The Preacher's Paradox
Inspired by Kierkegaard's ideas:
Faith is neither knowledge nor conviction. It is a leap into the void, without guarantees. Faith is risk, trepidation, and loneliness. ?therwise there would be no sacramental act, but simply conviction. Faith is not knowledge, for if a person simply knows, they have no doubt. Faith is, on the one hand, imperfect certainty, on the other, intention, and, on the third, a constant feeling of uncertainty. Any attempt to convey the content of the concept of "Faith," in my opinion, seems speculative, because it is a feeling that becomes a judgment when expressed in words .
Preaching is persuasion. It is a public word addressed to others, with the goal of evoking faith in them, that is, persuading them to accept something illogical, unprovable, and inexpressible.
Hence the paradox: if a preacher truly believes , then he finds himself in a realm of paradox and doubtand therefore cannot confidently call others. After all, it's unethical to call for something you're not sure of yourself; otherwise, you're simply avoiding any responsibility and calling for something you yourself can't confirm. If a preacher is convinced, certain of the truth of what he says, he no longer believes, but knowsand loses the right to speak of faith, becoming a hypocrite.
Preaching faith means either not having it or betraying it.
I'd like to address possible objections.
The preacher supposedly doesn't teach, but testifies. He doesn't impose; he simply shares his experience. This is personal testimony, not preaching in the traditional sense.
But then: The testimony itself is already public and therefore becomes an example, an instruction, a guide. As soon as you open your mouth and say, "I believe, and here's why," you're already suggesting, shaping, and externalizing something internal. This means you're either talking about something that can't be communicated, and therefore distorting it (a lie), or you're convinced it can be communicated and therefore no longer believe (knowledge, not faith).
The preacher supposedly invites you to share a risk, not offers knowledge. He doesn't say, "I know," he says, "I believe and invite you to take a risk too." But then: to invite risk, you need to define what it is and what's at stake. If you don't know what you're offering, you're irresponsible (you're not riskingyou're just enticing). If you know, you've once again moved from faith to knowledge and lost the right to call it faith.
The preacher sacrifices himself for others: He risks being misunderstood, rejected, despised he sacrifices himself, like Abraham. But Abraham's sacrifice isn't public. Abraham doesn't prove, explain, or teach. He simply acts contrary. The preacher, on the other hand, is on stage, in a position of authority, explaining the "meaning" of sacrifice, although true sacrifice is something else entirely, isn't it? After all, salvation is individual. The preacher cannot take on someone else's faith, someone else's guilt, someone else's risk, or someone else's responsibility. Therefore, the preacher sacrifices nothing but his own comfort or status.
And here's another thing. The preacher simply loves. He asserts: I want others to be saved, too. After all, is it wrong to wish for others to be saved? Doesn't love justify preaching? But love doesn't guarantee the right to interfere in someone else's destiny. Salvation, after all, cannot be recommended; it cannot be imposed. Otherwise, we fall into the same trap: the preacher "knows" that salvation is good and that this is the path to it. That is, he no longer believes, but asserts.
If the preacher is simply trying to score missionary points with the Almighty , then things are even worse.
Hence, I conclude that talking about faith means abandoning it. As soon as you try to convey faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature. According to Kierkegaard, the only true preacher is the one who lives faith in silence.
Faith is neither knowledge nor conviction. It is a leap into the void, without guarantees. Faith is risk, trepidation, and loneliness. ?therwise there would be no sacramental act, but simply conviction. Faith is not knowledge, for if a person simply knows, they have no doubt. Faith is, on the one hand, imperfect certainty, on the other, intention, and, on the third, a constant feeling of uncertainty. Any attempt to convey the content of the concept of "Faith," in my opinion, seems speculative, because it is a feeling that becomes a judgment when expressed in words .
Preaching is persuasion. It is a public word addressed to others, with the goal of evoking faith in them, that is, persuading them to accept something illogical, unprovable, and inexpressible.
Hence the paradox: if a preacher truly believes , then he finds himself in a realm of paradox and doubtand therefore cannot confidently call others. After all, it's unethical to call for something you're not sure of yourself; otherwise, you're simply avoiding any responsibility and calling for something you yourself can't confirm. If a preacher is convinced, certain of the truth of what he says, he no longer believes, but knowsand loses the right to speak of faith, becoming a hypocrite.
Preaching faith means either not having it or betraying it.
I'd like to address possible objections.
The preacher supposedly doesn't teach, but testifies. He doesn't impose; he simply shares his experience. This is personal testimony, not preaching in the traditional sense.
But then: The testimony itself is already public and therefore becomes an example, an instruction, a guide. As soon as you open your mouth and say, "I believe, and here's why," you're already suggesting, shaping, and externalizing something internal. This means you're either talking about something that can't be communicated, and therefore distorting it (a lie), or you're convinced it can be communicated and therefore no longer believe (knowledge, not faith).
The preacher supposedly invites you to share a risk, not offers knowledge. He doesn't say, "I know," he says, "I believe and invite you to take a risk too." But then: to invite risk, you need to define what it is and what's at stake. If you don't know what you're offering, you're irresponsible (you're not riskingyou're just enticing). If you know, you've once again moved from faith to knowledge and lost the right to call it faith.
The preacher sacrifices himself for others: He risks being misunderstood, rejected, despised he sacrifices himself, like Abraham. But Abraham's sacrifice isn't public. Abraham doesn't prove, explain, or teach. He simply acts contrary. The preacher, on the other hand, is on stage, in a position of authority, explaining the "meaning" of sacrifice, although true sacrifice is something else entirely, isn't it? After all, salvation is individual. The preacher cannot take on someone else's faith, someone else's guilt, someone else's risk, or someone else's responsibility. Therefore, the preacher sacrifices nothing but his own comfort or status.
And here's another thing. The preacher simply loves. He asserts: I want others to be saved, too. After all, is it wrong to wish for others to be saved? Doesn't love justify preaching? But love doesn't guarantee the right to interfere in someone else's destiny. Salvation, after all, cannot be recommended; it cannot be imposed. Otherwise, we fall into the same trap: the preacher "knows" that salvation is good and that this is the path to it. That is, he no longer believes, but asserts.
If the preacher is simply trying to score missionary points with the Almighty , then things are even worse.
Hence, I conclude that talking about faith means abandoning it. As soon as you try to convey faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature. According to Kierkegaard, the only true preacher is the one who lives faith in silence.
Comments (122)
Ive been thinking about faith recently. It certainly isnt something that gets a lot of respect here on the forum. The forum is full of people who consider themselves rational and that consideration leads them to atheism. They tend to be condescending and contemptuous of people who profess faith. As Ive come to see it, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of what faith means.
Those who have read my posts here on the forum know I have a strong interest in Taoism. I think faith is similar to what Taoists call Te, which is sometimes translated as intrinsic virtuosity and which I sometimes think of as our true natures, our hearts. This is a quote from Ziporyns translation of the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi). Ive used it many times here on the forum.
Quoting Astorre
I dont know much about preaching or how preachers see their vocation, but this description doesnt seem right to me. I dont think saying Heres what Ive experienced. You can pay attention and see what you find, experience, inside yourself is necessarily an instruction. Someone may show you a path, but you have to walk it yourself.
Thank you for your comment. Indeed, after the first reading, that's how it seems, so I'd like to clarify my idea.
When someone sends us a directive, an imperative, or a command to act, it's not limited to a simple act of coercionwithin any command lies a context: I'm telling you what to do and accepting responsibility for it. For example: a mother tells her child to wipe his nose (the mother is willing to accept the consequences of the wrong decision to wipe his nose), or a manager tells a subordinate exactly how to sell (the manager accepts the risk that if their subordinate follows their instructions and it doesn't work), or a state proclaiming an ideology (the sovereign is responsible and accepts the consequences of the ideology's failure). Any act of affirmation carries responsibility. When you say, "You must do X," if you're not willing to share the consequences of doing X with those you're addressing, you're simply a windbag or a demagogue. But if you say, "Guys, do A, because if it doesn't work, I'll compensate you for all the losses you incur (and that's how it will be)"that's a whole other level of responsibility.
I was drawn to this topic by conversations with so-called preachers (not necessarily Christian ones, but any kind). They say, "You must do this, because I'm a wise man and have learned the truth." When you ask, "What if I do this and it doesn't work?" Silence ensues, or something like, "That means you didn't do what I told you to do/you didn't believe/you weren't chosen."
Of course, the topic seems somewhat provocative, but it's certainly no less interesting to think about than the Sleeping Beauty problem or the problem of blue-eyed people on an island. I think the topic is at least thought-provoking.
Quoting Astorre
The salvation cult sounds more evangelical than Christianity per se. Liberal churches that do not follow Fundamentalist dogama generally do not emphasize this. I got through ten years of Baptist Christianity with almost no mention of any need to be saved.
Episcopal (Anglican) Bishop John Shelby Spong puts it like this:
Please share: do you see the "preacher's paradox" or do you think it doesn't exist?
Perhaps I'm proposing too rigid a dichotomy?
No, I don't think it matters.
I never liked this and I felt it was wrong, which I now expressed with the help of arguments in this post.
Quoting Tom Storm
This approach seems clearly preferable to me, as I wrote above:
Quoting Astorre
I truly believe that each person's personal faith is not a place for debate or philosophical argument. But please consider what I've written as a discussion of the structure built upon faith. That is, the object of study is not faith, but preaching.
Here is a more detailed explanation if I understood your question correctly
Quoting Astorre
Ive never encountered preachers who say, You must do X. I would imagine those are fairly simple types. You may be referring to the Fundamentalist Preachers Dilemma. I dont take fundamentalism seriously as a form of credible spirituality. And I say this as a nihilist... :wink:
I anticipated this objection:
Quoting Astorre
But I concede it isn't hard to find monstrous literalists - they are out there too.
Of course this is how it works. Preaching, teaching, mentoring, advising -- these all make for one-way relationships where the whole and sole responsibility is on the student/underling.
There are self-help books that state in a disclaimer right at the beginning of the book that the author and the publisher are not in any way responsible for what happens to the person if the person should choose to follow the advice given in the book.
I think it's a naive and idealistic to pose such a dichotomy.
Most people, and especially religious/spiritual types, hold a stance like this: "If you don't see things the way I do, you're blind/stupid/evil (and deserve to be destroyed)". And that's it, end of story.
Oh? Or maybe you fail to notice their authoritarianism?
Oh? Or maybe you see authoritarianism everywhere?
Oh, here's where I'm ready to intervene and responsibly state: authoritarianism, unlike liberalism, dictates how to act and what to do, but it also doesn't shirk responsibility (for example, a mother to her son or a teacher to a student). In this case, the preacher is considered a pure liberal by me. He says, "I'm affirming this, and you have the right to follow through or not, but the responsibility is yours." So, authoritarianism in its pure form doesn't deserve to be labeled as all the "bad things" it can do.
