amoralism and moralism in the age of christianity (or post christianity)
Nietzsche:I don't deny that it is best to avoid and struggle against many actions that are considered immoral; likewise that it is best to perform and promote many things that are considered moral -- but I maintain: the former should be avoided and the latter should be promoted for different reasons than heretofore.
With all the preaching people do, reading the perspectives of Frederich Nietzsche and Max Stirner can be refreshing: their ideas sometimes get conflated with "giving people license to do bad things", but the quote above indicates that it's not true. This is often how people interpret criticisms of morality: there's frequently a sense that a lack of it leads to unspeakable horrors.
However, I believe most of the criticisms of morality in philosophy come from a desire not to see things as either good or evil, but rather to acknowledge grey areas or a universal egoism that's behind all things. Overall, christianity has had a tremendous influence on both europe and the americas, and I think, especially in the case of Nietzsche, that he was reacting to the often punitive and harsh mindset of christians from his time period and before. It's easy to conclude that things are very different from the medieval era, and modern day christians have softer and more libertarian perspectives (separation of church and state, being an example), yet a dualistic attitudes towards morality lends itself towards punishment or ostracism. I don't think it's possible to do away with ostracism, as this goes back very far, even though sanctioned punishment is relatively new compared to the whole history of homo sapiens.
The fact that we still refer to dates as "B.C." is all the evidence I need that we are still in a Christian historical era, and part of what i like about Nietzsche is that some of his ideas still apply to people today even though his writings are now kinda old.
I'm wondering what it would take for a universal morality to be achieved, or if it's even possible. I've heard a lot of Christians insinuate that this is the goal of the religion, are we being pushed into this direction, even with the very high levels of atheism and skepticism? One of my goals is to read Copleston's entire works on the history of philosophy, and at one point he says that the Greeks "prepared" later generations to embrace Christianity with some of their monotheistic ideas, and in his case, he was implying that Christianity is a form of progress. It's not the first time I've heard people combine progressive historical sentiments with Christianity.
Sorry if this isn't as clear as you would have it, but I'm just venting my thoughts on these subject matters. I don't have a very broad understanding of what particular famous philosophers believed or believe today. I assume this is largely an atheist message board, and clearly i'm more of an atheist, but I'd like to hear any opinions on these questions/concerns if you want to share them...
Comments (123)
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I would highly recommend the historian Tom Holland on this topic. His thesis is not that Christianity produced progress per se, but rather that our contemporary world has been massively shaped by Christianity. This means, for example, that our criteria for progress are by and large Christian-birthed criteria.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Copleston is great. :up:
Yeah i can't read it cover-to-cover, but i somehow managed to do it with volume II in the "history of philosophy." I think maybe anything related to plato's literal text besides a soundbite is too rough for me, but aristotle seems to be more rationalistic and logical...
If you do, explain why you (seem to) assume that "a universal morality" is more beneficial than the absence of one.
FWIW, I'd recommend more contemporary (& secular) histories such as
Peter Adamson's podcast & book series A History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps
Bryan Magee's The Great Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy
Oh not at all, i just wanted to start the many possible questions with that one: it was rhetorical in the sense that i do not believe it, or think it's possible. Christian fundamentalists are not the only people who evoke a morality that "should" apply to strangers, and it's pretty much impossible to avoid talking about the scope of moral ideas when trying to lay a code of ethics or impose "right and wrong".
What's wrong with saying that moral truths exist independently of human opinion.
It seems to me that there are moral facts (e.g., torturing children for fun is wrong) that are true regardless of what anyone thinks.
What's wrong?
I can't verify moral truths.
Seems like pretty blatant emotional manipulation to me: you start by insinuating that moral truths are separate from human opinion: then you try your best to project the image of children being tortured.
Moral truths may be verifiable in principle if one adopts rationalist, consequentialist, or intuitionist frameworks.
But even a cultural relativist would say that moral truths can be verified simply by referring to the norms of the societies in question.
Alright, this is a much more interesting and workable response. One can extrapolate a moral truth from the people they know, and even if a society violates a moral truth (two examples being: capital punishment is arguably "cruel and unusual punishment", and so is a life sentence for being found with a bag of marijuana), it's something to go on as a naturally selfish person.
Most pre-modern theories of "objective moral truths" (a modern way of putting it) are at least prima facie as "verifiable" as those of the relativist/emotivist. However, I think the big thing to realize here is that:
A. Virtually all pre-modern ethics are virtue ethics (in the East as much as the West) and so they are framed fundamentally differently from the dominant modern moral theories (utilitarianism, deontology/Kantianism, and divine command theories) because they do not make "laws" their explanatory center point.
B. They do not separate "moral good" as a sort of sui generis, wholly separate "sort of good" that is distinct from the good of "good food," "good evidence," "good argument," "a good baseball player," "a good car," etc. For instance, for Plato, the Good is present even if what merely [I]appears[/I] good (and so in evils that people choose because they think they are good). But this is as true for later Christian thinkers like Aquinas; all things that are "good" in any way are so by participation in the Good. Indeed, for the medievals, "Good" is a transcendental property of being precisely because it is a conceptual not real distinction. Goodness is "being as (truly) desirable." It doesn't add anything over and above being (just as there is not the reality of a thing and, over and above it, its truthyet of everything that is, it is true that it is). And yet, because they make a distinction between apparent and real goods, such a distinction is "objective" in a sense (but not Kant's sense, which would be rejected as incoherent).
So, the older ethicist wants to say to the emotivist, Kantian, and utilitarian: "justify your claim that moral good is unique and unrelated to other goods." But the thoroughgoing relativist/anti-realist generally cannot justify this distinction because they don't think "moral goodness" is real in the first place.
Thus, the real question is a more global "values anti-realism." Nothing is good or bad in any sense. Yet this is prima facie way less plausible. Is it not truly bad for a bear to have its leg crushed in a bear trap? Is it not truly bad, at least ceteris paribus, for human children to be lit on fire? The fact that these things are bad for these organisms seems directly tied to what they are, and are seemingly verifiable. For them to be "unverifiable" we would have to say that the empirical facts of medical science, veterinary science, zoology, psychology, etc. are not really facts. Why aren't they real facts? If we just say they aren't real facts because they involve values and values aren't factual then all we have done is beg the question and assumed our conclusion as a premise.
Second, global values anti-realism is straightforwardly self-refuting. If nothing is truly good or bad then there can be nothing truly "good" about good argument, good evidence, good faith, etc. Indeed, if nothing is truly better or worse (truly more or less desirable) then truth cannot be "better" than falsity. And so, when the anti-realist expects us to agree with them because what they say is true, they have no grounds for expecting this of us. "Good" just means "I like." So if I don't like anti-realism, I ought not affirm it.
Likewise, if "good" means "I currently like...," then a late night tequila shot is "good for us" when we want it and becomes "bad for us" when we wake up hungover. Smoking is good for us... until we get lung disease and regret smoking. Etc. But this leads to a sort of global misology where we can never be wrong about anything and every decision we make is "good" (for us), which is absurd.
Prima facie, virtue ethics is very plausible. A strong rebuttal to it needs to show that, all else equal, it is not better for man to be:
Courageous instead of cowardly or rash.
Temperate instead of gluttonous/licentious or anhedonic/sterile.
Loving instead of wrathful or cold
Possessing fortitude instead of being slothful and unmotivated
Hopeful instead of fearful
Strong instead of weak
Agile instead of clumsily
Prudent instead of lacking in consideration
Wise instead of wise
Faithful instead of recalcitrant
Etc.
But prima facie, on average, it is better to possess those virtues rather than their corresponding vices. To be sure, a virtuous man might suffer from bad fortune, and a wicked man might benefit from good fortune, but fortune is by definition outside our control. Virtue is what makes us happiest with what is within our control. It also makes us more self-determing, less ruled over by our appetites and external causes, and so more free and self-governing (which is what allows us to flourish in spite of fortune). Hence, the anti-realist has to say the virtues aren't better for man, or else that they mean something different in every instance and don't really exist (a hard claim to make, since Eastern cultures have fairly similar core virtues).
I think the plausibility of anti-realism rests on the modern framing of ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre has a famous book, After Virtue, about how this framing emerges. It comes from Reformation era theology. And he argues that it is what makes modern ethics incoherent. I think he is right at least in broad outline here.
But who is saying that nothing is good or bad in any sense? Are you maybe hinting that someone was implying it here? Are you hinting that Nietzsche and Stirner were saying this? Because the quote Nietzsche gave that i posted directly contradicts that, and many of his other aphorism do as well. The whole reason i posted that was to advertise that this is NOT i'm trying to argue, but it seems that people try to project that onto philosophers who criticize morality in a more general sense, rather than technical issues with specific standards.
Even though i'm not willing to provide quotes at the moment, Nietzsche places a value on honesty in multiple places in his texts, so to me it would seem he thought that was one of the more important ideas when practicing a rational morality. Stirner, however, did not blatantly posit values: his style was more concerned with showing that there's a problem with assuming any of them are objective. However, you can still infer some vague things about his preferences from his philosophy alone.
My personal orientation to good and bad is that it's subjective 100% of the time: when the tiger eats the monkey, it's good for the tiger, bad for the monkey. The tiger gets nourishment, the monkey feels unpleasant and dies. The tiger can't be "morally wrong" because it can't question its behavior. However, this subjectivity gets extremely complex when you have humans who believe in free will and compatibilism.
sorry, my other response got posted prematurely: i hit enter and it posted, but i was just using it to make a new paragraph. It probably has something to do with my browser or hidden setting:
the subjectivity aspect of "good and bad" also goes beyond predation, especially when it comes to situational responses. Doing one thing in one situation will lead to positive results, and other times negative responses. While i can't give any specific examples at the moment like i did with the tiger, this becomes painfully true when you consider what you should and shouldn't say to other people...but i would assume that if you're being honest, and you're not intentionally trying to hurt people with your words, there can't be anything morally wrong about it.
You also mention Plato: my understanding with him and other Greeks is they largely believed moral righteousness was correlated correlated with the happiness that you feel, and that independent of the latter factor, that there was no basis for talking about morality or justice. However, the question becomes: to what extent can this be established objectively and scientifically. What behaviors lead to happiness, which ones lead to unpleasantness? I believe it's possible to answer this to a limited degree. One could argue that the mere studying of moral philosophy could improve people's lives, but you would have to acknowledge that this lack of study in moral philosophy has more to do with people not wanting to do it more so than a systemic failure in education.
Right, but is it not a fact that "being eaten by a tiger is bad for monkeys?" It seems to me that this is obvious. What monkeys are tells us at least something of what is good for them.
Likewise, is it not a fact that it isat least all else equalbetter for human to be strong rather than weak, agile instead of clumsy, intelligent instead of dim witted, courageous instead of cowardly, knowledgeable rather than ignorant, prudent instead of rash, possessing fortitude instead of being weak of will, healthy instead of sick, etc.?
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
My point was that the bracketing out of "moral goodness" as a wholly distinct "sort of goodness" comes from early modern Christian theology. Those who reject that theology need to justify using the distinction rather than just assuming it and going from there. Without such a distinction, anti-realism about values is presumably global
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Sure, I can help with an example: it is good to scoop up your own toddler when they fall and start crying. It is probably not good to run and scoop up a stranger's kid from the park. It might be good to bow to an elder if not doing so would grievously and needlessly insult them in some cultural context, and bizarre in another context. No serious moral realist theory fails to take account of such variances though.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
That's more of Aristotle's framing, but yes, the good is desirable. But, since we are often wrong about what will be good for us, the focus is on what is truly desirable, not what merely appears to be desirable. So, the Republic centers on why justice (and freedom) are truly desirable.
