"Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions
Traditional political philosophy often grounds its normative foundations in transcendent moral laws or abstract social contracts. However, the "must" argued for in this theory is not based on moral judgment or orientation, but rather on the efficacy requirement that a fundamental purpose imposes on action. It is an instrumental "must"an internal, factual necessity based on the causal relationship between ends and means. It is analogous to saying, "If you want to stay alive, you must breathe." Its compelling force originates from the factual existence of the purpose "wanting to stay alive" and the fact that "breathing" is a necessary condition for achieving that purpose. I am not claiming that the "fundamental purpose" is a "good" or "bad" value orientation in a moral sense, nor am I asserting that we oughtto comply with this purpose; rather, I am stating that it is a factually given setting at the level of biological mechanism.
Nevertheless, the conclusions derived in this theory coincide with many of the "moral obligations" we intuitively endorse; indeed, the parts that do not coincide appear, in my view, even more reasonable. Does this not suggest that the compelling force of the "moral obligation" we have always felt may precisely originate from this kind of "functional norm" encoded in our biological nature? For instance, we have an intuitionthat killing is wrong because our minds can vaguely discern that the act of arbitrarily infringing upon life would be fundamentally detrimental to our adaptation to the environment and survival. Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose."
Therefore, the claim of this theory is more radical than "describing a coincidence": it asserts that the unique authority of moral obligation stems precisely from this instrumental necessity deeply embedded in the logic of action. When we say, "A ought to do X," the compelling force behind it does not come from some mysterious transcendent law, but from a factfor any agent of action possessing a specific fundamental purpose, doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose. This "must" is not an approximation of morality; it is the very foundation of morality. The reason we feel the irresistible binding force of "ought" is that our rationality intuits this factual connection between the action and the fundamental purpose. The authority of moral language is merely the projection and expression of this factual connection within human psychology and culture. In other words, the essence of "ought" is the recognized"must" that serves the fundamental purpose.
Hume pointed out that it is impossible to validly derive an "ought" (a value or normative proposition) from an "is" (a series of propositions of fact that contain no value judgments). There is a logical chasm between them; any such derivation necessarily implies an unstated normative premise. However, this theory posits that the "ought" in the traditional sense is, in its essence, a specific type of "is."
The above is an explanation I made after completing the institutional argument to respond to Hume's dilemma.Translations provided by deepseek.
Nevertheless, the conclusions derived in this theory coincide with many of the "moral obligations" we intuitively endorse; indeed, the parts that do not coincide appear, in my view, even more reasonable. Does this not suggest that the compelling force of the "moral obligation" we have always felt may precisely originate from this kind of "functional norm" encoded in our biological nature? For instance, we have an intuitionthat killing is wrong because our minds can vaguely discern that the act of arbitrarily infringing upon life would be fundamentally detrimental to our adaptation to the environment and survival. Perhaps the moral system of human society is itself an adaptive tool formed under evolutionary pressures to promote group survival and reproduction. In other words, morality is a cultural apparatus that "serves the fundamental purpose."
Therefore, the claim of this theory is more radical than "describing a coincidence": it asserts that the unique authority of moral obligation stems precisely from this instrumental necessity deeply embedded in the logic of action. When we say, "A ought to do X," the compelling force behind it does not come from some mysterious transcendent law, but from a factfor any agent of action possessing a specific fundamental purpose, doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose. This "must" is not an approximation of morality; it is the very foundation of morality. The reason we feel the irresistible binding force of "ought" is that our rationality intuits this factual connection between the action and the fundamental purpose. The authority of moral language is merely the projection and expression of this factual connection within human psychology and culture. In other words, the essence of "ought" is the recognized"must" that serves the fundamental purpose.
Hume pointed out that it is impossible to validly derive an "ought" (a value or normative proposition) from an "is" (a series of propositions of fact that contain no value judgments). There is a logical chasm between them; any such derivation necessarily implies an unstated normative premise. However, this theory posits that the "ought" in the traditional sense is, in its essence, a specific type of "is."
The above is an explanation I made after completing the institutional argument to respond to Hume's dilemma.Translations provided by deepseek.
Comments (103)
I like the functionalist approach. I also share your idea about the origins of "ought." Essentially, this isn't a new ideajust a new perspective on an old instinct. Modern man, even without a background in philosophy, already lives within this paradigm. He intuitively thinks in terms of cause and effect:
"Don't mess with the electrical panelit'll kill you."