Then I wouldn't see it at all, as there'd be nothing to contrast it against. If everything is orange, you can't tell it's orange.
What exactly does that look like when authoritarianism takes responsibility? In that it punishes, ostracizes, imprisons, or kills those who fail to live up to the set standards?
In other words, a one-way relationship, a one-way responsibility.
This doesn't sound right, not at all.
Note how preaching to outsiders is not common to all religions; only the expansive religions (such as Christianity and Islam) preach to outsiders. Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, for example, do normally not preach to outsiders.
And when it comes to a religous teacher speaking to his ingroup, to the members of his religion, this is actually just a repetition of already learned material (or material that was supposed to be learned already). Such sermons, and insofar there is any conversation with the members of the congregation, such conversations, follow the Socratic method: the conclusion is known and accepted by all participants at the onset, only the steps to that conclusion are rehearsed. The ingroup doesn't need to yet be persuaded; it goes without saying that they have already accepted the religious tenets, or else they wouldn't be there in the pew at all.
As for preaching to outsiders: I never got the impression that the preacher is trying to "evoke faith" in me, much less trying to convince me to "accept something illogical, unprovable, and inexpressible". Not even remotely. In the best case scenario, I think they were "just doing their job of preaching" and I was entirely irrelevant to it. Iinstead of me, a carboard box might be there, and it would make no difference to them. In the more frequent scenario the preacher expressed his gloating over my eternal demise.
Quoting baker
You're obviously confusing authoritarianism with totalitarianism. Authoritarianism is when your dad punches you in the face if you steal your neighbor's bike (even though no one saw you). Totalitarianism is when you're a masterless slave, toiling in a quarry for eating an apple that fell off a passing truck. Kind of like a child taken into foster care by someone else for welfare.
When your dad punches you in the face, he's your opinion leader and your teacher, enforcing good manners and holding you accountable for your obligations. In the second case (totalitarianism), you're not even a slave, just expendable material.
I understand the audience I'm discussing with, so I'm explaining the ideas step by step.
So, that preacher who, smiling sweetly, sells you something he "knows" or doesn't believe is a liberal (in the classic sense, he does this to earn missionary points or just money without any responsibility). He's not the father who will pay your bills.
This resonates perfectly with Kierkegaard: Faith is a personal act. Faith is silent.
You subtly distinguish expansive preaching from intra-denominational preaching, and that's a great addition. The idea of ??the post is to identify the preacher's paradox in an expansive religion/belief. I think this is an excellent clarification. But I'd like to identify the paradox without reference to labels, but to the preaching of faith as such (no matter what it is, even belief in aliens).
A lot of Kierkegaard's testimony takes the form of an intervention. Philosophical Fragments counterposes the Socratic view of 'recollection' that says we have the grounds for knowing truth within us to the Christian view that the condition for knowing truth must be given to us. That follows Pascal who said that Christianity is a scandal for reason but closer to the truth of the human condition than what reason provides.
The Concept of Anxiety lays out how that difference relates to a person's experience through a contrast between original sin and the emergence of an individual through their sins. By this means, he draws the limits of psychology and the beginning of the theological.
Works of Love is one very long sermon on the difference between Christian love and every other kind.
I don't know how that relates to your paradox, but Soren K definitely intended to turn over tables in the temple.
Well, Im not convinced that you dont see orange everywhere. But let's not speak in code; my point is you tend to frame most ideas in a negative light, with a focus on what you see as abuses of power. And when others have a different perspective, you seem to need to paint them as wrong or deluded. An example is when you responded to my point with:
Quoting baker
You may not have been going for smug or patronising, but it could be read this way.
So given your response above about seeing "orange" I could use the same device. If I can identify authoritarianism, then presumably I can identify when it isn't there too.
But none of this really matters, right?
Do you think it is impossible for a Christian preacher to be non-authoritarian in their approach?
Quoting Astorre
What? Are you going for hyperbole and farce here? I dont know about your dad, but its perfectly possible to be an authoritarian parent without violence. And this definition of totalitarianism seems way off the mark. Why did you choose these examples?
A totalitarian parent or government would be one that seeks control over every aspect of a childs/person's life; use of time, interests, friends, and who uses guilt and emotional manipulation to gain total submission.
An authoritarian parent represents a somewhat milder version of this, emphasizing discipline, order, and compliance. Authoritarian approaches exist on a continuum, and some may even involve the use of violence.
Quoting Astorre
Isn't Kierkegaard just another person with a view on faith? I'm interested in why this matters. This point, and the accompanying paradox, seem important to you, but it doesn't resonate with me. So I'm curious about the gap
Are you a Christian?
As I said, I am not familiar with preachers or preaching of any sort beyond what Ive seen in church when I was a kid. I guess all I would say is that it doesnt have to be the way you described, even if it often is. Thats certainly not the way Lao Tzu, purportedly one of the founders of Taoism, did it in the Tao Te Ching.
Quoting Astorre
I agree.
Of course, Tom, that's a gross exaggeration. I probably expressed myself in a way that was taken too literally. But here's the thing, and I've written about this before. Aggression is always a form of oppression. I'm not trying to justify it. The idea was that the parent's aggression stems from their responsibility for the child's fate, not from coercion for their own benefit. That was a significant emotional exaggeration. We discussed this at length in another thread, but honestly, I don't want to return to it here.
I hope you understood me correctly.
My personal beliefs, with your permission, I prefer to leave in silence.
We've previously discussed the ethical aspects of guiding directives (you might remember in the context of rescuing a suicide), and I generally understand your position.
In this thread, the question seems to be: is it ethical to propagate something you don't fully understand or something you believe in without foundation (for example, if you've simply been brainwashed). A "preacher" in this context isn't necessarily an imaginary priest of some church, but anyone who advocates something.
I can accept that you were using hyperbole; it just seemed out of context.
Quoting Astorre
So you're saying that this thread is about whether its morally acceptable to promote or advocate for ideas that you dont really understand or cant justify rationally?
Thats certainly not what I thought the paradox was about. Yes, I think its acceptable to promote or advocate ideas you dont fully understand or cant justify rationally. Most people do so regularly, whether its their advocacy of climate change action, democracy, religion, or world peace. :wink: I don't think it's primarily a moral question, it's more a question of insight and wisdom. In life I don't take it for granted that anyone knows what they are talking about... me included.
Excellent. Now add a layer of responsibility: promoting something you're unsure of, you don't know the consequences, and you shift all the responsibility for following you onto the follower.
I'll try to explain what "faith" is in Kierkegaard's understanding, as best I can.
So, let's say there is "knowledge"that which is confirmed by experience or logic and meets the criterion of "sufficient reason." Doubt is eliminated by logic, experience, fact, and rational certainty. For example, "The sun is shining."
Belief is something that is at least somewhat confirmed by experience and logic and provides grounds for asserting that something will happen as you believe: for example, "The sun will rise tomorrow."
Faith is absurd, a belief contrary to reason. That which cannot be proven and even contradicts reason. Doubt is not eliminated, but accepted. Because the transcendent is something completely different, inaccessible to human reason.
If the existence of the Transcendent could be proven, faith would be meaningless.
For example, "If God stood before me as an object of knowledge, I would not believe, but simply know." But precisely because He cannot be proven, faith is possible."
That is, faith is not "weak knowledge," but the highest form of existence,
in which a person enters into a direct relationship with the Transcendent, without intermediariesneither logic nor morality.
Im not convinced thats how it works. Youre not including the ineffable (the sense of the numinous), the importance of which can only be conveyed without any inherent expertise. I think its perfectly acceptable for a believer in God to say that the truth ultimately lies not with him but with God, and through following a path and that all he (the preacher) can do is point in the right direction. To have a strong intuition and vocation, not to mention faith that this is the right way, is enough. And as weve already discussed, there are many types of preachers, and not all of them claim to represent divine authority or have definitive answers.
Now bear in mind I am an atheist and have no special fondness for religion or faith.
and yet, you defend these views well. Have you ever thought about the possibility that, deep down, you are either a latent believer or a dormant believer? :smile:
Indeed, it is a necessity for developing a relationship with the transcendent.
If God (gods) were to appear before us, how would we know that it was God? Would he(or she) say I am God and we would believe it and know it to be true? Would he give us a sign, of his power, such that we know it to be true? How would we confirm that it really is God and not some hallucination, or imposter?*
Perhaps we would recognise God, this presumes that we have already formed an image, or idea of God. Something that we have developed a faith in. But what if this image doesnt match the God before us? Does our strength of faith carry us past this doubt, until we can accept God?
Or perhaps a part of us is God, that we have nurtured through faith. That this part of us which is already God, reaches out to the God before us, that we know intimately in good faith that we are encountering God.
* There is a logical argument that it is impossible to know, or recognise God intellectually.
No. But I think youre asking that because you cant conceive of how my response could be rational, and so you assume it must belong to the realm of magical thinking. :wink:
No, rather, the point is that I've met many people who call themselves believers who don't possess even the slightest degree of the ethicality that permeates every one of your answers.
The average person, unable to justify ethics other than through religious imperatives, is nowhere near as honest. But you, calling yourself an atheist, therefore have reasonable ethical foundations. Now I'll ask you to provide them, as they are very valuable to me.
Here's the thing: by creating any image of God in our heads, we're trying to fit something into our heads that's incomprehensible, a priori. This is convenient for us, since it corresponds to our ways of knowing everything. But in this case, we're dealing with something that's impossible to fit into our heads, to know, or to create an image of. Feeling, experiencing, and sensingI think it's possible.
And perhaps people are a bit confused here: after all, red is impossible to describe, but it can be imagined. God, however, is impossible to imagine, describe, or comprehend.
I'm inclined to believe that if we meet Him, we'll certainly recognize Him.
??
Not at all.
It's not possible to convert to traditional Judaism or Hinduism; one has to be born into those religions in order to be a member. For them, neither the notion of conversion nor the notion of preaching to outsiders exist.
In Buddhism, conversion is possible, but they preach only to the person who comes kneeling to them begging for instruction.
I know religious/spiritual people who would comment to you along the lines of, "Why should I pretend not to know when I do know? Just to spare your fragile ego? No, I'm not going to do that!"
That's your projection.
I've always talked about the *uses* of power. But somehow, the Western PC discourse rules out any talk of power, as if any talk about power is talk about the abuse of power. The politically correct vastly underrate (or deny) how much in life is actually about power.
And "negative" is another word used by Pollyannas -- and the poltiically correct -- to denote an absence of the naiveté they so keenly exhibit.
IIRC, we've had this conversation before. I went to some lenghts to describe authoritarianism to you, and was surprised that you don't notice it. I assumed that working in the field of mental health, you'd surely had some seminars on the topic, especially on the modes of communication. Alas ...
As long as they teach Christian doctrine, they can't be anything other than authoritarian. Because Christianity is based on an argument from power, it can only be authoritarian.