"Happiness" here is a translation of eudaimonia, which might be better rendered as "flourishing" or "blessedness."
And yes, knowledge here might be "limited." As Aristotle points out, it is foolish to demand greater specificity than a topic allows. But as for what can be known, it seems that it is better to be: strong, healthy, agile, courageous, wise, prudent, magnanimous, loving, etc. than their contraries.
What can be known "scientifically" and "objectively" is another matter. I have seen people define objectivity such that even physics is subjective because it is shaped by the mind. Aristotle thought ethics and politics were a practical science. But if "scientific" means presupposing that values are subjective, then obviously this will be impossible, not because of any truth about the human good, but because "science" has been defined so as to exclude such truths regardless of if they exist. The sciences are saturated in value judgements however, so such a framing is always a preformative contradiction.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Well, on the older view of ethics as the study of ends, how to live a good life, and how to be a good person, I think people do study this. The self-help industry is huge, wellness terminology has flooded our everyday speech, novels and media focus on these questions, etc. Explicit moral philosophy is banished from most curricula however because teaching any positive content is anathema to liberal individualism. However, I'd argue that students are indoctrinated into a particular ethics, a sort of therapeutic, individualist liberalism that oscillates between civic humanism and emotivism. It's just that this ethics pretends it isn't an ethics, and pretends that its forms of indoctrination are uniquely liberatory because its presuppositions are those of "pure reason" and possess an epistemic humility no prior systems possess (arguably, this is just another sort of dogmatism though).
Good for the tiger, bad for the monkeydemonstrates that good and bad are relative, doesnt it?
To see what I mean about the modern paradigm, just consider that if you wrote a paper in most schools claiming that:
-ethics is wholly bunk and we should just act selfishly; or
-ethics comes from God by command and anyone who tries to justify it otherwise is kidding themselves
-ethics is a wholly formal, Kantian duty
-ethics is absolutely unknowable and everyone who says anything is unjustified
Would all probably lead to fine grades if they were well written and well argued. The only one that might get you in trouble is the divine command theory one, potentially on the grounds that the Bible and the Koran are not proper sources for a humanities class.
This is very much unlike mathematics or even history, where to give multiple wholly contradictory answers will generally mean one is wrong. The paradigm seems invisible here because it rules out nothing.
Yet the paradigm becomes visible if you consider what would happen if you wrote a paper justifying racism, sexism, defending Hitler, etc. A high school English student who justifies the society of A Handmaid's Tale might very well end up with a call home, particularly if the teacher thinks they are serious.
But what this shows is that the process is the focus of moral education (Dewey, Rodgers, etc.), although with certain bounds (no racism, etc.). Yet this isn't really an absence of ethics, it's just a particular dominant type that is taught.
Relative in what sense? What exactly is: "All else equal, it is bad for a monkey to be eaten," relative to? Certainly not the tiger. To the extent that the tiger has beliefs, I don't imagine it thinks what it is doing is good for the monkey either.
Or for: "having access to proper water and sunlight are good for my plant," if this is relative, in what context is it false?
Relative to the perspective of the individual.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The tiger enjoys a satisfying monkey hunt and mealwhich is good.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
It is false for anything that may compete for your plants water and sunlight.
So when a child feeds their cat antifreeze because it looks like a fun drink. Cats love antifreeze too. Is it thus truly good for the cat to drink antifreeze because all the individuals in question think it is so?
Quoting praxis
This is simply changing the subject to what is good for the tiger. Again, is it false that is "bad for the monkey to be eaten?"
Is it a fact that it is "bad for women to be raped," or does this somehow become false and it is good for women if they are raped just in case you're a rapist? But not even most rapists believe this.
Let me ask, on this view, how is it ever possible for someone to be wrong about what is good?
I disagree, because the blunt framing: "-ethics is wholly bunked and we should just act selfishly" is confused and hypocritical moral preaching. The third point about Kant is similar to what Nietzsche has argued about ethics, with the former's "categorical imperative", but overall he respected that Christianity was an origin for moralism, and Kant was a re-framer, and that is why Nietzsche was mostly respected in the academic circles he was a part of, even though i don't totally agree with his ideas...there's a pretty extreme degree of nuance that gets lost with "ethics is bunk" and "we should just act selfishly". My judgements about 1#, apply to point 4#: it can't be "absolutely unknowable" because our use of the word "ethics" proves otherwise.
[edits: i had skipped over point 2# for whatever reason first time around, probably because i was using my phone, i can't really comment on 2# as it does depend on the religion/ideology of the school, it's a pretty standard christian/judaism/muslim argument though]
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The therapeutic and pedagogical discussions you bring up are a form of informal moral philosophy, but i would argue explicit moral philosophy is not taught in schools because it involves young people who don't really want to be there...explicit moral philosophy is very hard, it's spoken about with incredibly abstract terms and systems, my tiger and monkey lesson is simple and has more of a resemblance to self-help logic. The very kind of supple and valuable lessons you can learn from formal moral philosophy are swept under the rug, so to speak, because our liberal/individualist system places more value on christian-based moral teachings, productivity at work, and achievements...these have some scattered elements which prepare children for office work, hierarchies, and manual labor. I think the basic format ("go sit down in a desk, kid") is more of an issue than what is taught. Someone brought up torturing children as a vague moral example of...something...but the very school system does torture children "compassionately".
Have you seen the television show "the good place"? The difference I'm trying to illustrate between informal philosophy and formal philosophy is plain in the show: it's about questioning the absolutist notions of heaven and hell, and as a result of creator preference, the characters keep name dropping Jame's Scanlan's "what we owe each other", as an obvious attempt to get viewers to buy the book. However, "what we owe each other" is a little misleading, because the title says "i know exactly what we owe each other", yet the actual contents are very convoluted and not pleasurable to read. Much of formal philosophy is like this, and we embrace it still because of the logical challenge and desire to creatively express our ethics and narratives. Formal philosophy is for people who like to think and argue, not for people who want simple answers, not for people who launch Machiavellian schemes (even though machiavelli was arguably a philosopher). The demagogues use formal philosophy temporarily and move on, but rarely do they write a peer-reviewed philosophy publication or wind up as professors...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
We could follow the virtue ethicist and treat these attributes as real, objective qualities of persons validated though third person consensus. Or we could treat them as truisms which pre-suppose a prior assessment of culpability. For instance, when we say murder is immoral, we dont really need to add the immoral part since murder already implies a value judgement which allows us to distinguish it from a more value-neutral term like killing.
All of the terms you listed above are truisms in that what they have in common is the assumption that the person they are describing has fallen below a norm of conduct. But they imply more than this. If we perceive a person to operating with the best intentions, trying their best given the circumstances and the limits of their physical and intellectual capabilities, then we dont apply these adjectives to them. We only apply them when it appears to us that the person is deserving of our blame. And in what circumstances do we assign blame and culpability to the other? When we believe they knew better than to do what they did, when we interpret their behavior as capricious, as deliberately and willfully suppressing their better, more caring and empathetic instincts.
But do these blameful judgements reflect objective realities about anothers character, or do they reflect our own inability to see the world from the others unique vantage? What if the fault lies not in their capriciousness but in our inadequate assessment of their motives and outlook? Given that the blameful, accusatory adjectives you listed impel us to respond with disapproval, punishment, demand for conformity and shunning, they may in many cases justify and even institutionalize a certain immorality and violence toward those who violate our expectations. As Ken Gergen writes:
With what, the examples themselves? But my point isn't that those positions are correct, but that our current systems allows students to pick between them as equally "right" alternatives. Whereas racism, sexism, Hitlerism, or even fundamentalism are not considered worthy of exploration by the "autonomous agent."
Quoting Joshs
It seems to me like you're just absolutizing a certain (problematic) post-Enlightenment understanding of virtue here, such that virtue is [I]really[/I] always grounded in deontological standards and variance from them. But I think that's a poor way of understanding it, and at any rate a dismissal of virtue ethics on the grounds that opposing modern views use its terms wrong doesn't seem like a fair criticism.
This is most obvious in terms of the physical virtues. When we say that Tom Brady is dexterous, we don't mean "in comparison to doing his best," but "in comparison to every other person." He is excellent at throwing a ball where he wants it when he wants it. Fleet-footed Achilles isn't called such because he tries his best to run (presumably, all the men he chases down are trying their best to run away as well). He has arete (virtue, excellence) because he is the most excellent in his particular role as a warrior.
And, all else equal, it is better to be healthy, strong, intelligent, wise, prudent, just, etc. than their contrary. That has nothing to do with "blame" per se. Although we might blame people for their vices, that is not [I]why[/I] they are vices, or what defines them as vices.
Of course, there is also the objection that strength, agility, courage, prudence, wisdom, fortitude, charity, etc. don't exist. But this seems absurd. It seems particularly absurd for the physical virtues because some people are clearly stronger, faster, healthier, etc., and yet it also seems rather absurd to say that this is so for the intellectual virtues, or for the practical virtues. Some people are particularly impulsive and rash for instance. Whether they ought to be "blamed" for this is besides the point as far as prudence being a virtue.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
This is a good example. The philosopher character is an extreme comic example of indecisiveness. It is not excellent to have this level of indecisiveness; that is what makes the character humorous. One need not "blame" him to think he could benefit from a change.
No, i was saying that i highly doubt any teacher beyond an elementary school teacher would accept "we should all be selfish" as an argument on a philosophy paper...because the only way you could back it up is by giving examples of how your preferences benefit you...and schools never put individual preference over the curriculum outside a process that allows that (i.e., disability related concerns)
I would make a distinction between assessments of capabilities which do not involve determinations of intent or motive and those which do. Going back to your list:
Courageous instead of cowardly or rash.
Temperate instead of gluttonous/licentious or anhedonic/sterile.
Loving instead of wrathful or cold
Possessing fortitude instead of being slothful and unmotivated
Hopeful instead of fearful
Strong instead of weak
Agile instead of clumsily
Prudent instead of lacking in consideration
Wise instead of unwise
Faithful instead of recalcitrant
Of these examples, it seems to me that only strong vs weak and agile vs clumsy dont necessarily involve judgements concerning motive, but they could depending on their context of use. Those which deal with motives are blameful in that they assume on the part of the other a capricious knew better than to do what one did. Whats crucial in blame is the belief that there is a close proximity between what they actually did and what they know they should have done. The distance between the two is a kind of straying or wandering off the path, a giving into temptation. Because blame is based on belief in this proximity, it leads to the further belief that we can cajole or coerce the other back to where we believe they know they should have been, and how they should have acted. We tell them a little more willpower will carry them over to the righteous path. This may be dished out in a loving way, but it rests on an underlying basis of hostility.
How might your list change if you focused on the possibility that you are construing their motives and capabilities inadequately?
Courageous , temperate, loving, fortitude, prudent and faithful become transformed into assessments which are not the product of the application of an inner willpower, but involve behaviors which reflect how the situation makes sense to one, given ones pre-existing means of understanding.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Sure you could, you could:
A. Argue for moral anti-realism, nothing objectionable there.
B. Point out that all decisions must thus be motivated by "pragmatism."
C. Argue that individuals seeking their own preferences is what makes the world go round, drawing on liberal political economy, etc.
You know, Ayn Rand, Gordon Gecko "greed is good." Or even a Sam Harris: "reasonable individuals want to maximize their well-being and that's why justice can be justified," or a Rawlsian elevation of the abstract chooser's reasonable self-interest vis-á-vis a wholly procedural "justice" as set over the presumed unknowability or irreducible plurality of the good.
I did say "well-argued." The procedure is important. Whereas, even if you swamp an argument for race or sex segregation and unequal rights in peer reviewed citations and make no logical errors, I imagine that's still going to land you in hot water.
