one concludes the questions cannot be answered.
Human nature is an absurdity. But that is still a nature. That can still be a metaphysical truth of interest to the scientist.
Quoting Tom Storm
I am interested in what others think, what I think, and most importantly what we all think is the truth. I dont want others to think like I do. That belittles everyone involved. But I do humbly think there are truths all rational people must accept. That, can seem like I want others to think like I do, but it is not. Its like saying Einstein was psychologically trying to get others to think like he thinks about energy, when psychology was not not of any interest.
As a person more interested in discussing world views and seeking truth, another response to this great post might be:
Ill admit I might be full of shit, if youll admit you contradict yourself in saying I cant be full of truth.
If philosophy is the love of wisdom, it is presumably the love of [I] something[/I] in particular, and it would seem that not all philosophical positions are wise.
This is not the same thing as "interesting." Hume and Nietzsche are interesting. I am not sure if they are wise.
But, supposing that one thought that all philosophical positions were equally wise (and unwise), that there were no ethical, metaphysical, aesthetic, etc. truths, and thus that "understanding" should replace critique and argumentwouldn't this itself be the demand that everyone else conform to the beliefs/preferences of the skeptic/anti-realist? That is, a sort of declaration of "victory by default?"
I don't think these are mutually exclusive categories. If truth is preferable to falsity, wisdom to being unwise, then obviously one will want to lead others to the possession of whatever wisdom and truth they have. Wisdom and knowledge are not goods that diminish when shared, but goods that grow the more people partake in them. Hence, the motivation for "conversion" (as Rorty puts it).
But note that someone seeking conversion still has motivations for understanding other's positions. First, because believing one is likely correct is not the same thing as thinking oneself infallible or in possession of the total picture. Hence, in fearing error, and in wanting to round out their position, they have reason to understand other positions. Indeed, where different, disparate traditions agree, there is something of a "robustness check" on the underlying ideas.
Second, conversion requires understanding opposing positions, both for translation and counter argument. Indeed, I can see how it might be the case that these might be some of the stronger motivations for understanding. If one believes positions are undecidable, more something akin to a matter of taste then truth and falsity, I don't see how this wouldn't, at least potentially, lead to being more close-minded, not less. Afterall, if one is challenged on one's own position, one can simply say that all positions have their own inconsistencies. Why learn about another position when all positions share a sort of equality? If you're enjoying your Flaming Doritos just fine, and you cannot be in error in enjoying them, why try to Extreme Nacho variety in the first place?
Now there are difficulties here. Commitment to any one tradition necessarily takes time away from others, and it is difficult to become conversant in many different traditions, particularly when some are very (perhaps intentionally) obscure. Yet it is worth the time, if only because all traditions tend to rely on at least some implicit presuppositions. These are often inherited, a sort of historical residue, and knowing their source is informative. Within a tradition itself, these sorts of presuppositions tend to be transparent.
Just for example, from 400BC to 1600AD a lot of philosophy was done. A lot of skeptical philosophy was advanced. Yet no one introduced a skeptical position all that similar to that of Descartes. St. Augustine had reason to formulate the Cogito before him, but it was in response to a quite different type of skepticism. The idea that all we know are our own ideas, and that even other people might be figments, hadn't occured to anyone. One might suppose from this then that other changes were necessary to pave the way for such a thesis.
This is important in that, for many people, this has become [I] the[/I] philosophical issue: securing the "external world." A lot of contemporary thought is based around resolving this very issue. But, stepping behind it helps to reveal some of the common assumptions in play, even if one remains convinced that it is not a problem that can be "dissolved" because the presuppositions in play are valid.
Likewise, any philosophy of history that includes the history of ideas must traffic in the unfolding of such ideas. This is why Hegel's philosophy of religion must at least try to understand all religions, even dead ones.
Which is just saying that to have a theory that is right is to have a theory that acknowledges all the relevant information and excludes all the irrelevant information.
Quoting Banno
What exactly does this mean - that the universe needs something external to it to be able to explain the universe? What if there is nothing external to the universe?
It certainly sounds metaphysical. It sounds like there certainly has to be something outside of language. Which I would agree with.
One of those camps is dramatically larger than the other.
I remember a little cartoon, taped to a terminal on the checkout counter at the college library. A guy, resting his head in his hand and gazing at a computer terminal, and he's saying, "Gee, I wish you could talk. I'd love to know what you're thinking." And there's a thought bubble for the computer, which is thinking, "I wish you could think. I'd love to know what you're saying."
We needn't kid ourselves, but so many do. So many pat themselves on the back, "He is so sure of himself with his truth-claims and propositions. I am unsure of myself, and I just knock things down. I take nothing for granted. How much better I am!" They do not understand that the wrecking ball presupposes its own truth-claims and foundations, but when the goal is virtue-signaling it doesn't much matter.
Quoting Hanover
I would call it a performative contradiction rather than a paradox.
Quoting Banno
But what's interesting here is that the religious thinker usually holds that God is inexhaustibly intelligible, and therefore they actually have a reason for openness to reality. Hence the reason why secular thinkers like Banno's Logical Positivists are so enclosed upon themselves and parochial: their premise is that there is nothing in-principle inexhaustible about reality; and their failure leads to a despair that then leads to vacillation between various forms of irrational optimism and various forms of despair and deflationism. Note too that the formalistic and theory-laden approach to explanandum and explanation has already trapped itself before it has begun. In reality there are no hard and fast divides between the so-called "object language" and the so-called "meta language." Both are artificial constructs needed to uphold a Great Divide that in truth does not exist.
Even the pragmatist should be able to see that in order to avoid both despair and presumption one needs a legitimate object and reason for hope. One needs movement afresh without cynicism towards the past or despair of true progress in the future. In today's climate what is needed is philosophy rather than diatribes, ideology, and virtue signaling (i.e. the reduction of thinking to public moralizing - the "comprehensive views are naughty" propaganda of liberalism).
The horseshoe effect connects megalomania solipsism and Carl Rogers listening-relativism. In both cases one arrives at a flattened and arid landscape, just by different routes. With the first the whole class listens to one person who expounds their ideas, and no one else gets to talk. With the second it is exactly the same, except that each person is given their solipsistic opportunity to speak before everyone walks home in isolation and silence. The choices are "monism" or "pluralism," where the common individualistic rule is that argument and contention is not permitted. No distinction between argument and imposition is possible. To argue is to impose, and to do this is to be an immoral exclusivist who does not judge all ideas equal. It is to fail the criterion of democracy in the realm of ideas. Influencing another individual's thoughts and beliefs is off-limits, because it presupposes the inequality of ideas.
Of course, thankfully most of the resident "pluralists" do not do this consistently. But if Banno's philosophical summum bonum of disagreement is to function, then there must be a legitimate motive for disagreeing. If we do not presuppose that error exists, then we would never disagree; and error cannot exist without truth going before it.
Maybe. But I'm not sure anyone believes that all philosophy is equally wise. I'm not familiar enough with the literature to make any assessments on behalf of others.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think Rorty is probably right that philosophy is essentially a discursive project. The history of philosophy resembles a conversation in slow motion, one marked by fashions and phases, as well as by committed reactionaries and revolutionaries. But it is also a fairly sheltered discourse, since most people take little interest in it and are effectively excluded by barriers such as literacy, time, education, and inclination. As a result, there tend to be two conversational groupings: the intellectual 'elite', and the rest of us, who paddle around in the shallow end with the slogans, fragments, and half-digested presuppositions that trickle down.
Philosophy as a distinct activity doesn't seem to be widely practiced outside of hobbyists and academic settings. Where do you think it shows up in today's world (as a practice) and can you point to a demonstration of its efficacy?
I would agree that advocates of a worldview that hold skepticism in high regard would be better received if they portrayed their position as aspirational as opposed to already being on a higher plane. As in, they can believe skepticism is the best approach, although they admit the standard is rarely fully achieved.
I still don't find the position sustainable just due to the impossibility of not having bias toward certain foundational standards, but direct declarations of superiority while claiming no one standard inherently superior strikes me as facially inconsistent as well.
What counts as wise in your assessment. What are the indicators?
I agree. And it may be that their thesis of skepticism is so broad that it is hard to produce concrete arguments in its favor, but I nevertheless think that we want rational arguments rather than moral preferences when deciding whether skepticism is the best approach. The skeptic can be construed as humble or at least as possessing "epistemic humility," and that is deemed morally valuable within our culture, but presumably on a philosophy forum we want to ask whether skepticism is rational, rather than asking whether it is moral.
Quoting Hanover
:up:
Your OP has already generated a lot of the good discussion it so richly deserves. I'll chime in on two points. The first relates to the quote above. A Theory Of Everything, in philosophy, would naturally have to include a theory of explanation itself -- what counts as explanatory, how explanations do in fact make sense of things, how we recognize an adequate justification, and much more. So to avoid circularity, a TOE will have to provide this account on a different level than the theory-internal explanations of other things. One of my main difficulties with this kind of grand theorizing is that not enough attention is devoted to recognizing this problem and giving a straightforward account of the necessary postulates or intuitions for explanation. And you can't just name them: Such an account must include the reasons why these postulates or intuitions are free from interpretation by the theory itself -- no easy task.
The second point concerns the discourse vs. dissection idea, which is a very helpful way to think about phil. It overlaps with the idea that philosophy is about some kind of wisdom or understanding. I got to take a class once with Richard Bernstein, and I remember his credo, which was something like this: "You have to restrain your desire to respond and refute until you've thoroughly understood the philosopher or the position you're addressing. [And boy did he mean "thoroughly"!]. You really don't have a right to an opinion until you're sure you've achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible. Otherwise it's just a game of who can make the cleverer arguments." I forget this constantly, as we all do, but I still hold it as ideal. You can't start being wise until you first understand. And yes, quite often the wisdom is aporetic, but that should teach us something about the nature of philosophy, not make us look forward to some glorious day when all the questions will be answered correctly, as demonstrated by superior argumentative skill.
Nice quote. My mum held a similar position. Great way to promote silence. It strikes me that a thorough understanding of anything is rare.
There are at least two problems with Bernstein's advice. The first is that there are thousands of philosophers, and if we could not critique and dismiss any of them until we had "achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible," then we would be bound to read only a handful of them, precisely the ones we were accidentally introduced to first.
The second is that the quality of philosophical engagement is a mean, not an extreme. Bernstein errs in thinking that it is merely a function of the philosophical author, but in fact it is a mean between the reader and the philosophical author. Thus someone who is less intelligent ought to have a less stringent criterion for critiquing. To deny this is to misunderstand the nature of quality philosophical engagement, and it is also to hamstring the development of philosophy students. To simplify, if you are reading something that seems really dumb, then you should call it dumb and go find something that you find more intelligent. There is no need to lie to oneself and pretend that it isn't dumb. Maybe you will later find out that it wasn't dumb, but the better decision is still to admit what you believe to be the case and move on for now. To cling to that which has no rationale that you are able to articulate is a form of intellectual dishonesty. The capacity to admit that a position is irrationalwhether your own or an author you are readingis crucially necessary for intellectual honesty. If one cannot identify such irrationality in others, then, a fortiori, they will be blind to it in themselves. As always, there are errors on both sides: it is erroneous to fail to give credit where due, and it is also erroneous to give credit where it is not due.
What Bernstein is trying to do is to get his students to avoid sophistry, and that is a noble cause. If we pick up an author who we have reason to believe is worthwhile, then any refutation we give must be the refutation of a substantial thesis. If the author is worthwhile, then for anything we refute, it must be understandable why the author would hold to it.
I'm happy to mix the two. Glad you can see the line of thinking here, and you are right to link it with Midgley. A related point came up in another thread only yesterday:
Quoting Banno Midgley argued that different explanatory modes (say, biological, psychological, sociological, or aesthetic) are not competing for the title of The Truth, but are each illuminating different aspects of reality, as long as they remain answerable to the shared worldthat is, not solipsistic or fantastical, but rooted in experience, practice, and evidence.
Where we - you and I - may lock horns is where I occasionally see science has having made certain conceptual assumptions, or as having presumed that it's conclusions apply where they do not. But it is incumbent on the philosopher to first understand the science before critiquing it.
I recall an argument that raged in a University Magazine between an old Kantian Ethicist and an agricultural scientist, many years ago. The Scientist claimed to have a way to ensure that beef was "good", involving certain measurements of the animal before slaughter. The Kantian of course could not resist pointing out at length that this was not "good", and in particular that the slaughter did not deserve the affirmation.
Never the twain, as I recall, both leaving the conversation perplexed as to what the other meant. Midgley would say the philosophers task here is not to discredit the science, but to situate itmorally, linguistically, and existentiallywithin the wider network of human concerns. Not to refute the scientist, but to enlarge the conversation so that words like good are not silently reduced or misappropriated.
I'm flattered that you have paid me so much attention. :wink:
You read me as denying that I have a worldview. I presume you got that from Quoting Banno
And you are right, this is an overreach. I recall dithering between existentialism, Popperian falsification, and a half-understood utilitarianism, then finding a way to bring these together by looking closely at the language used.
In my defence, the aim of those who's engagement with philosophy is primarily a discourse is completeness, while whatever world view I accept is certainly incomplete. My aim, in writing on these forums, and in applying the analytic tools we have at hand, is to achieve some measure of coherence. Those of us who see philosophy less as a doctrine and more as a practice of clarificationof untangling the knots in our shared languageinevitably work with fragments, revisable insights, and partial alignments.
While some approach philosophy as a quest for a complete worldview, my interest is in the practice of philosophical inquiry itselfhow our language reveals, limits, or reshapes the positions we take. In that sense, coherencenot completenessis my measure of success.
So, point taken. Thank you.
:wink: Indeed - although there is now such a word, created self-consciously. Good on you for noticing. I did indeed want something that portrayed an obsession with the dead, but thought "necromancy" a bit much. So I invented a term for the study of eulogies. The threads hereabouts on Kant, Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, yes and Wittgenstein and Kripke, too, as evidence.
It's not the topic that is problematic, so much as the approach.
And we have some agreement that philosophy ought to be therapeutic, although while you take that as placing it on the shelf alongside the self-help books, I want a therapy that prevents and cures obsessions with complete narratives at the cost of coherence, in which we might accepting that understanding may sometimes consist in living well with contradiction, rather than resolving it. Its also a kind of ethical stancevaluing honesty, humility, and the capacity to dwell in uncertainty over the satisfaction of final answers.
And it would be fair to accuse me of virtue signalling here. But you have seen my work, and know that I don't live up to this ideal.
Sure. I would also draw attention to the extra step of casting a critical eye over what is being thought. A shift from hermeneutics to critique. The best philosophical conversations seem to hold both in tension: sympathetic understanding and critical scrutiny.
Added: Yep.
Yep. That's the poison for which critique is the antidote.
I don't see that this is so.
Why should we limit wisdom to being either a particular, or a thing?
And see how even here, at the first step, so much is presumed?
We need not assume the dilemma that either there is one true narrative, or else all philosophical positions were equally wise.
Hubris, to presume on has access to the one true narrative. That, and a certain deafness. One might cultivate a sustained discipline of remaining open to what calls for thought. One might work with others on developing a coherent narrative while not expecting to finish the job. Something to sit between "I have the truth" and "Anything goes".
Oh, Leon. Already misrepresenting. You are a liar. You know better, but you do this sort of shit. And repeatedly and to others as well as to me.
It's a shame, really. You can do better.
Nice.
There's a clear difference between 'academic' philosophy and then like "Here at InGen, our philosophy is....".
The former being what we (supposedly) do here, and the latter being what laypeople take to be their general worldview. In the example, its specific to for instance, employment, but is clearly not something gleaned by any kind of attentive consideration (in most cases).
There is definitely an ignorance to the former. Seems to be the reason why most philosophers are considered pointless or superfluous (then again, the examples usually cited for that are absolutely pointless, superfluous philosophers lol).
This put me in mind of the use of metalanguage in Tarski, a hierarchy in which the truths in each language are set out in it's metalanguage, and infinitum.
There's an alternative, from Kripke, in which instead of assigning "true" or "false" to every sentence, we assign "unknown"; then we proceed to assign values of "true" and "false" as we interpret the language.
We thus avoid assigning a truth value to "This sentence is false".
Interestingly, this approach provides a theory that is consistent at the cost of not assigning a truth value to every sentence.
Run that alongside Midgley's idea of plumbing. Both find fixed points in an interdependent web. Both are partiality, interdependent, and rely on the practical need to patch leaks as they arise.
:up: It's abstractions all the way down.
Cheers.
Quoting J
Trouble is, we have to act. We don't always have the time, fortitude or inclination to understand someone - especially when their view is well removed from our own.
There are views that look to be not worth the effort. And we have to make judgements as to where we start our efforts and what to look at in detail.
There are posts in this thread to which I have chosen not to respond simply becasue I want to go have breakfast. I made a choice between those that seemed to progress the discussion, and those that don't. Others may make a different choice, and hopefully take this thread in directions I find unexpected.
I appreciate the Richard Bernstein account. Trouble is, there are limits on our resources. But also, responding and refuting can be a part of developing an understanding.
And there is this: we are involved in Quoting Tom Storm
Doing philosophy is a human endeavour. While it reaches for glory and joy, it stands in mud, puss and entrails. :wink:
I see what Count Timothy is getting at, though I don't think it's well expressed. (So Ill agree with the impulse while questioning the formulation.) I submit that there is an actual good the good, in Platonist termsand that being able to orient oneself toward it is essential to philosophy qua "love of wisdom." Naturally, there will be objections: Who knows what that is? or How can there be such a thing in a pluralistic culture?
But this doesnt negate the point. Mary Midgley, whom you mention, was concerned to rescue morality from scientism and evolutionary reductionism. She writes about far more than just philosophical plumbing. In Evolution as Religion: Strange Hopes and Even Stranger Fears, she criticizes those who take evolutionary theory not just as biological explanation, but as a total account of human nature, ethics, and meaninga trend she rightly sees as both philosophically naïve and culturally dangerous. Yet this reductionism, tacitly accepted, still underlies much philosophical discourse.
So what is the metaphysics of meaning? Of the good? Of what distinguishes the good from the merely useful? These are questions philosophy must engage with indeed, they are what make philosophy more than intellectual hand-waving. And it must be holistic in some genuine sense.
Quoting Banno
The P?li Buddhist texts acknowledge this very fact with clinical clarity:
[quote=Majjhima Nik?ya (MN 10) Satipa??h?na Sutta]In this body there are: head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, stomach contents, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin grease, saliva, mucus, joint fluid, and urine.[/quote]
Yet this frank realism does not cancel out the fact that Buddhism offers a transcendental philosophyone that seeks liberation from precisely this embodied condition, not through denial, but through insight into its impermanence and lack of inherent selfhood.
Quoting Wayfarer
I had to smile at this, since Tim prides himself with some justification on his erudition.
Quoting Wayfarer
I've been chasing Tim on this very issue in the recent thread on aesthetics. Here's what I asked:
Quoting Banno
Supose that there is an actual good. Now supose that we are in a position to pass a judgement on some act - kicking a puppy or stealing a loaf of bread to feed one's children or what ever - is that act Good? We look to the circumstances, to the consequences, to the intent of the participants. How would what we do in making that assessment differ, if there is no "actual good"?
Do we really need to understand the nature of being, to have the whole and complete truth before us, before we decide that the sunset is beautiful, or that kicking a pup is wrong, or that stealing to feed one's children is forgivable?
God, I hope not. 'cause if we do, we're pretty much fucked.
All the examples are artificial. It's like those endless discussions of the trolley problem. God knows what you would *actually* do in that circumstance. Useful for stimulating classroom discussion, but still artificial, because it's not a real trolley, and no actual lives are at stake.
Unlike our actual existence.
Even 'understanding the nature of being' sounds artificial, when expressed in such bald terms, but to see a real master at work, in whatever capacity or occupation they are engaged in, is to see what that understanding means.
I can't help but post this, the mods will probably remove it, but it's only 2:25 and there are actual philosophers (some since deceased) discussing this very point.
Yes, and consider the context: He was speaking to students, young minds, and urging us to develop good habits, not necessarily to practice this kind of thoroughness on every conceivable occasion.
Quoting Banno
Especially if such views aren't those of a historically important or well-regarded philosopher, but just some folks like us on TPF. So, often the best alternative for me is to not get involved. But if I do want to respond (and again, I wish I lived up to this as well as I should), there's really no excuse for not doing my best to construct that charitable account first.
I think too that Bernstein had in mind an approach to take with major philosophers. It's one thing to slight someone's opinion -- perhaps for good reason -- in a dorm-room bull session, and quite another to get the barest glimpse of Kant or Aristotle or Wittgenstein and then believe you're in a position to refute some key point. This is especially egregious when the refutation is scornful, implying that K or A or W must have been really unintelligent because you have shown them to be wrong! Such arrogance.
Sure.
And the guitarist practices outside of the performance.
A well thought through piece Banno. I have long thought of the two broadly different ways of philosophizing as the analytic and the synthetic. I see the analytic approach as a critical approach that really begins with Kant and his critique of traditional metaphysics, which had been based on the idea of intellectual intuition yielding the highest form of knowledge, as yielding wisdom. So, I see the traditional view as relying critically on the belief that there is a god or higher power that inspires the philosopher in their best moments of intuitive intellectual insight.
If this is right, then the traditional approach is a synthetic approach. That said I don't think all synthetic approaches rely on the authority of God or a higher power?for example some philosophers such as Peirce, Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty Whitehead and some of the semiotic thinkers attempt to create cohesive philosophical pictures which are consistent with modern science.
Such endeavors overstep, as you rightly point out, if they purport to explain everything about human, or even animal, life, or actually, even existence itself.. It seems inevitable that our pictures will always be adumbrations, sketches, incomplete and never wholly adequate to their subjects.
The critical analytic approach has also opened up new and different ways of thinking, and it could thus be said to have its own synthetic dimensions, which means as @180 Proof points out that philosophical practice cannot be neatly categorized in a strictly binary manner.
There are also, of course, philosophers such as the Stoics, the Epicureans and the existentialists who are concerned with discovering how best to live, that is with ethics, much more than they are with metaphysical system building.
There is also philosophy as the study of the history of ideas, not necessarily as a tendentious attempt to find authoritative confirmation for the enquirer's own beliefs, but just for its own sake.
You have opened up a fascinating topic, and there is much more I would like to say, but I am out of time right now and will have to come back to it.
I like how this is panning out.
Quoting Janus
Part of the thinking that went on before posting here was a rejection of those very terms, and the selection of 'discourse' and 'dissection', in the hope of leaving behind the baggage of the term "analytic". And don't mention "continental".
Another part was my trying to put a finger on what I find distasteful about Peirce, Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, Whitehead and others.
I'd also like to consider the early socratic dialogues as dissections rather than discourses. Perhaps the move to discourse came as Plato moved from telling us what Socrates said to telling us what Plato said.
Quoting Janus
Again, I'm happy with that, but still think the distinction worth some consideration.
Right - hence the distinction in ancient philosophy between praxis and theoria.
Might I suggest (pace Hadot) that in modern philosophy, the former is generally neglected.
(Incidentally, from what very little I know, Richard Bernstein was not one of those who neglected it.)
For me, philosophy grows out of the attitude attributed to Socrates - The unexamined life is not worth living. This way of seeing things has been growing in me over the past six months or so, although it is consistent with things I've been writing on the forum since I joined. Again, for me, philosophy isn't about the nature of reality, it's about how the human mind, and my mind in particular, sees reality, creates it, examines it. About the structure of thought and experience. About how the mind works looking at it from the inside. About the processes of reason and other ways of knowing. About self-awareness. About one of the tools, I would say the most important tool, used to make Socrates' examination - introspection. Finally, this way of thinking about philosophy sees it as a practice; like meditation, prayer, or Tai Chi, as opposed to a subject for study.
My question I guess - Is this phenomenology? That's an ology that has always confused me. Beyond that, is this a third way of seeing philosophy beyond the two you have identified above? One thing it's clear to me is that it is not is psychology, cognitive science, or any science.
Quoting Banno
You wrote something similar in another thread recently. I responded - you're just talking about metaphysics. And you agreed with me. You and I were both amazed you and I agreed on something.
So let's go back to my question to Tim. If we are to focus on praxis, then what does the Grand Theory Of All provide? Why do we need an analysis of being in order to say that the flower is pretty?
My suspicion is that it provides a rhetorical tool for authoritarianism. It's the elite philosopher kings who really understand which flower is beautiful and which plain.
The flower is pretty not because weve deduced it from a theory of beauty, but perhaps because it calls something in us to attentionand we respond. The work of philosophy might be to keep that response from being stolen by those who would pretend it isnt real until its been certified.
More clarity. Cool.
Explanation has to be on a different level than the thing it explains. Always leaving the explanation itself lacking an explanation.
Quoting Banno
Is this a positive observation, or does it point to some kind of deficiency to the language process?
After understanding these features of explanation, do you now possess some kind of tool when doing philosophy, or is this another example of the impossibility of metaphysics?
Your threads tend to be dissections rather than discourses. Those "What is..." questions, together with the way you like to dig in to detail.
So we don't just agree on what is metaphysical...
I agree. It is difficult to sound genuine when speaking of being qua being - sounds like word salad from a history nerd who probably couldnt hang for one minute with Aristotle or Wittgenstein or any of the real thinkers.
But philosophy, to me, is the meta language of all doing.
So philosophy is too immediately both self-aware and bound to its language. It is unlike playing music or any other act that we do. One cannot make doing philosophy a meditative act, like one does other things.
There is something utterly non-physical about doing philosophy. This builds no groove or rhythm that might facilitate true mastery.
And there is something essentially dialectic about philosophy that forever distracts one from such a rhythm.
No good philosopher believes they know enough to call themselves a master. (You can master academia and history, but not master thinking such that you would discover any of the ideas that those philosophers discovered.)
At least I have not seen it. Even a poet or prose writer can probably allow the muses to carry one towards a mastery of language unlike a philosopher engages language.
The closest one can get to being consumed in doing philosophy, the way a master is consumed while practicing his trade, is the moment when philosophizing becomes mystical contemplation. Words and self-awareness dissipate at that point, so you are not really doing philosophy anymore, though you may be thinking about being, or self, or language qua language, or the thought of nothingness.
So I agree, practice makes perfect, where more meaning can be found in the practice than in the perfection. But I did not learn this from philosophy. I analyze it when doing philosophy, but cant be as such while philosophizing.
Does that track anything with you?
Thought is a deficient term, though, as it seems so quotidian; we all think incessantly, often to not much effect. I dont know if theres a proper English term for the kind of insight being referred to but it seems more a reference to a visionary insight, noesis, perhaps, or gnosis, or something of the kind.
And these may be beyond discursive thought and so philosophizing in the sense of verbal formulation. But it is still part of the broader territory of philosophy (or at least used to be.)
In any case, Plotinus, the fountainhead of much of ancient philosophy, and even of much since, dwelt between those two worlds of mystical insight and philosophical exegesis. So too did many a classic philosopher. So the boundary is more a border, and a porous one at that.
Quoting Banno
I think a grand theory of everything is a mischaracterization. It's insight into the nature of things. It may show itself in a gesture or an artwork.
I can't see why you allow the "perhaps". Socrates would not get started without Laches and Euthyphro and Alcibiades. Equally, Plato needed Socrates to get started on his journey.
Quoting Banno
I hesitate to express a view about world-views in general; it smells strongly of hubris. Perhaps one should remember that if you set out to answer all possible questions, you are likely forgetting that any worldview will generate questions of its own, so a worldview can never be complete in that sense.
Quoting J
I'm very sympathetic to that idea. But I don't see how one could ever be sure that one has achieved the goal and even less sure that every idea deserves the same charity. On the other hand, I don't see how one could even move towards the goal without claiming the right to opinions from the beginning; what one should not claim is the right to claim exemption from the messy business of dissection and critique.
That was my point about there being a third way to philosophize.
Which is making me realize a fourth way might be seen as naive common sense. Non- analytic, non-metaphysical, immediate like mystical, but the opposite of transcendent.
Quoting Wayfarer
Philosophical type activity moves from naive common sense, to the analytic dissection Banno enjoys, to the metaphyisical more constructive type (building more things to be dissected), then to more mystical transcending type (completely not worth the analytics time as it intentionally uses illogical gibberish (paradox and seeming contradiction) to make itself known in language.)
"Something in particular," not "some particular thing." Which is just to say, the term wisdom has to have [I]some[/I] determinant content or else philosophy, the love of wisdom, would be the "love of nothing in particular."
Well, in ruling out, "anything goes," you are denying some positions. So, considering that you are also ruling out: "I have truth," in virtue of [I]what[/I] are you ruling out all those views which, according to you, "don't go?" What's the standard? Apparently it cannot be truth. Is it wisdom? How can wisdom be a standard by which some positions are excluded lest it be determinant?
Second, by rulling out some positions, you have already committed yourself to a "true narrative." Is this hubris? You've said in clear terms in the past that the "true narrative" cannot contain Plato's forms, metaphysical notions of truth, Aristotle's essences (however you understand that), the "view from nowhere," opposition to abortion, etc. You seem to have lots of comments about the true narrative you feel comfortable making. But what are they made in virtue of given that a grasp of truth is denied?
Further, you might ask, can truth contradict truth? Claiming to know that "truth cannot contradict truth" is not claiming to know everything. It's a fairly limited position. But supposing any reasonable confidence in knowing any truths, these truthswill necessarily rule out contradictory truths (or else require finer distinctions).
Now, if truth [I]can[/I] contradict truth, when and how is this so? An answer to this question is needed for anyone who countenances dialtheism, because if there is no limit then it follows that "anything goes" (and "doesn't go").
Finally, I would just point out that an embrace of pluralism or the claimed undecidability of "metaphysical" questions doesn't stop people from making strong metaphysical claims. Instead, because any opposing positions cannot be "wrong" it merely shifts the discussion over towards declaring the opposing view a "pseudoproblem," "not truth-apt," or else accusing opposing positions of being "meaningless" or "incoherent." Now, positions might be based on pseudoproblems, or they might be incoherent, but this charge is hardly a panacea and often seems to lead to bad faith argument. For, what makes something a "pseudoproblem" that cannot even be engaged with tends to depend heavily on epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions, and the move to focus on identifying pseudoproblems certainly seems to trend towards making these presuppositions transparent, since they are no longer a focus (indeed, they are assumed not to exist). And so you get broad, cursory dismissals of vast areas of philosophy as dealing in pseudoproblems. Rorty, for instance, in his chapter on Wittgenstein pragmatism, swipes away millennia of philosophy in a few sentences as a non-issue.
I hadn't thought about the Tarksi/Kripke angle. The "cost," when it comes to a philosophical Theory of Everything, may be something very much like this. Not every sentence can be given a truth-value, though such sentences may be needed for consistency. At the least, do we know that a truth-value in a metalanguage -- say, my "different level" in which we'd give an account of explanation -- has to be constructed differently from one within the target language? Logicians invited to weigh in here.
Quoting Banno
Indeed. Sometimes opening a meta-discourse such as your OP will draw people into a frame of reference that's fresher than their usual ones -- or at least that's how I experience it.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right. He was kind of a genius at theoretical thinking, but his background in the Frankfurt School and Aristotle never deserted him. The majority of his books turn at some point to the question of praxis, asking what philosophy, and philosophers, are doing. What is the good that we hope to accomplish? This was also why he was such great friends with Habermas, I think.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Well, it leaves it lacking for the time being, within the target level. I didn't mean to imply that there might not be satisfactory, non-circular resolutions of this. @Banno has some ideas about that, above. There is also the idea that some version of "explanation" may be non-discursive, non-rational, a kind of showing or demonstration.
Quoting Ludwig V
Yes, as I replied to Banno above. Maybe amend the Bernsteinian credo to "the most charitable, satisfying reading possible for you, as best you can tell." We'll never get it exactly right; we just want the good habit, the good intention.
That is obvious. Why would we need Godel to explain something so trivial?
Is linguistics, the study of languages, outside of language? If not then what are linguists doing?
Witt said that many philosophical problems occur when "language goes on holiday", I agree. I think many "philosophers" tend to misuse and overuse language unnecessarily. It's more like they aren't trying to solve any problems or to express any realistic (useful) idea. They are simply using words in artful ways - scribble showmanship - almost like a battle of who can use scribbles in more unique and complex ways. It is a social game they are playing. But don't conflate the game with what language is primary designed to do - to inform. Language on holiday is like colors and shapes on holiday in a surreal painting.
"By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by reflection, which is noblest; Second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third, by experience, which is the bitterest."
- Confucius
The issue I have experienced is that in trying to understand the other's position you find that the person doesn't appear to understand it themselves because they haven't bothered questioning it themselves (reflection). In trying to understand another's ideas I am trying to adopt them as my own, but I naturally reflect upon it, testing it by integrating it with other things that we know or that the other has said and find issues. When I show the discrepancies it is ignored - as if I didn't say anything (and if I didn't then why not explain why it isn't relevant if your intent is to help me understand?). I'm not asking a rhetorical question. I'm asking a question you should be asking yourself about your own position if you reflect honestly upon your own position.
It seems to me that many simply think that wisdom comes only by imitating - by referring to the group or an authority - the easy things, but does not lead to wisdom on its own.
Honestly questioning your own positions (reflection) and facing reality (experiences) are difficult. It means you have to accept that you might be wrong. I try to criticize my own position before actually submitting it for others to criticize so as to not waste time going back and forth on the trivial things. Using others to help you reflect on your own position can help you achieve a more objective view of the argument and evaluate whether it integrates well with the rest of what we know or not. This is where the experience comes in and why it is bitter. It can show you that you may have been wrong and you need to start over and reflect.
Quoting J
If the conclusion you have reached is aporetic then you've made a wrong turn somewhere in your thinking and would need to reflect.
Philosophy is not intended to answer questions, but to ask them. The question enters the domain of science when it becomes testable, and it is here where we end up answering the question. I would just end with another quote from Confucius:
"The man who moves a mountain begins by carrying away small stones".
Because Im trying to understand statements like this:
Quoting Banno
And this:
truths become available within human discourse
Banno
But then there is this:
truths become available not arbitrarily, not as illusions, but as intelligible articulations of a world we are always already in relation with.
Banno
This implies a world we are separated from - you need there to be me and separately the world logically before there can be me in relation with the world. The already is the ontological pickle (the chicken and egg portion of the discussion), but recognizing this tension does not collapse the gap that maintains a separate world to be articulated.
And what about this:
Quoting Banno
And there is what you say above, that the metaphysics of it all is only a trivial observation.
My sense is that there is the world, and there is the language about the world. Language is always from the outside looking back in, fashioning a window into being. I say looking back in, because it requires reflection, a move from the world, processed in mind, back onto the world. This back in move reflects Bannos already in relation with but accounts for the distance between me and the world that must exist for me to have a relation to the world.
To say being is not understood outside of language, and language is not a container, and there is nothing external interpretation - together these statements isolate language from attempts to use language to speak about the world. Maybe that is the intent. But then language itself becomes suspect. Interpretation becomes interpretation of a prior interpretation (language always in a con-text), and never an interpretation (or better, a translation into language) of the world.
The study of being is not the study of the word being. Studying is closer to the words. Being is closer to the thing being studied.
I think we precisely must assume this. There must be one true narrative, or else, all narratives are equally born and equally soon to be gone.
Maybe there is not one true narrative. But then, in such case, never can there be error or accuracy in any narratives that may arise, if one remains the narrating type.
I am enjoying this. Wish Banno would finish his sandwich and teach me something. I feel like Im on the usual precipice between everything and nothing. So few enjoy the view down here in the cave (or on the mountain, if you rather see Nietzsche in your company than Plato).
Let me guess, you haven't received a response? I would then refer you to my post just after the one you've quoted me on here in this thread (the last post on page 2).
Quoting Fire Ologist
Not only that but that the very scribbles and sounds that we make that manifest as language is somehow not part of the world either. We can talk about words and sentences like we can talk about cars and traffic.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Exactly. This is what I mean by language is scribble and sound usage that follow some rules. You have to use things in the world (scribbles and sounds) to communicate your "internal" ideas. The mind is just another process in the world that interacts with the rest of world to produce novel outputs in the world.
Quoting Fire Ologist
And oh, how the same ones that say there isn't a true narrative like to say that you are wrong in yours. I wish they'd just make up their mind. Are they talking about the world, or are they just making surreal scribble art?
I don't agree with any strong distinction between science and philosophy, but let me ask: can we (ought we) ever ask questions about ethics or aesthetics? Would these fall under the category of "science?"
Second, it seems to me that the arts must answer at least some questions. For, if we did not have grounds to believe any particular historical narrative, or a grasp of historical facts (including recent events), we'd have no reason to have faith in science.
At the same time, it seems that there are at least questions about what makes science a good way to know things that must be prior to science, and which tend to fall into the common box of "philosophy."
Of course, the line between "philosophy of biology" and biology, or "philosophy of physics," and physics, is always quite blurry. So too the line between philosophy of science and epistemology and foundational questions of evidence and the role of mathematics and logic in scientific discourse and models. That's why I actually think the art/science distinction is more useful than philosophy/science.
Let's pretend for a moment that the OP is not another diatribe against your bogey of monism.
Quoting Banno
Does your OP give any reason to believe that there are only two ways of doing philosophy, and that you have identified them? It doesnt. There is no argumentation to this effect. Youve simply pulled two things out of a hat and declared that they are the two approaches to philosophy. Its as if I made a thread, The two approaches to exercise (biking and swimming).
So what if we amend this problem? Then we would be talking about, Two ways of doing philosophy, among others. Well now the question arises: Why are we looking at these two ways in particular, and not others?
The rationale for your unsupported claim about completeness in identifying the two ways was a disjunctive syllogism:
But the deeper problem here is that the dissecting/disagreeing/critiquing way of doing philosophy presupposes the discourse way of doing philosophy. This is because in order to disagree philosophically one must provide an argument, and arguments will require positive claims and at least some level of discourse to support those claims. The possible exception is to merely charge someone with self-contradiction, in which case one needs only commit to the PNC, and this is usually taken to be a minimal commitment.
Less technically, the problem is that disagreeing and naysaying are not self-supporting. One cannot run around constantly disagreeing with others while pretending that they have no positive and substantial positions of their own. They cannot pretend that they argue only against positions and never for positions. Even if they somehow managed to only presuppose the PNC and never to disagree with anything that is not self-contradictory, their choice of what to disagree with would still reflect their own positive positions and predilections. No one is a robot which only disagrees on the basis of self-contradiction, and does so completely randomly. Indeed, no one on TPF comes anywhere near the approach which disagrees only on the basis of self-contradiction.
---
Quoting Banno
What does it mean to say that you seek coherence and not completeness? I think "completeness" is a pejorative representing a kind of strawman. If I'm wrong, then feel free to clearly lay out what it means to seek coherence and not completeness. Does the "coherentist" not seek to know more than they already do? Do they limit themselves to making the things they already know cohere?
Exactly. That is why I pointed out the underdevelopment of Bannos admission in passing:
Quoting Banno
That is a huge indictment against presuming one of the two ways of philosophizing is better than the other. Which Banno obviously presumes.
Quoting Leontiskos
Exactly. Which is why I keep saying if you want to point out error in another, you have to be upholding something objective between you both, such as the truth, as it can be found in the world both of you stand in relation to. Which contradicts the position that there is no such truth in the first place, and violates the PNC.
And further, Ive noticed when two people who seem to agree on the fundamentals of the Wittgensteinian type of philosophic game are discussing the world they make metaphysical claims all of the time and sometimes agree about distinctions between essentially different things in the world without harassing each other for wandering back into theoretical metaphysics.
So it is not even a consistently analytic robot that ever comes across.
Ill admit, I may just not be getting it. I do respect the conversation.
The OP made me think of Isaiah Berlin's idea of, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," although it doesn't fit quite right. Berlin is separating the "forest from the trees," not discourse from dissection.
Thanks for the perspicacious post. I have noticed the different philosophy "styles" on this forum, but hadn't distilled it down to a polarity : Dissecting vs Doing.
Since I am an amateur philosopher, who as a retirement hobby discourses on a Philosophy Forum, I dabble in both sides of this pursuit of Truth . . . and clarity. The Analytic side may consist of prising apart the various bits and pieces of each text and examining them for their beauty, utility and faults. But, you could spend a lifetime dissecting other people's ideas, and end-up with a pile of disconnected notions.
Yet my analytically examined life is almost over. So I spend most of my time on the Application (doing) side : putting together the best bits of historical science & philosophy into a complete GPS system for steering a life through the natural & cultural labyrinth. Philosophy is both a Study and a Practice.
One way to describe a holistic philosophy is as a Worldview. Some people inherit a complete belief system --- where the "grounds" must be taken on Faith --- from their traditional social religion. But I long-ago rejected the groundless Faith of my fathers. Since then, I have been privately constructing a personalized Belief System of my own, from whatever scraps of Truth I can find by dissection of other's views, or by personal observation.
Since the cosmos itself is dynamic and ever-evolving, my emerging belief system may never be finalized. And there is always room for improvement, including both positive & negative contributions from forum posters. So, my fallible personalized worldview seems close-enough to ultimate Truth that it will help me to steer a safe course between Scylla & Charibdis, and to avoid such personal pitfalls as snarling dogmatism and supercilious dissection.
Since I am somewhat analytical by nature, I encourage others to "dissect" my own rambling reasoning, in order to reveal its weak points. And, I agree that, for the pursuit of truth, "you can't have one without the other". Yet, when critical "dissection" becomes nothing but nasty "nitpicking", "fault-finding", or political put-downs, with no alternatives offered, I call it "trolling", and end the one-sided dialog. :nerd:
I think the key recognition that should be made is that philosophy is the love of wisdom, not the love of knowledge or the love of truth. One might believe the pursuit of truth or knowledge is the wisest path of all, but to believe that is a particular philosophy that can be challenged. What this might mean is that the acceptance of beliefs that are untrue might be wiser to hold.
In fact, I was going to enter the recent essay contest with a thesis along these lines, but I was given too much time and never got around to it. Yes, too much time results in a lack of urgency and lack of effort ultimately for some.
But my point would be that religion and I'm sure all sorts of beliefs fall into the category of not being valid upon a purely logical analysis, but I wonder what comfort one has upon their death bed for having had a firm committment to miserable truth as opposed to having chosen a more joyous path, filled with magical wonder and profound meaning and purpose in every leaf fluttering in the wind. Which sort of person is more wise is the question.
I believe that narratives can be both coherent and complete, given basic assumptions. While there will be multiple coherent frameworks given different assumptions as their basis, the more complex an assumption is, the less likely it is to be both complete and coherent. An assumption also requires its own expansion within itself, otherwise people would disagree about the conclusions and another assumption would be required. It seems entirely possible that given enough time, philosophy will eventually converge on one simple assumption, from which all else follows. Although I dont think this will ever happen even if technically possible.
Sure, and that's why a charitable reading can be important. You can help make the position clearer and more compelling! (And maybe start by discarding the assumption that the person "hasn't bothered questioning it themselves." Perhaps they've done so to the best of their ability.)
Quoting Harry Hindu
Well, showing discrepancies, that's step two, which requires a whole new mindset, I've found. Quite often, if I start by indicating that I do have some understanding of the position, and can see some value or importance, and then describe the discrepancies I also see, it's received more openly. Or not, of course! -- people get defensive.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Is the "you" here the "British 'one'" -- that is, "one should be asking oneself . . ." etc. -- or do you mean "you" as in me, specifically the position about understanding another's position that I was sketching?
Quoting Harry Hindu
Say more about this? I'm not understanding yet why aporia wouldn't be a possible outcome for a philosophical inquiry.
I have a friend with twins. One loves to build things and the other loves to destroy things. The second is parasitic, and is out of luck if no one is building.
I mostly think that a philosophy forum should require users to make new threads occasionally, and not just dissect and criticize the threads of others. That practice seems important both individually and communally.
I am not saying that you never build anything or that you never make new threads. But the tendency towards criticism rather than construction is pretty easy to understand on a number of different levels. In fact that tendency seems more intelligible than any connection between discourse/construction and foolhardy comprehensiveness or completeness. I am not convinced that such a connection holds.
Dissecting vs. comprehensive seems like a false dichotomy. True dichotomies would include things like analytic/synthetic, hedgehog/fox, forest/trees, cased-based*/systematic, or critical/constructive.
What I find is that many users on TPF aren't capable of close readings of texts, and this means that they lack a capacity for dissection. They focus on big themes ("forest-thinking") and are not really able to respond to more precise points or critiques ("tree-analysis"). The first thing I would want to teach them is how to "table" an objection; how to say, "I see and understand your tree-based objection; I don't know how to answer it; I will have to think more about it and get back to you." Or else something like, "I see that you have a valid objection, but I don't currently have the energy to try to address it." Once they can do that then the fear of countenancing such objections dissipates, and they can begin to contemplate them more seriously.
* I.e. casuistry in the true sense
Trouble is of course that if something is beyond discursive thought then it cannot be said. We could not have an argument that reached such a conclusion. And indeed the ending of elenchus is often aporia - the method of dissection ends without resolution.
This relates to the other dialectic mentioned in the OP, parallel to that between dissection and discourse the tension between coherence and completeness.
Mysticism presents as a desire to leap from the aporia to a conclusion, to complete the dialogue.
But it does so at the risk of losing coherence.
I've said this previously in relation to the path you follow. The leap from aporia to closure cannot be justified. Of course that does not make it wrong, or the conclusion false if such terms even apply here.
There are two paths here. One is silence, were we grant that there is nothing more to be said. The other is showing, were the value of one's beliefs is seen in what one does.
That's fair. If I recall, at the time I wrote "Perhaps you can't have one without the other" I was puzzling about whether it really is dissection that marks the emergence of doing philosophy, as opposed to just making shit up. It's so tempting to supose that elenchus that marks the beginning of something new and different, and to say that philosophy consists in exposing ideas to criticism. Hence the "perhaps", guarding against this perhaps too extreme view. But that's more rhetorical posturing than a philosophical commitment.
But this is just your recitation of your ideosyncratic worldview.
Consider:
"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds."
William James, Will to Believe
Or, to add another quote, from Plato's seventh letter: "There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject [of metaphysics]. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much converse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself... Again, if they had appeared to me to admit adequately of writing and exposition, what task in life could I have performed nobler than this, to write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the light for all to see? But I do not think it a good thing for men that there should be a disquisition, as it is called, on this topic-except for some few, who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves. As for the rest, it would fill some of them quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt, and others with lofty and vain-glorious expectations, as though they had learnt something high and mighty."
Or, as Saint John of Damascus puts it: "neither are all things unutterable nor all utterable; neither all unknowable nor all knowable. But the knowable belongs to one order, and the utterable to another; just as it is one thing to speak and another thing to know. Many of the things relating to God, therefore, that are dimly understood cannot be put into fitting terms, but on things above us we cannot do else than express ourselves according to our limited capacity."
Difficulty arises when the order of being is reduced to the order of knowing, or the order of knowing reduced to the order of speaking, or the order of speaking to the order of justification. For, in the order of justification alone, understanding of what is being justified is excluded.
Why limit ourselves to a scheme of four possible ways to philosophize? :D
It's how I see things.
Close to:
Quoting Janus
It is a pleasure unto itself, and this is enough to justify one's activity in doing philosophy.
But then I think when we do that -- read philosophy for its own sake (and here I only mean the sorts of names that frequently come up within a particular culture's practice of philosophy) -- we see there's more than just two ways to do philosophy.
Naturally I want to progress by way of example, so something that comes to mind is Spinoza's Ethics where we have a logic derivation of. . . everything? And on the other hand we have Hume as the nitpicker.
In more modern times I might contrast David Chalmers with Daniel Dennett.
So I don't think the point of the distinction is to be wide-reaching as:
Quoting Leontiskos
Rather it seems to me best thought of as aesthetic categories. There is a drive in philosophy to build big stories of the world as it is. The Timaeus, for example, which is surely philosophy but not exactly nitpicky or even skeptical. So surely this is a good part of philosophy, and I'd say you can't have one without the other, really.
But I'd focus here:
Quoting Banno
While world-building is part of philosophy, so is the skeptics. Pyrrho comes to mind here for me as a kind of arch-nitpick, with a moral cause to justify it even so it fits within that ancient mold of philosophy as a life well lived, even. Picking-nits is very much part of philosophy, and one need not have a replacement answer -- "I don't know" is one of those pretty standardly acceptable answers in philosophy. Aporetic dialogues having been part of philosophy as well.
Why must wisdom "have some determinate content"? There's the idea again that if it has no "determinate content" then it is nothing, but that doesn't follow. The assumption is that without determinacywithout clear, specifiable contentwisdom is vacuous. But this is not a necessary conclusion. The leap from indeterminacy to meaninglessness is unwarranted.
Tim's argument reveals again a tendency toward conceptual authoritarianism: the idea that unless a term can be decisively boundeddefined, categorized, and agreed uponit cannot function in serious discourse. But this is not how language works, especially moral and philosophical language. Terms like wisdom, justice, or goodness do not operate by being strictly defined; rather, they are thick concepts, entangled with practices, forms of life, and modes of evaluation. Their meanings are enacted rather than fixed. Philosophy consists not in flattening the knot but in understanding how the knot was tied.
Tim's view betrays a kind of metaphysical anxietya need for fixity. But philosophy, at its best, is precisely the space where such anxiety is exposed and undone. The refusal to accept a concept unless it can be nailed down is a refusal to stay with the concept. Its not a philosophical strength; its a failure of nerve. The world is uncertain. Deal with it.
Isn't it entirely possible that wisdom could be seen in what one does rather than in what one believes? We need not assume that there is one true account of what is wise. Indeed, if one reflects on the many and varied situations in which wisdom might be displayed, that seems quite unlikely.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Why not? We don't need to embrace dialetheism (that something can be both true and false) to admit that sometimes we don't know if something is true, or if it is false.
So again, we might prefer coherence to completeness.
Why?
Does poetry exist? Film? Music?
Quoting Banno
The irony is that you are a highly "mystical" thinker. Analytic philosophy allows so little to be said that analytic philosophers often "leap" to saying things that their own approach does not support. The claim here is an example of that. According to your own criteria, there is no justification for your claim that such a leap can never be justified. Russell's performative self-contradiction was not incidental, nor are the performative self-contradictions of those who follow his tradition. If one were to limit themselves to what can be said according to the analytic approach, then there would be precious little that they could to say.
Yep.
Quoting J
Cool. It's kinda what I had in mind. It seems to me there is a lot of very bad philosophy being done in the forums, and this thread is by way of articulating the problem, mostly to test if I'm mistaken.
And i think this difference prevents us seeing eye to eye.
It's the same "arrogance" at play when you decide not to read or respond.
Yep.
Of course this doesn't mean that we can't make use of rules at all in our explanations, only that we be willing to revise them.
Cheers. Hope the OP is helpful.
Quoting Gnomon
Oh, to be so lucky!
But as you so eloquently say, we do find ourselves putting the pieces of our history together in a narrative. This is an inevitable consequence of living a reflective life. This may be a sort of mythologising, a sense-making that to a large extent sits outside critical appraisal, at least by it's author.
Tolkien cannot be wrong about what happens in Lord of the Rings.
:smile: Of course it is. Who else's would you have me recite? :wink:
Yes, it absolutely does follow. At least, as I intended "some determinant content."
How are you reading that? Are you advancing the claim that a term can lack all determinant content (i.e. possessing not even "some" content), and thus refer to nothing more than anything else," and not be vacuous? "Lacking any (i.e. not even 'some') determinant content" sounds to me like a definition of a vacuous term Banno.
"Possessing at least some determinacy" doesn't suggest "it must lack all indeterminacy," rather it suggests "it must have at least some determinacy," i.e. not none at all.
So, I won't respond to the rest, because it's all based on this misreading. I was hoping you would reply to the substantive points and not make the entire reply about reading "must have some determinant content" as being equivalent with "must be absent of all indeterminancy."
And a very good one. Now suppose I ask, "What kind of question is that?" I'm genuinely interested in your answer; for what it's worth, mine is, "It's a philosophical question" -- that is, one that falls within philosophy to answer if it can.
Love this. On this, at least, we might agree!
So where else might we find agreement?
How am I reading "determinate content"? I presume you mean something along the lines of a sequence of sentences such that their conjunct sets out all and only what is wise and excludes all that is not wise. Such a sequent, when applied, provides an algorithm that systematically ascribes "wise" or "not wise" to every posited example.
Is that not so?
I understand your view to be that unless such a sequent can be set out, then wisdom is vacuous.
And I think that approach misguided.
There is an irony here in that many of the "great names" do this to each other. Nietzsche is obviously offender #1, because he calls out people by name or obvious reference, and is quite scornful, although he is, in at least some of the cases, not very well informed. Russell's history is a standout example as well (Grayling's is as bad on medieval thought and suggests people were involved in councils while dead/not yet born). But it happens to everyone. Kant thought the new critical philosophy cut deep enough to brand the bulk of what came before "twaddle" (although I think that's in a personal letter), and the idea that all (or most) of the problems philosophers have spent their lives on are just a failure to use language correctly requires at least a bit of hubris (particularly if one has not studied them). Hume recommending consigning the bulk of all prior thought to the flames.
I think that's just a trade-off for swinging for the fences. You're more likely to hit a home run, but your batting average goes down. Sometimes you also need the courage to say something stupid.
I'll just add that charity is tricky. Sometimes people's idea of charity seems extremely uncharitable, like when religious claims are reinterpreted as "not truth-apt." I would rather say we should try to interpret people as they themselves do, but trying to save their ideas from their own interpretation is also a great philosophical art. That's how we got Hegel and Fichte.
No, I just had in mind the idea that "wisdom" cannot be vacuous or apply to everything equally.
So:
If it's wisdom, it would have to be something. Otherwise "anything goes." But then what is wisdom, or any other criteria that you'd liked to recommend, that stops "everything from going?"
I'm intrigued. I spend a lot of time thinking about how to think about these sorts of things -- meaningful beliefs that are false, sometimes to the point that their falsity isn't exactly the point.
Knowing that the next challenge is due July 1, 2025.
I'm not sure I'd put it in terms of one's death bed, but I would put it in terms of one's happiness. If believing a false belief, such as "Ice cream is good, and it's so good that anyone who says otherwise probably hasn't figured out the truth of it's goodness" makes a person happy, and it doesn't hurt anyone, including themself, then by the hedonic metric that belief is not only acceptable, but good.
Yes, I see what you mean, except . . . I really did mean "the barest glimpse," i.e., people who've read a little bit of K or A or W in a class and feel themselves to be experts. Nietzsche acquitted himself rather better than that, wouldn't you say?
(I especially enjoyed his critique of Wittgenstein. :wink: )
It's an interesting framing because I think sophia would have implied something like knowledge (maybe "gnosis" is better). "Wisdom" has taken on a much more amorphous meaning in English, more "practical," less "theoretical."
I don't think wisdom can ultimately mean "believing what makes you happier though." I know you weren't necessarily implying that. I think praxis is part of wisdom, but so is theoria. That is, the sage knows why he acts. And not just from a narrow, self-interested point of view.
That's a crucial difference. I think this has to be the case, because we seek wisdom, in part, because of the sort of self-determination, self-government, and liberty it brings. It's a liberty from ignorance, in a sense, but not really in terms of gaining "episteme" (scientific-like knowledge). Plus, I think wisdom also implies having overcome weakness of will, such that one knows what to do, why one should do it, and then actually does it, even if it means drinking the hemlock.
Absolutely true. We need at both to make a science of knowing the world, and more than science to know really people.
But the skeptics seem to be arguing you only need skepticism. Or only admit perhaps there is more to philosophy. I disagree. Its not perhaps; it is certainly more than the skeptic that is doing proper philosophy.
There is room in experience, and can be reasons, and necessity to mistrust the mistrust. Even to trust the senses and learn from doing, and to learn without analyzing. Theres more. We should make leaps at times and analyze whats been done later. We must analyze it later, to be rigorous scientists, but the skeptic should thank the metaphysician more often for giving them some content to play with.
There's whole worlds between what is vacuous and what is determinate. That seems to be our point of difference. Those worlds are were we find the unknown, the unknowable, the mysteries and mystical, as well as scientific method and myth.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You are treating "wisdom" here as an individual, and making an existential instantiation? That is,
?(x) (x is wisdom) ? (a is wisdom) were "a" is a new individual constant.
That's inconsistent with your claim that wisdom is not a thing:Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Hmm. But if wisdom is not a thing, we can't make the inference that it is a determinate thing.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This just doesn't follow.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And again, asking this supposes that there is a sequence of sentences such that their conjunct sets out all and only what is wise and excludes all that is not wise.
And there need not be any such conjunction of sentences.
Instead, what we might do is map out how we find people using the word "wisdom" in various situations, noting the similarities and differences and so developing an open map of the ways the word functions in our community.
A much more involved and interactive task than thinking up a definition in the comfort of your armchair.
Along the way, we might develop some understanding of why not just anything is wise.
Is that so hard an alternative to grasp?
(added: Just to be clear, I am here playing along with the idea that we could set "wisdom" in syllogisms in this way, in order to show that in doing so we must treat wisdom as something it is not.)
Anyone-who-says-otherwise clauses tend to have the potential to hurt someone down the road. (Aside: My first thought: "Why can't they just enjoy ice cream?" My second thought: "It's possible the believe makes someone happy precisely because they don't like icecream." Beliefs and their consequences are a messy, messy topic.)
Right, which turns out to be a problem for an OP that wants to prefer one over the other.
Quoting Moliere
First, I would point back to the twins. Again, one's activity is parasitic and one is not. Philosophy does not exist without those who construct, but it does exist without those who deconstruct. Therefore deconstruction is not as fundamental to philosophy as construction; falsity not as central to philosophy as truth.
Quoting Moliere
I don't think it is plausible to combine "nitpicking" with "aporia." Aporia requires more than nitpicking.
I think this thread was partially motivated by my emphasis on something represented in my bio, "And don't just say why [he's wrong]; say what you think is right" (Hopko). I think it is incorrect to try to place nitpicking on a par with providing constructive alternatives. "It takes a plan to beat a plan." The Monty Python argument skit is apropos, where someone engaging in sheer contradiction believes that they are engaging in argument, or in our case, philosophy.
When someone is doing the Monty Python thing their telos is a kind of agonstic opposition, and this is not yet philosophy. Of course, there is a very significant difference between these two options:
"I don't know" could represent the first or the second. The Monty Python thing is a comical instance of the first.
Not that one ought to do so -- maybe one ought to do something else. Maybe there's a better good out there, like "figuring out the truth" that's more satisfying than believing a false belief.
I'd make the case that the builders need the critics -- else you get [s]back[/s]bad arguments.
Even on your premises, it remains true that bad arguments are better than nothing at all. The builders can exist without the critics. The critics cannot exist without the builders. So I think my thesis stands.
This is related to what I said to you here:
Quoting Leontiskos
Just as the critic lacks parity with the builder, so too does falsehood lack parity with truth. "This is false," presupposes some truth, whereas, "This is true," does not presuppose any falsehood. This is why your fundamental approach to knowledge based on judgments of falsehood is mistaken:
Quoting Moliere
Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.
Speaking roughly, it's just myth-making until the critique begins - then it can be doing philosophy.
I think it really could be the case that some questions' correct answer is "I don't know"; why does one need a guess to say "I don't know"?
I'd say that would require some sort of shared assumptions about how to make inferences, and the like.
But I find "I don't know" to be a far more productive realization, because it'll lead me to something else. Keeping in mind our lack of knowledge -- no matter how much we learn -- is how we learn more.
So I'd put in a defense for the skeptics that don't know -- they don't have to in order to say whether or not that they know.
Now, you don't have to teach anyone, either. A more curious student than an obstinant skeptic is a lot more rewarding for the teacher, most of the time.
But I think it's important to maintain the ability to say "I don't know", and reassess our beliefs because of our ability to make errors, or at least miss some things.
Quoting Leontiskos
Why?
Quoting Leontiskos
But the critics can criticize themselves!
They have no need of builders -- once you're curious enough to be a philosophical skeptic you will not have any need of a philosophical builder ever again. You'll be busy tearing down your own buildings, finding their flaws, rebuilding, finding their flaws, rebuilding. . . . or just stop building and see where things go. The Pyrrhonic skeptic, at least, has no need of the builders. Beliefs are the thing to be combatted.
Quoting Leontiskos
Well, for the analogy to hold. . .
Though if this be the analogy I'd just say truth and false form a dyad: You don't understand the one without the other.
I'd say there'd have to be some kind of "reasonable", whatever that amounts to, way to include myth-making in philosophy. Not all myth-making, but Plato is the immediate myth-maker that comes to mind there.
That's plenty good enough for me. So what we'd like to see a lot less of, both on TPF and in general, is the sort of interpretation -- if I can even call it that -- that recasts someone's view as "but what you're saying really comes down to . . ." or "but that's the same as ___ [fill in label of disliked philosophy]" and then draws a very negative and unintended conclusion. Such an approach is the opposite of "saving an idea from their own [poor] interpretation"; it actually strives for that poor interpretation and then insists that the speaker now must interpret it that way too.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Quoting Moliere
Yes, I see I've sparked some interest by pointing out the Americanist of philosophies, that unprincipled notion of pragmatism. The hell with rigorous principles. Let's get shit done.