It really doesn't help if the first thing people imagine upon hearing "authoritarian" is Stalin or Mao or Hitler. Authoritarianism is very common, it's the mode in which most people operate every day. Just because they don't go around killing, raping, and pillaging doesn't mean they're not authoritarian.
Not necessarily. They can be totally chaotic and still authoritarian.
Dermanding compliance is key. Seeing oneself as above the other person, as the authority over the other person is what makes one authoritarian. External expressions can very greatly.
I dont think this is accurate. Isnt the discourse of power one of the most common topics in Western PC circles? Isnt that exactly what theyre often satirised for: the Foucauldian obsession with power?
Quoting baker
This feels more like a personal attack, with a passive-aggressive flourish. Alas... really? Youd surely had some seminars? I dont understand why you need to make such snide comments.
As I said, Ive experienced some Christian preachers who do not evoke a discourse of power. What you describe isnt present in any "modes of communication". Your comment, was surprised you dont notice it seems more like a jibe.
Quoting baker
Say more about that, since the opposite is the more common argument. And yes, before you say anything, Im well aware of the history of Christianity. Im more interested in your idea that theres no possibility Christianity can be anything but authoritarian.
I think Kierkegaard is quite useless here. A hopeless romantic. That's not how religious discourse works.
Quoting Astorre
But by then it will be too late. Failure to choose the right religion while there was still time results in eternal damnation.
People do this all the time. Some do it under the motto "Fake it 'till you make it" or "We learn best by teaching others".
I don't think it's ethical, but it's not like there is a galactic court with which I could file my complaint.
I've been around long enough to have witnessed some very let's call that "vocal" preachers fall away from what they preached. A Buddhist monk who preached in a fire-and-brimstone mode and then a few years later disrobed. Another one who committed suicide. A Christian preacher who eagerly threatend me with eternal damnation, but who, after some back-and-forth, said, "But I'm a seeker just like you".
Then the more secular examples, like Marie Kondo.
Such incidents left me with a bitter taste. Many of these preachers have directed so much hatred and contempt at those they preached to -- and for what?
Such a discussion of power is a way to distract from the actual power issues.
It's factual. If you had read any of the links I provided earlier, you'd see.
It's the you-mode of talking that is auhoritarian. I've referred to this many times, many times.
"You've got to do right by God, and you've got to do it while you're still alive, or you will burn in hell for all eternity."
This is the essence of Christianity. Sure, some people call that "love" -- after all, God is giving you an out even though you deserve to burn just for being born.
Someone like Pope Francis might seem like an all-round nice guy, but he still believed, and preached, eternal damnation for everyone who doesn't live up to the RCC's standards.
And Christian preachers from other Christian denominations preach the same, just in favor of their own respective denomination.
How so?
Quoting baker
Like the comments presented by baker when arguing?
Quoting baker
Quoting baker
Quoting baker
But I think you're trying to argue that when you do it it's philosophical and factual...
Quoting baker
I didn't mention any popes and do not think of Francis as a good guy, just a better pope.
Quoting baker
Didn't Jesus preach such things too? Isn't one problem here the notion that there may be a God who is a thug and a bully? If this is the case, then those hellfire preachers are correct and tough shit, baker, we're all fucked when we die if we didn't worship this thing in the right way. And your inadequate human understandings of power or justice matter not a jot...
But I still maintain that I have encountered preachers who do not appear to peddle authoritarian ideas; their God is ineffable, with no hell or banishment and no single, right way to worship or be a person.
So where does this leave you? What are your conclusions?
I think many of us have seen all of the above and worse. For several decades now, I've argued that, for the most part, people interested in pursuing religion, spirituality, and higher consciousness are as flawed, careless, and ambitious as any other group of people. And the Buddhists I have known are as bungled as of them, with substance abuse, violence, and dysfunctional behaviors.
None of this tells us whether their beliefs are true or not.
Given what you say, where do you think you could find a source of benign, non-authoritarian people who meet your standards?
As I noted above, you're confusing authoritarianism with totalitarianism.
And here's the thing: it seems that for people within the Western metadiscourse paradigm, authoritarianism and totalitarianism are synonymous. They both connote something "vile" and "contrary" to the values ??of liberalism.
I'm not talking about you now, since I have no idea who you are, where you're from, or what your views are. But you've given me an interesting thought. Thank you.
Not to me, though. I think liberalism is both authoritarian and totalitarian in its own ways, and even worse, because it adds insult to injury (liberal rights and freedoms exist only on paper).
My issue with religion/spirituality (which, yes, I think are necessarily authoritarian) is that their picture is *not* on the money. That is, I think it would be far better if there would be a state religion, an official religion obligatory to all citizens of a jurisdiction and that the state religion would make sure that every child who is born there is automatically accepted into the religion. (I think "religious freedom" is problematic in so many ways.)
Instead, what is happening, especially in "free" and "democratic" nations is that religions fight for supremacy, all the while insisting on a separation of church and state (which is actually a religious idea and benefits the religions the most), and people who aren't by birth members of any religion are blackmailed by religions from all directions.
That we should push the religious/spiritual to sort things out amongst themselves, until only one religion/spirituality is left.
I'm inclined to think that the whole point of religion/spirituality is the pursuit of wealth, health, and power.
I'm not looking for "benign, non-authoritarian". If anything, I want people who are straightforward and can be relied on.
Because they focus on some obvious and egregious point, which then allows many everyday uses of power go completely unnoticed and taboo to discuss.
You didn't read the link, did you?
Of course he's a thug and a bully. The question is only which thug and bully we're supposed to devote ourselves to!!
And yet some people have figured it out which god is the right one. Don't you want to be one of those people?
Sure. But reading, for example, Meister Eckhart or Hildegard von Bingen while not having first been baptized and confirmed into a church is like not even having completed elementary school but going to the application office at a university and demanding to be enrolled into a PhD program.
And I'm sure Eckhart and Hildegard are turning in their graves when someone who is not even baptized into the RCC reads their texts.
Faith is always pitted in opposition to knowledge, such that acts based on faith are committed without reason, and only acts based on knowledge can be directly tied to reason.
On that view of things, I can see the preachers paradox. How does someone persuade about the logically, knowingly unpersuasive?
But I dont view faith or knowledge so narrowly.
(Remove the religious baggage. Forget God and religious faith for just a moment.)
Assume for sake of argument that knowledge is something like justified true belief.
Belief is an ingredient in knowledge.
We all know that certain knowledge is aspirational. We all know that we know nothing certain. So, we should always qualify our knowledge claims with at least that is what I believe to be the case. All scientific knowledge is subject to future falsification.
So then, what is faith?
Faith is what you live by. Faith is the knowledge you will testify to, knowing sufficiently to act upon. What you believe or have faith in is found when you are finished gathering evidence, finished reasoning about it, testing it, finished hearing others opinions, and then, finished with that process, you finally decide in faith to act, to believe, to say this is the best of my knowledge and belief. This is why faith is equated with a leap. Faith underwrites action. Faith bridges knowledge and action, driving acts of judgement and conclusions of understanding, where reasoning is no longer in focus.
Like when someone says they believe the pyramids were not built by Egyptians (continuing to keep God out of this). Two people see all of the same evidence. One uses reason to conclude that people did build them, and the other uses reason to conclude people could not have built them. To the one who believes people did build the pyramids, the moment he concludes this, he no longer needs to gather evidence, or apply reason to new evidence, or provide theories to explain evidence - hes done. He believes now. Egyptians built the pyramids. This is an assertion of what he believes, of what he has faith in. Egyptians built the pyramids. So in faith, his action is to rest on what he now believes to be the case, to stop doing any more science, to stop seeking more knowledge and evidence and just believe in what he now already knows. Whereas the other person, in faith, must continue to seek evidence, continue to apply reasoning and logic in order to develop theories (of aliens, or ancient lost civilizations).
But faith is the immediate ground upon which both men either assert knowledge about the Egyptians, or keep digging based on what they know and find wanting further evidence and reasoning. (And if some kook concluded on the available evidence that aliens built the pyramids, I find evidence of a kook, but thats just my belief )
Believing begins where reasoning and knowing are finished, and we instead judge, we understand, and we act.
So faith is immediately underneath every single act. We step out into traffic on faith that we can tell how to safely cross the street, not because our knowledge demands safety is certain.
So the preacher talking about God merely introduces new evidence, and applies the same, one and only logic that all minds must apply, and draws conclusions subject to the same analysis, to demonstrate what he believes.
The difference between the preacher and the scientist is what counts as evidence.
The preacher can say, it is impossible for any heavy animal to walk on water or rise from three days of death. But there was this guy who did it, witnessed by many, etc . Using this impossible testimony as evidence, logically it might be believable to listen to this guy when he says the guy who raised after death is God.
The difference between what religious faith is and what scientific knowledge is has to do with what justification is employed. Its not a difference that creates this preachers paradox. The preacher has to remain logical and provide evidence and make knowledge claims, just like any other person who seeks to communicate with other people and persuade them.
So really, there is no difference in the mind between a religious belief and a scientific belief - these are objects someone knows. They are both knowledge. The difference has to do with what counts as evidence, and the timing of when one judges enough evidence and logic have been gathered and applied, and it is time to assert belief and to act.
Dont get me wrong, religious belief can be insane. Scientific belief is much safer, especially if your goal is to cross the street.
The key question all must ask regarding faith is not, do I act on faith, or do I act on reason and knowledge? No. The question of faith is simply: what (or who) do I believe in? All acts only occur because of a choice to believe it is time to act.
I dont think this contradicts Kierkegaard as much as it sounds like it does on its face.
Quoting Astorre
No. The above is true of an act based on faith. The leap is an act. A act of faith is not knowledge. But faith itself is conviction. Faith itself is judgment, or the belief in knowledge is justified true belief.
This is, as usual, rough and cursory because I am not in graduate school - offered for your more thoughtful and discerning consideration.
This is a wonderful answer (I'm just emotional right now), and frankly, I expected something like this when I started this thread. Give me a couple of days to think about everything you've written. Thank you so much.
:up:
This is similar to my thoughts, but since I had already written this earlier, I'll share?
Quoting Astorre
I was reading Peter Harrison's "Some New World" recently, another genealogy of modernity, and one of his early chapters is on the radical changes in epistemic terminology due to the theological controversies that ended up driving the creation as the secular/naturalist/empiricist/exclusive humanist paradigm that emerges, as he has it, as an evolution of Christian theology (as opposed to a rejection of theology; others, Taylor, Milbank, etc. have made this same point).
Three changes are particularly important. "Natural versus supernatural" emerges as a new distinction. "Faith" is redefined from something like "trust," and at a deeper level, a sort of positive illumination (one inclusive of knowledge) to a something like "belief in the absence of knowledge."
Of course, part of the reason faith must now be "belief without knowledge" is because knowledge also gets redefined. It becomes something more like "justified true belief," as opposed to "the mind's grasp of being," and "justification" itself radically changes its meaning. To quote an earlier thread:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
These are all connected though. The idea of a wholly isolated and self-contained nature is also paired with a denial of any sort of contemplative knowledge, and eventually a denial that reason has any direct access to being (which leads towards reason becoming wholly instrumental and procedural, a computer).