Okay, i get where you're coming from now, but Ayn Rand posited new ethics based on her irrational arguments relating to capitalism ("self-reliant strength is good, perfectionism is good"). I think Gordon Gekko himself was meant to be the moral set up against the "greed is good" ideology. I want to point out that these are just specific kinds of justifications for selfish behavior, when there are potentially infinite possibilities...but as you say, phrasing is crucial for success.
I can only say that I think that is a reading largely or wholly absent from the tradition. Aristotle's typology, for instance, has it that the furthest state of vice is precisely one where the person [I]prefers[/I] vice and sees it as better. That's a theme in Plato too, who famously has Socrates argue in several places that no one ever knowingly does wrong (a point picked up by many Patristics).
Do you think it is impossible to define prudence, intelligence, wisdom, gluttony, etc. without having to ground them in blame?
I don't see why it should be. For temperance for instance, there is presumably a mean vis-á-vis the satisfaction of some appetites that is healthy regardless of what people currently think it is. Likewise, it's particularly hard to see how the intellectual/doxastic virtues could even be defined in terms of blameworthiness. What makes the intellectual virtues to be virtues at all is that the lead towards understanding, not that they meet some sort of criteria of proper effort. If this was the case, everyone could become wise simply by "trying hard." And this is originally just as true for the practical virtues. Bad choices don't become good ones just because you tried your best.
Quoting Joshs
Well, if you ground virtue in blame and layer this on, doesn't that mean that no one is ever more courageous, temperate, just, intelligent, wise, etc. than anyone else? They are all doing their best given their understanding, right?
But doesn't that seem absurd? Certainly some people are wiser, more just, more intelligent, etc.
Obviously someone makes a decision to behave in a certain way because in the moment of the decision they perceive that course of action as preferable to the alternatives they see as available to them. This doesnt contradict my assertion that the affects of anger and hostility are at play in grounding ones assessment of why they preferred that course of action. What matters to me is how you personally are led to behave towards someone who you perceive as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, gluttonous, wrathful, imprudent, anti-social, hypocritical, disgraceful or greedy. Do you not feel the impulse to knock some sense into them , give them a taste of their own medicine, get them to mend their ways? Do you not aim for their repentance, atonement and readiness to apologize?
How might your response to, and attitude toward, someone who errs in any of these ways differ your response to a student who cant grasp the principles of calculus because it is too advanced for their grade level, but you know they are bright and can be tutored to understand the material? Are you saying your attitude toward this student will be the same as when he punches his classmate in the face or puts thumbtacks on the teachers seat and injures them?
That depends entirely on our respective socio-econimic statuses and the relative positions we hold in the power hierarchy. If the person is above you in the hierarchy, you better keep your nose down, or face retaliation.
Quoting baker
Im more interested in what you feel like doing, what you would do if allowed to, than in what you can or cant get away with. Im focused on what impulses are implied in the structure of anger and blame, not whether you dare express those impulses.
It's absolutely vital to know one's place in society, and to actually internalize it. The criticism whispered quietly to the side with one's face down is a sign that one hasn't accepted one's place in society.
Those below have no business criticising those above.
They'll both think it good until they learn that it's not.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
No, I'm sure monkeys dislike being eaten.
Monkey consumption is still good or bad relative to the perspectivewhether one is the eater or the eaten.
this is good to know, because i have several cats and abhor the thought of any of them drinking anti-freeze. Interestingly enough, cats do not like beer, which is a good thing because it's also bad for them. Luckily, i do not have any anti-freeze (what would i use it for, and aren't there alternatives?), but i do like beer, so this is the perfect combination!
Ah, what a joy. FINALLY someone sunk that Titanic of a mind (or perhaps ego) of yours like a direct, apocalyptic final hit in Battleship. Of course it would be the noble Count. I knew it would happen. I've waited 5 years and played two long agonizing games of chess resulting in defeat after defeat for this moment. Victory is indeed sweet. Even if all glory doth indeed belong to another.
Quoting praxis
So, you admit, with hands wringing, and one's once noble tail tucked shamefully between one's once-triumphant legs, that, if we lived in a world where monkeys were the larger, more dangerous prey, tigers being eaten would be mere "relevance to the individual" and acceptable, par for the course, if you would. Therefore, the nature of all your truth, all your validity, is hinged on not fact, not logic, not what's right or wrong. but pure and simple juvenile circumstance. Happenstance. A mere toss of the cosmic die.
And here I thought I was defeated by a greater person. No, just greater odds, it would seem and now remains self-evident. :grin:
I'm glad you responded to the show I mentioned. I even remember his name...Chiri. Quite a silly philosopher character, i am assuming the moral is a jab at the extent arguments can really move anyone forward...i guess ill have to ask AI about the scanlin book.
however, i think this would be too self-limiting, to think of this in absolute terms: it's rather easy to "punch up" in some circumstances, it doesn't even always get met with retaliation. There's also a big difference between criticizing what someone does/says (for example, i do it all the time on here, as i think it's necessary for philosophy), and criticizing them as a person, the latter often being counter-productive. I think a discussion on revenge and punishment could be interesting, yet I'm not so interested in the technicalities of that due to the emotional affect of it, and the one who punishes tends to entrench themselves in their own justifications (i think as the Joshs post shows), so it doesn't make for great discussion...
I can give at least one example where it's not necessarily better for a person to be strong: For example, if your community is taken over by another, the strong are more likely to be killed or sent to the quarry than the weak. Similarly, a clever person will overconfidently leap over a chasm and is more likely to die than a clumsy one. Similarly, a "smart" person, relying on their intellectual superiority, will boldly (trusting their knowledge) rush to do what a fool would hesitate to do. Although the concept of "smart" isn't as simple as it seemsperhaps a smart person doesn't trust their knowledge.
Here I would like to conclude that the more universals there are, the more opinions there are, and the more differences there are. Some will say that prostitution is a good thing (especially considering how many rapes are prevented thanks to prostitution), while others will say it's a bad thing (especially considering how many diseases are transmitted).
In my opinion, the aesthetics of ethics lies in our ability to constantly choose different approaches, change our perspectives, and rethink.
It's funny, but I just criticized the idea of ??the good and then involuntarily proclaimed a new good, which consists in becoming.
Everyone agrees thoughts are relative to individuals though, the question is about truth (vis-á-vis values).
Something truly being good for you (or your cat) is not necessarily the same thing as merely thinking it is good, right? Or is it as Hamlet says: "nothing is good or bad but thinking makes it so?"
If the truth of what is good for any individual is simply relative to what they currently think is good for them, then we are collapsing any distinction between reality and appearances. Whatever appears good simply is good. Thus, it is good for us to drink poison any time we think it looks appetizing. (Presumably , the same "good" event "becomes bad" when we start to get sick, because our thoughts about it change. But if we don't recognize the source of our sickness, the poison remains "good for us" and so it seems we ought to drink more.)
In that case, it is impossible for anyone to ever be wrong about what is good for them. Now, what good is philosophy and reason if it is definitionally impossible to ever be wrong about what is best for us? Second, how do we explain the ubiquitous phenomena of regret and internal conflict?
You can think up such scenarios for any of the virtues. A rash person will tend to act impulsively and in some cases this might allow them to save their own, or others' lives. An unwise person who gives up on a misleading riddle and picks an answer at random might, by sheer luck, just happen to pick the right answer, while the wise are mislead by assuming the challenge in fair, etc.
One can do this just as easily with consequentialism (any event can plausibly lead to great benefits or evils given a long enough time horozon) or with any deontological rule that isn't incredibly vague and abstract. Perverse counterexamples are easy to generate because we generally deal with incomplete information, and because our moral choices are framed by fortune, which is outside of our control.
Hence, the "all else equal" and "on average" framing. The situations we face, and the information we have when we face them, is determined by fortune and fortune can conspire to make an enemy of vice. It normally doesn't though. More to the point, virtue is what allows us to be relatively self-determining at all, such that we have any control in how we respond to fortune. Those who are easily coerced by hardship or seduced by pleasures become more a bundle of warring appetites driven on by external causes, less a self-determining rational whole driven on by the desire for what is truly best. It is the rational appetites, the desire for what is "really true" and "truly good" that allow us to transcend our finitude, going beyond current beliefs and desires, and so to transcend the given of what we already are. Someone who just pursues whatever desires they just so happen to have, and who does not seek truth, will be wholly determined by fortune.
Note that we could just as easily flip your example. Perhaps the attacking forces are slave takers who will kill the weak and take the strong because only they will survive and make good laborers. What remains constant is that the virtuous will tend to be best prepared to weather any such eventuality. You can weight the dice in the other direction too, by just imagining a man of tremendous strength, a Beowulf or Achilles, who simply slays all 100 raiders who have had the misfortune to stumble across the village of a demi-god, or a super-genius who has built their village a Maxim gun, etc. At the extremes, it is always insufficient virtue that is the problem. No mere mortal can beat up Superman or Goku.
Virtue insulates us from fortune. Saint Francis, Laotze, and the Desert Fathers flourish in the wilderness with nothing. Saint Paul, Boethius, and Socrates are sublime in prison awaiting death and cannot be coerced or seduced. By contrast, some people are ruined even by "good fortune," by wealth or fame, such that they become miserable and morally reprehensible.
One could say that Socrates' case shows the evils of virtues because being poisoned is bad and his virtue leads to him being poisoned. I think this would be a bad way to look at things. Ultimately, beings (people most of all) are what are good or evil. The goodness of actions or events is parasitic on the goodness of beings. So the question with Socrates is not whether being executed is good, it is whether it is better for us to be someone like Socrates, or to be someone who is easily cowed, such that they cannot bring themselves to stand up for principles even if they think they should, because they value their security more.
This doesn't imply that "for a monkey it is bad being eaten" is 'relative'. At best, it might show that the what is good for the tiger is bad for the monkey and this leads to conflict between the two animals.
That "the same event might be good for a being and bad for another" hardly implies that "there are no objective statements about what is good for a given being". Indeed, even this 'relativistic statement' ( i.e. "the same event might be good for a being and bad for another") seems to be a truth that is independent for any given perspective on the matter.
At the human level there are situations that seem ambiguous but some seem obvious. For instance, indulging in a drug addiction seems good to the addict because of the pleasant feelings the consumption of a given substance might give. But when compared to the painful consequences the addiction bring, it seems to me clear that the addict acts under a deception about 'what is truly goodfor him/her'. And this isn't true only 'for me' but also for the addict himself/herself.
In a 'virtue ethics' framework what is sought is what is truly good for a human being and the reasonable assumption that is made is that a human being might misunderstand 'what is truly good for him or her'.
There is no way we can participate in the science and technology of today and still think as people did when Martin Luther and Nietzsche were alive. Martin Luther thought the witch hunts were necessary. Back in the day, people lacked science and were very superstitious. From 1100 to 1700, the Catholic church unwittingly prepared Europe for the information transformation. These are the years of scholasticism. AI defines scholasticism like this...
There was a serious backlash against Aristotle's logic. Francis Bacon, born January 22, 1561, and died April 9, 1626, turned the world of reasoning upside down with inductive reasoning versus Aristotle's deductive logic. Francis Bacon's inductive reasoning opened the way to modern scientific thinking, and that is a totally different frame of mind that leads to understanding creation as a process of evolution, taking the place of the Biblical creation story and believing the Bible is a collection of pagan stories starting in Sumer, not a supernatural revelation of God.
What it takes for a universal morality to be achieved is today's technology, especially the computer and the internet, and the continued spread of science. How do we know the truth? We begin with the participation of all nations, then ask the right questions and validate the facts. I say this in part because all religions share the same morality. The differences are not that great because humans are not that different from each other. Another reason I believe unity and consensus are desirable and possible is that the death of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and framing our minds with science instead of mythologies, would end conflicts that trouble us so much today. Some good has come from those religions, but so have bad things come from the religions. Ignorance leads to evil.