There's no morality herethere's necessity.
But I have a question for you. Your approach works brilliantly in the context of the formation of society, when any deviation could cost the system its very existence. However, what happens when society becomes overdeveloped?
A hundred years ago, people could afford much less. The risks were higher, the connection between action and consequences more direct. For example, openly declaring one's sexual orientation meant jeopardizing everything: reputation, safety, even one's very existence. Why? Because society then had a clearer sense of its own boundaries, its own supporting structures. Even a single violation was perceived as a crack in the foundation.
Over time, society has strengthened. It has become so resilient that it no longer fears individual deviations. The right to personal choice has become a cult, sometimes to the point of absurdity.
Today, teenagers online hurl words at each other that would once have landed them in court or jailand they do it playfully.
As a result, the sense of boundariesthat very sense of what is necessaryhas become dulled. The individual no longer faces direct punishment for deviant behavior. The functional regulator you wrote about dissolves in excess freedom.
We have Ouroboros, a morality that devours itself.
A system created for survival has succeeded so much that it is now destroying its own foundations.
And here's my question for you:
How do you see this consequence within the framework of your approach?
Can a functional morality explainor restrainthe self-destruction of a system that has become too successful?
That's the difference between ought and is. The receipt from the checkout is what is the case, the shopping list is what ought be the case.
The difference is in the intent one takes to each. One guides your actions, the other describes them.
And that's pretty much why you can't get an ought from an is; at some point you have to change from what you see about you to how you want things to be - to change your attitude. And that's not a issue of deduction.
So in your essay, if the conclusion is an "ought", there has to be a point at which that ought is introduced. And that seems to be "the compelling force". So even if "doing X is a logical requirement dictated by that fundamental purpose" then isn't that fundamental purpose is hte source of the "ought"?
And if so, it's not an "is".
Paradoxically, this can imply that the psychological distinction between states versus action utilities is less clear, considering the fact that agents don't generally have the luxury of having perfect epsistemic knowledge of their worlds prior to taking an action (e.g. as required to solve the Bellman Equation).
Also, an action is only as good as the state that it leads to - rewards are related to (state,action) pairs, so utility values can be thought of as equivalence classes of states quotiented with respect to action utilities. This is practically important, since agents don't generally have the memory capacity to store perfect world knowledge even if it were available. Agents tend to visit and focus their learning on the state->action->(reward,state) chains that correspond to highest reward, and then learn compressed representations of these visited states in terms of a small number of features that efficiently predict utility. E.g Chess Engines estimate the utility of a board position by representing the board in terms of a managebly small number of spatial relations between pieces, especially in relation to the Kings. So the representational distinction between states and action reward values in the mind of an agent is muddied.
I agree with you, but haven't you previously resisted a reduction of what ought to be the case to what one wants to be the case?
On the grounds that "ought" has a social aspect, yes. Small steps. Not what I want but what we want.
Your OP is a well-stated version of an evolutionary explanation for morality. As such, it's open to the usual objections, which I think are correct.
First, let's assume that we really could come up with the ideal "natural" or "socially adaptive" or "evolutionarily coded" description of how humans may best flourish. Conceivably, you could take this description and apply it to the species in general, saying "For the species to flourish, this is what must happen." But a species is not a moral agent; it doesn't know about terms like "ought" or "should." But individuals do, and at the individual level, the same old problem arises: Why should I, an individual, care about the flourishing of the species? For that matter, I may not care much about my own flourishing -- and if I don't, what is the argument that I ought to? What makes it right for me to do so? You need some previous moral premises (involving an ethical preference for life over death, happiness over pain) in order to make that work. Now of course, as a matter of fact, most of us do prefer happiness to pain, but not because it's ethically right to do so. It just feels better -- and that's only a moral reason if you can make the argument that feeling better is the right thing to pursue, ethically.