My point in bringing this up?
What exactly doesn't Saint Paul know after being struck blind on the road to Damascus, being gathered up to the Third Heaven, etc? What doesn't Ezekiel know, or Abraham? For them, any doubt certainly isn't framed in terms of Kierkegaard's dialectic of the subjective and objective, with the later denoting an empirical consensus space centered around mechanistic, purposeless world where God is absent except as a "transcendent" force reaching in. So, what exactly do they doubt?
It seems to me that they might have claims to knowledge. That doesn't mean they are correct or that they lack doubts. However, their doubts might be different from our doubts if we inhabit the "closed world" of natura pura. At any rate, this "risk of being wrong" isn't particularly unique to religion.
For instance:
Quoting Astorre
This happens with fitness gurus all the time. Yet we normally don't think of "how to gain muscle" or "how to bench press more" as questions of faith. The same sort of thing might happen with creative writing, relationship advice, etc.
The modern Western retooling of epistemology tends to wholly exclude contemplative knowledge, which is a core part of all pre-modern philosophy (Eastern even more than Western even). This affects religion more than other areas, but it also affects how the physical world is viewed, aesthetics, politics, ethics, etc. These all risk becoming areas of "faith" because they aren't open to becoming a sort of reliable techne that justifies and objectifies itself in regular, reliable use. However, as the scientific anti-realists argue, this applies just as much to scientific theory (as opposed to technology).
Afterall, while the elimination of contemplative knowledge was originally argued for on the grounds that people who appeal to it contradict one another, it seems to be a fact of history by this point that empiricism and instrumental reason have led to no more agreement in the relevant areas. Nor have modern ideologies (fascism, communism, liberalism) been particularly less violent or assertive in their dogmas. Indeed, arguably Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity, in at least many traditional forms, agree on more of importance than post-Enlightenment thought (which of course, has many strands that wholly deny value any true reality, or truth, etc.).
I think the paradox arises more from what Charles Taylor calls the "closed world system:"
I will just add to the Taylor quote that what is missing is any notion that such virtues need to be cultivated. They are generally considered to be automatic. They don't require praxis or cultivation. Kant's formal freedom is always there for all. There is no "knowing by becoming" or conformity to being required. Likewise, these virtues don't seem like they should rule out contemplative knowledge, but other axioms do rule it out.
And this is how you get your tough questions for the preacher. "I did the formula, I said the rosaries, or sat on the mountaintop, etc. But the procedure didn't work. If the procedure didn't work, it is bunk, or at least ineffective for me." Such an objection is, where techne is the gold standard for knowledge, absolutely fatal (although perhaps it can be overcome if there is evidence that the "procedure" works for enough people). Yet the counterpoint from the preacher or sage is likely to be that the "procedure" is mere supporting praxis, and that one ought not expect it to work like a course of antibiotics, or changing a light bulb.
No. I seem to be incapable of believing in any god variations. So 'right one' is not on my radar. Its probably a matter of disposition. Are you a theist?
Quoting baker
Im not sure what this means. A fight to the death until only one theism is left standing? Or a battle over first principles until only one belief system has survived scrutiny? How does this work in your view? And if one religion or spirituality remains, are you saying that this one represents the truth, or merely that it's the one that survived? And what if there are multiple paths and spiritual truths and the human urge for simplifications and reductions not applicable?
quote="baker;1018093"]I'm inclined to think that the whole point of religion/spirituality is the pursuit of wealth, health, and power.[/quote]
All spirituality? Including the aforementioned Meister Eckhart or Hildegard von Bingen?
Quoting baker
Do you mean that you prefer people who arent hypocrites and are predictable, so that if theyre bad, its all out in the open?
Quoting baker
I read the I-message statement link. I also attended a seminar on this.
Quoting Astorre
Quoting Astorre
I think the idea that the preacher testifies is essentially correct. How does Moses preach in a fundamental way? By the light of his face, which reflects the light of God. He covers it to protect those who are dazed by it, but the covering still attests to Moses' stature.
God shines into the world. He shines in Moses' face, in prayer, in sacrament, in truth, in argumentation, in rhetoric... There is no box that can protect its contents from God's light. The idea that faith is simply incommunicable is a false form of apophaticism. "Faith is incommunicable, therefore God cannot communicate through faith," would be a false inference. Faith is incommunicable in a certain sense, but the one who thinks he understands faith so well that he can limits its bounds and its communication is engaged in a form of (apophatic) idolatry. The temptation is to try to encompass faith, both by excluding it from certain spheres and by attempting to comprehend its mechanism.
Quoting Astorre
Why not?
Quoting Astorre
So long as the recipient understands that the conveyance of faith is only a shadow and a sign, there is no danger.
As an example, I'll give a few hypothetical judgments:
1. The Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful because I've seen it.
2. The Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful because I imagine it.
3. The Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful because everyone says so.
4. The Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful because Michelangelo worked on it.
5. The Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful because it encompasses diverse themes, has a harmonious color palette, and is thought-provoking.
Question: Which of these judgments conveys the speaker's belief that the Sistine Chapel ceiling is beautiful, or proves it? The answer is neither. In reality, a representative of a non-Christian religion, for example, could enter the chapel and not like the ceiling at all. Language is incapable of exhaustively expressing subjective experience: "What cannot be spoken of, one must remain silent about." Preaching (especially expansive preaching) is about instilling an idea, igniting an inner fire so that the listener can then find confirmation or experience it for themselves.
And here a paradox arises: infecting another person with an idea you don't fully understand yourself, or are naively convinced of, without sharing the responsibility for following it, seems unethical. This lies in the content of the opening message of this thread.
Quoting Leontiskos
If they understand it, they probably don't believe it.
I keep trying to agree with this, but I cant. :wink:
The argument assumes that fully understanding an idea is a moral prerequisite for sharing it. Isn't it the case that human communication and learning relies precisely on partial understanding and the exchange of ideas that are still not fully formed?
I also wonder how you can successfully infect another if you dont have the germ of an idea in the first place (forgive the pun).
As I said earlier, much education and exchange of ideas happens precisely this way; through the sharing of incompletely understood notions.
Morality itself seems a good example. Most of us learn to do and not to do certain things without having a fully articulated sense of right and wrong, and without being properly explained why a given thing is right or is wrong. The lessons arent any less useful simply because theyre incompletely understood by our parents or teachers.
I hold any number of beliefs and views that I dont fully understand, but that doesnt make them any less useful.
(fixed typo)
Excellent! This is a source of fertile discussion.
Quoting Tom Storm
It's all logical; this rhetorical technique is called "reduction to absurdity." The point is: remember the example of the father and son with the stolen bicycle? Responsibility. That's the point! Teach me whatever you want, I'm willing to do it, but compensate me for all the risks of negative consequences of following your teaching.
The exchange of ideas between people is something entirely different: for example, between you and me. It's the engine of progress. But there's a different nuance: we exchange premises (often with a note of subjectivity) and don't insist on the truth of our ideas or judgments. Although, of course, there are people who completely understand this world and do nothing but share their truth with everyone and know how everyone should live (but we also consider such behavior unethical, don't we?)
Not necessarily incomprehensible, but perhaps alien. So different that it just doesnt make sense, or seem sensible to even consider it to be the truth.
What Im getting at is that we in this world dont have the apparatus, the mental language to know God. So that when God presents him/herself to us. We do not know him, recognise him, accept him as who he says he is. That if we did have the apparatus, it would not be incomprehensible at all. It would be just like meeting an old friend.
Yes, something we know through our body, not our heads.
Unless one is already acquainted with him, like how one knows an old friend.
This is the dilemma Im pointing out in my response. We might know him, but deny him, or find ourselves to be blind to him. If we analyse what is being described in the bible. Interesting things are being described in ways which indicate something not normally known about in our day to day lives. So when God arrives, all the creatures of the world lift their heads, turn to him and say his name;
Then I heard every creature in heaven and on earth and under the earth and on the sea, and all that is in them, saying: To him who sits on the throne and to the Lamb be praise and honor and glory and power, for ever and ever
(Revelation 5:13)*
This is interesting because it suggests that the currency of language when God is present is the same for all animals and primitive animals who dont have the apparatus to speak, or to know, do speak and do know, in that moment. That wherever on the planet they are, they see him instantaneously and respond in chorus. This tells us that God presents through the heart of being of all creatures (I would include plants as well), instantaneously. So we would know him and would respond in a transcendent, transformative way (creatures would speak, who could not speak).
That when God is present, we and all creatures are hosted (lifted up into heaven) and see through this revelation, God in heaven.
*new international version.
You and I have quite similar ideas, apparently. I can only add to this from Kierkegaard: faith is silent.
I encountered the preacher's paradox in my everyday life. It concerns my children. Should I tell them what I know about religion myself, take them to church, convince them, or leave it up to them, or perhaps avoid religious topics altogether?
I don't know the right way. I don't know anyone who knows. I'm the father. I'm responsible for them (that's my conviction).
I think this is the same error, but with beauty instead of faith. So we could take my claim and replace "faith" with "beauty": "The temptation is to try to encompass [beauty], both by excluding it from certain spheres and by attempting to comprehend its mechanism." To have the presupposition that one can exhaustively delineate and comprehend things like faith or beauty is to already have failed.
Quoting Astorre
False. And self-contradicting, by the way.
Quoting Astorre
And, "So long as the recipient understands that the conveyance of faith is only a shadow and a sign, there is no danger." But the idea that faith is only a subjective experience is another example of the overconfident delineation of faith.
Quoting Astorre
"Infecting" is an interesting choice of word, no? Petitio principii?
Communicating supernatural faith is communicating something that transcends you and your understanding. If someone thinks that it is impossible or unethical to communicate something that transcends you and your understanding, then what they are really doing is denying the object of faith, God. They don't think God exists, or they don't think faith in God can or should be intended via preaching because they don't think faith is sown that way. I think the whole position is based on some false assumptions.
Preaching is a bit like introducing someone to a friend, to a living reality. The idea that one cannot introduce someone to a friend unless they have a comprehensive knowledge of the friend and the way in which the friend will interact with the listener is quite silly. In this respect Kierkegaard is a Cartesian or a Hegelian in spite of himself. His attempted inversion of such systems has itself become captured by the larger net of those systems. The religious rationalist knows exactly what faith is and how to delineate it, and Kierkegaard in his opposition denies the rationalist claims, but in fact also arrives at the point where he is able to delineate faith with perfect precision. The only difference is that Kierkegaard knows exactly what faith isn't instead of what it is. Yet such a punctuated negation is, again, a false form of apophaticism - a kind of false humility.