The way many humans dealt with this moral conflict was to create a story where the hunted animal agreed to being killed and eaten in exchange for a benefit the humans would provide. However, the Christians have a different relationship with nature that is not so nice.
:lol: That is pretty narrow-minded. In fact, that thinking might lead to avoidable conflicts.
While I find your approach easily refutable (with your permission, I won't), I personally find it very relatable.
At the same time, it seems a bit outdated. It seems very sentimental and naive by today's standards. To me, these are very sound ideas, time-tested, but they're unlikely to interest anyone today. Unfortunately.
We will absolutely misunderstand even about ourselves so how can there be objectivity?
If you can show that, all else equal and on average, it is better to be gluttonous, slothful, cowardly, rash, unintelligent, weak, unhealthy, clumsy, weak willed, wrathful, etc., by all means. I have never had anyone take me up on that challenge so I'd be interested to see it! Rebuttals always seems to go in the other direction, contesting that the virtues can be defined.
If it is uninteresting today, I think that has more to do with the dominant notion that "freedom" is the ultimate good and that "freedom" involves a flight from all determination, such that any "virtues" necessarily present a sort of "limit on freedom" by "telling us not to act in certain ways." But, aside from misunderstanding what a virtue is by trying to define it in terms of individual actions, I think such a conception of freedom, as hegemonicly dominant as it is in modern culture, is straightforwardly incoherent on close analysis, since arbitrariness is not freedom. On any view where liberty must be defined in terms of [i]rational[/I] second-order volitions (the desire to have the desires one has), desires must be [I]understood[/I], which in turn requires certain doxastic and practical virtues.
Indeed, even critics of such a view regularly default to it when they accuse others of a lack of intellectual humility, engaging in bad faith argument (i.e., being motivated by desires other than truth), possessing poor reasoning capabilities, being close-minded or "dogmatic," leaping to judgements, etc. These are all criticisms of intellectual or practical habits (vices). And correcting these deficiencies seems to require something like Plato's notion of the establishment of the "rule of the rational part of the soul, as a sort of "meta-virtue" required for the consistent seeking of the virtues.
Or as Alasdair MacIntyre puts it more broadly, "the good life for man must involve those virtues required to discover the good life for man."
During my university years, Aristotle's Rhetoric was my go-to book. Discussions about virtues literally remind me of it.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned above, today's society is such that pronouncing something like this publicly will invite ridicule and misunderstanding. And you have to be a fairly accomplished rhetorician to explain these values ??to a contemporary audience through various techniques, appealing to the listeners' personal values, conveying ideas about "kindness," "honesty," and "caring."
Today, I was having a lunch conversation with a colleague of mine, born in 1995, who completely misunderstood my remarks about proper care for parents or simply human cooperation. The conversation went on for a long time, and eventually, of course, he agreed with me, recalling how he himself suffered from Covid alone in an apartment in a city of millions, with no one to give him water, simply because he chose individualism as a virtue (discourse does its job). And then, he agreed, almost in a whisper, hesitantly, so no one would hear. After all, it seemed rather strange, in his opinion.
It was a light conversation about "involvement," and I noticed how contradictory it fit with his ossified individualism, where the core value and highest good is "success at any cost."
Hence my words about how naive it all seems today. Although, of course, you were talking about something quite different, nonetheless, this experience struck me as a colorful example.
Well, I would not say that about all Christians... anyway, I believe that even the most radical vegan would recognize that, in order to live, we have to kill some animals (e.g. the insects that would destroy our crops).
Also, note that Christians actually recognize that this world is not (at least now) 'what is meant to be', so perhaps e.g. the inevitability of conflict with other species would be better understood in that light.
This is not to say that, of course, that many Christians didn't have a 'not so nice' relationship with nature.
In a more general viewpoint, it seems to me right to say that a human being should seek 'what is truly good' for herself or himself. At the same time, it is also obvious that, even within a 'secularist' viewpoint, that (most? all?) human beings often act against their own good, are confused about what is 'better' or 'worse' for them and so on. This is to say that 'virtue ethics' is IMO applicable even within a purely naturalistic view of human beings. In fact, it seems the only view to me that avoids a 'legalistic' reason to consider some intentions, behaviors etc 'right' and others 'wrong'.
Quoting praxis
I would say that, yes, it seems that it is inevitable for human beings to misunderstand and act against our own good.
Regardless, I do not see how even if all human beings misunderstood what is 'truly good' for them or even what is 'better for them' and what is 'worse for them', this would falsify the possibility, in principle, of making objective statements about 'what is truly good for human beings' and so on.
There was a time when most people believed that the Earth was the center of the universe and all celestial bodies revolved around the Earth. Yet we know that geocentrism is 'objectively false'. So, it would be not surprising that we might in a condition that we do not know what is truly good for us and nevertheless, in principle, we could know it.
And I do not see a contradiction between what I said above with the claim that philosophy might help us to improve our understanding of 'what is truly good for us' (in general or in a particular situation) etc.
:vomit: I am sorry, I am strongly opposed to using the God of Abraham religions to understand reality. It stood in the way of science and stopping, or at least slowing down, the destruction of our planet. It continues to stand in the way of science, and this has divided the US. I feel no mercy for those who bring this upon us.
:lol: There are people here who want to ban AI. If I had the power to ban something, it would be the God of Abraham religions. Starting out one's thinking with Christian mythology is problematic.
Where there are cars and other motorized vehicles and machines with internal combustion engines, there is antifreeze. Cats sneak into people's garages and sheds, and find all kinds of things there, some of them not safely stored. To say nothing of cars leaking antifreeze.
If that's flourishing ...
It's not sustainable to ascribe to and abide by a moral system that disregards how the world really works. Idealism like that drives people crazy.
This strange idea that philosophy should be cut off from real life ...
This is clearly a bad analogy. Scientific truths are a different category of knowledge than moral truths or values.
But do they not claim the lion's share of one's cultural or social "zeitgeist" depending on their popularity? Especially in times when perhaps, unlike today, the lines or understandings of "truth" and "morals" and "virtues" were less clearly drawn, if even visible? :chin:
Basically, there was a time when the two were one and the same. Naturally they became distinct for a reason, but can we really sit here in all honesty and pretend like the then-system didn't lay the foundation for what is the now-system and perhaps is only just another stepping stone toward a greater system? Why, who could say! Those before surely doubted, perhaps they were the most popular, and yet, here we are. So fancy that, eh?
I won't deny that it is, for many, unaccessible. In part this is because, beliefs to the contrary, we absolutely do still indoctrinate children into ethical systems; it's just that the current hegemon is one of therapeutic individualism (with an irreducible plurality goods).
I don't think it is naive though. To have stepped into the frame with a strong teleology is, in the modern environment, virtually always to have step out of the hegemonic paradigm, which means that one knows that opposing paradigms exist. The naive view assumes that one is absolute (e.g., that it stands alone as the fruit of "dispassioned reason" now that "superstition" has been paired back). By contrast, people often seem to think that even the most trivial sorts of relativism must be fatal to moral realism, so that millennia of past thinkers across the West and the East must have somehow been blind to the fact that "stealing seems good to the thief," or that cultural norms vary, etc., which denotes a sort of global naivety about past (and non-Western) theorizing on values.
This is certainly true for philosophers who advocate for any sort of metaphysically robust "virtue ethics", who are always aware that their justification requires challenging dominant assumptions in metaphysics and epistemology. I would say that the "naive view" thus tends to be more along the lines of: "'science says' the world is meaningless and valueless, or at least that values cannot be observed, except perhaps as some sort of occult 'emergent' property." Or, even for those who are aware of the many "deconstructions" of the prior view, and all the genealogical treatments that make it appear historically contingent and bound up in prior theological commitments, there is still a strong naive belief that rejecting the empiricist-naturalist metaphysical and epistemic frame is simply equivalent with abandoning "science and technology," i.e., that such a frame is "necessary for doing science," or at the very least, that it played a crucial, dominant role in the "scientific revolution" and "Great Divergence" that has led to modern technology.
I think such a view is "naive" because it is inculcated in the culture as a sort of default. I don't think it is unsupportable, but I also don't think it is particularly robust to sustained criticism either. The "Great Divergence" by which Europe pulled ahead of the rest of the world starts before the "New Science" and the trend is steady and doesn't really change until centuries after the New Science has become dominant (due to the Industrial Revolution). The metaphysics dominant in an area don't seem to track with differences in military or economic power, and at the individual level there are tons of examples of great scientists and inventors who went against the grain here. But more to the point, core epistemic starting points like "human reason is wholly discursive and never finds direct union with its objects" clearly have little to do with the practical methodologies of technological development.
And you'll see this in cultural products. Science fiction and fantasy will assume that, if a culture has any substantial technology and mastery over nature, they have developed an empiricist-naturalist outlook, and even a language of "natural law /obedience." Authors clearly want to make their cultures diverse and unique, and yet it seems that the imagination balks at the notion that a Taoist, Hindu, Neoplatonic, etc. culture could ever achieve a significant mastery over nature through techne. But if one understands the paradigm that emerged from Europe as both contingent and theologically loaded (even if it now denies God, it does so from a particular metaphysics/epistemology originally based on belief in God) then this seems rather naive.
Clear to whom? A great many philosophers reject the fact/values distinction. How exactly do you justify it?
And many of them argue against objective values.
Sure, hence it would an equally hollow argument to say merely: "Clearly there are objective values, thus an analogy that implies otherwise is a bad one."
You see, this another i had with your previous discussion: anti-realism is not a coherent perspective, it's just a means of labeling a position one finds threatening. The real problem is that people are constantly what they imagine with reality, and one of the biggest ways they do this is with moral value systems.
For example, i have been having issues with social media and message boards for years. The moderators do not really care, and expect only me to behave myself. That isn't an example of anti-realism, it's just a system that makes empathy impossible.
I have tried lots of advice to deal with my nicotine and internet addictions, but none of it works better than what i have discovered. The issue isn't my anti-realism, its difficulty dealing with a reality that requires facing manipulative advocacy and facing the information super highway.
Thanks for responding to my thread everyone: enjoy what you can.
Quoting baker
I think i may figured out why my winshield wiper fluid ejector stopped working: some ice probably cracked the container. But this is false, you never strictly need antifreeze to operate a car...you don't need to mix oil with antifreeze.
Interestingly, geocentrism most definitely expressed anthropocentric values and Galileo paid the price for extracting those values from astronomy. In the end it's all about power.
It seems that you have an aversion against Christianity and apparently other Abrahamic religions. I just say that generalizations are never helpful and I think if you seek enough you'll find that there are very different ideas among Christians on a huge variety of topics.
But note that I wanted to make a general point about virtue ethics which was widely accepted, I believe by many Christians in history. But, in fact, not only Christians but you find the idea in many ancient cultures (e.g. Indian religions, Taoist texts like Daodejing and Zuanghzi and so on).
Clearly, virtue ethics assumes that there is a distinction between 'virtues' and 'vices' and the firsts are 'better' than the seconds for a given person.
I find interesting that you only quoted this part of my post. You raised the objection that, if all human beings are wrong about 'what is good for them', then 'objectivity' about ethics is impossible. I merely made an example where there has been a context where most people have been wrong.
In any way, I don't believe that one can make such a 'hard distinction' between scientific truths and moral truths. We also learn, at least in part, good and bad behaviour with experience. A coward, for instance, often lives in a tormented state due to their fear. Instead, a generous person might find solace in the acts of helping others and live a more serene life than say someone greedy who lives in either a constant fear of losing one's possessions and/or in a state of disappointment for not having all the desired riches.