Second, it seems all too clear that what's been selected by evolution for human behavior isn't a reliable guide to morality anyway. You refer to "a factually given setting at the level of biological mechanism." Well, just to pick one such setting, heterosexual men are hardwired to find nubile young women/girls sexually desirable. There are obvious advantages to being able to begin reproduction as early as possible, and a 13-year-old girl will likely be strong and healthy too, suggesting healthy offspring. But most cultures now regard such a program as immoral. Why? What is the reasoning that would show us -- rightly -- that childbearing at such a young age is an immoral hardship to impose on a girl? To make such an argument, you have to weight different "natural" features of our species, and make an ethical decision about which ones to take as guides. In short, "ought" and "should" must again be introduced; there is no "specific type of 'is'" that can help us.
This seems like a long and convoluted way to explain something that can be better explained in a much more direct way. We believe killing is wrong because we care about others. We care about others because we see them as like ourselves, which allows us to relate to them, learn from them, expand the boundaries of our sense of self. Its not a question of what we can get out of them for some narrowly conceived selfish purpose, but that they become a part of our own sense of self. The self is enriched and expanded to include others rather than simply treat them as objects for solipsistic purposes. Yes, we could argue that this furthers the survival of the species, but this is still looking at the notion of survival too narrowly and statically. What is being enhanced isnt the mere static survival of an object-a human, but the becoming and expansion of the self. Social bonds, friendship , love and cooperation dont just do the bidding of some prior fundamental purpose called evolutionary survival; they are its extension and redefinition. They are not just a means to some prior end. They are their own ends., their own fundamental purpose.
Quoting Banno
Its difficult for me to absorb the sense of this Humean distinction. My brain is clogged with too many sedimented layers of philosophy which have explicitly dismantled the entire framework on which the is-ought distinction is built. My thoughts bounce from enactivists like Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela to hermeneuticists like Dilthey and Gadamer, from poststructuralists like Deleuze and Foucault to phenomenologists like Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-ponty, from Wittgenstein, Putnam and Rorty, to Joseph Rouse and Karen Barad.
Quoting Astorre
Youre right, the is-ought divide is not a new idea. So why not let some fresh air into the room by focusing on newer philosophies ( there are many of them) which dismantle the basis for the is-ought distinction?
I agree with the thrust of your post, and I personally share the sentiment quoted above. But . . . suppose I don't? Suppose I don't see others as like myself, and am not interested in relating to them or expanding my sense of self. Are you arguing that I ought to? If not, what does this have to do with ethics and morality, with doing the right thing or pursuing the good or however one cares to phrase it?
I'm skeptical of this. It might be the case that donating to a sperm-bank would serve our biological nature's ends. That seems at least initially plausible. Yet, I don't think we intuit a compelling force that this is "good," or that it would be "good" for our tribe or kin to donate sperm, so it's not clear this is what is going on when we concern ourselves with morality.
Quoting panwei
I'm not sure of this, but your instrumental theory might turn out to be either: (a) trivial prediction; (b) imports normative "ought" again.
It becomes (a), if you are merely stating that "given desire X, you are likely to be motivated to Y because it efficiently achieves X." There is no compelling force, it is a descriptive claim without any normative content. It is incomplete if it is to serve in our moral deliberation.
Or it does (b) by adding the premise "you ought to take the efficient means to your ends." Then there is normative force, but I'm not sure how that fits into your picture since it appears like the gap is back.
Or have I misunderstood you?
In ordinary language, "ought" is also used to signify predictive confidence, as in "it ought to rain"; so "oughts" aren't necessarily used in relation to utility maximisation. Furthermore, we understand what an agent is trying to achieve in terms of our theory of the agent's mind, which is partly based on our observations of their past behaviour. So an inference of what an agent 'ought' to do on the basis of what 'is' can perhaps be understood as an application of Humean induction. And our description of what 'is' tends to invoke teleological concepts, e.g. if we describe a ball as being a snooker ball it is because we believe that it ought to behave in the normal way that we expect of snooker balls from past experience.
So if descriptions of what is the case are necessarily inferential, and if our understanding of moral obligations are in terms of our theory of minds which in turn are inferred from behavioral observations, then perhaps there is an argument for saying that only oughts exist, even if we are never sure which ones.
Just consider the assumption that there are facts about values.
So:
X is better than Y (X is more worthy of choice than Y) is true (a fact).
It does not follow that this fact can never imply "choose X over Y." To be truly "more worthy of choice" or "better," or "more desirable," is simply to be what ought to be chosen. The only reason this is obfuscated is because much modern ethics has this bizarre fixation on "ought" as only applying to a sui generis sort of "moral obligation." Yet even after centuries of this, we still don't use the word "ought" in this way. "You ought to try the chicken," or "she likes you, you ought to ask here out," do not imply "you are morally obligated to eat this chicken," or "you are morally obligated to ask our friend out on a date."