"Jamess central thesis is that when an option is live, forced and momentous and cannot be settled by intellectual means, one may and must let ones non-rational nature make the choice. One may believe what one hopes to be true, or what makes one happiest;"
https://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/pucourse/phi203/will.html#:~:text=James's%20central%20thesis%20is%20that,a%20sharp%20disagreement%20with%20Clifford.
It's not so simple as to suggest you can create falsity in light of truth, but working through the criteria:
First, the evidence must be inconclusive. You can't just will to believe you're the king of the world. So, something like God would be an example.
Second, it must be what he calls "live," meaning it has to be something you can accept as true. If the belief is so alien to your nature, then you simply can't will to believe it.
Third, it must be forced in that you will choose necessarily and live by the consequences of your choice. That is, you will either believe in God or not, and the way your life goes from the there will be affected.
Fourth, it must be momentous. The decision will impact your entire existential orientation.
Note how it puts the will into belief. A not so subtle move. You are in charge of your beliefs. Accepting that radical notion as true opens many doors.
How about theorizing?
Because who really needs to waste time critiquing a myth?
Your bias is showing again.
At least, that's a charitable way of putting it, while avoiding that question: "What is philosophy?" -- just note "however we justify it, it's philosophy in some way because Plato did it" Now would that fit into the builder side or the critical side, or both? It seems both to me. And which we would want to emphasize in Plato is whatever our preference for reasoning is -- narrative or myth or what-have-you that's greater than human experience, or taking apart how it is we do these things.
I think the greatest philosophers end up doing this -- Kant's a good example there where he manages to sort of fit both categories whichever which way we may want to put the categories.
So for the critical philosopher that doesn't seem to be a problem, to me. It's almost like you'd expect that in some way instead. So it's easier to render these as a sort of aesthetic, and some philosophers manage to express themselves in both . .. modes?
Quoting Moliere
If nothing is built there is nothing to criticize. Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize? If the critics are to criticize themselves, they will first need to learn how to build. Hence my point.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Moliere
Then provide a response to my argument. Provide an example where "this is false" presupposes no truth, and explain why "this is true" presupposes falsehood.
Quoting Moliere
Sure, but dissection is not the same as saying, "I don't know."
Quoting Moliere
Exactly. It is productive. "I don't know," leads precisely to building. "I know that you are wrong," (dissection) is an opposite of, "I don't know."
Note too that the act of dissecting is an intrinsically negative act, insofar as it is a search for falsehood. The dissector is therefore someone in search of error; a kind of inquisitor who comes to fall in love with the discovery of error in others.
It is one thing to call something wrong because it is incoherent or invalid. These are process problems - like, you dont follow the rules or that doesnt make sense.
But it is another thing to say you are wrong because that doesnt exist. That is a positive assertion highlighting something that does in fact exist (namely, the landscape surrounding the hole you just carved where that thing you said doesnt exist was supposed to be). Analytic skeptics cant say someone is wrong about what exists, just whether their manner of speaking is coherent or valid.
Once you are talking about what exists, you need a metaphysician.
That's not true. Suppose you hire someone to build you a house. You don't know how to build the house, but your criticism is important to how the builder proceeds.
Now the builder could tell you "Look, if that's what you want, I'm telling you you aren't going to get a house, it will collapse" -- but the person would still be justified in their claim that they don't know how to build a house.
Quoting Leontiskos
There's one solution to the liar's paradox which says there is no problem -- "This is false" is straightforwardly read as a false sentence, and not true.
For the other I'd point to our previous discussion on the dialetheist's solution to the liar's paradox where the solution is to recognize that the liar's sentence is both true and false.
Now, that's just co-occurrence to demonstrate a dyad between the two to the standards you laid out. But I think that "...is true" and "...is false" presuppose one another to be made sense of. That is, there is no "...is true" simpliciter, but rather its meaning will depend upon the meaning of "...is false", and vice-versa.
So there is no prioritizing one over the other.
Banno, I asked:
It's a question. Surely you have some criteria in mind. I just offered wisdom as an example.
You are once again conflating "something" and "some thing." You seem to be making the same mistake you accused Plato of re the Forms. Yet my point is merely that a vacuous term (or one that is indeterminately mutable) cannot be the criteria for "what goes," (i.e. which "narratives" are accepted) else "anything goes." This is merely the observation that if a term applies equally to everything, it lets everything in. If the term is meaningless, then it cannot keep anything out. If it is unlimited in its mutability, then it [I]can[/I] let anything in.
I'm not going to respond to the rest because it's the same mistake.
But if "wisdom" were the standard by which "not anything goes" and wisdom judges between "narratives," then this would effectively be an appeal to the democratization of knowledge, no? What is true is what the many believe?
Except that, for terms like beauty, wisdom, true, good, etc., you would also end up encountering many mutually contradictory theories.
It seems obvious that this would be a poor method for trying to inquire into many terms. For instance, if you want to understand "quantum indeterminacy," you ask the physicist, not the many; if you want understand "pseudoexfoliation glaucoma," you ask the opthalmologist, not the many, etc. Nor did these people come to know what they know by asking the many, but rather the opthalmologist studies eyes, the historian studies history, etc.
Why not?
Suppose a person who is skeptical about some things existing and not skeptical about other things existing -- so not the Cartesian scenario, but a little less grand.
Maybe.
Though it's hard to believe when lots of people understand their environment well enough to get along in it -- I can't deny that there's a pull to the realist case, especially if we have no need of metaphysics whatsoever.
It's so easy to navigate that it's hard to theorize. Surely we must know something about what exists, even if we don't study philosophy at all.
Like I think, therefore, I am. Or have I already said too much?
I actually wonder if that'd qualify... I'm not sure.
I was more thinking insofar that we weaken our requirements for knowledge so that the skeptical problems become irrelevant then in a very common sense way it seems to me that the mechanic knows cars -- a mixture of know-that/know-how that in some way connects the mechanic to the economic sphere such that they can take care of thems they need to.
I'd be more inclined to say we don't need to know the cogito, but we do need to know enough about some trade to live.
So we know something, surely -- but the devil is in the details.
Quoting Moliere
I asked you what a critic is supposed to criticize if there is no builder, and in response you pointed to a critic who criticizes a builder. Do you see how you failed to answer my question?
This began when I said that if there are no builders then there can be no critics, and you responded by saying that in that case the critics would just criticize themselves. So again, your example of a critic who criticizes a house-builder is in no way an example of critics criticizing themselves, sans builders.
Quoting Moliere
There is no prioritizing truth over falsity because of some obscure gesturing towards the Liar's Paradox?
I'm just asking you to give me an example of an assertion of falsehood which presupposes no truths. Can you do that?
"John wrote 2+2=5 on his paper. Bill said that his answer was false. But no truth needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false."
Something like that. Something straightforward. An example.
You seem to be saying that without a counterfactual understanding of falsehood there can be no claims of truth, and without a counterfactual understanding of truth there can be no claims of falsehood. That's fine, but it doesn't establish parity. I am saying that every claim of falsehood presupposes at least one actual truth, but not so with claims of truth. I am saying that if Bill does not know some truth then he cannot say the answer is false. So even if there is parity on the counterfactual consideration, there is still a lack of parity on the consideration I have presented.
Just to be clear, I like the two ways to philosophize thesis.
I just dont give analytic dissection the priority. We need to assert, and then dissect. Whatever is left is truth about the world.
There is very little truth about the world that has survived the dissection. But I see it.
Banno and Count seem to be arguing what wisdom is.
Well it is not error or nonsense, and it is not a ham sandwich. So it is something. And I see it is worth scrutinizing to try to define better.
Right. Chronologically and logically, assertion precedes dissection. :up:
Aporia can be seen as precisely the points where dialectic ends and noetic insight is required. The fact that language and symbolic thought is inherently limited, is something that can and has been a subject of philosophical discourse. Wittgensteins aphorism at the end of the Tractatus ('that of which...') is often treated as a full stop a way to shut down discussion of anything that cant be stated in propositional terms (especially by you!) . But it can also be read as a threshold: an acknowledgment that there is something beyond what can be said something that may be shown, enacted, or lived. Anyway, the idea that wisdom might transcend discursive articulation isnt foreign to philosophy it runs through Plato, Plotinus, and arguably into Wittgenstein himself. Its also central to Eastern philosophy, where sometimes silence becomes the highest form of answer, akin to 'see for yourself!'
Mysticism is often a pejorative term, shorthand for vagueness or woolly-headedness. And, to be fair, it often is that. Theosophical Bookstore shelves are full of mystical aphorisms, and its not hard to generate vague-sounding phrases that mimic profundity (we've had more than a few here, I remember 'Brother James'). But the actual mystics whether Buddhist, Christian, or other are people of of great discipline, clear insight, and spiritual rigor. What they describe is often not fuzzy at all, but the result of a highly refined insights. Easier to say than to enact.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Interesting that the root of the word 'Upani?ad' is 'sitting closely' - the relationship of chela to guru.
Quoting Fire Ologist
There's a stream that might be called 'analytical mysticism' in Catholic philosophy. At least, it has its mystical elements, from its inhereted neoplatonism and the presence of mystics in the Church (You've mentioned that you're Catholic). Jacques Maritain, Bernard Lonergan, William Desmond - all great philosophers in that tradition. There are many more.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Let's recall Lloyd Gerson's most recent book Platonism and Naturalism: the Possibility of Philosophy.
No thanks, C.S. Peirce is my go to American. Pragmaticism, not pragmatism, thank you :grin:.
While they are contrary opposites, on the view of truth as a transcendental property of being, falsity is parasitic on truth for the same reason that evil is parasitic on goodit is an absence. If truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being then its lack is a privation. Likewise, without ends, goods, the entire concept of evil makes no sense, since nothing is sought and so no aims are every frustrated.
Do you see how it's correct for the critic to still say that they don't know?
That's what I was hoping the example to demonstrate -- they don't have to say "Look, here's a better house" in order to say "I don't know how to build a house"
Their opinions may not be relevant to the construction of the house, sure -- but they'd still be right in claiming ignorance, so there are circumstances where it's better to claim ignorance rather than propose a solution.
Quoting Leontiskos
Oh, OK. Sure, I can.
Your examples of the kinds of examples helped me get what you were after better.
So you want a circumstance where bill said some statement is false, and there is no truth that needs to exist in order for Bill to say that the answer is false.
Correct?
So it's about the conditions of assertability? When a person can assert they believe something is false?
Still thinking about a good one, just asking for more information
How is it you understand the truth without falsity, though? What's this part where you're not thinking about the false, but instead -- prior to falsity -- only the true?
There's a sense in which we have to know things about "2" and "+" and "5" and "=" and "...is false"
So it seem easy to assert, without much specification on priority, that such an assertion would require some truths.
In just a first-go thought, that one would not qualify.
Mystics often make perfect sense to each other and can follow each others logic.
Appreciate the references.
Well, yeah. It's right there!
For sure. I find philosophy pleasurable, so even supposing the skeptic is correct I'm not a Pyrrhonic skeptic. For me I just don't think philosophy is scientific knowledge, strictly speaking. I apply different standards to both disciplines, and tend to think they're better when they stop trying to control one another towards the "right" way to think. (But then can be productive together when both are valued)
In a straightforward way if the LNC and LEM holds then there is nothing this sentence is about "in the world", right? It points to itself. Its referent is itself. Is the sentence an object in the world?
I'd say if we maintain the LNC and LEM as the standards for what can be considered, or all that is worthy of consideration, then a straightforward assignment of "False" to "This sentence is false" is an example of a falsehood that needs no truth.
Sorry, I chose it for a reason last time and it's still the one that fits now.
Indeed it is. But we agreed:
And your
is just such a misreading. Indeed, I gave an example of how truth might work, following Kripke's formal example, to @J earlier in this thread.
Of course there are truths, and we can "have" them.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Let's look at that, then.
"Something" means: There exists an x such that... ?(x)?(x)
"Some thing" means: There exists an x that is a thing, and... ?(x)(thing(x) ^ ?(x)
Now in both of these "x" is an individual variable. It stands for some individual. That is, in both, the x is treated as a thing.
So you want to draw a distinction between something and some thing as if this can do substantive philosophical workas if the former is lighter or more deflationary in its ontological commitments. But this distinction collapses under scrutiny. In both formulations, we are quantifying over a domain of individuals using an existential quantifier. The variable x in both cases ranges over individual entities, regardless of whether we label them things or leave them bare.
This is still treating wisdom as a thing, not, say, an activity, disposition, virtue, capacity or what have you. It is still reifying wisdom.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Here you have it again. I don't see that you have explained how "wisdom" (our present example) is a vacuous term. I haven't said that it is vacuous - far from it. You appear to think that something I have said leads directly to that conclusion, but what?
Lets' backtrack - it's always worth keeping an eye on how we got here. You said
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
To which I objected, because it makes assumptions that I think are unreasonable. It presumes that for some notion to be coherent or meaningful, the object of its love (wisdom) must be determinatea particular something. It presumes that wisdom must function like a referential termpicking out an object in the way that the tree or the number 2 does. It presumes that this object must exist in some way that justifies the pursuit.
It comes back to a picture that has you enthralled, such that there is wisdom out there somewhere, wisdom as a treasure hidden in the world or the mind, and our job is to find it; but why shouldn't wisdom be instead what we do?
Philosophy need not be the love of some particular thing called wisdom. It might be the love of wise ways of beingand those are not found but lived.
Consider the limit case. There is only God, who is omniscient, and the seven spheres He has created. Now, that the spheres exist is true. It is true because truth is convertible with being. If they exist, it is true that they exist.
There is arguably logical convertability as well. To say "a man is standing," is to say "it is true that a man is standing," (assertoric force), which is also to say "one man is standing" (unity).
God knows everything that is, so there is adequacy of the intellect to being. But there are no false beliefs, since God is the only intellect. Yet God knows and knows that He knows, fathoms and understands.
Sure, but I never contested that and it doesn't intersect with what we were discussing in that line of the conversation. My question to you was literally, "Without builders what do you say that the critics criticize?" Do you have an answer to that question?
Quoting Moliere
Yep. I am saying that, "If you claim that something is false, then you must already hold to some truth in order to say so." The counterexample would be, "Here is an example where someone claims that something is false even though they do not hold to any truth in order to say so."
Quoting Moliere
If you have to resort to the extremely controversial example of the Liar's Paradox then your answer is going to be highly implausible and controversial. I've already given you my thoughts on the Liar's Paradox and I obviously think your analysis is incorrect.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think that's right, but I think it is even easier for an Analytic to see that falsity presupposes truth by looking at arguments which attempt to demonstrate falsehoods.
Quoting Banno
Asking what is x? doesnt suppose anything, except there is x.
Note too that in the past you have claimed that, "This sentence is false," is an example of a sentence that is both false and true simultaneously. So in that case it fails the criterion of presupposing no truths. If you now want to change your analysis to say that it involves falsity but no truth (and therefore does not violate the LEM after all), then that looks like an ad hoc attempt to try to answer my challenge. The Liar's Sentence can't be true and false when you want to disprove the LEM, and then merely false when you want to object to a claim about the primacy of truth. Changing your mind in this ad hoc way is unprincipled reasoning.
Sure, I agree with that.
Surely you've noticed these aren't things I attend to :D
I do in fact think of the implausible and controversial.
Yeh, a bit of an impasse. But if asked it is what comes to mind.
Quoting Leontiskos
This may be koan like, but it is at least a concrete example from the opening of the SEP's article on Pyrrho.
You're again doing that thing where you ignore the central conversation where you are having the most difficulty:
Quoting Leontiskos
We can't just paper over your invalid objection to my claim that without builders there can be no critics. That is the central and older part of the conversation, and it is the part that an auto-didact will have an easier time with. I focused on it for a reason.
The critic criticizes themself. They don't have to learn how to build in order to do that. Suppose the builder goes away and the buyer decides to try what they had said they wanted. It falls apart like the builder said, and the buyer becomes a builder.
But there is Pyrrho's option of simply not building. How does that not count to your mind? The very point is to not believe -- so one does not need to know how to make inferences in order to stop making inferences, or even pointing out ways in which they are unsatisfactory. It's not like Pyrrho kept to this stubborn skeptics task, at least in the telling of the story -- he learned how the rationalists spoke and used their arguments against them.
Seems to me that once we understand what's true we also understand what's false -- at the very least the object is an object and the object is different from the foreground which is what makes an object an object and not just a wash of meaningless perceptions. To see any individual we have to be able to say when it is-not the background.
I agree.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, sometimes. True.
But there's stuff after the Tractatus, and not just from Wittgenstein. The stuff that can't be said can still be evaluated, by examining what it does.
Think I've pointed that out before.
So there is I think not all that much difference between our positions... the vanity of small differences, mostly.
You occasionally lean on a dualism or idealism, and it's mostly these to which I object - where things are said that don't work.
Sure, but falsity is not related to truth as negation (contradictory opposition), but as a contrary.
Aristotle has a distinction that I think holds up:
-Asytheta: truth as the conformity of thought and speech to reality (whose opposite is falsity); and
-Adiareta, truth as the grasping of a whole, apprehension (whose opposite is simply ignorance)
We can also consider the "three acts of the mind:"
1. Simple Apprehension, "What is it?" (produces terms - deals with essence)
2. Judging, "Is it?" (produces propositions - deals with existence)
3. Reasoning, "Why is it?" (produces arguments - deals with causes, or we might say "reasons" today because "causes" has been butchered).
All of these related to the adequacy of thought to being. Now apprehension must come prior to judgement or else there is no content to make judgements about through predication, composition, division, concatenation, etc. And there must be an analogous sort of "sense knowledge" prior to any intellection about what is conveyed by the senses. So, positive apprehension, i.e. some content (adequacy of the intellect) must be prior to the judgement stage where falsity enters the picture.
Likewise, nothing can be known as false without knowing at least something as true already, because no inference, to truth or falsity, can be made from nothing. Hence, falsity is posterior.
So I wonder if the notion of a contrary can do the work you're wanting it to do here in demonstrating that falsity is posterior do to our state of knowing. Seems to me that we can explain our state of knowing in terms of Judgment, which in turn requires a notion of the true and the false, sort of like the categories. In the state of ignorance we lack any sort of notion of either truth or falsity.
I mean, I kind of get the idea, but where my thoughts go is that you [s]need[/s]can't have one without the other. I don't really think of falsity as a privation of being. If anything falsity has more to do with how we judge, and being cannot be privated by such things.
Excellent.
So many ways to properly be wrong. :razz:
yeah, not a bad reply at all.
The whole architecture is authoritarian in form. That style of philosophising is structured to preclude objection. Each term is defined into place. Every disagreement is downgraded to a misunderstanding of the system. Theres no space for a counter-example, because nothing is allowed to count as one unless it already fits the scheme. That is the problem of the grand theory: not that it's false, but that it's closed.
So the come back will be that you haven't understood... becasue the monolith protects itself.
The question arrises, how this is to fit with @J's idea of not critiquing until the whole is understood, when the act of understanding closes of critique.
Puzzling.
As usual Im probably missing something but I dont think the concern is everything. Its not a monolithic theory of all things. Its about a unity, or just one thing.
One thing in the world. We strive to know the essence of that thing, because we understand there is something there. We dont preclude critique in order to proceed towards that essence. Critique is welcome. But only after there is some positive move to criticize.
Philosophizing is one thing as well. You just said style of philosophizing, and gave it the essence of authoritarian. You said whole architecture.
The monolith protects itself.
This is metaphysical speak as much as it is critique of one particular style (which I would refer to as aspect but thats may just be my style.)
Just as puzzling.
Well, in my experience the issue in (real or concocted) Philosophically problematic situations aren't violations of pre-set rules directly, rather situations where rule #1 plays against rule #2 (classically a conflict of legitimate interests). Thus the "philosopher" must choose which of his rules should be violated. Viola, the pre-set rules are not universally applicable.
In Kant? Isn't there apprehension prior to judgement? There is intuition/understanding/reason, which is clearly influenced by the three acts. He takes quite a bit from Aristotle. That's sort of Hegel's critique. "Oh look, I started presuppositionlessly and just happened to find Aristotle's categories." (I never found this critique of Hegel's strong, maybe the categories have held up because they are themselves strong).
Kant would deny truth as the adequacy of thought to being in the strong sense, or the idea of form coming through the senses to inform the intellect. I suppose the response here is that he rejects this because he presupposes representationalism and he has no good grounds for doing so (totally different subject). I'm also pretty sure he falls into identifying falsity with negation. So there would be other differences. I just don't know if the differences hold up without also accepting the fundamental axiom of "we experience only ideas/representations/our own experiences, not things," and of "knowledge of things in themselves," (as opposed to things as revealed by acting, actuality) as a sort of epistemic "gold standard" to aspire to.
I think this is perhaps missing the point. To judge "x is y," predication, one must first understand x and y. Now if we are talking about a judgement of something newly experienced in the senses, it seems clear that "x" must be there for "x is y." How could one even say y of x without specifying x in at least some way?
This is fair. I think this is consistent with both Aristotle and Kant in a way. A notion of truth as truth does require judgement. Aquinas has it that truth is most possessed when we know something and we know that we know it as true. Obviously, simply being aware of something, does not represent this sort of grasp. So, the priority of truth in the mind hinges on the idea that truth is the adequacy of the intellect to being, but that we can also speak analogously of truth. Hence, sentences can be true. Speech can be true in several senses (e.g. lying vs truthful speech, truth vs falsehood), models can be more or less true to life, and there must be truth in the senses to some degree, as well as in things (as the measure of truth). The truth that is prior to judgement is not as fully truth. Likewise, judgements that are known as true judgements are even more fully the realization of truth.
But if a duck is the measure of true things said about a duck, and a tree is the true measure of judged of the tree, then truth is first in the measure, and only later in judgement. Man is not the measure of all things. Kant tries to preserve this, even as his representationalist assumptions make this difficult for him. So this is another sense of priority. That is, it does not become true that the duck has wings when we judge it to be so. It was already true prior to our judgement (when the possibility of falsity enters the picture).
You cannot answer the question: "in virtue of [I]what[/I] does 'anything not go' given we have already said that we do not possess the truth?
The rest is just an example. Feel free to ignore it. Surely you have some criteria in mind by which it isn't "everything goes?" Or do you? Is it sentiment? Another appeal to democratization?
That was the question. I cannot see why it requires me explaining my conception of wisdom, and my understanding of principles (in formal logic even), in order for you to answer a question about how you determine "acceptable/correct/true narratives" and discard "unacceptable/incorrect/false narratives," or if correct/acceptable/true narratives can contradict one another? Can they contradict each other? That was one of the questions.
Ok, but you were the one who made "I have truth" a claim of hubris. Instead we need: "something to sit between "I have the truth" and "Anything goes." (Your words).
What is that "something?"
You often accuse arguments of being "merely rhetorical," but what exactly is it that such arguments lack once logic is determined by usefulness and "I have truth" is off the table?
I didn't claim wisdom was vacuous, I merely said it cannot be the standard by which accepted narratives are judged if it is vacuous. Likewise, the love of wisdom would be the love of nothing, or nothing in particular, if wisdom doesn't mean anything. I don't think that's that difficult a point. No need for formal logic. Vacuous terms don't do anything. Wisdom has to signify "something" in that it cannot signify "absolutely nothing."
Theory-ladenness notwithstanding, A99/B160 should make clear that apprehension, in the Kantian sense, has to do with the possibility of perception, and as such, is very much methodologically antecedent to discursive** judgement with respect to empirical cognition.
Aesthetic judgement, on the other hand .that which regards the inspiration of some feeling relative to the representation of a perception .presupposes that the perception has already been structured.
Personally, given the emphasis on apperception and its rather more convincing necessity in the overall theoretical construct, I can do without apprehension in this Kantian sense.
Anyway .just my opinion.
(** philosophically archaic definition, so as not to be confused with the way the term is commonly used on this thread, yet consistent with the immediate subject matter.)
There's a lot of truth in this, but I want to dwell on why it appears this way. Let's take math. Is math authoritarian? Is it structured to preclude objection? Well, yes, if by "objection" we mean an alternative correct answer in a given math language. Math is deductive, apodictic -- in some grand sense, if we could really understand numbers, we could have predicted the Mandelbrot set. Even incompleteness was "there from the beginning," from this perspective.
Now let's take music. Is musical creativity authoritarian? Does it preclude objection? I admit it's not clear just what that might mean, but something like: Is there a right and a wrong way to write music, are some musics intrinsically beautiful, apart from context, and others not? etc. Surely not, because creative work is not deductive. You can't start from some axioms and work out what's going to be great music. My "objection" to Haydn might be to write like Bartok. But that doesn't make Haydn wrong. This whole terminology is a misfit.
OK, so where does philosophy fit between these two extremes? If one thinks of philosophy as a deductive system, beginning from something like axioms or first principles, then you get what I call "armchair philosophy" -- it appears one could just sit and think, and with rigor and persistence discover all the correct answers. So, is such a philosophy authoritarian? That's a bit strong, but it rather depends on how the first principles are justified. If there is some literal appeal to authority, then yes, philosophizing in this way can be quite uncompromising. Moreover, if the principles contain moral elements, this will collapse the idea of "being wrong" as mistaken and "being wrong" as immoral, definitely an authoritarian move.
Is this kind of philosophy structured to preclude objection? Not in the sense that it may not welcome questions and critique. But it takes "objection" to mean "something that can be overcome by the system," not "something that casts legitimate doubt on the system itself." That kind of objection is presumably ruled out in principle. This is because, as you say, "Every disagreement is downgraded to a misunderstanding of the system." Or if this is not the case, we need a clear explanation of what could make a closed deductive system revisable -- perhaps internal inconsistency?
To me, one of the most interesting questions is, "If you have a longstanding and vigorous commitment to some philosophical method, what would it take to change your mind about it?" Needless to say, this question applies to analytic philosophers just as much as Kierkegaardians or whoever. But I do think that deductive, foundationalist philosophies run a higher risk of being trapped in a method that, for structural reasons, cannot see a different viewpoint as anything other than a deductive mistake or misunderstanding.
Yes, and we shouldn't find this surprising or confusing. What philosophy can talk about is not the same thing as what philosophy can mention or acknowledge. That would be like saying that, because cell biology isn't a philosophical topic, it somehow fails to be legitimate. I can say that philosophy has shown me that there may be realms of experience beyond the discursive. That's not to claim that philosophy has talked about them. It's the old image of philosophy as pointing to a door you must open by other means.
Naturally it's tricky and subject to interpretation. Something that might be of value here is that Kant kind of does sit astride the line being explored here. I can say how I understand it, but mostly what matters in my summoning him is in his limitation on metaphysics. I recognize he takes a lot from Aristotle, but his modifications definitely put metaphysics into question as a science -- and I think it's a fair reading to say that the powers of judgment "underly" the categories.
"That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt...But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. -- Intro CPR, Gutenberg edition
In the Kantian sense, sure, but "perception" isn't even the same thing as we normally mean it when we speak "in the Kantian sense" :D
The priority is of the forms of reason -- most importantly for our discussion here I'm thinking of Kant's critical turn on metaphysics, in particular. With respect to metaphysics Kant is the nit-picker, and with respect to scientific knowledge Kant is the world-builder.
It depends on from which view we are talking about ethics and aesthetics. Are we talking about them from the "internal" position of distinguishing right and wrong and beauty and plainness, or "externally" with ethics and aesthetics simply being one of the many means humans use complex social behaviors to improve their social fitness?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
How about what makes science a good way to know things is that it is the only method that has provided answers and philosophy has provided none. Name one answer philosophy has provided that did not involve some semblance of the scientific method - observing and rationalizing one's observations.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
All philosophy can do is ask questions. Will there be questions that cannot be answered? Sure, but those questions will only seek subjective answers (ethics and aesthetics from an internal view - similar to how Banno is invoking Godel in this thread), or just be silly (language on a holiday).
Quoting Jamal
Hegel's response being "that's not relevant to philosophy" as a way of dealing with a possible counter-example.
Now it could very well be the case that this is a stupid thing to say in relation to another thinker, to have missed the point. And truthfully I think for any research program to be productive -- be it philosophical or scientific -- there are going to be some counter-examples that are simply ignored as not pertinent to what the thinkers are trying to get at.
But I think it worthwhile to note that Hegel's approach, though it feels like it encompasses it all, can be turned on its head and re-intepreted.
And, further, it's actually good philosophy to do so, sometimes. (Re-interpretation seems to require both the critical and the narrative)
:D Hey, I'm the one defending the nit-pickers. I had you in mind in crafting the thought -- it's always a bit of an art in trying to simplify the greats to a manageable idea we can all work with and think through.
Agree with a good deal. Especially on the point of some newer members coming in with a ToE pretending great wisdom and exhaustive theoretical depth, which, when ever so slightly pushed, collapse.
This is not to say that I think it makes to delimit what a philosopher ought to do, but "taking things down" or "breaking them apart" is good mental hygiene.
Beyond that, when evidence is lacking to settle a case, the merits should be decided on the strength of given reasons. However, we should also be aware that in many respects, our own inclinations in philosophy could be off the mark.
My point was that charitability it is a two-way street. I can only help make the position clearer if the other participates in answering the questions or explaining why the question is irrelevant.
Quoting J
If understanding is the first step, can you say you have successfully completed the first step if your questions that would help you understand are not answered (they get defensive by the simply fact that you are questioning anything they say)? When I show a discrepancy between their current claim and their prior claims is it fair to say that either I don't understand their position or their position is a contradiction BEFORE even reaching step two, and if they don't address the discrepancy by agreeing to either of those two possibilities, then what? At what point are we to say that they are simply insulting our intelligence and wasting our time?
Quoting J
The former.
Quoting J
A possible outcome - yes. A useful outcome - no. Computers produce errors even though they are the most logical devices we know of. If the output is aporic then you need to re-evaluate the input or the program for bugs. If you have reached the conclusion that we don't know anything - doesn't that constitute knowledge - that we don't know anything and therefore creates a contradiction?
What we've seen in the threads about Frege, Kimhi, and Rodl is that we can't rest content with this formulation. Consider what you just "said": "a man is standing". Did you also say "it is true that a man is standing"? I certainly didn't take you to be saying that. If I were to reply to your statement by asking you, "Is it true that a man is standing?" you would be puzzled, because you intended no assertion. You would try to explain the difference between use and mention, quite rightly. And yet you said what you said.
Moral: There is no one thing called "saying", which carries with it certain corollaries (such as assertion). A statement can be used or mentioned. It can be performed in a play or suggested as a possibility. It's the same insight we find in Rodl about "p" -- we want to think of "p" as innocent, just a sort of placeholder whose meaning is obvious, but it isn't. What we choose to allow "p" to stand for makes a difference in what we can go on to say.
Fair enough. My nice division into steps is oversimplistic.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I dunno, the aporetic dialogues of Plato seem quite useful. But we may be saying the same thing -- that aporia is an invitation to reconsider. My idea is that the reconsidering is a lot more radical than looking for a "bug" in the logic, because I think aporia is often a sign that we've set the whole problem up incorrectly.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yes, but not about X. So no contradiction, I'd say.
Exactly. Context helps to establish the meaning (what a word points to) of certain words. Some words are helper words in that they establish the context of the other words in a sentence. When we have agreed that a certain scribble can have multiple meanings, we use helper words to distinguish between the multiple meanings. So we can say that the helper words point to the specific definition of another word in the sentence.
Words (scribbles and sounds) are like anything else in the world. We can use other scribbles to establish context, or something else in the immediate shared environment to establish context, like the direction you are pointing. More scribbles is just one of the possible things we could use to establish context.
This is what I mean when I say that we use the world (scribbles, sounds, braille, pointing, etc) to communicate. Scribbles are just one of many things we can use to refer to other things.
When you look at or listen to another language you do not know you see scribbles and hear sounds. You can't even tell where one word ends and the other begins when hearing a foreign language. It is only by learning the rules for interpreting the sounds does one perceive the spaces between the spoken words. The spaces is what makes language modular, where you can plug in various strings of scribbles with other strings to create new meanings. So there are times when it is useful to use a single word as pointing to something and useful to take the whole sentence as pointing to something depending on the words being used.
Right, there are all sorts of modifications possible in quotation, ampilation, appellation, etc. But these are hardly counterexamples. Descriptive sentences, claims, signify "what is." But truth vis-á-vis sentences just is the property of signifying "what is" If descriptive sentences, claims, facts, etc. did not signify "what is" it's hard to see how they even have content. We are, after all, predicating something of something, which is to say that something is, which is also to say that it is true that something is.
Would we ever claim: "x is y, but it is not true that x is y?" (And please, no examples using quotation, this obviously applies to actual claims only). If not, then there is a convertability and it is related to the possibility of signification and content. Appellation, etc. are certainly important, as is the question of assertoric force, but those are unrelated as far as I can see. The convertability deals with cases where there is assertoric force, and surely, there is at least sometimes assertoric force, and this is crucial for signification.
The strong counterexample would be that there is never assertoric force, or that saying "x is y," doesn't entail that it is true that "x is y," i.e. that x can actually be y, but this isn't true of x. Or, that saying something about what is is not basic.
Which is the same as saying that the program was written incorrectly and/or is handling input that is was not designed to handle.
Define "useful".Quoting J
Your edit of my post isn't what I intended to say.
anything = everything about every X
If you have reached the conclusion that you don't know why or how the universe (everything) exists, then aren't you effectively stating that you don't know anything about everything? Doesn't the conclusion of you not knowing anything about X create doubt in your understanding of all the other X's? If I'm wrong about X, how do I know I'm not wrong about all the other X's?
But you made a distinction between philosophy and science. As commonly conceived, philosophy deals in observations all the time. This is true of phenomenology, ethics, metaphysics, etc. Is the claim that whenever these involve observation they are actually "science" and not "philosophy?"
I would just say that this would make most (perhaps all) philosophy into "science," or at least "scientific" (in virtue of involving observation). Indeed, it's a popular axiom [I]in philosophy [/I] that "there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses [i.e. "observed"]. And this other sort of "philosophy" that doesn't involve observations would either be very small or non-existent.
I'm not really sure why these should be different. Ethics is the study of ends. Politics, as a sort of archetectonic study of ends in the broadest sphere possible, is both a study of what people do and what they would benefit from doing, and this is recognized in the contemporary social sciences.
124. Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language;
it can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is.
It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery
can advance it. A "leading problem of mathematical logic" is for us
a problem of mathematics like any other.
I think such remarks are self refuting and mischaracterise both mathematics and philosophy by falsely implying that they are separate language games. Indeed, formalism fails to explain the evolution of mathematlcs and logic. There's nothing therapeutic about mischaracterising mathematics as being a closed system of meaning.
I agree, but lets give the devil his due. I think it will be helpful, and it will also afford an opportunity to give an example of how to constructively interact with a thesis rather than dissect it.
Quoting Hanover
There is a very interesting and ubiquitous philosophical problem that is being confronted by Hanover. I touched on it <here>. Consider this argument:
1. Supposition: The only rational assents are those that are entirely derived from the intellect (and not at all derived from the will)
2. But (most) everyone is involved in a great number of assents which are not entirely derived from the intellect
3. Not all of these assents are irrational
4. Therefore, (1) is false
Our most familiar instantiation of this problem is the debate over moral realism, where the anti-realist holds to (1) and claims that moral assents are not rational (because they are derived from the will, whether in the case of oughts or values). But we faced another acute instantiation of the problem in the recent <thread on faith>, where we saw that faith-assents are common and rational even though they involve the will. For example:
Quoting Peter L. P. Simpson, Political Illiberalism, 109
Consider an example of a conservative argument against (1) which does not go so far as William James voluntarism:
Quoting Leontiskos
The conclusionwhether belief or opinionthat the mushrooms are edible is not motivated purely by the intellect. In fact such a belief would never have been formed if one were not starving and desirous of food. One would never have had occasion to judge the mushrooms edible if not for that hunger. The will is necessary for such an assent, but this does not render the assent irrational.
My guess is that the number of assents which involve the will in such a way is very large. It doesnt seem to be practicable to avoid all such assents, which is probably why people like so often overreach their own intellectualist criteria. Janus is someone who gives a very idiosyncratic approach to this problem by positing a set of non-rational assents which are justifiable to oneself but not to others. Williams James seems to go too far in collapsing truth into will altogether. Pascals Wager represents an especially potent leveraging of the problem. But even after dissecting all of the errors, it is very hard to deny that there must be some rational assents which are not derived entirely from the intellect.
The Medieval answer to this philosophical problem is found in both a robust understanding of the relation between the intellect and the will, and also in the doctrine of the convertibility of the good and the true.
(Given that it is plain to us that there is a form of will which is inimical to intellectual honesty, presumably any thinker worth his salt who rejects (1) must follow Aristotle in distinguishing an upright will from a corrupt will.)
---
Austere criteria for knowledge and reason will result in a truncated philosophical sphere, and this is what @Bannos view commits him to. He has a relatively narrow view of knowledge, philosophy, and reason, because of his more stringent criteria (with some exceptions). Something like (1) appeals to him, even though he is plagued by the same fact of incompleteness that plagued the Logical Positivists. Like his forebears, he has no principled way to exclude knowledge claims, given that he knows that his own system is incomplete. Such people can say with certainty, If a rational assent is derived entirely from the intellect, then it is rational, but they are constantly tempted to affirm the consequent and assert (1).
This austerity is given to dissection in one way, insofar as many knowledge claims will fail the stringent criterion and a tight logical system will be able to show why they are not theorems within the system. But in another way the negative judgments that naturally follow upon dissection are beyond its reach, even though it often deceives itself in denying this. Lacking completeness, the fact that something is not a theorem within the system does not prove that it is not true. Thus the adherent is consigned to the paradox of only being able to dissect and never being able to exclude; of only being able to say, At least according to my incomplete system, what you say is not valid. Gödel and reality itself beckons them onward to wider vistas, where the truths which elude them can be seen.
For these reasons I find Hanovers approach too strong (although at this point he is only quoting James' more mild ideas). The intellect itself is sufficient to show that Bannos approach is insufficient for the sake of truth.
It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of what you say here. :up: :fire:
Quoting Banno
Quoting J
This could be an interesting discussion. For now I will only add:
Quoting Leontiskos
Every determination is a negation, including the determination involved in the act of understanding. If such "closing" is necessarily authoritarian, then mathematics is authoritarian, and we actually have some nutty folk in universities saying precisely that.
Quoting Leontiskos
Only when it comes to providing answers. The only way we obtain the answer is by testing all possible answers. An untestable answer is just as valid as all the other untestable answers.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Isn't logic a fundamental branch of philosophy and isn't rationalism vs empiricism a philosophical debate? I think the claim that philosophy deals in observations all the time is suspect.
Do you agree that science also deals in observations (all the time)? If so, then dealing in observations is neither philosophical or scientific, but something else and philosophy and science would be types of this something else. What is that something else?
Do you agree that philosophy and science both deal in rationalism (all the time)? Are there any irrational scientific theories? Can there ever be such a thing as an irrational scientific theory? Is there such a thing as an irrational philosophical theory like in the fields of religion and politics?
If both philosophy and science deal in observation and rationalism (all the time), then dealing in observation and rationalism are not defining qualities of either. What makes them different is their defining qualities and the difference is in how testable the answers to any question we pose are.
This is a very interesting post. It reminds me of how Aristotle (or maybe it is Aquinas in the commentary), likens moral reason to advice given by a father or friends, rather than the strict informing of theoretical reason vis-á-vis demonstration.
One idea here in the medieval context is that, because we only ever encounter finite goods, the will is always underdetermined. Thus, there is always a "choice factor" in our pursuits (and from a theological point of view it is this separation that allows/is necessary for man to transcend his own finitude and so to become more "like God"at least this is one answer for "why were Satan and Adam not created fixed on God?")
@J might find this interesting because, if I have understood him correctly, this relates to why he thinks all moral reasoning is always hypothetical? That is, we can tell what follows from moral premises, but never be led to any particular premise (even though the premises are indeed really true or false, and knowable as such, which is the part I don't get, since this would seem to imply non-hypothetical judgements are possible).
I think this goes too far. There are at least some things that can be known as good vis-á-vis human nature, particularly ceteris paribus, and if the good is more choice-worthy than the bad, then we have a clear intellectual line to the preferability of at least some habits, i.e., the virtues (intellectual [I]and[/I] moral). But I'll certainly grant that this does not apply to every case, and is not without difficulties in particular applications. Nor do I think this suggests the absolute priority of the intellect in the pursuit of virtue, in that the [I]appetite[/I] for knowledge, including knowledge about what is truly best, always plays a role.
Right, reason becomes trapped in the disparate fly-bottles of sui generis language games. Man is separated from being, either by the mind, or later by language. He is like the separated lover who can never reach his other half in the Symposium. Language, the sign vehicle, ideas, etc. become impermeable barriers that preclude the possibility of union, rather than the very means of union.
D.C. Schindler has a book on the "catholicty of reason," the way it always relates to the whole and always is already beyond itself that I quite like. It's very continental though, which is not everyone's cup of tea.
From the text:
You know, the old Hegelian dictum that: "to have recognized a limit is to have already stepped beyond it."
Ethics is not necessarily the study of ends, but the ends in relation with some intent because we see people that accidentally caused harm different than people that intentionally caused harm.
What people do and what is best for them is different than what an individual does and what is best for the individual, which could conflict with what is best for the group. The questio s and conclusions of ethics and politics are subjective and why science doesn't bother with them.
In this context, I meant philosophically helpful or provocative -- something worth our time to understand. Is there a way you prefer to think of it? -- I'm certainly not married to this one.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Oh sorry, didn't mean to misconstrue. As for "everything about every X", I guess I don't know what to say about that!
Right, because the former are seeking different ends from the latter.
Potentially. That's a question ethics and politics studies, the role of the "common good" being key here.
Good questions. The difficulty in answering these are precisely why I don't see a particularly strong line between the two.
I would define useful as being applicable in real-world situations and produces the expected results.
What does "philosophically helpful" mean if not helpful in extending language's holiday?
I take your use of "provocative" to mean that it causes one to reflect upon the usefulness of one's own ideas in contrast with a different idea, or to think differently about something in a way that is useful, with usefulness being defined here as I did above.
This is why I'm saying that philosophy as language on holiday is not useful as I have defined it. It's just scribbles that are not applicable to the world as we know it, and might never be applicable, so it's only use could be to provide some social benefit by using language in artful ways, not to say anything useful about the world.
To assert X is to claim that X is true -- I imagine you agree with this, and so do I. But life, and language, has many shades of meaning, and we don't always draw such a clear line. I might say, "That man over there is my old roommate." But if you ask me, "Are you asserting this?" or "Are you saying this is true?" you shouldn't be surprised if I pause for a moment and then reply, "Well, not quite. I think it's true, it appears to be true, but I'm not 'asserting' it as if I were under oath."
Point is, we need to stipulate what counts as an assertion. That's why I was focusing on "To say 'p' is to say 'p is true'." I don't think that's right, but it is right that "To assert 'p', and make clear one is doing so, is to say 'p is true'."
Seems like you're just defining "intent" here.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Not when the "common good" is bad for the individual. The good of the individual vs the good of the group is a well-known ethical dilemma and has not been settled as far as I know.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
If you're having difficulty answering the questions then how can you say whether there is a strong line or not? The point of asking the questions was to try to get at whether there is a strong line between the two or not, and if the distinction is useful or not. The conclusions reached in any field of knowledge must not contradict the conclusions reached in another field. All knowledge must be integrated. The field of genetics integrates well with the field of biology. The field of quantum mechanics does not integrate well with classical physics. The interpretations of what the science of QM is showing would be in the domain of philosophy as none of them are testable at the moment.
I could give me my answers to the questions, I just don't think it would be particularly helpful. "Testability" of "falsification" are often offered as criteria for science. I do think this works. Theoretical work often predates the possibility of any sort of test or "verification" by decades. Mach famously decried the atom as unfalsifiable. A number of major physicists decried the quark on the same grounds. The quark and anti-particles were first developed as speculative theories and were not immediately testable. The theory had to come first though. Quantum foundations is often decried as unfalsifiable, but in fact some theories of objective collapse have been successfully tested (and seemingly falsified). This work has given us real insights. We wouldn't have Bell's work on locality without it for example.
And this sort of issue isn't limited to physics. You can see it in the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis debate in biology just as well. Information theory, and the idea that "biological information" is "really reducible to mechanism," is a particularly apt case, because it becomes a very philosophical question, really one of metaphysics when one wants to challenge the idea that dyadic mechanism is the way causation must be described. Understanding dynamical systems and a lot of complexity studies in quite similar.
If science only becomes science when it is testable, then a great deal of what scientists do, especially theoretical work, is philosophy and not science. So, like I said, the line is not very clear by this criteria, or at least it fails to corresponds to common usages.
I was thinking about it a bit more and can see philosophy, with the application of logic, tests the theories for soundness, while science tests them by experimentation - a process involving both logic and observation. So, philosophy and science done well would be where the conclusion reached passed all, or at least most, of the tests each one performs.
Oh, Im a rational-life-long, card-carryin dissector, to be sure. I do loves me some minutia, donchaknow, in the interest of philosophical clarity of course.
I do think that James creates criteria to limit the amount the will allows one to create one's own reality, but I do think there is merit to the position that the will is a dominant force in one's life, enough so that it can significantly change one's outlook and perspective. It's especially noticable on website like this, where I often detect an over-riding sense of doom, this idea that if you don't accept a certain pessimism, then you're looked upon as blissfully ignorant. And the point is that it's not ignorance. It's a choice.
And so that's why I ask aloud why someone thinks there's virtue to absolute fidelity to logic and scientific discovery if it yields such misery. But I do understand that some cannot but do that because to do otherwise would be alien to their nature. This is what James means by "live," meaning the decision to beleive has to be of something you actually have the constitution to believe.
Quoting Leontiskos
My personal worldview actually is very different than this, only referring to pragmatism because it is more palatable here than my actual views that lean toward theism and mysticism, but that's an aside as far as what my particular beliefs are. What's not an aside is that everyone's personal beliefs form their worldview, which is what I think the OP doesn't address as closely. What it actually addresses is the fact that there are two ways of philosophizing within the analytic tradition, and some do it rigorously and some do it sloppily. Those who are rigorous allow beliefs to fall as logic requires. Those who are sloppy maintain their views regardless of where they are contradicted, using analytic systems when it benefits their biases and ignoring the problems when it doesn't.
When we truly have different views of the world (i.e. not a shared view), then rejection of the results brought about by the tools of other traditions isn't inconsistent. If my world is not conducive to examination by an atomic microscope, it doesn't bother me what results it might show.
Yes, I think that's right.
A closely related point, made by many authors, is that the masses do not reason in the way that philosophers reason. For example, whereas a philosopher would uphold liberalism on intellectual grounds, the masses will tend to uphold liberalism on volitional grounds. They tend to view liberalism as good, not as true (although liberalism may not be the best example since some of the proponents such as Rawls eventually admitted that their own grounds are largely volitional). The same argument could be made for something like the existence of God, and it is worth recognizing how the philosophersor else those with more direct knowledgelead the way and the masses follow in their wake.
When push comes to shove, @J is a volitional reasoner. He wonders if we should avoid truth-claims because they are immoral. @Banno is starting to lean in that direction as well, as can be seen by his recent post/diatribe against "authoritarianism." The first thing I would say here is that this is okay, so long as they recognize what they are doing. J has certainly begun to recognize it and he has a less intellectualist bent than Banno, but Banno is more schizophrenic, vacillating between intellectualism and will-based assent.
That juncture between the intellect and the will when it comes to assent is a neuralgic point which seems to underlie a lot of the instability of these discussions. The great boon of a doctrine about how assent relates to both intellect and will, such as the Medieval doctrine, is that it allows us to think more carefully and countenance more honestly those assents of ours which are strongly volitional. So I think @Hanover has put his finger on something important with his William James' quotes.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Right, and when we think about the intellect/volition problem in specifically "moral" terms (in the modern sense), the question immediately arises, "Is the good communicable and universally binding, in the way that the true is?" This is probably a large part of @J's concern. He worries that objective claims of goodness lead to imposition and coercion.
Although I haven't looked at this problem in awhile, it seems clear to me that the intellect and the will are tightly knit, and that the true is good. The difficulty is the reversal, namely the claim that the good is true. Can we say that what is good is also what is true? How does the convertibility in that direction work? Although the mushroom case is interesting, nevertheless the will is only a motive for knowing that truth, not a proper grounds for the truth. Thomists lean towards intellectualism, so it is natural that I have more difficulty with this direction.
Yes, that's fair and I noticed you pointing that out.
Quoting Hanover
Interesting. I noticed it when I joined. Now I take it for granted. :grin:
Quoting Hanover
I think that's well said.
When I wrote the post you are responding to I had no internet, and was working from memory. When I revisited the actual conversation I realized that your quotes from James were fairly conservative. My impression was that James at times went farther than that, but maybe that is incorrect.
I am wary of bringing up Pascal's Wager, but an argument similar to it could help illustrate a more "pragmatic" option:
Now compare this to something more conservative:
Now those are merely two approaches, and there are doubtless countless others, including in between.
But the funny thing is that many if not all of us really do seem to hold to assents based on something like option 1. Many if not all of us are involved in assents that, were we to trace back the justificatory structure when asked why we hold them, we would have to admit, "Because it is good to so believe," or, "Because what is believed is good/desirable/choice-worthy." For example, "Do you think the tornado is going to hit your house?," or, "It's late and she hasn't come home yet. Do you think your wife is cheating on you?" It strikes me as implausible that a negative answer to such questions is purely intellectual, and does not strongly involve one's desire for what is good.* ...Eventually we will want to ask what extent of volition is rationally permissible, if any.
(Obviously the Analytic temptation here is to make a distinction between two different senses of the question about the tornado or the adultery, but in reality those two putative senses really do seem merged and melded together.)
* Curiously, Aquinas singles out one form of assent as, "to incline to one side yet with fear of the other." The tornado or adultery questions represent that variety of assent. We could also give examples where there is volition and uncertainty but not necessarily any fear, such as, "Do you think the sun will come out tomorrow?"
That's the thesis, and you haven't defended it. You've just imputed bad ("authoritarian") motives wherever you like. I was hoping for more from that post of yours. Note that if you are actually looking for structural phenomena that predispose towards authoritarianism, then mathematics is certainly authoritarian! Do you think mathematics is authoritarian? Because two people can't have different answers and both be correct, or both be mathematically validated?
Quoting J
This is more strained reasoning. "Surely not"? Almost everyone agrees that some sounds are not music; some music is more musical; some music is more beautiful; and some music is more objectionable. So if we use your own criterion of "intersubjective agreement," then music is "authoritarian" (according to your curious definition). The reason John Williams was given the score for Harry Potter instead of you or I is because John Williams is a better musician, who produces better music. Similarly, anyone with even a vague familiarity with music is capable of creating a shit piece of music, that everyone will agree is shit. So the idea that there are no criteria for good music is obviously false.
Quoting J
"Creative work is not deductive, therefore there is no right or wrong way to make music, and no good or bad music." That's a wild non sequitur.
The whiplash that your post produces occurs because there are no real inferences utilized in order to arrive at your conclusions about "deductive reasoning," or, "authoritarianism." You have some conclusions in search of an argument. Your beginning was promising insofar as you tried to identify an authoritarian pole (mathematics) and a non-authoritarian pole (music), but after that it went downhill.
Note your argument:
1. Any discipline in which quality is measurable is authoritarian
2. In mathematics the quality of contributions is measurable
3. Therefore, mathematics is authoritarian
First, he responds to the idea that we never grasp the truth, the absolutization of Socratic irony as the claim that "all we know is that we don't know anything (absolutely)."
The second idea he addresses is a sort of "bracketing" out of "epistemic humility."
This is, of course, not to suggest there is no benefit to setting things aside. And we can still respect Aristotle's advice that we should not expect explanations to be more precise than the subject matter warrants. But it does point out a way appeals to humility become totalizing.
Perhaps it also explains the tendency of theorists to want to go beyond claims of mere skepticism, and to instead claim that the whole of being or intelligibility must be contained within the limits of humility they have set.
How would you group mathematics and philosophy into the same language game?
I'd say they are different in the sense that math is a science, and sciences differ from philosophy. That may not be enough to claim a separate language game, though -- it'd depend upon how we want to talk about language games.
I tend to think that Wittgenstein's intent, at least, is to lead the fly out of the bottle. Noticing that a language game contains one way of looking at that whole world outside it is what I draw from that metaphor.
Well that fits with my sympathies. Along with...
Quoting Banno
Once one consummates philosophy I believe it ceases to be a certain kind of philosophy, at least -- and sometimes it becomes a science or something else rather than what philosophers care about.
But the philosopher is one who reaches for the erotic, rather than consummates it.
I don't think the two ways are unique to the analytic tradition. At least I'd use Kant as a mixer between the two ways, and Hegel as the world-builder.
In early modern philosophy I find it hard to find another comparison for the critical grump. Hume leaps to mind but I'm wondering if that would not count as a continental since he's from across the aisle, when I'd say he's part of the Enlightenment tradition which seems to count as continental to my mind.
Bit of a shame your post came at the bottom of a page, as it seems to me to deserve quite a bit of attention.
The closure we're talking about is methodological. Popper perhaps set the standard for understanding method, with his discussion of the logic of falsification. Popper showed how to compare the logic of different methods. His apostle, Watkins, wrote a very good piece which was the subject of a thread of mine a few years ago. His article, Confirmable and influential metaphysics, contrasts the logic of some differing approaches to acquiring knowledge. I think we can use this approach here.
I began a long post outlining Watkins' approach, but you may be familiar with it already, and can always read his article if you are interested.
What's relevant here is the way in which some theories, by virtue of their logical structure alone, can be neither falsifiable nor confirmable. So, "All ravens are black" can be falsified, by presenting a raven that is not black. Other theories an be confirmed: "There are white swans" is confirmed by presenting a white swan. Notice that this is a result of their logical structure - U(x)(f(x)?g(x) for the former, ?(x)(f(x) ^ g(x)) for the latter. Any theory with that form will also be either falsifiable or confirmable.
Other theories are neither confirmable nor falsifiable. Some, because they are immunised against either by their structure: "The dragon is invisible to those who do not believe" - if we cannot see the dragon, then it's becasue we do not have sufficient belief, not becasue there is no dragon. Or "Every event has a sufficient cause" - a favourite around here. Consider, if we happen across an event that on the face of it does not appear to have a cause, we cannot conclude that it has no cause - the cause may be hidden from us for some reason. And, since it does not specify what counts as a cause, neither can we find every cause for every event, confirming the theory.
Such theories have a group of specifiable logical structures that prevent criticism. "That style of philosophising is structured to preclude objection."
Now lets' go back and consider Tim's
Quoting Moliere
This is a haunted universe doctrine because it:
It presents itself as methodologically innocent, but is in fact haunted by an entire metaphysicsof mind, knowledge, and reality. And once that haunting is seen, the claim can no longer function as a neutral starting point.
@Moliere is rightly sceptical. If someone claims to judge righty without prior apprehension, the comeback is that they had not noticed their prior apprehension; the theory is unfalsifiable. And for any judgement, the prior apprehension remains unspecified; the theory is unverifiable.
The take away here is that the logical structure of a doctrine can shield it from critique. And I hope you will agree that this is not a good thing.
More to come.
Have you stopped beating your wife?
No, I won't answer your question.
I made "I have all and only the truth" a claim of hubris. This is not the same as "Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The bit were you said
So where to from here?
Maths doesn't close itself off in the way I'm suggesting. Consider potential closures: ' 'There can only be one line through a given point that is parallel to another line". But what if we just suppose that there can be more than one? What happens? Well, Hyperbolic geometry. "You can't have the square root of a negative number"? But what if we just imagine that there is one, and call it "i"? A complete and coherent and quite magnificent geometry. Mathematics is not closed to contradiction, to criticism, to what is contrary to it.
Quoting J
There's a well-documented path from field songs to Blues to Rock, but it's a path seen by looking backwards, not forwards. Again, music is not closed to novelty and contradiction and looking forward it is not possible to see what comes next - which is why it is such fun.
Quoting J
Yep. And we might add that we can map out what it is about them that makes them this way. Hence my previous remarks about Popper and Watkins. But that's one example amongst many. I was surprised to learn from @Jamal's thread that Adorno has a similar approach... I must get back to that and give it more consideration.
This might also relate to . Seems to me that part of what is missing, if critique is absented, is a lack of what might in information theory be called a feed-back mechanism, a reflexivity, that is needed for improvement.
There are a few things that could be said here about fossilised medieval doctrines. Best not.
Well said. Me, too. But I can't say more. :wink:
The analytic tradition was merely the next necessary moment in the push towards Absolute Freedom.
Thanks - yes, but that aspect of the OP has been sidelined. I'm intrigued by the apparent way in which criticism of a suggestion is seen as impolite...
Shouldn't it be seen as doing a great curtesy?
Indeed.
Hegelian rhetoric can be brilliant, as in the mouth of that salivating Slav, iek. And our own @Tobias, of course.
Why is it so hard for some to see that not every statement has assertoric force? Or that a negative statement may have assertoric force? Puzzling, from a psychological point of view.
These are excellent quotes from D. C. Schindler both here and in your previous post. :up:
I will have to look into him more closely.
I don't think these folks understand how completely they are destroying the philosophical enterprise and the things they believe they are saving. On the other hand, there is also a thread of misology that has erected this so-called "epistemic humility" as its god, and cares not what happens.
See also:
Quoting Leontiskos
What happens is that there is a dichotomy set up between "monism" and "pluralism," where both share the premise that the individual is immune to rational influence. The "monistic" individual is immune via his own "authoritarianism," whereas the "pluralistic" individual is immune via pluralism. They are two sides of the same coin, and both undercut the notion of truth, transcendence, and the ability to influence one another via rational considerations.
So the critic is actually a builder? That's your solution? "Critics don't need any builders, because they are builders too!"
You are conceding my point, namely that builders are necessary. You've merely conceded it by magically making the critic a builder. You are not contesting my point that critics cannot exist without builders.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Moliere
This is nonsense, Moliere. :roll:
You are showcasing the incoherence of extreme skepticism, where your goal is just to contradict people, Monty Python-style, with no regard for your own incoherence and self-contradictions. This is a prime example of someone who is not interested in real philosophy; who won't even shy away from the fact that they contradict themselves without shame. You are apparently content to flip-flop back and forth like this for all eternity, so long as you are able to contradict everything at once. Good luck with that approach! Really - it will destroy you.
Banno, is asking you, "how does your system not lead to 'anything goes?'" really a leading question ? You cannot offer any answer to this? How is it even leading?
Well, you see my confusion, you didn't write: "I have all and only the truth," but rather "I have truth."
I was reading this charitably as suggesting a standard other then truth because otherwise, as it seems you did intend it, it's a sort of hyperbolic strawman dichotomy. I mean, what is the point of setting up a dichotomy between declaring oneself omniscient and infallible and epistemic nihilism? Who exactly do you intend to critique here? It's like saying: "well, it's silly to love Hitler, good governance is somewhere between Hitlerism and complete anarchy." Ok. Not many people are claiming otherwise.
But if "not anything goes," then how is one not making a claim to a "true narrative?" Apparently certain narratives can be definitively excluded. In virtue of what are they excluded and why isn't this exclusion hubris?
Second, either all true narratives avoid contradiction or they don't. If they don't contradict each other, then they are, in a sense, one. If they do contradict one another, you need some sort of criteria for when contradiction is allowed (which all serious dialtheists try to provide) because otherwise, if contradiction can occur anywhere, then "everything goes" (and doesn't go).
Thanks, . I was writing a longish response, only to have it deleted whiel refreshing multiple windows. Bugger.
It was a list of the various points you made, and how I agreed or disagreed. The upshot was that I pretty much agreed with all you said, except for a few thigns.
Not everything we do with words is communication, if communication is understood as the transfer of information. We also command, ask, promise, and so on. To be clear, I do not see how these can be reduced to just the transfer of information, and also, if they were, it would be very inefficient to talk about them in those terms.
And not every word is either a noun or a helper word.
Generally, it seems to me that you are setting out much the same sort of approach as is found in the Tractatus, an approach that needs to be superseded for the same reasons that that book was superseded by the Investigations
Or, perhaps, the solution is not algorithmic.
There might be a Scotsman lurking here...
At the risk of oversimplifying, best I make explicit that I did not deny having a world view, nor suggest that having a world view was a bad thing. I said that my worldview is incomplete, and that this is a good thing, since it allows for improvement, whereas those who have complete word views have no such luxury.
So back to the Scotsman. Is it that we truly have different world views when and only when we reject the results brought about by the tools of other traditions?
Otherwise, how do we tell that we truly have different world views?
The danger is that different worldview becomes a way of immunizing ones beliefs from critiqueyou only truly have a different worldview if you reject mine outright. But there's that Scotsman, no?
Feyerabend was all set to do his Doctorate under Wittgenstein, who unfortunately up and died, forcing him to settle for Popper. Whole fertile acres of philosophical discourse lost to fate.
If Language games are incommensurable, all sorts of problems ensue. So I think we have to go with Davidson here, and reject the idea of incommensurability in such things.