But is the problem preaching, or is it a particular kind of preaching? Someone whose preaching attempts to connect someone with something that is dead (such as an idea) instead of something that is living (such as a friend or God) will fall into the incoherences that the OP points up. But not all preaching is like that. If someone tries to persuade others to believe things that one cannot be persuaded to believe, then their approach is incoherent. But not all preaching is of that kind.
I've already realized that your judgments are rooted in emotion, but asserting something false requires the speaker to possess the truth.
The ideas I've presented are a somewhat in-depth discussion of Kierkegaard (as I understand him). However, since you possess the truth, it's my duty to inquire about it. Not in a negative way (that is, through negation), but in a free, positive expression.
So please reveal the truth to us!
The preacher who thinks he has to make his listeners believe something that they cannot be made to believe is faced with a contradiction, yes. But to hold that all preachers think such a thing, and that the contradiction is intrinsic to preaching, is to have made a canard of preaching. Or so I think.
In general I think you need to provide argumentation for your claims, and that too much assertion is occurring. Most of your thesis is being asserted, not argued. For example, the idea that all preachers are trying to make their listeners believe mere ideas is an assertion and not a conclusion. The claim that the preacher is engaged in infecting rather than introducing is another example.
Quoting Astorre
I would suggest giving more credence to the Biblical testimony and the testimony of your Church, and less credence to Kierkegaard's testimony. Faith is something that transcends us, not something we control. It is not something to be curated, either positively or negatively.
Part of the question here is, "Do you want your children to be religious?" Is it permissible to want such a thing?
Well, since you haven't yet reached the point of presenting the truths (you're probably still warming up), it seems entirely reasonable to deepen your criticism.
So, by accusing my topic of unjustified assertions, you've forgotten the interrogative nature of this post. As with all my other posts, by the way. So here, too, I asked, "What do you think of this cut?"as if scalping the object of study. On the other hand, by calling the sermon "infection," I used a very vivid metaphor that perfectly aligns with my convictions: faith develops within a person, but begins with a seed (which enters from outside). And I emphasize this once againfaith develops within the subject!
I'm passing on my other "unproven assertions" as a sharing of my experience, which I always include a footnote to.
I hope you've warmed up and are ready to continue the dialogue in a positive manner?
When it came to my own children I just told them about religion, what its teachings say and what atheists and agnostics say. But didnt reveal my position on the issue, rather just said that it is for each person to arrive at their own position. This seemed sufficient and I didnt talk about it much after we had discussed it enough to have covered what Ive said.
I think cultural context is important here. Where I live, belief in God, or following a religion is very rarely talked about, or raised. There is a general sense of either a soft deism, or soft atheism. With most people never giving it any thought. My approach might have been different were we living in a more religious society.
It's a shame, everything was going so well.
Actually, I want to thank you for your comments. I wanted to take a break to think things over before replying, but my urge to turn up the heat a little got the better of me
This topic is very personal and important to me (as Ive shown above), and I truly appreciate any point of view.
My situation is a little different from yours. My city is at the intersection of cultures, paradigms, and ideas (Chinese approaches, Russian (Christian) narratives, Islamic beliefs, traditional values, blurred by Western individualism in a society where everyone both cares and doesn't care about each other). This explains the many questions I have.
I think it's irresponsible to bring children into this world without first being sure of metaphysical issues first. But what's done is done, so, moving on:
Based on my personal experience, I think it's best for a parent to consider the possible social and economical ramifications for not raising their children in a religious way. If you live in a country/culture where the majority is religious (and it's irrelevant if they are only Sunday saints) and send their children to church, then it's best to do so as well. It's not worth it to be a pioneer. If your particular decisions regarding religion could lead to your children being ostracized and stigmatized, then you need to make other decisions.
If because of this, the religiosity you teach your children seems shallow and worldly, so be it. They can improve on it later, if they have the time and energy and inclination. But right now, they need to train themselves to become socially and economically successful. Because without that, religosity is in vain.
And don't ask the local priest or other religious people where you live for advice. Don't let them know your deepest doubts, fears, concerns. Because this could backfire horribly, for you and for your children.
They can only understand something is "only a shadow and a sign" (or the "finger pointing to the moon") if they also know what it is that casts that shadow and what the sign stands for.
No.
Of course, this is a pipe dream, but yes.
It would be a trial by combat:
The Thirty Years' War and the wars immediately connected to it were a form of large-scale trial by combat. The combatants, Catholics and Protestants, decided to force God to show his hand, with the agreement being that whoever won was right about God, had the right religion. Unfortunately, they ran out of soldiers, and the war was never properly finished to the point where there would be one clear winner.
That's irrelevant. The option that needs to be ruled out is that only one religion is the right one, because this is the most immediately and long-term dangerous one. If only one religion is the right one, then failure to join it on time will have eternal irrepairable consequences. If more religions are right, then it doesn't really matter what we do, and we can just go about our lives as we see fit.
I'm especially wary about people like Eckhart and Hildegard. My experience has consistently been that religious/spiritual people who through their public writings and talks seem especially sensitive, sensible, empathetic are nothing like that in how they actually interact with people. It's like dealing with two different persons.
That can hardly be called a preference.
But it doesn't seem to resonate with you?
As a counterpoint, a book I really love, Robert Wallace's [I]Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present[/I] argues, compellingly I think, that mysticism is a regular part of human experience, and that this is what the "Platonic tradition," rightly understood, is grounded in. Here, "faith" has more to do with loyalty to what is highest in us (including our experience of our own freedom), and trust in beauty, love, and truth that is directly and ubiquitously experienced. And so, part of the role preaching is to merely awaken people to this, and to motivate them to recognize it and live into it.
I just shared part of the introduction so I won't repost it here. I've shared some of the psychological and metaphysical grounding of this claim before.
So, against the "closed world system," where the claims of the "mystic" or preacher are "maximally distal" from what can be known with confidence, Wallace argues that the divine is not only what is more immediate, but also what is most fully real.
Now, with a "preacher" we are normally also talking about someone who is discussing, to at least some degree, revealed religion. Revealed religion is different, since it often involves historical claims and more distal metaphysical claims. But these are normally mixed with claims about this "generally accessible mysticism" and how to develop and live into it (although some religions lose track of this). I think the role of "knowing by becoming" (of which Boethius is such a great example) is an excellent example of how this works in practice. The relevant knowledge is in many cases a sort of self-knowledge.
And indeed, for a lot of theologians the role of revelation, particularly historical, public revelation (as opposed to private), is precisely to elucidate those things not easily accessible by this sort of experience. But faith (trust) in these revelations is supported by the former sort of faith (loyalty); hence "have faith that you might understand " (Isaiah, Augustine, Anselm).
I really love Wallace's book, but I think it also shows the limits of "natural theology." Aside from being unable to meditate disagreements, the larger issue is that, buffeted by skepticism and distraction, it only gets one so far. Particularly in our modern context, it seems like it could easily become a sort of sterile orientation towards the Good/Beautiful/True as mere "conceptual objects," the target of a "limitless desire for goodness" that is nonetheless unattainable, where union is always out of reach. I can think of no better image of this then Dante's Limbo, filled with the righteous Pagans who, though lovers of the Good in the abstract, are forever separated from the object of desire (and it is perhaps better here to take this as an image, and not as a theological statement about the fate of particular souls after death).
Quoting baker
And yet so many religious texts devalue these, and so many key figures eschewed them and gave them up in life.
First, anyone as interested in the truth as you are, and who obviously loves his children enough to consider such big questions, for their sakes, it seems to me you are doing fine by them. (I see God at work already.)
But that is all in the background, and avoids your question.
My experience is somewhat counter-intuitive. I think we risk robbing people of a choice about God and religion when we dont teach them about these things when they are young. Religious faith is an adult decision, for sure, but someone just may never fully consider the option that is God if first seeking to familiarize yourself with God as an adult, and after living so long without God. I still believe God reaches all of us, but the innocence of youth makes a softer ground to first plant the notion of God than the repentance necessary in adulthood makes. Adult informed consent about God is just harder to inform when that adult did not already hear about God since the time he first learned about other important things, like truth and good and knowledge and life and death. It just gets harder to see God as we get older and become entangled with the immediate necessities of life.
I dont think you would be considering these questions of how to present God and religion to your children, if you did not recognize potential good value and truth coming from religion. If you believed in your heart that religion was clearly a net bad, you couldnt have this issue at all. Am I right about that?
You ask Should I tell them what I know? That may depend. What do you know about religion, and what will you tell them? I wouldnt want to encourage you if your idea of religion was of a cult of mindless, loveless, insignificant, pawns in some other-worldly game - religion has to free one and save one from such predicaments, not create them.
And I would never advise teaching something you didnt believe in or did not see any lasting good in. A notion like God when insincere, has nothing to do with God. Its like ones dead great-great-grandfather. Either you believe he existed or you dont, but if you possibly didnt, you shouldnt think you could do him justice teaching about him to your kids, if you believed there was no such person there to teach about.
-
Regardless, religion is about mystery. Scientists seek into mystery as much as the one who seeks truth in God. Truth seekers all have similar hearts. God can represent truth and knowledge, the answer, the law, in the universe, in our science, in our lives and in our minds; and Gods relationship with us through the church and religion can ground ethics, and social bonds, and all that comes with people knowing people, (even politics), and all of the frictions we create for ourselves.
There is no harm exposing kids to good people of faith. It comes in many forms.
Religion rarefies, and absolutizes, and objectifies, while at the same time highlighting the subjective, particular, visceral life lived. It contains law and reason and logic, and analytics of language. Religion solves and presents solutions. It prompts questions, new ideas, emotions. It can soothe in death in suffering. It can turn the bad into good.
But it can cause harm too. No doubt your questions loom high and large. But so many otherwise good things can cause harm too, can they not? Even the seeming best things in life, like success, and power, can destroy us.
If you are deeply troubled by these questions, I suggest you ask a few different priests or just good people at some churches - and see if an answer presents itself right in the place you are inquiring about. I am sure, at the right church, there is a lot of good that religion can bring.
So, I took a short pause before giving a thoughtful response. I really enjoyed your post. As far as I understand, you're proposing a more integrated model of faith and knowledge, one where the paradox is resolved through a redefinition of concepts.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Here I partially agree. Everything we call knowledge (including in the scientific sense) is ultimately based, to some extent, on belief. None of us possesses absolute knowledge in any field, science, or judgment. We possess knowledge that is sufficiently justified (for us). Knowledge that is sufficiently justified (for us) is everything that a person accepts as true and acts upon (including both rationality and belief). Sufficiently justified knowledge, however, includes both a rational (verifiable) component and an unverifiable component.
I agree with this statement.