I suppose, if we face objections here we can allow that it is an axiom of practical reason that: "it is true that one ought to choose the better over the worse, the more choiceworthy over the less, etc."
So:
1. It is true that we ought to choose the better over the worse.
2. X is better than Y.
C. Thus, we ought to choose Y.
Is fine, and so it follows that if there are facts (is statements) about values we should have no problem following these into conclusions about what we "ought" to do. If people insist that 1 must be included in all arguments involving "values" I would counter that this seems unnecessary given what "better" or "good" mean, but it hardly seems too problematic to include it since it is obviously true.
The point of the division is more that Hume's psychology precludes ever knowing such facts, although it also precludes knowing virtually any facts at all, which we might suppose just indicates that it is a grievously deficient theory of knowledge.
Good point, that's another common usage of "ought." And given Hume's epistemic commitments, I do wonder if there can ever be anything other than these sorts of "ought" claims outside claims about "relations of ideas," which are themselves grounded in sense perceptions from which we can only ever derive predictive oughts (which arguably can never be justified according to his epistemology and psychology).
:up:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Aquinas:
Quoting Aquinas, ST I-11.94.2 - What are the precepts of natural law?
The nub is whether predicates like "good" and "better" are truth-apt or can be "factual." What you've rightly pointed out is that, regardless of what one says when they are in their "philosophy mode," in everyday life we take it for granted that such predicates are truth-apt.
I know we've been here before, but I have to point out that this could only be true if "better than" is defined as "should be chosen" or "is worthy [?] of choice," in which case the alleged argument becomes a tautology ("We ought to choose what we ought to choose"). But if "is better than" is given an independent interpretation from "should be chosen," then the argument merely shows that the "ought" premise in needed in order to get to the "ought" conclusion. How do you justify the first premise? Why is it morally obligatory to choose the better over the worse? -- that question needs to be answered without reference, overt or covert, to what is worthy of choice; otherwise it just goes in circles.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Of course they don't. That's why they aren't moral injunctions. Whereas "You ought to help the poor" is. Is there a reason why "ought" can't have both moral and non-moral uses? Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that "we still don't use the word 'ought' exclusively in this way"? For why should we? -- surely the deontological ethicists weren't recommending that.
I'd argue this as well; you'll notice that standards tend to shift rather than stay permanent, "we killed them and it is justified because..." and various other examples.
"Ought" and "must" aren't the only illusory types words people to use, there's also the use of can/can't beyond possible/impossible, and the dreaded "should".
What Im arguing is that sense of self has nothing to do with the physical boundary that divides the outer layer of my skin from other persons. It has precisely to do with relatability and assimilability. I can be divided within my own self just a much as I can be united with another person, depending on the relative success at achieving this integration. My personal desires and interests dont come before this striving for self-integration; it is intrinsic to the very nature of desire. This ought is not a choice, it is the condition of possibility of intelligible experience.
Yes, and you still haven't addressed the problems with your view. "X should be chosen because X is worthy (or worthwhile)," is simply not a tautology. Your claim that it is a tautology requires equivocation and a redefinition of "worth."
It should be easy enough to see this by simply noting that an argument over whether something has worth is not the same as an argument over whether some course of action should be taken. For instance, "The coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen," is not the same as, "The coffee should be chosen because it tastes delicious," and yet 'tastes delicious' is itself here understood as a relevant form of worth.
The way Im reading x should be chosen is that it implies a preference. The choice being recommended is preferable to the alternatives on some basis, and thus more worthy to be chosen than the alternatives on that same basis. One isn't making a blanket implication of the worth of the recommended choice, only that it is worthier than the alternatives on some basis. Its hard to imagine a circumstance in which the utterance the coffee should be chosen because the coffee should be chosen would be useful, except as a way of answering objections with because I said so, which isnt a denial that I deem the coffee preferable to (more worthy than) alternatives, but simply says the reasons for my preference are none of your business and just do what I say.
Well, OK. So if I were to say to someone, "You ought to ____ [filling in your description of what you call the intrinsic striving for self-expression]," that would be pointless, since they're doing it anyway?