D.C. Schindler might be my favorite philosopher currently putting out regular material (and he puts out a lot). I will say though that he has a tendency to sometimes be a bit too polemical on some issues, which I'm afraid might turn some people off. He also tends to be fairly technical, although I've only found his first book on Von Balthasar to be really slow going.
What's interesting here is that he makes a similar critique of liberalism vis-á-vis political theory. In claiming skepticism about a host of issues (including everything related to any real human telos), liberal theory ends up taking up an absolutized stance on these issues that is far from neutral, and involves many impositions. Yet it doesn't make these impositions based on positive claims that can be challenged through public debate, but rather bases these impositions on an appeal to [I]ignorance[/I], which essentially makes the position unchallengeable (or at least, defendable using an arbitrarily heavy burden of proof to shut down opposition).
Since one can always find at least some reasons to question and deny almost any position, particularly in something as high level as politics, the skeptic can always defend their skepticism by appeals to ignorance and humility. And they can just set the bar for evidence warranting any positive counter position incredibly high, since on their view, they don't have to prove anything because they are only claiming ignorance and a position that follows from it (whether liberalism even follows from such skepticism is another matter; arguably, "might makes right," follows instead).
Of course, this skeptical justification doesn't mean that liberalism recommends a state that doesn't impose much on the individual, families, churches, corporations, etc. Quite the opposite; the state becomes omnipresent. In the progressive liberal vision, there state is ubiquitous, and in many formulations of conservative liberalism, the state is still ubiquitous in order to ensure that the market can be even more all-encompassing. And obviously, liberals generally also want education, civic culture, etc. based around their ideology.
I guess part of the problem is that [I]proper[/I] humility still involves a mean. There can be modesty that isn't prudent. Pusillanimity is a vice, as is senselessness. We would hardly applaud a doctor who didn't treat a patients' cancer out undue skepticism about the diagnosis. That there is an ideal level of skepticism that is prudent, and that it is often a vice when considering the practical sciences, where the needs of action are always immediate and bad actors on the move, is partly what is at issue.
Yes, the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' of course do carry philosophical baggage. That said I would say "dissection" is synonymous with 'analysis' and discourse is always a putting together of ideas which would count as synthesis.
Anyway a mere terminological point should not matter.Quoting Banno
Right, I agree the distinction is a valid one and is useful.
I suppose it's a balancing act, if you (or anybody) are harsh to all these enlightened posters, then less people might be willing to engage. But it can help the odds of conversations retaining a high quality, but that's not guaranteed either.
It's annoying more than anything because of the "I know Something you will never see" attitude, but, whatever.
Yep.
Here's were this line of reasoning spits off from the thread:
Quoting Banno
See if I have this right. I've said "it's not the case that anything goes". You understand this as implying that there must therefore be, amongst the Great List of statements, those that go and those that don't. And that further, if we know that there are some that go and some that don't, there must be a criteria for sorting the Great List in this way. And you chide me for not setting out that criteria.
How's that? Is that along the lines that you propose?
If so, then here's the presumption: that there is indeed such a Great List. That's why the question is leading. That Great List is the presumptive Theory of Everything. What I'm questioning is, why must we make that presupposition? Why not, instead of a Great List, a series of short lists, each perhaps consistent within itself?
And this, looking around, seems to be what we do have. Discrete areas of expertise, either unrelated to each other, or addressing the same things in different ways.
We can model this approach more formally. The supposition of the Great List is that there is a series of sentences, the conjunction of which is The Truth. G={A & B & C & D...} and so on, until the Truth be known.
Your question to me is, we know that for some sentence, say C, C is either in the Great List, or it isn't. It can' t both be in the Great List and not in the Great List. And Banno, from what you have said, it seems that it is both in the Great List and not in the Great list, from which it follows that anything goes.
It's a valid point. But it presumes that the list is a series of conjuncts. What if instead it were a disjunction of conjuncts? What if, instead of {A & B & C & D...} we had {(A & B & C & D) v (A & B & ~C)...}? Since (C v ~C) is true, {(A & B & C & D) v (A & B & ~C)...} can also be true.
This alternative list contains no contradiction.
Now this is but an outline, and there is much left to do. But I hope perhaps it shows you why I can't give you a direct answer.
Good. I'm pleased with the attention it has garnered. Yes, 'dissection' is pretty much 'analysis' but I went with the former both in order to leave behind some bagage, and to take advantage of the alliteration.
Sometimes you have to walk away.
Right, for me the great philosophers' ideas and systems have aesthetic value. They present us with novel ways to think about things?and they are admirable just on account of their sustained complexity of inter-related ideas.
As to Chalmers and Dennett?the latter seems to me by far the more imaginative philosopher. I also see Hume as an immensely creative thinker and not at all a mere "nitpicker".
[quote=Daniel Dennett]Im a robot, and youre a robot, but that doesnt make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions. Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?[/quote]
I didn't imply anything about a great list. I implied that some explanation of how "everything doesn't go," is needed for you to be offering more than: "absolute pluralism, except arbitrary limited by what we [I]feel[/I] can be excluded by fiat."
The rest of the post doesn't include such a standard. The idea on disjuncts is interesting, although I wasn't thinking in terms of "lists." However, by itself, it seems to still allow for the inclusion of everything, except now only hypothetically. But accepting all possible contradictory claims as "true" (or acceptable, or whatever) only hypothetically is pretty much epistemic nihilism lite. Another way to put it: how does this not include "all possible disjuncts," which is still "anything goes?" It seems to me that some must be excluded by some principle.
This doesn't offer a principle for exclusion at all. Indeed, it simply tries to neutralize even the bare minimum effect of PNC as an exclusion principle. But if nothing is excluded, then "anything goes."
Plus, is this consistent with your stated positions, e.g. a strong claim the elective abortion in unproblematic, that Plato's forms are nonsense, that the "view from nowhere" is an inappropriate standard? It seems all this gets you is a list of hypothetical disjuncts where these positions you reject are both rejected (false) and not-rejected (presumably hypothetically true).
You should read: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/995248
Hegel's style is only monolithic because it is presuppositionless and thus without the multiplicity introduced by bias :cool:
Although, more seriously, it is interesting that few thinkers are interpreted in more diverse ways. But if Hegel can produce Magee's hermetic sorcerer, Pinkard's Aristotleian "naturalist," Blunden's proto-Marx, Kojeve's liberal, Dorrien's theologian, Houlgate's ontologist, Pippen's logician, Harris' semi-mystic, or the proto-fascist Hegels of yesteryear, he can hardly be monolithic. Rather, all have issued from what he put forth in virtual form, and they shall all sublate one another on their return to Hegel as Geist. But they are each moments in the Absolute Hegel.
Pyrrho didn't leave anything for us to critique. That's perhaps the most consistent sort of skepticism I can imagine. So, no, he had no need for them. The point was to counter them.
Also, I'd say that the builder metaphor can only go so far in philosophy. This going back to there being more than one way to do philosophy.
Quoting Leontiskos
Do we die on the hill of a metaphor?
Suppose there were two people who like philosophy talking to one another and at the end of the conversation someone says "When you live in this house it will destroy you"
The once-contractor nods and goes about thier business.
Some time later the builder sees a path into the woods in the same place.
Before the builders there were people who just wondered about shit. It took the architectonics to come along and think that thought had to be a building to be worthwhile -- so indeed I do think it's the other way about, and sometimes we just want different things.
That's pretty much the way I see things between you and I. Philosophy isn't a wrestling match and we really can consider ideas without judging them as true or false in all cases -- we can provide caveats and exceptions and note difficulties along the way without it toppling all knowledge. In fact, in order to do so, we have to have some kind of knowledge to begin realizing that our categories don't hold up -- it's in the differences that we find true knowledge of the world, rather than their idealizations into sameness.
I think we have to make a case for, rather than assume, incommensurability between language games. I'd put the incommensurability on the side of intension, though, such that it's not an in-principle incommensurability -- insofar that people with two sets of assumptions listen to one another over time I think bridges can be built, and in fact usually they are not necessary at all. We simply mean different things by the same words and misunderstand one another.
But then there are times where it seems quite difficult to translate one explicit language game into another explicit language game -- insofar that we recognize that they aren't really doing the same thing then we would say these are not incommensurable. It's only an interesting sort of possible incommensurability when we have two language games of fairly equivalent persuasive power competing over both intensions and extensions of words.
Or something like that.
I think incommensurability needs to be bounded -- but there are times it seems to "fit", and insofar that it's not an in-principle incommensurability then it doesn't seem to contradict Davidson to me.
Definitely. I mean I think we do have to ask, eventually when we think we understand the philosopher well enough, "So is it true, though?" -- and that's what I'd call the against the grain reading.
But generally I see more value in the with-the-grain reading because the whole value to me is understanding different ways of thinking. I find it fascinating.
Truth is an underlying concern of mine, but the value of philosophy -- much like science -- really does include knowing what's we've said before whether it was true or false. One, those thoughts might prove true in a different environment, so they are worth preserving so as not to have to reinvent them wholesale down the line. Two, if we forget a mistake it's more than likely we'll commit it again, so it's good to look for these thoughts on their own even if they are false -- I wonder about the truth or falsity, but their value is so much more than that.
I'm open to reclassification on the basis of something. It's just a rough idea right now! :D And I'm attempting to classify such that it's appealing to all involved in the conversation -- rather trying to show that the idea is appealing as an idea for thinking through ways of philosophizing.
Attempting to use familiar names to get at what those differences might be is the method, but I don't imagine I have it correct.
But you see this is exactly the monolothic move -- to demonstrate how Hegel is actually appealing to whomever is talking about him, and how, in fact, they would agree with him only if they truly studied and understood his words.
I think it's monolothic in that it's a philosophy that swallows all philosophies, and one need only spend time studying Hegel to see the truth of that. In a way one cannot disagree with it -- they can only misunderstand it. :D
My distinction isn't Scottish, it's lionesque, as in we're disagreeing upon methodology employed in truth seeking, not just inconvenient results I reject post hoc. Our game yeilds differing results because we're not playing the same game. I appreciate the lion distinction is meant more radically typically, as in it results in an entire failure to communicate, but that seems unecessary. It makes as much sense to consider gradients of lion-speak, as in its not a fully differing form of life, but just somewhat so.
My methodology looks up to the heavens, but not in a childlike way, but in a way that searches in all instances for the teleos, as in why would that happen given everything has a purpose. You simply cannot start where I start and ever end up with a conclusion we must walk away in silence to metaphysical questions.
But I'm here to learn, so tell we where you see I've diverted into nonsense.
Quoting Banno
Good joke, and just to be clear: We can say more, using language in all of its delightful manifestations, we just can't say more in rational discourse, with the apparatus of a formal system. Notice I'm trying not to equate "rational discourse" -- or anything else -- with "philosophy", full stop. @Wayfarer and others are right that philosophy as a practice has meant many things over the centuries.
Quoting Banno
Thanks but isn't it just how we talk? I wasn't feeling particularly insightful when I wrote it, only trying to clarify that an assertion generally has to be marked out as such, to avoid ambiguities.
Quoting Banno
That was the "radical reconsideration" I had in mind.
Quoting Moliere
Quoting Banno
Both these comments are trying to come to grips with the question of what sorts of objections are seen as legitimate by a philosophical method. I think you're right about the formal, methodological closure, and @Moliere is also putting their finger on a characteristic of "big" philosophies such as Hegel's: The appeal is to a kind of linguistic or conceptual closure. It's not that the system is unfalsifiable -- though it may be -- but that it's uninterpretable in any way other than as laid out. Certain foundational questions or objections are necessarily misunderstandings -- on the grounds that there is only one way to understand what's being said.
Here's another way we could think about it: When Peirce and Habermas talk about the ideal forms of communication -- communicative action, the best ways to carry on a public conversation -- they seem to have in mind that there is an endpoint, or at the very least that there could be, but we do not now know what that will look like, nor could we possibly. In other words, what I'm calling "armchair philosophy" is an inadequate method. Whereas someone like Lonergan, who is a brilliant and under-appreciated thinker, seems to picture something different: Conversation is a forum to answer and refute objections, because the endpoint is already clear. I read him as saying that philosophical conversation should involve principles already known to be true, and that we can benefit from sharpening and expanding these principles by hearing the objections of others and responding. On this point, I think Peirce and Habermas have the more justifiable and more reliable method.
Quoting Banno
That is true, but I was using the math example to show how a deductive system may not permit different "correct" answers within that system. Probably I shouldn't natter about math, as it isn't my forte, but isn't that more or less right? If we're doing algebra, solving an equation isn't open to the "objection" that there might be another correct solution. And stretching a point, you can even call this authoritarian: If you say otherwise on a test, the teacher will flunk you! But there's nothing pernicious about any of this. It comes with the territory of an accepted formal system. The problems arise when we start to treat philosophy as such a deductive system.
OK, with the mods' permission, here's a link to a song my band did about Zizek, my least favorite philosopher. Just for fun, apologies if you're a Zizek fan!
Yikes. I hate it when that happens.
Quoting Banno
Commanding and asking are conveying information about one's intent. When someone yells, "Stop!" what they are doing is conveying information about their intent. What they are actually saying is, "I want you to stop!", and "Stop!" is really just shorthand for saying "I want you to stop!". We could just say, "I want you to stop!", or we could just say, "Stop!" (they mean the same thing), and let the other things in our immediate environment speak for us (context), like your hand signals or you reaching out to physically stop the person from stepping into a hole and breaking their ankle. Like I said, scribbles and sounds are just one of many things we use to represent what it is we intend to convey. Its just that scribbles and sounds are what are more commonly used as they are readily available.
If the person did not stop, then how can you say you used the word, "Stop!"? How can you say that it refers to the person stopping. You can't. This is why the command doesn't point to the actions of another, but to your intent to change the actions of another. We can convey our intentions, but that does not mean we always get what we intend.
Information is conveyed even beyond what was said. By looking at someone's writing and listening to them speak information about which languages they can speak and their level of understanding of the language they are using are also conveyed. Those things are just irrelevant to what the speaker is saying, but could be relevant in other situations.
Promises and apologies are conveying information about one's intent, or to solicit help in the future. To promise someone something is to convey that in the future they would provide assistance to another. It is a way of reinforcing social bonds. Apologies are saying, "Please don't socially exclude me for my mistake as it will not happen again, and I intend to correct the wrong." That is a mouthful no doubt, but that is why we can rely on other things to participate in conveying what we mean more efficiently.
Quoting Banno
Examples?
Quoting Banno
And why wouldn't the Investigations not need to be superseded? Isn't his "language on holiday" from the Investigations? I've been using this to support what is found in the Tractatus in that language is on a holiday when we don't use words as they were intended - to convey something about the world, which includes your intentions. Anything else is just an artful use of scribbles and sounds.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting Banno
I would need an real-world example of a "solution" that was reached without an algorithm.
I would just like to point out the reason we frequently ask for each other's definitions here, on a philosophy forum, is because when someone does not use a word how it is commonly used, or does not align with any of the multiple definitions the word might have, we are asking for the user's private definition.
Once we learn how each other are using the scribble, we can communicate with an understanding of each other's uses and translate to our own use. We could continue doing this without having a shared, or common, use. The problem is that it is very inefficient when communicating with multiple people every day. We would have to learn every individual's private use to translate to our own. It's much easier to learn one common language rather than millions of private languages. That is why we have a common usage, but can get by by understanding another's private use if we needed to. It would be like two people that speak their native language and the foreign language of the other. They could both communicate by speaking the other's native language without ever using their own native language, or a common language.
Interesting. I find very much the opposite.
I think Dennett had a great imagination, and I might have agreed he was more imaginative than Chalmers -- until "Reality +" came out a couple of years ago. Fantastically imaginative! Even Dennett might have been envious.
Anyway, imagination aside, I find Chalmers much the more interesting of the two. Dennett was hobbled by a reductive physicalism that, for all his brilliant writing, he could never make plausible for me.
He struck me as consciousness avoidant.
He has always been extremely cringe-inducing in this topic. The level of irrationality and utter disregard for the most evident, clear, best understood phenomena out of everything there is, is just beyond words.
Which is why his book is called "Consciousness Denied".
He has some fancy neuroscience; he does write well - but the people who agree with him are just tiny.
It's a useful tool to oppose, and for that we should be grateful. But outside of seminars, who believes it?
If a person breaks an arm, or gets shot or something horrible, would Dennett say "oh, that's just a broken machine, it's nervous system is sending pain signals to the brain, nothing to worry about".
Of course not, he would likely call for help, because what he is experiencing is reality, not illusions or dispositional behavior or a magic trick.
Maybe philosophical project building comes from an innate need to make the world predictable, explainable, controllable. Out of project building comes technological feats, like the solar calendar, which end up surviving thousands of years of philosophical flux.
People like Descartes and Kant could be looked at the same way. They left us with ideas to play with, to explore. So the poster who shows up with a project is giving us something to test.
Funny! (You do know it's "Consciousness Explained," right?)
Quoting Manuel
My point wasn't about agreement -- as I said, I don't agree with him at all -- but rather about how he could even be "a useful tool to oppose" if his arguments were irrational beyond words. When people really are irrational in that way, top-notch philosophers don't bother with them, as there'd be no point. Since this is not the case with Dennett, I ask again: What do you think he might have been doing that caught the attention of just about everyone in the consciousness field?
Quoting Manuel
If this is a serious question, then I think Dennett would say, "Yes, it's a broken machine, its nervous system is sending pain signals to the brain, and that's a very bad situation for this machine to be in, and deserves plenty of worry." Something along those lines; he never suggested that people were somehow less important because they were, in his view, strictly physical objects. Nor, to my knowledge, did he think that being in pain was not an experience. He thought we had incorrect views about what that experience amounted to. And he did think we could be wrong, sometimes, about whether we were in pain or not.
Here is a general claim you make:
You see this as "authoritarian," and both of these claims of yours are moral claims.
You also hold to this:
The problem here is that, by your own criteria, your own claims are "authoritarian," and therefore you are involved in hypocrisy or performative self-contradiction. You castigate "authoritarians" as suffering from a moral deficiency which bears on their argumentation, and therefore violate your own rule. You say, "You can't accuse the wielder of an argument of immorality," and yet this is precisely what you are doing with your ongoing "authoritarianism" diatribe.
Quoting J
Is it authoritarian or isn't it? And is authoritarianism pernicious or isn't it? Do you see how you are unable to answer such simple questions?
The other problem here is that, even in the first place, you are not able to say what "authoritarianism" is and why it is bad. This goes directly to my Beyond the Pale thread, where you are confronted with the question, "What is authoritarianism and why is it beyond the pale?"
Quoting Leontiskos
The intellectually honest person would say to themselves, "Yes, my claims about authoritarianism are moral claims, and moral claims require defense. Therefore I will accede to defending my moral claims."
By this point I fully expect you to continue evading such simple questions and to persist in your incoherence.
I was looking at his books. What books or articles would you recommend as a starting point?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Clear and important points. :up:
If mathematical findings were "there from the begining" who exactly is the authority that is being "authoritarian" here?
Second, the whole idea of "authoritarianism" as an evil is based on the idea that the authority is illegitimate or wielded improperly. If some random stranger wandered into your house and began eating your food and availing themselves of your valuables, and you said: "stop that, get out of [I]my[/I] house," you could hardly be accused of acting in an authoritarian fashion. Indeed, the objection by the stranger that your statement was warding off possible objection by laying claim to the house would be farcical, insane.
And yet your statement [I]is[/I] no doubt there to ward off all objection. It is [I]your[/I] house. You decide who gets to eat all the food and carry off the TV. This has been commonly accepted at least since Homer giddily celebrated Odysseus murdering all of his "guests" (who to be fair, were definitely asking for it).
So in a systematic philosophy, who exactly is the authority? Is it Aristotle for philosophers partial to him? It would appear not, because the most famous users of Aristotle all change significant elements of his thought. Plotinus adapts it considerably. Aquinas changes much. Arendt is not just explicating him.
In Aquinas this is particularly clear because the format he uses asks a question and then provides objections pro and contra from various authorities. But Aquinas frequently sides with none of the authorities he cites, or reinterprets them. Now if Scholasticism is authoritarian, in virtue of what does Thomas countermand all the recognized authorities?
Well, from the replies, it would seem that this is normally done on the basis of logical argument, appeals to experience, etc. That is, these would be the relevant authority. But then the question is, do these lack proper authority in philosophical debate? Is it authoritarian to insist on them as arbiters? And if it is authoritarian, what is the proper authority, or is there none? If it is none, or none in particular, and there is no arbiter, how is this not "anything goes," with the issue decided by power?
Now, presumably the non-authoritarian pluralist, when faced with [I] any[/I] objection, does not automatically grant it the status of an equally valid position besides all others. If they did, then "anything goes," since all positions must be accepted. So in virtue of what are some objections denied instead of accepted as equally valid alternatives? To avoid full Protagorean relativism you still need some standard (authority) by which some objections and theories are excluded.
Indeed, to simply say of any objection: "ah, I see your point. So you have discovered an equally valid explanation contrary to my own!" is to refuse to take objections seriously, to immunize yourself from all critiques, and to absolutize the authority of currently held positions.
Further, systematic philosophers often do allow for different explanations, valid in their own context. The medieval problem of universals was allowed to be an open problem for 1,000 years. Yet to simply deny that disparate, contradictory claims need to be harmonized is to make them immune from challenge on the grounds that they are demonstrably untrue from even "valid" prospectives.
The pluralist either recognizes some authority or else "anything goes," which in turn makes all their own positions immune to contradiction.
Quoting Banno
I agree the poles are what is vacuous and what is determinate.
Maybe more plainly, we speak of what is indeterminate and what is determinate.
And I agree there are worlds (or at least the world) that sits between these poles.
Speaking of the determinate is where the speaking corresponds directly with the spoken about. It is also like the apriori, the axiom. Or for believers in myth, it is the truth, the absolute. The fixed. The permanent and unchanging. The eternal. The ground.
The indeterminate is the unknowable-in-itself. Its psuedo-determinate when known as nothing or the vacuous, but then, that may just be a language trick where we have determined nothing. It is unformed. It cant exist and is all around us, and in us, allowing for mystical/mythical (maybe meaningless) statements like this one.
We live somewhere in between. We are the synthesis builders. In fact, we build the poles of the determinate and the indeterminate by naming them, conceptualizing them, before speaking further about them. We are the meaning seekers/constructors/dissolvers.
And this is where I believe various folks disagree. (Again basically agreeing with Bannos statement above.)
The dissectors seem to focus on the fact that the language game must be constructed first, before we can use language to speak about the world, so the world itself remains indeterminate to the speaker, and the world we really live in is within language. Determinacy and indeterminacy is within language, the world itself remaining indeterminate.
The metaphysical discursive philosopher may or may not directly refute this (despite how harshly Banno condemns us), but is at least open to the fact that, since there must be a world in itself as an ingredient in the synthetic world we occupy, and as we are beings who live in and share this world in itself synthetically, we must all have had some degree of direct access to the world in itself (I said degree of direct access, which is again a synthesis). We know absolutely that the world is. The metaphysician may only know more about the world by accident, and despite all of the rigorous arguments and language used to support what he thinks he knows, he is more truly taking shots in the dark. But he believes he can sometimes hit the intended mark, and that what he knows is sometimes in fact the world in itself. (Physicians call this predictability, but they are playing a different game so that is only analogous to rhe metaphysician.)
Because such theorizing can only accidentally be accurate, and there is no measure to confirm whether actually right, the dissector wont philosophize about such leaps. The dissectors see that as folly.
I see that point. Hume and Witt should give everyone pause.
Metaphysics takes a leap involving hypothesis based on assumption. Hegel had hubris claiming he saw the Absolute and giving it a capital A.
But I also see hubris in Wittgenstein. He made a similar mic drop move, but from the opposite pole. By soundly identifying how metaphysics can only be theoretical in essence (yes pun intended), he showed metaphysicians must be fools, and their claims of determinacy made up of indeterminate parts; he now knows better than to ask about the One and the Truth.
But later Wittgenstein still gave nod to the mystical, admitted his ladder was a metaphysical construct of sorts, and he continued speaking about transcendence, and morality. These are synthetic, discursive, folly too, if being truly consistent. Like Banno here may have been frivolously inconsistent in daring to distinguish the unknowable from the mysterious or the mystical but not the myth.
In the end, from what I can tell, if you will not make the leap into assertions about the world in itself, philosophy is narrowly defined as a discussion about how we can accurately say things - its an analysis of the language game. Its Wittgenstein. And its no longer about the world.
So what are we left with to discuss since Wittgenstein said it all?
Nothing, except how people who dont get it, or cant get it must be authoritarian as they keep abusing language.
Id still rather dissect notions of the world and its mysteries.
I admit it may be a frivolous pursuit. No need to keep reminding me. Sorry to burden you with my ideas about the truth of the world.
There is the world.
There is talking about the world. (Aristotle, Count, myth story tellers)
There is talking about talking. (Witt, Banno, etc.)
Because we all talk, we should all learn to improve how we talk, and as philosophers and scientists, pay attention to the talk about talking. So thanks, Banno (if youve read this.), and Hume, and Nietzsche, and Witt, and Kripke, and Russell, etc.
But because we all have to live, in the world, and because we all have to talk about living in the world, we should also talk about the world, and the truth, and what is good in itself. (Thanks Count, and Aristotle, and Socrates, et al )
The same, one mind, burdened with its logic and judgment and senses and understanding and imagination, at every turn of its neck, faces both the determinate and the indeterminate, as it lives and speaks in the world with the other language users.
Im sure Ive got this wrong (thanks, Banno). I am sure if I spent more time on it Id revise it and improve it, maybe scrap it, and there are contradictions and vacuous moments. Im also sure this nevertheless makes some sense of things, the same things that all of us sense as sentient beings in one world. But this paragraph here gives you my world view.
My philosophy is certainly unfinished, but it must contain elements of the finished, or it only contains nothing, and was finished before it started.
-
Call x the determinate, and y the indeterminate, and z the mixture.
We live in, and are, z - a mixture in motion.
Because z is mixed with the indeterminate, z is more akin to x, the indeterminate. The indeterminate is the dominant gene, so to speak. The indeterminate poisons everything it touches turning determination into a best guess.
But I wouldnt know anything of the indeterminate whatsoever, without the determinate. And I certainly know the fact of the indeterminate, so I must therefore know the fact of the determinate.
So I continue to believe seeking to distill X from Z, and distinguish X from Y, is the best use of my time as a philosopher. Where Banno said above That seems to be our point of difference - this is what triggers my interest - discussion about the point (the world) that lies between people.
Do I sound authoritarian and close-minded and incapable to you? Is there anything above you would want to work with?
This is overly deferrential to analytic methods, exposing a bias towards its supriority. I'm not sure you've said otherwise specifically, but I would push back on any notion that metaphysicians (which I take to mean "anti-Wittgensteinians") claim certainty and do not in fact alter their specific viewpoints over time, subject to what they take to be knowledge. Centering the world around those who take language as a way of conveying private thought meaning to one another versus those who consider communication to be a language game where meaning is derivable through use seems a bias toward analytic philosophy as well, as it suggests there are two sorts of people in the world Wittgensteins and not Wittgensteins.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The idea is apparently that mathematics is systemically authoritarian (in the same way that something might be said to be "systemically racist"). @J is doubtless invested in "anti-racism" as well.
Quoting Leontiskos
Any alternative definition of authoritarianism could be substituted into the [brackets]. The idea seems to be:
Quoting Leontiskos
Well, Witts approach is air tight. It is just not about the world. Its inside baseball. So I wouldnt say it is superior at all. It leaves out the all the other fun about going to baseball game besides just the stats. What about the beauty of a late game home run? The good of taking your kid to the language game?
Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A Philosophical Investigation is the only one I wouldn't really recommend. Not that it isn't good in some ways, but it's extremely continental. I have a decently high tolerance for that sort of thing, but it was too much. It's also his dissertation I think and seems less polished.
The Catholicity of Reason is very good, and the quotes give a good idea of its main subject matter. Plato's Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic is written two years later and centers around the same themes. Being a deep dive on the Republic, it isn't as broad as the earlier book, but in some ways I think this focuses the arguments and makes them more accessible, and it also expands the consideration more into the metaphysics of appearances and goodness. Schindler was apparently the student of Eric Perl, and you can see that coming through in the metaphysics.
Love and the Postmodern Predicament: Rediscovering the Real in Beauty, Goodness, and Truth is probably the most accessible, until the last part where it shifts quite a bit. It's also shorter. I really appreciate the idea of an accessible work on the Transcendentals, and I think he does a pretty good job. The later part is more of a deep dive into Thomistic theories that treat beauty as one of the transcendentals, whereas the intro is a broader social commentary.
Freedom from Reality: The Diabolical Character of Modern Liberty might someday be considered a "mature work." It brings in a lot from the prior texts, and starts to work a lot of these ideas into the framework where the defining feature of modernity is the elevation of potency over actuality (matter over form, etc.). It's a study of notions of liberty in Plato and Aristotle as compared with Locke (and a lesser focus on later thinkers like Kant and Spinoza). I think this is perhaps the biggest thesis because it rings very true and the ramifications have obviously been huge.
Retrieving Freedom: The Christian Appropriation of Classical Tradition is the second volume of Freedom From Reality, but it's more a history of the development of classical Christian notions of freedom. This might be my favorite, although it doesn't intersect much with modern thought in the way the other works do. It covers Plotinus, Augustine, Dionysius, Maximus, Anselm, Bernard, Bonaventure, Aquinas, and then Scotus and Ockham. Normally, many of these names are relegated to niche books and articles and its really great to have them in a systematic dialogue. There is supposed to be a third volume at some point covering modern thought.
He also has a book on freedom in the German idealists from a decade prior. I've only read the Hegel chapters. It was good, but really quite focused on those thinkers.
The Politics of the Real is the main critique of liberalism. I think it's also the weakest. It's not a bad critique, it's just that a lot of people have made similar points, and in some ways supported them better by wading into political science and economics more. Being political, it's unsurprisingly the most polemical. It has a section on the philosophy of rights that is quite good, but he sometimes weakens his argument by going off to justify Catholic social teaching when he doesn't really have space to make the argument (marriage was the big example here). It still had some good stuff though.
He has some other more theological stuff I haven't read, mostly on Von Balthasar.
I assume @J has something in mind, like "we" (i.e. people) make the standards for mathematics (although this seems opposed to the idea that mathematical discoveries were "always there" so maybe not?) Otherwise, wouldn't something like medicine be quintessentially authoritarian? For, either the patient lives, or they don't. Either they end up disabled, or they don't. There is a clear arbiter of success. Likewise, for engineering, the bridge either collapses or it doesn't.
There is clearly better or worse medicine, better or worse military science, etc. and the results of these arts are always highly consequential, with great moral import. A person who kills their patients through negligence, designs a bridge that collapses on people, or loses a winnable war is blameworthy. How could they not be? Likewise, academic dishonestly, e.g. falsifying data, is also blameworthy.
But to suppose that metaphysics, ethics, politics, etc. is not like engineering, medicine, military science, etc., i.e. that it has no proper authority, or that its measure is man and not the subject matter, is extremely consequential. It cannot be an a priori stance without presuming much, which is the opposite of humility. Nor, if each individual man is the measure, does it seem like there will be much to say about those fields, since "everything goes," whereas, if the measure is men collectively, an appeal to democratization, we seem to simply have a power battle.
Is it? I don't think Wittgenstein's philosophy is presuppositionless. Its style (both early and late), does not make its presuppositions clear, but we can infer them from what must be assumed to make arguments like the rule following argument from undetermination go through. These require certain ideas about warrant and knowledge. Quine is helpful here because he makes similar arguments from underdetermination, but is much more explicit about what is needs to be presumed to make them go through.
Argument from underdetermination was not unknown in ancient thought (skeptical equipollence), but it wasn't considered a strong form of argument. It only becomes undefeatable when it is assumed that learning is a sort of pattern recognition, which stems from the empiricist program, nominalism, etc.
Historically, the empiricists' epistemic presuppositions were actually grounded in metaphysics, in corpuscular mechanism, but they have hung around in the tradition even after their initial motivation has disappeared. However, they are hardly "presuppositionless" or "without bias." They assume specific answers to metaphysical questions (although they are often justified by appeals to ignorance and skepticism, which is not a valid justification; one cannot say "I don't think we can decide the realism debate, therefore I am justified in assuming nominalism." At least, that isn't "humility.")
Arguably (from the viewpoint of other traditions) the problem simply occurs when you treat meaning as psychological or behavioral, having rejected natures and real essences, and thus have already reduced intellectual knowledge to inductive habit or training.
But we might object that, in at least some cases, to follow a rule is not to obey a convention or social practice, but is rather to act in accordance with the nature (form) of the thing you're engaging with.
For example, arithmetic on this view is not a set of social customs, but an application of the intelligible structure of quantity (multitude). If you say 2 + 2 = 5, the problem isnt that you're out of step with a language gameit's that you're violating the essence of multitude as discerned by the intellect. And, given the way arithmetic developed the same way across disparate cultures, and the way in which failing to observe its rules seems to result in wrong answers, regardless of our customs, this does not seem like it is obviously wrong.
So, the "Wittgensteinian" conclusion here, particularly Kripke's extension, could arguably just be taken as a reductio against the epistemic presuppositions that lead there.
You're right, "authoritarian" isn't a very good term for anything other than humans. My "Well, yes" was meant as an answer to the second question, "Is it structured to preclude objection?" And by "structured" I don't necessarily mean "by some agency." Thanks for helping me clarify that.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I can't really add anything to the "anything goes" discussion you're having with @Banno. There's clearly something in this all-or-nothing position that seems incontrovertible to you. I will keep trying to understand it, but no luck so far.
I don't think it's that hard to get. Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't. If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?
If one cannot offer any criteria for making this judgement, then the choice seems arbitrary. In the past you have said some narratives are not "reasonable." But what does "reasonable" mean here? From what I've gathered, it has no strict criteria, but "you know it when you see it." If I'm wrong, feel free to correct me. If I am right, can you not see how such an incredibly amorphous, ill-defined criteria essentially makes inquiry all a matter of taste?
Ever since they got rid of the never ending extra inning baseball game, it ceased having any beauty to me. I'm an anti-modernist. I don't even use electricity. I read the internet by candle light.
This is all spot on.
Maybe all narratives are acceptable/true/valid/good enough.
If we want to say no to that, what Count says above has to be true.
Added: where I differ maybe from Count is that I havent discovered the thing that forces one to say no.
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. A narrative about how to interpret and evaluate Beethoven's music, compared, say, to his contemporary, Hummel's, is going to say some things that are acceptable, true, and valid -- or at least try to. It will appeal to knowledge about the High Classical style, its aesthetic standards, the transition to Romanticism, European cultural history, and much more.
Such a narrative will, we hope, be "reasonable." And it has no strict criteria. We may or may not know it when we see it -- there's usually debate among musicologists concerning this kind of thing -- but we aren't utterly in the dark either. We don't want historical mistakes or bad reasoning, but merely avoiding these things will not get us where we want to go. This is, perhaps, the difference between "criteria" understood as rules which can be applied in all cases, and something much more rough-and-ready. But I still have trouble seeing how this makes anything arbitrary.
Anyway, this is the middle-ground position that I'd recommend as frequently more accurate than having to choose between "recognizing some authority" and "anything goes." It's a practice, it is learned and deepened over time, and new consensuses produce new questions. It may be the case that some philosophers, doing a certain kind of philosophy, need to find indubitable foundations to be going on with, but most areas of knowledge and interpretation aren't like that. To insist on such criteria, under the specter of "anything goes," is to misunderstand. Or I suppose you could try to convict all the musicologists of not knowing what they're doing, but surely that would be silly? :wink:
I think a similar example could be made involving hard science, but this is not my field, and one's enough to show what I have in mind.
This is a narrative.
Is there a reason the above is acceptable or not?
I go so far as to say the ideas are brilliant. I mean, someone had to try to build the complete system of German Idealism, right?
In a way his is the philosophy to pick up if you think you can have a ToE -- if you can definitively translate Hegel into your system as a worthy inference, somehow, then you might have a philosophical basis for at least claiming a ToE.
But not necessarily, as @Count Timothy von Icarus noted about Hegel being pluralistic in a way. And my general impression of Hegelian interpretation is pro-pluralist: all interpretations are valid. And I cherish any input @Tobias decides to give us.
But you see... there's that quicksand feel of being sucked back into the universality of Hegel's mind, as if a human in the 1800's could see all of time and know it.
I find it funny that your example comes from an area that I would imagine most people think is purely a matter of subjective taste, akin to "which food tastes better." I would disagree with that of course, but it seems like a particularly fraught example for this reason.
Do they ever succeed, in musicology, ethics, physics, metaphysics? If they did succeed, how would you know? If you cannot know if they ever succeed in saying "some things that are acceptable, true, and valid," how is this not an all-encompassing skepticism?
Well, suppose I was uncharitable and was to say that this is "invalid and not reasonable epistemology." And I "know good epistemology when I see it," having practiced it. And indeed, I could probably draw on an appeal to consensus, or at least majority opinion on this point. However, I cannot offer you much by way of what does make for good epistemology, or what is wrong with your approach. What is the response then? Am I being unfair? Am I being "reasonable" in my rejection?
Is this supposed to be an appeal to democratization and popularity, or just "if you do it a lot 'you just know it when you see it' better?'"
How could it ever be demonstrated that this is the case? This would surely be debated. But then the same problem of amorphous standards would plague that debate as well.
Yes sorry. The story of narration goes:
Quoting J
So is this always absolutely the case, or can there be reasons not to accept it?
Oh, no, sorry if I wasn't clear. Musicology does much more than try to make aesthetic judgments -- in fact, it rather rarely does that. It's a "human science" as much as any other.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Because I don't require this kind of certainty in order to participate in a practice that produces narratives that may be true; that offers ideas about what would be reasonable that fit my own understanding; that seem to the best of my belief to be true; but that are open to debate and revision. I don't have to know. I don't think skepticism represents such a position. A skeptic thinks all this talk of truth and reasonableness is malarkey. (Did I really just use the word "malarkey?" :smile: )
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
It doesn't sound unfair or unreasonable to me, but as always, context is everything. If this is a philosopher and scholar whose work I respected, and whom I knew was part of an ongoing conversation on these subjects, I hope I'd take their views seriously, and invite them to explain, though I'd probably be surprised at their initial unwillingness to make their case.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The latter, though I'd "fair it up" a little to read, "If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually."
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, this is important. It calls into question the entire project of Foundational standards -- I'm using the capital F so as to represent the idea of a standard that can be used to set and judge other standards. And this takes us back to the -- by now perhaps a little tired? -- debate about what may stand outside interpretation.
Only if we've stopped caring about doing philosophy and found our answers, I think.
I think I understand your question, but tell me if I've got it wrong. I think you're asking whether the truth of the "Some narratives . . ." statement is beyond debate -- whether it represents something we can be certain of. If that's the question, my answer would be no. There could be reasons not to accept it.
Thanks for the overview of his works! I think this is the one I will read first, since it looks interesting and may dovetail with Simpson's book on Illiberalism.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think his idea was that for mathematics a high quality answer is true and a low quality answer is false, so it's cut and dried. I don't disagree that these other things are "authoritarian." I think everything (worthwhile) is "authoritarian" in that strange sense, i.e. involving quality discrimination and also the notion of merit.
But the reasoning isn't very tight. For example:
Quoting J
"X is structured to preclude objection, and it is not structured to preclude objection by any agency." That's just a contradiction. I think the "systemic" avenue would be more fruitful.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree, and this is a huge problem for @J, namely the fact that there are blameworthy acts, and people do carry them out. Thus avoiding all systems that provide the tools to identify blameworthy acts looks like a flight from reality.
But note that, at face value, "A person who designs a bridge that collapses on people is blameworthy," is not true. All bridges will eventually collapse, and therefore this cannot be a sufficient condition for blame (and I think this is also why engineering is not as clear as mathematics). This relates to <this post>, where I similarly pushed back on a point where you imputed blame.
Of course we could read you charitably as saying, "A person who [negligently] designs...," but the broader point is that the phenomenon of fault is pretty tricky to nail down. It requires philosophical skill to nail down, and that skill presupposes a mind that is not prejudiced with respect to blame, either pro or con. I think Aquinas' treatment is excellent, but I also don't think there are four people on TPF who could follow it. My Beyond the Pale thread is a rough introduction to that whole question, and it was intended to generate interest in the fact that we all impute blame even though few of us have an understanding of fault.
-
Quoting Fire Ologist
I agree. :up:
Quoting J
As @Fire Ologist aptly points out, what you are doing here is providing a "narrative." Your narrative involves the claim that there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, and each criterion will generate a disparate set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "J's narrative."
Now consider a second narrative, namely the narrative that although there are many different criteria for what is to be considered acceptable/true/valid, nevertheless each criterion will generate the exact same set of acceptable/true/valid things. Call this, "K's narrative."
Now go back to what Count has pointed out:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
[/list]
[*] Or else:
[/list]
[/list]
So do you choose (1) or (2)? Must we avoid (2) to avoid "authoritarianism"?
Quoting J
But this is surely a strawman, given that acceptable/true/valid is not the same as "beyond debate."
Note too that you and @Banno can say that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale, but it is obvious that you don't believe that nothing is beyond debate / beyond the pale. When someone such as yourself judges something beyond the pale, you are obviously involved in quality discrimination. When you deem something to be beyond the pale (and beyond debate) you have deemed it to be of excessively low quality. It's more than a little bit ironic that those who are in the very process of carrying out a campaign against that which they deem to be beyond the pale also profess that nothing is beyond debate, and that anyone who thinks things are beyond debate is "authoritarian." "Authoritarianism is beyond debate, and by 'authoritarianism' I mean that which deems things to be beyond debate."
Quoting J
Then, some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason. (And you have asserted some sort of absolute criteria exists and a universally non-arbitrary narrative exists and contradicted your own narrative.)
OR
Then, what is the criteria we use to tell when it is not acceptable to say: Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort
AND
does that criteria set up a narrative that is sometimes valid and sometimes not? Leading to infinite regress
Bottom line on this second optional outcome - you still havent avoided arbitrariness.
So you don't think that god knows everything? Or that every statement is either true, or it is false, and hence there is a set of truths, and all other statements are false? Ok.
I am tempted to go a step further, and suggest that we assume commensurability. That, after all, is what the Principle of Charity implies. You and I are talking about the very same world, in which we are both embedded. Our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement. But our disagreements make for longer threads.
Do dolphins have a language that is so different to ours that we cannot recognise it as such? Good question. I do not know the answer.
But you are not a dolphin.
And when you are not looking up to the heavens, when you get hungry or cold, and look instead to what is going on around you now, then we may find agreement, and maybe work together to build a fire and cook some food.
And then your metaphysics will not be nonsense, but only relevant in how it influences what you put in the stew.
Kosher, I presume? I'll go with that, if you keep it gluten free.
I think I can go that far. Not sure how to disagree, but I split your reply for a reason... :D
Quoting Banno
Assuming commensurability makes sense to me, at least as a philosophical norm. Else we'll likely talk past one another.
But I wouldn't want to rely upon the justification "our points of agreement overwhelm our points of disagreement" -- because it may lead to the same thing. This is the first time I've tried to express this, but there's this "other" side of charity whereupon the maximal charity doesn't hear the expression of difference. Or, perhaps, the more charitable act isn't to always interpret within your bounds, but recognize when there's a genuine difference -- that'd be the more charitable interpretation.
I like charity as a principle, a lot. Just there could be this other weird way of "swallowing" another's thoughts.
I am so lost here. Where did I assert an absolute criterion? Is that following from the fact that some narratives are acceptable for only one sort of reason? How does that make the reason absolute? I'm sorry, would you mind trying again to explain?
Well, yes. That's why it's brilliant. The simple observation that we can do more than one thing with the words we use.
Quoting J
A fair point. Yes, we can say more, and yes we just can't say more in rational discourse. What happens when the more said outside of rational discourse is taken back in to that discourse? When Way, for example, claims that all there is, is mind? When Hanover objects to putting oysters in the stew?
I'm not sure what you mean here. That there could be an end to philosophy, a point where we have finished the Great List of Facts?
Perhaps, but I don't see why. Could there be a point where there was nothing more to say about mathematics? Could there be a point at which there could be no new songs?
Is philosophy so different?
Nice. I think I see where you would go.
And I guess all I can do here is point to the basic liberal principles of accepting the differences that make no difference. If someone wants to be referred to as "they", why not just oblige? And were it makes a difference, to seek accomodation before violence.
And of course there is much, much more to say here.
Thank you for the compliment Banno, *tips hat*. As for Hegelian rhetoric... might it not be that both ways of philosophizing as you sketch them are incomplete? Nitpicking, plumbing, dissecting etc. is also always done from a background of assumptions, even if it would simply be reducible to the laws of logic, it still assumes that logic is the proper pickaxe to perform philosophy with. Usually much more is assumed, though I think. Also, the Socratic or the Cynic erects a world, albeit not very explicitly. The system builder and discursivist tries to make these intuitions explicit. This renders them visible and therefore also more easily picked apart.
The nitpicker and the builder are sides of the same coin. One may prefer this style, the other that one, but both are in the business or clarity, and in the process between the two, inadvertently display all those things that are still unclear... Just my two cents during a late evening...
Nor am I, because this is a point of debate about Habermas, at least (not sure about Peirce and his convergence theory of truth). The question is, Is the "endpoint" a final consensus for human society (perhaps similar to the Marxian idea), or could there be, as you're wondering, an end of philosophy? The distinction I would want to make, in any case, has to do with a process of dialectic that may reach some end, but cannot be predicted to do so, versus a process where the end is already known, because the principles entail it.
Fairly sure that an "end of philosophy," were such possible, wouldn't look like a sorting of true from false.
I do hope my account is incomplete. Otherwise this might be too short a thread. Onward...
Sure.
But that's not all there is going on here. A command also creates of an obligation, a question seeks a reply. That's more than just a transfer of data.
Quoting Harry Hindu
"hello". It doesn't name a greeting, it is a greeting. And I know you will object to this, saying it names an intent to greet or some such. But it doesn't name an intent to greet. It greets.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Marriage? Scratching your nose?
Yep.
Yeah.
You are trying to avoid arbitrariness, while avoiding authoritarianism.
Lets go back.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You answered this to avoid arbitrariness saying that narratives are acceptable/valid based on one sort of reason. But this is a narrative too, a meta narrative about narratives, but just another narrative. So Counts question could again be asked and becomes whether this new levels one sort of reason is arbitrary. So I asked again, is this new narrative absolute or not?
You said no. This no is either an absolute (at a third layer we havent gone there but it would be me asking you how you came to say no), or you are just contradicting of the initial statement that all narratives can be validated by one sort of reason or another.
You either:
1. answer my question yes and contradict your statement about narratives, or
2. answer no and keep punting the question to a meta, meta-level, avoiding the question making everything continue to seem arbitrary, or
3. something becomes the absolute authority on narratives, ending the infinite regress but also contradicting the original intent of the argument with Count.
Its still confusing but maybe Leons post clarifies it.
You cant say there is nothing absolute if you want to avoid saying the validity of any narrative is arbitrary. Some goal post must become fixed before the arbitrary is avoided.
Having more to say is better than having nothing to say, so cheers to that.
I've noticed that several posts in this thread speak of having a "narrative" as-if it's a bad thing, like fiction or myth. Is "dissection" or "analysis" of a philosophical Narrative different from literary Criticism? In philosophy, how is a Narrative different from having a self-examined philosophical Position or personal Worldview, in which all parts of the story are integrated by a central principle or core value? I suppose it's that core belief (e.g. God) that critics attempt to seek out and dissect. Does analytical revelation of that Core Value determine whether the Narrative is True or False, Good or Bad? Or is the critic's worldview the deciding factor? :smile:
Philosophical Narrative :
[i]Many philosophers argue that our sense of self is shaped by the narratives we construct about our lives. According to some philosophers on Oxford Academic, our personal identity is not a fixed entity but rather a narrative we continually revise and refine.
#. Narrative can play a crucial role in ethical reflection, helping us understand moral dilemmas and evaluate actions by considering their narrative consequences or their alignment with certain ethical frameworks.
#. Narrative analysis is a method used to examine the structure, content, and function of narratives in various contexts, including literature, history, and everyday life.
#. Narratives can shape our perceptions of reality, influencing how we understand events, people, and ourselves.
#. Daniel Dennett, while not strictly a narrative philosopher, uses the concept of the "narrative self" to explain how we construct a sense of self through the stories we tell.[/i]
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=philosophical+narrative
:smile: Thanks for listening.
Nah. There can be many good reasons for something -- hence not arbitrary -- without requiring that any of them be absolute. The infinite regress of "justifications for justification" doesn't apply to this question. If there is no "fixed goal post," all this shows is that the reasons are not certain or absolute. But I don't require either one.
What is it with this fascination with "either absolute or arbitrary"? Do you really think and act that way IRL? Not being snarky, I'm actually curious.
Maybe. Or should I say maybe not.
Does that answer the question?
It had me reaching for the antiseptic... to whip down the furniture.
Quoting J
Thanks for that.
I want to be clear that, in contrast to your much more interesting response, I think there is a formal fallacy in the argument on which Tim relies. I'd hoped to show him the problem with the Great List account, but apparently he can't see it there.
An inability to present a complete system of justification does not entail the impossibility of a partial, situated, local justification.
That there are mathematical conjectures for which we do not have a proof does not entail that there are no mathematical proofs. Likewise, that we cannot rank all narratives against some final infallible standard does not entail that we cannot give good reasons for rejecting this narrative, and accepting that one.
From the absence of a universal criterion, Tim concludes that no valid judgment can be made. That doesn't follow.
Its not about justification. You didnt answer the question.
Edit:
Count: Is that blue or not?
J: Well its not green.
Fire: Is not green, blue or not?
J: No.
In my youth, I had little exposure to Philosophy outside of Theological argumentation. As a Post-religion adult though, my "reflective life" was mostly Science-based, until the Great Recession and subsequent Retirement gave me time for impractical philosophizing. Triggered by a perplexed comment from a quantum physicist --- "it's all information!" --- I was motivated to create my own personal worldview (mythology), based mostly on key concepts from Quantum Physics and Information Science.
I call that "narrative" a mythology because A> I am not a scientist, and B> my narrative goes beyond the evidence for a something-from-nothing beginning. Both of those limitations left me vulnerable to harsh criticisms by those who revere classical science and abhor transcendent narratives. But I see no reason why theoretical philosophy must be limited by the empirical rules of science. For example, Aristotle, whose writings were mostly based on empirical observations, reasoned from the obvious imperfections & contingencies of Nature that, logically, there must be something like an Ideal Source of creation & causation*1.
Since I have no colleagues to censor my personal myth, I depend on this forum for "outside critical appraisal". Some of that criticism has been bulldozer fault-finding --- showing me where I need to patch the myth --- and some has been holistic & constructive. I am not the hero of my unfinished myth, but it does put my little life into a wider perspective. :smile:
*1. Aristotle's first cause argument, also known as the unmoved mover argument, posits that everything in the universe that undergoes change must have a cause, and that this chain of causes cannot extend infinitely backward. Therefore, there must be a first cause, an "unmoved mover," that initiates all motion and change without itself being moved by anything else. This first cause, according to Aristotle, is God, according to some interpretations.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=aristotle+first+cause+argument
Note --- Logically, the First Cause cannot itself be an effect of a prior cause. So, some view the Big Bang as a Secondary Cause, which leaves open the question of "what caused the Bang?" Of course, nobody knows the answer to that, but like Aristotle, we can reason beyond what is now known, to speculate on the First and Final Cause. Unless, of course, that going-beyond seems critical of someone else's mythical Narrative.
If Banno's categories of "dissector" and "discourser" are just "metaphor," and all dissectors are also discoursers and all discoursers are also dissectors, then what in the world do you think the thread is even about? When I contrast the builder with the destroyer (and you recast that as the builder and the critic), it makes no sense to respond by claiming that the destroyer is a builder. You can't distinguish builders from critics and then turn around and say that there is no difference, because the critics are builders, too. If there is no difference then why in the world would we make the distinction in the first place!?
It is more rigorous to speak this way as a matter of course, even when we are not explicitly comparing and contrasting builders with critics:
If you were to remove the words, "final infallible," then you would be offering a real argument instead of a strawman. But I understand why you and @J won't abandon the strawmen. It would put you in a tough spot. It would put you face to face with the arguments being offered, and therefore with the problems of your strange position.
To assess a narrative and judge it good or bad requires a standard. To assess a narrative and accept or reject it requires a standard which one takes to be somehow definitive or elevated. If there are no such definitive or elevated standards, then rejection is never permissible. We would never say, "This does not fulfill some (arbitrary) standard, therefore it is to be rejected." To reject something requires judging that it fails to fulfill some definitive or elevated standard. To judge that it is beyond the pale.
Ways of looking at, or doing, philosophy.
Quoting Leontiskos
To note two ways to philosophize.
You wanted to claim that the builders are superior to the destroyers.
Thus far -- which is a usual approach for me to philosophical disagreement -- I've maintained that both ways of philosophy are good. So my disagreement has only been against your notion that the builders are superior to the other side, whatever that happens to be. (And surely you can see how "building" is a metaphor, yes?)
Elsewhere @Banno considers such behavior to be "talking about others behind their back." What would happen if we held him to his own standards? The question that resonates throughout the thread. :wink:
Very down to earth posts.
In my usage, a narrative has a truth value - it sets out how things are, or at least it sets out how they are supposed to be. A narrative ought be consistent, and truth matters.
A myth, in contrast, is neither true nor false, but shows something. It's truth value is irrelevant.
Narratives are not bad things, unless they are taken to be beyond criticism.
In a sense the OP is offering a demarcation criterion, for separating philosophy from religion or fiction. It's that philosophy involves this conscious and wilful exposure of the narrative to dissection.
If we follow this approach, then any narrative on offer is open to criticism, and so there can be no "final" narrative; at least, if there is one, a narrative that is beyond critique, that's an end to doing philosophy.
So philosophy is a process, and not a narrative.
Your approach, of taking transcendental leaps from mundane science, is always going to be open to philosophical criticism. But that does not make it not worthwhile... indeed, that's what we are doing. There's glory in the process, not just in the result.
So keep going.
You keep tacking on things like "universal," "absolute," "infallible." I asked for [I]any[/I] criterion, which was allegedly a "leading question."
And the only answer so far comes from @J and is: "it's a different criterion in each instance and you sort of 'know correctness when you see it,' but it also involves being thoughtful." This seems to me to be incredibly vague, and seems to open the door to declaring oneself justified, or others unjustified, whenever one feels like it, just so long as one considers oneself thoughtful. That is, it seems open to authoritarianism.
I don't recall you agreeing to [I]any[/I] criterion though, no? Can one be provided?
I find this to be a very authoritarian position. Apparently you think that unless someone uses a form from your Great List of Valid Arguments they are creating a "fallacy." This is an inappropriate demand for completeness vis-á-vis argumentation. How can you know the entire list of valid arguments and when they apply in each instance? What's the criterion for this?
Now look, I thoughtfully considered that argument. It's consistent with my habit of practice, which is robust. I know good argument when I see it, and that argument is definitely one of them. Others agree!
You want to impose your One True Standard of Argument on us with your authoritarian List of what is valid, but I think there is a happy mid-point between declaring oneself infallible and in possession of the One True List of Valid Arguments and not allowing just any argument at all. I don't allow just any argument. I don't make just any argument. I try to only accept or make just those arguments that, per the case in question, would be justifiably valid according to my practice. But this is one of those cases. I have been thoughtful. My argument is valid here, not fallacious!
Interesting. So is truth a criterion for accepting narratives? Do true narratives contradict one another?
I feel I can mention a verse from the early Buddhist texts in this context. Partially because it is so succinct, and also because Buddhism, especially of the type represented in these (Pali) texts is resolutely non-theistic in its outlook, so this is not an attempt to smuggle God into the picture.
[quote=Nibb?na Sutta; https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.8.03.than.html]
There is, monks, an unborn unbecome unmade unfabricated. If there were not that unborn unbecome unmade unfabricated, there would not be the case that escape from the born become made fabricated would be discerned. But precisely because there is an unborn unbecome unmade unfabricated, escape from the born become made fabricated is discerned.[/quote]
So this 'unborn, unmade, unfabricated' is a fortiori also 'the unconditioned'. And I think there's an abyss in the current philosophical lexicon, where something corresponding to 'the unconditioned' used to dwell. I think in the Western cultural context, this is associated with God, so post death-of-God, the unconditioned has been banished from respectable philosophical discourse, except by way of hints and aphorisms. Perhaps also it is subject to what Alan Watts decscribed as a taboo (in his last work The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who you Are.) There's a kind of gentleman's agreement as to what is considered a suitable topic for philosophical discourse, and of this, 'we must be silent' (or else :brow: )
I have found a relevant (and open access) academic paper on this topic -that is The unconditioned in philosophy of religion Steven Shakespeare,. where he argues that 'the unconditioned' badly needs to be rehabilitated and re-situated. I have still not fully assimilated this paper, but as he engages with and situates his discussion in relation to the broader analytical tradition, others might find it a useful resource.
I would suppose that we might find a point of agreement at least in preferring valid arguments to invalid ones. But from what you've just said here, my preference for validity seems to you to be a kind of personal quirka peccadillo.
I gather that's meant as some sort of rhetorical flourish, but you lost me in there.
Again, it seems to me that there is a structural flaw in your response; that it depends on a logical fallacy, which I have attempted to set out for you. But I can't make you see it.
This question is a trap, of course.
Too good. :lol:
Quoting Banno
As a sophist it behooves you to avoid them.
When you say something silly and another person points it out, apparently you think you can just rely on a rhetorical flourish, "You're not infallible! I can't believe you think you're infallible!" Failing that, you claim that there is no such thing as a justifiable standard for sophistry or anything else, so obviously you can't be engaged in sophistry!
Just imagine the real philosophy that might occur if not for all of these elementary threads.
What makes an argument valid? Isn't the idea you've advocated for in the past a sort of unrestricted logical pluralism based on what we deem useful? But I do not find it useful for me to embrace any logic where my argument isn't valid here, and it is surely valid in at least some.
I'm not even sure what this "Great List" is supposed to be. Propositions as abstract platonic objects? The options for understanding truth are not limited to early and late analytic philosophy. Early analytic philosophy has the dubious honor of being the new Cartesian substance dualism, only rolled out so that people can knock it down and declare their particular theory the victor by process of elimination.
I didnt mean to not directly answer your question here. My non-answer maybe was actually meant to demonstrate something. I was trying to demonstrate that any arbitrary string of words surely would not answer you and that you, like all people who speak, rely on some absolutes just to follow along the conversations. I almost answered Finland but youd have to really respect me to work out I was trying to respect your question with that answer. So I said maybe, which people often say, but os just as indeterminate and arbitrary.
Quoting J
We are in the ocean, swimming in indeterminate arbitrariness. That is the ubiquitous ground - drowning, to seek footing. If you are really asking me about either absolute or arbitrary IRL, what I wade through is almost entirely arbitrary, but not only that, as once in a while, I touch the oceans bottom, brush the shoreline, and stand still for as long as I can.
And you call what Im saying either absolute or arbitrary. IRL, at every step I try for the absolute. If ever possible, I invoke it. Whenever I can, I fix it, or grab hold of it. Once in a while, I catch it. I think the last time was 2022.
The question I have for you is, how do you avoid it? Have you never demanded absolutely not! Maybe to someone saying you know Trump is a good guy who loves all races and respects all women. Do you never say I am absolutely certain about anything? Never? Do you ever say never? Do you never pause and force others to wait, now is not the time. Wait for me to tell you. Honestly, IRL, you never shine light on the absolute with certain authority? Are you never like a tyrant at all? How do you survive in this world if not?
Sometimes, when you say you are wrong I am certain you were absolutely right to say that, because you are clearly a smart person.
I can say this about you, because I dont believe all is arbitrary. Most of life may be, but not all of it.
Count said:
Either all narratives are acceptable/true/valid, whatever you want to call it, or they aren't.
That is a simple enough assertion. Maybe you wouldnt say that but it seems straightforward to me. Either everyone gets to say this is true about whatever they want or they dont.
Count then asked:
If some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?
What determines which narrative must be rejected?
You answered:
Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort
So what is your answer? Either all narratives are acceptable or not? You say some are for one reason, some are for another reason.
Does that mean all narratives are acceptable depending on the reason?
Or maybe some narratives are rejected after all, because you havent finished answering, since you only mentioned some?
I tried to ask if you were finished answering and gave the last word on all narratives. You said no, but that left me wondering then if some aren't, in virtue of what are some to be rejected?
I love it when Banno, actually talks philosophy. I dont even need any humility, although that would be nice.
I love this thread. The OP was a great set up for a for an important question.
I just answered a thread about someones incredulity about how I get along in life, as if any of us have any idea who or what each other is or does or says when not doing this little thing of ours.
There are probably 10,000 people in the long history of humanity who give any shit about anything we say here. We are the tiny captive audience.
We should all appreciate each other more.
This crap is fun for me.
Wish I didnt also have wear a helmet.
Wait, Banno stopped reading my posts too.
Bueller use the word unconditioned in a sentence today? Bueller?
Not much to do with utility. Each formal system has it's own definition. Which logic is your account valid in, then? I was using prop calculus.