I already made the example of the addict. Clearly the addict acts under a self-deception (sometimes mingled with some awareness of behaving against one's own interest) about what is 'good' and might completely ruin his or her life.
These are clearly empirical observations one could make. They perhaps do not tell the whole story about what is 'virtue' and what is 'vice' but nevertheless they are important in a context of virtue ethics. I like virtue ethics because, as I said, seems to me the only ethical framework where ethical behavior never becomes an external imposition.
I still have not find a compelling objection of the apparent objective validity of, say, the statement "an addict, while indulging in the addiction, acts against one's own good".
It's about how the mind can best determine an increase of what is vital for the body to prolong its existence. So, perhaps. Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), we become blinded by that which we do not understand, and so inevitably make choices that seem wise or conducive to this psychotic goal, yet eventually... make a fatal misstep. And so, the pendulum of power is, perhaps doomed, perhaps favored, to swing back and forth, forevermore. Some ranges of motion simply take longer than others. To no credit of those who become unwitting pawns of fate that a lost world has no choice but to imagine they have any control or influence over. Which they ultimately do not. No mortal does.
"Anti-realism" in meta-ethics just refers to the claim that there are no facts about values; which is quite popular as a position. Plenty of people embrace this term as a label for their own ideas; I am pretty sure it is coined by anti-realists themselves.
The Count was quick to point this out and I agree.
I think human reality is largely shaped by human needs or purposesand human values. We dont share the same values however, so if there are objective values, who is right and who is wrong? And what is the purpose of insisting that one set of values is Correct? It provides the means to harness collective power.
I read, in a research lab, that a Bomobo bit a researcher after saying he would do so if the worker did not correct a wrong. That is how an animal without language sets its boundaries. There is a claim that some of these animals learn enough language to communicate verbally. They are social animals with some rules determining right and wrong behavior, but not the language to be philosophical. Even horses are said to pass culture on to their offspring. I hope that discussion culture falls under the subject of ethics and morals.
We might to able to identify our major cultures and if they there are social differences in their morals and ethics. But I also think our Western understanding of Asians is not adequate for the task.
Would you like to pick up from here and say something? We might consider how different the discussion would go if we held a more scientific mindset, as opposed to assuming Christianity pretty much covers the subjects of morals and ethics, and proceeded with Protestant assumptions.
Okay, for me the phrasing instead would be "subjectivist", which states moral truths exist, but ONLY subjectively. So that still means i can use moral values if they are beneficial to my selfish interests, or ignore them if they appear harmful or immoral. I don't know if Ayn Rand ever called herself that, her excuse was rationalism.
I think claiming there are "no facts about values" is confusing, because facts tend to imply shared information, and there are plenty of those. However, i guess some folks see anti-realism as the best framing for their suspicions on morality.
It was actually Nietzsche who argued this in "Geaneology of Morality", that "the good people" are just the powerful imposing what is "good" on the basis of what is good for them. To me, the point of how to make life better for everyone with a loss of moral absolutism is an interesting one, yet i'm pretty it's impossible currently given that human psychology tends to be more motivated by fear and anxiety than pleasure.
Quoting baker
I personally don't think think it's impossible for those things to happen, and it really depends on what attacking and punishing looks like. It's not idealism to know that the hierarchically powerful are not all powerful or godlike.
Maybe you can't assassinate a president and expect to get away with it, but i would suspect a president's cabinet members do hurt them sometimes, but in a much more minor way. I would argue that believing in the social infallibility of leaders is crazier than thinking it's impossible to harm them without getting away with it.
As an example: let's say a single parent is abusing their kids. Wouldn't it be possible for that kid to kill the parent and get away with it? It would be much easier for the kid to do that if there weren't police, and it wouldn't necessarily be good for the kid's future, but i'm just saying that it's possible.
Quoting baker
nah i'm unfortunately just a sensitive person and sometimes i don't want to talk about specific things on the internet ;-) I don't think it can be fully cut off from other things you do, even though it's always the case that people are like "let's not talk about this, let's do something else", and sometimes that approach appears necessary for group cohesion. I was having some thoughts about how punishments for extreme crimes could be improved to be less harmful and less hypocritical, but i am not quite ready to start a discussion on that kind of a rabbit hole here yet.
TBH, I never wanted to assume the truth of Christianity from the start in my posts, not sure why you think that. I was just arguing that, in my opinion, virtue ethics is a better view about ethics than other models. Virtue ethics is also generally coupled with the 'intellectualist' model of freedom, i.e. that a rational being is truly free when he or she is freed from all 'obscurations' that prevent him or her to recognize properly the good with the assumption that being 'rational' means to spontaneously desire what is recognized as good, in contrast to the 'libertarian' model which, instead, simply assert that freedom is the same as 'deliberative power' to choose among alternatives.
This model of ethics and freedom was certainly accepted among many Christians in history but I think you find it also asserted in completely different traditions like, say, Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelism etc in the 'West' and also in Indian religions. For instance, in Buddhism Nirvana is said to be achieved when spiritual ignorance ('avidya') ceases precisely because the 'enlightened' isn't said to be deluded about what is truly the highest good for him/her.
I now believe, after having reflected upon these things, that these kinds of ideas about freedom and ethics - irrespective (of some form) of Christianity, Buddhism or even 'secularism' etc being right - make most sense and they are the only that allow us to avoid considering 'virtuous behaviour' as the result of merely following an external code which is unrelated to our own nature.
Having made this clarification, sure, I think that scientific studies about the behavior of animals actually give us more understanding about human ethics. I am a bit reticent, however, to use it as a starting point because as you note there are differences among animal species. Still, I believe that the best approach is to study directly what happens among humans. I believe we should make the same observations we can make about animals in the case of humans.
So, I believe that the starting point of this kind of inquiry would be: what is good for a given human being? Considering that humans seem to be 'social animals', i.e. that human beings can't really be in total isolation from other human beings, we might think that, perhaps, relationships with others are essential for the good of a human being. So, how should people relate to each other in a way that it is good for them?
Are cultural differences enough a barrier to prevent us to make some judgments about other cultures? For instance, it seems that it is better for children to be raised by parents who truly love them. This is something that certainly seem to be supported by research in psychology. If we encountered a society that doesn't consider important how parents treat their children, would the difference among our cultures prevent us to say that such a society is simply wrong about this? Are we so hopelessly constrained by our own cultural context that we aren't able to make any judgment about other cultures?
Quoting praxis
:up:
Quoting praxis
I believe that the best approach here is to carefully examine all proposed 'set of values' with a critical spirit in a similar way one does in science (although the approach can't be the same of course). I happen to believe that, as I said, in the beginning of this post, virtue ethics and the intellectualist model of freedom are right precisely because they make the most sense and not devalue ethics as the mere following of an extrinsic moral code that is estranous, as you put it, to our 'needs or purposes'.
So, I believe that the starting point is to assess and try to find out what what are these 'needs' and 'purposes' are. Clearly some of the 'needs' aren't culturally dependent. It seems that, for instance, all children need genuine love when they are raised. Are we going to argue that this depends on a given culture? Or, instead, we might consider that, say, after reading the brutal effects that being raised in a dysfunctional or even abusive context can have on a person, perhaps we are allowed to say "it is good for children, irrespective of their cultural context, to be raised in a loving environment" as something that might apply to cultural contexts different from our own.
I did not think you personally started with Christian notions, but I think it is so much a part of our Western culture that it would be unavoidable.
Quoting boundless
What are possible obscurations to rational thinking?
Quoting boundless
I don't like labels, and I am realizing that is hindering my ability to understand what you are saying. I mean, I know virtually nothing about libertarians. On the other hand, I feel strongly about the importance of learning virtues, but now I am thinking that learning virtues may be culture-bound and that this may be inadequate. Such as, I recently learned, some cannibals feel strongly about the rightness of eating their loved ones when they die. Culturally, eating people is forbidden, but to the cannibals who eat their loved ones, to not eat them is terrible. I think culture puts some limits on what we can think about.
Quoting boundless
I have listened to a long explanation of meditation and Buddhism, which makes me think that enlightenment is a totally different frame of mind from our everyday thinking. I don't think I am ready to be free of being a part of our common lives with all our social concerns.
Quoting boundless
Interesting, given the Buddhist choice of disassociating from the cycle of life and death. Some days I think I am ready to do that, but I am still desiring my attachments, which give my life a personal meaning. I think I perfer the ups and downs of our lives to a state of bliss and no attachments.
Quoting boundless
Well, what would be good for me is an end to pain and more energy, so I could do more volunteering and have greater life satisfaction. This is so far from what I think you are talking about, but, back to us being animals, our health and the amount of energy we have. plays into our decisions. It is hard to be the person I want to be when dealing with pain and having very little energy. Like many people my age, I am learning to keep my mouth shut and let the young find their own way. The way to relate to others is to be encouraging but not interfering. Wow, that is hard for me to do!
They're not necessarily considered infallible, they're untouchable -- at least for those low enough in the hierarchy.
I was once talking to a Catholic priest. I gave a real-life example of one person causing great material damage to another person, namely, making the person homeless by destroying their home (and everything that comes along with experiencing that damage). Curiously to me, he replied, "We cannot understand evil."
So, to revisit:
Quoting Joshs
To which I replied that the socioeconomic status of myself and the other person respectively plays the determining role in how I would think about such a person's actions.
I still think it's naive and idealistic to think a person of low status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of high status. It's naive and idealistic to think that the same measurments apply to everyone, regardless of status. This doesn't mean that one must think of the higher-ups as infallible, but that one is not in a position to judge them. A quietism as summarized by the priest above seems to be a much more viable way to live, in contrast to wasting one's resources in a futile pursuit of "justice", or becoming cynical and jaded (and worse) upon realizing that one's sense of right and wrong cannot be acted on in cases that seem to need it most.
i think you're conflating and assuming way too much. Who is the ultimate judge of "correct"? Here's a John Cage quote to further elaborate on what i'm saying:
A mistake is beside the point, for once anything happens it authentically is."
It should be noted that John Cage largely got famous for making very weird and unconventional music, some of it isn't even "music" in the technical aspect. His interest was re-writing the classical music standards: you can complain that a person of "lower status" couldn't have done what he did, but the truth is that we are creative animals, and what we do is what we do: it doesn't apply to a standard until we use them. I get you feel anguished that double standards exist, yet i do not need to internalize them, nor do i need to except some horribly slavish existence. Some will, some people will have it so bad they can't think of their life in any other way, but you don't need to bring every other person into it. It's very, very naive to think the rich and powerful are always happy.
You are talking about status...but what type of status are you talking about? People apply measurements, but the measurements themselves have absolutely no objective value. I personally don't want to go down your train of thought of trying to impose an objective truth, to me that's really depressing, because i can no longer judge a situation for myself. I can't go through my life using the opinions of others as a reference ONLY, while assuming that i can't know or judge at all. That's pretty viciously masochistic yet seemingly common.
the biggest issue is not that you are wrong, but the same can be said in reverse. For example, the racist trope about african americans being lazy came into being because the latter would be tired after working all day, and white people thought that this was a sign of their inherent laziness. Where great distance exists between two people, the ability to properly judge them diminishes. If a low status person attended a university, it could happen that they have all the tools they need to judge the words and actions of other people, but this of course is never guaranteed....it could be an awful university, it could be that the lower status person will feel too alienated by the culture and curriculum to get very far, yet i don't see how someone could get through there life without being open to different possibilities...
Ok.
Quoting Athena
A lot of things. I made the example of addiction before. An addict clearly acts against one's own good. And this is because they prefer the good feelings experienced by indulging into the addiction over the long term benefit of stopping it.