Expressed mathematically, this formula would be roughly as follows:
[Sufficiently justified (for the subject) knowledge] minus [Rational knowledge] equals [Faith]
In Russian, there is a special word for "sufficiently justified (for the subject) knowledge" "pravda." In everyday speech, we say, "This is my pravda"that is, it is how I reasonably believe, based on rational and irrational judgments, and act in accordance with it. Example: someone who says, "My pravda is that the Egyptians built the pyramids" expresses their reasonably well-founded knowledge, based on archaeological evidence (the rational part) and the decision to stop doubting (faith). This is their "pravda," which motivates them to take action (for example, writing articles or teaching). In Russian, there's also the word "istina" (truth), which is equivalent to "truth" in English. But the concept of "pravda" (truth) is not the same as "truth" (truth), although translators will translate it that way. There are many other cultural features associated with Pravda that I thought you might find interesting, and that are relevant to our discussion.
However, I would like to clarify your answer in another part:
Quoting Fire Ologist
In the previous text, I distinguished between the concepts of rational knowledge and faith. So, when it comes to religion, the part I called faith is dogmatized and not subject to criticism. When it comes to science, the part of our judgment that I call faith is presupposed, but can be refuted. This resonates with Popper's ideas.
That is, you and I, as educated people with a scientific bent, can debate this or any other topic, but our discussion has the potential to evolve: I can agree with you; you can agree with me; we can come to something new together. But this is completely impossible when it comes to intra-dogmatic discussion.
Returning to our paradox, which you've certainly mitigated with your judgment: the paradox still exists. If dogmas were subject to revision, that would be fine, I'd agree with you, but dogmas are not subject to revision (that's what religion is for). Therefore, I conclude that the paradox remains.
Don't take this as flattery, but reading your comments, as well as , gives me a special vibe. It's an almost mystical feeling of warmth and kindness.
Quoting Fire Ologist
Of course, you're right. Although I don't like to talk about it, I'm constantly on the razor's edge. I've seen examples of both deep religiosity and atheism within my own family. That's why I really liked Kierkegaard's ideas. I seem to be constantly seeking a balance between these two phenomena, naturally in my striving for God. Thanks to this philosopher, I can now call this feeling faith. Because, as he states, "...faith is not absolute certainty or knowledge..."
Regarding the religious upbringing of children, I tend to agree with you. After all, I'm an adult, and religion hasn't done anything bad to me. This may not be a particularly representative sample, but it's my "pravda."
My children are baptized, of course, but I don't insist on hammering ideas and postulates into their heads; when I bring them to church, I try to give them something to experience on their own.
Thus, I resolved the preachers paradox for myself after all, I am inclined to believe that I share responsibility for the future of my children.
You provide a very Kierkegaardian and therefore Christian view of faith. To the extent you're an adherent of that and want to make sense of that, I can understand your OP. My only thought is that what you say of faith is not universally accepted as true within the Abrahamic traditions. In particular, faith is not a lonely, individualistic venture necessarily, but Judaism sees it as communal. Celibacy, isolation, living as a monk are all very counter to that tradition. A Jew needs a minyan to pray.
The idea that you have to have doubt in order to have faith is also not universally accepted as true. Trust in God and belief in God are different things and both can be absolute without jeoparizing their legitimacy.
Quoting Astorre
This is the most bizzare part of the Kierkegaardian analysis, where the suggestion is that Abraham sacrificed himself. He didn't sacrifice himself, he attempted to sacrifice Isaac, meaning Isaac was the intended and almost victim. Zero consideration is placed upon what happened happened to Isaac. Kierkegaard then describes how Abraham then accepted Isaac back in love, when the text describes Abraham leaving with his two servants without Isaac and never speaking with Isaac again. The act wasn't private, it was in the presence of the two servants. The only indication that he loved Isaac was in a strange passage from before the attempted sacrifice. Genesis 12:2 states:
"Then God said, 'Take your son, your only son, whom you loveIsaacand go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on a mountain I will show you.'
It's strange because Isaac wasn't Abraham's only son. Ishmael was his other son. And the text indicates he cared for Ishmael as well (prior to casting him off), " The matter distressed Abraham greatly because it concerned his son [Ishmael]". Genesis 21:11. God told Abraham not be distressed because Ishmael would also be given a nation, which means that Abraham had to know that Isaac would not be killed because his anscestory was to be given a nation.
Thematic to the behavior of Abraham is his surrender of his children, first with Ishmael and second with Isaac who he attempts to sacrifice and then never communicates with again as far as the text suggests.
Thematic to the Hebrew bible generally is the covenental relationship between the Hebrews and God, where God promises them he will protect them and give them a nation great and strong if they adhere to his rules. When they do as he wishes, they get reward. When not, punishment. This is to say, "faith" in the context of the Hebrew bible is faith in the word of God, not in the existence of God. That is, when God says cross the Jordan and I will keep you safe, hesitation will be seen as distrust in the protection God says he will provide you, not in whether God actually exists. The complaints by the Hebrews in the desert were of the form "why did you free us from Egypt just to have us die of starvation?," not "I wonder if there really is a god." How could they have thought that? They saw the 10 plagues, the partiing of the sea, manna from heaven, water from rocks, etc. They didn't need faith. They had empirical evidence. As did Abraham. God told him that his 90 year old wife would give birth and that happened.
It's only through imposing an anachronistic definition of faith onto the biblical narrative that we can arrive at the absurdity of Abraham's actions.
I just don't see the binding of Isaac as saying what Kierkegaard needs it to say.
Speaking of words in different languages:
What is the Russian word for "faith"? And what does it mean etymologically?
Indeed. So often, when the word in the translation is rendered as "faith", it should probably be "faithfulness" or "loyalty" instead. "Faith" is a word that currently typically denotes something like 'a state of cognitive uncertainty, but also hopefulness'.
Similarly, "to believe" etymologically means 'to hold dear'; historically, it doesn't have this exclusively cognitive meaning it tends to be ascribed today, especially in secular circles.
This is a popular dichotomy, yes, but it's a false one nonetheless. It's a dichotomy that holds only when one attempts to justify religious faith to an atheist, on atheist terms.
Now why on earth should one do that??
The moment one starts to justify religious belief/faith/dogma is the moment one disbelieves it and demotes it.
Religious dogma is just that: dogma. There is no argument for it, no rationalization, no support. It just is. That's the whole point.
It's no wonder people are not convinced by all those "reasons for belief in the existence of God". Reasons actually detract from such belief. It's just bizarre that religious people are the ones offering them.
I like your approach: it reminds me of one of my academic advisors at university. It went like this: I would come to him with my essay, he would read it, scribble it down, and he wouldn't like everything: it wasn't expressed well enough, the evidence wasn't right, there was a retreat into unnecessary explanations. Ultimately, this encouraged me to return to the main concept of the work every time and analyze, recheck, and rewrite. Ultimately, he still didn't like what I brought back. I was at a loss until one day I realized that he liked my concept and my train of thought, he liked the main idea, it was just that my technique was really lacking at the time. Over time, I learned, and our work together was very fruitful. It's the same here. I see that you agree with the concept itself, but my technical execution is often lacking. I see that. Sometimes I generalize too much, sometimes I add more sensuality and emotion than necessary. But wait. I like it! I enjoy it, so why not continue? This isn't a place for defense, but for human dialogue. And your criticism is also appropriate and pleasant, but I couldnt help but remember my story from the past.
Faith translates into Russian as "VERA."
And it's a very broad concept. It encompasses both a female name and the feeling and concept of a vast number of Russian philosophers and writers who have attempted to understand this word. There's no consensus on this. As a native speaker of Slavic languages, I think you're probably familiar with all of this.
I myself use this word to describe my sense of aspiration toward the transcendental, which is impossible to comprehend, know, or justify.
It's always like this: as soon as you believe in something, a philosopher appears and crumbles it all to dust.
Have you noticed how it is typically the wealthy who give up their wealth for the ascetic life, and not the poor?
No religion encourages poor people to stay poor. Not to mention that no religion appreciates the poor, at best, they are pitied.
Also note that the majority of monks and "ascetics" live a materially better life than the majority of the human population.
Quoting baker
I haven't. None of the monastics I have personally met came from particularly wealthy backgrounds, and everything I've read suggests that isn't the norm today, nor in the past. Some of the more famous monastics came for wealthier backgrounds (although by no means all, or from extravagant wealth), but this seems to have more to do with their educational background, which is what enabled their writings, which is why they are known. Oblates were often from poor families that couldn't support them.
The "Father of Christian Monasticism," Saint Anthony the Great, was an Egyptian peasant. Saint Pachomius, the other core figure in early monasticism was a laborer conscripted into the legions as part of Rome's unending civil wars. Saint Macarius was a cattle herd. Saint Moses the Ethiopian was a slave turned criminal gang leader before converting. Saint Arsenius is the only one among the core early Desert Fathers I know of who was from a wealthy family. Simeon Stylites was likewise a shepherd's son. Evagrius, who doesn't appear to have been super wealthy, but was privately educated, relates being humbled for "putting on airs" because even this level made him stand out in the desert set. Because the monks taught each other to read and memorize core texts though, many could become literate even if they were from poor backgrounds, which is how they ended up taking over education (also raising oblates).
I suppose that gets back to your earlier point about only elites doing philosophy. This wasn't always the case. Epictetus was a slave, and sources speak of the poor being drawn to the Cynics in particular. It is, of course a tendency in ancient thought, the transition to Christian thought has a lot of important figures from peasant or slave backgrounds.
Quoting baker
Define "materially better." Arguably the Amish also live "materially better" lives than their secular neighbors despite eschewing several centuries of technological progress. Yet this seems to have more to do with avoiding certain vices and inculcating particular virtues.
Certainly, if you go back to the pre-modern era monasteries often were more economically successful than the surrounding communities (although again, not always). This is generally chalked up to better organization and investment of surpluses, at least initially. Some later became corrupted by this and became more something like just another feudal estate at the economic level. Others didn't (I've seen the thesis that being built on extremely marginal, unproductive and remote land helped with this, which is exactly why the founders put them there).
I've been thinking about your words for several days now. Unfortunately, my knowledge of Judaism is very superficial, but the facts you cited were already familiar to me.
It never ceases to amaze me how a religion that grew out of Judaism later became so different from it.
This must be a very interesting topic to study. Can you recommend some literature on Judaism for someone raised in the Christian paradigm (something descriptive and more scholarly)?
Take a look at: https://jps.org/books/unbinding-isaac/
It offers a comprehensive discussion of Kierkegaard from the Jewish perspective, showing where it diverges from Jewish views, and introducing other Jewish theologians along the way you could follow up on.
I'm particular, he discusses Joseph Soloveitchik, a towering figure in modern Jewish Orthodoxy who was sympathetic to Kierkegaard"s position more than others. Not sure how deep you want to get into it, but Soloveitchik's "Lonely Man of Faith" and "Halachik Man" offer deep commentary. I suggest him because he is "modern" relying more upon Western philosophy far more than his ultra orthodox (haredi).counterparts.
If you want to appreciate what absolute optimistic positivity looks like, the very readable "Positivity Bias" on the Hasidic Rabbi (the Rebbe) Menachem Schneerson: The idea that humans are born into sin in need of salvation could not be more foreign to this concept, but instead it speaks of a divine soul, nothing wretched about it.
https://store.kehotonline.com/mobile/prodinfo.asp?number=ERE-POSIB
But as to where to start, Koller's book is directly on point to this thread.