Why are you asking? Is it that you think you and I might have such differing accounts of validity that an argument that is valid for you is not valid for me?
Can you see why, to me at least, this change of topic might look a little bit like an avoidance strategy?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's apparent. Hence, my
Quoting Banno
God is a survivor.
We throw God out and we are left with the exact same world.
He just wont die no matter how hard we try.
And that is literally true for some of us.
Ill bite.
Yes, there are true statements. Some of them, are about some things, in the world.
I dont know about taken together, these tell us about what is real. Taken together and real scare me a bit.
Id say, taken together they tell us something about what is real.
I understand you want to hear from Count.
But Ill give you true statement about the world that tells us something about what is real.
There is wisdom in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics.
Or maybe, there is wisdom about the essence of language itself in Wittgensteins Tractatus, but it is really hard to infer.
No doubt, but the point I was labouring, was the concept of 'the unconditioned' and its place in philosophical discourse.
Honestly, here on Bannos thread, and hes not talking to me anymore, Im kind of afraid to bring up anything close to God. I dont want that to be how we fly off an otherwise hopeful encounter.
But I was also still agreeing with you in my own weird way.
The Buddhist text kind of reflects what I said here (I think, slightly):
Quoting Fire Ologist
I think they both allude to a kind of inference of the positive (unborn-unmade/ determinate) from the negative (born-made/ indeterminate).
(But that is applying to the Buddhist text, and to my quote, the positive and negative to sort of align them, which may not actually do justice. Luckily, I can call it mystical and get away with it? :brow: )
A rather facile response! As with the arts, where quality, although it is recognizable to the tutored eye, is impossible to strictly define, so with phenomenological accounts derived from intelligent, unbiased reflection on human practices and experience.
To what part?
I thought it was all that was needed.
Quoting Janus
Not one single, tiny definition?
The problem is that discourse about 'the unconditioned' is inextricably bound up with theology in Western culture. That is because so much of neo-platonism, which had a framework for that discourse, became absorbed into theology by the Greek-speaking theologians. As a consequence, in secular culture, there is a taboo against this framework of discourse, on the grounds of its association with religion. I think that is the dynamic behind a lot of this debate.
I agree. The unconditioned is probably the most analytic way of referring to what was formerly often called God, or the transcendent or the One with a capital O. The word has the least baggage, but I agree, its all taboo now.
Metaphysics sympathizers are always suspect. The hidden agenda must be religion or authoritarianism, or a closed system of everything. All for excluding, othering.
J asked me seriously how I actually function. Banno thinks I am a terrible person.
I just think the idea of the truth is a good one. So is the idea of the good as in a good idea. I want to be able to say that is good to another person and mean it. Not just mean I think that is good, but simply know and say that is good. I think we can. Im not sure we can often, but once is enough for me to have hope for more and make all of this bickering actually meaningful. (There I go again )
Cool. Ill check it out. Thanks
I'm not changing the subject. I explained why my judgement is completely sound according to @J's criteria of being thoughtful and grounded in practice, and I know soundness when I see it, and this is a sound conclusion.
How can you dismiss my thoughtful conclusion as invalid? That seems like it would be the authoritarian demand that your standards trump everyone else's. But I've been at least as thoughtful and involved in practice as you have, and so that's nonsense. At best, and at worst, we must both be right. And so this amorphous, weak standard clearly must clearly "let in everything" as I conclude it does, and "not let in everything" as you conclude it does. Both are equally valid conclusions, since both can be arrived at by thoughtful individuals engaged in practice, according to the standard adopted for this particular question. To deny this would seem to require a reversal: the claim that there are criterion for selecting criterion. Yet if they aren't both valid conclusions, in virtue of what is one wrong and why isn't this standard authoritarian?
So I can hardly be wrong here. Indeed, that we are both right, that the standard does and doesn't let everything in, only further strengthens my conclusion.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Quoting Fire Ologist
I have to smile, because "never" is once again an all-or-nothing option, implying that if I sometimes do, I have contradicted myself! To which I can only reply, "Sure I do, sometimes, but not other times."
I think there's much to discuss about "form of life." Maybe the topic for another thread one day, but it seems central yet not well explained (at least for me).
Quoting Banno
Philosophy generally is what you only do on a full stomach, a luxury reserved for the few.
Quoting Banno
Glatt.
Is it always and only an all or nothing option, or only some of the time?
I have to smile, because you still havent directly addressed Counts question, or any of the meager substance of my post.
Just admit it, either all narratives are acceptable or they arent, and if they arent, want could possibly ground that? Saying they are and they arent depending on the reason doesnt address the question. Because then what criteria allows you to say that??
Good post overall.
I want to highlight this from it because it looks important to me.
I think we can all accept that one of the general lessons of philosophy is that hubris is to be avoided -- not necessarily for the causes of virtue, but at least for the causes of not looking stupid ;)
And I think I see your assessment here as a way of adding a second dimension to the distinction so as to have four categories -- World-builders/Dissectors and Hubris/Humility.
With the former I think I'd say these are categorical, not evaluative, descriptions.
But with the other I'd say these are evaluative, and to give a nod to Aristotle I think the mean between them would be where goodness lies. One can be too proud or too humble, and we can think of extreme examples to make the point, but there is a kind of practiced back-and-forth in philosophical dialogue where sometimes we make the assertion and sometimes we take it back or think there's something else there.
And really I think that's more of a choice we make case-by-case. The extremes are there as a warning, but the mean remains rather undefined.
I'm still catching up on the thread, but fwiw I want to express my appreciation of this series of posts of yours, and throw my support behind your views, to no one's surprise I expect.
If I wanted to formalize it a bit, I might say that we're not advocating the abandonment of criteria tout court; useful, meaningful criteria (of value, of truth, et bloody cetera) are both local and modifiable. Local here meaning capturing as much of the context of their application as needed. (A question like "Is this a good car?" has no answer or too many without context.) Modifiable meaning that if your criteria can't evolve or aren't open to challenge or debate, you're doing it wrong.
And I think the counter, the demand for universality, permanence, certainty -- which will attack even what I'm saying here, "Are criteria always and everywhere like this? Then you're contradicting yourself!" -- should just be ignored as juvenile. This is not how serious people think. It's like lecturing Jerome Powell after taking Econ 101.
Anyway, some nice posts @J.
So, the endless regress problem. What do you see as the way out of that?
Very kind, thanks. I keep thinking that there is some way of making this clearer in the abstract, but maybe not. Perhaps you have to examine some real practice or issue, understand how the participants do in fact make their judgments and discuss the results, and then . . . perhaps the "absolute criteria" problem would just be seen through, as it should be, in most cases. (Note escape clause -- not even avoiding absolute criteria is always an absolute criterion. :smile: And this is not a heinous contradiction, but just a report on how we do most things.)
You seem to be conflating intent with the intended outcome. You can intend to create an obligation for someone to stop when you say, "Stop!" but when they don't did you actually create an obligation? Could you even say that you conveyed any information? Maybe you did and the listener heard you clearly and understands what you want them to do, but the other is under no obligation - ever - to respond in the way you intend. You might need to convey more information, like holding a gun to their head, for them to respond as you intend. The same goes for intending to receive a reply. Just look at many of the conversations on this forum where someone asks a question that is ignored or answered in a way that the questioner did not intend. In these cases, there was an intent, and information was conveyed, but no obligation was created and no reply was received, so how can you say that an obligation was created when one wasn't?
Quoting Banno
I've addressed this one with you before, but your response was that you simply didn't like what I was saying.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Quoting Harry Hindu
They are informing the other that we intend to start a conversation (exchanging information) with them and when we intend to stop exchanging information.
"Hello" greets except when it doesn't. If you say, "Hello" to someone and they ignore you, did you greet them? If the other refuses to participate in the "game" do you have a "game"?
Quoting Banno
Are you saying that you don't have reasons to get married or scratch your nose?
I spoke too fast. I should have said pretty air tight (because everything with Wittgenstein in a general sense has to have blurry edges).
And I should have just said, Wittgenstein made some valid points that I can work with. Wittgenstein to me, speaks of the How. He applies flux to the flux with rigor. Hes Heraclitus post highly developed math and logic. He yielded a rigorous analytic tool. Even though that would bother him to hear, thats the best I can make of him.
None of it really tells you about the world. It applies its method to tell you what the world is not, and what language doesnt say. Its the hammer and the tuning fork smashing metaphysics. When it is used to catch a fallacious argument, it proves its value.
But in the end, Witt is for the backroom experts who refine the product. The front room produces what I (and most people) need from philosophy and speak of the What and the Why. These should be subjected to Witts How-to-speak, but serve a different purpose and have their own substance regardless of the confusions and clarifications.
I agree Witt isnt air tight. I think that is why he had to admit, once you see his world view, you have to throw world views away, and that is a contradiction; you need a worldview in order to see that you never really had a worldview, and that is the new worldview.
So I was wrong.
We are all in the midst of identifying the prior, the presuppositions, asserting something that is merely supposed, and maybe even finding what is just posed. Wittgenstein gave up on all of that and stayed in his box where only language could be used to suppose other words. He just did it pretty well.
Sort of. More like the why dont you just answer the question problem.
Quoting J
The truth. Something absolute. Something not arbitrary. Something said about the world, and not just about the speaker.
Im not afraid of the big bad authoritarian tyrant, as long as he is telling the truth.
What is truth?
Exactly. Once you declare that there is some aspect of the universe that is random, or indeterminate, then you've create a dualistic problem of trying to explain why there are so many things that are determined.
It seems to me that mixing the determinate and the indeterminate would be like "mixing" water and oil. Or, that the indeterminate is a projection of one's ignorance and trying to use the indeterminate as a tool to understand a deterministic universe would create the problems you cite. Dualism just causes more problems than it solves.
Again, that's not a very charitable paraphrase, but let it stand. It's hard to draw general conclusions here, isn't it? One person's "incredibly vague" is another person's "good enough to be going on with." And of course this applies at the level of disciplines as well -- lots of variance in how much precision is needed for a given subject.
I still think the Chakravartty - Pincock debate in the "Epistemic Stances . . ." thread is an excellent place to look at this question. There, the topic is hard science, which might be more familiar to you than musicology -- I probably shouldn't have picked such a specialized example. Have a look!
Truth:
To pry into this great question I would start by saying two things:
1. An example of one truth is like this: there is this person who calls himself Frank on TPF and who asks what is truth. That is an example of the truth. As a statement, it is a statement about the world, an actual world with an actual Frank in it apart from me who said this truth.
2. If truth can be defined in endless different ways then I would assert, there is no such thing as truth. This second statement isnt a definition either, but it shows you that the ones defining things, dont get to be the arbiters of what is truth. Truth is about the world, not merely the speaking stating it.
Should we bother to go on, here in this thread?
How is it uncharitable? I copied and pasted the phrases. I get that we don't always "know it when we see it," but we sometimes do. (Yet such a claim seems hard to challenge whenever it is made). What would you change?
Sure, that's exactly my point. This is an appeal to bare personal preference. My argument is specific enough for me, how could it possibly be wrong?
If you want to say that my interpretation that "your standard is so vague that 'anything goes,'" is invalid, in virtue of what is it invalid? I've approached it thoughtfully, others agree with me, and I approached it within a practice. Indeed, there seems to be consensus among those who share my practice that this is so. What else more is there to say? What's the objection?
Maybe your standard implies "anything goes" for some philosophies and epistemologies and not others? So we're both right... and both wrong. But that we're both right and wrong would seem to demonstrate exactly my point.
Further, there is the issue that people frequently disagree about what constitutes proper fields of discourse and real distinctions in subject matter (e.g. "Jewish physics"). Presumably there is a higher level discipline, philosophy of science and epistemology, for adjudicating these disputes. But if that's the case, then there would be higher level criteria vis-á-vis lower level criteria and standards of proper warrant that applies across disparate fields. The criterion for determining that "Aryan physics" is not a valid field with its own unique criteria has to come from outside Aryan physics itself, because according to Aryan physics, it is a valid discipline, and the larger realm of physics (called by them "Jewish physics") has no authority over it.
What specifically about the world?
The point isn't that our existing criteria are everywhere universal, certain, and immutable. It's that they have to be criteria. But I think this framing of "absolute criteria" is a red herring. My critique of these standards is from the lens of epistemology, and surely epistemology has some standards. If I reject J's standards, it does not seem that, by his standards, it would be possible to reject my rejection. Perhaps we would both be right, but that's exactly the problem in my view.
Second, are you suggesting that epistemology is wholly sui generis for each subject matter? Something like the hermetically sealed magisterium or Latin Averroism?
If not, then then obviously there is something the same vis-á-vis all epistemic situations. If they are sui generis, then you have all the problems of the hermetically sealed magisterium, i.e. that it allows for contradictions, and that what actually constitutes a "hermetically sealed magisterium" will vary according to each discipline, such that some disciplines will make claims on others, but those disciplines will reject those claims and declare themselves sui generis and hermetically sealed. And indeed, there is no reason this shouldn't trickle down to the level of individuals.
If each discipline is allowed to have its own definition of its reach, criterion, and subject matter, we can hardly object to the fact that, historically, and I would imagine even today, most epistemologists think what they are saying applies to [I]all[/I] knowledge claims and [I]all[/I] instances of warrant. It takes the whole of human knowing as its subject matter.
To give an example: is it valid to have a distinct "feminist epistemology?" What about a French or White epistemology? Can there be an Aryan physics with its own standards as set against Jewish physics? Or a capitalist genetics as set against a Marxist genetics?
Those are all real world examples justified by professional philosophers within a practice. Some were extremely consequential; the differing genetics led to famines that killed large numbers of people. But they were unique standards for a particular problem set developed within a practice by thoughtful people.
So where exactly is the error in those cases? Or was there one?
If one knows one is giving the appearance of contradicting oneself then wouldn't it make sense to explain why the distinction is not truly contradictory, or why contradiction is not a problem? I'm not sure if a preemptive ad hominem amounts to much there.
Criteria obviously do vary by subject matter. And so does specificity and certainty. I don't think anyone has argued that they don't. But in virtue of what is this variation appropriate? Presumably, it isn't "anything goes." That's the question. What settles epistemic disputes? What determines when a field is a pseudoscience? Saying: "well standards vary by subject matter" doesn't address the issue that people disagree about standards and what constitutes unique subject matter. It's a non-non-sequitur
Quoting frank
Specifically, something, any thing, in it or about it, like for instance, Frank the poster is posting.
A fact is an example of the truth.
This is why this thread is so good. Now we are forced to ask what is truth?
When you ask me what is truth, do you mean what is knowledge or how do we know or do you mean what is real or do you mean what is?
Any which way, either all narratives are true or they arent, if you know what I mean, Frank.
I assume so.
Quoting Fire Ologist
You said:
Quoting Fire Ologist
Is truth a property of statements? Or is it a property of the world? Or what?
Should we start another thread?
Property?
Truth is said in statements or known in subjects and is about what is. Correspondence is part of it. Alignment of subject to object. Coherence and validity is part of this. Being is part of this. Identity and unity will be issues.
This is me avoiding the question. Truly.
So I bet you know enough to get back to this thread. If you feel youve made a point by me not simply defining truth, then ok. I dont feel like this is on point.
We never resolved the earlier issue of whether discursive metaphysics comes first to provide the content that the analytic dissector can then dissect. Then we never resolved the issue of whether all statements are true or not.
Now we want to see if we can define truth together as friends over a cup of coffee?
Well, see:
Quoting Leontiskos
Banno is constantly making threads and posts that amount to, "Monism is authoritarian, and I won't say what I mean by 'monism' or 'authoritarianism'." It's propaganda in that none of it is amenable to argument. Indeed, it positively resists philosophical argument by mischaracterizing all of the views at each point, for example by pretending adversaries are championing "infallibility." Beyond that it likely violates the forum rule against evangelization.
Banno is really passive aggressive. Its hard when you are so smart like him to put up with us, so he builds up that anger I guess. Just joining in the discussion with the other psychologists around here.
I am pretending Banno is not really a part of the world of this thread. Thats called deluding myself, but, he is enabling me, which is nice. All the benefit of his thoughts and easy to ignore all the baggage. Count takes the heat.
At least until it will all crash and burn .
We do. By talking. Sometimes negotations fail, though.
I don't think there's one way it happens. What settles a philosophical dispute? Isn't the volume of words on this site alone enough to demonstrate that there is no such settling, once and for all?
I think this is where the notion of research programs, or paradigms, or traditions plays an important role. But I think that this paring down of a problem is -- necessarily -- going to block out many things of concern. There is simply an overabundance of being, a constant overflowing of language such that language is always catching up, at a distance. And because there's so much in relation to our abilities we will necessarily have to focus in on some part of the infinite whole. We've been doing this since we could pass on knowledge through oral traditions. We have no say in what came before, only a valuable inheritance which, as it was then so it is now, is constantly in dispute.
But even this valuable inheritance is too much for us to comprehend -- even it is infinite in relation to one person's ability. And in order to learn a tradition or research program or paradigm one must listen to those who are doing the practice. These are what I'd call the a priori assumptions which define a practice, if we want to put it into philosophical language at least. There may have been someone for whom it was a posteriori, but for us who inherit what came before it's quite literally a priori, and often the way these things are taught they are taught such that we just have to accept them as true in order to move on.
That's a good habit for learning within a tradition.
I think that the negotiations fail more often not simply because we've been habituated to this teacher-student model by the practice, and then when we encounter someone whose different from us that habit kicks back in. But here we are equals talking about ideas, and not teacher-students or student-teachers, except insofar that we acknowledge such a relationship. For example, @Banno has helped me understand Davidson and Wittgenstein -- without his efforts on these fora I'm pretty sure I wouldn't have cracked that nut on my own.
Not to say I have a superior interpretation or something -- I just mean I finally got to the meat and felt like I understood something of what he was getting at.
And, really, I can say that about lots of philosophers and fellow posters here. So it's not like we can't learn outside of the teacher-student relationship.
But it takes some mutual respect and understanding that the other person, no matter how crazy they may sound, probably did arrive at their views by some philosophical process, and really the best we can do is tease out what that sequence of thoughts are.
But the dispute will, likely, continue beyond us -- it's a dispute we had no hands in creating, and here it lives on through us, so I doubt we're going to stop it here.
But who is making that counter? Doesn't it just sound like a strawman on the face of it? And where in the thread do you find someone arguing for it?
A quick inlet into the problems with @J and @Banno's view is to look at where J argues that mathematics is authoritarian, music is non-authoritarian, and philosophy must be somewhere in between. Note his premise: mathematics is authoritarian!
This is the argument:
Quoting Leontiskos
We are talking about judging contributions to some field, namely judging them good or bad.
Consider two normative concepts, the minimal-negative and the maximal-negative. I am calling the maximal-negative, "Beyond the Pale." The minimal-negative would be something like "low quality," or, "sub par." The minimal-negative and the maximal-negative are both judgments of badness.
What is my argument? What is the non-strawman argument? It is that everyone has a substantive minimal-negative and maximal-negative which they deploy, and that any reasonable definitions of "authoritarianism" within this thread generate hypocrisy, given that the one who accuses of "authoritarianism" leverages his own maximal-negative that is, by his own definition, "authoritarian." By "reasonable definition of authoritarianism," I mean something that is actually held and for which there is real evidence. The canard of, "Self-imputed infallibility," is an unreasonable notion of authoritarianism precisely because it is a strawman for which no evidence exists. If @J thinks that someone holds to a self-imputed infallibility despite their protestations to the contrary, then he will have to point to the evidence.
(Note that when you say, "This should just be ignored as juvenile," you are making a negative judgment that is likely a maximal-negative. Your judgment is certainly "authoritarian" according to @J and @Banno's criteria. You are deeming something beyond the pale and rejecting it, without allowing it recourse. That is what it means to ignore. If @Banno were the least bit consistent he would label you "infallible." And I would say that your own utterance involves the hypocrisy I pointed to, given that you must have a high degree of certitude that something is worthless if you are going to dismiss and ignore it as juvenile. It is self-contradictory to eschew certitude before "ignoring something as juvenile.")
The argument of @J and @Banno is quite simple. It is that
* We could also consider the minimal-positive and the maximal-positive, but that is not what people are interested in in this thread.
---
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Let me elaborate on that parenthetical remark. By "authoritarian" @J means something like a definitive rejection of a view or person. So, "Not open to debate," is one way of getting at that. This creates a threshold at which the maximal-negative crosses over into authoritarianism. If someone's maximal-negative is beyond that threshold, then apparently they are an authoritarian.
But note that when you say, "[It] should be ignored as juvenile," you are engaging in definitive rejection. You are denying the view recourse by ignoring it. And when @J or @Banno ignore all my posts, they are engaging in definitive rejection. It logically follows that the three of you are "authoritarian," given that you engage in definitive rejection. This was actually the premise of my thread, "Beyond the Pale," namely that everyone engages in dismissal and even definitive forms of dismissal.
So the double standard is clearly evident. If the three of you did not engage in definitive rejection and deem certain things beyond debate, then there would be no double standard. Similarly, if I held that we should never deem anything beyond the pale, then I would be engaged in a double standard myself, because I candidly deem some things to be beyond the pale.
(The more robust point is that there are shades of negative judgments, and shades of definitiveness, and that even a minimal-negative involves a shade of definitiveness. Even to deem someone's belief sub-par or false involves a sort of micro-definitive negative. This is precisely why, elsewhere, @J posited the idea that deeming people wrong is itself immoral.)
Where do you see your preference for dissection playing in here?
Right, many of histories most bitter wars are ideological, so clearly debate can collapse into power relations. My concern about epistemic standards that are too loose is that they basically just fast forward us towards the collapse into power relations.
Talking is effective for different reasons, right? You have your old ethos, logos, and pathos, different sorts of appeals. But isn't a "good argument" one that tends towards truth, not one that tends towards conversion and agreement? If it was the latter, then it would seem that we are always dealing with mere power relations. That is, of course , the thesis of some philosophers though.
I am not sure if we have "succeeded" if we have successfully talked others into accepting our own false opinions though.
Further, some of these debates are highly consequential. Consider the current debate over vaccines in the US. Or consider the example of a sui generis "socialist genetics" that led to famines that killed thousands, if not millions. The stakes in some debates are very high, and so I'm not sure "we talk and maybe we agree and maybe we don't" works in principle. That at least, isn't how things are often done in the wider world, again because stakes are often high.
A question here might be: "can people be taught to better evaluate claims?" If they can't, then philosophy is pretty useless, or at least general epistemology is. If they can be taught, then presumably there are principles for evaluating claims and narratives that are more general.
We rely on authority to settle a lot of these issues, e.g. doctors carry special weight in the vaccine debate. But obviously there is an issue of proper authority. Doctors don't have authority on vaccines just because they claim it, or because it is yielded to them, else there is never "improper authority" in cases where people recognize authority. The idea of a "proper authority" that is distinct from whoever just so happens to hold authority seems to me to require an additional standard, and probably one that is general in its principles since we must adjudicate proper authority across disparate spheres.
I think it is helpful to try to outline the two competing theses, but I'm not sure you're trying very hard. It looks like you attached a vacuous thesis to yourself and an absurd thesis to your opposition, which is pretty common on TPF.
If I'm wrong, then what are the two theses, clearly set out? And it would be helpful to try to be objective by skipping the epithets like "juvenile" and "unserious."
Sort of a common problem in these responses, the critique is invalid because if it was valid some sort of rigid, infallible epistemology would have to follow, and a rigid epistemology of infallibility is wrong, hence the critique is wrong.
But I don't think I'm being unreasonable. If you throw @J's epistemic position into Chat GPT it identifies all the same issues I did, plus some others (although these seem ancillary to me). I don't think it is biased towards "foundationalism" or "infallibility" (of course, I don't think I am either). It's not that these issues couldn't be ironed out, and indeed I think there is some truth to the explanation, particularly vis-a-vis the way justification works in practice (which is not to say, ideally).
Yet even an appeal to internal consistency requires some sort of standard. If we take the same approach to logic, we end up with the validity of arguments varying on a case-by-case basis as well. That consistency, avoiding self-refutation, or coherence is a worthy standard itself presumably varies case by case.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Quoting J
@J feels a need to qualify the criteria by adding the word "strict." He also puts "reasonable" in scare quotes.
Banno's approach is to utilize the strawman not of "strict" criteria, but of "final infallible" criteria:
Quoting Banno
Count keeps asking a question about criteria simpliciter. @J and @Banno keep responding to a different question. They are responding to a question about "strict criteria," or a question about, "final infallible" criteria. No such question has been asked.
Why won't @J and @Banno answer the question that is being asked?
Why do they feel the need to answer a question that has not been asked and then pretend that they have answered the question that has been asked?
You're not. I think you're giving @J and @Banno far too much credit. They are avoiding the questions being asked and failing to give arguments for their position. They won't even give a clear account of the terms that are being used within their accusations. Still, your charity in the face of that is admirable.
In the past @Srap Tasmaner has been able to lend a hand to a foundering position. Maybe he can do that here. Maybe he can clarify the thesis and the arguments that are supposed to attach to their position.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course it is, and it is a standard that @Moliere has within this thread. The fact that @Banno's championing of coherence clashes with @Moliere's ignoring of coherence is itself proof that those who favor the so-called "dissection" approach to philosophy disagree even among themselves about whether coherence should be applied as a criterion. @Moliere's tack highlights the fact that coherence (internal consistency) is a substantial criterion - at least if we are not to resort to "authoritarianism" in order to dismiss his incoherence.
That's pretty interesting! ...Not that it is too difficult to identify the problems, which are substantial, but it is a tidy critique on the basis of the "intersubjective" nature of LLMs, which is @J's epistemic bedrock.
I am curious, though, whether that reply was conditioned by your historical interaction with ChatGPT? Does that ChatGPT instance have access to your past history of interactions with ChatGPT?
(The "semantic drift of 'truth'" problem is something I thought about bringing up, but I decided it would be too difficult for them to understand. If @J were actually correct, then there could be no overarching word which captures correctness within each discipline. Each discipline would require a wholly different word/concept to represent its normativity (and even "correctness" and "normativity" could presumably not be applied to all). But again, this is too complicated for those who won't even consider simple objections.)
In this exchange, you're project building and I'm dissecting. You either become fascinated by the mechanics of dissection, or you resist it because you're in love with the project. :smile:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
First, a clarification -- A defense of dissection, in the sense that it is not superior to the builders of philosophy, is what I've set out to defend.
More or less that the skeptical position isn't inferior to the non-skeptics in terms of philosophical excellence. Both are valuable. Also there's a sense in which this delineation is quite soft, so even stating a preference for one over the other is a difficulty. As we see earlier @Janus disagreed with my classifying Hume as a nit-picker, and @Hanover disagreed upon that. So far it seems to me that the idea is still quite hazy.
***
Actually we both liked @hypericin's essay -- maybe we could say there are [s]elephants and ravens[/s]land-whales and crows (sorry hyper), as styles of philosophy.
I could defend the other side, too, and even have in this thread to some extent by referencing Plato as an obvious myth-builder -- but there is a particular habit in philosophy, like Hegel's and Marx's, which swallows up other philosophies into themselves. At this point that's the only real error that I think I can point to that I've been thinking through: sometimes the world builder builds so large that it becomes a giant, coherent circle that reinforces itself, and since Hegel-to-Marx demonstrates that we can turn Idealism into Materialism it seems to me that the coherent circle reinforcing itself doesn't exactly have a relationship to what's real at all.
Neither idealism nor materialism, in terms of metaphysics.
Now for a proper coherentist this wouldn't be a fault. But I just don't see the world that way at all -- for the coherentist who does this would be seen as a good thing, a reason to accept the account. But for myself I tend to think absurdity is a real thing, so coherentism is automatically ruled out -- rather than a marker of a good belief I tend to think entirely coherent accounts which reinforce themselves are somehow skipping over a problem to make the system appear smooth, when in fact it's not.
Ye olde appearance/reality distinction
***
For my part I tend to think of metaphysics not as knowledge but ways of organizing the world around us such that multiplicity doesn't overwhelm. I'm not opposed to the metaphysics. I don't think one can be, really -- metaphysical thinking abounds. I just doubt that the metaphysics are real, exactly. The minutiae, the strange, the different, the absurd -- these are what seem real to me.
****
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think that if we have to worry about epistemic standards being too loose in order to control power relations then we've already fallen into a battle of power relations where truth isn't as important anymore.
Not that this isn't practical, of course -- there are many social situations where we should not trust others' opinions on things. Power is in fact a part of the world that we have no choice but to contend with.
I think that if we have a good relationship, though, that the epistemic standards come to fore through that relationship. I want others to speak the truth so I speak the truth, and when we get that reciprocity from someone else then, and only then, do we have a trustworthy standard to which we can appeal.
So rather than standards or proofs I would offer relationships and trust -- if you have a good relationship of trust with someone then as we work together the standards will slowly take care of themselves as we tackle problems together.
Which is why it's easy for two traditions to clash. Both people have done a lot of work to the point that they are used to being listened to as an authority due to this or that argument or reason, and suddenly two well-informed people who think like that talk and they try to out-teach one another or show them up in some way and suddenly -- you see how that's a battle for power rather than truth?
But if we trust one another and we want the truth then we can set aside who is right and focus on "How did we get here?"
For sure, I agree there.
I don't see persuasion as divorced from truth, though. How else are we to craft an argument other than to make it persuasive? Are we supposed to make it sound bad in order to really make sure it's true?
While I can see an error in accepting a conclusion just because we like the conclusion, I would say that such a person wasn't interested in whether or not the argument was actually persuasive or not -- they just wanted to have something to say, like a chant in a rally.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Oh, it doesn't work in principle. When Feyerabend says "Anything goes" he really only means at this highly abstract level where we are trying to divine the logical principles by which all knowledge is produced from the beginning of time and onto into the future. When that's the standard of universality that you're reaching for then upon examining classical cases of knowledge generation, such as Galileo's Two Worlds, you'll simply not find a common thread through all of them. The number of people that have tried different things and succeeded is so large that you'll always be able to find some counter-example to such a giant aspiration.
More or less the question cannot be answered. But what's interesting is that if we closely examine particular sciences then you start to see patterns at least within the same era. And it seems they work in a more local sense, and in terms of a smaller (i.e. not literally the whole universe of knowledge, past present and future) generalization we can succeed for a time. It's just that it's probably going to change in the future since that's pretty much what we've observed since the beginning of science -- constant change from one theory to the next.
That in spite of the fact that the stakes are, indeed, high. There's a reason we think about this stuff. It makes complete sense to ask and pursue the questions. I have no problem with such projects -- I just think there's a lot of them out there (and this is part of the confusion in living in our modern world)
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Well I am mostly in favor of philosophy being useless. I wish it could be more useless -- but this is an aside.
I don't think that exactly follows because one can be taught something that doesn't have principles. Like @J's use of musicology I'd go to acting theory here, particularly Stanislavski, who is explicitly building a system that doesn't have principles. We learn to do, and sometimes we can learn how to evaluate claims, but in so doing we'll be attached to a particular tradition with its own evaluative tools.
This isn't exactly damning insofar that we understand that we can't learn without making some assumptions. But just like Picasso and Botticelli are both painters so there can be two philosophers that produce different works of art. (Indeed, I largely think of philosophy as a kind of wisdom literature, which is why I think aesthetics are actually very important for understanding philosophy, moreso than epistemology)
But all that to say I would answer "Yes" to your question, but not follow your inference. People can be taught. That doesn't mean there are principles for evaluating claims and narratives. It could be that we evaluate claims and narratives with other claims and narratives, and that would explain why it gets so confusing sometimes.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
We do, but it doesn't seem to me that doctors really ask what philosophers think on whether or not a doctor is a good doctor. Similarly so with all the trades. I did note in brief earlier how the one thing you probably have to know is some kind of trade to live in an industrial world. So these are the sources of knowledge that we work with on the day-to-day. Sometimes philosophers' ideas trickle out into the world and you can see their influence, but their influence is -- properly I think -- restricted to influencing the mind through argument, narrative, ideas, and all the various tools of philosophy.
Rather than writing the standards by which some professions ought to proceed I think the philosopher is better as a point of reflection. Philosophy is a dictatorship, but a dictatorship without any power to enforce its whims -- at least when it's best.
And then also -- while there may be an elevated relationship between philosophy and other disciplines at the very least here, on TPF, the general assumption is that we're all equal. There are people of differeing levels and exposures of course like anything, but really the only way we here can resolve a dispute is by talking and finding some sort of standard by which we can agree. Else it's the clash of worldviews talking past one another.
Yes, that would be great. But again, the opposition of "absolute" and "arbitrary". Really, nothing in between would do?
Quoting Fire Ologist
(Either/or opposites again. Kant?) I know more or less what you mean, but do you think that kind of statement is available for all the areas that interest us as philosophers?
I don't fully accept that theism/atheism = believer/skeptic. That's the whole faith debate all over again. The scientific worldview does not permit skepticism of the worldview, namely of a belief in science. The theistic worldview does not permit skepticism of that worldview, namely of a belief in God. The point being that we're all believers and non-believers alike, and most of us question the certainty of our conclusions, but not of our methods. That is to say, there are plenty of "I don't really know" responses from theists and it's not like there aren't plenty of "It's just a plain fact" responses from scientists.
Theists don't walk around claiming full knowledge of everything without question any more or less than scientists. It's not as if scientists truly truly question everything.
Third option, I project build, welcoming your dissection, to produce a well tested product.
Except not here. Resisting it not on any principle but respecting the thread is maybe not the place.
This thread is about the process. Or types of processes.
Appreciate you.
I think its available for anything speakable.
I also think it is difficult to achieve. But wouldnt take step one towards it with passion if I didnt see it as a goal.
Fair enough.
Quoting Fire Ologist
What I see is all the emotion involved. Project builders love their projects. There's something a little sadistic about dissection.
I certainly don't think either theism or atheism are superior with respect to claims to know and such. I agree with your arguments here.
"Some narratives are acceptable, true, or valid for one sort of reason; some are so for another sort; some for a third sort; etc. . . . [not "a different criterion in each instance"; that would be silly]. . . . If you engage in a practice consistently and thoughtfully, you know reasonableness in that practice when you see it, usually." I think that's what I said the last time. You're far too good a rhetorician not to recognize the difference in tone between my version and yours . But it's not worth squabbling over.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Count T, I just don't know how many different ways I can try to say it. If you, or anyone, puts forward a position within some practice, and I know you and respect you, I'm going to assume that you do so with far better reasons than "bare personal preference." If people went around declaring their "bare personal preferences" with others in the practice, in short order no one would talk to them. Hasn't that been your experience as well, in whatever projects you've engaged in over the years? This is the "absolute-or-arbitrary" bogeyman again.
Likewise, I simply can't imagine a serious scholar or thinker saying, "How could I possibly be wrong?" Rather, the usual attitude is, "This is how it seems to me. Profs X and Y have said similar things, Profs V and W offer some counter-evidence, and draw different conclusions. OK, here's why I think X, Y, and me are in the right on this. Let's discuss." I know you think that out of such a discussion we would get a clear, criteria-based, permanent answer -- and I don't deny this sometimes happens, but not often. And yet, mirabile dictu, some tentative consensus may be reached, and the practice goes on.
I promise this is the last time I'll mention it, but . . . . Chakravartty and Pincock? It's an opportunity to see how this kind of discussion actually proceeds, around a real issue of some importance.
Well, that's a clear enough credo. I'm probably not the right person to talk you out of it, even if I wanted to. I also appreciate you, your passion for truth as you understand it. And I think my question about how you negotiate the absolute/arbitrary chasm IRL offended you. Please let me apologize. I meant no personal criticism, though I see how it could have landed that way. I just wanted to understand better what it's like to be you! But I'm sorry if I stepped over a line.
Thank you for returning us to what's in front of us -- the nature of philosophy itself. Those who see it otherwise -- who think that something has gone wrong because we can't settle the disputes -- have a lot of explaining to do. What, exactly, is supposed to account for this sorry situation? Why has the truth not prevailed, despite century after century of what are supposed to be obviously correct arguments?
@Banno and I have a long history of talking on this very issue, as you can see in the aside where I gave Banno a theory of incommensurability -- an old topic between he and I, and one which I've gotten better at defending thanks to his nitpicking.
That the dissectors disagree with themselves is only consistent with dissection and disagreement and difference :D
Yep.
When you divide the world into serious and unserious, you have already provided a definitive judgment. It is not substantive to say, "Well yes, I agree with what you say, so long as we are not talking about serious people. With serious people it is much different." The "unserious" is just a special category of people you disagree with, and people you have relegated to a ghetto. The "serious" is just a category of people who all agree that they cannot be wrong about certain things, and therefore do not contradict one another on those things.
Don't you find it the least bit odd that the person decrying superiority schemes has relegated the whole human race into "the serious" and "the unserious"?
Quoting J
If you "seriously" wanted to discuss it you would.
Well, yes. If your commander gives an order, you are thereby under an obligation, even if you do not follow that order.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's right. When I say "Hello" to someone walking towards me on the mountain path, I'm not informing them that we intend to start a conversation. I'm too focused on getting up the mountain and don't really want a chat.
I am greeting them.
So I don't like your response because it is wrong.
Quoting Harry HinduYes. We say "They ignored my greeting".
Quoting Harry Hindu
Are you saying all behaviour must be explained algorithmically? I won't agree.
Quoting Moliere
Yes. Back. AND forth.
Both sides of the dialogue working together.
It does take humility. But not too much or you shrink from making the assertion.
But hubris is usually just bad. You need confidence in life, but not hubris. Id say.
It's overkill, no doubt, but we might formalise it a lot.
Supose we have a list of sentences, A, B, C...
The assumption, from Tim and others, is that each of these sentences is either true, or it is false.
We list all the true sentences: { A & B & ~C & D....} and so on. Tim's objection, so far as I can make sense of it, is that if we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then the concatenation of sentences contains a contradiction and anything goes.
So Tim sees the existence of an undecided sentence as leading to a contradiction. {A & B & C &~C & D...} implies C and ~C, and so anything goes.
But what is being suggested is that rather than a string concatenating every sentence, we can have instead groups of sentences that are consistent with each other, even if not consistent with the whole. That is, we can have (A & B & C) as consistent with each other, and perhaps (B & ~C & D) as consistent with each other, without contradiction. {(A & B & C) v (B & ~C & D)} does not imply (C & ~C).
{(A & B & C) v (B & ~C & D} is consistent, despite including both C and ~C.
So in 's example, (A & B & C) may be how we evaluate Beethoven's music, while we evaluate his contemporary Hummel, as (B & ~C & D), and we do this without contradiction.
Tim's insistence that a contradiction must follow is simply invalid. We can happily insist on a sentence being true in one circumstance, and false in another, without contradiction.
And all this in propositional calculus, without resorting to non-classical logic.
@Count Timothy von Icarus, I do not think that you have yet addressed this. "Explaining why the distinction is not truly contradictory" is exactly what the above argument does.
Maybe a little. I mean, the level of this conversation really has nothing to do with real life. We each cant really infer anything about how we get along in life by debating metaphysics versus analytics. Its like two people debating the causes of the Punic wars and one says to the other - how do you manage life thinking like that? Kind of made me think, what are really talking about here?
Quoting J
Very kind of you. No worries.
You must know by now I kind of invite the abuse. Im like a street brawling philosopher. Would have loved a sit down with Hume, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, although I would have needed to bring Aristotle and Kant and Socrates to that fight. I can take a little abuse - and I get that the internet doesnt always capture the real emotion involved.
I apologize myself for the distraction. Taking offense is mostly my problem not yours. Offend away. As long as you dont just leave me hanging.
I dont think we are understanding each other on the substance here. Life.
By now there are five other conversations to grab onto. Til next time.
Definitionally, yes.
So I'm not quite satisfied anymore with that dichotomy... it was a first guess from the usual thoughts.
Hubris/Humility would naturally be read as Bad/Good, and that's not what I want to convey.
Quoting Fire Ologist
That's closer. I'm not sure how to put it yet in neutral terms -- I want to somehow distinguish the categorical from the evaluative.
Much like George Dickie does.
Cheers. You are most welcome.
But is this right? Are "determinate" and "indeterminate" poles, or are they contradictories? If they are poles, then they are like the North Pole and the South Pole. If they are contradictories then they are like, "black" and "not black" where there is nothing in between.
Now if you think "determinate" and "indeterminate" are poles, then what is an example of an intermediate between the two? What is "the Equator" to these two poles? What is neither determinate nor indeterminate? It looks to me that they are contradictories, not poles (contraries), and therefore there is no intermediate.
I think @Count Timothy von Icarus' point is a bit like Aristotle's point that the archer must have a target. He must be aiming at something. If someone is said to have knowledge, then it must be knowledge of something. It would make no sense to say, "He is a very knowledgeable man." "About what?" "Nothing at all!" It is correct to say that our endeavors must have some aim, some goal (and therefore some determinate content). Either we are aiming at something or we are not aiming at anything; either the field of study has some determinate content or else it has no determinate content. That's the idea.
@Banno is again falling into that strawman strategy where he answers a question that is not being asked:
Quoting Banno
@Count Timothy von Icarus spoke about "determinate content." @Banno pulled another of his bait-and-switches and substituted, "Clear, specifiable content." @Count Timothy von Icarus would surely agree that content which is not perfectly clear and specifiable need not be wholly indeterminate, but that is not at all what he was talking about. He was talking about a bare minimum of determinacy, in the sense that there must be some goal that the archer is aiming at, no matter how diffuse or subtle. @Count Timothy von Icarus is using determinate/indeterminate as a contradictory pair, for this is precisely what his argument requires. To interpret him as enunciating a contrary (or polarity) is ignoratio elenchus.
Lol. This is some wild mischaracterization. It would be great for you to quote @Count Timothy von Icarus to try to substantiate this very strange reading.
Exactly!
Thanks for your help. :lol:
Some here seem to have a prejudice against the very notion of contradictory pairs. For example:
Quoting J
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
"Either the animal has eyes or else it doesn't."
This is not "all or nothing reasoning." It is called the principle of non-contradiction. Why does @J continually fail to answer such questions? Does he want to argue for some third option? Does he think the animal doesn't have eyes, and it also doesn't not have eyes?
Others have an obsession with the same.
Determinate/indeterminate is not a contradictory pair. Many things are partially determined. Borderline concepts - "baldness"; mathematical forms such as [math]0^0[/math]; quantum states which are determinate in probability, indeterminate in value.
See if you can reply to these examples, rather than indulging in personal insults.
Like calling someone obsessive, like this?:
Quoting Banno
It's impressive how you squeeze hypocrisy into even the smallest posts. :wink:
Quoting Banno
Determinate/indeterminate could be read as a contradictory pair or a contrary pair. The point is that @Count Timothy von Icarus was obviously using it as a contradictory pair, which he even clarified. To be fair, @Fire Ologist introduced the determinate/indeterminate pair, not Count. Here is an example of what Count said:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
"Some" determinate content. So your examples of things which are "partially determined" all count as having some determinate content.
The vegan will ask, "Are there some animal products in this food, or not?" It's fairly clear that there are only two options here. This comes with the territory of the word, "some."
And that not every situation is reducible to a binary?
And that there is a place for some nuance?
And maybe, that wisdom might sometimes not have a determinate content?
(and yes, I admit I hit you back first. )
All words have a semantic range. The question asks how the words are being used within a context or argument. @Count Timothy von Icarus's "some determinate content" vs. "no determinate content" is clearly a binary. Don't you agree? Or do you think it is impossible for him to make that distinction between some and none?
Quoting Banno
Again, the equivocation looms. Wisdom never has no determinate content. It may have semi-determinate content, but semi-determinate content involves some determinate content.
This is how the conversation might have been expected to proceed:
Sure. And in setting this up as a binary, he already forecloses on the possibility of it not being a binary. He presumes what was to be shown. That's why @J fairly suggests he account is uncharitable.
Again:
Quoting Leontiskos
This form looks like a binary: "Either some X is Y or else no X is Y." If you or @J think that @Count Timothy von Icarus is setting up a false binary (a false dilemma), then you have to provide an argument for why the binary does not hold. Specifically, you have to demonstrate the third option. Surely you agree that some logical distinctions are in fact binary? That not everything is non-binary?
You yourself appeal to contradictory binaries at times:
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Saw this edit. Appreciate that. :up:
Allow me then to say that I was quick on the trigger at the beginning of this thread. Of course, I feel like we've been around this merry-go-round too many times by now. I anticipated it moving in this very direction, namely "monism."
To my eye, J is providing comprehensive answers. But the folk he is talking to do not see that there is a problem with their questions, rather than with J's answers. That is, J has been providing examples of where the binary does not hold, but this has gone unrecognised.
Further, why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does?
A step back. Look at your example of this discussion being like shooting an arrow - to shoot well, you need a target. But that assumes that there is a target, that we already have the conclusion. Perhaps a better analogy would be were we are working together on a construction, but do not agree as to the final result. We might reach agreement on fitting this bit you made in with the bit I made, and work together towards something satisfactory to us both.
Why need we presume the conclusion?
Okay. I would love for someone to point me to the place where @J provided a third option.
Quoting Banno
I think the form of @Count Timothy von Icarus' statement is sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the one who denies that it is a true binary. Namely his , "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." That form reliably signifies a binary.
Quoting Banno
It assumes we have some kind of target, but it does not assume that we have the conclusion. If that were true then the archer having a target would be the same as the archer having a bullseye.
Quoting Banno
But I think we must have a target for our construction. We must have some aim at what we are intending to construct, however vague.
Quoting Banno
We could negotiate in deciding what to aim for and what to construct. That's pretty common. We'd still have a target, individually and jointly.
Quoting Banno
To presume the conclusion is post hoc rationalization. An aim and a bullseye are not the same thing.
Sure, but you're objecting to the tone, not the content. But the tone is intentional because I am trying to show a problem here, which is that your standard seems to presume that people always know when they are being "reasonable" or are arguing in good/bad faith. I think it's obvious that they don't though. For example, all the scientists working for cigarette companies or Big Oil probably don't all sit down to their work and think "time to go do some bad faith science to get paid," (although I am sure some do). They will claim they are thoughtful and operating within a practice, and some of them will believe this. So too for political bias in the sciences. And that's why you need concrete standards and principles to point to, and not just:
But in retrospect, I probably shouldn't have done it because it's resulted in you not responding to any of the substantive points, e.g., conflicts over jurisdiction between different subject matter areas, the issue of "pseudosciences" (which are still practices with committed adherents), political bias in disciplines, or my most basic point, which is that, by your own standards, your own epistemology can "correctly" rejected.
Exactly my point, so then it isn't the case that it's [I]just[/I]...
..but rather there are some standards by which opinions are to be taken seriously or not, and it is not merely that "one person's "incredibly vague" is another's 'good enough'."
I mean, consider the context here. I said: "I think the epistemic standards you've laid out are too vague, here is why," (the prized dissection). Can you see how a response of: "well one person's 'vague' is another's "good enough,"' simply renders the position impervious by default?
Sure, and this would be a fine rebuttal to me if I had claimed that your narrative doesn't have anything to do with how good discourse might progress. But I didn't say that. I didn't say it got nothing right. I said it wasn't tight enough to define good discourse on its own.
So, from the top, consider this:
One of your premises is that there are no standards that will apply across all areas of knowledge (or presumably a wide area like "all of science"). We cannot point to criteria or principles that will determine valid criteria across different areas. Is that fair?
Yet many (if not most) epistemologists think that they make valid claims about all of human knowledge, i.e. claims that apply to other disciplines and not just epistemology and epistemologists themselves. Many (if not most) philosophers of science think that they make valid claims about the whole of the sciences, and each science in particular, not just "philosophy of science." They think they have justifiable criteria for deciding issues of jurisdiction, or overlapping areas of authority. They think they have ways to identify science and pseudoscience. Not all of them do, but many do. These are professional philosophers acting in a practice who are thoughtful about their conclusions.
Thus, they hit all your criteria for producing a correct narrative. Yet many of them embrace a position that contradicts your own. They do think they have some principles or criteria that apply across either all human discourse or at least the sciences, or at least formal argument.
Hence, we seemingly have a "correct narrative" that contradicts your own. I don't see how your response cannot be self-refuting if it can allow that it is sometimes correct to reject it.
So, now, what are the options? As far as I can see:
A. "Yes, my standards allow for my own standards to be "correctly" refuted and contradicted, but that's no problem?"
Or:
B. "No, those particular philosophers are incorrect, and I am correct."
If it's B, then you need some additional criteria for why they are incorrect. But, by definition, you will be introducing new criteria for "epistemology generally" or for "philosophy of science generally," and I'm not sure if that wouldn't [I]also[/I] contradict your previous position, unless you want to say that: "there are standards for epistemology, but these don't actually apply for other disciplines that involve questions of knowledge but only to epistemology," or that there are "standards for philosophy of science, but these don't actually apply for individual sciences, but only to philosophy of science itself." But if you take that route, then you are [I]still[/I] saying that those epistemologists and philosophers of science are incorrect despite holding thoughtful positions developed within a practice, that have (or at least at times have had) relative consensus.
That seems problematic to me.
In what post did I advance this "argument?"
My point was about the standards allowing for self-refutation, and seemingly [I]allowing[/I] for contradictions. Indeed, if the principle of non-contradiction cannot be specified as a general epistemic principle then it seems obvious that contradiction is allowed. I didn't claim to identify a contradiction, merely the fact that denying PNC means denying PNC. Presumably, it follows that if one denies the PNC, one is allowing contradictions, particularly when it is very easy to generate examples using those criteria where thoughtful people operating within a practice will contradict one another.
Quoting Leontiskos
He is providing examples of where the binary does not hold. That is different to pointing to places where there is a third option. See . Note 's response. Consider what it is they are agreeing on.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't see how what you say here forms an argument. I do not see why Tim's statement implies anything about burden of proof. Stating that all statements are binary does not show that all statements are binary, nor assign a burden to those whop deny that all statements are binary.
Quoting Leontiskos
That's not how it looks to me. It looks more as if you have reached a conclusion and are looking for an argument that will hit it.
Quoting Leontiskos
Not my experience in curriculum development or in building co-design. Indeed it seems to me that the cases in which we share a "target", beyond a vague agreement as to the direction we might head, are rare. Have you ever been in a conversation were what was at issue was, what will we do? Not all inquiry is about hitting a known mark; sometimes, its about discovering what might be worth doing or understanding together. Thats a different modelless like archery, more like building without a blueprint.
All of them.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And yet non-classical logics are coherent. Non-classical logics, such as paraconsistent logics, do allow for contradictions without collapse, and they are mathematically coherent and well-developed.
Added: Here, explain to me where the following goes astray:
Quoting Banno
Be charitable.
I don't think I suggested anything remotely like this. Is this in reference to wisdom? The point I made there was very simple: a contentless, vacuous term cannot be used as a criteria that keeps anything out because it applies equally to everything.
You're the one who turned your misunderstanding into all sorts of different theses.
Ok. It still seems problematic to me if various scientific or historical claims are allowed to directly contradict one another and yet be equally "correct narratives." Consider: "CO2 emissions do and do not increase global temperatures," or "Osama Bin Laden was and wasn't the mastermind of 9/11." Or for philosophy, "we can and cannot know the external world exists."
Now, before you go off into claims of "infallibility," I am not saying that we always know the answer in such disputes, or that both positions might not be well supported. I am saying that claims like: "Bin Laden was the leader of the 9/11 attacks" and "he was also not involved with them at all," should indicate that at least one cannot be true (obviously some sort of resolution through finer distinctions or an identification of an equivocation not withstanding).
Ok. So I've misunderstood you.
So explain to me what is in error here:
Quoting Banno
Let's focus on this in the hope of reaching some agreement.
Ok. Is there a problem in allowing this to be undecided?
This statement?
But this is a misreading. I did not write "either each narrative is true/correct or it is false,' or even "either each narrative is true/correct or it isn't." I am saying, "if not everything goes," (i.e. if not all statements are true/valid/correct), then you need some reason for why not all statements are true/valid/correct, else the choice is arbitrary.
It doesn't say anything about the statements being binary. In saying "not anything goes," you have already admitted that some narratives "don't go." My only point here is that if you decide that some narratives "don't go," you need some reason for that decision, else it is arbitrary.
The point is merely that there cannot be a blanket denial of any principles/criteria/reasons.
So then we reach: "but the principles/criteria/reasons are different in every instance." My question then would be: "if they are different in every instance, in virtue of what are they good criteria/principles/reasons?" The denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in the obvious way that a total denial of all reasons/principles does, but I am not sure how it keeps arbitrariness out either. In virtue of what does one know the right reasons/principles for each instance, if they are always different?
What do you mean by undecided? Do you mean "we don't know" or do you mean "Bin Laden was neither the mastermind of 9/11 nor not the mastermind of 9/11." I think the latter in this example is clearly farcical.
Either OJ Simpson really killed his wife or he didn't. It's possible we can never know, or never know with certainty. Some historical facts are not accessible. That doesn't mean Nicole Simpson was stabbed and hacked up by "no one in particular" is an option.
Both.
If we allow a case in which it remains undecided if some sentence is true or false, then do we have a contradiction?
Treat them as seperate cases, if you like.
So a decision made for no reason at all isn't arbitrary?
"It isn't 'anything goes.' Why don't some things go you ask? I can offer no reason/principle/criteria to justify why some things don't go."
It's an error to call that arbitrary?
What's an example of an "undecided" historical or scientific fact? If I think of a murder trial for instance, this suggests to me that no one killed the victim found stabbed repeatedly, or that no one in particular killed them, which seems absurd.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That'll do. If we allow it to remain undecided, does a contradiction follow?
Banno, you obviously know the answer to the question, you're using the correct term. It isn't claiming that it is both true and false (contradiction), but is a violation of LEM. However, in this particular instance, the violation of LEM is absurd.
I mean, what's the point here re epistemology? Because some systems exist that ignore LEM it we should consider the possibility that it is neither true nor false that OJ was the person that killed his wife? Or that it is neither true nor false that she was murdered?
How?
Over to you again. Explain how allowing a sentence to be undecided violates the LEM.
Maybe begin by explaining which version of the LEM you would use.
This by way of a request for clarification.
You can no doubt see where I am going.
We agree that if we allow a contradiction, a statement that is both true and false, in propositional logic with a binary truth assignment (true or false), anything goes.
But if we instead allow a statement to have an undecided value, there is no contradiction and it does not follow that anything goes.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Not necessarily. We might not be denying a position, and not affirming it, but leaving it undecided.
Interesting and simple. Could it be argued that this is avoidance of a kind?
So far as epistemology goes, it's the equivalent of saying "I don't know". If that's avoidance, maybe.
"I don't know" might be seen as antithetical to a philosophy that can explain everything. So presumably has more in common with dissection than discourse.
First, the obvious:
This is still saying some positions aren't true/correct. To say "all positions are true or undecided, and at least some are undecided" is still saying that not every position is true.
Yes, but I don't get the relevance at all. What's the point?
"Ha, gotcha! My epistemology doesn't say "anything goes," because it actually says that while no one can ever be wrong, it's also not true that everyone is always right."
First, this is still "anything goes," as far as I can tell. If you cannot ever tell anyone else they are wrong, that is an epistemology that is too weak. It also relies on the idea that no narratives/statements are ever either correct or incorrect, i.e. that LEM never applies. But it hardly follows that because not everything is binary, absolutely nothing is.
Consider: "Sure, I don't think you're wrong about the fact that putting mercury in kid's lunches is good for them and will improve their grades, but I think it is neither true nor false that putting mercury in kid's lunches is a bad idea, so we shouldn't do it." Saying something has a truth value gap, or is not truth apt, does not produce strong warrant.
An epistemology that can dismiss no positions as wrong is too weak, and I think this is fairly obvious. "I don't think x is either true or false," doesn't produce strong warrant for action. Further, if you cannot reject any position then consider that even if I had said: "all statements are either true or false," you would not be able to say to me "that's incorrect," but rather only "it is neither true nor false that all statements are binary in this way." And yet to tell someone, "you're wrong about that statement, it is neither true or false," is to tell them they are wrong, not that they are neither right nor wrong. You'd find it quite impossible to defend this solution while actually keeping to it.
And note, you are equivocating on "undecided" when you say "I don't know," is the same thing as "undecided." You clearly know this on some level, because you know what the term means in the formal context. For instance, your reply here likens "undecided" to merely any pronouncement of one's own lack of knowledge. But I have to imagine you don't really think that accepting LEM is declaring oneself infallible. Most philosophers, for most of history, accepted LEM, even radical skeptics. For instance, by your definition here, the Goldbach Conjecture could be deemed "undecided," because it isn't proven, and yet that would obviously be an equivocation on the term "undecided," switching between its formal and informal meaning.
The case, for @Tom Storm's edification, that corresponds to the notion "undecided" in denying LEM would not be: "I don't know the answer to 'idealism, psychophysical parallelism, god ,'" but rather "these positions are neither true, nor false." In some sense then, it isn't modest. It claims to know something about the truth value of the statement in question.
Second, this entire conversation is a non-sequitur, because my point was that @J's standards allowed for judging their own refutation to be correct, and clearly opened the door for affirming contradictory positions as "correct." I never said "each narrative is either correct or incorrect." Depending on how one uses "correct," descriptions/narratives can obviously be more or less correct. The Doctrine of Transcendentals allows that things can be, in an important sense, more or less true. I've already corrected you on this above. See:
Now if you're going to disagree with that, by all means. I never made the point you're ascribing to me.
Lastly, the OJ Simpson example is absurd. Do you agree? Can you come up with a non-absurd example? Statements about future contingents would be at least something stronger. But if one wants to argue that LEM doesn't apply to future contingents, it does not thereby follow that LEM doesn't apply in cases where ignoring it leads to absurdity. Indeed, ignoring material logic entirely and applying an exclusion of LEM to the whole of human inquiry, to all subjects, seems to itself be a universal principle of the sort you are denying exists.
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Banno
I see determinate things and indeterminate things, so there is a quality to each and they are more like poles. Like determinacy and indeterminacy are properties of some thing before it is known and during which we inquire about it (like wisdom).
And the Aristotle example is helpful. We must be aiming at some thing, but to the extent we are not sure what that thing is, or dont know all there is to know about that thing, that thing has some indeterminacy to it.
But Banno is wrong because we cant even identify or determine something specific, like wisdom, if it does not have something determinate to it. Count is right to say that, from the very start of the target practice, wisdom must have something determinate to it or we may as well be talking about stupidity or my shoes. There must be some determinacy before we make any meaningful move toward some particular or something specific and not vacuous.
Yes.
Quoting Banno
If you are both working towards agreement. If you are both working towards the same final result. If you are working together. That would be a fine interpretation to me.
An example of working together would be you saying to Count, I see your point, there must be something determinate in the mix here.
The fact that we switch from one analogy to you better analogy before expressly agreeing on the value of the first analogy, shows you trying to frame things, like you dont like the framing. Why is that? Why do we need a better analogy? Because that could mean people are still at cross purposes and not working together.
I was merely making a joke. I figured they are 'neither true nor false' would be the official line.
P ? ¬P and not ¬? P ? ¬P. or something like that.
The situation you're describing seems accurate to me. There's a great deal of disagreement among epistemologists and philosophers of science about criteria, and to what extent a robust realism about science would make those criteria obligatory. And in general, the people who carry on these debates are smart, professional, and entirely deserving of a respectful hearing.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is where it goes wrong. I've said nothing about correct narratives, have I? I've talked about reasonableness, and what seems true, and making a good case for a position, and trying to identify criteria or stances that will be helpful in a particular practice. But I don't think any of this is going to produce an obviously correct narrative about something, unless you're willing to qualify that by saying, "correct as best we can tell; good enough to be going on with; good enough so that the next folks who disagree will have a clear target."
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Indeed they do.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The troublesome word is again "correctly." I think what you're imagining is a kind of meta-conversation in which some issue about epistemological standards could be put to rest for all time, and one version deemed correct. I don't believe this happens. I believe philosophers (and scientists) come to points of agreement, are better able to frame their disagreements, and then move on. In a way, philosophy is a bad example, because its abstract nature allows the "unresolved conflict" aspect to be highlighted. In a more concrete actual practice, we see the consensus-driven model in constant operation, and able to produce perfectly satisfactory results. I think in the human sciences generally there is a great toleration for unresolved questions and disagreements, and very little belief that some day, some way, all these ways of interpretation will be put aside in favor of a single correct version. As for hard science, I have to rely on the discussions by others, but something similar seems to be in play, though possibly there's more hope for an ultimate TOE -- don't know if that's still on the table these days.
So in light of this, if I may, let me revise your A: "My standards allow for disagreement and lack of acceptance, and they recognize that those who disagree may believe they have refuted and contradicted them -- just as I believe my own position is stronger -- but neither of us is in a position to say whether this in fact has been done. It's 'no problem' in the sense that the practice will go on regardless; it's certainly a problem, a good one, in the sense that such disagreements often motivate the next moments in the dialectic of a practice."
I guess an issue here might be "correct/incorrect" as another over-simplified binary. Again, I have to pose the obvious question: If a view about science or epistemology can be shown to be correct, as you mean it, why has this not ended the discussion? How is it possible that the debate is still vigorous?
The obligation is created when you signed up for the military - obligating you to follow your commander's intentions - not when the commander speaks. The commander is just informing you of his intentions.