Good. You are describing teleological reasoning.
Quoting panwei
Right, but the opponent of teleological reasoning will claim that they have no reason to adopt the fundamental purpose/telos that you identify. They will say, "I agree that I ought to eat food if my purpose is survival, but I don't grant that my purpose need be survival. I could choose to die instead of survive if I want."
Quoting panwei
Yes, very good. :up:
Quoting panwei
Your point has been given in all sorts of different ways over the years. One of them would simply say, "I have such-and-such a purpose/telos/end, therefore I ought to undertake the means to that end," is a straightforward derivation of 'ought' from 'is'.
Yessir.
Quoting panwei
I was going to argue with this. As I see it, all political judgment is underlaid buy a value judgment about what the responsibility of a society is to its members. As I read further down, I see that youve addressed that issue pretty well.
Quoting panwei
This is how I see things too, although it always pays to be skeptical about attributing specific purposes to evolution. The way I say it is that people like each other and we like to be around each other. We find value in other human beings, especially those close to us. Under ideal conditions, these values guide us in how we behave when were trying to live together. The ultimate foundation of morality comes from within us, it isnt imposed from outside.
Quoting panwei
I have a somewhat different take on this. I split what we call morality into two parts 1) that voice inside us that guides our actionsour conscience 2) The voice of authority from outside that works to control disruptive behavior and maintain the stability of society. Sometimes these two factors reinforce each other, sometimes not.
Quoting panwei
Yes, this makes sense to me.
Quoting J
Theyre doing some ought, but it may not match your ought. Your ought may be taken as an invitation to view the situation from a different vantage. In psychological theory, the separating of is and ought translates into the difference between the person as a static object and the motives which push or pull them into behaving.
The ought is this spark plug which is presumed to be needed to drive action. Psychological approaches like enactivism assume that we always already find ourselves thrown into action, so the ought of motive doesnt have to posited as a separate mechanism from the is of being in the world. The issue isnt how we get ourselves started but how we cope with the way we find ourselves thrown into situations , that is, the direction of motive.
The enactivists also argue that the social linguistic community is inseparably intertwined with the very notion of self; intersubjective factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world and ourselves, even in the immediacy of our instrumental copings with the environment.
Another thought. I think maybe this emphasis on biology and evolution underplays the importance of culture and learning on our personal moral judgments.
Again, a really good OP.
One of the reasons I wouldn't phrase things in quite the same way that @Count Timothy von Icarus does is because I think the relativistic model is sub-optimal. To put it concisely, I would rather talk about "good" or "worth" rather than "better" (and of course 'better' denotes a relation).
What this means is that if something is "more worthy" or "more valuable" than something else, then it does have intrinsic worth. So when I say, "Better than the alternatives," there must be some fixed rational aspect according to which it is better. In the coffee example that fixed rational aspect was taste, and this cashes out in the fact that one does not only desire something that tastes better than the alternatives, but one also desires something that tastes good.
This dance between 'good' and 'better' is always operative in the realm of practical reason (including morality). Each entails the other, and so your point is fine as far as it goes. Nevertheless, for Aquinas and Aristotle the good has a priority over the better, and this is because the precept, "Seek the better," already presupposes the precept, "Seek the good." This is presumably why Aquinas talks about good-seeking as the first principle of practical reason, rather than better-seeking.
Quoting Joshs
Yes, and that's much the point. Worth-based reasons are not tautologous in the way that @J likes to claim they are; they are not tautologous in the way that will-based reasons are. @J incorrectly claims that, "I chose the coffee because it has worth," is the same as, "I chose the coffee because I chose the coffee." When we appeal to worth of any kind we have moved beyond tautological, will-based "because I said so."
Well, if the good is being qua desirable (what is truly most fulfilling of desire) in what way is it ever "better" to choose the worse over the good?
Why choose the better over the worse? Why choose good over evil? These seem extremely obvious to me, so I am not sure how to answer. Those who deny morality tend to say that nothing is good or evil, not that it makes sense to choose evil as evil. Even Milton's Satan has to say "evil be thou my good," because "evil be evil to me that I might choose you anyway" makes no sense. So, what is the definition of "morally obligatory" here?
Quoting J
So, helping the poor isn't truly desirable or a path to happiness? Then why do it?