Another possible example might be excessive 'self-importance', e.g. someone who tries to force their will on others which likely result in isolation, excessive suspiciousness and fear.
Quoting Athena
By 'libertarianism' I mean the position that equates 'freedom' with the mere 'ability to choose between different alternative'. In my view, this understanding is incomplete.
Choices are made with an end in view. If we aren't constrained to act otherwise, if we are presented with different options, we choose the 'best' alternative, i.e. what we think is good for us (even when we experience a 'cost' for such a choice - e.g. in an 'altruistic' choice - we regard it is better to act in a certain way despite the 'cost'). However, we can be wrong in our thinking about what is good and this leads us to choose what isn't good for ourselves.
Regarding the differences between cultures I do think that the best explanation is actually that societies can be wrong in their practices, just like individuals can. I do recognize the possibility that I am 'constrained' in my judgments by my own cultural and social prejudices but I also believe that an excessively 'relativistic' approach leads to absurdity. To make a different example, slavery has been seen as 'something natural' for a very long time. I believe that nowadays we are simply more aware of the evil that slavery is and those societies that considered slavery as 'normal' were simply deluded.
Also such a relativism would also make questionable the dialogue between cultures. If we are so constrained by our cultural and social prejudices, how could possibly have benefit by having a dialogue with someone from a different socio-cultural context?
As always, perhaps, the truth is in the middle.
Quoting Athena
Neither do I. In any case, I was just using Buddhism as an example where virtue ethics seems to be central. IIRC, some scholars disagree with this interpretation of Buddhist ethics because in Buddhism there is the central tenet of 'anatman', not self, which is generally interpreted as meaning that the 'self is illusory'. At the same time, however, for an 'unenlightened' disciple the 'virtue ethics model' seems to best represent the way in which Buddhism ethics 'works'.
Incidentally, this idea that "we should cultivate virtue because it is good for us" was actually common in Antiquity. It is certainly found also in Greek and many Christian thinkers. However, in the latter case, there are undoubtedly also streams of thoughts that seem to reduce ethics to 'following rules of an extrinsically imposed system' (especially from the Late Middle Ages, if I am not mistaken). But you also find many thinkers that agreed that virtue is it's own good, that we should cultivate virtue because it is beneficial to ourselves and so on.
Quoting Athena
Ok, I see and I appreciate that :up: Note, however, how the conception of 'what the good for us is' influences the 'ideal' of life we have and how the former depends also on the 'worldview' one has.
For someone who has a 'secularist' worldview, clearly, the 'good' arguably is 'flourishing' in this life. And it makes perfect sense in such a framework.
A traditional Buddhist would, however, point out that, if Buddhism is correct, we are bound in samsara and, ultimately, 'flourishing' doesn't resolve the deeper lever of suffering we are into. In other words, those effort would be amielorative but, ultimately, would be unsatisfactory. Practicising for the ending of the cycle of death and rebirth would be the 'highest good' for them. So, in this framework, a monk or a nun that tirelessly practise to achieve Nirvana with limited social contacts would be seen as wiser than an activist.
A Christian can similarly argue that social, environmentalism activism is good. But, again, the general worldview that a Christian has is different from that of a 'secularist' and this influences also the conception of what the 'good' is and certainly for a Christian activism alone can't be the 'highest way of life'.
I could go on with examples.
So the reason why I said that discussing about 'what is good' is the starting point is that it is the foundation upon which ethics is oriented. Also, I think that too often a 'religious life' is assumed to be a life where one imposes to oneself an extrinsic 'moral code' that one follows only due to fear. Incidentally, I also believe that extreme forms of relativism also have the same problem. If there isn't any 'objective' ground upon which we can base values, ethics etc, at the end of the day there is a risk that one system imposes itself. It is no wonder why IMO Nietzsche made so many references to conflict while also be a critic of 'morality' as a form of 'denial of life'.
Forgot to mention that 'what is good' for a person seems to be related to the 'what is a person' and this would in turn imply that ontology and ethics are related. Ethical values can't be an 'arbitrary code' that has no bearing to the ontology of human beings in order to be meaningful.
Sorry for the insubstantial response. I thought better of it and came back to try adding some substance.
My reading of N is basically that virtue ethics is life denying or slave morality and very much in the game of social power dynamics.
He indisputably preached creativity, self-overcoming, and the affirmation of life.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Lets say for the sake of argument that Nietzsche-interpreters like Deleuze and Focault are right in seeing the direction of the ethical for Nietzsche not within a particular content of belief, nor any particular rule or principle of conduct, but as continual creative self-transformation and self-invention. Would this be appealing to you?
Of course, the source of my disagreement was praxis trying to argue that my take on Geneaology of morality was false, and that his edited version was correct. They both work IMO, even if criticisms like "Nietzsche was the prototype for nazi and fascist ideology" are mostly false. What i like about him is the ambiguity and multi-faceted dimension of his writing. I don't like the prospect of turning his writing into a self-help authority.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
What I like about Nietzsche is that I am able to discern in his work a substantive, radical and quite focused philosophical stance. There is ambiguity in any philosopher. For me what is most admirable about him is not the ambiguous aspects, but the aspects the philosophers I most admire are in general agreement about, such as the meaning of concepts like eternal return and will to power. I cant imagine a powerful philosophy which doesn't help one makes sense of ones world and oneself. In that respect all good philosophy is self-help . No one understood that better than Nietzsche, who believed that all philosophy was autobiography, and whose philosophical insights rescued him from desperate sickness back to health time after time.
Quoting Joshs
The part that makes it fun, at least for me, is the ambiguity. Otherwise, i wouldnt read his books themselves, but i would leave it up to some academic interpretation. Kaufman was a pretty good source for that among others, yet there's always room to make your own, even after all this time.
Just checking - does this work the other way? Would it also be naive and idealistic to think a person of high status could correctly measure or evaluate the words and actions of a person of low status. And I'm also interested in what you count as high status.
Here's the thing: How do you cope with blatant injustice done to you, and you have no recourse for rectifying it? Without becoming cynical and jaded?
You can't really dish out punishment without either committing some crime, or getting some collective approval that someone committed a wrong against you
This is moot, because the person of higher status is automatically correct by virtue of their higher status.
Someone with more socioeconomic power.
Look, I'm not an elitist. I'm interested in having a measure of peace of mind and not becoming cynical and jaded in the face of injustice.
If you look at popular religion/spirituality, as well as popular psychology, the advice usually goes in the direction that the ordinary person (who doesn't have the means to revenge themselves) should embrace a type of amoralist, anomic stance where they are quietly okay with whatever happens or is done to them (or others). Morality doesn't seem to be something everyone could afford.
For example: You get falsely accused of some wrongoing at work, you get fired, you are blamed for losing your job, so you're not eligible for unemployment benefits; you don't have the money to pursue the matter legally. How do you get peace of mind in such a situation (without doing something illegal)?
Well, it seems like in that kind of a situation (being accused of something falsely) means there is no legal recourse without some evidence of the business behaving illegally. The unfortunate reality is that alot of times people do not get punished for harming us...even though dishonest behavior can have long term disadvantages (for example, alienating people who could useful or comforting in the future)
I dont think this is moot. In my experience, low-status people can and do question those of higher status. And changes may result.
Quoting baker
Ok, thanks for the clarification.
I'm not sure I share this understanding. I guess I'd need to understand this through specific examples rather than abstract principles.
My previous was a little too depressing, as i was only thinking of it in terms of "getting justice". Things similar to what you have described have happened to me before.
While retaliation tends to be off the table, what does tend to help is finding a sympathetic ear, and looking for what can be learned from the situation. The saying "the best revenge is living well" speaks directly to situations where you want revenge but also realize acting on it just makes your life worse...
Absolutely!
For sure, it is incomplete. As social animals, our thinking must be inclusive. As supposedly intelligent animals, our thinking needs to consider future generations.
Yep, nations and cultures can need psychoanalysis just as much as individuals. The way nations play war games makes psychoanalysis very important.
Something that you mentioned is the middle path, balance, and harmony. As you know, it isn't all about me or all about you, but it is about us. If I am knocking myself out to be the perfect daughter, wife, mother, woman, it doesn't matter. If I don't know everyone else's idea of perfection and meet it, I am not going to get what I want, approval and acceptance, maybe even honor? I used to do some public speaking, and perhaps the most important rule is "know your audience". This is essential if the goal is to persuade others to accept new ideas. In everything we do, who do we want to please and why?
It was a real shock to me to build my life on the 1950s ideal woman image and suddenly sink to being "just a housewife". Who wants to be just a housewife? It sounded like a dirty word. My 2 1/2 years younger sister was way ahead of me. She took the career path, while I felt like a fish out of water when the change was made. For me, this has everything to do with amoralism and moralism. How fast can we change our morals and keep up with a society that is on the move? But here is the question that really bothers me- was the force of social change really better for humanity?
You wrote in favor of this and that, both being part of the truth. I often find truth is both this and that. But right now, everything is moving too fast, and I am not sure we are on the right path. I am not Christian and want to point out that Christianity is in the line of destroying the goddess and supporting the patriarchy, and I have strong feelings against all this. Many native American tribes were matriarchal, and I think that is better for mankind.
There are so many things to think about, and I wish we began with scientific thinking, not Christianity a personal God, and individuality, that can be divisive and exclusive and include harmful rationalizations. Destroying the planet for temporary benefits is not good thinking. It is not moral thinking.
Well, I was lucky enough to have enough time to write those long posts (and I also have a tendency to 'overelaborate'...). I'll have likely less time in the following days, so I'll reply less frequently .
Quoting Athena
:up: Yet, sometimes it seems to me that many people do not seem interested to live a coherent life in beliefs and deeds, and/or do not seem to be able to appreciate the consequences of certain beliefs, and/or do not live up to their own standards...
Of course, I am included.
Doing philosophy however helps to do that or at least be aware of these kinds of disconnects.
Quoting Athena
Agreed!
Quoting Athena
Again, I agree with this. I believe that, in fact, societies and cultures can 'learn' in a way analogous to how individuals learn. One example is, for instance, how slavery became in time seen as the monstrousity which it is. Nowadays we think that a human being can be considered a property as an abomination but slavery was practised regularly. I believe that at least on this point it is safe to say that humanity (on average) has learned a bit better what is better for each and all individuals.
Quoting Athena
Well, we can also say that both an 'unconcerned' and a 'perfectionistic' attitude can damage both oneself and others. If I don't care about the 'goodness' of my actions it is of course a problem. At the same time, however, if I care too much I will probably be unable to act in any way and we get entangled in despair. So, yeah, we need the proper balance. Easier to say than to to do.
Quoting Athena
In a way, both us and others. But, again, we should seek to 'please' in the right way. Assuming that the lecture aims to inform the audience of some theme, the goal is to inform the audience in the optimal way. So, one can't either cause boredom to the audience nor entertain them without any real information. The optimal way is to both inform and entertain. Again, more easily said than done. Realistically, this means that we need to put a limit on both the quantity of information we want to share and the 'entertainment/pleasure' we want to give to the audience.
Furthermore, in some context causing unpleasant feelings can be for the good of the other. While 'punishments' should be avoided as far as is possible, sometimes they are inevitable. Not punishing someone for their inappropriate behavior is hardly uneducative at least in some circumstances. Sometimes the right 'punishment' can be the proper way for a transgressor to come to their senses and change their ways (and if the intent is educative, perhaps it would be better to speak of 'corrections' rather than 'punishments').
Again, this equally applies to someone who behaves badly but also for an addict. If a parent knows that their teenage child assumed drugs, the parent might decide to ground the child and take the child to a doctor against their will. The child perhaps would perhaps find painful this kind of intervention but we can expect that, once the child has become wiser, he or she will be grateful to their parent.