Quoting Banno
Now you're moving the goalposts. In the situation where one says, "Hello" to strike up a conversation, what I said still holds.
I can say, "Hello!" when it appears that someone does not hear or understand what I'm saying - to get their attention. Your example appears to be one where you simply want someone to acknowledge your existence and you theirs.
Quoting Banno
In other words, they did not want to converse with you or acknowledge your existence.
Quoting Banno
I wasn't saying anything. I was asking if there are reasons to get married or scratch your nose.
Quoting Banno
I will come back to the rest of your post, but dude, really? You think that when says, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," he is saying that all statements are binary? How does that follow in the least? This strikes me as an unbelievable level of mischaracterization. If I say, "Either all X is Y, or else not all X is Y, and this statement is a binary," I am not therefore claiming that every statement is a binary.
You are still reading it as, "Either all narratives are [negative contrary/pole], or else all narratives are [positive contrary/pole]," despite the fact that this has been clarified multiple times. To say, "Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't," is the same as saying, "Either all narratives are [X], or else some narratives are not [X]." Anyone who accepts the PNC must accept that as a binary.
We're 14 pages into the thread and @Count Timothy von Icarus has tried to do little more than present the most elementary disjunctive syllogism:
He has been stonewalled by you and @J, not for any logical missteps, but rather because his first premise is, all or nothing, and apparently according to some special rule he is not allowed such a premise (despite the fact that the premise is nothing more than an application of the principle of non-contradiction - it is not "all or none," but rather, "some or none"). The stonewalling is moral and rhetorical in nature, I cant believe that you would engage in this all-or-nothing sort of reasoning!
Its a bit like going to a basketball game, and as soon as the first team team tries to dribble the second team cries foul! Then for the next twenty minutes the second team argues that dribbling is not allowed. The kicker is that the first team is accused of being uncharitable for trying to dribble the ball. On the contrary, I would submit that the level of patience and charity that Count Timothy has with you guys is mind-boggling! :yikes:
Are you going to allow his argument a hearing, or not? Is (p ? ~p) a permissible premise? Because if @Count Timothy von Icarus is not allowed to use (p ? ~p), then I cant imagine what will happen when he says something controversial. If he is not allowed to dribble, then I cant imagine what will happen when he tries to shoot. :zip:
This is why I effectively , "There is very little evidence that @Banno and @J are interested in playing basketball at all."
I had considered you to be laying out criteria for correctness there because you wrote:
And then gave your overarching standards for those reasons. The context for this was that I pointed out that if someone declares that their epistemology is not "anything goes," but then says they can give absolutely no reasons for when something "doesn't go," they have offered an obviously unsatisfactory response.
If you're denying these as standards then we're back to: "my epistemology is not "anything goes,' but I can give no explanation of why some narratives 'don't go.'" Or "my reasons for denying some narratives are sui generis in each instance." How does this keep arbitrariness out?
I'm not. This seems like yet another attempt to set up a false dichotomy between declaring oneself infallible and having any epistemic criteria at all. But there are many fallibilists and yet very few who subscribe to "there are no epistemic principles" or "epistemic criteria are sui generis in every instance." Indeed, I would guess virtually none, because both of those positions have obvious problems.
The idea is that there are better or worse epistemic principles. That doesn't mean we necessarily know them or know them with certainty. The denial that there are better or worse epistemic principles would seem to allow for arbitrariness, for how would it keep it out?
This is the same false dichotomy.
See above. I never said it was a binary. I said that if one claims that one's epistemology is not "anything goes," then not all narratives can be equally correct. But if not all narratives are equally correct then in virtue of what is this judgement made? Nothing about that requires a binary, claims of infallibilism, etc., it simply requires the observation that if one can give no reasons for their standards then their standards are open to arbitrariness.
Likewise, if one claims one's standards are always different in each instance, then presumably the meta-standard by which they judge standards appropriate in each instance is also different in each instance. And the meta-meta-standard will also be unique in each instance. And so on. If this is not arbitrariness, it certainly cannot keep arbitrariness out. For by what metric would any standard be deemed poor in any particular instance?
Note that @J's response is to continually try to restrict the domain to so-called " narratives":
Quoting J
Quoting J
Instead of acknowledging @Count Timothy von Icarus' obvious point that, "Some narratives are not acceptable/true/valid/etc.," @J time and again says, "No, because everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing." Or else, "No, because every narrative within the subset of reasonable narratives must be deemed reasonable."
@J continually fails to answer the questions, fails to stay on topic, and instead recites tautologies. The obvious answer to @J is, "Yes, everyone who deserves a hearing deserves a hearing. But not everyone deserves a hearing, and you yourself do not grant everyone a hearing."
Put differently, there are two theses:
Which thesis is @J's? He keeps equivocating and vacillating between (1) and (2). He begins with (2), and then switches over to (1) when he fails to justify (2), and then after justifying (1) he switches back, pretending as if he has succeeded in justifying (2).
Note that [deserves a hearing] could be replaced with any of the other normative concepts under consideration. Whatever the normative concept, @J's equivocal arguments are the same.
A terminological point...
There are "binaries" involved in your approach. Namely, disjunctions utilizing a contradictory pair. I feel as if we almost need to return to Aristotle's explanation of the difference between a contradictory pair and a contrary pair...
[3], [3a], and (arguably) [4] utilize contradictory pairs, and they are the binaries that @Count Timothy von Icarus is reliant upon. [1] and (arguably) [2] utilize contrary pairs, and they are the strawmen that @J is reliant upon. But all five are presented as binaries, namely as two-place disjunctions with an exclusive-or. We need to avoid letting the word "binary" become yet another pejorative term conveying emotion rather than substance. Or if that's all it has become, then we should not use it if we want to do real philosophy.
See: Square of Opposition
That makes sense. I was thinking "binary" in terms of 2, because this seems to be the objection.
I might add:
5. If one claims standards are wholly unique in every instance then one cannot keep arbitrariness out.
That's a little trickier. But 5 is obviously false as a descriptive claim. To use the example of economics given earlier, it is not the case that economists use different epistemic standards for every question. They do not complete peer review by judging each submission by entirely different standards. And so too for philosophy of science and epistemology.
This gets at one of the unaddressed issues, which is identifying pseudoscience.
And the idea that standards are wholly different in each instance is at odds with the idea that authoritarianism is always inappropriate in epistemology or that only reasonable narratives need be considered.
Also, if you want to make an appeal largely to "reasonableness," this would suggest something like a virtue epistemology (which would be my preference in many respects). But a virtue epistemology has to have virtues, the virtues cannot be different in every instance. And virtues presumably have to be virtues for some reason. Normally, intellectual virtues are considered virtues because they keep false judgements out and help someone attain to truth.
Looking over your conversation, I think this may be worth focusing on:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is asking two good questions -- though first, I'll say again that I don't think the target statement ought to be framed in terms of criteria that are different in every instance. When I posted about this, I talked about different sorts of criteria, more or less keyed to the practice in question. But within a practice, I don't think we need a rethink every single time. The sort of criteria involved will usually do for a host of different problems.
The first question is, "Granted these (allegedly) different sorts of criteria, is there something in virtue of which they are the good/appropriate criteria in each case?" I think the answer is yes and no. There is not "something" -- presumably on a meta-level of discourse -- that allows us to say that any given criterion is qualified to function. But there are certainly facts within the discipline which will suggest to us what such criteria might be, including previous success in advancing the discipline and provoking exciting new questions.
What I think may be a stumbling block here for @Count Timothy von Icarus is the idea that a practice could ever have been successful at all without the sort of agreement on first principles that he has in mind, or at least could have done a lot better with the principles clearly in mind. And here -- you knew I would say this! -- there is no one response to this. Some disciplines may lack success precisely because of insufficient attention to criteria for evaluation and judgment; others may do fine; and most, I think, are somewhere in the middle, carrying on with "doing their thing" while often engaging in robust debate about what principles are to guide them. But it's a good, interesting question.
The second question arises from accepting the idea that "the denial of any overarching principles doesn't lead to arbitrariness in [an] obvious way," as compared to rejecting principles tout court. So we want to know, "But how does this keep arbitrariness out?"
Since this word "arbitrary" has come up so consistently, I'm wondering if possibly some of us are using it to mean different things. But I'm going to use it to mean "not based on any particular reasons; like a throw of the dice." On that understanding, I would answer the second question this way: "It doesn't, but if the discipline is longstanding and has smart, experienced practitioners, quite quickly the demand for good reasons will channel the discussion away from arbitrary and unfounded practices. Furthermore, just about no one presents their views in this way."
Now this kind of response will be unsatisfactory if one really believes that all reasons are obligatory, as someone like Christopher Pincock does. That view entails that, while a proponent of epistemic stance voluntarism thinks they have good reasons, they really don't. Now we can see how a different interpretation of "arbitrary" makes a big difference. If "arbitrary" means "not based on any particular correct reasons," then yes, "being arbitrary" is pretty much what everyone has to be, who doesn't accept the allegedly correct, meta-principle-based reasons. They just don't realize it! But that seems like a very question-begging usage.
It will also be unsatisfactory if one insists that words like "good" and "unfounded" and "doing fine" and "success" need meta-level explanations before the practice can get off the ground. The idea here would be that I must really have some principles in mind, and I'm hiding behind bland, undefined terms like "reasonable," "well-founded," etc. so as to avoid saying what they are, or else acknowledging that I don't know. But again, the appeal is to examine the practice itself. Any discipline is going to be able to offer some working criteria for what is well- and badly-founded argument or evidence within that discipline. So, in the abstract, I can't lay out a one-size-fits-all definition of what a term like "reasonableness" must mean (other than the obvious strictures on what it doesn't countenance), but maybe @Banno and @Count Timothy von Icarus could agree on a sample discipline or practice to examine, and see what they could learn.
Sure, and that way of viewing it is understandable. I probably should have avoided the words "determinate" and "indeterminate," given that @Count Timothy von Icarus did not make that distinction.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, that's right. "Possessing some determinacy vs. possessing no determinacy," is an either/or, not a matter of poles, and this is surely what Count was saying.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, this is a very good question. And I would add that (p ? ~p) is in no way a controversial claim, nor is it controversial that this represents a binary. When one's interlocutors are particularly stubborn one is forced to appeal to very uncontroversial premises. When they deny even these very uncontroversial premises, there is very little else that can be done.
That makes sense.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, good. If a standard is not generalizable then it is not a standard at all. This relates to the connection between a particular and a universal.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, this is all eminently true. I would say that there are so many problems with @J's view that it is a veritable cornucopia of error. Given this, it is important to start with one or two things, and to keep them simple.
If one really wants to try to engage a sophist, it becomes important to establish and then continually re-establish the ground rules. You effectively have to say, "Would you like to play a game?" "Sure." "How about basketball?" "Okay." "And do you accept that we are allowed to dribble when playing basketball?" "Sure, I will agree to that." "That we are allowed to pass?" "Okay." "And to shoot?" "Yes, I suppose I will agree to that."
For @J this would be a pertinent ground rule:
It seems to me that @J does not want to engage in that sort of discussion.
This sort of thing can save a lot of time and energy, even though it shouldn't be necessary for those who are "serious." For example, I could have substituted these three lines for my entire conversation with @Moliere earlier in the thread:
"Do you want to engage in a discussion where we are not allowed to happily contradict ourselves?"
"No, I don't."
"Okay. Thanks for letting me know ahead of time. :up:"
Quoting Banno
Note here that Banno is offering a binary. "Either a contradiction follows or else a contradiction does not follow."
Now if I were Banno I might , "[Why think it is a binary?] Why should it be up to us to demonstrate that the binary does not hold, and not up to you to demonstrate that it does?"
But I'm not Banno, so what I say is, "A contradiction does not follow." Supposing I were undecided about OJ Simpson's guilt, a contradiction would not follow.
---
Quoting Banno
I read that post carefully, even before you referenced it. I don't see him doing that. Can't you spell it out in your own words? What is the putative binary and what is the reason why it does not hold?
Quoting Banno
Above you make the implicit claim, "Either a contradiction follows or else it doesn't." Is it more reasonable that I accept that this is a binary, or that you must provide an argument for why it is a binary? Who has the burden of proof here with respect to the question of whether your statement represents a binary? After all, if your putative binary is not a real binary then it represents a false dichotomy.
Quoting Banno
I concede that if we are doing that then we are engaging in post hoc rationalization, which is impermissible. So now we have our agreed and negotiated rule, namely, "Post hoc rationalization is impermissible." This is a kind of target insofar as we are jointly aiming away from post hoc rationalization. We are agreeing that post hoc rationalization is bad, and we have placed post hoc rationalization "beyond the pale" or "beyond debate." Without doing this sort of thing we will not be able to progress at all.
In this case we have a common rule and two different aims. Or one aim that is shared and two aims that are not shared. But there is a second shared aim, namely the aim of determining whether I have or have not in fact committed a post hoc rationalization. So here is a map of these aims, considered as sets:
Without a shared aim we cannot truly be doing something together, and all aims have some level of determinateness. In this micro-case that shared determinateness is represented by the second and third elements of each set, which are of course shared elements. (Note that we could still engage the practice without that third element, but in that case we would merely be pursuing speculative knowledge rather than also pursuing practical knowledge. The current sets are practical precisely because if Banno were to succeed in his demonstration, then by the agreed rules Leontiskos would be required to abandon his post hoc rationalization. The conclusion bears on the future actions that Leontiskos will be bound to.).
(Note too that we are truly involved in these three aims, even if we are not going to devote an entire or separate discussion to them. These three aims are ingredient in what we are doing right now, in this thread.)
In any case, my point was that having a target and shooting an arrow into the bullseye are two different things. To have a target is not to have succeeded. It is not to have finished. It is to have begun.
Quoting Banno
A vague agreement is a target. Understanding this is crucial in order to understand the position of myself and @Count Timothy von Icarus.
Quoting Banno
"We are going to build something," is also a target. In that case the target is building something. When my nephew takes out his wooden blocks he already has a vague target, even if he doesn't know what he will build. He knows he wants to build something.
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
I agree, if "their epistemology" concerns some actual field of study or practice. The more abstract this gets, the harder it is to generalize about what "goes."
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
A good question, which I hope my earlier reply to you and @Banno addressed.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes! And the crucial thing I want to add is that "knowing them" must occur in a context. There are, I believe, genuinely varying epistemic stances to take, some of which may be better or worse for different circumstances -- but can't we get rid of the specter of arbitrariness? The differences among stances are not going to resemble one person saying "direct realism" and the other saying "I like ice cream cones, so only ice cream!" There will be reasons for the differences, argued case by case among intelligent people. If we fail to agree, that doesn't mean we are in utter darkness about what makes a good epistemic stance.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I suppose that's true, but I keep wondering who are these people who give no reasons for their standards. Is there some particular instance or debate that you have in mind? And is there no way to remove the threat of arbitrariness by offering the standards in context?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
A good question (though "metric" may be pre-judging what's needed). By all means, the best way to look at this kind of question is to choose a particular instance. Sorry again about musicology, if that's not your thing!
Seems like in context is meant to do the same work as in truth, or absolutely, all of these to avoid arbitrariness.
But we can ask of the context type limiter, by virtue of what did you determine the context, or can you be wrong about the choice of context (or if not wrong, can you construct any context you want or feel)? Context identification immediately begs these questions. Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, we are still in a world of arbitrariness. (Which I believe is basically what Count, Leon and I are saying).
But really, if we are all agreeing with each other that arbitrariness is bad, and arguing over whether that which prevents arbitrariness is better framed as either an absolute or a context, maybe we should pause on the distinction between absolute truth and context, and not keep trying to distinguish what happens to arbitrariness as between context defined statements versus absolutely defined statements.
And I do see the looming problem of if context doesnt avoid arbitrariness, but the absolute does, how do we know what is truth or not?
However, to me, the first step in solving a problem is admitting it. Arbitrariness is no use to anyone - how do we avoid it?
(We should almost crack open some champagne here. Any arbitrary champagne will do, but it absolutely has to have alcohol in it.)
As far as I can tell, there has to be an understanding of whether or not we will ever defeat arbitrariness without absolutes and truths, but I think the question can be framed as, can a context do the work of an absolute?
I dont think so.
Whether we ever find absolute truth, whether we get there with a particular, single absolutely true statement about an objective world, is another question, but if we start all these inquiries seeking only statements grounded in context, I think it is clear that we will never get there, by design.
But there are such criteria,* and you have already identified one. You have identified the criterion of good/appropriate. "Good" is precisely a "meta-criterion," if you like. And again, if 'good' has no meaning then your first sentence is nonsensical.
There are characteristics that every discourse has in common, and one is the notion of goodness and badness of contributions (which is also why your mathematics-authoritarianism is incoherent). Every discourse utilizes this notion of what is good and bad, and the meaning of 'good' from one discourse to another is not entirely equivocal. If it were entirely equivocal then we would not be able to use the same word in each discipline.
Much of this may go back to your quandary about the elusive meaning of 'good'.
* They are precisely the Medieval convertibles.
Trouble is, these same questions can be asked of the allegedly absolute standards: "By virtue of what do you determine this standard to be absolute?" and "Can you be wrong about what you're calling absolute?", to which I would add, "How would you know you were wrong?"
Your context-specific questions are entirely appropriate too. My suggestion throughout this discussion has been that the "by virtue of what" question is going to require some appeal to a particular practice in addition to whatever overarching criteriological standards you want to put forth.
I like your framing of "arbitrariness," though, because it's really not something we need to worry about, IMO.
Good point. We could say, "If the contexts are just gerrymandered, then why think their various modes of practice are respectable or coherent?" If the contexts are not merely gerrymandered, then there must be some reason why one context requires one mode of practice and another context requires another mode of practice.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Similarly: Is arbitrariness bad in every context, or only in some contexts? This whole conversation is shot through with overarching context-predications. "Arbitrariness" is one such example.
Quoting Fire Ologist
If we all agree that arbitrariness is beyond the pale, then it looks like we're all "authoritarians" who ultimately deny arbitrariness a hearing.
Quoting J
It's no coincidence that @J thinks we "do not need to worry about" all of the crucial parts of the discussion. He should ask himself if arbitrary explanations are considered bad in all disciplines, or only in some. He should ask himself whether his dictum, "We must always recognize that we could be wrong," is true in all disciplines or only in some. If there are no overarching standards, then surely it is false to say that we must always recognize that we could be wrong.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Your comment was:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You said that if a statement is ruled out, it is denied. Now you want to change that to if a statement is ruled out, it is not true. That is a shift in your position, a partial and begrudging acknowledgement of some of what has been said here, so we will count it as a positive move.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course we can sometimes tell when a statement is wrong. Nothing in what I or J has said says otherwise. So what you say here is way off.
Again, the point is the logical one, that we can say of a statement that it is true, and we can say that it is false, and thirdly sometimes we can say that we don't know it's truth value, and that doing so does not, as your statement quoted above implies, lead immediately to "anything goes".
I'll bold that, becasue it seems to keep being forgotten.
And so much of what you say after that is irrelevant, and misleading. It's just not what has been suggested.
If we are to continue this discussion, it might be kind of you to at least acknowledge the logical point bolded above. Then we might have a common ground. If you think there is an error in the logic, set it out. If, for instance, you think it violates LEM, set out how you understand LEM and how it is violated.
We don't do those. This is serious.
:wink:
Tim's reply makes quite a few assumptions. His reply is that we must assign "these positions are neither true, nor false". But that's not so. We have the option of not assigning a truth value at all.
Now this is exactly what Kripke does in his paper on truth. He begins by explicitly not assigning a truth value to any statement in his system; then assigning "true" to the tautologies; and "true" or "false" to other sentences as they are interpreted. The result is a set of true and false sentences and a set of sentence with no truth value.
The advantage is that liar sentences - "this sentence is false" - are never assigned a truth value. Quite clever, really.
Another interesting aspect is that assigning truth values becomes a process.
And yes, it is legitimate to think of these as the ones for which the truth value is unknown. That's just using Kripke's system to modal epistemic issues.
Glad that you are reading along.
That ain't so, for the reasons given in my reply to Tom, above.
I don't know if OJ killed his wife or not. I've not paid the case much attention, not having much interest in the biography of self-entitled 'mercan celebrities. It's your example, not mine.
I am happy to work with whatever example you might choose, becasue it is the logic that is at issue. Choose another.
And again, your use of LEM needs explanation.
Trying to, but I know as much about logic as I do about genetic engineering.
Yep.
Usually I find myself arguing against idealism or antirealism, but here I find myself against Tim's excessive realism.
There are various arguments that could be deployed against realism here, if it were to be explicitly expressed.
I've explicitly shown how Tim's reply is dependent on an invalid argument. Several times. I'm not sure there is more to be said.
Kripke's account leads to forms of antirealism, with which I am not overly happy. So I'm not offering it as an absolute answer here - just as an example that shows the problem with Tim's attempt to equate not knowing something with not knowing anything.
Do you think such an approach is one that assumes theism and some of the philosophical scaffolding which supports it?
Odd that such an stance should need any defence at all.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Maybe the sage doesn't consciously know why he acts. There are many things we 'know', but can't really explain why we act in a certain way, like say riding a bike or playing an instrument. If living wisely is a praxis too why should we expect an explanation for it not to be arbitrary, or anything goes?
This is the assumption that isn't justified, that everything first must be understood consciously, in terms of universals, before we can be said to know anything.
Well, I was attempting to avoid god, but you asked.
Yep.
I don't think it's a coincidence that Tim and Leon are so adamantly disagreeing with the idea that one can coherently maintain an agnostic position.
I hadn't thought of this, but it's an intriguing parallel to what counts as an intellectual "practice." On this analogy, I want to say that there are elements of just about every practice that are not theoretical, that can only be understood by doing -- and this includes the intellectual ones. And the question we might then pose is, "Is philosophy one of the exceptions here? Could it be a practice which depends for its success on theoretical/rational understanding, or even the possibility of such understanding?" I don't know. True to form, philosophy presents us with a self-reflexive puzzle about its own nature.
...and everyone holds foundational positions...
As you say.
So a large part of the discussion should be about what we can agree on, despite those differences.
And that is basically a liberal stance. As against the authoritarian stance, that one way or another we must force agreement.
Perhaps. I gather that would involve adopting a liberal attitude to interacting with others, accepting that they may have different foundational attitudes without actively engaging with them.
Still writing a reply to your other post.
Of course, there are many here who also take issue with liberalism so there's that. :wink:
There's nothing in belief in god that has to lead to this sort of... antagonism (?)
And nothing in disbelief, either.
I am guessing that you would put that down to being built on top of our emotional preferences, too. But the liberal/authoritarian dimension isn't an accepted emotional fundamental, so far as I am aware - more a part of pop psychology.
SO I don't think that philosophical differences are ultimately "explained" by psychology. I suspect you do?
My intuition is that we respond to all things through prelinguistic emotion and gradually fumble our way to articulate a response. This often consists of a post hoc rationalization of how we feel, (tempered by the influence of upbringing and culture, naturally). But over time, I think we establish a personal web of beliefs that makes many of our responses formulaic - in that they automatically match the presuppositions we have arrived at. Of course, some people are wildly inconsistent, while others are disciplined and rigid.
What is your account?
I agree.
Quoting J
Yes - doesn't this amount to insisting that the discipline at least be self-consistent?
We might even supose after Feyerabend, that a practice could be successful becasue of a disagreement on first principles, of the sort that Tim has in mind; that a tension between fundamentals might well lead to progress. Think of the tension in physics concerning wave-particle duality at the beginning of last century.
Feyerabend would say this is precisely how science often works: progress through pluralism, through the friction between incompatible paradigms or first principles. Agreement can produce stability, but disagreement can produce invention.
"But how does this keep arbitrariness out?" Consistency does this work, seems to me. That together with some variant on Davidson's triangulation, keeping the community - and we are talking about groups of people, not individuals - on a common topic.
I like the method suggested here - it fits in with my own desire to find common ground quite well.
So I suggest that we allow @Count Timothy von Icarus to choose the example, as an act of good will.
Not dissimilar, but i might place much more emphasis on the community than the individual. Not a "personal web of beliefs" - it's public, and learned, and shared.
And so available for discussion (and revision) in a way that private ideas are not.
Which is what we do, here.
It seems that the fundamental opinions of some are less malleable than those of others. I find that interesting and confronting. That resistance to revision one sees even in intelligent, well educated folk.
I guess it kinda grounds my OP - a moral preference for doubt.
Yes to this first part, surely -- that's just conversational civility, I would hope.
". . . . without actively engaging with them."
But is it really necessary to avoid active engagement on fundamentals, in such a case? It might be frustrating and might not produce much shift in position, but done in the right spirit, I think it could help sharpen some questions, always worthwhile.
I was more thinking about whether having very strong beliefs in philosophical absolutes and/or first-principle-type foundations has to go hand in hand with deism or theism. What about someone like Ayn Rand? -- granted, not exactly a world-class philosopher. Her atheism is rooted, according to her, in extremely fixed "objective" foundations. Or even Dennett -- I'm not sure he'd agree to being called a foundationalist, but his faith in physicalism was absolutely unshakable, and seems very much like an indisputable first principle to me.
Oh, not at all. There's a lot here about foundational beliefs and relations to hinge propositions and so on that would be fun to go through.
And there is the tu quoque reply, of course, which is irrefutable, since we all have base beliefs.
I think the issue is methodological - not about what you believe but what you do with it.
Say some more on this.
It also seems to me that some are more preoccupied by certainty or absolutes than others.
Well, we might shift the philosophical weight from ontology or doxastic content to praxis and procedure.
What matters would not be the abstract truth of a belief, but how that belief functions within a system (logic, science, discourse); gets used (for justification, prediction, coercion); survives confrontation (with evidence, argument, or rival beliefs) and integrates with shared methods of reasoning or inquiry.
Ever hear of Fred D'Agostino? DAgostinos take: Instead of asking, What do we all believe? we ask, What kind of practice allows us to live together with our differences?
Ah yes and this is a good question for this forum where we can practice this in microcosm.
Quoting Banno
Would this not mean that some people might practice compassion even whilst holding an ostensibly intolerant belief system? Ye shall know them by their works.
I've been following along even though I haven't much time to engage in depth right now. Is not the 'argument from authority' generally (and rightly) considered to be a fallacious argument in philosophy, or at least contemporary philosophy?
If this is so then debunking an argument from authority would not need to rely on psychological (ad hominem) grounds.
That said, here with Tim and Leon, we seem to be dealing with arguments for authority. Could such arguments stand without also allowing arguments from authority to stand?It seems obvious that all arguments from authority cannot possibly pass muster?which seems to leave us with the obvious and difficult question as to what criteria, in the absence of empirical or logical support, could be used to assess the soundness of any purported authority?
But only up to a point, because if two people have very little in common by way of approach, then they are not doing the same thing. Banno has made clear that he is interested in coherence:
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
So if @Moliere contradicts/"dissects" despite his own incoherence, and @Banno contradicts/dissects for the sake of coherence, then I would say that the two of you are doing significantly different things.
-
- The errors of liberalism would eventually come to light right alongside the errors of the OP, namely as a one-sided and myopic approach. In fact folks of all different persuasions are able to recognize the one-sided individualism of liberalism (as the recent essay contest shows). But the thread isn't there yet, and championing liberalism before the thread naturally arrives at the topic would surely be premature.
Lots of false inferences going on here. With that said:
Quoting Janus
See:
Quoting The Core Fallacies | SEP
(Note too that by appealing to SEP I am already using an argument from authority, namely SEP's authority.)
Expertise is demonstrable within the sciences and practical matters in general. How could expertise of a purported religious authority be demonstrated?
Quoting Moliere
Not quite?I disagreed with an assessment (which I was not accusing you of making) that Hume was merely a nitpicker.
And that seems right. Are you claiming that we could simultaneously claim that a statement is both undecided and ruled out? It seems odd to say that an undecided statement should be ruled out.
Quoting Banno
I don't see @Count Timothy von Icarus saying, "If someone says that they don't know the truth value of a statement, then anything goes."
Note the quote you identify:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And note your interpretation:
Quoting Banno
I don't understand that interpretation (even though I think the content of it is true). What @Count Timothy von Icarus said in that quote was, "If not just anything goes, then some things are denied." Or in the second person, "If you agree that we cannot say that anything goes, then you must be denying some positions." This is back to the Square of Opposition, namely:
Or specifically and literally:
@Count Timothy von Icarus is correct. If you deny
I see the focus on undecided propositions as needlessly complicating the picture. Even so, it introduces modal notions. What I would say is that affirming some proposition as undecided is not enough to allow you to deny
The only thing I can see against Count's quote is a quibble. It is that, "I might say that there are things that do not go, but that no one engages in those things, and therefore I do not deny any live positions even while denying possible positions."
Don't we have lots of threads where this question would be more on topic? It doesn't seem related to the things that have been discussed here.
Edit: It seems like your brain is still in the "What is faith" thread, where you were concerned with these exact same issues.
Neither of us have said that. The strawman has been chugging for so long that it must be rather bored by now. :lol:
Nevertheless:
Quoting J
Banno is partially right, perhaps only by accident.
In order to posit overarching relations between a set of things, that set of things must have some common ground. The theistic notion of God represents a common cause, which establishes common ground among all (created) things. In other words, only if you have a reason to posit some form of common ground between all things do you have warrant to draw all things together under certain notions, relations, truths, etc. God would provide one way to do that, among others.
This is why, for instance, Newman argued that theology is the central discipline within a university (and historically it was). It is the overarching thing that relates to all other things, because it studies The One who unites all things under one heading. Without that central gravitational body the disciplines will fly off into space, unconnected and unconcerned with one another, each in their own self-contained and insular boxes. Without that central gravitational pull you end up with all specialists and no generalists, where the specialists become unable to talk to anyone outside their field.
One does what one can...
That's a fine question.
The fallacy of arguments from authority is an informal fallacy - it's not a logical fallacy as such, not false becasue of the structure of the argument. it's not a fallacy to pay attention to the thoughts of someone who has authority...
Listen to your doctor, for fuck's sake. Then question them to make sure they have paid attention to you and know your circumstances and are up to date on the research!
Authority does not grant immunity to critique. Not even for priests.
But that for and from bit needs some thinking...
I think you're rather missing my point, but this is quite common for you -- if you can't understand why someone would say something then you conclude that they must be incoherent.
But it could be that you just don't understand someone, and they only appear incoherent to you.
Something we agree upon is that we can make inferences at this more local level. So insofar that I choose a logic for a situation and it's understood by the people for whom it's meant then we can make inferences. It just takes communication between people building a relationship rather than arguments in epistemology to do it. Or, rather, these discussions are the very same thing as doing epistemology -- but it cannot be done away from the group for whom it's meant.
I wouldn't say this is for the sake of incoherence. That's not a very hard goal to obtain.
The topic is philosophical method. Your posts are bang on topic.
Ahh OK. Makes sense to me. There's the critical side and the builder side. What do you have in mind when thinking of Hume as a builder? The Dialogues, or would you say he's sort of both like a lot of the philosophers that are the usual names probably will be?
His History of England, surely!
:D
Quoting Banno
The danger is not just when those in authority tell themselves stories free of critique, but stories that only reinforce their authority, not justifying it so much as entrenching it; stories that silence dissent, or only permit dissent of a certain, agreeable sort.
Imagine an Aristotelian who only allows the use of Aristotelian logic.
This Aristotelian insists that all valid reasoning must proceed via syllogism, that the law of non-contradiction is inviolable, and that every proposition must be either true or false no tertium quid. No paraconsistent logic, no many-valued systems, no relevance logic, and certainly no quantum superpositions.
Anyone presenting a counterexample is either misled or misusing language. If it seems like a contradiction can be true, the Aristotelian says, you must have failed to grasp the essence of the terms.
This Aristotelian doesnt just believe in Aristotles logic theyve made it a gatekeeping method. No proposition that requires another logical system can even get in the door. Thats not reasoned rejection; its methodological foreclosure.
Of course, that would never happen.
They are logically questionable. They attack the person, not the claim. They shift focus from argument to biography. But mostly, tu quoque's a continuation of that very authoritarianism - If only the perfectly consistent may critique others, no one may critique anything - except the philosopher kings. This is at best a recipe for epistemic paralysis no norms can be defended, because any attempt to do so can be deflected with tu quoque.
Your logical fallacy is...
Are you seriously advancing the epistemic position that no one is ever wrong but that the two options would be: "yes I agree," and "I don't know?"
"My epistemology isn't 'anything goes' but in it absolutely no one is ever wrong." Sounds like "anything goes," to me
Second, I think you're also conflating multiple senses of "undecided" here. There is:
1. We personally do not know the answer.
2. The positive statement that one knows that no one can know the answer.
3. The positive statement that one known that the position in question is neither true nor false.
These are three different things. When people have resistance to "I don't know," it is normally not on account of 1, but on account of 2, generally when there is equivocation between 1 and 2 and it is used to advance some sort of positive claim.
So for instance, if I don't know anything about molecular biology, it would make no sense for me to demand that my local school district not teach theories in molecular biology. Likewise, objecting to creationism being taught in schools only makes sense if one thinks it is likely false, or at least unlikely to be true, not because one "doesn't know" if it is likely to be true or not. But it's popular to equivocate between 1 and 2 on this issue.
"I don't know" is objected to because an appeal to one's own ignorance, masquerading a "modesty," is often used to advance positive claims as decisive. For instance, "I don't know issues related to the human good, therefore we should "bracket out" everything I don't accept and advance my liberal political theory, anthropology, and ideology on the whole of society." Or "I don't know if realism or nominalism is true so we'll have to 'bracket' and just presuppose my preference for nominalism is true." That sort of thing. If people don't use their own professions of ignorance to justify claims, then I think "I don't know," is only going to annoy people when it's obvious intransigence.
Right, so this is an appeal to a sort of virtue epistemology. Virtues are principles, so I can get behind that. However, I don't think "smart" and "experienced," are necessarily good virtues here. Consider the examples of Aryan physics, socialist genetics, phrenology, etc., which were created by intelligent, experienced scientists.
Practices have to be open to external critique by some additional standard or else there is no way to identify pseudoscience. You get all the issues of the hermetically sealed magisterium otherwise.
Here is the classic answer: sciences are based on per se predication, what is essential to things. And it is not essential to living beings that they are observed on Tuesdays, so we do not have a sui generis "Tuesday biology," nor is it essential to physical processes that they are researched by Jewish scientists so we cannot have a "Jewish physics." This isn't a silver bullet, but it captures most of the egregious examples.
But from your response, it seems like what you really have is just loose criteria for "when people deserve a hearing," or are "reasonable" and not really anything about correctness or truth per se. Yet might this preference for current practice and what is deemed "reasonable" tend towards ruling out radical critique? If we were having this conversation just 100 years ago, perhaps a bit more, the proposition that "women and Africans have comparable mental abilities to European men" would be considered "unreasonable" by many, including smart, thoughtful people engaged in relevant practices.
Hence, it seems that there are general principles here vis-á-vis various sorts of bias that are inappropriate. And these issues are still with us. One of the things the replication crises have exposed is that fields that became ideological echo chambers became very willing to accept and teach prima facie very hard to believe conclusions as "well supported" if they just so happened to support ideological agendas.
Not at all.
I'm inclined to respond that all of this, taken together, is another way of showing how a practice advances -- not by finding first principles and sticking to them, but by a kind of build-your-boat-on-the- ocean method. Eugenics or racial anthropology, 100 years ago, were given a respectful hearing, but also immediately questioned and debated. And what followed? They've been demoted to pseudo-sciences, undeserving of serious consideration. I think we'd agree that this is the way it's supposed to happen. My view is that it doesn't happen because of a rigorous appeal to standards or principles. It's a constant back and forth between trying to clarify such things, watching what happens when different answers are tried, and allowing input from other disciplines (in this case, ethics) to help us decide. Also, of course, with science, we want results we can test and confirm.
So I'll just highlight this, as probably not necessary:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm all for external critique as part of the mix, but to say that science needs a non-scientific standard to identify pseudo-science seems to go too far.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, exactly. The conversation, and the practice, goes on. We work on finding the principles appropriate to our discipline, some smart dude or dudess disagrees, and lo . . . a new conversation!
It depends on what you're talking about. When you are ignorant of the facts, it certainly does appear that "anything goes", or "anything is possible". That is what probability and randomness are - projections of our ignorance. While probabilities seem to narrow down the list of possible truths, randomness seems to imply that anything goes. A probability is probable, but all probabilities are possible.
I wonder if "smart" and "experienced" were the criteria in these cases?
There's something common among these pseud-sciences -- namely that they have their conclusion in the name. There is an ideological filter by which one can become this or that scientist, or one must have the correctly shaped skull to truly understand phrenology, or whatever.
Rather than a set of positive principles for productive science I'd say there are some generally common markers for pseudo-science. The important thing here is to allow creativity on the productive side: If we don't know everything then we simply won't be able to formulate all the principles that we'll ever need to generate knowledge.
We can and will try. But I don't think we should be looking at pseudo-science as a basis for our philosophies of knowledge -- we have knowledge, and we know that's not knowledge, so our theorizing about knowledge ought to ignore them.
I'm not certain there's principles for identifying pseudo-science, but there is the notion of degenerative programs rather than generative programs -- in some way a science can become this echo chamber, as you noted. But as the process goes on we suddenly have a name "The crisis of reproduction in the sciences" and we can investigate "What's this then?"
With Nazi/Jewish science I think we see that as degenerative -- it excludes minds that could very well help the project for reasons that aren't scientific. They are obviously political. Same with socialist science and all the rest. There's an identity attached to them such that there's a person whose better than others on the basis of some trait -- but that trait is a social designation, or something which a practioner has to confer upon someone as one of the clean (like Freud's psychoanalysis)
Lastly though -- the most damning thing about these is that they have in fact been considered respectable at times. So even if a science is respectable that does not then mean it is true, or knowledge, or what-have-you because we come to respect things for reasons other than what makes a sound inference. So we have to check, in a particular case, if that is what's happening here or not -- but we won't have a rule ahead of time for the invented pseudo-sciences of the future. We'll have seen some and have a general idea of what to look for -- but to do the identifying it'll take conversations like this with shared norms of discourse. And human beings pretty much only do that when they trust one another.
Ok, really? The issue is not the issue?
What about the framing (context) do you like? Although Id rather have you explain how that answers the question you dont think we need to worry about.
Im a data privacy and security lawyer, manage many employees as a founder of my firm, and manage them one on one, mentoring new attorneys and old attorneys learning this new practice, And I learn with them, building a practice area that is still about 15 years new and growing and evolving. Most of my clients are entities that have been hacked causing data theft, ransomware events, and other fraud and compliance issues. Giant companies and mom and pop entities.
Can you think of something more amorphous than lawyers interpreting new laws and framing the context of new types of facts to make new arguments with other lawyers? I am utterly beset on all sides with gray ambiguity, unknown origins, unknown goals, on uncharted territory. Basically people being people in a virtual world.
As a lawyer, at work in the real world, where information is like concrete, a raw material, when things are broken, businesses are threatened, bankruptcy looming, and no one knows the truth or the facts or maybe even what the real issue is, I still have to speak. It is my job to frame the context and make an argument and represent my clients interests to help them defeat interests and people who are against them. Most of the time we are all drowning in it depends and the answer is unproven or untested or the law has not been interpreted by any courts or there are contradictory interpretations in various courts depending on the jurisdiction.
In this world of uncertainty, I have to build something so solid I can charge businesses and insurance companies money for it. I have to justify my words and arguments and say what is and what is real and who is wrong and who is absolutely full of shit and what this means and what it does not mean so that people with competing interests all come to agreement; all ina climate where everything is constantly dissected. The arguments and interpretations I make convince my client to let me speak for them, convince the people and regulators suing my client to go away, and convince the insurance companies to pay for it all.
Indeterminacy, does not work or function or get me or my partners and employees paid, despite most of what I work with being indeterminate.
In this virtually new mix, if I identify no absolutes, certainties and objective truths, I will absolutely fail. Companies wont listen to me and will falter, and lives will be impacted, in the real world. I only succeed when I demonstrate something undeniable, the absolute - words you can take to the bank, even if the cost creates great risk. Sometimes I convince people to pay their detractors, not me, millions, or pay for expensive forensic investigations, for public notices of a breach, all things that only seem to hurt them, but for sake of what is still in their best interest.
I have to convince everyone of the same thing, no matter what their biases and contexts or goals.
Do you think I could get away with the following discussion with all of these competing stakeholders if the result costed money? How about big money?
You and Banno have said a few times basically that the truth of statements is not arbitrary - that one statement can be true for one reason and another statement is true for another reason.
You said it is context that prevents arbitrariness, and prevents meaninglessness, or allows stating an opinion to serve a function as a statement.
But you have also said that, along with the arbitrary, authoritarian absolutes are also bad. That stating something is absolutely true is basically wishful story-telling, because only a tyrant would say he knows or could say what is truth absolutely.
Right? This is your position:
[i]The arbitrary is bad.
The authoritarian is bad.
Opinions have context to give them a value.
Nothing more to ask about in this context.
Nothing more needs to be said.
I will send you my bill for the wisdom in the morning.
And oh, by the way, if you ask me: either all statements are true or they are not, but if not, by virtue of what are they not true? My answer is, it doesnt matter, and I wont answer.[/i]
That is your current position here.
Well that is incoherent. You wont get paid yet - it doesnt cash out.
Count, Leon and I have showed you and Banno how it doesnt work probably 15 distinct times and ways now across many more posts. (Once was enough to beg a reply that has not come.)
You need to be able to answer this question. I will happily address any/all questions but one at a time. Right now, we need to discuss context or absolute truth versus arbitrariness
You can have any opinion you want. But if you want me to pay you for it, it better be the right one or the ground will continue to crumble beneath us.
Answer the simple question. Whatever the answer is, Im not seeing it, and neither is Count or Leon.
If the answer is, there is no truth, we know nothing absolutely, so the context in which every opinion sits can never be certified or ultimately proven certain, and so the value of every opinion is as arbitrary as the next one, then so be it. Tell me that. Thats what I am paying for. Something that hangs together that we can try to apply and show the value of in the real world.
The word authoritarian on this entire thread is a euphemism, and a metaphor. They way you and Banno and others dodge and weave around the questions make sense, where contexts shift to make any assertions whatsoever stand. Who is behaving like a tyrant, answering to no one in this debate?
We are still just philosophers, all of us literally just talking, blowing in the wind - if we want our arguments to have any impact IRL we better hope they might possibly be binding and absolute, because faced with absolute truth, people lie and cheat anyway, even when the arguments are air tight.
Rigging contexts will only get us so far, because it is still just more gray indeterminacy, able to be fire framed and deconstructed endlessly.
I would have an easy time convincing a majority of people that you and Banno are dodging the issues and questions.
Id be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.
And then the Judge would force you to answer are all narratives acceptable or not? The most liberal progressive judge would demand, in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say all narratives may be true stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the truth you swore, since you wont answer the question and think it doesnt matter.
I can hear the charges of more authoritarian judgmental demands. Its just a debate. You arent really on the stand. I dont really have any power over you. Whatever you say wont change how you choose to live and whatever you do next. I can be as much a tyrant or slave as I want IRL and so can you - that is what matters not in this debate.
But if its a debate, why not just answer the question?
Why you analytic dissectors and logicians think you can make these arguments is baffling.
[b]In the OP, Banno said something like maybe you need both the discursive narrative and the analytic dissectors.
Maybe??! That is a central issue here - wherefore the ability to make stuff up as Banno and Witt frame metaphysics? This is not a small admission, even if only hinted at by Banno.
Then later, Banno suggested reframing analogies as working together on a construction but not knowing the final result. This again is a huge admission. Working together implies something common - a work bench where we come together. It fixes something absolute, that neither can deny in order to work towards some unknown final result.
And I pointed out NONE of us like arbitrariness.
Non-arbitrariness should now be the anchor (or unknown X we keep in mind). We are all trying to say how non-arbitrariness is a possibility, because we all agree and have said in one way or another, arbitrariness is bad.[/b]
Quoting Fire Ologist
Quoting Leontiskos
I think @Fire Ologist's notion of context carving or gerrymandering is apt and insightful. This sort of thing seems central to @J's argumentation.
This is the analogue of gerrymandering:
Here are some concrete ways @J relies on gerrymandering:
@J does the same thing with other concepts, such as "reasonable," "valid," "equally true," etc.
Quoting Leontiskos
I generally think that's where our intuitive appeals will come from first -- the trade that one survives in is the home of a person's mind. I like to make the joke that the cobbler sees the universe like one big shoe.
It's exactly in that context that I think you can begin to see a sense of coherency -- when people are aligned towards some goal or other they tend to put aside the various nit-picks which philosophers like to investigate and try to focus on what matters to the mission (namely, of making a living)
But then different trades use different norms. And therein lies the difficulty, especially since each person's trade will feel very certain to them. It's a day-to-day reinforcement of a habit of thought so it couldn't not do so.
My solution, still, is in trying to listen to one another and build a relationship of trust. Note that this answers the question without giving particular details on how to go about it or which virtues are pertinent. I think that has to be settled amongst the practitioners of a particular trade (or, in the cases of science, a research program or what-have-you), and least of all by philosophers.
This is so interesting! Naivete among those who work in the real world, such as yourself, is very rare.
Quoting Fire Ologist
:up: :fire:
Quoting Fire Ologist
I have been thinking the same thing. If "authoritarianism" is naturally interpreted as "tyranny," then the ones who are refusing to answer questions and refusing provide argumentation are clearly engaged in a form of tyranny. Imposing a thesis on others without rational substantiation, and without addressing their concerns, could be the definition of tyranny.
Quoting Fire Ologist
It's true. A respect for charity cannot prevent us from seeing reality, from acknowledging that evasive dodging does happen, and that it is happening left and right in this thread.
Quoting Fire Ologist
A good common cause. :up:
That was an enlightening post. I had been thinking to myself for some time, "@Fire Ologist seems like he is somewhat new to philosophy. I don't think he has studied it formally or anything like that. Still, he has a remarkable knack for getting things right and seeing through the smokescreens, even on a forum where lots of people are blowing smoke. That's pretty difficult to do. I wonder how he does it? I wonder if he can maintain it?"
Now I see the answers to the questions I was asking in my head. :wink:
You left out one part. In order to listen, someone needs to say something to listen to.
We say as metaphysicians.
We listen as analytics.
We trust each other on the dialogue together.
Historically, these examples were resolved by an appeal to principles considered valid across the lines of the presumed disciplines though. That is, appeals to standards of objectivity, that post hoc rationalization is not good reasoning, the notion that the political or ethnic identity of the scientist is accidental to the science's subject matter, appeals to the principle of non-contradiction when consensus/authorities in different fields contradicted one another, standards of valid arguments, etc.
If there is a bad consensus and bad practices, they don't just work themselves out through discourse as a sort of random brownian motion. Or at least, they haven't historically, and they wouldn't do so quickly. The replication crisis for instance spanned many fields because the idea was that the principles that were being poorly applied in social psychology were relevant for other fields because they were general. Likewise, the Sokal Affair and later replications weren't taken to apply only to specific journals are reviewers, but represented a problem in practice.
Oh, definitely. Or, rather, they work themselves out through discussion -- but not in a sort of random brownian motion.
I don't mind a resolution by an appeal to principles -- I'm just skeptical of them being universal principles for all time and space and every thinker ever that has been is and will be. Not that you're putting something like that forward, exactly. The two thinkers I've named are Hegel and Marx that seem to fall into the world-builders trap. Maybe we could say that there are faults of individuals and faults of groups? Something along those lines?
I'm looking for an evaluative dimension to cross across the world-builder/dissector dimension, which I'm thus far taking to be descriptive (with the extremes serving as warnings)
None?
So falsifying your data so that you can gain fame and wealth is can [I]sometimes[/I] good practice vis-á-vis good inquiry?
Yup. Only sometimes. (in the logical sense -- in our phenomenological sense, many times)
There are parts of science that aren't exactly falsifiable, but are the conditions on which falsifiability is built. The conservation of energy strikes me as a possible candidate here. But Feyerabend's Against Method does a much better job of using Galileo and noting how by our standards we propose today, like falsifiability, if Galileo had been held to them then his worldview would have been set aside as impossible. The spheres had better predictive power than Galileo, at least by my understanding from that book. The instruments which Galileo were using were rudimentary and imprecise in comparison to the old instruments.
The important lesson there is that Galileo was a rules-breaker with respect to good epistemic practice, especially in his time, but his creativity and diligence are what made his theory last. (Though I think it being true helped us accept it over the various methodological problems we might pose towards Galileo's inference -- truth has a way of being persuasive even if you don't follow all the rules)
It is very gratifying to see this. There has been an unfortunate level of gaslighting in this thread, where the tyrannous accuse others of tyranny, and those who are not willing to engage in argumentation accuse others of irrationality. That's how it always goes, but it is still unfortunate to see @Count Timothy von Icarus, who is a hallmark of earnest engagement, saying things like this while consulting ChatGPT:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Moral of the story: when the guy accusing you of authoritarianism is not willing to offer answers to questions repeatedly asked, you don't have to worry about his accusations. The charges of authoritarianism in this thread are little more than an attempt to get what one wants without engaging in any reasoning or argument at all.
Quoting Moliere
*Sigh*
But at least you're willing to be consistent in the position and bite bullets.
Glad you see it as at least consistent.
Bullets are my philosophical breakfast :)
To be fair, by this logic, it wouldn't [I]necessarily[/I] be bad to simply lie about one's position for advantage here. :cool:
The rest of this seems unrelated to the basic principle that intentionally lying and falsifying is not good for inquiry.
But yes, falsification has its weaknesses. Newton was also almost immediately falsified, but instead of rejecting the theory people posited additional massive bodies (the outer gas giants) at the edge of the solar system to explain the irregular orbits of (then) outer planets. And we did indeed find those planets eventually. Mach famously declared the atom to be unfalsifiable and the quark was derided in similar grounds, as well as the anti-particles.
Yet there is a certain sort of falsifiability that I think is a very general principle. Chesterton explains this sort very well in terms of paranoid delusions:
But sometimes whole movements have fallen into this, e.g. where any criticism of Marxism is just evidence of Marxism.
Not only is this a misunderstanding of tu quoque, it is an invidious attempt to pre-invalidate any replies that might come.
You are being lazy. You are avoiding philosophical argumentation. You answer @Count Timothy von Icarus with one-sentence posts and you don't even attempt to try to answer me. You'd rather share short quips in your echo chamber, with those who agreed with you before the thread even started. There are a half-dozen posts in the last few pages that you haven't even attempted to address.
There is no need for appeals to authority because the answer can be made obvious. You can, if you really want, separate 112 beans into groups of 8. It is clear when the emperor wears no clothes. Whereas appeals to standing practice and consensus open to door to authoritarianism precisely because authority can manufacture both of these.
Consider the classical image of Justice. She is not presented as exceptionally virtuous (hard to do in a statue). She is not surrounded by a crowd who agrees with herrather she stands alone. She is not looking to some crowd, or upwards to some authority. Rather, she wears a blindfold. She carries no membership card, but rather scales. And the scales decide the issue, not her. Nor does she pull out different scales for the rich, for women, for the foreigner, nor use different scales in each instance. If she used different scales in each instance, we might worry that the choice of scale decides the issue. And it is for precisely this reason that she is justified in carrying her sword.
This is not to say that appeals to authority, practice, virtue, or consensus are never warranted, just that they aren't ideal. They are needed for where principles have less clear purchase.
No, your position is by definition incoherent. I outlined it <here>.
Let me be frank. The fundamental problem for you and @J is that you overestimate yourselves. You put yourselves on a pedestal when in fact you require instruction. The student who fashions himself a teacher is a huge liability both to himself and to others. He would do better to doubt his own ability, recognize that he does not understand and is unable to answer the questions being posed to him, and then don the habit of the novice. Instead of appealing to contradictory senses of the Liar's Paradox every time he finds himself in trouble, he should say, "I don't know. I don't have a good answer to your question. But I recognize the question and will think about it. I see how it creates problems for the position I laid out. I am not going to give a superficial and reactionary response in three seconds."
This is at the bottom of @J's tirade about authoritarianism. He doesn't want us to take professional philosophers seriously; he wants us to take himself seriously. He wants recognition and respect without doing the work of earning it, and his various threads on Kimhi and Rodl have stymied his achievement of that recognition. So after everyone agreed that so many of those threads went nowhere and were not worthwhile, @J pivots to the general rule for the sake of his own particularity, "We have to take everyone seriously! We have to deem every position worthwhile!"
The irony here is that people see the positions of novices as worthwhile, as long as the person recognizes that their own position is that of a novice. But if a novice who constantly contradicts themselves, fails to respond to objections, fails to correctly interpret texts, etc., is also arrogant and demanding of respect, then obviously their positions are not deemed worthwhile. Superficiality with a potency for improvement is deemed worthwhile; prideful superficiality which is incapable of self-critique and self-knowledge is not.
This is all true even though the tu quoque will inevitably come. It will be said that this all applies to me. I admit that I am not a "professional" philosopher, but the spectrum still holds. I have a degree in philosophy and I have done graduate work in philosophy. I am intermediate. Most crucially, I accept that I cannot contradict myself and I respond to questions and objections as stated. And it is worth noting that I do not group @Banno with @Moliere and @J. Banno really is not a novice in that way.
Yes, good. This is why I wouldn't have used the word "authority" in sentences like this one:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The more generic term would be rule or criterion, where an authority is one type of criterion.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
There is a notion floating about that authoritarianism has to do with appeals to authority. I don't think that's right. I think authoritarianism has to do with tyranny, as @Fire Ologist pointed out. An appeal to authority is a form of argumentation. Tyrants do not care about argumentation.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Hmm. There is circular reasoning here. If appeals to consensus lead to authoritarianism, and authorities manufacture appeals to consensus, then the authority must have existed even before the appeal to consensus occurred. We can't say that the first causes the second and the second causes the first. Even if we posit a spiraling up, it has to start somewhere. I think you need to replace "authority" with "power."
More directly, as Aristotle says, a democracy can be tyrannous. Appeal to consensus can be tyrannous ("authoritarian") when the consensus absolutizes itself. This is closely related to the subset of arguments from authority that are fallacious.
Note that when @J or @Janus ground truth in intersubjective agreement they are absolutizing consensus in precisely this way.
Where have I put myself on a pedestal?
That'd be a rule which I agree with that I wouldn't want to do. That is, I'd say putting yourself on a pedestal is a bad thing -- where I somehow gain immunity to criticism and you somehow are more vulnerable to criticism.
What instruction do I require? What would that do, other than make me agree with you?
No one tries to control what they know cannot be controlled. Thus a tyrant will generally not try to control mathematics, given that mathematics is so hard to manipulate. Granted, we see the tyrants of Critical Theory trying to do precisely that, but the move is still uncommon. Along the same lines, we saw the Soviet Communists try to do similar things in relation to dialectical materialism.
But on the whole a tyrant will limit themselves to manipulating what can be manipulated, and fields with clear and transparent standards are more difficult to manipulate. So I think your thesis here is basically correct. This is closely related to what I said here:
Quoting Leontiskos
For example, engaging earnestly in moral philosophy requires being willing to change one's behavior, but given that few are willing to change their behavior and question their status quo, it follows that few are able to truly engage in moral philosophy. More simply: the tyrannous passions within us make it difficult to do moral philosophy objectively.
That you grant yourself the ability to contradict yourself while denying others the ability to contradict themselves would be one example.
Quoting Moliere
These are the words of every headstrong student to their teacher. This mindset is precisely what precludes learning and knowledge.
I require instruction, and there are many places I can go for it. If one does not recognize that not every position is equally correct, then they cannot learn anything, they cannot know anything, and they are by definition not teachable.
I don't grant myself that ability, though. That's your interpretation which I'm attempting to demonstrate as false.
You have your stories about why it is I do, which you've posted, but I don't believe those stories are true.
I don't know how to respond to them, though.
Quoting Leontiskos
It does, you're right.
So here on TPF the only way a teacher-student relationship can develop is by some mutual understanding. What I've called trust.
I trust you are pursuing the truth, else I wouldn't put up with all of this frustration that you likely mutually feel :D
Earlier I said something about the teacher-student relationship -- mostly to note that on TPF we have to start at a position of equality even if you know you know more than the interloctor.
We are all equal here, and have to build ways of learning/teaching from that paradigm, rather than the usual paradigm.
And I hope I've demonstrated my willingness to be a student at this point. There are more examples than @Banno, tho he might be the only one who cares enough to chime in on that.
Let me repeat this:
Quoting Leontiskos
If we do not admit that knowledge exists, that some things are right, and that some things are wrong, then we have banished ourselves to ignorance.
We must also admit that, just as not all propositions are true, so too not all thinkers are equal. Making everyone equal prevents one from learning, because it prevents one from seeing that someone else knows something that you do not. Democratic culture balks at the words "inferior" and "superior," but they are apt and useful words. Some of my philosophical superiors on TPF would include Paine, apokrisis, and Pierre-Normand. If you look at my discussions with them you will see that I am very deferential and open-minded; that I am much more careful and precise in my reasoning. That discrimination between superiors, inferiors, and equals is very important if one is to progress. This is why @J discriminates between professional philosophers and non-professional philosophers. He sees that the former have more to teach him than the latter, and hence demand a more docile and teachable disposition.
Note too that if @Count Timothy von Icarus and I were either "monists" or pluralists, then would be unable to accept my criticism and improve his paper. He could not have learned anything new if he hadn't presupposed that not everything is equally correct. In that case his paper would never be able to increase or decrease in quality. One sentence would be as good as any other. Recognizing the fact of intellectual inequality is indispensable for everyone who is interested in the intellectual life. Those near the bottom of the totem pole are most tempted to reject this fact, and this is why such people are in special need of humility.
(I've made this reasoning more precise in previous posts, such as <this one>.)
I know this is a standard way of looking at the world, especially as a teacher.
We can't "make everyone equal" in the factual sense, but we can treat everyone equally in the evaluative sense. And, in fact, I think we learn more from doing that. It's the small voices, the different perspectives, the things thought false that usually bring about some new way to answer the old questions.
Quoting Leontiskos
I think this is more in your imagination than true -- capitalism is deeply hierarchal. "inferior" and "superior" are the words you wouldn't use on the basis of the faux-equality of liberal-capitalism, but the hierarchical relationship is there. And I'd equate, in our day and age, liberalism with capitalism.
"Superior" and "inferior" are used all the time when it comes to money and power -- maybe not in those words, but they'll say something like "I'm not so sure about that person in this respect..." -- whenever money or power are at stake "inferior/superior" is a concept, even if not named as such.
Heh. I like all of them -- we've had our bouts before and I know I'm different from each. But I thank them for their contributions to this website and my mind. They're wonderful posters.
@apokrisis and I have a longstanding difference that I don't know how to work through. @Paine and I simply get along, so far as I know. @Pierre-Normand pursued the profession where I did not, but we've had fruitful conversations with respect to philosophy before.
I myself don't care to be a superior. But I don't want to be considered an inferior, either, unless I sign up for it. I have to accept that I must be a student in order to learn from a teacher here. In the extreme: If I did not do so then every post would be part of my belief system. I think that's the sort of thing you've been noting as bad: where the standards are so loose that you can say anything at all to anyone at all at anytime for whatever reason.
Hopefully, in this description, you see I agree that's a problem.
I don't think it is very important as much as it's a habit of philosophy. It works, but there's other ways of doing philosophy. I think teacher-student is an important relationship, but not in the hierarchical sense exactly. Or, at least, here on TPF we have no choice but to try to build those relationships without hierarchy -- we really are just some strangers on the internet who happen to like reading philosophy.
Oh, I have no problem with people wanting to differentiate between the good and the bad. We have to at some point, right? Else we'll get stuck in paralysis.
I only think that in so deciding we don't express something so universal as "Standards of knowledge for all time and space and thinkers" -- seems a stretch now. A tempting stretch, but a stretch nonetheless.
Quoting Moliere
I gave an argument and you basically appealed to your "equality doctrine" and classed it as, "A standard way of looking at the world" - that as a way of dismissing or marginalizing it. What you should do instead is address the argument.
Quoting Moliere
Okay, but is it true to view it as a problem or is such a view merely, "A standard way of looking at the world"?
Quoting Moliere
Okay good, this is precisely the point. "Superior" and "inferior" are relative terms for "good" and "bad." It is literally impossible to differentiate between good and bad without differentiating between superior and inferior.
Quoting Moliere
It's actually pretty obvious that there are universal standards for knowledge. Like truth, for instance. Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false. That's a standard for knowledge. What is the dogma that militates against such obvious facts?
I thought I did, but I'll try again.
Quoting Leontiskos
Making everyone equal does not prevent learning. At least as a default assumption in a conversation -- I'll admit that hubris is bad, that headstrong students are often wrong, and other such mistakes -- but here we have to assume that we've all at least read some philosophy and the best way to proceed isn't teacher-student, but peer to peer. At least as a default.
Only upon agreeing to certain ways of arguing could we teach one another, I think? Even if that be "I am the student"
Quoting Leontiskos
Here I'd be frustrating and say both/and -- but I'm still trying to find a place where we can actually talk rather than do the merry-go-round.