Kant's response relies on sheer formalism to answer this question. I suppose what is "desirable" is "the good will willing itself," but because of his epistemic presuppositions Kant is only able to establish this by sheer definition. Indeed, other people and their freedom as moral agents cannot be known according to Kant, but are mere "postulates of practical reason" needed to justify practical reason's definitional drive towards universalization.
I will just repeat what I've said before here:
I mean, what is the point of Kantian ethics if you don't agree with his epistemology? Kant himself seems to allow that it must be developed only because of the extreme epistemic limits he has set on himself.
This makes sense, but I dont think it contradicts what @panwei has written. I think it makes sense too say, or at least consider, that the fact we care about each other is something that has evolutionary roots.
I saw @Joshs response to this. Here are my thoughts. Its not that humans have to or ought to see others as similar to themselves, its that they tend to and are capable of seeing them that way.
It can have evolutionary roots in two ways . One way is that it is a gimmick, an arbitrary genetic contrivance whose value is indirect; that it is adaptive for the survival of the species. The second way is that the intrinsic dynamics of caring and social involvement function according the same same principles as evolutionary processes; not as an arbitrary gimmick that just so happens to further survival but
as what Piaget described as the fundamental organizing principle of life , the reciprocal relation between assimilation and accommodation in evolving living systems from a weaker to stronger structure. This limited the arbitrary gimmick aspect, as though we would stop caring about each other if evolution found a better way.
Another way to put it is that relevance and mattering are not inventions of evolution, but its basis.
What is the institutional argument?
In what sense did you complete it?
Quoting panwei
Which translations?
Quoting panwei
Is this your own observation?
Quoting panwei
Which theory? (Your OP's title?)
Cf:
Quoting Fr. Michael Sherwin, OP, Christian Virtue in America's Nietzschean Wasteland: Thomistic Reflections, 29:05
Oh, I definitely agree about the tendency and the capacity. It's just that, if I happen to be one of those lacking that tendency or capacity, we've pulled all the ethical teeth out of the argument if you can't say to me, "But here's why you ought to" (or perhaps, "Here's why you should at least behave as if you did"). Otherwise, ethical injunctions only apply to those who have the proper tendencies and capacities. But it's the very ones who don't that we'd most like to persuade, if we can.
Are you telling me that you read the wrong books? I think Iv'e mentioned that previously. :wink:
But the account you gave, , aligns well enough with my own, with the addition that points out, if one is not giving consideration to others, one is not doing ethics. says much the same thing.
Quoting Joshs
I'm not sure how the conclusion follows from the premise here, but despite that I think I agree with the sentiment. Isn't his the familiar existentialist claim, that we don't first exist as neutral observers, but that our very existence is saturated with normatively? And even then, the question of what to do remains; and the answer is not found in what is the case, but what we would do about it. This is not a rejection of the is/ought barrier, so much as a expression of it in phenomenological terms.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Your are invited to read Gillian Russell's new book, and the article being discussed in my most recent thread, that sets out in detail various barriers to entailment including the is/ought barrier, using a first order logic an model theory. I'm still digesting the argument there, but your claim is not self-evident.
I wasn't much able to follow the rest of your post. You noted that we do regularly invoke "ought" statements such as "you ought try the chicken", but seem to think these mitigate against the is ought barrier rather than demonstrate it. There's a play on the word "fact", which in this context can variously refer to what is the case, or to only "is" statements. It appears that you think that n "ought" statement cannot be true, which is a vies some quite prominent philosophers have adopted, but which is sorely tested by the obvious validity of the syllogism you set out. And we've elsewhere discussed and I think rejected the view that Hume's account of induction "precludes ever knowing such facts". points out two other issues with the approach you seem to be adopting, that "better than" already presume judgement, and that "ought " may be used instrumentally or categorically.
So to this:
Quoting Joshs
Quite true of instrumental choices, where it makes sense to give look for further explanation; but what about "you ought to treat others fairly because you ought treat others fairly"? One might imagine Kant saying such a thing, with the force that this is were we make a start, that this is our foundation.
In any case we mentioned here might find agreement in pointing out that it is by no means evident that we ought do what we have supposedly evolved to do. Evolution does not answer, indeed hardly even addresses, the questions of ethics.