Quoting Athena
Good questions. A famous aphorism of Kierkegaard says that life can be lived forwards but can be understood backwords. While I would disagree if this is taken to an extreme, this is largely correct. It is difficult to say if certain changes have been for the better. All we can do is form a well-reasoned opinion given evidence.
A rigid moralism has undoubtedly painful effects on people. Of course, I have said above that painful experiences can be for the better. But, at the same time there are cases where it is evident that a rigid moralism becomes self-referential and makes the 'code of law' something more important than the persons it is supposed to be useful to. If moralism becomes an obstacle to the process to realize the good for the individual and the community it should be put into question.
For instance, if a moral system is supposed to make people more loving but the practical effects are that people become more self-centred, suspicious and so one it is right IMO to question the moral system. But this should be done in a careful way and not in an unreflecting way.
Quoting Athena
Yes, I agree. And the problem with fast changes is that people have not time to think about them in a proper way.
Quoting Athena
I am also not a Christian partly because I find it impossible to accept some social norms that are generally held by Christians to be 'non-negotiable'. I do believe that there are good arguments for theism and I am very sympathetic to some forms of Christianity but I can't right now join a religious tradition (Christian or otherwise). I know that, perhaps, it doesn't make sense to be a 'non-religious theist' but, to be honest, I can't help myself to be different.
Regarding gender inequality, I think it should be said that we tend to have an 'idealized' view of cultures we are not familiar with. I do not know about native American tribes so what I am saying doesn't apply to them, but over time I came to the conclusion that 'patriarchy' isn't really a problem of a specific religion or culture but simply was a common theme in Antiquity. Indian and Chinese religious traditions and societies haven't generally be 'more open' to gender equality than in the 'West'. Despite its reputation, for instance, you'll find more female writers among in the history of the Catholic Church - whose writings have been highly regarded for centuries - rather than, say, in Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu etc traditions (to my knowledge, I would be happy to be disproven here). I am not suggesting that Catholics are more 'inherently' open to gender equality than anyone else or anything like that but I just note how our assessment can neglect these things.
Furthermore, at least in recent times there are movements inside Christian traditions as well as for instance Buddhist traditions and undoubtedly other traditions that actively try to raise the awareness of the dangers of 'patriarchy', so I am a bit wary to make general assertion about what is the position of a given religion about this matter.
In general, I am persuaded that 'Christianity', 'Buddhism' etc are umbrella terms in which you find extremely huge variations in many aspects. So really if one tells me that he or she is a 'Christian', a 'Buddhist', a 'Muslim' and so on I have to say that I have little information about him or her.
In my humble opinion, I just think that neither 'patriarchy' nor 'matriarchy' perhaps are the best options. Indeed, it seems to me that biological sex shouldn't be thought as a reliable indicator of the place in society that an individual 'should have'. I wouldn't say that biological sexes do not matter at all, but they certainly seem to matter less than our ancestors seemed to believe so firmly.
Quoting Athena
I agree. After all, irrespective of one's own religious beliefs I think that we can establish if certain things are good for us both individually and collectively. As you say ruining the very environment in which we live is certainly not a good thing to do. It is also frustrating how difficult is to get a substantial change here.
We have so many agreements that there was nothing for me to add to what you said, except to confirm that we agree: only when a person knows better can they do better. Morals without virtues is a bad thing. I think far too many of our decisions are built on notions of reward and punishment, with far too much taken for granted, assuming the wrongdoer knew better or should at least automatically know better, and therefore, must be stopped from repeating a bad action by punishing the wrongdoer. The obvious bad judgment of relying on punishment is that it does not ensure the child/person understands the wrong and has learned what would be better.
I had several pen pals in prisons, long before the internet, and it was so sad to be aware of their failure to know better, and how the conditions of prisons can make things worse. Our correction system is not wise. Especially when it goes with an amoral society with weak family values. :lol: I must laugh at myself because I am imagining getting on a war horse with all my armor and rushing out to confront this evil of ignorance. I didn't know better when I was young, and I hate dying before correcting our shared ignorance and bad judgment.
The most important information I have come across in my lifetime was a Canadian woman's explanation of why we must teach virtues. Language is vitally important. When we do not have a word for something, we know nothing about that something. Children can not be virtuous without the language of virtues, and we can not depend on their parents to teach them about something when they themselves don't even have the words for virtues and therefore, can not have virtuous thoughts. Our education made good citizenship the priority of education until 1958. Now we are smart, but we have lost our wisdom.
Quoting boundless
I have read that, in the past, Buddhism and Catholicism were so similar that there was concern about them blending. I do not think we can properly understand the words attributed to Jesus without an understanding of Buddhism, which came out of India with Hindu influences. If there is a "word of God", according to Joseph Campbell, that God spoke to everyone, but people in different places understood His words a little differently because of the different geology of people around the world. I think we can study the history of these religions and gain an understanding of their development and the historical and political influences. I think this is essential to a study of God's truth. To study only one holy book leaves a person ignorant of so much, and this is important if we want to be rational about our notion of truth.
I think Cyrus was one of the most awesome people to have ever lived and ruled a country. This is Whoops, had to delete that!
That is important because of how the Persian religion influenced the Hebrew understanding of good and evil, and the spread of superstition, leading to the belief in demons and torpedoing the intellectual developments coming out of Hellenism. On the success of patriarchy and failure of matriarchy, he who wins the war gets to tell the story and set the rules. But the gender thing is not just about patriarchy and matriarchy, making the discussion of gender differences extremely complex. I think a Japanese geisha is the ideal of femininity by any national standards, and I would love it if, like the French, we celebrated the difference. Hare Krishna is androgynous. Hey, this could make a fun thread. All the different flavors of male and female.
Good gravy, my thoughts are going all over the place, and this is not leading to the standard of good philosophical argument.
Quoting boundless
This might get my head back on track. I want all decisions to be in the best interest of children. Okay, this is virtues and morals. In a patriarchy land follows the line of males. In a matriarchy, land follows the line of females. Internationally, we have reason to believe that women tend to be the better caregivers for children, and empowering them seems to benefit the children more than leaving men in charge. But I know females who are terrible mothers! :gasp: I think fathers play a very important role in raising children; however, their role may be different from the mother's role. Both a mother and a father are important, and maybe both would do better if they believed how valuable they are. I did a Google check, and there is an important connection between child rearing and philosophy.
I think the situation of being wrongly accused, fired, and denied unemployment is very bad, and I can sympathize with the desire to harm those who wronged the person who was fired. What is left but revenge and a moment of feeling empowered, when all else has gone wrong, and one might feel powerless and need to act on that feeling. However, ProtagoranSocratist is correct. But how do we call up the inner strength to resist a desire for revenge?
When I experience such difficult times and don't know what to do, I draw a Virtue Card and/or check with the I Ching. Beginning with the injustice of being fired, I asked for the best way to deal with this situation and drew the card for "tact".
Acting on a desire for revenge is nonverbal communication and can lead to legal problems. I Ching says, "The Superior Man keeps his anger under control and is moderate in his desires".
Because I have been between a rock and a hard place many times, I know it is a whole lot easier to do the right thing when we are secure in our resources and have good support from family and friends. I would have sympathy for anyone without the resources and support, but this is all the more reason for not risking making matters worse and for clinging to the personal value by doing the right thing.
We used to think virtue and strength were synonymous. I think it would be nice if it were culturally recognized as important today. Most of us will not become part of the exclusive elite circle, but each of us can enjoy the strength of virtues.
I think philosophy can give us the grounds for a post-Christian culture that is successful.
At the moment, my head is full of a lengthy explanation of Carl Jung and the need to stop suppressing our dark side, but instead work to unite our psyche. Here is a need to stop projecting our evil onto others, creating a situation such as the world wars. Now that is the opposite of Christianity and declaring God wants us to destroy the evil enemy. I often wonder what the world would be like without a God of war.
the quote you gave in describing tact was more about finding the truth, the churchill quote seems more about appearances, revenge, and politics than a renewed shared understanding. The quote you described explicity requests people don't offend each other...
However, punishments can also be educative. For instance, a parent that let his or her child to experience the 'bad natural consequences' of the child's behavior might do the right thing that allows the child to understand the problems of acting in a certain way. Also, I believe that is some cases 'extrinsic punishments' can be educative. Again, a parent that knows that, say, their child stole something from a shop might reprimind the child and decide that the child should go to the shop, give to the owner what has been stolen and apologize etc instead of letting the child do what they are currently desiring. This is clearly an extrinsic punishment in the sense that the child at the end does something that they would not like to do.
Of course, in both cases the point of punishment is educative. So punishments can actually help a person to become virtuous at least if they are skillfully applied.
Nevertheless, a rigid moralism where people are merely expected to follow rules and being punished in a purely retributive fashion if they misbehave risks to be perceived as purely cohercive by those who have to follow it.
So, at least ideally I believe that all punishments should have - among their goals - the education of who is punished. Clearly, it seems that such a goal can't be reached in some cases or can't be the main goal of the punishments but it seems to me that that these situations shouldn't be 'the norm'. Quite often, it seems to me, the problem is not the 'rules' in themselves but rather the approach to them. So 'fear of punishment' and even 'punishments' can actually be good motivators to learn virtue but at the same time can never tell the whole story. The 'moral code' we are expected to follow should be somewhat linked to what is good to us.
In this discussion, I am thinking about a member of the forum whom I have chosen to ignore because he refuses to be considerate of people's feelings. He intentionally rejects the notion that tact is important.
This is not just about my feelings when I feel insulted, but the society I live in and my grandchildren and great-grandchildren, and the kind of society I want for them.
I grew up with a very bred grandmother, and I was attracted to older people who were as virtuous as my grandmother. I experienced these virtuous people, and no one can convince me that this gentile and dignified way of life is not possible. For me, nothing is more important than doing everything I can so that a better reality is made manifest, as it was once made manifest by educated people.
I am thinking many may think I am a snob, so I must clarify that what I am saying comes from my heart. This is about love and caring, and believing we can manifest a wonderful reality if we put our minds to it.
And if I am sent to Hell because I am not Christian, oh well, I will do my best to make Hell a better place. :smile:
Immediately, what came to mind while reading your reply is the word "discipline" and the Eastern philosophy regarding discipline.
Unfortunately, I can not use the AI explanation of discipline that I wish everyone understood. However, I think I can use the address to the thought and hope people use it to learn another way of thinking that is very different from how our Western, Christian culture thinks. https://www.google.com/search?q=eastern+notion+of+discipline&rlz=1C1GCEA_enUS990US990&oq=eastern+notion+of+discipline&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIHCAEQIRigATIHCAIQIRigATIHCAMQIRifBTIHCAQQIRifBTIHCAUQIRifBTIHCAYQIRifBTIHCAcQIRifBTIHCAgQIRiPAtIBCzkzMDA1NmowajE1qAIIsAIB8QX3fg88BV5Isw&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
I hope you see this is not an argument against what you said, but a different way of thinking. A well-disciplined child will do much better in life than an undisciplined or punished child of the West. Our vision of a punishing and rewarding God appears to be in the Last Days of this God's truth. I hope we see things differently and fulfill the hope of the New Age- a time of high tech and peace and the end of tyranny. :heart:
Yes, I see. But I am suggesting that punishments and fear of punishments is a necessary (or perhaps inevitable) part of education. In my example of an adolescent that steals from a shop, the parent decision to lead the child to give back the item stolen and apologize to the shop owner is certainly a punishment even if educative. After experiencing it, the adolescent might gradually come to his or her senses and avoid to do that again, perhaps initially for fear of being punished again and later because he or she understands that the action is wrong.