Quoting Leontiskos
Eventually we'll disagree again on this. :D -- "what is superior, the beautiful or the sublime?" is the first question that comes to mind.
Quoting Leontiskos
That's a good example, but not one I'm ready to go into in this thread. I'll concede that knowledge is true for the most part. It's that "for the most part" that I imagine we'll disagree. But I also think that so far out there that it'd take us so far astray as to start a new thread of thought.
You don't give any arguments for that assertion. Be that as it may, I will give you another argument for my own position.
If I am to learn something from another person, then I must see that that person knows something that I do not know. If someone knows something that I do not know, then we are not equal. He knows more than me, and therefore has more knowledge than I do. Our knowledge is not equal, particularly on the matter under consideration.
You are probably wanting to appeal to this:
Quoting Moliere
This is incoherent, although it is hard for the Western liberal to understand. Suppose I gave you two pieces of wood and said, "Make them equal, not in the factual sense, but in the evaluative sense." This is just hand-waving.
If I see that someone has knowledge that I do not have, then they are not my equal (with respect to the knowledge in question). They might be my equal in some other way. They might be the same height as I am, for instance. But they are not my equal in knowledge, which is precisely what we are talking about. My inferiors might possess knowledge that I do not have, but they will be less likely to possess it on any given occasion than my superiors. That is why I pay more attention to my superiors.
Quoting Moliere
Then you've contradicted yourself again. You've said it's true but not truer than anything else, so to speak.
Quoting Moliere
So do you think it is coherent to say, "X is good, Y is bad, and X is not superior to Y"?
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Moliere
I said, "Knowledge is supposed to be true and not false." Apparently you think that sometimes, "Knowledge is supposed to be false and not true." I think that's crazy, but we can leave it for another day, as you say.
Indeed. It's sort of a weird mix of both though. Because of the washing out of cultural norms and institutions by capitalism and liberalism, and liberalism's banishment of non-liberal approved virtues (which are quite thin) from education and public life, and the presumption of "equality" and a "classless society," people become hyper focused on a narrow range of status symbols. Fukuyama addresses this. When everyone becomes "equal," people strive for new ways to rise above the crowd. But not all of these will be healthy.
Hence, the heavy focus on wealth, elite education, status, and increasingly, sex as one of the last forms of validation not to be fully commodified or driven from the culture. As participation in civic organizations, churches, unions, etc. have collapsed, and become more precarious, people have fewer sources for thymos outside the market (or the "sexual market"). In my whole career I have had a single person ask me for a raise on the grounds that they needed more money due to personal issues. I have had countless people ask for raises with seemingly no concern for the money, because they took it as a sign of worth (and indeed, self-help books for careerists stress this heavily).
I read an article in the Atlantic a while back on this sort of thing. Cultural balkanization and the replacement of America's particular blend of Protestant Christianity with a secular liberal capitalist ethos had eroded its pretensions to be a classless society because all appeals to excellence were slowly boiled down to market power. Even the cachet of elite taste has increasingly waned. The exemplar tech bro or stock trader is not possessed of the elite tastes of past ruling classes.
This is problematic in the way all status obsessed societies are, but more so. First, because of capitalisms' intense short-termism and insatiable hunger for growth, which courts ecological disaster, but also on wholly aesthetic grounds. Homer already knew his arete obsessed Greeks were missing something, that the quest for glory was ultimately hollow. But at least there was some beauty in it. With capitalism we get the ugly reign of quantity, without the thymotic glory of warrior cultures, or more appealingly, the sublimation of that violence into high art, or things like the Japanese tea ceremony. The knight, samurai, or the hoplite certainly has more going for them than the Wall St. suit.
I partially blame firearms and high explosives for making war increasingly a crap shoot that is no longer dependent on physical abilities. It's a sort of kinetic Marxism! The Japanese had the right of it in banning guns in favor of the katana. :rofl: :cool:
Kinetic Marxism will be the topic of my upcoming thread where we argue for the return of the battle axe and flaila wholly unique argument for gun control.
As I muse, I want to say that for @J and the intersubjectivists/democrats, knowledge is conceived as a kind of democratic vote. These are the rules for how knowledge is generated:
1. We ask a question.
2. Everyone gets one vote, and only one vote.
3. One must simply vote. It is not permitted to give reasons alongside one's vote.
4. Whichever position wins the most votes wins the "knowledge election."
Obviously on this democratic view everyone is perfectly equal, and therefore there is absolutely no "authoritarianism." Rule 3 may seem odd at first, but I think someone like @J or @Moliere actually sees reason-giving or argument-giving as illegal, because it gives one person more power than the others. After all, if one reason or argument is more compelling than others, then the person wielding that reason or argument will effectively have a greater say over the final outcome. They would have "more votes" to cast, so to speak, and this would make the process undemocratic. This inequality would be inimical to intersubjective agreement conceived in a democratic fashion.
This would explain why @J is so particularly opposed to demonstrations, i.e. arguments from foundational premises. Demonstrations are characteristically strong arguments, and therefore create even more inequality than a mere argument. The point more generally is that rule 3 can be more grievously or less grievously transgressed. A demonstration is a grievous transgression of rule 3. A simple argument is less grievous. A mere opinion less grievous still. Least grievous of all would be the waffling claim:
...we might even be able to allow this sort of waffling assertion, given that it is such a mild transgression of rule 3.
On this view mathematics is not a problem, not because it trades in objective arguments, but rather because everyone agrees when it comes to mathematics. We only look at the votes, and the mathematical vote is unanimous. Thus we don't really care whether people give arguments for mathematical positions, given that it isn't a close race. That some people are effectively "casting more votes" than others isn't a big concern given that a few votes won't sway the election.
Contrariwise, on @J's subjectivist view music is also not a problem, because it is a matter of taste. It is not a matter of knowledge and therefore no vote needs to be taken, and we know that it is not a matter of knowledge because if a vote were taken there would be no clear winner (petitio principii).
The real problem for @J comes in fields where the vote is contested, and this is precisely what we would expect from a theory of intersubjective-democratic knowledge. It is the same problem that most besets democracies. For example, in the field of ethics there are strong coalitions and substantial pluralities, and what this means is that the race is close. In mathematics the race is not close so we don't need to worry about cheaters who violate rule 3. In ethics the race is close and we really do need to keep an eye on cheaters who violate rule 3. Thus particular attention and effort must be expended to make sure that no one gives argumentsmuch less persuasive or strong arguments!when it comes to fields like ethics, politics, etc. It is precisely in those areas that we must put a particular emphasis on the democratic dogma, "All positions are intrinsically equal. We will vote to decide, but it is impermissible give arguments alongside one's vote. The giving of arguments presupposes that not all positions are intrinsically equal."
(Obviously this whole conception ignores the reason mathematics generates more consensus than matters of taste do, but I think this sort of reasoning really is at play in @J's worldview.)
I don't think that's accurate. The position strikes me more as a sort of virtue epistemology in search of clear virtues. It isn't against argument and reasons, it just denies overarching standards for them, or even general principles. My thoughts are that it describes good discourse, but in very vague way that doesn't rule out bad discourse.
The difficulty I see is different. First, a very robust pluralism insulates claims from challenge. This is sort of the opposite of democratization; it's atomization. If someone issues a successful challenge to your position, or if you are unable to make any good arguments against theirs, you can simply fall back on: "well, there are many equally valid narratives, even if they contradict one another, so there is nothing to worry about here."
The issue of an inappropriate democratization of truth comes up in two ways if there is vagueness though.
A. There is no way to exclude anyone. We can say "we only allow reasonable objections," but if the standard for "reasonable" is weak or different in each instance, then we will have difficulties justifying exclusion unless everyone already agrees with us.
This is precisely what has let "race realists" be so effective in their evangelism. They come ready to fight with their studies, government statistics, etc. This is not to say they always act in good faith, but they do make appeals to evidence. And then they get rejected out of hand as beyond the pale. Yet, due to other difficulties, the culture generally lacks the resources to show why they are beyond the pale in a credible way. The result is that it looks to would-be-converts that the race realists' case is stronger than it really is because the opposing side seems to be forced into abandoning argument in favor of authoritarianism (and indeed actual censorship in academic settings).
B. Given certain assumptions about language, what you're describing can happen. Because if what we're talking about is primarily words and not being, and words just mean 'how they are currently used," then everything is necessarily democratized in a way. Socrates' debates about the true meaning of justice make no sense if "justice" is just a token in a game, and others don't use the token the way he does. Clearly, he isn't using the token right, so he must be wrong. At best, he can propose that it is useful to the community to use the token differently.
But that's very different from excluding reasons. Reasons are discussed. I suppose though that reasons arguably lose their purchase without any clear principles. "You're just engaged in post hoc rationalization, political bias, appeals to emotion, contradicting yourself, your premises are false, your argument isn't logically valid," etc. doesn't necessarily work as a "reason" if these are not considered to be illegitimate in general, but only illegitimate on a case by case basis.
@Moliere has given us the best example here. If falsifying your data and lying isn't always bad discourse, but only bad on a case by case basis, then the response to "you just faked that data," can plausibly be: "sure, so what?" So to for "your premises are false," or "your argument is not logically valid." And yet, if there are no general principles, these would presumably have to be appropriate in at least some cases.
But I do not think @J and @Banno are likely to agree on that one. I have to imagine that "it isn't ok to just make up fake evidence to support your claims," is going to be something most people can agree upon, granted that, on the anti-realist view that good argument is simply that which gets agreement, and all knowledge claims are simply power battles, it's hard to see how justify this since it would seem that faking data is fine just so long as it works.
Good response.
There's also the problem, that if "sciences are based on per se predication", we need an explanation of "per se predication". I've not seen a satisfactory account.
But what does it mean to not be against arguments and reasons but deny overarching standards? Isn't rationality itself an overarching standard? I certainly couldn't be for squirrels but against mammals, given that squirrels are mammals.
I agree with most of your post, but I don't think it contradicts what I've said. Granted, I was trying to give a sort of microcosm of the reasoning, so that probably needs sussing out. For example:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Note that the position I set out both insulates claims from challenge and results in atomization. I don't think either are incompatible with democratization. So this is an example of how I think you are right and yet it does not clash with what I've said.
But let's look at a place where it might clash:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
That's right, and we could revise 3 so that it doesn't exclude reason-giving, but instead excludes certain forms of reason-giving. I want to say that however we devise 3, it will eschew strong attempts to rationally influence others. As I tried to illustrate with the more- and less-grievous transgressions, at some point a line will be drawn, and that line will have everything to do with the Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB). Someone who thinks that rationality binds us and that we ought to be persuaded by (good) arguments will have a higher ERB. Someone who thinks that rationality does not bind us and who disagrees that we ought to be persuaded by argumentshowever goodwill have a lower ERB. They will also differ on whether and to what extent good and bad arguments exist in the first place.
To give an example, someone who gives an argument and expects their interlocutor to be persuaded by the argument will tend to have a higher ERB than someone who gives an argument but doesn't really expect their interlocutor to be persuaded. And a moral realist will have a higher ERB than a moral non-realist by definition, at least with respect to moral arguments and claims.
In @J's utopia everyone has relatively low ERBs, and therefore the intentional strength of arguments will be limited. Combative argumentation will be non-existent, given that no one has a strong sense of the bindingness of rationality or of their own arguments.
Rule 3 is merely a limit case which illustrates the asymptote. If someone prefers that everyone have a low ERB, and there are no limiting factors on that preference, then they will prefer rule 3. But there will of course be values that are in competition with that preference:
Quoting Leontiskos
So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in @J's thought).
But the reason I don't think much of what you said conflicted with what I said, is because the motivations that you identify are largely all consistent with the motive for a low overall ERB. For example, the desire for there being, "No way to exclude anyone," is, "different from the desire for excluding reasons," but it is not inconsistent with the desire for excluding reasons, and both are bound up with the desire for a low overall ERB.
The wrinkle in what I am saying is that the desire for a low overall ERB is not an end in itself, and therefore it must be instrumental to some further end. Nevertheless, this is part of the problem with @J's approach, namely that it conflates means and ends, and is not able to identify its own ends. Further, the democratic paradigm seems obvious and invasive. I would want to say that the atomization and the restrictions on reason are part and parcel of that democratic paradigm, and are not opposed to it.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Good point. @Banno would agree that falsifying data is impermissible, and is not good practice vis-á-vis inquiry. I'm not sure whether @J would agree. He would doubtless avoid giving a clear answer. He would certainly not disagree, as @Moliere did.
But in reality anyone who holds to a firm rational standard such as this is evincing a high ERB with respect to that standard in question. So a clear and consistent @J would say, "We must strive for low ERBs, with the exception of things like the falsification of data." This is parallel to Popper's idea that, "We need to be tolerant except for when we don't." What is occurring is a clash of two different values or standards, and what is required is an attempt at reconciling the two conflicting values. In this thread we have seen a refusal to try to reconcile the two values or even recognize them, and this makes it easy to vacillate between the two (or three, or four...) in an ad hoc way.
Following this:
Quoting J
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Why do you see this as a virtue epistemology? Here is what I think is required for a virtue epistemology in the way you are intending:
1. Intersubjective agreement grounds knowledge.
2. Virtuous classes will more reliably produce knowledge intersubjectively.
3. We ought to be virtuous; or we ought to look to the virtuous class and not the non-virtuous class.
It looks like @J accepts (1) and (2) but not (3), and without (3) I don't think you have virtue epistemology. @J presumably wouldn't admit that the virtuous class is better than the non-virtuous class, given that this would require an "over-arching standard."
It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of this sort of thing:
Quoting J
Quoting Leontiskos
When someone uses evaluative terms but claims to be using them in a value-neutral way, you're in trouble. This is true whether the evaluative terms are positive ("virtue") or negative ("authoritarianism"). The person who talks about the non-pernicious authoritarianism is manipulating language in a very problematic way.
This is another way to understand why it is fraught to simply assume that @J is doing "virtue epistemology." Virtue epistemology takes for granted the normativity that @J is vacillating on.
I thought this was sensible:
Quoting Fire Ologist
I took you to mean that trying to pin down "arbitrariness" was less important than the distinction being made between absolute truth and contextual truth. But maybe that's not what you meant.
Somewhat famously, Feyerabend argued that Galileo manipulated or selectively interpreted his dataparticularly with regard to the telescopeto press the case for heliocentrism. At the very least, Galileo made use of rhetorical and polemical tools to press his case.
The discussion has moved on to scientific method. I'll argue that there is no algorithmic method that produce science, that rather science is a social enterprise involving open criticism and shared information, a poster-boy for Davidson's triangulation.
If you think there is an algorithmic scientific method, all you need do is present it.
I'm sure you know what I'm going to say!: "Brownian motion" as the only alternative here is yet another either/or binary, about as useful as "absolute" and "arbitrary." Couldn't we allow that something in between is more characteristic of how such practices actually work?
Sure. Did you have a principle in mind in between?
It's not a binary. It's only down to Brownian motion if one denies any determinant principles that guide discourse whatsoever. For instance, is simply faking your data bad inquiry, or is it sometimes acceptable? If even this is ruled out as a principle because everything is case by case consensus building, I'm not sure how there can be any determinant structure to good discourse.
"Reasonableness" is at least something. But how do we know when someone is "reasonable." From what I can tell, this is also up to case by case consensus building. So it seems like individual opinions groping towards consensus all the way down.
One thing to note here is that epistemology is in some sense normative. It's about what leads towards knowledge. So, when you object that "well, real world discourse sort of looks like this," that's like objecting to "rape is wrong," because "in the real world there are rapists." Nor do normative standards entail "forcing belief." Indeed, belief cannot be coerced in many cases, only assent. The point is not that all people follow epistemic standards, but that some forms of discourse are more likely to lead to knowledge than others. If it wasn't the case that some kinds of discourse were more likely to lead to knowledge than others, then I can hardly see how being "reasonable" would matter.
Is that supposed to be a counter example? As in, "if Galileo did it and he had a good theory, then sometimes it's ok to just lie and make up observations?"
I don't know if it counts as an "algorithm,' but sure, good scientific inquiry means not falsifying your data, not arguing from false premises, and not using invalid arguments.
Arguments of the form:
All squirrels are mammals.
All dolphins are mammals.
Therefore, some squirrels are dolphins.
For instance, don't demonstrate their conclusion. They don't become part of good inquiry because the conclusion is true.
There might, in some cases, be other ethical concerns that warrant falsifying data perhaps, but that wouldn't be the same thing as it being part of a good epistemology.
What progresses science is not adherence to some set of rules.
"Ah!" Says Tim, "but what do you mean by progress... if you are going to progress, you must already know what progress is..."
Yawn.
No, Tim, you dont need a final theory of progress to recognize when something works better, explains more, predicts more reliably, or opens new avenues of inquiry. Scientists manage to get on with things without resolving metaphysics every morning. Progress is what happens when a community, through criticism and collaboration, refines its grip on the worldeven if it never gets a Gods-eye view of it.
Asking a question is now misrepresentation? I didn't get what the point of the example was.
I'm not talking about a final theory, merely basic principles like "it's not ok to just make up your observations" or "good arguments don't start with false premises and are valid ." Or, considering your objection just now, how about, "it isn't acceptable to misrepresent positions?"
Do those not always obtain? If not, when wouldn't they obtain?
Getting you to answer questions is like pulling teeth. That's why a theory like "Brownian motion" has to be postulated. Because you won't give honest answers to simple questions.
If you were to move from principles in the strong sense to heuristics, we might have some agreement.
Its not okay to make up data is a good rule of thumb, yes, but the history of science is full of edge cases where selective, embellished, or even downright faulty data played a productive role. Galileos telescopic observations, Newtons bucket, Eddingtons eclipse photosall involved choices that wouldnt survive a modern methods review.
The issue isnt that anything goes, but that what counts as "okay" or "not okay" is itself historically and contextually shaped. There is no algorithm for scientific legitimacy, but a community negotiating standards as it goes.
So I agree its not acceptable to misrepresent positionsbut even that relies on shared context and trust, not a principle mechanically applied.
Quoting Banno
This is interesting, and let me generalize it to avoid unnecessary rancor. The question is, What's the difference between "reasoned rejection" and "methodological foreclosure" when it comes to defending the basic tenets of a philosophical system?
What catches the eye are the verbs: only allows and insists. It seems that the proponent of the system ought to give some reasons why they won't allow, why they insist. And ordinarily, that's what we want from any philosopher, not mere assertions. But it does get uncomfortable at the level of first principles, because someone may want to say, "This is the bottom line. Your request for reasons is out of order, because a reason implies an explanation for why something is the case, and if we truly have a bottom line here, then there is no explanation."
How to proceed? After all, this isn't necessarily wrong. I think a great deal depends on the tone of the conversation that ensues, as you say here:
Quoting Banno
If only allowing and insisting is done in quotes, so to speak, that can make for a rich, productive conversation, perhaps one that helps the interlocutor see why the system's proponent chooses that bottom line, and encourages them to suggest their own. The hassles begin when the expectation is rather that the system must be right, on pain of faulty reasoning or some such. That kind of insistence, I prefer to steer clear of, as it's so uncharacteristic of the good philosophers I like.
The thing is, once you acknowledge that there are perhaps intermediate, context-derived principles or standards . . . there's little left to disagree about! That's all I've been saying. You've seemed to fall back so often on "either we have an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases, or it's random chaos!" that I had to keep trying to draw attention to the middle ground.
As for a principle in mind in between . . . once again, for what field of discourse, for what practice? We need the context. Maybe literary criticism, or non-profit grantmaking? I know something about both of those (plus musicology :wink: ).
Sure, and many similar moves led to things like the approval of drugs that led to birth defects, toxic chemicals in kid's drinking water, etc. That invalid arguments can sometimes have true conclusions doesn't make them valid arguments, and that falsified data can sometimes support true conclusions doesn't make falsifying data good practice. And indeed, since it makes more sense to falsity data when one cannot support one's claims [I]because they are false[/I], it's probably more likely in cases where the conclusion is false.
As an objection to "falsifying data is always wrong," this is the same conflation of normative standards and actual practice I mentioned above. It's the equivalent to objecting to "rape is wrong," because "but there are rapists," or "sometimes good people are born from rape."
I will grant that there is a gray area in some fields. In political science, people often select case studies on the dependent variable. But the quantitative analysis is also often window dressing.
However, I think it's inappropriate to conflate "anything that wouldn't pass a current methods board," with "knowingly just making shit up" (which does happen, see recent news). I find it hard to imagine how the latter is ever good inquiry, even if we might justify it ethically on other grounds using some bizarre counterexample. But counter examples don't disprove principles, they merely show that there can be things worse than the violation of a principle that justify its violation.
But here is the bigger issue:
Would it be the case that, so long as a community agrees, making up data is good inquiry and a path towards knowledge?
I don't think it would be. So, the issue isn't just about what some community agrees. If some community does agree that falsification is ok, they're going to tend to come to false conclusions.
Community agreement doesn't keep out the case where the community agrees with falsifying data. But that isn't a bizarre counter example, there are plenty of real world examples, e.g. some "race realists," some anti-vaccine advocates, etc., who consider themselves a sort of epistemic community and are so convinced of the truth of their conclusion that they don't see any problem with falsifying data. This was also true with "socialist genetics." Not only was falsification allowed, people were positively pressured into it. And the result was a great deal of deaths.
So what would be the objection here: "but that's not the real community, the real community is the broader scientific community?" How is that claim justified? If community practice is the ultimate justification of all standards, then communities define themselves, and are presumably infallible within themselves.
If the system being discussed is used to determine what counts as "reasoned rejection", then we have "methodological foreclosure".
In the example, the Aristotelian system sets out what it is to be reasonable as accepting LEM. So it methodologically forecloses on paraconsistent logic.
What happens next? If Aristotelian logic is taken as final, paraconsistent logic is anathema. Alternately, we could admit that paraconsistent logic is incompatible with Aristotelian logic, and carry on seeing where paraconsistent logic leads.
So if Aristotelian logic provides the "an absolute, context-independent standard in all cases" it forecloses on paraconsistent logic.
Yep. That's not down to the community failing to accept a principle, but a mismatch between what the community says is the case and what is the case. It's a failure of triangulation, not of principle.
The language game of doing science is embedded in the world, which provides the boundary. It's the reason not just anything will go. The community doesn't reject making data up becasue it breaks some Grand Principle, but because doing so bumps up agains reality. It's a methodology, not a normative principle. Scientific communities dont reject making up data because it violates a timeless rule; they reject it because it doesnt work.
This whole approach is misguided, namely your idea that we need to look at one single field. The whole question is about overarching relations, both of the whole and between fields. Zooming in on one field will never answer such a question. Looking at an isolated part will never tell you about the whole qua whole, nor will it tell you about relations between parts. This appeal to look at a single field in isolation is another prelude to evasion.
Quoting J
There are two questions:
1. Are there context-independent standards?
2. Are there context-dependent standards?
You have refused to answer the first question for 17 pages. Every time you are asked about the first question you dodge and start talking about the second question.
If the way the world is requires that epistemic communities follow certain standards to avoid false conclusions, that sounds a lot to me like the grounds for a principle.
What's the objection here? "The way the world is makes it so that falsifying your data and lying isn't a good way to reach knowledge, but that doesn't make not just making up your observations a valid epistemic principle because..."
What's the end of that sentence? The only one I can think of is "because sometimes making up your observations to fit your conclusions is a consistent way to achieve knowledge," which seems clearly false.
Yes, a mismatch that wouldn't exist if they had accepted the principle.
Also, even if you imagine some bizarre case where people just so happen to consistently make up fake observations that support true conclusions, this still wouldn't be a good counter example because presumably holding true opinions in virtue of observations you just lied about isn't constitutive of knowledge.
The world doesn't require anything.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No!
Again, that is not what was said.
The way the world is will show that your data is made up, not that some mooted principle is true.
The point being made here must be very far form how you understand things to be, for you to repeatedly make such misinterpretations.
IDK, seems like grounds for a principle to me.
Can you give an example where just making up your data consistently leads towards knowledge? I would accept that as a strong counter example.
No, and that is exactly the point!
It's not some principle that leads to knowledge, but repeated, open, communal discussion.
Where do you suppose principles come from?
So there are no examples where just making up your data consistently leads towards knowledge, but it still isn't a valid epistemic principle to not just make up your data? Why isn't it a valid principle?
But it would be if the community says so?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No. The community is embedded in the world.
Again, it looks to me as if you are being disingenuous, this time by ignoring the triangulation.
Quoting Banno
I'm really not sure what is supposed to be disingenuous here. It seems to me that if a principle holds with no imaginable counter examples, it's a solid principle. That's my only point.
We seem to be in agreement that there are no imaginable counter examples, so I don't know why the principle isn't valid?
So does whichever standards triangulate properly represent good standards, even if the community doesn't agree to them, or does the community have to agree to the standards and they have to triangulate?
I guess now I am trying to tell if the standards exist in virtue of triangulation prior to the community accepting them. If they do, then I would just say that those are what I mean by principles, and we have found some agreement.
Quoting Leontiskos
I suppose we all agree the answer to (2) is "yes", though we may choose to interpret the question differently, hedge in various ways, and so on.
The conflict here is certainly about (1).
I would like to see this approached as an open question, but I'd like to frame it in a particular way, as a question about [s](1)[/s] (2), upon which we all agree.
Now, I've never read Kuhn, though I've been familiar with the gist of the original argument for years. We all know that the issue he addressed was the nature of paradigms in scientific research, and the replacement of one paradigm by another, which, he claimed, was never a matter of new observations invalidating one paradigm and ushering in another that was more adequate.
That's close enough to what I have in mind, only I'd throw in every sort of framework, worldview, evidence regime (or whatever it's called, @Joshs has mentioned this), and so on. If you like, you could even throw in language-games.
I'm not wedded to any particular view here, but I think it's simply a fact ? interestingly, a fact about our culture ? that since the rise of cultural anthropology, in particular, we are all of us now more knowledgeable about the existence of views quite different from our own, and have grown more sensitive to those differences, which shows up, for instance, in the way we talk about history now (the other another country). A certain sort of relativism comes naturally to Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic people.
We are also by now smart enough to know that the sort walled gardens imagined by early structuralists are a myth, and that neither are worldviews (et very much cetera) static.
So here's how I would want to address question [s](2)[/s] (1): is there some mechanism available for prying yourself out of a given scheme/worldview/framework, and is that mechanism the use of reason? We might see this as a step required for the change or evolution of a worldview (though not the only way), or as a mechanism for shifting from one paradigm to another, Kuhn be damned.
So there are two ways it could be anchored to issue [s](1)[/s] (2): either (a) as what connects one thingy (worldview, framework, conceptual scheme) to another, or changes a thingy noticeably; or (b) as something that enables you to free yourself entirely from the false prison of all thingies.
I want to add that it seems clear to me that the project of the Enlightenment hoped that reason could pull off (b), and much follows in its train (reason is the birthright of all, no one need ever again be beholden to another in areas of knowledge, and so on).
(With the discussion of pseudoscience, I found myself thinking about alchemy, and the place it is given nowadays as a crucial forerunner of chemistry; while its theory may leave something to be desired, its practice was not without merit. So how does chemistry emerge from alchemy? Was it the application of reason?)
So is it possible to set aside all worldviews, frameworks, and schemes, by the use of reason? (To achieve, in that much-reviled phrase, a "view from nowhere".) Is reason the crucial means by which one jettisons the current framework for a new one? Or is there something other than reason that can allow such transition or liberation?
Now you have added "imaginable". So now you are doing modal logic?
There is a difference between following some god-given principle and trying things out to see what works.
You appear to advocate the former, I advocate the latter.
Well we owe you, because the thread is in need of such a thing. :up:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I agree.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay, so we are searching for a question...
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
So now we are asking, "Are there [paradigm/framework/worldview/evidence regime/language game/scheme]-independent standards?"
Is that the question you want to ask?
I thought "context" was too broad, and I am similarly worried that your question is too broad. I think I vaguely understand what you mean, though. When talking about this "question" (it is questionable whether it is a single question), I will try to use a single term to help us keep to the same page.
In the thread we have been talking about whether there is some criterion which applies to all ("scientific") fields, rather than only to a subset of them. I think that question is more manageable, but we can ask many. I am not averse to questions.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay, so the premise here is that I'm stuck and I need to be pried out?
I haven't read Kuhn's book either, but perhaps we're asking if there is some common thread between the two paradigms in which the shift is effected.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Yes. We could also say (c) that there is some standard that is being followed both before and after the paradigm shift. A standard that is not affected by the paradigm shift. This is like (a) but it abandons the premise of prying out what is stuck.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Right.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
What if we give our preliminary answers to the questions on the table before proceeding? Would that be a bad idea? Here is a collection of the questions:
My preliminary answers, to the best of my ability and in a yes/no format:
...Apart from that setting of the stage, I will add one thing. We can also think about this in terms of commensurability and communicability. For example, we could ask whether two people could communicate with one another even despite their different "languages." We could ask whether people from two different paradigms or epochs would be able to communicate despite that difference. We could ask whether someone before a paradigm shift could understand or anticipate the post-shift reality, and whether someone after a paradigm shift could understand the pre-shift reality. And so on...
That would be an excellent research question which would probably balloon very quickly and have to be pared down. So naturally I'll answer it from the top of my head without any more work:
Beyond the lore that's spoken of in standard text books I have little knowledge of that transition. One thing I do know is that Newton practiced alchemy, and some of his experiments have been replicated in the modern day -- the problem with alchemy as contrasted to chemistry is that all the alchemists wanted to keep the secret of the philosopher's stone, or transmuting lead to gold, or immortality all to themselves. So they would write in a cypher. Part of recreating Newton's alchemical experiments was figuring out what he meant and what we meant by different words. Digging more into this would naturally lend itself to the conversation evolving here -- that's pretty much an example of translation between paradigms as clear as you're probably going to find.
But all this to say that it's a very interesting question that I don't know more than what I've said here.
Yes, that's the idea ? and I'm glad it's clear enough despite me mixing up the numbers. (Anyone who found the post deeply confusing should reload to see my edits.)
We landed at some point on questions like this: Are all narratives acceptable? I think it's clear no one wants to say that, but they mean different things when they answer. I understand the impulse of the question; when I was young and discovered Science, or when I was somewhat older and discovered Logic, I thought they were tools especially useful for ruling things out. But I'm older now, and I can't help but read that question and ask, acceptable to whom? in what context? for what purpose? And I understand the question as intending to be taken as "acceptable full-stop," or, if need be, "acceptable to Reason." And I can't help but wonder if anyone is ever in a position to stand nowhere and choose which town to go to ...
Hence my plan of grounding the question instead on the relations among thingies: how do you, given that you're currently in St. Louis, decide whether you might like Kansas City more? Whether Kansas City might be better (in some sense you could give substance to)?
I'm not immune to the claims of reason as the great tool of liberation from dogma and delusion ? and have disconcertingly frequent occasions lately to wish fervently for its wider embrace. Even though everyone knows (well, almost everyone, around here at least) reason has a shockingly poor track record ? despite its PR ? as a tool for freeing people from dogma and delusion, that only really applies to modern man in his natural state, not to reflective man trained in the use of reason (i.e., us). Sadly, I for one would expect a lot more consensus to have emerged in philosophy if that were so.
In other words, I want (1) to be an open question. Maybe my youthful faith in reason was warranted. Maybe not.
I don't want to, but in the interests of comity I will also answer your questions ? with the proviso that I'm not altogether happy about my answers.
Here's my problem with The Criterion of Scientificity: what we're talking about is behavior, and largely social (rather than cognitive) behavior. What makes what you're doing science is, primarily, how careful you are about your work and your willingness to submit it to the review and criticism of others, but there are a number of other important points (the construction of an explanatory framework, for instance), and I think (a) we are really talking about a classic "family resemblance" here, where there are a great many criteria in play, an evolving set, and you won't find all of them or a consistent subset that identifies all and only science, and (b) science doesn't have a monopoly on any of the strands of the rope that binds the sciences together ? which is why identifying a few things common to all scientific practice (as I confidently do above) is not quite enough to identify only science (necessary but not sufficient). Every science may have this collaborative aspect I'm so insistent on, but so do other things; you need that plus a healthy subset of the other traits of science, which themselves are traits not exclusive to science. (Do painters not engage in careful observation? Do painters, on occasion, not observe and paint the exact same object under varying conditions? Etc.)
It is clear that people sometimes leave St. Louis and light out for Kansas City. It is possible, and the question is, first, what enables that move, and, second, how does anyone judge whether it was a good move, or the right move? (Anyone might be that person moving, someone who stayed behind, someone who already lived in Kansas City, or someone who lives in Chicago.)
As if @Banno won't already be exercised enough by my use of "conceptual scheme".
I have very mixed feelings about the issue of "commensurability" but yeah, I would like everything you mentioned to be on the table. I think it is perfectly reasonable to ask whether any of us can truly understand the ancient Greeks, say. I think it's perfectly reasonable to ask a question like that even if I were later convinced that it's in some way a defective question.
An anecdote
I once saw a small flock of birds attempt to perch in a very small yellow-leaved tree. It was too small for all of them to light so they sort of swarmed around it, some finding a spot then taking to the air again moments later. They gave up after maybe five or ten seconds and set off to find a better spot, and left behind a nearly bare tree, the beating of so many wings and jostling about of all these little birds had caused nearly every leaf to fall. I felt, just for a moment, as if I had seen the tree ravished by Zeus, who had taken the form of a flock of birds.
Kicking myself for not noticing you had already used the same metaphor:
Quoting Leontiskos
And the answer is almost certainly yes, but what's common is only part of what makes both science, or both the same science, or whatever, so it's not the whole explanation. Anyway, that's my hunch.
Sounds authoritarian.
Quoting Banno
Counts been doing one thing for about 10 pages now. Beating his head against the wall, where Banno says whatever he thinks will deflect from a direct answer and avoid an actual discussion (despite constantly talking about having a discussion.)
Youve been spiraling and spiraling away from central moving issues, trying to avoid the contradiction you think isnt a contradiction. Moving and moving the goal posts to avoid what is clear
Not arbitrary That is your term. You want statements with some value to NOT be arbitrary. Bannos law:
Make sure to say but not arbitrary about useful statements. Enough said.
Anyone asks you why or how this law works, asking Why not let all validity and truth be arbitrary, and if not, by virtue of what?
And you wont give answer. Post after post. It is obscured and avoided. As if we all cant see what is in black and white right here in these pages.
When pressed anyway, as Count refocuses the evasions, in attempt to continue the discussion as we aspire towards, to sort of triangulate towards something together as you call it, we squeeze out like a midwife context and now what the community says.
But how that is not a new arbitrary, moving target (which Count keeps showing over and over is the case) simply avoiding the direct question, showing the arbitrariness of your positions?
How have we moved this discussion forward together at all as you want as our goal?
And that all isnt rediculous. We arent smart enough to understand what is happening here?
And your methods arent authoritarian and tyrannical.
And that all of these pages and arguments are not useless to truly avoid the same issue over again: is every statement true/valid/non-arbitrary, or not?
Even if you want to reframe your issue Banno, its a simple yes or no question. You can deconstruct it after you answer it, so just answer it.
I dont think you answer it, by design, and its a design flaw in a thinker who wants to avoid arbitrariness, or accusations of arbitrariness. So now there is no real telling what is your idea of the arbitrary or not-arbitrary or context or determinate/absolute Now we must add Bannos version and context of community triangulation.
We have an endless attempt to begin a discussion, instead of an attempt to interpret what your OP said.
The thing is, I like triangulation with the community to test the value/truth/validity, or a statement/assertion/narrative. But the goal, IMO, has to be something about the world, if we are to avoid arbitrariness.
And the irony of it all is that, IMO, it is the absolute and truth alone that defeat tyrannical authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is about a person, not an idea. The absolute is knowledge, which makes you, the knower, your own authority. That is the beginning of any possibility of avoiding tyranny.
Yes
Possibly so -- though I don't like calling it a mechanism.
No.
No.
Depends on the thingy. The alchemy/chemistry example brought up shows how the two had at least some overlap since we were able to translate alchemy-speak into chemical-speak to see what they tried. So in that case it could be said that the elements were what was common to them, while their meanings about the elements diverge widely.
No.
Yes. Though they need not be the same standard. For me it'd depend upon how meaning relates to standards -- it could be that the standards changing just is the paradigm shift, after all, but it could also be more of a conceptual shift than a shift in one's evaluative tools. Also it's very tricky to define a paradigm in a general way -- most of the time it just ends up looking like "disagreement", which doesn't exactly have all of the radical implications that incommensurability and paradigm shifts can evoke (not necessitate, but evoke).
I don't believe so, but this isn't fatal to knowledge or philosophy. It even helps explain their use -- we'll always have some perspective so it's good to hear what others think. Their view may be better than yours in certain circumstances, and I can't think of any other way to be somewhat cognizant of one's own worldview without having encountered ones that are sincerely held but different.
Also I'm wondering why we would want such a liberation? What are we liberating ourselves from in stripping ourselves of a worldview?
Something I discovered through Buddhist studies is that one of the defining virtues of a Buddha is the capacity to see things as they truly are. This is conveyed by the Sanskrit term yath?bh?ta?, often translated as in reality, in truth, or more emphatically, really, definitely, absolutely. According to my lexical research, cross-cultural equivalents include the Platonic al?th?s epist?m?true knowledgeand the Latin veritas rerum, the truth of things.
An obvious objection comes to mind: But isnt that a religious claim? Buddhism is a religion, so this is just another worldviewprecisely the kind of thing were meant to be questioning.
This brings to mind the distinction in anthropology between emic and etic perspectives. An emic perspective interprets a culture from within, using concepts meaningful to its participants; an etic perspective observes from outside, applying supposedly neutral, cross-cultural terms. But as thinkers like Thomas Kuhn have shown, the etic stance is still a perspective. It never quite attains the neutrality it claims, despite its scientific aspirations. So where does that leave us? Are we doomed to an endless relativism of schemes?
Interestingly, from the emic standpoint of early Buddhism, this isnt an irresolvable dilemma. In fact, the P?li texts repeatedly describe the Buddha as having abandoned all viewswhat they call the "thicket of views," the tangle of conceptual proliferations (MN 2). The Buddha is said to have transcended not only wrong views, but view-taking as such. From this perspective, he does not occupy a standpoint but has relinquished all standpoint. Naturally, from the outside, this may sound like just another doctrinal claimof course Buddhists would say that! But the Buddhist tradition also provides a strong philosophical rationale. They hold that the Buddha is perfectly disinterested: having eradicated every trace of craving, aversion, and delusion, he sees without distortion or agenda. He has no dog in the fight. In this sense, his insight is not a matter just of detached observation but of existential transformation.
There is an intriguing Western parallel here. In The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, Peter Harrison argues that early modern science emerged not from naïve rationalism but from a deeply Augustinian concern: that human reason, corrupted by original sin, was no longer capable of grasping reality as it truly is. Science, then, became an ameliorative disciplinea method to correct fallen perception and restore, as it were, the veritas rerum that Adam once possessed.
One could dismiss this too as merely a Christian rationalization. But what interests me is the shared intuition: that true knowledge is not just a matter of method but of moral or spiritual purification and insight. In both cases, the obstacle to seeing things as they are is not merely intellectual error but an egological distortion.
From a Buddhist point of view, the condition for seeing yath?bh?ta? is not a superior argument but the cessation of clinging. And from Harrisons perspective, scientific reason arose not in spite of mans flawed nature but because of itas a response to the failure of pure insight in a fallen condition.
Both views reflect what might be called the sapiential dimension: that wisdom is not simply the correct deployment of reason within a framework, but the transformation of the knower. It is precisely this dimensionwhere epistemology shades into ethics and spiritual practicethat tends to be overlooked in the analytic tradition, but which I think is essential to this discussion.
I tried to suggest two reasons: one identifies your ideology (etc) with dogma and delusion, which prevent you (as @Wayfarer notes) from seeing things as they are; the other is transitional, and based on the intuition that to put on a new pair of glasses you must be able to take off the old ones. In the latter view, you might, in that moment where you have no glasses on, not see perfectly but rather not see at all (Kant's "intuitions without concepts").
Your first paragraph is close to my view, that reason serves the social function of comparing different views so that we can triangulate our perspective on the world using the perspective of others. We are naturally adept at two things: rationalizing our own views and finding fault with the views of others. You can leverage that. And if you institutionalize and formalize the process, you get science. Roughly.
Trying what things out?
Count is talking about developing a thing to try out.
(Not trying to follow it or claim it is from from god.)
You go from god-given principles to things.
What things? Any old arbitrary narrative? Or something more about the world itself and able to be meaningfully understood by more than one person?
Once we see what this thing or principle is, and see how it can develop and how it works, then we try it out or follow it.
We are at the thing creation stage.
Banno, I get that you want the principle to emerge out of the doing, that its a process is your answer to every where are you going with this question. Counts question is will you ever get somewhere or know it when you get there? Is it going to be called a principle or what whenever you get there?
And you are always the one on these threads who sees God lurking.
Im going to move on to the Srap-Leon conversation, with Moliere and Wayfarer, where people seem to be working together.
Not just digging further into their entrenched positions and not listening to anyone who merely disagrees.
Nice not talking to ya.
Talk about "language on holiday".
It seems to me that you're simply asking if realism is the case. Is it?
Ah, I understand it better now ...I think. Some of this relates to my point about the part-whole relationship, where each implies the other.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Right: "narratives" was another of the words floating around in this ocean of a discussion. :smile:
To be fair, in many of these discussions I feel like someone drives their truck into a giant swamp, and we're all watching from the sidelines. They inevitably end up stuck in the middle of nowhere, and when they look around for help everyone is sort of scratching their heads and staring at each other, wide-eyed.
What this means is...
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
...I want to ask specific and clear questions. For that reason I am wary of the word "thingies." It's not a good combination when the words are vague and everyone is looking for an excuse to claim that they are correct.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay, thanks. I think it will serve as a helpful starting point to orient us and clarify misunderstandings. It's something I can come back to and reference if I become confused about your position, and it allows us to see if we've actually changed our minds or not in the end.
I like your discussion of "scientificity" since it is so focused, and because I know what you're talking about:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
This is presumably related to Q3:
Quoting Leontiskos
First, to (a) I would say that we have to think about abstraction here. What the opponents of myself and @Count Timothy von Icarus have consistently refused to do is engage in more encompassing abstractions (see my post <here>).
Let me try to illustrate this with a very simple example:
Now note that you have to omit "and only" from (a) if (a) is not to collapse into (b). And note that Q3 asks precisely whether there is something common to the sciences, not whether there is something that is only common to the sciences. This is a good example of why I want to pay attention to the questions that we take ourselves to be answering.
Your preliminary answer to Q3 was, "Yes-ish ? this one is in some ways too easy and too hard." Now is it too easy when we ask what is common to the sciences, and too hard when we ask what is restricted to the sciences? Or is there a different reason why it is "too easy and too hard"?
I think the question is easy because it asks what is common to the sciences (and I think that is what the thread has been focused on, namely the possibility of "overarching" characteristics or norms). We've already identified some of the commonalities recently, for example here:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Now regarding (b), I sort of agree with you. I am happy to agree for the sake of argument, given that I don't think (b) bears on Q3 or this thread. I think it is a separate question, and I don't want this thread to balloon more than it already has. But let me know if you think we need to answer (b).
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Let me lay my cards on the table regarding these questions of "switching positions with someone else." Humans are enormously adaptable, and they all have the same nature. I think we can switch positions with others, whether linguistically, culturally, scientifically, etc. There are a few limitations and immutabilities, but when we are speaking about volitional realities I don't see much in the way of per se impossibility of switching positions.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay, good.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Very nice. That's part of why I wanted to bring up commensurability and communicability - precisely because they are not agonistic. They presuppose no "prying out what is stuck." Of course one could pick up "commensurability" and revivify the metaphor of stuckness, but I want an optional lens that does not presuppose stuckness.
I actually think the threadat least this part of ithas largely been considering the question of whether scientists in two different fields can be said to be doing the same thing, rather than whether a scientist can pry himself out of his field and embed himself in a different field. For example, it could be asked whether a scientist's opinion with regard to a foreign field is capable of being worthwhile, or whether a non-scientist's opinions about scientific questions are of any worth. The thread has also been concerned with normativity, e.g. "criteria." So we have been asking whether there are common threads that are criteria.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I'm glad you pointed it out because I think it's the same metaphor applied differently. I.e. "common thread" vs. "binding thread." Or, "Is there some thread common to all the sciences?," vs. "are there threads that run through the sciences and through nothing else?" Note that the first question is neither about the necessary or sufficient conditions of science. It is simply about whether there are things that all the sciences share. For example, if we accepted that all tables have legs, it would not follow that nothing else has legs. The idea that this criterion must therefore have to do with "necessity" is bound up with (Kripke's, among others) modal essentialism, which I don't find helpful.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Right, that's exactly what I was just trying to say. :nerd:
"Is there a common thread?," is different from, "What threads must [this] have in order to call it 'this', or in order to be [this]."
Yes:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Fire Ologist
Exactly. Those who are bound to the truth are not bound to any person's will. Truth is the only thing that liberates from authoritarianism, as we have seen especially in Communist regimes.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Was the OP just an attempt to supply an argument for the predetermined conclusion that religious thinking is bad? It doesn't seem to have succeeded.
The irony here is that Banno does a 180 when he goes after religion, relying on unimpeachable principles that religion has supposedly transgressed. "Any stick to beat the devil."
Quoting Fire Ologist
Good choice. It's not a coincidence that my first serious post in the thread was written to @Srap Tasmaner. In fact, in writing my Last rigorous thread, I tried to wait to post it until Srap or fdrake were around, and I literally went out of my way to post it in the early morning, when I knew Banno was asleep in Australia. It was all for naught, given that he sabotaged the whole thing anyway. The only threads where you can do <this> would be threads like Jamal's, where the owner writes the thread.
I think it is more helpful to think in terms of priority. For instance, human nature is prior to human culture. This is not to say "temporally prior." No humans have ever existed outside of a culture. Human culture always shapes psychology and people's understanding of the world. And yet human culture requires that there be humans, and "what humans are" necessarily always shapes every human culture.
Even thinkers who were at pains to deny human nature in their quest for "freedom as potency/power," end up having to bring some notion of it back in, e.g. for Sartre, faciticity, modes of being, etc. Because obviously cows don't learn French, only people do, nor do people reach puberty, spin themselves into a chrysalis, and emerge weeks later with wings. Human beings are something determinant, and what they are always plays a role in what they do, e.g. epistemological efforts. People might disagree on exactly how this works, the degree to which we can know what is prior, etc., but it seems hard to dismiss any notion of man as a certain sort of being. Yet the sort of being man is shapes all of man's cultural pursuits, hence "priority."
I think of reason and principles of knowledge in analogous terms to this example, not as a dialectic where one pole is "contextless." This means looking for unifying principles. For instance, the principle of lift is in some ways the same in different sorts of insect wings, bird wings, bi-planes, drones, fighter jets, etc. and yet it is clear that these are all very different and require a unique understanding. Likewise for principles in complexity studies that unify phenomena as diverse as heart cell synchronization, fire fly blinking, and earthquakes. Identifying a common principle is not a claim to have stepped outside a consideration of fire flies and heart cells, but rather a claim to have found a "one" that is present in "many." If such principles didn't exist, I don't know how knowledge would be possible.
Importantly there is a move in Descartes, Kant, etc. to have mental representations become "what we know" instead of "how we know." This gets carried forward into philosophy of science and philosophy of language, such that theories, models, paradigms, etc. are all primarily "what we know," instead of means of knowing. I think this is a pretty fatal error, but since it is popular, I think it's worth pointing out that it plays into the demand for the "view from nowhere."
On this view, the mental representation, theory, paradigm, etc. represent a sort of impermeable barrier between the knower and the known, and hence we always know the barrier and not what is on the other side of it. I think this is based on bad metaphysical assumptions that, because they are common, often go unacknowledged. I think it's an improper absolutization of the old scholastic addage that "everything is received in the mode of the receiver," and a neglect of the dictum that "act must follow on being," for being to be meaningful.
That's a whole different topic, I just wanted to throw out the idea that the "view from nowhere" need not be a pole of opposition, and indeed wasn't for most of philosophical history. I'd frame it instead in terms of principles and priority.
A good analogy is a light that passes through many panes of glass. From where we sit, we might always have to look through different panes, with different tints. So there is never a case of "looking directly at the light." And yet I wouldn't want to say here that man simply cannot ever see the light, but only "the light as filtered through the panes." The light "as filtered," is still the light. The panes are transparent to some degree. They let in more or less light, and one can move around to look through different panes, and some are further back, and so more fixed in our field of vision than others.
The critique of the thing-in-itself of modern process philosophers is relevant here. The thing-in-itself is not only epistemically inaccessible, because knowledge relies on interaction, but also entirely sterile, since how a thing is when it is interacting with absolutely nothing else, and no parts of itself, is irrelevant. To even formulate such a sterile being requires some dicey assumptions.
Why do you think that? The problem is that the "contextualists" presumably do not see their position as precluding realism.
Yeah, I think we're falling into Enlightenment categories. I don't think anyone here favors Enlightenment rationality (except perhaps when @J channels Nagel).
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, this is well-stated. :up:
---
- Thanks for your answers. I will try to come back to this. :up:
That's not really how I intended it. I was trying to remain as broad as possible. Hence, not using "true" but the cumbersome "true/correct/acceptable/etc." The idea is that any sort of epistemology has to make judgements of some sort, and presumably judgements that are non-arbitrary, and so which make some sort of appeal to "reasons" in a broad sense.
I personally think it's a mistake to conflate "good," or "useful," with "true," since then we have the questions of "good or useful for whom?" and "truly useful, or just currently assumed to be useful?" etc., but I didn't want to foreclose on that either.
It seems to me that there must be judgements of some sort, that there must be something like "reasons" to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, and that, if reasons are sui generis in every instance, or potentially so, it is hard to see how arbitrariness can be kept out. That was the basic idea.
Now, there is also an issue of separating the normative from the descriptive. The cultural construction of standards as a descriptive claim can stand alongside an understanding of superior/inferior normative standards. It would be something like the common moral anti-realist genetic fallacy argument to claim that there aren't superior and inferior ways to developed knowledge because such standards emerge from contingent social processes (although, I'd also challenge that such processes are ever wholly contingent).
At best, the descriptive observation might support something like a debunking argument to attack any warrant for claims of normative epistemic standards. Which is just to say that I haven't seen any way the normative question can be foreclosed on. And indeed, if it was foreclosed on entirely, and we said there were absolutely no better or worse epistemic methods, that seems to me to be courting a sort of nihilism. But neither does the existence of the normative question require "contextlessness" to address.
Quoting Leontiskos
Although it may sound partisan, the simple fact of the matter is that @Banno and @J have been trying to chastise a certain moral disposition:
Quoting Banno
They think it is morally wrong to philosophically engage in a certain way (i.e. with a particular level of certainty).
The whole thread has a moral flavor. It is about whether we are allowed to do certain things, philosophically, and specifically whether we are morally allowed. Your posts are interesting, but they may be missing this central piece of the thread.
The moral thesis of Banno and J is something like, "It is impermissible to judge someone wrong simpliciter, because there are no unconditioned criteria that bind everyone." It is the idea that we can only ever say that someone is wrong according to such and such a standard, but that there are no overarching standards which can be said to bind everyone. And this is applied in a scientific or philosophical register, as for example in claiming that someone's philosophical position is wrong. My notion of, "Expectation of Rational Bindingness (ERB)," may be helpful, even though it is a rough sketch.
It was intended as an abstraction; if it doesn't hold up, I wouldn't mind or be surprised.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't think so.
Quoting Leontiskos
My understanding was that if you're intent on policing the boundary between science and something else (art, sport, pseudoscience), you want to reliably pick out all and only sciences, you want necessary and sufficient conditions for some activity counting as science. I don't think you can have that. The "necessary" part is too easy -- "done by sentient beings" for a start. But that doesn't help much in narrowing the field of candidates. The "sufficient" part is too hard because of the diversity of methods and practices. Not all sciences perform experiments, for instance, or have to define "experiment" quite differently. (The universe is a population of 1, so cosmology has a problem right out of the gate.)
Quoting Leontiskos
It was one of Wittgenstein's metaphors for how family resemblance concepts work.
Quoting Leontiskos
And of course there are.
Quoting Leontiskos
It's just another way of talking about "all and only", just quantifiers. It doesn't implicate modal logic at all; on the contrary, the modal box and diamond thingies are just quantifiers understood to range over possible worlds. That's literally all they are, restricted quantifiers. So you've got this backwards.
Quoting Leontiskos
The above caught my eye. Given that you believe humans have the same nature, and by this you apparently have in mind a powerful facility to understand the world from the others point of view ( linguistic, cultural, scientific), what sort of explanation is left in order to account for profound disagreements concerning ethical, epistemological and philosophical matters ( not to mention day to day conflicts with friends and family members)?
It seems that what is left falls under the categories of medical pathology, incorrect knowledge and irrationality, and moral failure. Is this characterization close to the mark?
This is exactly why I moved to anchor the normative question to relations among or transitions between given epistemes (worldviews, frameworks, ideologies, whatever).
People move from St Louis to Kansas City. But if you live in St Louis, how much do you really know about Kansas City? How do you decide? Can you see Kansas City as a native does before you move? Do you need to? It's well known that an outsider might see what's good about a place that the locals take for granted, but an outsider might not see at all what the locals love about a place. Is there available to everyone, no matter where they live, a reliable method of judging the value of a place? Is where you live now relevant at all?
My plan for making the normative question more tractable was, instead of asking whether St Louis is better than Kansas City (or, in analogy to the science issue, whether they are the same kind of city), to ask, if I live in St Louis, should I move or stick? And the same if I live in Kansas City.
The difficulty, given my preferences, is that, while much of later 20th century philosophy is a rejection of the "view from nowhere," it still continues to use it as a sort of dialectical pole, and in fact, to accomplish this, it tends to project the preferences of early-20th century empiricists back onto the whole of philosophical history. So, the position is rejected, but it still "looms large," and it becomes difficult to step out of its shadow. Indeed, I think helpful elements of the past get occluded by this formidable shadow.
Yeah, I probably should have addressed that, I just wanted to clarify the idea behind the initial disjunct of "all narratives are true or not all narratives are true."
I'll have to think about that analogy. I can see how it is apt in some ways, particularly the difficulty of knowing a locale before going there, but I also think that practical reason (better or worse) differs from theoretical reason (more or less true/accurate) in substantial ways, that an analogy might have to reflect.
To be put it very shortly, if knowledge is our grasp of being, truth the "adequacy of thought to being," then I am not sure if the idea of many different cities works. Would this denote many different beings (plural)? (Or I suppose just different places to do your research from, but then there seems to be a "progress" element that we need to account for; the difficulty is that "better" seems to open up cases where something is better for reasons unrelated to epistemology and knowledge).
That is, given the assumption of one being, one world we are all a part of, I might want to adjust it to something like there being many roads to the same location. For instance, driving to the Grand Canyon. But the Grand Canyon is also huge and looks very different from each rim, or from the bottom, or from Horseshoe Bend, etc. So there is both a question of which roads even lead there, which are best to travel on (which might vary depending on your "vehicle"), and which angel you'll be seeing the Canyon from. Presumably, once you are "closer" it should be easier to get to other close views.
Maybe this works, maybe not. I suppose one benefit here is that someone is always somewhere in proximity to the Canyon, although it may be possible to drive in the wrong direction. Because it does seem to me that, in being normative, there has to be a sort of "progress" in any analogy, although I suppose cities being "better" might capture this. The case where all locations are potential destinations would seem to me to suggest a sort of anti-realism, or at least something in conflict with most notions of epistemology as goal-directed along a particular axis. I am not sure about multiple discrete destinations though, what that would have to imply about knowledge.
That's a sort of evolutionary thesis that could also be framed in information theoretic terms. But of course, evolution doesn't preclude the formation of genetic diseases either.
There are problems there, but I think it gets something right.
I like the roads. That's nice. But of course the real trouble is that we must choose not knowing where each road leads. They all lead somewhere, but is it where we want to go?
And the two metaphors combine naturally: how do you know if some place is a place you'd like to go until you've been there? Do you decide based on what other people have said about it or what?
The moving cities analogy is interesting. I think we can take it a bit further. Let's consider the question, "What's it like to live in Kansas City?" This frames the issue as if there were only one way to live in Kansas City. but of course what it is like to live in Kansas City is not a thing, but a series of choices and interactions - do you stay in your flat, or do you go out and explore the parks? Do you join a choir, or a bike club? Do you get to know your neighbours, or keep to your old relationships?
The analogy holds when we consider changes in fundamental beliefs. it's not about what is the case, so much as what you do next. As such there is no answer to "What's it like to live in Kansas City?" apart from what one choses to do in Kansas City.
There's another aspect that is quite interesting. I would like to go back to this:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Assuming this is honest, it shows how very, very far Tim is from understanding what I have been suggesting. It would be somewhat extraordinary for someone to suppose that I would argue that "no one is ever wrong", given that almost all my posts are about how folk are wrong! I think many would see it as my modus operandi!
How can Tim be so thoroughly mistaken? Do we supose his case is different to others here, who display less intelligence but more ill-will and aggression? Is Tim in the position of someone in St. Louis trying to describe what it is like to live in Kansas City? Is he just saying that there are better Jazz clubs in St Louis? (Never having been to either, I'm guessing...)
If you are not interested in Jazz clubs, such an observation is irrelevant.
Which city is preferable depends on what you are doing.
So it appears that Tim wants to do something fundamentally different to @J, @Moliere and I. Perhaps he's building from what he supposes are firm foundations, rather than looking around to see how things are.
But our differences might not be about what is the case, and so not the sort that might be brought out by logical analysis. They are rather differences about what we want.
@Tom Storm, more along your lines of psychology rather than metaphysics.
Would you be able to summarise what the two camps are arguing? I'm assuming there's two.
The view from nowhere? But don't you object to that?
Quoting Wayfarer
To be disinterested in the suffering of others doesn't appear all that admirable.
I do, iff considered as pre-Brentano, re: late 19th century, hardly the apex of the Enlightenment paradigm.
But you probably meant by anyone here, conversational participants, rather than just some guy raising his hand from the back of the room.
You haven't missed much. No, I won't presume to summarise Tim's views. And yes, the thread is drifting into the culture wars, which is a bit of a shame. But perhaps my point has been made and carried.
Yes, I like this too. I'll see if I can develop it even further.
Some places we might need to visit, or to give an account of what they're like, will be very different from Kansas City. KC is diverse, big, full of possibilities. No single account is likely to do it justice. But suppose the destination is a narrow series of underground tunnels leading to a hidden treasure. In such a case, the options -- and our reasons for being there -- are much more curtailed. It's not unreasonable to say, "Look, we're here for the treasure, and if there's another 'way it's like' to be here, we probably don't care much about it." Moreover, we might have a treasure map, and to ignore this map, assuming we trust it, would be not "diverse" but foolish, given the circumstances.
So the idea is that there is not only a diversity of possibilities within a given city, but a real diversity of kinds of cities/destinations. Some are ideal for encouraging a variety of interpretations, others all but demand a rigid metric.
The cry of distress, then, is "But how do we tell the difference?! How do we know if our practice or project is more like multifarious KC, or narrow Treasure Tunnel?" I think the answer is, "You may not know beforehand. You may have to look and see. But being unsure is not the same as being utterly in the dark, or forced to act at random. Nor does it mean that, if neither of these extremes is quite suited, we can find no middle ground."
See the monk with dysentery. The Buddha upbraids the monks for not caring for one of their number who has dysentery and personally attends to him. "If you don't tend to one another, who then will tend to you? Whoever would tend to me, should tend to the sick.
As far as the view from nowhere - theres a world of difference between scientific objectivity and philosophical detachment, subject of this essay:
Then he was not disinterested - wanting someone to look after him.
See the problem?
This seems to be the key. From what Tim has said, he does not agree. I supose he might say that you need to know what you are looking for before you go exploring. But why?
Disinterested doesn't mean not caring. It's disinterest in the sense that a judicial officer or doctor is disinterested - has no personal interest.
Quoting Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer
To care is to adopt a view.
Further, how could one ever know that one sees
Quoting Wayfarer
Perhaps I see things as they truly are, now, without the years of meditation - who's to say? SHould i take your word for it?
Moreover, doesn't your view require that our point of view is always situated, always subjective? I the Buddha's view then, still subjective?
Take pity on us - can you see how difficult it is to reconcile your account with logic? Presumably, the logic must be in error...?
Nice. This remains unaddressed.
Perhaps it's particulars that decide the issue - a new job, a cheaper house, being near family.
And here maybe the analogy breaks. Not sure.
And also, the idea that some circumstances do invite a rule-bound, rigorous, deductive approach -- and others do not, and many are in between. I'm even happy with saying that, in some cases, we might know beforehand, or at least have a pretty good idea. And . . . wait for it . . . in other cases we do not!
'The Buddha' is not an individual person as such. In the Pali texts recounting the Gautama's final days, he talks about how his body is old and worn 'like an old cart'. In those contexts, he refers to himself in the first person 'I am getting old'. But when conveying the teaching, he uses the impersonal term 'tathagatha'. (Quite what the identity of the Buddha is, is dealt with in an encounter with a questioner who demands an answer, 'are you a god' (no) 'a demon' (no) 'a man' (no - I am awakened, i.e. Buddha.))