To be alive is to want things, things beyond what one needs. Can you truly say you've never felt a temptation to have something, that if the actions required for that something to become yours or otherwise like yours, wouldn't hurt another person, possibly severely to the point of the worst state of mind one could imagine? We often don't think about the true, eternal, rather the chain-of-effect of a simple action like stealing a loaf of bread from a shopkeep or sleeping with someone's wife, for how could our limited mortal minds truly process such a large dynamic in a passing moment? It can't!
While some might argue this ignorance or inability is not "wretched" in nature, it surely can lead to wretched things all while simply going about one's day and not thinking any more deeply than about what is in front of one's self. You can understand that. Your whole career involves such types of thinking.
All men are capable of great good and great evil. That much should be common sense. Theology be damned (not really just as a figure of speech for those who'd only listen to those who speak their 'language').
Could you please review this work of mine, taking into account your views? I would be incredibly interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16096/the-origins-and-evolution-of-anthropological-concepts-in-christianity
https://aish.com/to-life-2/
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1127503/jewish/The-Resurrection-Process.htm
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/332555/jewish/Maimonides-13-Principles-of-Faith.htm
(look particularly at #13).
To the extent you're asking for a comprehensive account of what the afterlife is to Jews and how the body/soul are composed, realize that account will vary from biblical times, to rabinnical times, to medieval times, to current time, notwithstanding variations between hasidim, Litvish, modern orthodox, and the liberal forms, like conservative and reform. It's complex and varied, but rarely as central as it is to Christianity, largely because most of the effort is spent on halacha, or the understanding of the law that governs the day to day. It's a very much this worldly religion, but the moshiach (messiah) still plays an important role, although he has yet to come (and he bears no resemblance to Jesus).
What is the Jewish explanation as to why are there people who are not Jews? How did those other people who are not Jews even come to exist?
Why are only Jews God's chosen people?
Not every Christian has a Kierkegaardian view of faith, though.
Christianity is a religion of adult converts, and it teaches individual eternal salvation or individual eternal damnation. As such, it is necessarily a lonely, individualistic venture.
It's an interesting discrepancy: Etymologically, Latin "fides" means 'trust', but Slavic "vera" (related to Latin "verus") means 'truth'.
It can indicate that adult converts are supposed to take something as truth what would/should otherwise be a matter of trust. They are expected to take something for granted, as true, despite the lack of trustworthiness.
What primary or secondary Kierkegaard sources do you base your argument upon? So far I've only seen you quote Wittgenstein as if his words were simple truth. I would suggest reading Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments where he speaks to the idea that all teaching/learning is aided by temporal occasions (including preaching), and that the teacher should therefore understand himself as providing such an occasion:
This is why what I've already said is much more Kierkegaardian than the odd way that Kierkegaard is sometimes interpreted by seculars:
Quoting Leontiskos
Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason. Myron Penner's chapter/article is quite good in this regard: "Kierkegaards Critique of Secular Reason."
The Philosophical Fragments juxtaposes the Socratic idea of self-knowledge to learning the truth in some other way. That is an exact description of his argument in the text.
Some bridge is needed to get that text to mean what you describe.
Where i will push toward religion is to say you are always of infinite moral worth, but that is aligned with humanism as well.
Thus, as far as I could tell from the cited articles, there is no mention of the life (or any kind of existence) of a separate soul after death, until the resurrection of the entire body. You must understand that I am unfamiliar with this religion and am literally starting from scratch.
The cited texts mention the soul, but they refer to it as something that lives in and alongside the body, emphasizing the soul's formation only during life (as in the example of the rabbi's answer that one should live longer to fulfill more commandments). It is also mentioned that you will be resurrected as the same person you died. Therefore, any formation outside of life is impossible.
Did I understand correctly?
I agree, this is truly interesting. Indeed, in Latin, veritas means truth. It turns out that, as a Slav, I understand both the word and the act itself in a very Western way. I'll definitely look into this, thank you. I wonder how this happened; perhaps it has something to do with the different understandings of the Roman and Constantinople churches? A very astute observation.
No, that's not the Jewish position.The position on it has changed over time, but that's not been the position for probably 1500 + years. https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/immortality-belief-in-a-bodiless-existence/
There are also different traditions within Judaism on the issue. It's like asking what do Christians think about X. It might depend upon whether I want to know what 1st Century Catholics thought or what modern day Presbyterians think.
Hasidic traditions delve deeper into the mystical and have more developed views of the soul than Litvak legally focused traditions. For example, the Chabad Hasids believe this : https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/3194/jewish/What-Is-a-Soul-Neshamah.htm
The animal soul/spiritual soul is the focus of the Tanya, a religious writings specific to that group.
Much of this has to do with Jewish history as much as theology. Biblical Judaism was temple based, with sacrifices on the alter, priestly classes, and what you read in the text. Rabbincal Judaism as it emerged since 70 common era (the destruction of the second temple where the temple mound currently is in Jerusalem) is very different, and with migrations to different parts of Europe, interaction with other cultures, it's changed over time. In fact, the past 100 years has seen major changes with WW2, mass migrations to the US and Israel, the growth and significance of Yeshiva (seminary) focus, political influence, secularized and liberal strands develoing , etc. I mean a Reform Jew might not even admit to a meaningfully real god and might sound atheist. There's just lots of ground to cover.
If you're trying to arrive at what we'd call the traditional Orthodox Yeshiva oriented tradition (black hats and beards, but not the long sideburns), then I can give you that position, but I'd need to look it up to be sure I got the nuance correct.
it looks unambiguous
Rabbi Kushner is a Conservative (capital C) rabbi, not an Orthodox one, making his views more liberal and less mystical. It's like asking what the Christian view on homosexuality is and listening to an Anglican and then a Southern Baptist. It'd be inconsistent.
If you want like a very specific halachik position on something to do with the soul that a rosh Yeshiva would endorse, i can give you that, but expect significant variation if compared to Conservative Judaism, a 19th century development.
And, particularly within more liberalized traditions, they permit variance of thought among leadership and congregants, with Reform considering inclusiveness of beliefs (even very open to mixed marriages and Christian congregants) a central tenant.
The reason I suggest to you the Litvak view is that they're convinced they represent true historical auththentic immutable Judaism. Of course, many think otherwise.
I was surprised by the depiction of what is said to be "Socratic" in your account of the Penner article. I will try to read it and maybe respond.
If I do try to reply, it would be good to know if you have studied Philosophical Fragments as a whole or only portions as references to other arguments.
Well that sentence about "standing athwart" was meant to apply to Kierkegaard generally, but I think Fragments is a case in point. The very quote I gave from Fragments is supportive of the idea (i.e. the Socratic teacher is the teacher who sees himself as a vanishing occasion, and such a teacher does not wield authority through the instrument of reason).
Quoting Paine
I am working through it at the moment, and so have not finished it yet. I was taking my cue from the Penner article I cited, but his point is also being borne out in the text.
Here is a relevant excerpt from Piety's introduction:
He goes on to talk about Climacus in light of the early Archimedes and Diogenes images. All of this is in line with the characterization I've offered.
I want to say that Penner's point is salutary:
I find the readings that Penner opposes very strange, but they are nevertheless very common. They seem to do violence to Kierkegaard's texts and life-setting, and to ignore his affinity with a figure like J. G. Hamann (who is also often mistaken as an irrationalist by secular minds). Such readings go hand in hand with the OP of this thread, which takes them for granted even without offering any evidence for the idea that they come from Kierkegaard.
Quoting baker
This looks to be a false etymology. The Latin fides and the Slavic vera are both translations of the Greek pistis, and vera primarily means faith, not true. The two words do share a common ancestor (were-o), but vera is not derived from verus, and were-o does not exclude faith/trustworthiness.
If one accepts that such a Christian character is the most important question throughout all of his work, Penner playing off one camp against another looks like a made-up problem.
I will have to think about how Penner's use of "secular" relates to what Kierkegaard has said in his words in other works.
Kierkegaard does see Christianity and Worldliness as essentially different. But he does recognize a "well intentioned worldliness. It is too much for me to type in but I refer you to pages 69 to 73 of this preview of Works of Love, starting with: "Even the one who is not inclined to praise God or Christianity..."
In all the books I have read of Kierkegaard, Socrates is a wise observer of the world but is forever a resident of Dante's lobby of worthy pagans. The preview I linked to above does not include page 406 so I will type it in:
Kierkegaard does oppose the modernity of many of his contemporaries. I disagree with Penner's implication that Kierkegaard shares Penner's view of the Enlightenment. Kierkegaard draws from ancient and modern psychologies. They both encounter the same limit regarding the life of the single individual. Kierkegaard composes his own psychology when he distinguishes the anxiety of the pagan from anxiety as the consequence of sin. The first kind is demonstrated in his consideration of genius and fate beginning with:
The Anxiety of Sin involves the demonic which finds expression in ancient and modern presentations. For example:
I am getting blisters on my fingers, to quote John Lennon.
Then why isn't everyone born into the Jewish religion?
And why do the Jews outkill them by a magnitude of 65 to 100?
Quoting Paine
It looks as though you are relying on the inference
Quoting Paine
I want to make sure this conversation is properly contextualized. You might have to tell me what you are objecting to, because I might be misunderstanding. made me think that you are objecting to the idea that, "Kierkegaard wishes to stand athwart the Enlightenment rationalism notion of self-authority, preferring instead a Socratic approach that does not wield authority through the instrument of reason." Instead you want to propose, "The Philosophical Fragments juxtaposes the Socratic idea of self-knowledge to learning the truth in some other way."
That is the state of the matter as I understand it, and don't want to lose track of that thread just as soon as it has been enunciated. Now again, I have not said that the central theme of Fragments is Kierkegaard's "wish", but I do think that theme is a substantial part of Fragments. So we can certainly talk about what is happening in Fragments. Nevertheless, the point of as it relates to this thread is to situate Kierkegaard's approach to preaching within his Socratic approach to teaching, which would seem to undermine the too-simple dualisms that the OP is relying upon.
Quoting Paine
I tried to find it, but the website said, "Pages 23 to 197 are not shown in this preview."
I have been trying to find an alternative copy to read your excerpt. There is one available from archive.org, but the document is protected and cannot be OCRed, so I'm not sure where that quote would reside inside of it. Maybe you know?
Quoting Astorre
This dilemma expresses the difficulty, or impossibility, of making a close approach to the divine.
Quoting Astorre
Why does Kierkegaard write "...the only 'true preacher,' instead of 'the only truly faithful person' is the one who lives faith in silence."? With the insertion of "preacher," the sentence sets up as self-contradictory, given the dilemma quoted at top.
Quoting Astorre
Human nature cannot abide total irrationality. No part of cognition, faithful or otherwise, can be of use if devoid of reason. Of course humans rationalize faith in transcendence. How else could they have any understanding of it?