So, I am not really disagreeing with the 'Eastern' notion of discipline and that a disciplined person in such sense is in a better state than a person who doesn't good only out of fear. But I would say that punishments (in a broad sense, including 'experiencing the natural results of one's actions' and 'educative punishments') and the fear of them are perhaps necessary part of our education.
Clearly, purely retributive punishments can't be read in such a way as their aims do not include education.
Regarding 'divine punishments' in Christianity I don't think that we can say that there is a single view. In fact, I believe that most Christians would say that in some cases the 'divine punishments' are educative. When they say they aren't, many Christians nowadays say that they are actually the consequence of the 'hardening' of the sinner's heart.
I don't, of course, deny that the picture of a vengeful God hasn't been common in Christianity and at times the most accepted one. But there is no single view about these among Christians.
Wilhelm Reich might argue that people perform this particular punishment as part of their "character armor" instead of it being selfless education. In other words, it's not really about the kid deserving to be treated so harshly, but about the parent's fears about how the child will make them look in the future.
I'm not saying i wouldn't do something like that example as a parent, yet when a child can't use money to the extent their parents can, it seems absurb to look at the item stolen as being sacred and inviolable. Maybe stirnly telling the kid "You didn't pay for that: go put it back.", could be more educational and simple, but i'm not a parent. Simple as possible seems to best suit children rather than dramatic performances.
Perhaps in some cases yes. In some cases no. Not sure why one would like to think that in the case I was thinking. Let's say that the stolen item was quite costly and if done by an adult the act could be considered a somewhat serious instance of theft.
I mean: I was thinking about the case of an adolescent that isn't easily convinced by a simple 'verbal reprimand'. Indeed, there was no physical harm done to the child in my example from the parent. The parent simply didn't allow the child to go to a place he/she did want to go (let's say having fun with friends) and, instead, brought him/her to the shop owner to apologize and give back the stolen item. It is actually an example of 'restorative justice' that perhaps also can benefit to the offended part here.
I am also not a parent but I do not see any kind of selfish behaviour in the parent. Certainly, 'doing nothing' would be worse. The misbehaving adolescent here might in that case continue in his/her destructive behaviour.
In any case, even a 'verbal reprimand' is actually a form of punishment even if it is less intense.
Even among adults, let's say that a grown man/woman one night drives recklessy and gets a fine for having exceeded a speed limit. Getting the fine might actually be the occasion of changing the way he/she drives. Maybe at first for fear of getting fined again and, later, because he/she comes to see that safe driving, while perhaps more boring, leads to more good than reckless driving.
Of course, punishments should not exceed some boundaries. Of course, at least when possible, dialogue or other 'measures' should be applied instead of punishments. But I think that punishments, when skillfully done, might lead to the good of those punished.
i can't really imagine that a parent, who probably wishes other people saw them as a "good parent", can really see the difference though. I'm trying to point out that someone trying to protect their image is a natural part of also wanting to protect their child. Unfortunately, families tend to be isolated units, so image protection becomes a real problem for the parents. Who is going to help them take care of their kids, or let them have momentary relief from their work and parenting duties, if outsiders are judging them for failing to keep up with the local standards?
This is a little bit of a "shifting goal posts" issue in your examples: at what point can you really say the behavior is wrong? So, if an adolescent steals something expensive, then they've clearly passed the threshold of childhood and can now make decisions that have real gravity? Most (if not all) court systems in the U.S. completely disagree with you: a 13 year old would rarely get punished to the same degree for stealing a car as a real adult, and there are age of consent laws to prevent real adults from even considering having sexual relationships with adolescents.
I guess in a way, it's good to be as un-conflicted about moral dilemmas as you are, I wish I could look at crime and punishment with lower degrees of skepticism.
Do you think that 'punishments' (in a quite broad sense of the term) can never be means of education? Do you think that it is always possible to avoid 'punishments' and still educate efficiently?
'Punishment' here means either causing or allowing some kind of painful or unpleasant experience. I would actually answer yes to both, i.e. that 'punishments' can be means of education and that it isn't always possible to avoid 'punishments' to educate efficiently for the reason I tried to explain in my previous posts.
"education", to me at least, is besides the point, because education and learning are radically different things. Education can't really exist without some institution that requires it, whereas learning is a constant process we all face that never ends.
I was never intending to imply that punishment always does more harm than good, or cannot be justifiable, but that we cannot ignore the stance and selfish ends of the punisher. I felt your examples of the parent chastising the kid for stealing, and the state punishing someone for driving aggressively, were too standard and lacked the day-to-day complications of ethical decision making. I still can't just complacently accept those vague examples as a lesson in the "always good". Punishers are capable of making dubious claims about the actions of others and their intentions, and probably do so on a regular basis. Trying to exclude any punishment from ethical and moral standards makes absolutely no sense if you are indeed trying to make the best decisions for everyone involved.
Not every unpleasant social reaction can be adequately described as a punishment either. For example, a baby crying might feel like a punishment, but it would be absurd to try to argue that a baby cries as a natural, divine punishment for the sexual behavior of the parents. It's pretty typical for people to moralize about anything to do with children, which is a pretty huge motivator for me not to have children. If I can't always control myself and I make mistakes, then why burden myself with someone who I have even less control over? It's still entirely possible that I will have kids anyways, yet having to repeat very common ideas just to cover my ass.... "don't take that candy bar off the shelf without paying for it! If you want something, ask me to buy it for you", or, "well, it's your fault the state is fining you this large amount, you shouldn't be driving so recklessly"...seems to detract from the joy of the experience. The thought of me repeating the second moral lesson is even worse I.M.O., because then I'm stepping into the dicey territory of blaming someone else for a choice made by a police officer, which seems to be hypocritical. On top of that, traffic fines and punishments are a pretty clear example of extortion, no matter how much sense it makes on the surface...
However, I would indeed tell my children both of those things if i had them, as my child stealing or [later] driving recklessly would leave me no choice. I guess a more interesting moral question to me would be, when do you stand up for your kid when someone else punishes them? How far should I go in shaming them over inappropriate sexual expression and language?
I see your point but IMO humans are intrinsically social animals, so social behavior is an essential component of human life. And, hence 'education' is inevitable.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
This is a questionable statement IMO. You seem to assume that it is simply impossible to punish without any selfish end. To make just one example of someone who would disagree, in a Buddhist discourse (AN 4.111) the Buddha, who is assumed to be totally selfless, is depicted as stating that sometimes harsh words are useful for some disciples and, in some cases, people can be even regarded "as [not] being worth speaking to or admonishing" (so, expelled from the order of monks... this is not explicitly stated in the discourse I quoted but you can find examples of transgressions that are regarded as worthy of expulsion). Criticism and expulsions are clearly punishments. So, your premise here is simply questionable.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I agree with that. But I was making a point of principle. In practice, I agree with you that, unfortunately, bad motivations can 'mix' into the decision behind a given punishment. So, yes, punishments should be regulated. I sense that, ideally, punishment should aim for the good of both the transgressor and the community (so, punishments should also protect the victims, if there are any). So, at least a regulative principle, those who punish should seek the individual and communal good.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Yes, unfortunately, and the idea of 'inherited guilt' that is present in certain forms of Christianity certainly had a bad influence. Note, however, that this idea is absent in many other forms of Christianity (the idea in these forms of Christianity is that we have a weakness that predisposes us to sin and not that we are 'born sinners' worthy of punishment). Again, this is an example on how we should be careful to generalize some criticism to the whole of 'Christianity' when, in fact, it is apt only to some forms.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Not sure what your point is. In any case, I believe that fines are an example of a necessity. They aren't perfect because, after all, rich people aren't as affected by fines as poor people, but without traffic fines many people would neglect the rules.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Ideally, a parent should accept the punishment, assuming the punishment itself is really 'for the good'.
In any case, the parent should evaluate carefully the situation and accept the punishment if it is indeed the 'better' option. This isn't clearly easy but parents shouldn't justify wrong behaviour of their children. Of course, if the punishment is totally unjust, disproportionate etc it is right to defend the child.
What a rediculous statement, i have to stop here: how can one possibly commit "an unselfish act"? I think you attempt to answer this, but ill have to address that later.
I think you are getting at something that typically bothers me about religions in general: if this is indeed a supposition for buddhists, then it is not an atheist religion as some claim, because the buddha must be a God if he is indeed selfless, as there is not a single selfless person on earth.
Quoting boundless
How? This is questionable, because you're not elaborating.
I was only arguing that your simplistic examples justifying punishments of children and punishments for speeding aren't adding enough information for us to come up with a reasonable punishment. If you drive, then you'll see how unhelpful that is: the police regularly exceed the speed limit. It's not only about "enforcing good behavior", it's about collecting revenue and scaring people into safer driving habits. This opens up more questions, and doesnt clarify morals.
Quoting boundless
The police do more than enforce necessary rules, if you can't come to that conclusion, there's no sense in me trying to re-iterate my original extortion comment.
What do you mean by 'unselfish'? It seems perfectly conceivable to me. I can conceive a human being acting for the good of another without any kind of expectation of getting some benefit from that.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Most Buddhist schools affirm a view that implies that the 'self' is 'illusory' in some ways, so it isn't surprising that they assume that a Buddha isn't in any way 'selfish': if their view is right, the very idea of 'getting a benefit for oneself' is, ultimately, illusory. Other religious traditions have different models of explaining how a person can be selfless.
Regardless of Buddhism, Christianity or any religion really, how do you know that "there is not a single selfless person on earth"? How can we be certain of the truth of this statement?
Certainly, there are degrees of 'selfishness/selflessness'.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
I'm not elaborating because it seems a tangential issue for me. My point was simply that punishments can be educative and aimed to the good of the individual who is punished and to the good of the community and that, in some cases, such punishments are perhaps the best course action for realizing such a good.
I really don't see why you are insisting so much on the 'selfishness' of those who administer the punishment. In your view, it seems, any act is in some way selfish. Even if this was true, it remains the case that if (some kinds of) punishments are the best course of actions for realizing the good of the individual and the community then the punishment should be done. After all, in your view, even the most 'selfless' acts of self-sacrifice have a 'component' of selfishness, so how the presence of 'selfishness' is a reason for devaluing punishments?
I think I can justify the possibility of complete selflessness. It seems at least conceivable that, given the degrees of selfishness we see in the real world, it is possible that some human beings can be totally selfless. This doesn't mean that such a possibility is actualized.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
So what? Police might have to exceed the speed limit in order to catch criminals. Or even if some officers transgress the speed limits, it is nevertheless true that in many circumstances doing so is dangerous.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Yes, and scaring people into safer driving habits perhaps is a good thing both for themselves and the community in many cases. There are people who do not break the basic forms of morality only because the fear of punishments. Punishments and the fear of them have a place in educating people and building a virtuous character.
Of course, some people can be brought to virtuous behavior by dialogue or by example. But it seems evident to me that this isn't true for all. For some people it seems to me punishments and/or the fear of punishments (which might be of different kinds depending on the case) can be the only way in which they can 're-orient' their will to the good. And perhaps a subset of these people might even be corrected by any kinds of punishments, I don't know.
Quoting ProtagoranSocratist
Yes, but they also do that.
Wanted to add that even if 'perfect selflessness' were impossible for human beings - in the sense that humans by being humans can't be devoid of a minimum amount of selfishnesss - 'perfect seflessness' could still be a good regulative ideal. If being 'less selfish' is better (for oneself and for others) than being 'more selfish', 'perfect selflessness' could be a state that people can never approach but they can still approximate.
That makes perfect sense if you have faith in the police, but otherwise, this excuse is much harder to support.
Ok, yes, some police officers might break the very rules that enforce on others. Not sure about your point though. What are you getting at? How does that contradict what I was saying about it?
It actually doesn't :) It's very much in line with what you were saying, "So what?" signals a form of emotive apathy.