The point I'm trying to press, is that scientific objectivity is still embedded in an intellectual context, which embodies particular assumptions and axioms, notably about the nature of what can be understood and measured, what is amenable and tractable to precise measurement and quantification. Within that context, the scientist seeks to ameliorate all trace of personal proclivity, confirmation bias, and so on, so as to derive a result or frame an hypothesis which is confirmable by others. It is fundamentally third-person in nature.
Philosophical detachment is different. It shares many characteristics with scientific objectivity but with a crucial difference. While both aim to transcend personal biases and arrive at an understanding of what is truly so, philosophical detachment seeks its goal through self-transcendence rather than by bracketing out the subjective altogether.
To understand this distinction, first differentiate the subjective from the personal. The subjective refers to the structures of experience through which reality is disclosed to consciousness. In an important sense, all sentient beings are subjects of experience. Subjectivity or perhaps subject-hood encompasses the shared and foundational aspects of perception and understanding. The personal, by contrast, pertains to the idiosyncratic desires, biases, and attachments of a specific individual. Philosophical detachment requires rising above, or seeing through, these personal inclinations, but not through denying or bracketing out the entire category of subjective understanding. And that's because we ourselves are agents, not objects - we're not the species h.sapiens as objects for science, but living beings who are inextricably involved in our lives.
So there's a real distinction there.
What is the point of me exchanging several long PMs on this where I clarified this point to you in detail and asked you for clarification in each of them, refusing to offer up that clarification, and then posting this here?
I am still confused about what your point on undecided statements was. I have explained though precisely why it seemed to me that the counter example you were pursuing was bizarre.
And note that this entire line of posting was started by your conflation of "all narratives are true or they aren't" that is "all x are y or not all x are y," as being equivalent "each x is either y or not-y." That was supposedly "my theory." Whereas, what has offended you, is merely my asking an incredulous question. But I was incredulous because the counter example for having "missed" the undecided option for "all statements are true or not all statements are true," would be the strange objection that one has unfairly ruled out the possibility that "all statements are neither true nor not true." Likewise, even if I had said "each statement is either true or false," the objection that I have missed the undecided option only seems to have purchase in this context if it is inappropriate to leave the door open on their being no false statements.
I don't really know what the point was supposed to have been otherwise, hence my asking.
Which you continue to do.
Most puzzling.
That would be a far more edifying approach than the present woful mess.
Sure.
Supose that someone claims to have achieved "self-transcendence". How could we check?
They'd be the ones charging money for intensives... (sorry, a cheap shot).
Do we agree that one can coherently say "I don't know"?
If someone asked what it's like to live in Kansas City, I would imagine they're asking what the people are like, what the local culture consists of, the natural environment, etc.
If you answered with: "I drive on a giant highway to get a giant steak and potato" I think your listener would wonder about you. In other words, you'd have to spout out a huge number of personal anecdotes to convey what you could easily express with descriptions.
I just think when a person asks what it's like to live in a city, they're asking how it feels to live there. You'd want to help them connect it to feelings they already know about. Wouldn't you want to describe scenes, rhythms, tastes, colors, etc? Compare and contrast to other locations? Yes, you probably gathered that information by doing things, but that seems incidental. Consciousness is filled with feelings, right?
Is the framework that supports the realism of other minds and their contents context-de/independent?
Is there a difference between what something is like and what something is?
I think all human beings have experience of knowledge, error, and being aware of one's own ignorance. So, there is already an epistemic orientation. If there wasn't this sort of orientation, then there wouldn't be anything to differentiate epistemology as a distinct pursuit.
There is a Meno Paradox element of: "how do you know what you're looking for in a specific case," of course. I don't think this applies to "why not prefer falsity over truth or ignorance over knowledge?" though.
Is this still supposed to be a metaphor for epistemology? Or is it philosophy more generally? Presumably, in the case of epistemology we want to head in the direction of knowledge and not ignorance, right?
So I am not sure how there are multiple destinations, or what that would represent. Are the many destinations sui generis "types of knowing?' Would that suggest many different, incommensurate truths or types of truth (which would mean many different incommensurate beings)?
It seems to me that, even were this so, the goal would still be all of the destinations (not from a practical standpoint, but from a theoretical one). Whether or not this is achievable would be a different question.
Whereas, even if there is only one destination, the question of if [I]any[/I] road leads to the destination would remain.
Yes, yes, yes, that was the whole point. I thought this was perfectly clear.
Take @Leontiskos's anxiety about distinguishing science from pseudoscience. Let's say we all just agree that we prefer science to pseudoscience. Hurray for us. What good does that do? Does it help you determine whether what you're doing is science or what someone else is doing is pseudoscience? No, it does not. You need more than a preference for that.
Now let's grant your single goal, the singular world that we desire knowledge of. Now let's suppose we have some worldview, ideology, episteme, framework, or conceptual scheme ? and the idea is to look at these thingies as potentially veridical or at least truth-engendering, and so also potentially misleading or falsifying. I hope that's clear enough.
My city business was supposed to ground the question of which one to pick by assuming that you already have one ? you already live somewhere not nowhere ? and you need somehow to evaluate the alternatives and decide whether you've got the desired knowledge-producing worldview (or one of the several that will do so, we don't have to commit immediately) or you've got one that engenders error, distortion, and all the stuff we don't want.
Reason was offered, I believe, as a means of determining whether some other framework might be better than the one you're already using, the one you have right now. The city you currently live in. Or maybe it would tell you everything's fine, you already live in paradise.
It's no help at all to say, "I want the one that produces knowledge." We already know that. How do you know whether you've already got that one, or whether it's one of the other ones?
And so it is with roads. You want to go to the Grand Canyon. Which road do you take? "The one that goes to the Grand Canyon" is not a useful answer. The question is, how do you know which one that is?
Maybe there is no road there. Maybe the Grand Canyon is a myth. We can play lots of games here, but that's not what I was trying to do.
The plan was to approach the problem of relativism in a particular way, by acknowledging that you are already relying on some particular worldview (etc) when you face the question of whether some other worldview is "acceptable" or in some other way good. It's not like going shopping for something you don't have yet. (Hence the usefulness of the metaphor of where you live, since you must already live somewhere ? although I guess your thorough-going skeptic or cynic just wanders, "no fixed abode," which I guess we will now get dragged into talking about.)
The sorts of issues I wanted to raise seem obvious to me: you've got a worldview, and presumably it provides the framework within which you will evaluate alternative worldviews ? smart money is on finding that you've already got the best one and the others are crap. Even leaving that aside, what are you even evaluating? Is it a genuine alternative? Or is it that alternative as understood in the categories you're already using? It's an issue of translation, right? You have to translate the other framework into yours ? how do you evaluate the fidelity of that process? Is it even possible to access a different worldview that way? (Can you know a city the way the locals do without just being one of them?)
Which brings us back to the claim that reason can deal with this challenge, reason can enable you to understand and evaluate other worldviews untainted by your own perhaps faulty one. And the question I wanted specifically to leave open was, whether this is so.
It's very repetitive, I'm sorry. I thought this was all clear before, so I've probably overexplained now.
I am starting to see the dialectic as between process oriented (with no clear goal) (like this thread Banno set up), and goal oriented (with a clear process) (like proponents of truth like).
Or maybe a dialectic between working from the inside out (like Banno repeating how all is already within a language), and working in a straight line (like those of us actually want to get somewhere when we speak do).
Hard for me to pinpoint. Indeterminacy revelers versus determinacy seekers.
I thought this insight was instructive:
Banno wants the assertions about the world to emerge out of the doing. What we do with words is the arche of what others might call human knowledge. Because of this, its a process is his answer to every question such as where are you going with this? (Are all narratives true or not was a where are you going with this type question.) Our main question about his method is, how will we know whether we are getting anywhere and whether we have reached the end and can say we now know something? Will you ever have a point to your dissection of everything?
The closest answer to these last two questions the process/dissection philosophers have given is context (although I have some catching up to do).
I think context is really their word for absolute principle. (So they are contradicting their methods by asserting non-arbitrariness grounded in context.). They think they are not contradicting themselves because they think the context can have as much flux and lack of permanence and indeterminacy as whatever the undefined thing has within that context. But context must be fixed or it does not do the work they think it does to avoid arbitrariness and they get nowhere when theyre trying to make a point (like this thread is getting nowhere, constantly moving away from any target that might begin to emerge).
Con means with.
Text means the language.
Context has to be outside the language, to be with it, or it is just more ill-defined indeterminacy and cant provide sufficient context.
IMO, language itself is outside of the world, which is how it can be about the world. Language is meta-world. By speaking, the process lovers refute themselves and cease being doers. We cant do language without referring it to the world.
We can make language its own object and speak about logic and let truth mean validity, but this is just a meta-meta-language, because language is already meta).
So when they discount all references to the world as metaphysical and vacuous and ill-conceived, in addition to contradicting themselves by speaking at all and situating themselves outside of the world in a language, they in effect make speaking meaningless. Which is, if they are conscious of it, why they devour all attempts to say anything.
If we parrot what they say about the world and say: all is flux, but who really can say - they will forgo the dissection process and allow our metaphysics to stand. They make all kinds of metaphysical claims as long as they are tied to flux and relation and process, and as long as they leave more questions unanswered when answers might emerge. And as long as they are spoken by accolytes and friends, as opposed to people like me. But as soon as they get a hint of those like me who seek to deconstruct deconstruction itself, they devour all meaning and references to the world and try to be more consistent and true to their process oriented, goalless metaphysic.
We probably should not allow the constant reframing of the central question.
I think that is the key to showing the weakness of just being Wittgenstein about things. They never can sit still. It becomes pretty plain that this is so by act of will, and not by conclusion of logic. (Srap is discounting reason itself, which I agree, we always must be careful with our human limitations of even reason, but its suspect to me in this context.)
I am not trying to win a debate. I am trying to be right, conform myself and my thinking to what is (as you say Count). I am utterly unconcerned with authoritarianism. Or, I am trying to be the sole authoritarian in my own life. (Trying to is important here.). They are trying to defeat our arguments and defeat their perception of our underlying motives. I will be happy to confirm all is only flux and that a man cannot step into the same river twice, or once, because then I will be able to live more successfully (or cease trying to succeed at living). I will also throw away all philosophy (as speaking refutes never standing still in the river). I happen to think flux is only half of the story language refers to, not all of it. I like Aristotles way of thinking so far as I can tell.
This thread will certainly never get there, which is ironic as they are stuck in the mud, mud being the clearest form and context for them.
Edit:
And it is not us versus them personally. I am happy to live in the world with them and respect them as I respect myself and you both. Them refers to their arguments. Im drowning in mud as well, only struggling with it because I see lifelines in truth, and absolute goals, and ideals and good answers.
I don't know. We are all born solipsists. When we reach 8-12 months of age we convert to realism by acquiring object permanence. Was realism and the idea of other minds a position the toddler already had, or did it just make more sense to the toddler that their mother (other minds) still exists when they are not seen or heard after interacting with the world over the past 8-12 months?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I don't know. If you start evaluating other worldviews are you not expressing some dissatisfaction with the one you currently have? Once you start evaluating other worldviews, can you say you are in a state of actually having one?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Im not sure about your premise, but either way I think the conditional is mistaken. One does not need to reliably pick out all and only sciences in order to exclude pseudoscience. All one needs is a single necessary condition in order to exclude something like pseudoscience.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Whether or not that is correct, I dont see the need to talk about ...and only. If something doesnt have legs then it isnt a table (on that example I gave). We dont need to claim that only tables have legs in order to make exclusions based on the necessary criterion of legs.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
What do you suppose the normative question is? I gave my account <here>. I hope it was clear.
You are assuming that we have some species of activity and we need to define it in order to justify exclusionary practices. Let me show you a different way to think about it...
Again, I want to say that the central contention of the thread is, There are no overarching standards by which we are bound. A number of us are opposing that thesis. @Count Timothy von Icarus' example of falsifying data or evidence strikes me as an excellent counterexample, and the fact that @Banno resisted him shows that it does cut against the thesis of the thread.
Im not quite sure what your analogies about St. Louis and Kansas City have to do with this central question. I can dream up ways to connect them, but those dreams involve lots of contentious assumptions.
Im guessing you want to talk about necessary conditions because necessary conditions pertain to exclusion, and you seem to have assumed that someone is trying to police or exclude. Of course, Banno and @J are trying to police and exclude (certain levels of certainty), but I dont think thats what you meant.
A moral analogy might be helpful (and the thread is really just moral philosophy in the end anyhow). Compare law to morality, namely legal jurisdiction to the universal moral jurisdiction. If we say, Youve broken a law of Venezuela, then we will of course need necessary conditions for what counts as Venezuelan jurisdiction. But if we say, Youve murdered someone, we dont need to figure out whether the guilty party was under Venezuelan jurisdiction, because murder is impermissible everywhere. The thread is precisely about such universal standards, such as a standard which says that one may not falsify evidence as a matter of inquiry. We are talking about standards that apply everywhere, so it doesnt matter whether we move from St. Louis to Kansas City. The contextualists are saying, There is nothing which is impermissible everywhere. On this different way to think about it, we are asking about unconditional necessities, not necessary conditions.
Now there is real ambiguity in whether we are talking about excluding from some species of activity, or else opposing certain things regardless of the species of activity. I have been leaning towards the latter, as I think it is closer to the heart of the thread. Someone of your mind would naturally transpose any enunciation of the latter into some variety of the former, and I think @Count Timothy von Icaruss points about falsifying data offer a good example of how to confront such an approach.
More precisely, I think s claim that view-from-nowhere thinking is more pervasive than we realize is correct, and that this is related to your own belief that
(So much of this is closely parallel to debates about moral bindingness. I feel as if <my thread on the moral sphere> could be retooled for intellectual virtue rather than moral virtue, and it would address the central contention of this thread. In that sense we would say, Whether or not there are binding and overarching standards, everyone believes there are. Similarly, my <recent thread> says, We all believe there are binding and overarching standards, but can we make sense of such beliefs?)
-
Glancing at this:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Note that I have literally not said a single word about "pseudoscience" in this thread, so you're clearly mixed up. What I think is happening is that you are projecting <this thread> and <this thread> into the one we are in now. ...Count has spoken about pseudoscience, but I take him to be speaking analogically, and I do not take him to be interested in that question per se, apart from the parallels it has to the more central question.
Why bother? If we all believe there are such standards, justifying the claim that there are seems redundant.
Because one or two folks are denying it. Even their simple claim, "You are bound to not-bind people," is self-contradictory.
So by "making sense of such beliefs" you mean something like achieving coherence i.e. exposing the contradiction in denying it? I think that's a step short of justification.
Good. This is almost exactly Aristotle's argument for the PNC in Metaphysics IV. "You are welcome to deny the PNC, so long as you never speak or use language."
Quoting Fire Ologist
The trouble is the fact that processes have goals by definition.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, and even more fundamentally, we should all be willing to state what we believe the central question is.
Quoting Fire Ologist
The thread is another example of, "X is bad and I won't say why." It is very similar to the faith thread, "Faith is bad and I won't say why." Whenever they try to say why they end up utilizing strawmen of faith (or whatever it is). So you say, "What is faith, on your reckoning?" Or, "What is authoritarianism, on your reckoning?" And their response is prevarication. It's just tyranny, and you can't reason with a tyrant. They have to be open to rational argumentation and a defense of their views before you can reason with them.
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Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
More than conflation. @Banno decided to stick his head three feet into the sand to avoid seeing what had been pointed out to him ad nauseum. That he still hasn't admitted the point is beyond belief, even for him.
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Quoting goremand
Have a look at the thread in question if you like. I would again liken this thread more to my thread on the moral sphere, where I try to show people that they already have moral beliefs.
Quoting Leontiskos
You're latching onto that last sentence, which is about a different thread.
It sounds like you're an investor with some initial capital and you're looking to improve your lot. "Maybe I should move to Kansas City. Hmm..."
Again, I'm not sure what this has to do with this thread. What is the normative question you believe to be at stake? How does this relate to what has been discussed in the thread?
Quoting Moliere
To be clear, "some" = "one."
If so then "not always" is what I say -- and really I'd only focus on the cases where there's one set of standards being switched for another set of standards such that there wasn't some over-arching agreement which can settle which is better after all. Else you're just talking about disagreement within a set of standards which doesn't exactly do the work that "paradigm" is supposed to. There's nothing radically different about two rationalists disagreeing with one another over which is the better inference. The notion is that the ideas are different enough that such a path of disagreement fails. It's the ideas themselves, or the standards, which are in question rather than whether a person has followed the proper inference within an accepted set of standards.
Hey you're right! I suppose it's all one big thread to me. We all end up saying the same things in every thread, myself included, though I keep trying to have new ideas...
Quoting Leontiskos
I think that was @Count Timothy von Icarus's phrase. It's whether there are overarching standards we are beholden to and can rely upon when judging the worth of a narrative (all the etc). All I was trying to do is see what such a thing would look and act like when you are already committed to such a narrative, when you already live somewhere and the question is not the abstract "Where should one live?" but the more concrete "Should I move?"
No worries. :lol:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Yes, I added this in an edit:
Quoting Leontiskos
I see the pseudoscience question that @Count Timothy von Icarus has raised as an analogy for something that would be more generally considered beyond the pale.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay, excellent. Thanks for setting this out. I agree. :clap:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
This makes the assumption that the person's starting point is not beholden to the the standard, no? It's a bit like, "Well I live in Brazil and I could move to Venezuela, but I'm going to have a look at the Venezuelan laws to see if it would be a good idea to move."
So I am worried that your scenario already assumes the thing that we are supposed to be proving. Obviously if we're thinking of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City, and St. Louis does not have the standard that Kansas City has, then that standard is not overarching. The question has already been answered.
This is really, really helpful, for I believe it highlights precisely what @J has been doing all along. It also shows how easy it is to get leverage on such things when someone just answers simple questions simply.
My intention was absolutely to treat it as an open question.
Quoting Leontiskos
I actually worry about that too, especially with the stuff about translation that I posted.
I want, on the one hand, to leverage the recognition that people do not start from scratch every moment of their lives, but to avoid suggesting -- what is clearly false! -- that change is impossible. (That's why I have used words like "stuck" and "prison": they cut both ways -- as an extreme version of the relativist position and a jab at how extreme that position is.)
Understood.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Okay. I suppose I can see how that recognition has leverage with respect to the central question, namely insofar as the premise which says we start from scratch would invalidate the possibility of an overarching standard.
Ultimately I think we need to give arguments for or against the central thesis of the thread. It seems like you're trying to present things that stay perfectly neutral with respect to the central thesis, but nevertheless elucidate the question. I think it is often possible to do that, but it is very difficult in this case. I actually think gave a pretty definitive argument, providing an example of an overarching standard. Perhaps everyone already agrees that the standard he presented is overarching...?
If I wanted to try to straddle the neutrality fence, then I would present an image that pertains to bindingness or beholden-ness. Such as, "Is this a question of Venezuelan jurisdiction or is it a jurisdiction-less question?" I struggle to see any way in which the example about St. Louis and Kansas City has even the capacity to support the position which holds there to be overarching standards. I could manufacture some possibility, but it will look weak given that predetermined setup. In other words, the very notion that someone would posit an overarching standard which says that someone must move from St. Louis to Kansas City is pretty outlandish.
Sort of. It's asking if there is a common thread between the two paradigms, given that each paradigm is made up of many different strands.
Here is how I would approach the topic. First, read to Banno, beginning with the words, "I concede..."
What I do there is identify a common aim that Banno and I share within that conversation. I want to say that the question of this thread is bound up with the question of whether we all have common aims, or more precisely, common ends. Let me be very explicit about how this relates to the central question: if we do not have common ends, then there is no overarching standard; if we do have at least one common end, then there is at least one overarching standard.
(Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II.Q1 - Man's last end)
For this I just go to science and history -- they both speak about "the world", but in their own particular idioms and ways of making inferences. They both mean "reality", and they mean it in a realist way such as "reality outside of my particular opinions about reality, but rather what the best methods/values which produce knowledge say"
At least that's the example which impresses me the most because even theories of time and causality differ, but we're both talking about the same world, and we're talking about it in the realist sense where our ideas are supposed to conform to the world in some way, and our particular opinions about the world aren't what determine the truth -- in short, both easily lend themselves to a sort of objective realism about the world.
So the way I resolve that is to say they are different ways of knowing about the same thing. It'd be foolish to say either scientists or historians don't know anything because of the universalization of the standards of science or history exclude the other. Much better to shrug and say "I'm not sure how these guys relate -- perhaps we don't translate one into the other, but are about the same thing, and so demonstrate different facets of the same reality"
You're welcome to say "I don't know" when presented with ' question about whether all narratives are equal or some narratives are unequal. But if you really don't know the answer that question, then it is odd that you would write a thread claiming that dissection-narratives are better than discourse-narratives. You can't maintain your OP here while simultaneously saying that you don't know whether some narratives are unequal. :kiss:
Well, actually I meant the opposite.
I can put it another way: it's a question of whether the subject who judges things like narratives and paradigms and cities is thick or thin. In the thick conception, the subject comes with a history, a culture, a worldview, all that relativist business; in the thin view, he comes armed with rationality.
It's in that sense that taking the subject as a quite abstract rational judge is treating them as starting over each moment, entirely without the sort of baggage we all actually have.
I want first to recognize how this baggage constrains our judgments, second to recognize that this constraint is not absolute (sometimes paradigms are overthrown), and third to see if there's a role for rationality in setting down some of the load you're carrying, and even in choosing to pick up something new.
I think @Count Timothy von Icarus is especially interested in being in position to tell someone that they *should* put down some baggage they're carrying. The grounds for saying so would be (a) that this particular burden does not help you in making rational judgments, and (b) that Tim can tell (a) is the case by exercising rational judgment. (Stop thinking you need to sacrifice chipmunks to the river every spring so it will thaw, would be a typical Enlightenment example.)
I'm not sure how close that is to your view (or if it is in fact Tim's), but that's the sort of thing I imagine is on the table when people say they want an overarching standard.
I agree, and this is the point of Goodman's that so impressed me, that there's no reason to regret history not being science, or biology not being physics, or art not being history. All are what he calls ways of worldmaking.
Unless you dont believe in definitions.
Processes should have goals. But dissection focused philosophical styles are process for the sake of process. Its eternal recurrence of the same process.
Feelings arent inner senses sprinkling their subjective coloration over experiences , but activities, doings. They are our ways of being attuned in situations, the way things strike us.
I'm glad you brought Goodman in here. In one of his later papers, he says, "No firm line can be drawn between world-features that are discourse-dependent and those that are not." This connects with your discussion of the "thick" and "thin" subject. Goodman goes on to reject the "fallacy that whatever we make, we can make any way we like." In the context here, we might expand this: "There is no firm line called 'objectivity' which, if the 'thin' subject stay on one side of it, will produce only non-discourse-dependent accounts. But nor does the 'thick' subject who crosses that line find themselves confronted with discourse-chaos, an infinite multiplicity of arbitrary and equally plausible versions."
Goodman has a lot to say about how we do proceed, as a matter of practice. I like this pithy version; after rejecting "irresponsible relativism" of the kind I just sketched, he says:
Context again. Now the objection can be raised, "How do you know what counts as 'serviceable' or 'judicious'? Aren't these weasel-words for something much more foundation-like, such as 'objective' or 'rational' or 'truth-producing'?" And the response here, I think, has to be, "These foundation-like words are extremely important -- they are what prevents us from simply declaring that we can carry out a practice 'any way we like,' as Goodman says. But they are not understood outside of a context where something can be (for example) serviceable or not; there is no 'thin' subject who can pronounce upon them from a meta-position of 'baggage-less judgment.'" I would also call such a theoretical place a position beyond interpretation, one from which all interpretation is supposed to follow, while itself being uninterpreted.
You also raise the question of whether such personal, contextual baggage can be dropped or exchanged. I think the Goodmanian answer is, "Certainly, and rationality may be an important guide in doing so." But so, for instance, is compassion. Once again, we're forced to ask, "What is the contextless stance I should try to take, in considering this question? Will rationality always have the last word, as Nagel puts it? Or does he mean, the last word in philosophy?"
I wonder if there is a further justification for coming "armed with rationality" as the best choice the "thin" subject can make.
In any case, as you say, this is a thought experiment, since none of us is ever in such a contextless, baggage-less position. But that doesn't mean it isn't important. Trying to say what a view from nowhere would be is extremely important, if perhaps ultimately unsatisfactory.
I've still not read Goodman, to my detriment. But your description of him here looks similar to what I think. We should celebrate these different ways of knowing, and it even opens up a reason for philosophy to exist at all -- because no matter how much a person may know in a certain area it will always be worthwhile to talk to someone else that knows more in a different area, and the nit-picky philosophy is what's particularly good at finding the confusions in attempts to translate two different worldviews.
Not that it needs that to be good, of course. Everyone's just always (annoyingly ;) ) asking "What's the point of this philosophy?"
Doesnt it take a contextless, baggage-less posture to be able to say what you just said above?
I don't think so. In the context I find myself in no one has ever been in a contextless position. What's wrong with that?
Sure, in a very broad sense. If epistemology can never identify better or worse ways to achieve knowledge it is useless. Or, if knowledge is always wholly defined and contained within some paradigm, such that "sacrificing chipmunks truly thaws rivers just so long as you're a member of a certain community that currently accepts this," it seems perhaps to be equally pointless.
There do seem to be some epistemic "rules" that it is quite hard to think of counter examples for, e.g. "just making up observations to support your claims," is not a reliable way to achieve knowledge. More extreme, "intentionally sabatoging your research program" is not a reliable way to attain knowledge. Not accepting arguments from premises known to be false, or where the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, might be others.
Likewise, there are habits that seem to be more or less conducive to attaining knowledge, i.e., "epistemic virtues." The opposite of this claim would be the idea that no habits (e.g. epistemic humility) can be said support epistemic success in general.
But note that this does not require the Enlightenment conception of reason as primarily a sort of discursive rule following, or a sort of "method," "system," or "game." Later critiques of reason tend to leave this assumption firmly in place and rely on it heavily. I don't think it's an adequate notion of reason, as demonstrated by where it leads.
To address your earlier question about the limits of reason, I would point out that the claim that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms or world-views is, of course, a gnostic claim. One presumably [I]knows[/I] this if one claims it to be so. Yet to have recognized a boundary is to already have stepped over it.
Now, if we claim that reason is in a sense isolated [I]within[/I] "world-views and paradigms," we face the odd situation where some world-views and paradigms resolutely deny our claim. They instead claim that knowing involves ecstasis, it is transcendent, and always related to the whole, and so without limitalready with the whole and beyond any limit. And such views have quite a long history.
Our difficulty is that, if reason just is "reason within a paradigm," then it seems that this view of reason cannot be so limited, for it denies this limit and it is an authority on itself. Our criticism that this other paradigm errs would seem to be limited to our own paradigm.
The positive gnostic claim, to have groked past the limits of intelligibility and seen the end of reason from the other side faces an additional challenge here if we hold to the assumption that any such universal claim must be "from nowhere," and itself issued from "outside any paradigm, " since it is also generally being claimed that precisely this sort of "stepping outside" is impossible. But perhaps this is simply a misguided assumption. Afterall, one need not "step out of one's humanity" to know that "all men are mortal." One can know this about all men while still always being a particular man.
So, that's my initial thoughts on the idea that reason cannot adjudicate between paradigms. It seems this must remain true only for some paradigms, and one might suppose that being limited in this way is itself a deficiency. After all, what is left once one gives up totally on reason as an adjudicator? It would seem to me that all that remains is power struggles (and indeed , some thinkers go explicitly in this direction). Further, the ability to selectively decide that reason ceases to apply in some cases seems obviously prone to abuse (real world examples abound)in a word, it's misology.
But none of this requires stepping outside paradigms, except in the sense that reason may draw us outside our paradigms (and indeed this happens, MacIntyreRIPwas drawn from Marxism to Thomism). To know something new is to change, to have gone beyond what one already was. That's Plato's whole point about the authority of the rational part of the soul. The desire for truth and goodness leads beyond the given of current belief and desire, and hence beyond our finitude.
I'll just add that the absolute, to be truly absolute, cannot be "objective" reality as set over and against appearances, but must encompass the whole of reality and all appearances. Appearances are moments in the whole, and are revelatory of the whole. Appearances are then not a sort of barrier between the knower and known, but the going out of the known to the knowerand because all knowing is also in some sense becomingthe ecstasis of the knower, their going out beyond what they already are in union with the known.
Maybe it is just the way it was said. Sounded absolute. Quoting J
None. Not one.
Is ever. Not ever.
Absolutely no one can possibly be.
Since none of us is ever.
Sounds like if someone say well one time I realized a moment void of all my baggage, discarded everything, even this language, and was encumbered by no context, and had a view of all things if someone said that, we dont have to care about anything else they say, because since none of us is ever baggageless and contextless.
Maybe no one is.
Just sounds so absolute. Which might contradict the thrust of the position.
In order to say that, dont you need to see all people at all times?
Isnt that so high above all space and time, like from nowhere? If you were always in a context with baggage, how can you get to a place where you can say no one is ever?
Ok, so does that mean you would never use the phrase since no one is ever?
That would seem more consistent to me - to avoid saying things like that.
I see. You're right to point out that never/always statements are often made in contexts that imply foundationalism. But I don't think that has to be the case. I meant it more or less as @Srap Tasmaner paraphrased it: Given my best take on reality, it looks to me like it's impossible to arrive contextless and baggage-less . . . But I'm happy to add those qualifications.
:up:
Makes sense again.
Leaves open the possibility or at least hope of baggage free observation.
Just a little language police stop and frisk.
Well, in a sense. I find the idea of a view from nowhere both seductive and alarming. It keeps calling, but I suspect it's a chimera.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Hey, you didn't read me my rights. I want a lawyer! . . . . oh wait, you are a lawyer.
I am too. My point since the beginning here is that we assert in absolutes in order to move towards the world and truth, and we need to dissect every assertion with rigor to keep it honest (valid and sound).
Personally, I want to be able to say no one ever about the world. I hate the police as much as the next guy. Most of the cops I meet are Wittegensteinians. I am more often the perpetrating violator.
But I agree we need those cops, and add we need both metaphysics and analytics, in that order, for sake of logically coherent, sound assertions about the world.
I wonder most about where Banno said in the OP perhaps we need both.
Id say we certainly do. No one ever says something meaningful about the world without both. (But I can hear the police sirens again
It seems to me that no one in the thread is claiming such a thing, but you anticipate this objection:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
First I think it is quite important to note the initial claim. @Count Timothy von Icarus did not start a thread saying, "I want an overarching standard." It is the other way around, where @Banno started a thread after private conversation with @J, opposing overarching standards.
Be that as it may, let's suppose someone claims that there is an overarching standard and that Jake has violated it. Does it follow that the person has a thin and not a thick conception of paradigms, or that Jake is being asked to put down baggage? I don't see why it would. All that is needed is a common thread running through every paradigm, from which the standard can be derived. The paradigms can be as thick as you like.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Yes, "I believe there is an overarching standard absolutely precluding contextlessness, but I could be wrong." So @J believes in an overarching standard. That he thinks he could be wrong is neither here nor there, since no one is claiming infallibility.
The objection here is, "That's not a 'standard', that's just how reality is!" Again:
Quoting Leontiskos
Quoting Leontiskos
@Count Timothy von Icarus is not a police officer going around saying, "You're now in the jurisdiction of Venezuela, and therefore you're beholden to this Venezuelan law I have here in my pocket!" He is engaged in a Socratic move, "Although you don't know it, you just contradicted yourself. And if you think you don't care about contradicting yourself, then I will show you that you really do care about it."
Good.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes. I was playing language police. This isnt just about language.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes. We all need to recognize since no one ever about the world, in order to adhere to the PNC.
Added: So the language police may have over stepped frisking J for saying no one ever, or the Wittgensteinian law book may need to be revised.
There is simply no argument here to the effect that "science" and history have no common thread.
Quoting Moliere
We can say that "science" and history have a common thread without saying that either "scientists" or historians don't know anything. Similarly, saying, "I'm not sure how they relate," says nothing about whether there is a common thread.
I'm afraid these are all invalid arguments.
We've already seen a common thread between "science" and history, namely, "Do not falsify your data."
Yeah, that's one of the points I wanted to make. There are certain assumptions that need to be made for it to be the case that all general epistemic principles (or any at all) must require a standpoint outside any paradigm to achieve. I don't think those are good assumptions though.
Consider Plato's "being ruled by the rational part of the soul," as an epistemic meta-virtue. The basic idea that, ceteris paribus, one will tend towards truth if one prefers truth to falsity and one's pursuit of truth is not derailed by other concerns (passions and appetites) that are prioritized above truth, doesn't seem to require any move to a paradigmless space. It is rather a statement about all paradigms, made in the context of a particular thinker. But unless it is impossible to make statements about paradigms from without, this doesn't preclude its being true. Plato might be wrong, but he isn't wrong because his claim requires standing outside "Platonism."
Note too that, if it is asserted that Plato can only speak about what is true for his own paradigm (that truth is bound to paradigms), this charge would apparently refute itself, since it would itself also be limited to a particular paradigm. Yet this objection would also seem to rest on the same absolutization of paradigms into "what we know" instead of "how we know."
But this is also not an appeal to an axiomatized system or "rules," or epistemology as a system. Indeed, Plato has a marked skepticism towards language and sensible realities (including cultural institutions) as a whole, not a preference for a "perfected system" that exists within the context of these.
I think that's right. Those darn sirens. :smile:
I did note that argument doesn't lead to truth. I gave two examples to talk through together.
Arguments will be used along the way, but I noted the things that differ between them -- time is more questionable, but causality is easier to establish.
Though "science" in scare quotes makes me think you have something else in mind, and the examples are not persuasive.
I'm fine with them not being persuasive -- I only said what persuades me.
I just find it odd to separate scientific study from historical study. This bears on the discussion of "scientificity" from <another thread>.
It's certainly odd. I recognize that what I say is odd.
As it turns out it seems reality is odd. The absurd, rather than the coherent, marks reality better.
Right. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree. I've been pondering misology, and the way that the passions can hijack the reason.
For example, if someone wants to never admit they're wrong, then might achieve that by holding that every narrative is equal, including their own. They might avoid clarity in conversation, avoid being "put on the record," avoid answering questions, etc. All of that is great if you want to ensure that you will never be proven wrong. Opacity in general is a great help. But this is all passion-driven. The desire to never be wrong, or to never be shown to be wrong, is derived from the passions, not the reason. It's not at all clear how one can argue against such passions.
I think the work you did can be utilized elsewhere, which is why I keep bringing it up. Don't we all agree that data should not be falsified? How did we do that? Did we all have to step outside ourselves in order to recognize it, grab hold of the truth, and hold on tight as we stepped back inside ourselves? How were we all able to recognize that standard even though some of us live in St. Louis and others live in Kansas City?
What I find funny about the "hermeneuticists" I have encountered is that their practice shows them to be looking for a "view from nowhere," even as they speak against it. They attempt to float above the fray with endless qualifications and contextualizations, and to what end? They clearly think that they are approaching some kind of objective view. My approach is much different, it is, "Cut out the fat and just give me an argument for what you believe to be true." Jump into the water right where you are and start swimming. That's how you get somewhere. It's no coincidence that many of the folks who fret day and night about frameworks and contexts and all the rest of it are remarkably bad at giving and recognizing arguments. That sort of dancing can become an excuse for avoiding arguments; a way to "rise above" without getting your hands dirty.
Describes half of this thread.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, please.
Quoting Leontiskos
To no end. I am beginning to think that as soon as they see an end in sight, they feel the need to back track, take a turn, or just stop moving. Ends, like foundations, are anathema to the purely analytic philosophic enterprise. And sets a standard that cannot be met, namely, deconstruction without construction.
It's .
Quoting Fire Ologist
I mostly agree, but I would say that Analytics do hold to a standard of consistency. Hence the between two self-described dissectors in the thread.
@Banno tends to become "aimless" whenever he tries to move beyond a criterion of consistency, as he is doing in this thread.
So I'll not be participating in this thread anymore. @Fire Ologist and @Leontiskos, I think you should be ashamed of yourselves.
@Leontiskos, back when I was a mod, I would have warned you pages ago to cease your relentless attempts to diagnose "the problem with @J". It's inappropriate. It's disrespectful. And in my view it's a violation of the site guidelines, but none of the other mods have ever been as committed to reining in this sort of behavior as I was.
Don't bother defending yourselves. I am not interested.
You are misreading the situation. Easy to do on an online forum.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I think that's nonsense. From your very first post you've had a biased read on the whole discussion. The strawmen you've relied on and your inflammatory language throughout is indicative of this (e.g. "juvenile," "unserious," "policing," "stuck," "imprisoned," "anxious," "baggage"). Your whole concept of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City begs the question, as has been pointed out. And you haven't even acknowledged the other ways to consider the question. But it is convenient that you won't have to confront that growing laundry list now, isn't it?
I am disappointed to see this silliness from you. @Fire Ologist said it very well:
Quoting Fire Ologist
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Yes, insofar as I think moderators ought to address the way that @Banno and @J make accusations and insinuations before prevaricating and hiding in the bushes, thread after thread.
This thread is a testament to what happens when the targets of catty, moralizing sniping confront the snipers, and it turns out the snipers have nothing of substance to offer.
We have to go out of our way to show compassion on a message board. Ive said multiple times in here and otherwise that I respect Banno and this and other posts.
Ive made clear where I agree with ideas and specific language from Banno and J.
I get along with J.
Banno is intolerant of me.
And Banno and J can take care of themselves.
Much like your strange claim that I was concerned with pseudoscience in this thread, this claim is similarly lacking in accuracy. None of the posts you reference make any mention of @J. I certainly don't think he is a "hermeneuticist." I had in mind those who explicitly appeal to "philosophical hermeneutics."
Nevertheless, it is quite natural to opine on what @J believes when he refuses to answer question after question, and also to opine on why he constantly refuses. It's no coincidence that human systems such as courts have remedies for that form of evasion. The solution is simple: @J merely needs to engage in philosophy and answer the questions posed to him. To engage the members of the forum. That is a guideline here, after all. As is the guideline against "evangelization," such as the incessant opposition to so-called "monism."
Seems an appropriate point.
I agree. That is the important contribution of the analytic school to the philosophic enterprise. Rigor.
Added: Precision. And so clarity.
mortis. :wink:
:grin: Nicely done.
Banno killed the thread.
And like rigor mortis, I just wouldnt stop.
Up for an autopsy?
No thats wrong. :razz:
Its how dead can coherently be used when referring to this thread.
A feeling is an activity?
You can change the way things "strike" you. You can influence your emotions through will (up to a point), while your actions stay the same.
I think you successfully show that we can't make a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral norms such that anti-realism closes the door on only the former, and that people always act morally in the sense that their acts might be subject to moral scrutiny (which I think is a bit of a trivial truth). I don't quite understand how this gets us to the claim that people all have (implicit, I assume) moral beliefs. I would like to know if you're even interested in justifying a particular set of norms (rational, moral, whatever) rather than just proving that they are implicitly assumed.
Consider a story
You see a thread about two different ways to do philosophy. Looking closer, you find that the subtext reads, "The right way to do philosophy and Srap Tasmaner's way to do philosophy." Soon enough it becomes clear that the premise is even simpler, Srap Tasmaner is an authoritarian. This isnt surprising to you, given that the duo who produced the thread has been consistently doing this sort of thing for over a year now.
So you enter the thread and push back, also giving arguments and asking questions with respect to the thesis. The duo refuses to consider your arguments or answer your questions. For 22 pages they even stonewall a premise of your most basic argument, namely <p v ~p>. So the duo wont consider your arguments, they wont answer any questions, and all the while they maintain their thesis, Srap is an authoritarian. At one point one of them actually says, My answer to your questions is, I dont know. And youre still an authoritarian. A banana republic. Splendid.
But then someone who is more serious enters the thread: someone who agrees with a speculative thesis that the duo believes supports their moral thesis. He is willing to hear your arguments and answer your questions. He is not neutral, but he is at least genuinely trying. You point out some of his non-neutral presuppositions, and he tries to reconfigure his analogies. He is intent on turning a blind eye to the moral nature of the central accusation and wants to keep to the speculative thesis. Thats fine. At least he is answering questions and exchanging arguments. He is the first person to do that on the duos behalf, and he is offering the first real arguments for anything resembling the thesis of the thread.
Then he sees you give an argument for why the duo are themselves authoritarian.* He takes umbrage, refuses to continue, and says, You should be ashamed. All because you argued that someone was an authoritarian. Imagine how fucking crazy that would be. :meh:
(In the end you think wryly to yourself, Maybe I should have just called them authoritarian instead of arguing the point. Surely thats what makes all the difference. :grin:)
* What you mistakenly took me to be explaining I have indeed explained elsewhere in the thread.
What you are doing here is very similar. You have decided to ignore me because you think I should not treat any witness as hostile, even if they are hostile. Such a decision to ignore is inevitably based in an overarching standard, namely one regarding the treatment of witnesses. So in this thread, your exclusionary practice is oddly enough a position taken with respect to the OP. You are another person who excludes and attempts to shame those you disagree with (both directly and through inflammatory insinuation), even though you claim to deny the very standard that such a practice depends upon. This is self-contradictory. You are of course welcome to try to shame me based on your selective readings, but you cannot at the same time eschew the overarching standard that such shaming presupposes.
This is why the promoters of the thesis that there are no overarching standards end up as tyrants. It is because that extreme form of self-righteousness is inherently tyrannical, with an inherent double standard (There are no overarching standards, but nevertheless my judgments are absolute, beholden to no standard!). When someone like @Count Timothy von Icarus, @Fire Ologist, or myself tell another that their position is wrong, we provide the standard upon which our judgment is based, and to which appeal can be made. Hence truth and standards are the very things which prevent tyranny. The reason we are happy to answer questions and consider objections is because our will is not absolute.
This is the difference between tyranny and rule of law. In a tyranny you get locked up because the tyrant said so, and the tyrant is beholden to no overarching standards. Where there is rule of law you get locked up on the basis of a standard, and if you can show that the standard does not apply then you will not be locked up. Only where there is tyranny is there no recourse; only where there is tyranny can someone simply say, Don't bother defending yourselves. [My will is absolute]. Similarly, only where there is tyranny is there a self-elevation above rational discourse, where one says, I refuse to answer your questions and engage your objections, but I will at the same time pretend and act as if I have done so. This latter is tyranny even when it is covered over by a thin veneer of politeness.
The ironies of this thread are endless.
Okay, thanks.
Quoting goremand
Do all people make non-hypothetical ought-judgments?
Quoting goremand
I wouldn't try to justify some to someone who doesn't see that they are already making others. Does that make sense?
@Jamal, I would prefer that the thread stay open. Banno keeps making his bed. Why not let him sleep in it? <Here> is his newest iteration; his newest bed which will similarly disintegrate and which he will also eventually ask to be closed. He is making threads that are little more than excuses to crap on other members; he craps freely; he refuses to engage; and then he asks for the threads to be closed. I want to say that this habit of "thread"-making is a problem.
Quoting Wayfarer
:lol:
The Analytic is analytic. He is a knife: he cuts. He is very good at dividing, separating. He is not good at ...really anything else. So yes, he dissects, criticizes, and accuses; but he is evidently unable to construct, synthesize, or build up. Too often he is someone whose skill with a knife is over-developed, and whose skill elsewhere is underdeveloped.
Well they have something in common and they have something that is different. The question is whether the difference excludes historical study from being scientific, and we would need arguments for that thesis. Obviously the assumption that historical study is altogether unscientific would help preclude the possibility that there is some common thread between history and "science" (what are we including under that heading...?), but that's precisely the sort of assumption that needs to be argued.
No, it's really not close at all, beginning with the idea that human nature is the ability to understand the world from someone else's perspective. I don't think that's what human nature is, although human nature includes that (which is why we answer arguments and questions).
If someone thought the only thing humans have in common is the ability to empathize, so to speak, then the opposite of what you hold would follow: there would be no possibility of disagreement; there would be no possibility of distinguishing one's own perspective from another's. There would be one lump of merged view, one over-mind that does not distinguish persons. If all we could do was empathize (so to speak), then there would be no possibility of disagreement at all.
Contrariwise, if we could not say to someone, "You are wrong,"whether for moral reasons or for some other reasonthen we would simply not be intellectual beings with individual views who are able to grow in knowledge and understanding. This so-called "compassion" ironically snuffs out all contexts and perspectives, which is yet another reason why the "contextualism" counter involves non sequitur.
:up:
Or more generally, "A passion is an action?"
A feeling is generally seen as something that happens to us, whereas an activity is generally seen as something we do. To define feelings as activities is a bit like saying, "Internal things that happen to us without our doing anything are things that we do."
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I offered what I see as a non-question-begging way to approach the question <here>. Consider now another.
What does @J want? My guess is that if you asked him another simple question, such as, "You want people to avoid authoritarianism. What, precisely and concretely, are you asking them to abstain from?," he would again have no answer. Be that as it may, it is easy enough to point to the kernel of this thread and what @J (but perhaps not @Banno) is ultimately opining on.
Quoting Leontiskos
He wants at least two things: niceness and the possibility of growing in knowledge as a community. Prescinding from @J's premise of truth as intersubjectivity, the question is about how and in what ways the two values of niceness and intellectual rigor ought to coexist.
This is closely related to Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - "Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?" This is a kind of limit case or paradigmatic question regarding the topic, and it is closely related to the discussion about the relation between truth and goodness from earlier in the thread. It relates to the so-called "principle of charity," yet without the thoroughgoing vagueness and ambiguity that "principle" inevitably carries.
It's actually worth quoting the article in full, given that it is so relevant and perspicacious. What Aquinas says here is offered as fodder for argument, as always. It may or may not be correct, but at least it is providing real arguments and attempting to answer the question at hand:
Quoting Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?
(It is worth noting that if Aquinas' position requires religious premisesand it may well do so!then it remains to be seen how such a position could be justified without those premises. This is another irony of this thread, which is anti-religious in spirit. But I digress...)
Okay, well that is certainly an argument. :up:
Quoting Leontiskos
So I have never heard of a university with a science department. "What are you studying?" "Science." "Hmm?"
I mean, many universities offer a Bachelor of Science degree in history, so what do you make of that?
I think they're using "science" in the old way of "an organized body of knowledge", rather than the 19th c.-contemporary way of "performing experiments to generate data to test hypotheses" -- i.e. before people thought science was distinct at all.
has argued over a number of posts that the soft sciences or social sciences are also sciences. What do you make of those arguments?
Sticking with particular examples: If you look at Gilderhus' History and Historians and compare it to any of the scientific papers out there now you'll see that the methods are not the same.
Well, a person's passions are [I]their[/I] passions. They are also something we can have more or less control over, through the cultivation of habits (virtues/vices) and the will's ability to overcome the passions.
So, I don't think I would locate the passions outside of us, or we wholly something "we don't do." However, I would at least locate some of them outside the will. For instance, when a man cheats on his wife, even though he wished he hadn't (giving in to an appetite/passion), we say he has suffered from weakness of will, and perhaps even that his act was not fully voluntary. Whereas, when a man doesn't cheat on his wife because he sees this as truly worse, we don't say that he suffers from "weakness of passion."
The passions are properly ordered to the will and intellect. When they "happen to us," as often is the case, the opposite is happening to some degree. I wouldn't describe this as "coming from without" though, but rather, as Plato does, as a lack of unity. That is, what we have is warring parts, and a whole that is less unified in its aims (less perfected).
Okay, but isn't history a "soft science"? If so, then by your own concession history must be just as scientific as any other science. And yet you've said otherwise...?
Sure, and neither would I.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think this is because of the difference between receiving and doing that I pointed out. Your word "suffer" is similarly passive. Passion/passio/pathos are all etymologically related to suffering. If an action is something an agent does, then a passion is something an agent endures. Similarly, if I use a shovel to move a pile of dirt, then the shovel is active and the dirt is passive. The shovel is moving and the dirt is being moved.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I want to say that, at least in general, we only "control" the passions indirectly. For example, you can't just make yourself angry with the snap of your fingers, even though you can just snap your fingers. A passion is not an action. Snapping your fingers is an action; anger is a passion. In order to get angry you need to perceive injustice, and we cannot directly command ourselves to perceive injustice. We can make ourselves angry by doing things like searching out injustice, or focusing on injustice, or magnifying our perception of an injustice, but this is all indirect.
Passions pertain to passivity; actions pertain to activity.
Here's Aquinas, maybe more than we need:
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.22.1 - Whether any passion is in the soul?
But with a scientific account you attempt to get down to the root cause (if it is possible), and if it's not possible to try and simply as much as you possibly can. You also get to repeat things under conditions to see if you're right. The assumption there being that the world is not just objective and real, but there's an element to the world that allows us to see a sort of rational order to it -- where our idealizations begin to appear more than idealizations, but rather abstract instantiations of a higher order. So the sociologist or the economist of world war 1 will look for trends in population data that predict wars of the sort that world war 1 was. Think Emile Durkheim here who very much wanted a positivistic science of social organisms -- also Karl Marx sort of fits in here, who thought that history could be studied in the "scientific" manner and also treats social organisms in the same manner that a chemist treats chemicals.
But the historian will look to the stories of the people that lived through it, the government documents left in archives, and -- of course -- other histories of the event to attempt to tell the story of world war 1.
And there is this temptation in both disciplines, I've noticed, to "universalize" these methods to a kind of ontology. I think the ontology you get with science is some kind of indirect realism that the guesses approximate towards, at least with respect to our representations (know-that) rather than know-how. I think the ontology you get with history is like a constantly evolving reality that's never still.
Just to give you an idea of what I think, at least. I'll be real and say I'm not too interested in convincing people, but will share what I think and why. Ultimately though I'd just point to some textbooks because some of the "why?" isn't so well formulated as to be a philosophical theory, but rather is a beginning of philosophical wonder for me -- it was a surprise to me when I started to realize this difference.
Of course I could just be wrong about the difference and then all of this is bunk. But I'm not persuaded ;)
Oh, that's an interesting claim. I will have to come back to this, but you said you agreed with Srap, and he clearly takes history to be a social science:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
That's the most proximate reason I assumed you would accept history as a social science.
By calling it a "framework" I think we are already presupposing that it is contextualized, aren't we? I think realism presupposes that not every knowledge-claim is reducible to a framework, or is even able to be captured by framework-talk.
I don't know. Is solipsism a framework, or the state of reality, or both?
For the realist realism is not merely a framework; and for the solipsist solipsism is not merely a framework. To say "both" would require the adherent to claim that their own framework (e.g. realism or solipsism) is superior to other frameworks. I suppose they could do that, but it seems like the very idea of a "framework" would impede them.
Right. To say "both" is saying that the framework more accurately reflects the state-of-affairs than other frameworks do and is what makes you a solipsist or a realist.
So is the question, "How can we know when a framework more accurately represents the state-of-affairs?" or "How can we distinguish between the framework and the state-of-affairs?", or something else?
That's an interesting point. I'd generally agree. Historians can sometimes absolutize historicism and scientists of a certain persuasion can sometimes absolutize their inductive methodology into a presumption of nominalism and the idea that all knowing is merely induction. In the latter case, this is sometimes quite explicit, e.g. Bayesian Brains.
I'll just add that the classical formulation of the difference is that science deals with the universal and the necessary. History is always particular though. Indeed, it's the particular in which all universals are instantiated. This doesn't preclude a philosophy of history, but it does preclude a science of history. Jaques Maratain has a very short lecture/book on philosophy of history that makes this case quite compactly, and he's drawing on the "traditional" distinction (in the West) that was assumed for many centuries.
In terms of a logos at work in history, I certainly think we can find one, just not a science. Hegel's theory seems to explain some aspects of 20th century history quite well. There is a sort of necessity in the way internal contradictions work themselves out, and you see this same point being made in information theoretic analyses of natural selection that look at genomes as semipermeable membranes that selectively let information about the environment in, but arrest its erasure. Contradiction leads to conflict that must be overcome.
But you cannot predict this sort of thing in any strict sense, because it is always particular. A great image for this is in Virgil. Virgil is very focused on the orientation of thymos (honor, spirit) in service of a greater logos (the good of the community, the historical telos of Rome, and ultimately, the Divine). However, although his gods (themselves a mix of personified man-like deity and more transcendent Logos) set the limit of logos in human history, and characters [I]only ever recognize them when they leave[/I]. I've been rereading the Aeneid and this seems true in almost every case; only when they turn to go, when we are "past them" in the narrative, are they recognized as gods by man. It's very clever, and works well with elements in the narrative that are skeptical of the ultimate ability of man to consistently live up to logos.
Hence, history can be more than Gibbon's "register of [the] crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind." For instance, Gibbon's observation that the switch from citizen soldiers to professional legions "elevated war into an art, and degraded it into a trade," applies quite well to the United States after Vietnama recognition of a universal in the stream of particulars. (I like Durant's "every civilization begins like as a Stoic, and dies an Epicurean," too, even if it isn't always true).
Quoting Leontiskos
Im going to be lazy and let CharGPT summarize the postings that Im drawing from:
Parts of this do seem consistent with the classical faculty psychology that dominated antiquity through the early-modern period though. The passions and appetites are an engagement with the world. The concupiscible appetites (pleasure/pain) are a sort of pull towards union or away from union (aversion).
So I don't disagree with . I was actually thinking of Saint Thomas because I read the section on the appetites and passions in ST for my incomplete paper on Virgil a few weeks ago. And indeed, a lot of Catholic thinkers (e.g. Sokolowski) pull together phenomenology, enactivism, Thomas, and Aristotle.
There is a sense in which the passions are something we do, as one of our powers/facilities, and yet another sense in which they happen to us, in that they are often involuntary, and indeed often run counter to the will. Likewise, it would be bizarre in most settings to say that having a heart attack is something we do, although in some sense it is still true.
The passions and appetites aren't like a heart attack though. They can be commanded by the will, even if they are often recalcitrant. And our ability to command them can be improved with training; that's one of the ideas of asceticism. So, the other writer I was thinking of is Saint John Climacus, who I have been reading at night, and this is precisely what the monk aims at with "blessed dispassion," not the elimination of the appetites and passions per se, but their right orientation and ordering (granted, it sometimes seems like the latter in some passages). This is why, if you pray the Horologian, you end up reciting Psalm 50 many times a day. It's the "cultivation of blessed tears" and repetence, as Climacus would put it, a right emotional state that is willed.
Right, or just as all cats are different, or each cat in different momentsyet their still all cats. There is an idea in Aristotle, developed by Thomas that I really like, which is that the virtues are like universals for action. Hence, a virtue like temperance perhaps takes different forms in different cultures and epochs, or in each instance, yet remains a single principle. It's not a perfect analogy though, because obviously cultural standards can themselves be more or less temperate, and more or less conducive to virtue.
What could have been an interesting thread was killed by the resident sophists who can be relied upon to prefer participating in culture wars over philosophy. Question their biases and they become nasty, obfuscate, misrepresent or just refuse to engage.
By refusing in turn to engage with them we give them no air...which is as it should be. Posturing erudition is no substitute for sound thinking and good will.
Im am trying to salvage dialogue.
I pointed out from the beginning, we need to identify something whole before we have something to divide, we need both the metaphysical and the analytic, so I agree that when only focused on dividing we ignore half of the activity, but there I go trying to talk about the substance again.
The way I read many of these exchanges between those I will call the Wittgensteinians and the Atistotlians (although that is just to avoid naming people here, but you know who you are!), is the Aristotelians openly seek to understand the other position (or any position), so they can accurately analyze it; they ask specific questions about it, to both better understand it and to reveal the limits of their own understanding, and they provide restatements, to better ensure everyone is on the same page; they craft critiques, and offer positive alternate views. Whereas the Wittgensteinians may do these same things, but only when talking with each other - when someone disagrees with them who is perceived to be an Aristotelian, they act indignant and paranoid (emotional) and tired (as if dealing with their lessers), and argue about hidden meanings and bad-faith and psychopathy (authoritarian intent, myth-making, delusional), some of them making ad hominem comments, and position themselves as too smart to dignify such people.
Its tedious to deal with but occasionally substance forms, so I keep trying.
But mostly, it seems clear to me that the Wittgenstinians who keep taking away their ball to go home and dont want to play anymore, are doing so because they are constantly being beat, losing the arguments.
There is no reason to think analytics are the true philosophers and metaphysicians are just making stuff up. We havent gotten very far off of this bold (metaphysical) claim, and the Aristotleans have made it clear that Analytics First, the Make Anslytics Great Again crowd, is lacking any useful, explanatory power of better ways to philosophize.
It is all written in black and white here. There are so many unanswered arguments. So much left undeveloped. Seems clear to me, the Wittgensteinians are in no position to tell anyone you are wrong despite how often they say it.
But that is no reason for giving up. People are indeed wrong. Id love to reengage on the substance.
We should be tolerant - truly more tolerant.
Wittegensteinians - you picked the fight - you lost the opening rounds - any response before you go home to your private messaging?
Quoting Janus
I thought it was interesting. It was Banno who specifically asked to kill it. So are you referring to Banno as a resident sophist?
Quoting Janus
Thats not what I ever see. I see people avoiding a direct question, or changing the subject with an accusation you are biased. One person needs to ask a question at a time. Thats a dialogue.
You dont always get to answer questions with a better question like maybe you are actually an authoritarian because of your God delusion? Or Ill answer your question as soon as you answer 10 of mine, even though I made the assertion you are questioning and you havent asserted anything yet.
Real bummer.
It was @Banno who requested that it be buried after the sophists (mostly you and @Leontiskis) had already killed it. As @Srap Tasmaner said "you ought to be ashamed of yourselves". But of course I understand why you won't be.
The thread became a bit of a shit show. But overall I'm happy with the result. Indeed, the passion of the response overwhelmingly carries the case in the OP.
Thanks for that. I agree, though not necessarily about the erudition; many people on TPF are indeed erudite about specific philosophers, no posturing. Such knowledge on its own isn't enough, sadly, to lead to thoughtful conversation.
Quoting Banno
The OP was good, and could have been discussed intelligently, including by those who disagreed with your basic bifurcation, and/or your conception of philosophy. Disagreement, for some, leads to anger and personal berating, which is a shame.
It's true that there are quite a few people here who are well-read in specific areas. I see that as a good thing provided their erudition has not become ideology?but sadly, that is not always the case, even with the most erudite. My point was in line with your point about erudition not being enough to lead to thoughtful conversation?erudition displayed for its own sake just is posturing?it certainly doesn't count, at least not in my book, as good philosophy. It is prominently on display when people quote extensive passages as substitute for their own words.
Yes. Imagine what you did <here>, but multiplied over twenty pages and then combined with hypocrisy. It was a truly impressive display of sophistry. :wink:
The continue from those who have consistently failed to engage in dialogue throughout the whole thread. "If you can't beat them..." then I guess you do whatever the heck you can to calumniate them, all the while refusing to dialogue with them.
Quoting Janus
@Srap Tasmaner's outburst was <bizarre>, to say the least, utterly lacking in context. It's usually a bad idea to fall into that form of judgmentalism when you're such a newcomer to the thread.
Quoting frank
The relation between affect and cognition has been my thing for a long time, and Ive collected so much flesh for the enactivist view it would make Buffalo Bill proud.
Just so you know, there was a new rule added which says, "AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part." In any case, I don't respond to purely AI posts.
The commensurability of conceptual schema remains one of my main philosophical puzzles.
I'd like to take the idea of treating dissection as a demarcation criterion a bit further - that the difference between, say, literature, myth, or religion on the one hand and philosophy on the other is the emphasis on dissection and critique; on iterative re-assessment of one's position.
Quoting frank
The key thing about affect is its character as change of disposition, as a being exposed to the world in a fresh way. That doesnt seem to be adequately captured by the solipsistic connotations of a mind turning inward towards itself. Affect does the precise opposite, throwing us outside of ourselves by the way it affects us.
Good post. :up:
I think what you say about Wittgenstenians is natural to that worldview, which is more enclosed. But it's also worth noting that @Banno was the primary Wittgenstenian in this thread. @J and @Srap Tasmaner are not as exclusively interested in Wittgenstein.
Regarding the Analytic question, I think part of the difficulty is that cutting with a knife is most easy and most precise. Doing other things is truly much harder. In that way Analytic philosophy can generate agreement regarding its dissections. That can be helpful, but unfortunately it is a very limited agreement due to the fact that it lacks all manner of comprehensiveness, as the OP itself admits.
I agree that an organism and its environment are intertwined. I don't agree that stasis is an illusion. It's one pole of an opposition. You can't conceive of motion without it.
I don't think there is much flesh connecting any philosophical outlook to an explanation for consciousness because there presently is no explanation for it. All we do is speculate.
I was referencing the fact that we model the world and react to the model prior to reacting to the world, but more physiologically, the most powerful driver of emotion is dopamine. Activation of dopaminergic pathways starts within the organism, most fundamentally in architecture contained in DNA.
Yes, that seems correct.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I added this in an edit:
Quoting Leontiskos
I think what is happening is that you have two incommensurable ways of viewing something, and it is likely impossible to try to strike some neutral ground. This is almost certainly why @Srap Tasmaner's "St. Louis to Kansas City" idea failed.