As for internal monologues concerning the divine, the same absolute human demand for semblance of reason applies. How does it matter if Kierkegaard ruminates on God in total privacy? Is it not true that as soon you try thinking about faith, you rationalize it, and therefore betray its nature?
What about maintaining an open mind? Couple this with the concession God will not be understood, or even known beyond perplexing glimpses, and you have a procedure for accepting visitations from the divine with an open mind.
Listen to the fool in motley as soon as listen to the wise man, for the divine is a horrid beast of miracles as with Moses aglow in the dark for days after his descent from Mt. Sinai, and witness also Job and his poxy boils in payment for iron faith in the almighty.
My statement was a reaction to hearing that there were those for whom "there is little of value in the explicitly Christian character of Søren Kierkegaards thinking." Perhaps I was over broad in my response, but I wanted to signal that such a view is very far from own. I don't have the problem Penner is addressing.
It is true that I question:
Quoting Leontiskos
But it is not an argument against it as a thesis because Penner is pushing back against a problem I don't have. Considering how Kierkegaard may be teaching in a Socratic fashion does not subtract from the role of Socrates as the most worthy pagan in K's works. I will have to ponder how that relates to Penner's view but don't present it as an argument in itself. That is why I am trying to approach the question of the Enlightenment beyond the context of Philosophical Fragments.
Now, Kierkegaard has many different forms of address as evidenced by the different pseudonyms. The psychological considerations in The Concept of Anxiety are very far from the straight up preaching in Works of Love. Note that the latter is published under his own name.
I will take a look at your link to find the passages I referred to.
I, too, find the OP lacking because it does not specify the text being read. There is no way to know if it has the problem Penner objects to or not.
The passage starts on page 57 and goes to page 61.
The beginning is really the preceding paragraph saying: "Love for the neighbor has the perfections of eternity--. Kierkegaard uses this formula to begin many different topics in the book.
The beginning of the section II C at page 51 gives the context of the passage within the larger argument.
Its a wonderful excerpt, deeply relevant to our own time. Kierkegaard points out the way that Christianity has raised the eyes of man, but also notes that the equalities to which the worldly are devoted are much different from Christian equality.
Quoting Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 59-60
Now Im not exactly sure how this relates to the thread, although I agree that Kierkegaard admits a kind of well-intentioned worldliness. I dont think Ive said anything to the contrary.
Quoting Paine
Okay, understood.
Quoting Paine
Right. This is what I see claiming: The preacher thinks the truth of faith can be taught, but according to Kierkegaard this is impossible. Therefore there is something wrong with preaching. My response is to say that, according to Kierkegaard, in the proper and fullest sense, truth can never be taught except by God, and this includes faith. For Kierkegaard, the human teacher is modeled on Socrates, and because he does not have the capacity to impart knowledge in the way that God can impart knowledge, he is only a teacheror in this case a preacherto a limited extent. Thus if we situate the preaching of faith within Kierkegaards larger understanding of teaching, there is nothing sui generis about faiths unteachableness, and the problem of the OP is dissolved.
According to Penner the error derives from an irrationalist/existentialist reading of Kierkegaard, which thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Caleb Miller indulge. For example, he quotes Miller claiming that Kierkegaard is Chief among those who have defended the view that reason undermines faith, and that Christian faith should spurn reason. Penner argues that Kierkegaards critique of reason is a critique of a very specific form of reason, namely the secular reason of modern philosophy:
What emerges here is the possibility of a critique of preaching that is nevertheless not a critique of every kind of preaching. It is precisely the preaching or teaching of the pseudo-Christianity, produced by the rationalistic modus operandi of modern philosophy, that Kierkegaard finds fault with. It does not follow from this that a father cannot teach his children about the faith, and of course this was in no way Kierkegaards intention.
And of course Kierkegaards point is not that there can be no such thing as a well-intentioned worldliness, but even in your excerpt from Works of Love Kierkegaard is distinguishing that worldliness from authentic Christianityin that case distinguishing worldly equality from Christian equality. The parallel is salutary insofar as we could imagine the same worldly man programmatically devising a way to bring about equality, and also programmatically devising a way to preach such that his sermons moment in time has decisive significance so that the hearer could not for a moment forget it (Fragments). In both cases what is being rejected as falling short of Christianity is secular or worldly reason.
There are plenty of examples where Kierkegaard expresses dissatisfaction with fellow Christians. It is fair to say that his opposition to Hegel, for instance, is an objection to an expression of modernity. But a fair amount of that objection is based upon "rational" grounds as much as upon religious ones.
When discussing the psychological, Kierkegaard uses "modern" ideas of development. He argues that they become inadequate after a certain level of explanation.
Penner is basing his interpretation on this differential:
That makes it sound like Kierkegaard was fooled by various apologetic speech. It seems fair to me to ask for evidence of that in Kierkegaard's actual writings rather than rely upon Penner's inference.
If we are going to speak of the Enlightenment, should that not also include the issue of rights as discussed by Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, etcetera? The more "Christian" life Kierkegaard is calling for does not cancel the "individual" depicted in those places.
I'm not sure what you mean by that.
Quoting Paine
I don't think rights are a function of the Enlightenment. For example, Aristotelian approaches to justice involve rights (which are the correlative of duties), and this surely precedes the Enlightenment.
I'm actually not really sure where this is going, or what your theses are.
I heard Penner to be saying that Kierkegaard was not imagining that his rivals were outside the Christian community. So, if he did understand that they were outside, he would have responded differently. I will avoid such a bank shot and just look for what Kierkegaard has said about worldliness.
Quoting Leontiskos
What one does see in the writings of the Enlightenment is an attempt to separate the "Natural" from what has been imposed upon it, whether through human or divine authority. I am not sure that would have even been an idea for Aristotle.
Kierkegaard claims that views of "nature" have been changed because of "Christianity." Such a view both affirms and questions the separations drawn in the City of God by Augustine.
Okay. My sense is that Penner thinks Kierkegaard was correct as seeing them as within the Christian community, and therefore he does not see Kierkegaard as being "fooled."
Quoting Paine
A fair point, but that seems a bit of a different subject than rights per se. Natural rights preceded the Enlightenment, and some forms persisted through the Enlightenment, no?
Quoting Paine
Okay. I admit I am not familiar with this thesis of Kierkegaard's, except in vague outline.
It is Penner who calls the "moderns" "pseudo-Christians." I take your point that my characterization of Penner's argument does not zero in on the difference between his view and Kierkegaard. So, I will try to speak strictly about that difference without impugning Penner's rhetoric.
When Kierkegaard speaks of 'Christendom', he refers to his congregation where they confess a faith that requires a life lived differently than the "worldliness" that most are comfortable with. Calling them "pseudo-Christians" would not capture how this dilemma is as old as Christianity itself. Francis of Assisi spoke in the same language. The City of God and the City of Men will always be different territories.
Christendom also cannot be dismissed as simply "fake" because it is through its survival that the conditions of 'worldliness' have changed. That is what I meant to emphasize in the passage from Works of Love, beginning with:
Quoting Works of Love, page 57
Life in Christendom is not complete but is an agent of change in the world. In this sense it is the source of the equality of individuals expressed through many works of the Enlightenment. They have value but are insufficient for the engagement Kierkegaard is calling for. The highest wisdom one can look for without that engagement is that of Socrates, whether one lives in Copenhagen or Athens. That is the crisis missing from Penner's depiction of the secular.
Right.
Quoting Paine
Yes, I agree.
Quoting Paine
Yes, good.
Quoting Paine
I assume you don't have access to the Penner chapter? If that is so, I will restrict myself to what has already been quoted from that chapter.
The part of Penner that I was focusing on was his idea that Socrates presents something superior to Enlightenment secularism. This is because secularism wants to be a teacher instead of a midwife, and yet for Socrates (and Kierkegaard) this is confused. One must restrict themselves to being a midwife and forgo the role of teacher, which is reserved for God. (Except, of course, insofar as one teaches precisely through midwifery.) This bears on the OP.
But of course you are right that the "pseudo-Christianity" of the Enlightenment is not without value.
Quoting Paine
Incidentally, do you see the individualism such as is found in the West as uniquely Christian, such that it would not come from other cultures? I've seen some folk claiming such a thing recently.
I am glad we have found some common ground.
I will need to mull the teacher/midwife distinction because it cuts across many different points of view I have not tried to assemble before in one place. I will put out a few thoughts without suggesting they form anything like a thesis.
There is the bias I must confess to regarding the reading of ancient texts. The proposal that the new has not superseded the old is always worth considering.
One controversy that has played out for years on this site is how to understand the midwifery in Theaetetus against the accounts of recollection in other dialogues. Kierkegaard clearly refers to the latter in the Fragments as a fundamental condition. Does Penner deal with that difference in any way? I will poke around and see if Kierkegaard discussed that issue in particular.
As a matter of theology in the Protestant tradition, the role of who will be a teacher is an explosion of thoughts after questioning the apostolic continuity of the Catholic dogma. I figure that all the "disciple at the second hand" discussion in the Fragments can be ruled out as a secular conversation. It certainly is a stumbling block for those who want to separate that thought from the theological.
Quoting Leontiskos
Well, Hegel said as much. It is important to remember Kierkegaard is repeating that view through his view of paganism. I do not agree with them. Maybe I can say why sometime.
This is likely the case. I am persuaded by both your arguments and SK's.
I know you addressed love. But perhaps the "resolution" comes from seeing the preacher as willing to sacrifice his/her faith for the salvation of others.
If we go with the concept (faith) to its ultimate conclusion, faith will transform the individual so that the individual is no longer interested in its own ego. It will liberate the individual from the bondage of individuality.
In that state, just as there bhodisattva in Mahayana Buddhism will forsake/defer his/her Nirvana, return to the world of name and form, until all sentient beings are freed, the preacher in the Abrahamic tradition will make the movement from faith, back to the world (also of name and form), thereby "nullifying" or "contradicting" faith in favor of saving others.
This reminds me of Tolstoys short story The Three Hermits. In the story, a bishop visits an island where tales describe three old hermits who live a simple life of prayer. Upon arrival, he is surprised on how they pray. Three are ye, three are we, have mercy upon us is recited to the bishop. The bishop is shock of their lack of traditional formality of prayer and thus teaches the correct way of prayer. After feeling satisfied they know how to correctly pray, the bishop leaves the island. As the boat moves away from the island, a light is seen from the direction of the island, the crew see the hermits walking on water towards the ship begging the bishop to teach them the right way to pray for they have forgotten. The bishop humbled and in awe by what he saw said, Your own prayer will reach the Lord, men of God. It is not for me to teach you.
:up:
Quoting Paine
I don't remember him getting into that. Here is his concluding paragraph, which might shed some light:
Quoting Paine
Yes, this is a great point. I am going to revisit that section.
Quoting Paine
Okay.