Russell's paper is interesting but she is actually only speaking obliquely to Hume's position (actually, the choice of title is a little puzzling in that respect; maybe the term "Hume's law" is used differently in some areas of philosophy for what she is talking about, but it isn't Hume's original position). It's true that, from the epistemic direction, the Guillotine is justified as a sort of a special case of the more general attack on induction, but Hume's objection would also prohibit moves from the "universal" to the "particular" wherever "values" are concerned. I did find that a little strange actually, Russell is speaking more to Hume's justification for the "law" than the "law" itself.
Hume's claim is more expansive though. Because morality is just sentiment, it can never justified by reason alone, full stop. Reason is also wholly inert in terms of action, so even if normative claims did work in this way, they could never drive behavior. Those claims are what set up the Guillotine. What Hume is objecting to has nothing to do with form, it has to do semantics, what kinds of facts there are, and how language refers to them.
Russell gets at the epistemic side: we cannot know universal value claims. But actually, Hume goes further. There can simply be no such thing as a descriptive fact about value, so of course one cannot derive "ought" from "is" even leaving aside the gap from particular to universal. His position can be described as ontologically eliminativist in this respect. It isn't a sort of skepticism on this issue; because of his psychology, such facts are impossible. He is pretty explicit about this in the Treatise BTW, he compares "vice and virtue" (values) to secondary qualities (which in his context are wholly subjective and do not exist in the world objectively at all).
A great many philosophers since have rejected the fact/values distinction and this has nothing to do with logic per se. If you want a close analogy, consider logical interpretations by emotivists.
Thats what social rules, laws, the police, and public shaming are forsocial control. As I intimated in a previous post on this thread, ethics and morality, to the extent they are useful ideas, deal with what comes from within, not what is imposed from without.
Im not sure I understand the distinction youve made and Im not qualified to specify any particular evolutionary mechanism. Humans and other animals have instinctsmodes of behavior that are hereditary. I dont know whether its appropriate to designate the kinds of behavior were talking about as instincts or whether they represent a more complex mental process. Maybe thats what Piaget was talking about.
I am a skeptic about evolutionary psychology the attribution of particular behaviors to specific evolutionary pathways or genes.
The other point of contention is your "Hume's psychology... precludes knowing virtually any facts at all", which is far too strong. Experience grounds our knowledge.
is there some more substantive point on which we disagree?
Sure. But both of those separated things are how things are. Causal knowledge of the world is in the state it's in, and the agent's subjective preferences are in the state they're in.
How is describing these or any other states of affairs supposed to determine how they ought to be?
Not sure I get this. Can you expand?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I sympathize. Explaining what seems obvious to you, to someone for whom it isn't obvious at all, is difficult. I won't press you. I'll just say that, from my viewpoint, there are many possible reasons for choosing the better over the worse, only some of which are ethical reasons. And for what it's worth, the question "Why choose good over evil?" seems to me to be a different question entirely.
No, I agree with the many critics who say that the division is wholly metaphysical. Maybe it can be justified, but it would have to be justified on metaphysical terms. However, what Russell is talking about is a real limitation of deduction. I am not totally sure why she is calling it "Hume's Law" though since it's a slightly different issue. My suspicion is that maybe people use the name for the issue she is talking about too, a sort of semantic drift in the literature maybe, sort of like how "Aristotelian essences" in many articles in analytic philosophy have very little to do with Aristotle's metaphysics. IDK though.
Hume's issue isn't just that we cannot go from "particular" to "universal" facts about values, but that there simply are no such facts, because value statements can never be purely descriptive since they relate to purely subjective sentiment. It's a very early-modern sort of division.
Quoting Banno
I agree that it's too strong. That's the problem with Hume! I mean, he basically says as much too. He says you'd go insane if you took his conclusions to heart. Bertrand Russell said something similar, basically "Hume demolishes the line between sanity and insanity" or something to that effect.
Such as? If one had "good reasons" for choosing "the worse" over the "better" it seems to me that, by definition, we must think that "the worse" is in fact, in an important respect, better than "the better." Else why choose it?
No doubt, I might choose the "worse character" in playing a video game against a child, because I want the competition to be more fair, etc. But in those cases, I am choosing the "worse" because it is truly better as respects the ends that I believe to be themselves better. So, in this example, winning the game is not better than having a more equal competition.