So surely ampliation is required to understand the opposing view, and a rather abrupt and extreme form of it. This issue is explored a lot in the field of interreligious studies, where there can be significant limitations on one's ability to understand another view (and the same thing could be said to hold between secular and religious thinking). Religion and culture are the two biggies, where a form of conversion and life is required in order to truly understand.
- Coming back to the question of whether there is a common thread between history and, say, physics. Here is why Srap thinks so:
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
History would fulfill that criterion, so the question is whether Srap is mistaken about his criterion for what makes a science.
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Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is an interesting and useful point. :up:
Perhaps when we now talk about "history" we are talking about "knowing what happened in the past." Is that the thing that Maritain is considering, or is he considering history in some other manner? And do you happen to know the text where he talks about this?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I think I agree with this.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
So the issue here is apparently prediction of future events, or a determination of the principles that led from one point to another?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, that is a beautiful idea.
Yep. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I would argue that the Orthodox use of "passions" is at least somewhat different than Plato or Aristotle or colloquial usage. I would say that Orthodox "dispassion," very crudely, has to do with a state of self-possession and self-command. It is the idea that "thoughts" (again in a wide, Orthodox Christian sense) do not move you. So there is that connection of being unmoved by passions, and a desire to achieve a state of dispassion, but I don't see the Orthodox view contradicting the idea that passions are primarily things that happen to us in the postlapsarian state. That's why Orthodox on the whole view passions as bad and desire a state of dispassion (although I realize there are a few exceptions, who you have read). So my hunch is that the Orthodox might admit that the deified individual has motive powers similar to the passions, but that they would not generally call those things "passions."
The trick is that everyone agrees that unwanted passions happen to us in a way that desirable and cooperating passions do not, as Aquinas sets out in the text I gave. From this is eventually follows that the well-ordered individual's passions are part of him in a way that a disordered individual's passions are not. But these are all very fine and subtle distinctions.
The analogy of the wind may be helpful here. When the wind is with us, it flows into us and we become one with it. It facilitates our movement and combines with our will. When the wind is against us, it opposes us and pushes us in a direction we do not wish to go. Note too the Spirit/wind parallel.
No, not necessarily. But most of all, I don't think it is a requirement for joining the rational community.
Quoting Leontiskos
Yes, absolutely.
I don't know. Would this mean that it would be impossible for a person to convert from one position to another? When I was a Christian I had one framework but began to notice things like how what you believed often depended on where you were born and raised, which made me start questioning my beliefs. I eventually became an atheist. I had overcome my upbringing. What you seem to be saying that what happened to me is impossible. Or are you saying I'm not really an atheist because my original framework prevented me from understanding what it actually means to be an atheist?
(@Count Timothy von Icarus)
I ran across an idea that I found quite fascinating, both with respect to this thread and with respect to the Wittgenstein/Analytic Philosophy question. It was from the recent discussion between Jordan Peterson and Jonathan Haidt, from 44:11-46:53. Go ahead and listen to those few minutes, but what Haidt eventually says, drawing on Piaget, is, A video game is really like the junk food of games, in that it doesnt have the nutritious part which is the disagreements, the arguments. Peterson interjects, Right, so theres no meta-negotiation about the rules themselves. So one of the things Piaget pointed out [ ] And thats also why Piaget wasnt a moral relativist he thought there was a hierarchy of morality. And thats also why he thought Thomas Kuhn was wrong
They dont talk about Wittgenstein, but I have never heard anything which hit the nail so perfectly on the head with respect to axiomatic thinking, such as Wittgensteins or Analytic Philosophys! It is the idea that if there is no ability to see the rules, jostle against them, and engage in meta-negotiation (with respect to, say, so-called hinge propositions), then there is a deficiency and a lack of robustness in the activity. complains that Aristotles induction is not (deductively) valid, but according to Piaget this is a feature, not a bug. I think this is why Aristotle is so much more robust than Wittgenstein: because he doesnt set those a priori limits on what can be done, and also because he does not have a set color palette before he begins his painting. This is what makes him so much less contrived and artificial (and here others would argue that Plato is better yet). Note too how it is Piagetin his observation of children, progress, and developmentwho sees what Wittgenstein is so blind to the Wittgenstein who literally physically abused children because they werent doing it right!
Now some have been claiming that they want the ability to negotiate the rules, and I have been at pains to point out their performative self-contradiction. They say they want to negotiate the rules, but they dont negotiate, they dont engage in dialogue, they dont answer questions forthrightly, and they in fact take their marbles and go home. On the other hand, the people they dub authoritarians are precisely the people who are doing all of those things: negotiating the rules, offering arguments, presenting objections, etc.
Note too how well this reflects Aristotles discussion of the PNC in Metaphysics IV. He in no way attempts to prove it. He allows his opponents to try to argue, but he also shows why their arguments are doomed to fail. This leaves it open for his opponents to try to argue and see for themselves how Aristotles prediction comes to pass. Anyone who has read the text seriously has probably done this for themselves. This closely parallels @Count Timothy von Icarus discussion with @Banno over the principle concerning the falsification of data, where Banno's rejection of the word "principle" eventually turned out to be ad hoc.
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Quoting Joshs
The better question to ask is, How do we come to agree to disagree? I want to say that if two people are to agree to disagree, then there must first be earnest dialogue, there must be honest irreconcilability, and each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing. It is easy enough to see why such a thing is not possible where dialogue at all, much less earnest dialogue, is refused.
I disagree on both scores. I have a whole thread disagreeing with the first claim. I would argue against the second claim on similar grounds insofar as we concern ourselves with intellectual ought-judgments, i.e., "You ought to believe that 2+2=4." But no one "joins" the rational community. They are already rational, and they are already bound by the truth that 2+2=4. Even and especially as they ignore such truths will they feel their binding force. We can't opt in or out of the fact that 2+2=4 will have an effect on us and on our lives, as for example is seen when consulting one's financial transactions.
Quoting goremand
Okay, good.
I'm saying that no one is both a Christian and an atheist, straddling that line neutrally. A Christian can become an atheist, but if they do so then they are no longer a Christian. No one truly says, "I am both Christian and atheist in a neutral sense."
We could perhaps imagine someone who is neither and views both objectively and neutrally. I'd be fine with that, especially for the sake of argument.
(But note that @Srap Tasmaner was not "neither" when he appealed to the very same framework petitio principii that @J was appealing to less eloquently. In fact Srap is very deeply committed to that framework sort of relativism. Nevertheless, the difference is that Srap is much more capable of questioning his own presuppositions by engaging in dialogue and answering questions.)
What matters isnt whether you call it an explanation, the gods eye truth or mere speculation, but what you can do with it. Todays iron -clad scientific truth will be tomorrows superstition anyway, so what counts is how a perspective aids in guiding the understanding of oneself and others in real-life situations. There are an enormous variety of practical ways in which an activity-based view of affect can do this. Numerous theories of personality and psychotherapy are based on them.
Right. The idea that we only have indirect access to the world through internal representations is a cartesian, reductionist view of emotion, and stands in direct opposition to the enactivist claim that we dont represent the world via internal schemes but are in direct contact with it by way of our patterns of activity and interaction.
This is the lack of flesh I was talking about. My discussion with Pierre-Normand ended up in the same place: a fairly large disconnect between his view and basic biology. Like you, Pierre-Normand said we can take a grain of salt with science, which is fine, just recognize that science is presently very helpful in providing narratives for "an enormous variety of practical" avenues.
Quoting Joshs
That's cool, and you very well may be right, that enactivism is the way forward, but our present biological understanding of organisms actually saves lives on a daily basis. I'm not casting shade on enactivism at all. I'm just saying it's got a ways to go to supplant the scientifically rooted view that presently prevails.
Quoting Joshs
I get it, but I think there's a strawman in calling the opposing view Cartesian. I think Robert Rosen is right that biology in its present state is founded on a set of expectations, some of which are apriori. In other words, a little Kant is helpful in understanding what we mean by life. It really isn't Cartesian though. If anything, contemporary biology is a subset of physics.
Lets say that two parties who embrace sharply opposing philosophical, political or religious positions are bought together to engage in earnest dialogue. Wouldnt it be predicable that if each fails to be persuaded to cross over to the others stance, they will also have a great deal of difficulty in accepting the logic behind the opposing view? If I tell you that I understand the reasons for your disagreement with me, but in the same breath I find those reasons to be irrational and logically faulty, am I really understanding those reasons?
When I say, "each party must understand at least in part the reasons which prevent the other from agreeing," I am not saying that they are able to mouth back the words the other person is using. I am saying that must be able to understand, at least in part, the reasons.
Quoting Joshs
Only if they cannot rise above post hoc rationalization, where reasoning is irrelevant and it's only assertions that matter. Anyone who understands what valid reasoning is should be able to see how a position possesses validity, coherence, and rationale, even if they do not agree with the conclusions. Anyone who cannot do that is more interested in ideology and "material positions," rather than true reasoning.
Quoting frank
What exactly is this scientifically rooted view of biology you claim prevails?
Let me characterize the most recent thinking in biology as I understand it. The endosymbiotic theory of Lynn Margulis showed that eukaryotic cells arose through bacterial symbiosis, challenging the traditional gene-centric view of evolution and emphasizing cooperation over competition as a driving evolutionary force. This connects to several broader shifts in biology that overlap significantly with enactivism, post-Cartesian thought, and free energy principles:
Modern biology increasingly views organisms not as discrete individuals but as holobionts - integrated communities of host organisms plus their microbiomes. This dissolves the classical boundary between self and environment, much like enactivism rejects the subject/object distinction. Your gut bacteria aren't just "in" you - they're part of your extended phenotype, affecting everything from mood to immune function.
Researchers now emphasize that biological properties emerge from dynamic interactions rather than being reducible to component parts. This mirrors enactivism's emphasis on cognition as enacted through organism-environment coupling rather than internal representation.
Biology has moved beyond genetic determinism toward understanding development as emerging from gene-environment interactions across multiple timescales. This aligns with enactivism's rejection of pre-given structures in favor of enacted meaning-making.
Karl Friston's free energy principle suggests all biological systems minimize surprise by maintaining their structural integrity through active inference. This provides a mathematical framework for understanding how organisms maintain their organization while coupling with environments - a core enactivist insight. The organism doesn't just adapt to a pre-given environment but actively shapes its niche while being shaped by it.
All these developments dissolve classical Cartesian dualities: mind/body, organism/environment, gene/culture, self/other. They point toward understanding life as fundamentally relational and processual rather than consisting of discrete, bounded entities.
The convergence suggests biology is moving toward what some call a "process ontology" where identity emerges from patterns of relationship rather than essential properties - a view that resonates across these philosophical and scientific frameworks.????????????????
Yes, I think that's a good point. One of the deficits of the empiricist program is that it tended towards (although not always) making all emotion, goodness, and beauty and entirely internal affair, ignoring its directedness and interactivity. The issue with the subject/object accounting structure is that everything always has to be placed on one side of the ledger. Something similar happens with perception and knowledge in representationalist assumptions.
It's just called On the Philosophy of History. Like a lot of his stuff, it's free online. He is pretty opposed to the Hegelian project. I am not so much, because I think it has some truth to it and that Solovyov offers solutions to some of Hegel's problems.
He does have laws, but they are more observational.
More looking for principles. The problems posed by internal contradictions is a good one. I think Hegel's theory does explain the history of liberalism in the 19th and 20th century quite well. There, it faced challenges from nationalism and socialism, and it sublated both to varying degrees. Key planks of socialist platforms became universal in developed liberal states (e.g. the welfare state), and this helped address the internal contradiction between the idea of democracy and self-rule versus the tendency of capitalism to concentrate wealth such that elites become able to manipulate the system and lock out economic and political competition (which is essentially the system destroying itself, corrupting its own principles).
Likewise, nationalism was absorbed into liberalism such that "Algeria for the Algerians," and "Iraq for the Iraqis," are phrases even leftists endorse. The idea that all France had to do was give Algerians liberal rights was fully dead by the time of decolonization, but liberalism actually began by being quite as universalist as Marxism (e.g. France forcing "sister republics" on foreign states as if conquered much of Europe).
And now we see liberalism eroding national identity and so undermining public support for the socialist policies it absorbed. The contradictions are apparent and informative, but it would be foolish to think this gives one predictive insight on the exact shape of their resolution. Man is free and he can respond to this sort of contradiction in many ways. That's how Solovyov resolved Hegel's oppressive focus on the universal and Providential. He sees a telos to history, an end, but not necessarily its attainment; just as an organisms has ends but might grow ill instead. History becomes the meeting ground of truth and falsity, the dramatic encounter in which the wheat is winnowed from the chaff, the blazing fire that reveals what man has built his work from (I Corinthians 3:15). It's end is man's communication of goodness to man, through the Church and state as well as the union, family, etc., man lifting each other up towards the goal revealed in Christ of "godmanhood."
So, to bring it back to the Aeneid, Virgil doesn't seem to suggest that Aeneas is a puppet. He [I]could[/I] stay with Dido, or kill himself in despair over losing her, but he doesn't. That's why he's the hero, because he sees, if ever so vaguely, the logoi he must follow, and suffers to do so ("agony" in the Greek sense of contest), even though he also fails to wholly actualize.
The problem that comes up in logo-skepticism is that nominalism and the elevation of the individual/particular has made it so that the logos must be embodied in Rome [I]as it is[/I], because culture and institutions are considered to be prior to any determinant logoi, the ground of their being. And so you get bad takes like: Virgil must be simply "writing propaganda," but then "sticking it to Octavian with his subtle skepticism" rather than the idea that Virgil (being exposed to Stoicism, Platonism, and the Peripatetics) simply recognizes that unities struggle to fully attain their form, and often fail, but that this struggle is needed for them to be anything (and anything good).
Yup, I think that's quite correct. Saint Isaac the Syrian is a good example:
[I]The world" is the general name for all the passions. When we wish to call the passions by a common name, we call them the world. But when we wish to distinguish them by their special names, we call them passions. The passions are the following: love of riches, desire for possessions, bodily pleasure from which comes sexual passion, love of honor which gives rise to envy, lust for power, arrogance and pride of position, the craving to adorn oneself with luxurious clothes and vain ornaments, the itch for human glory which is a source of rancor and resentment, and physical fear. Where these passions cease to be active, there the world is dead . Someone has said of the Saints that while alive they were dead; for though living in the flesh, they did not live for the flesh. See for which of these passions you are alive. Then you will know how far you are alive to the world, and how far you are dead to it.[/I]
During compline, when we ask for God to strengthen and correct us that we might awaken to "hymn [His] incomparable glory all night long" the goal is not to be free of affect (it is rather to be filled with it) but of inappropriate affect (and presumably for monks and nuns, to not accidently sleep through the midnight service :rofl: ). There is less separation between emotion and thought in general though. The "heart" as the "eye of the nous" has both, there being a sort of intellectual emotion too.
Isnt there a danger of relying too heavily on the validity of the others reasoning and too little on the possibility that the other is making use of conceptual senses of meaning you are u familiar with? Dont many situations of breakdown in communication result from a confusion between reasoning that lacks validity, coherence, and rationale, and valid reasoning anchored to unfamiliar concepts?
So, since I am a member of the rational community, I must believe that "I ought to believe 2+2=4", and if I deny this I am implicitly contradicting myself? Why is this? It seems to me I can get along fine simply believing that 2+2=4 without concerning myself about whether I "ought" to believe that or not.
It's fascinating, yes. Animal cells probably resulted from archaeal cells that swallowed mitochondria. The theory has been around for a long time that the first complex organisms developed in tidal pools as communities of differentiated cells. I don't think it establishes a priority for cooperation, but yes, it was a turning point in biology when cooperation was highlighted.
Quoting Joshs
This view has been around for decades, but it does not "dissolve the classical boundary between self and environment." It just says that understanding life involves recognizing the concept of a biosphere: a complex set of interdependencies between animals, plants, bacteria, and fungi. You could hardly understand the interactions if you dissolved the boundaries between creatures.
Quoting Joshs
It goes both ways, yes. Life transforms its environment to meet its needs. The environment in turn, transforms genes. The two definitely need to be understood together. Remember that in this, we're looking at the behavior of populations, not individuals. For instance, if we take the wolves out of Yellowstone, the whole environment will change because the wolves' former prey will over consume the vegetation, causing erosion around the creeks, and a loss of habitat for insects, fish, and birds. Just one animal population missing causes the whole scene to change.
But you can take one wolf out of Yellowstone and keep it in a cage. It will be fine. I suspect that what you're doing is trying to take principles about populations and apply them to individuals. It doesn't work that way.
Quoting Joshs
I was driving along one day when all at once, the whole functioning of the circulatory system appeared in my mind at the same time (I'd been studying the heart for a while). It was a stunning vision. It's true that sometimes we get lost in details and can even stray into error from failing to see the bigger picture. This bigger picture is not a philosophical renaissance for biology, though. It's always been there.
The thing is, my point holds in an even broader sense than you are interpreting it. As long as one separates the reasoning process from the conclusions/beliefs that are held, and also recognizes correctness and incorrectness with respect to reasoning processes, then what I say holds. Thus to, "Understand the other's reasons," is to understand the reasoning process being used, and to deem it at least partially correct. Whether or not we define validity as, "a quasi-correct reasoning process," or as something more strict, makes no difference to this broader point.
(Note too that one could understand another's reasons in a way that involves no judgment of correctness, but that this will not lead to an agreement to disagree, which is our topic.)
Quoting Joshs
Your posit here is, "If your conclusion is false, then your reasoning is invalid." Or, "If your belief is false, then the reasoning process which led to this belief lacks all forms of correctness."
None of that follows, and I think the whole idea is bound up with a preference for post hoc rationalization, or in this case a non-discrimination between the process of reasoning and the beliefs that are thereby generated.
I said "you," not "I." I am thinking of non-hypothetical ought-judgments with respect to others. So if you are tutoring struggling first graders, and you inevitably base the various lessons and interventions on the belief that the child ought to believe that 2+2=4, then you are thereby a member of the rational community. Note well, for example, that every teacher and tutor is thereby a part of the "rational community."*
* Everyone is, but teachers are even in virtue of their teaching.
That seems unnecessary to me. All I have to do is explain have math involved, and the child will understand if able. What essential role does the obligation to believe a particular claim play for either the teacher or the student?
To believe that someone ought to do something is not the same as believing that someone has an obligation to do something. This equivocation between "ought" and "obligation" is extremely common on TPF.
But note that our touchstone for this conversation is the notion of "non-hypothetical ought-judgments," that this is taken from the thread, "The Breadth of the Moral Sphere," and that that thread is extremely clear about what such a thing is. The only difference is that we are focusing on intellectual matters rather than moral matters. So if you mistakenly believe me to be talking about obligations, then I would suggest revisiting that thread.
Ideally, there is a via media between dispatching with individual organisms and dissolving them into a universal process (and thus making all predication accidental), and a static view that fails to take account of the fact that physical (i.e. changing) beings are inherently processes. That is, organisms are organic wholes and measures (form), and are also always subject to change. The goal-oriented effort to sustain form, entelechia, demarcates the whole. Gut microbiota are accidental though. One doesn't become a different person or species when one has a course of antibiotics.
Yeah, but this would apply to food that is consumed too.
At any rate, the Cartesian cleavage is based on the unity of mental life, not the physical boundaries of organisms. Descartes philosophy of extended bodies and corpuscles arguably has already dissolved the individual body, erring in precisely the opposite direction.
Obligation sounds very "heavy" so maybe that was a poor choice of words, but I don't see how this distinction is made strictly speaking.
Quoting Leontiskos
I have read the OP, but I can't promise I've absorbed it completely. What stood out to me is that you allow for acts to be judged as moral (or as you say now, rational) even if moral judgement doesn't feature in the decision of the act, which I think is true. The way I see it, we can judge whether an act is moral/rational/whatever simply by checking it against the appropriate framework, but strictly speaking there is no need for the agent of the act to be aware of that framework.
Quoting Leontiskos
I dont have any disagreement with this. What I have in mind are situations where the other is not even wrong, where the opponents are talking past one another, where it appears as though the other has changed the subject. This may seem like an inconsequential circumstance, easily remedied by a careful clarification of the substance of the topic. But I suggest that such gaps between parties in construal of the nature of the topic are responsible for the lions share of social conflict, because they are difficult to detect. Before we can separate the reasoning process from the beliefs that are held, we first have to be able to recognize the underlying perspective on the basis of which those beliefs get their sense. If we mistakenly assume we both are interpreting the meaning of the concepts seeding the reasoning process the same way, we will pre-emptively move to looking for faulty reasoning in the other rather than making sure we are actually talking about the same thing.
Well let's clarify the substance of the topic. :razz: I have been explicitly talking about what is needed in order to agree to disagree. Do you want to talk about a different topic?
Quoting Joshs
I think we have to be careful that equivocation is not occurring between two people, that's true. The deeper problem is something I pointed to here:
Quoting Leontiskos
The trouble with being at cross purposes is that it can be very hard to sort out that sort of equivocation, and self-knowledge plays a much larger role given that people can deceive themselves about what they are doing.
I wrote about topic-equivocation, for example <here> and especially <here>.
That's understandable. But I've not used the word "obligation." That's your word. I'm happy to stick with the words I've used, such as "non-hypothetical ought-judgment."
Quoting goremand
That's fair. It's dense.
Quoting goremand
Yeah, I think that's basically right. That is one of the points I was trying to convey. :up:
I don't complain about it -- I understand that guessing is a feature, and not a bug. What I noted is that there's a limit to guessing and checking due to our finitude, much in line with Kant's epistemology where science can count [s]of[/s]as knowledge, but not (EDIT: knowledge of the thing-in-itself, and metaphysics cannot count as knowledge, though the mind will continue to pursue it due to how it functions and desires for a complete picture.
The Ideas of Plato, and explicitly God, Freedom, and Immortality are the things beyond reason's ability to justify in from theoretical cognition. We can practically know them, but this is a kind of rational faith rather than a knowledge like we know causation.
I think that Aristotle believed you could make inductions up to that point because the universe is finite, and so even if you're wrong there's going to be a good guess out there to find. Even in metaphysics.
Kant, on the other hand, took the problem of induction seriously -- was it even a problem in Aristotle's time? Is Aristotle's topics anything other than a students guide to thinking about inference rather than a deep philosophical treatise? -- and answered it. The answer, however, cuts off knowledge of the deepest IDeas traditionally associated with philosophy, at least of the theoretical sort.
My noting that his induction isn't valid is more or less associated with his metaphysical conclusions rather than everything he ever said. I think once you're talking about God, Freedom, or Immortality theoretical knowledge can't touch it -- mostly due to Kant's influence on my thinking.
The idea is not that guessing is a feature, but rather that a game which involves rule-negotiation is superior to a game which does not. Hence Haidt's claim that, "A video game is really like the junk food of games..."
I think that's an opinion written from ignorance, honestly. I play video games with my family all the time, and negotiations about the meta-rules of play are a part of that. It's not that different from a board game -- it's not like you can hack the laws of physics to make dice roll a different way. So it goes with a video game -- you can't hack the code, but you still play with others and form relationships and negotiate through them and that's what makes the game good.
Maybe check out the video and try to understand what is being said.
But that is nonsensical. It would be like asserting that one is both a bachelor and a married man, so of course no one is both a Christian and an atheist. Not being either would qualify one as agnostic - which I think is a cop-out.
Maybe there are better examples? Can one be a realist and a solipsist? No - same issue. Can one be both a rationalist and an empiricist? Maybe. For me, it is a false dichotomy. I see that we are both using both rationality and observations to support our conclusions.
Quoting Leontiskos
Are you saying that Srap is ignoring the law of identity and excluded middle?
All this talk is useless until we start applying what is being said to real-world situations.
Seems like the same thing to me. Direct and indirect realism are false dichotomies. One must be in direct contact with some part of the world and indirectly connected to the rest of it, or else you are the world (solipsism), or you don't exist. Not to mention what and where the "I" is that is connected to the rest of the world. Are you your consciousness, your brain, your body, or what? Most philosophical problems are the result of a misuse, or an overuse, of language.
So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand or subscribe to rational norms?
There is a video game called MineCraft which doesn't exactly have rules to play by. There are rules in the sense that it is a physics engine where different simulations of objects interact within some set of rules which are apparently deterministic. But there's no reason to do one thing over the other. I've watched children play video games in the exact manner that Haidt praises the negotiation of rules for marbles -- the children are in fact still children even with different technology, and they negotiate all kinds of rules all the time.
Which framework are you using to reach such a conclusion?
Does an toddler "subscribe" to the idea of object permanence (realism), or is it simply naturally occurring cognitive development? Would the child ever be able to survive on it's own if it did not reach this cognitive milestone?
Which normative framework? Or just which framework in general?
Oh no, not at all. That strikes me as saying, "Someone does not subscribe to breathing, therefore they do not breathe."
To be honest, I was just trying to be generous. Your understanding of that point in the thread does not seem overly strong. The point is that there is an equivocation on what "moral" means. The reason people act morally when they are not intending to act morally is because they have a strange understanding of "moral," which is what the thread was trying to address. But that point you singled out is admittedly tricky, and I would even say it was a relatively weak spot in the OP, which could not be ironed out without adding excessive length.
Quoting Leontiskos
I am thinking of situations where, as you say, two gensuses ( genera) differ subtly enough that the second can be reasonably mistaken for the first. Your characterization of such situations seems to assume that nothing stands in the way of our recognizing and properly interpreting the meaning of the second genus, save for circumstances where the other intends to mislead. But what I have in mind are genera informed by conceptual systems that are not readily recognized and understood. Do you not believe that there are ideas floating around us which we are not prepared to assimilate because they are too alien relative to our background concepts? In the situation where someone tries to exterminate Jews and another tries to stop them, can we really say that they are engaged in a common pursuit of practical execution before we understand WHY they are doing what they are doing f from their own perspective? Opponents in a football game can easily switch sides because the game is understood in the same way by all. But the rescuer and exterminator of jews are not on opposing sides of the same game. They are playing different games, and neither sides position appears justifiable to the other.
Thanks. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
We're a little bit off topic, but this is obviously related to the Adorno thread. I am wondering what the contradiction here is said to be, in a precise way? Is it that democracies can turn into oligarchies, and once they do then they are no longer democracies? I think that's true, but it looks like a change rather than a contradiction.
Or perhaps we have here the idea that democracy is incompatible with liberalism, because liberalism is tied to capitalism and therefore tied to oligarchy? If so, then I would want to ask, "What is it about liberalism that is tied to capitalism"? I'm not disputing the thesis, but I want to see the reasoning.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, very good. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Great quote!
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Great - I think we agree on this. :up:
Right, and that is what I was talking about in the quote. I think you actually mean "innocuously" rather than "reasonably."
Quoting Joshs
That post I quoted is literally identifying "being at cross-purposes" as one central cause of dismissal, and then going on to claim that dismissals of that kind can be either correct or incorrect. An example of an incorrect case would be the false attribution of blame, which is what you are thinking of.
Quoting Joshs
Maybe try reading the OP of that thread, especially where I talk about "material positions." That is what you are talking about here, and it is taken for granted given the OP.
Quoting Joshs
I would argue that in both cases each side knows what the other is attempting to do, and that each is trying to thwart the other. That's why they are not at cross-purposes in the relevant sense. If we think of "being at cross-purposes" differently, then even the footballers are at cross-purposes simply in virtue of the fact that they are on different sides.
The idea is that in order for cross-purposes to result in (moral) dismissal, there must be blame. And in order for there to be blame the other must be falsely representing his purpose.
These points are incredibly subtle, so you will have to try to understand the context. No one took me up on that point in the thread, probably because it is too much of a quagmire for most. For example, you might say, "Ah, but the rescuer of Jews morally dismisses the exterminator." The answer would be, "Not in the sense we are speaking about, given the fact that they continue to engage with them (militarily)." The exterminators are not being dismissed or written off militarily. They are both engaged in an activity which presupposes that the lives of Jews are important. Again, these are subtle puzzles. One can dismiss the exterminator's aim as hopelessly depraved without dismissing the exterminator's military efficacy. The exterminator is being depraved but he is not being deceitful with respect to his genus of activity (or, if he is, it is not a beyond-the-pale form of deceit given the expectations of war, spying, etc.).
If you think that's a cop-out then we are on the same page. I am saying that there are some cases where it is impossible to say, "I am neither black nor white. I am perfectly neutral." If you think the theist/atheist case is one of those cases, then that is the sort of thing I am talking about.
"I am neither a framework-relativist nor a realist. I am perfectly neutral between the two."
Isn't the common thread of those cases where it is impossible is where the distinctions have been clearly defined and are in opposition (law of the excluded middle)? Atheism is the antithesis of theism. There is no middle ground, but there could be an absence of both (agnosticism). The cases where it is possible are cases where there isn't a clear distinction and\or the ideas are not contradictory - meaning that opposite sides can actually be integrated into a consistent middle ground.
Atheism could be thought of as an absence of any religious frameworks. The issue is when the theist tries to integrate their supernatural framework with the natural one, or even a moral one (why did God create the circumstances that allow childhood cancer to exist?).
Morality is subjective. Sure evil is the opposite of good, but what each individual interprets as good and evil can vary depending on the context (like them being in that situation instead of the person they are observing). Are there better ways to integrate socially (doing good things) that improve the fitness of our species - sure. Is the continued existence of human beings a good thing or a bad thing? What type of framework would an advanced alien species possess and have to say about that? To say that some behavior is moral or immoral is based on one's own subjective framework. There is no universal framework of morality if you're asking if there is some universal moral framework to judge a person's behavior by.
It sounds like youre talking about the kinds of general social know-how that allows us to navigate in interpersonal situations without having to have in-depth knowledge of other persons motives and beliefs. Ordering in a restaurant, driving in busy traffic, dancing the tango or strategizing against enemy soldiers are all examples of this skillful coping. Blame would seem to mark the limit of the anticipatory usefulness of such coping, the point where a more in-depth understanding of the others perspective becomes necessary. Deceit would not appear to trigger blame unless it could not be accounted for as an element of the social practice. Misdirection is an expected strategy in football and war, but not in cooperative ventures. The enemy general who pulls off a successful subterfuge ( D-day) is to be admired, whereas the friend who betrays ones trust triggers rage and blame.
Right, good.
Quoting Moliere
Are you truly unable to see Haidt's point? Have you ever watched children at recess, playing a game and disputing the rules? Minecraft is not a counterexample. It's just a game with loose rules. The only time Haidt's point comes up in video games is when there is a bug, and then some people exploit the bug, and then there is an argument over whether the bug ought to be exploited. But it is almost always fair game to exploit a bug in a video game, and that's no coincidence.
When I worked at a school there was one game in particular that the children played, which I believe they called "wall ball." But the rules were extremely complicated, and despite this the children understood them remarkably well (although I don't think they would have been able to articulate them clearly). I had a co-worker who I would sometimes lunch with, and she was never able to discern the rules of the game in the years she worked there.* That sort of phenomenon would never occur with video games. The rules of a video game are defined by the code, and they cannot be bent or broken.
Indeed, when adults play children's games with children, they are often convicted of transgressing the rules, and there will be a large number of infractions before they begin to understand how to play. That's normal, and also funny. Contrariwise, when an adult plays a video game with children, they get their ass beat, but they are never accused of breaking rules. They are just laughed at because they are so bad.
* One of the rules of this game was that, if you tried and failed to catch the ball after it bounced off the brick wall, then you were inactivated. You were unable to play again until the ball hit the wall. Even if every player missed the ball, there was no exception (and this fascinated me). At that point the whole game went into stasis, and could not be continued until an outside party joined the game, picked up the ball, and threw it against the wall. If no one came to renew the game, it would end and the children would veer off into other games, like basketball or kickball. That combination of competition, cooperation, fault/blame, and consequencesboth individual and communalhas everything that a good game needs, for it mimics the complexities of reality and life.
Well, at the park at least.
That's very much what children do when they play anything at all.
Quoting Leontiskos
Now note I'm talking about children playing with children. They do all the stuff you're describing no matter the medium -- at the park, playing wall ball, playing pretend, playing "a game", or playing MineCraft.
I think that the video game is singled out with respect to marbles because there's a kind of nostalgia for an age that didn't exist, as if children were somehow better off then than now, and our modern technology is ruining their development.
At one point it was comic books that would ruin children's minds, then television, and now video games. It's the same concern played out over and again.
Yes, I think that's a good way of putting it. You wanted real-world application, so let's come back to the thread now, using your tool of the LEM. This is the central counter-claim of the thread:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Note the form:
@Banno, @J, and @Srap Tasmaner have no ability to answer that question, and they failed to answer it for 20 pages, making all sorts of weird excuses.
@J and @Srap Tasmaner in particular tried to say, "Let's take a step back into a neutral frame, so that we can examine this more carefully. Now everyone lives in their own framework..." Their "step back" was always a form of question-begging, given that it presupposed the non-overarching, framework-view. That's what happens when someone falsely claims to be taking a neutral stance on some matter on which they are not neutral* (and, in this case, on a matter in which neutrality is not possible). In general and especially in this case, the better thing to do is simply to give arguments for one's position instead of trying to claim the high ground of "objectivity" or "neutrality."
Note that if one holds that all narratives or frames are equal, then they should just say that. They should be honest about it. The problem here is that it is evident to everyone that not all narratives are equal, and this is why such people refuse to answer the question in that way. We could sum up this part of the thread as, "There is an obvious truth that some people refused to admit, and their avoidance of dialogue was part and parcel of that refusal."
* And this is related to the deceptive genus I am discussing with @Joshs
I've explained what you're unable to see. There was nothing in my explanation about "nostalgia for an age that didn't exist." There is a difference between video games and wall ball, believe it or not.
Take care, Moliere.
Obviously we disagree on most all of this. If you want to give an argument for your positions, feel free.
I agree with this part of your post. :up:
Regarding cross-purposes:
Quoting Leontiskos
The simple way this has churned out in this this thread is, "Oh, I thought we were forthrightly answering each other's questions. I see you're not doing that. So what game are you playing at instead?" Hence the deception.
I have to say don't quite understand why you would ask me that.
Quoting goremand
Quoting Leontiskos
Sorry, "no, I disagree" or "no, there is no need"? Do object to me characterizing norms as something you subscribe to?
I didn't see the word, "some" in the original quote and that seems to make a difference. The original quote seems to be saying "either all narratives are true or all narratives are false", but that doesn't make any sense because there are narratives that contradict each other, so it cannot be that all narratives are true. But all narratives could be false in that we have yet to find the true narrative. This also doesn't seem to take into account that some narratives might be partially true/false.
If we were to narrow down the scope from "all" to "one" then if two people have opposing narratives - viewpoints that are the opposite of each other (god exists/god doesn't exist) - then yes one has to be correct and the other false, but if they do not AND they both have issues, then it could be possible that both are wrong. It seems to depend on where one narrative stands in relation with the other - if they are direct opposites (god exists/god doesn't exist) and how many conceptual holes each one has compared to the other. Many issues do not have black or white solutions. There can often be other narratives which might be a middle ground or might not - depending on how much of the two counter-narratives it overlaps or shares (only if it shares an equal amount of both of the other two narratives would it qualify as middle ground). If there are parts that the 3rd narrative does not share with either, one might say it is not a middle ground, but simply a 3rd possible narrative.
Quoting Leontiskos
When we hear about an issue for the first time and listen to the arguments that support one side or the other for the first time, and evaluate and compare the number and scope of conceptual holes in each for the first time, are we not taking a neutral position? Which position would we be adopting at this point if not one that says reason and logic are valuable methods for determining the truth of a claim? Is there another position one could take? Does it make sense to take the position that logic and reason are NOT methods for determining the truth of a claim? One might, but that would seem to undermine many of the other things that they have said. Is there a person alive that takes the position that logic and reason are NEVER useful methods for determining the truth of a claim? Could such a person survive in the world?
I've worked through this before in the thread, but we can do it again:
"Either all narratives are [X], or they aren't." (original quote)
? "Either all narratives are [X], or they are not."
I don't think (2) is a plausible interpretation. It looks like something which is clearly false, and something which does not fit the context, and also something which is an inherent stretch (namely to distribute the "all" in that way). It is also contrary to the other ways @Count Timothy von Icarus has phrased the point.
Beyond this, (2) looks like a strawman, and this is why. Accepting for the sake of argument that both interpretations are possible, nevertheless (1) results in a valid argument and (2) results in an invalid argument. So why interpret (2) rather than (1)? @J has accused Count of transgressing the principle of charity, but his interpretation is by definition uncharitable. "He might be saying something that is perfectly valid, but I am going to interpret him in a different way, such that his argument is invalid."
I mean, suppose a marine biologist says, "Either all the fish are diseased, or they aren't." Would you really interpret that as, "Either all the fish are diseased, or else all the fish are not diseased"? I.e. "Either every fish is diseased, or else every fish is not diseased"? I simply do not see that as a plausible interpretation.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I think once we understand that (1) is being said rather than (2), then a lot of the things you point out here follow. The earlier iteration : "Well, in ruling out, 'anything goes,' you are denying some positions." I.e., "If we say that not anything goes, then we are saying that some things do not go."
You were asking two different questions:
Quoting goremand
1. So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to understand rational norms?
2. So would you agree with me that there is no need for the members of the rational community to subscribe to rational norms?
I would say that members of the rational community (i.e. everyone) do understand rational norms, but they do not subscribe nor need to subscribe to them.
Else, you are using the word 'need'. I would ask, "Need for the sake of what?" Your phrasing is implicitly instrumental.
Well, this is "contradiction" in the context of Hegelian dialectical, which starts off pretty clear in the Logic with being/nothing -> becoming, but becomes less clear cut in historical analysis. The basic idea is that a historical moment (e.g. early liberal republicanism) comes to negate itself, making itself what it is not precisely because of what it is.
For Hegel, who has a strong classic bent in this respect, the telos of history is the emergence of a truly self-determining human freedom (man becoming more wholly himself and more truly one). But freedom itself is subject to the dialectic. If we begin with freedom as "the absolute lack of constraint and determinateness," the "ability to choose anything," we run into the contradiction that making any choice at all implies some sort of determinacy, and is thus a limit on freedom. Yet the fact that, to sustain our perfect freedom, we need to never make any choices, while freedom is also "the capacity to choose," is a sort of contradiction. He identifies this sort of flight from all determinacy with the excesses of the French Revolution early in the Philosophy of Right, but you still see this in leftist and libertarian radicals all the time; they flee from any concrete, pragmatic policy because determination is a limit on liberty.
So there ends up being many revisions of freedom, which has to be worked out across human history (the idea of a "commonwealth" coexisting with slavery and conquest is one example going back to Saint Augustine's City of God; the fact that the "lord" is not free to lift his boot off the neck of the "bondsman" without risking revolt is another). With liberal democracies, I would like to say that the problem was that they were self-undermining. They allowed for, and indeed positively promoted their own collapse into non-democracy, which is a negation of the original term that promotes and expresses freedom. Socialism and nationalism, in their respective ways, helped to avoid this self-negation by addressing the concentration of power that could be used to subvert liberal democracy. But now, globalization, mass migration, and then secularism and capitalism's tendency to erode culture, have destroyed the basis for nationalism, and yet "national identity" was holding up support for the redistribution of socialism.
From this, we might diagnose the problem and some historical currents, but we could hardly use it to predict the future. That's Solovyov's main insight. History might be providential, but man is free, and he "loves the darkness" (John 3). I
History doesn't have a utopian end point assured to it, as Eusebius and Hegel might assume, but is closer to Dante's vision (where he is most unique as a philosopher) of a goal whose assurance isn't realized. It is, however, perhaps actual only to the extent that it rationally embodies this telos (Hegel's famous point with "the rational is the actual and the actual is the rational.") Which is just to say, we can speak meaningfully of "progress," of actualization, but we mustn't fall into the trap of many left Hegelians, of thinking this makes history a sort of manichean battleground. The good is sewn with the bad and only time tests then.
Natural language is fuzzy, so I suppose it could be read like that, although that seems to be a stretch to me. Saying "all x are y or they aren't" is a simple disjunct between affirmation and negation of "all x are y." That's how I intended it at least. So, the objection of the possibility of narratives without truth values was brought up, but I don't think this affects the disjunct. If some narratives are neither true nor false, then obviously they are not "all true." The excluded middle here would instead be "all narratives are neither true nor not-true." Note though that the context is epistemology and presumably epistemology, since it deals in knowledge, deals in narratives that have truth values, if not exclusively, at least primarily.
I don't even like the term "narratives," to be honest. It's connotations seem perhaps inappropriate for epistemology. I would rather say perhaps "all knowledge claims."
So every substantial change is a contradiction, on that reading?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Interesting. :up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Okay, but I'm asking "why?" Why is liberalism thought to be incompatible with democracy? Or why is a "liberal democracy" thought to be self-undermining? What is the reasoning? Again, I don't necessarily doubt the conclusion, but I want to see some particular reasoning for it.
I'd push here and say "Is it ever true?" -- but I'd want Durant to clarify his use of "Epicurean" which I imagine is the more popular image.
Epicurus gets the shaft far more often than deserved so I always want to stand up for him -- especially because I'm guessing Durant means it as in "decadent pathos at the cost of prudence"
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I tried to draw an analogy between science/history as I'm trying to defend it, but then upon examination I thought "Naw -- there really is a conceptual difference here" -- In a way this is a testament to philosophy, though. What we mean by "science" in our world today is a product of philosophical exploration -- it just took some odd 400 years to even be able to point to the distinction in a reasonable manner.
Still, I say this without having read the lecture/book you refer to.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
:up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Given my persuasion I ought agree -- but it's one of those points that I constantly find myself coming back to to work out what it really means, after all. I recognize the irony here -- negating sublation would lead to the sublation of sublation -- but my doubt is a little old fashioned here in wondering just how do I go about making this inference myself?
There are a handful of examples that I can see the pattern in, including my own patterns of thinking.
But I also know it's very easy to read patterns into what we're considering. And at least as I understand it Hegel's philosophy of history is pretty out there to the point that, while I find it interesting, I know exactly how it'd sound to anyone who thinks time is linear.
I'm fairly skeptical of a logos in history, too, but I doubt that's surprising :D
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I like your ability to draw analogies to pre-modern philosophy. And definitely appreciate the references to poetry.
I don't think we can predict these things in a strict sense, of course. History is too particular for that. But then, to wrap this back to the OP, to what extent does the world-builder philosophy help understand these historical moments? Not prediction, but what is the relationship? "Sense-making"?
Yes. I await the day when "natural language philosophers" finally begin to understand natural language. :smile:
Is this necessarily the case (i.e. do they need to)? It doesn't seem like it if you look at norms in general. I could unknowingly be acting in accordance with any number of arbitrary norms as I go about my business. Why can't I act in accordance with rational norms without understanding those norms?
I see your point which is why I pointed out that the word, "some" was not used. If it were then it would be obvious what you are saying. What if one were to say, "All fish are swimmers, or all fish are not swimmers"? How would that be different, if at all?
Just on it's face, "All narratives are true" simply does not fit observation when we are aware of narratives that contradict each other. All narratives can't be true by way of LEM.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Natural language is not fuzzy. It only appears that way in philosophy forums (language on holiday) when philosophers forget that language use is not just syntax but semantics in that language refers to states-of-affairs in the world. The scribbles are about states-of-affairs in the world. Just because you followed the syntactical rules of some language does not mean that you used language correctly. It has to point to some state-of-affairs as well - whether that state-of-affairs be in another country, on another planet, another person and their ideas and intentions, or all knowledge claims as opposed to some.
This is why the knowledge claim, "All knowledge claims are true" is simply false on it's face because we already know that some knowledge claims contradict each other and LEM. I don't even need to get to your other claim that "all knowledge claims are not true" to know that the first one is false. You start off with a faulty premise and it is faulty because it does not fit observation and follow the LEM. Adding the second claim as if it even relates to the first, or your use of "all" is an example of what language on holiday is.
Yes, that was the point. P V ~P is not a premise and conclusion, but a premise itself, a basic disjunct. Also, might you be confusing the law of the excluded middle (LEM) with the law of non-contradiction (LNC)?
I think it is obvious. In philosophy it is called the Square of Opposition, and I have mentioned it often in this thread. To negate the claim "All X are Y" is to affirm the claim "Some X are not Y." To say, "Not all are that way," is to say, "Some are not that way." My "some" interpretation is the obvious interpretation.
Saying "All X are not Y" also contradicts "All X are Y," but it does so gratuitously. The charitable and minimal interpretation requires interpreting what is necessary, and to deny "All X are Y" it is necessary to affirm "Some X are not Y." It is not necessary to affirm "All X are not Y" in order to deny "All X are Y." This is a classic case of trying to push one's opponent into an extreme position in order to make them easier to refute (i.e. the informal fallacy of the strawman).
Quoting Harry Hindu
Do you interpret, "Either all fish are swimmers, or they aren't," as, "All fish are swimmers, or all fish are not swimmers"? It's the same issue.
Quoting Harry Hindu
If not all narratives are [X] then some narratives are not [X]. That's exactly what @Count Timothy von Icarus was pointing out. It is not a controversial claim, to say the least. The more interesting question asks why it has been evaded for 20 pages.
Quoting Leontiskos
-
Quoting goremand
Because if you are acting in accordance with a norm then you must have an understanding of that norm at some level. If you have no understanding of a norm then you cannot act in accordance with it.
So If I invented a normative framework for say, ants, with rules like "ants should protect their queen", "ants should walk in a line", "ants should utilize a caste system" etc. and most ants acted in accordance with it, it must be the case that the ants have an understanding of my normative framework?
I made a rule that the clouds should eject some water when they hit a low pressure zone. They've been doing a great job.
How would you answer your own question?
That they would be "good ants" if I judge them according to my framework, and that this does not require that they have any understanding of said framework. Similarly, people can be rational without understanding the normative framework used to judge them as such.
I would agree, in principle. A norm, insofar as it is a euphemism for some explicit rational condition, understanding is that by which that condition is given its object. That I understand perfectly well the explicit condition, e.g., respect as a certain, albeit merely cultural, norm, it does not follow I must always without exception, hold the door for a lady.
Well we agree that ants protect their queen, do we not? And we agree that ants are not rational, and therefore do not engage in rational norm-following, do we not?
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
My point is that it's easy to "reverse-engineer" a normative framework just by observing how some entity tends to act (humans, ants, clouds, whatever), and claiming that this is how they "should" act. But this does nothing to justify the the framework, i.e. justify the claim that "this is how things should be".
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-II.1.2.c - Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?
Isn't the "rational appetite" just another type of "natural appetite"? Certainly most people are inclined to be rational.
And my point is that it is absurd to claim that ants are engaged in rational norm-following, so this is a massive strawman you are wielding.
Quoting goremand
In the context of that quote, acting for an end via the will is much different than acting for an end via mere instinct. This is why, for example, animals do not have any developed language.
It makes no sense to make this about "rational norm-following" (which I assume means following a set of norms because it is rational to do so) when discussing rational norms themselves. Reason can't compel you to be reasonable, that's circular.
Quoting Leontiskos
I don't really see why it is much different. I believe human beings are rational by "mere instinct".
Can someone relate it back to the theme?
I simply do not think that non-rational norm following is coherent. So to talk about norm-following is to talk about rational norm-following. Because they are not rational, the ants are not following a norm. End of story.
Quoting goremand
Even if humans are naturally rational, it remains true that a rational decision is different from an instinctual reaction.
To my understanding, Leontiskos objected that you can't "do philosophy" without already "having a philosophy", and so to him this distinction doesn't really make sense. Then he made the more specific claim that rational norms are a condition for "doing philosophy", and I took issue with that. I'm sorry if our discussion is a weed in this beautiful garden of a thread.
Quoting Leontiskos
I take this to mean you stipulatively define norm-following as necessarily rational. Leaving aside how I think it's pretty common to apply norms to animals, machines etc. that clearly aren't rational, given that rationality is a set of norms, haven't you now made being rational a necessary condition for becoming rational?
To me, if you transition from from defying rational norms into following them, you've transitioned from irrationality to rationality. But that transition obviously can't be compelled by the rational norms themselves, so under your definition it appears simply impossible, because you don't allow that one can be rational for irrational reasons.
I think norm-following requires rationality. No stipulation required.
Quoting goremand
How so? How is it at all common? We could say, "The blender is abiding by the norm of blending up fruit. He hasn't deviated from that norm yet." But that is metaphorical language. We don't actually think the blender is abiding by norms.
Quoting goremand
You would have to spell that argument out in more detail.
Quoting goremand
First, do plants, animals, and machines "defy (rational) norms"? I don't see that they do, or can.
Let me try to sketch your argument. I'm still not quite sure what you are saying.
(4) and (5) are especially opaque to me.
Quoting goremand
:wink:
More likely we would express it like "a blender should be able to purée fruit", in particular we might be quite disappointed if a blender failed to do so. I don't think this is a metaphor at all, I think we have expectations about how machines should behave.
Quoting Leontiskos
It think that depends on our willingness to ascribe beliefs to non-humans, I am open to reasonably intelligent animals and maybe computers behaving irrationally. Plants not so much, I guess you could even say that plants are always rational, but only in the same sense in which they never lose at football.
Quoting Leontiskos
My idea of "norm-following" is conforming to a set of norms. Your idea seems to be the same, but with the added requirement that you have to be rational.
Let us say we want to figure out whether or not an entity is rational. Since being rational means following rational norms, we have to first establish whether the entity is capable of norm-following. According to you, that depends on whether or not the entity is rational, which is what we're trying to figure out in the first place. So we could never know whether the entity is rational or not.
Quoting Leontiskos
Maybe I overinterpreted what you wrote, it took "rational norm-following" to mean "rationally justified norm-following". So I took you to be saying that adopting a set of norms requires rational justification, which doesn't makes sense if rational justification itself depends upon a set of norms.
So you think we should put it on the blender that it has failed to follow a "norm"?
Quoting goremand
Whereas I would not say any of that.
Quoting goremand
Well, you have to be able to "attend" to the norm in a non-metaphorical way, and for that you need rationality. We can say that the blender "attends" to the purée-norm, but this is just whimsical or metaphorical speech. The blender is not attending to anything. It is just being forced to move in certain ways.
Quoting goremand
That's your strange definition, not mine. So the circularity seems to be coming from your own definitions.
Quoting goremand
Then please re-write the argument I provided, correcting any mistakes I made. I want to see your actual argument.
Yes, and the consequences for the blender will probably be quite harsh.
Quoting Leontiskos
Then how is it that you agreed with what I wrote here:
Quoting goremand
So the agent doesn't have to be aware of the framework, but they need to capacity to "attend" to it? What does that mean?
Quoting Leontiskos
I'm really surprised to see you object to this ("being rational means following rational norms"), I thought this was at the core of what you wanted to say. Originally you made an analogy to with moral norms, do you also have problem with "being moral means following moral norms"? What is the actual relationship between rationality and the associated norms, if not this? Can you follow rational norms without being rational, or vice versa?
I've asked what your argument is, and I've even tried to represent it:
Quoting Leontiskos
Again:
Quoting Leontiskos
If you are unwilling to state your position clearly and without ambiguity, then I see no reason to continue.
---
Edit:
Quoting goremand
I've said that one who follows norms is rational (i.e. If X is following a norm, then X is rational). I'm not sure how you managed to get a definition of rationality out of that. But again, you have to set out your argument clearly if I am to know what you are saying.
I'm sorry for not making this clear: I'm withdrawing my argument, because I lost faith in my interpretation of your view. Any argument I make is necessarily against what I take to be your view, there is no point if I don't have some degree of confidence in my grasp of your position.
What I would like you to attend to are the questions I asked about the your view on the relationship between rationality and rational norms, because it's something I'm confused about right now.
Quoting Leontiskos
Understandable, but I maintain that I am absolutely not unwilling. Anyway, you're not under any obligation to keep this up, if you're just bored or annoyed with this talk that's a perfectly legitimate reason to bow out.
Okay, well let me expand on my edit:
We can go back in the conversation:
Quoting goremand
And:
Quoting goremand
This is apparently coming from the notion of susceptibility:
Quoting Leontiskos
What this all turns on is volition and negligence:
Quoting Leontiskos
Negligence is the idea that someone can be accountable to a norm that they are not currently following. Note that humans can be negligent and ants cannot, and this is because ants do not act self-consciously according to norms.
Let me call out, in particular, the list of questions with which she closes her essay. Following Peirce, who at one point offered "a small specimen of philosophical questions which press for industrious and solid investigation," she gives her own list:
Plenty to work on here, no matter which style of philosophy you favor!
I've never been keen on "foundherentism", an ugly name. But there is much to be said for the core idea that something must be taken as granted, while the overall structure of our beliefs ought be coherent. I'm also not too keen on "hypothetico-deductive method". The missing piece in Hack's account seems to m to be that our reasoning is public, that experimental evidence is shared, and so embedded in our common understanding. But I can agree with her that neither Old Deferentialism nor New Cynicism, nor indeed some synthesis of the two, gives a sufficient account of science or rationality considered more generally.
Nor do I go along with her rejection of statistical approaches, which appears to be based on treating probabilities of propositions being true, rather then of their being believable. Though of course if the aim is truth, then Bayesian thinking will not help.
Now I've not read Hack closely, so I may be quite mistaken here. There is it appears some agreement between the pluralism Hack advocates and the piecemeal approach suggested in my OP.
It's a good list. We might start a thread on each, and have endless fun...
I liked Evidence and Inquiry very much, and have reread it a couple of times. Yeah, "foundherentism" is an unfortunate coinage. But as you say, something like it is surely right. And when we get into the details, we find some ingenious answers to issues that come up both for the Deferentialists and the Cynics. Her discussions about how to rescue foundherentism from the objection that it is a blurred version of plain old coherentism are really sharp.
As for her list of topics . . . We rarely see a straightforward list of problems that a very good philosopher thinks are the most interesting to explore. That's part of why I wanted to share hers. As you say, any one of them would start a TPF ball rolling. The one I find most unexpected as a philosophical issue is "What the mechanisms are of self-deception and of wishful and fearful thinking?" If anyone, reading this, happens to know where Haack might have written on this topic, I'd like to know.
I dont know if Haack wrote about it to any significant extent (it wasnt present in what Ive so far read of her writings), but the issue of self-deception is a very complex and problematic topic in philosophy. For example, one form of self-deception occurs when one lies to oneself and maybe others (e.g., I didnt do it) while being momentarily aware that this is a lie (e.g., knowing full well that one did do it) only to at a future juncture come to believe this very lie as being a full-blown truth. Id label the issue as one regarding the philosophy of mind. The SEP has a dedicated entry to the issue of self-deception here.
I intuitively believe the issues of wishful and fearful thinking can become easily resolvable philosophically once the issue of self-deception becomes satisfactorily accounted for.
, it is unexpected for me because it seems to be more an issue for psychology than philosophy.
Or am I missing something here... philosophically, self-deception is inadvisable, but psychologically, it might be the appropriate approach.
In truth, your account is somewhat overly simplistic for me, but, that said, by and large I agree. In real world cases, the successful self-deceived will sometimes form a confirmation bias whereby they attempt via all means possible to justify the (believed) truth of what in fact is a self-deception. I take this to go hand in hand with the human egos often valued impetus to be right rather than undergo the suffering of being wrong. A kind of self-preservation of ones identity as righteous, and the comfort (or else, satisfaction and peace of mind) that accompanies it. And, in cases such as this, the self-deception can well persist despite the surrounding community expressing otherwise via all sorts of evidence. (Dont know how common this is, but Ive encountered this in the course of my life.) Still, again, by and by, Im in general agreement with you: if we're honest with ourselves ... then what you say follows.
In the epistemological context she is concerned with, self-deception represents the mirror opposite of the act of knowledge, in much the same way that falsity represents the mirror opposite of truth. So it is broader than a lie of the practical reason. The idea is that there are cases where one can be self-deceived even within their speculative reason, and that this will shed light on truth and knowledge (by shedding light on falsity).
This tracks a more classical approach where the intellect is naturally oriented to truth, and the primary difficulties lie in intellectual impediments (such as self-deception).
As a song by "The Doors" has it: "you know the day (in this context, light and thereby truth) destroys the night (falsity), night (falsity) divides the day (truth) ..." Poetic but substantial enough to me, this when it comes to the ontology of truth and falsity.
Yes, or the Wood Brothers' song "Keep me around":
Quoting Wood Brothers, Keep me around
Inquiries into falsity can shed light on truth, but they always fall short because falsity is something less than truth. The Darkness does not comprehend the Light. If Augustine is right then falsity is a sort of absence or privation. The Parmenidean paradox regarding falsity is also relevant here.
Yes, that was why I was surprised too, but the SEP article that @javra pointed us to is revealing. It seems there have been plenty of attempts to formalize the family of "self-deception" terms in ways that are tractable philosophically. I like this one: "self-deceivers dont believe p; they believe that they believe that p, and this false second-order belief'I think that I believe that p'underlies and underwrites their sincere avowal that p as well as their ability to entertain p as true." For extra credit: How might a psychologist prove or disprove this hypothesis? :smile:
I'd more or less go along with Davidson here, as a default position. Se the paragraph in his bio on problems of irrationality. The second-order belief idea is immune to empirical analysis. But our minds can be "weakly partitioned". One might believe p and believe ~p while never believing (p & ~p). That would be demonstrable: and that's a part of why setting stuff out explicitly and sharing with others is so useful.
A more difficult question might be whether such inconsistent beliefs are maladaptive.
Sure. There's plenty more going on, including no small amount of self-deception. But not with you and I of course, only with them. And is it maladaptive? For that, we have @Jamal as arbiter.
Seems like you're trying to insinuate something here.
Of course everyone, me and you included, is engaged in self-deceptions. Thats not the issue. For instance, philosophically speaking, it just as false to believe that I am as it is false to believe that I am notthough each falsity occurs from a different vantage. (This being, for example, basic Buddhist teachings 101.) Point being, issue is not if we are engaged in any self-deceptions (wed be perfected being devoid of these, and all humans are imperfect) but, rather, what to do about it. One either prefers truth over falsity and so values the cathartic sting of bubbles getting burst whenever they so do or, else, one doesnt, preferring instead the eternal preservation of falsehoods. In some ways its akin to becoming an alcoholic: its only when one loses all concern of becoming an alcoholic while drinking that one runs the risk of so becoming. Long story short, we all engage in doublethink, just that some of us dislike it while others do like it, with only the latter claiming that they are perfectly devoid of it.
I think that's key. To try to separate oneself from all others is perhaps the most fundamental and insidious form of self-deception.
(This is why the Christian doctrine of Original Sin is so powerful: because it involves a universal acknowledgment of humility. No one who believes in Original Sin can separate themselves from others at this most fundamental level.)
Quoting javra
Good, but I think motives may need to be clarified, particularly because it seems impossible to prefer falsity in itself. So I don't think anyone "prefers the eternal preservation of falsehoods," given that falsehood is not an end in itself (as truth is, at least on a classical view). The motive is rather something like pride or vanity, the desire to be right or to be seen as right (or intelligent, or powerful, or virtuous). So to oversimplify, we all desire to be esteemed and we all desire truth, but oftentimes a devotion to truth requires that we humble ourselves and abandon our desire for esteem. The question then becomes: do you care about truth more than being esteemed? That question has more teeth than a question about whether one prefers truth to falsity.
:up: On this we very much agree. Because it deviates from the intent of the OP, I was trying to keep things short in my last post. But yes. Its what in my own terminology I'd sum up as the choice between preferring egoistic interests, what you term "pride or vanity", or else the more egoless interest of uncovering, of being aligned to, and of ultimately conforming to ever deeper truths. Apropos, the Ancient Greek term for truth, aletheia, gets variously translated as "unconcealedness", "disclosure", "revealing", or "unhiddenness".[2] It also means "reality".[3] A different contextual vantage on what truth signifies. As to vanity:
Quoting Stephen Crane
So, when it comes to the pointing fingers at other's vanity, as another dictum from the Oracle at Delphi goes: "Everything in moderation". We're all, after all, in our own ways and degrees, vain.
Yep. :up:
And part of my point is that a desire for esteem is not bad. Vanity is something like an excessive desire for esteem. As you say, moderation is involved.
Quoting Stephen Crane
Wonderful!
No, just wordplay, with a slight hangover from another conversation about Harry. Too obtuse, it seems. Not to worry. The point was that you and I will have trouble recognising how we are deceiving ourselves, especially without intervention from others. Easier to see it in others; but then, what we see is never the whole story.
Indeed, going back to the topic of the OP, I'd question whether there even is a whole story.
So, and this by way of a critique of my own account, the piecemeal, coherent, approach might turn out to be less "adaptive" than a complete account that is incoherent. And it might be that those who adopt a complete, incoherent account are unable to see the inconsistency. Consider Christian theology, for example. Or any of a number of recent threads.
I blame @Jamal for having me read Adorno. The "respect for the suffering of particular beings that are "crushed" by universalising systems..." there runs parallel to my OP here, at least for me.
So I'll leave you to swap lyrics and poems. Myth. Don't be concerned about going off topic here - that happened twenty pages ago.
Considered and acknowledged.
:party:
Woohoo!
Let's go wild and lay ruin to this thread!
That's what I call "doing philosophy".