Quoting J
Well, that's the classical definition of goodness, and it might take some unpacking. Goodness isn't something over and above a thing, just as there isn't a thing and its truth as something distinct, over and above it. Being "transcedentals," goodness and truth are conceptual, not real distinctions (but of course, "objective"). They are being as considered from a particular aspect, as intelligible/knowable (truth), or as desirable (goodness).
An easy way to see how this takes shape in ethics is to consider that pre-modern ethics (in the East too from what I can tell) is primarily concerned with reality versus appearances, and the higher versus the lower. We want what is truly most desirable, not what merely appears most desirable. We know we can be wrong about what is most desirable, and this leads to regret and bad consequences. Ethics is about discovering the best way to live/act, i.e., what is truly desirable. In this context, to knowingly choose the worse over the better is essentially to act contrary to reason and desire.
Of course, a difficulty here is that subjectivism has sort of crept into our definitions. "Desirable" becomes just "whatever is currently desired." However, Etymonline tells me that the word entered the English language in the 14th century, then meaning: "worthy to be desired, fit to excite a wish to possess." That's the better way of taking it here.
I grasp the essence of your argument. However, I contend that there is no necessary connection between success and the complacency you describe. ??The key reason the phenomenon you identified emerges is that the inherent logic of the institution does not inevitably lead to progressive development.?? Conversely, the institutional conclusions I have derived from first principles of action theory, such as the fundamental purpose, explicitly incorporate mechanisms to ensure sustained robustness.
For instance, at the administrative level, a rigorously demonstrated conclusion mandates that officials can only advance by achieving administrative results superior to those of their competitors. This merit-based mechanism for promotion is perpetual.
As for preventing the erosion of normative perception among the general public, the solution lies in legal educationspecifically, in?? the constitutional reasoning process. In practice, if a constitution can be founded upon arguments as rigorous as mathematical proofs, then a secondary school student could comprehend its entire logical framework with minimal effort. This understanding would instill the certain knowledge that the constitution rests upon an unshakable foundation.
In my argument, I begin by postulating five axioms of action, one of which is the Axiom of Purpose. This axiom explains the root of behavioral motivation. It consists of two parts. The first part posits the existence of a fundamental purpose underlying human action. This axiom is derived from a commonsense observation: human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation (this is a descriptive statement of fact). This observation indicates a directional relationship between all human actions and adaptation. I term this directional relationship a "teleological relation," from which the Axiom of Purpose is derived. This axiom, which can be formulated in several compatible ways, aims to show that human behavior is, at the level of biological mechanism, configured to achieve a fundamental purpose. It is a factual postulate, not an "ought."
However, it is indeed this fundamental purpose that serves as the key premise for deriving various conclusions about what "must" be done.
The requirements imposed by an individual's specific purposes on their specific actions do not constitute the behavioral norms for the entire society. The norms for society as a whole are constructed upon the fundamental purpose shared by all individuals. The conclusions derived from this fundamental purpose do not mandate that any specific individual must make the utility-maximizing choice regarding a particular, concrete goal. Within the framework I have argued for, utility-maximizing choices are only relevant at the level of public objectives, and the magnitude of this utility is defined relative to competitors.
This theory does not require you, as an individual, to care about your own flourishing. The conclusions it derives exist as social norms, whose codified form is established as the constitutionthe sole source of legal authority. By subsuming specific behaviors under these conclusions, we arrive at the complete legal system. You may not care about your own flourishing, but you must abide by the law.
Regarding your example involving a 13-year-old girl, I hold a specific view on the legal status of minors. The prerequisite for expecting Person A to obey the law is ensuring that A knows what the law is. However, humans are not born with this knowledge. Therefore, prior to enforcement, there must be a process for A to learn the content of the law (i.e., legal education). If we artificially set a final age limit for this process, we thereby artificially create the category of "minors." In other words, a stipulated age serves as a deadline by which individuals are obligated to understand the fundamental logic of the legislation. Once past this age, they are presumed to have this understanding and henceforth bear independent legal responsibility for violations. The case you mentioned can be explained by the fact that the individual had not yet fully comprehended her rights and obligations pertaining to the relevant actions.
The reason I used the example of "thou shalt not kill" is that I have logically derived this conclusion from the fundamental purpose (and I could have used other examples as well). Since this derived conclusion aligns with a moral duty we intuitively recognize, I used this example to demonstrate that the alignment is not a mere coincidence.
1?"My framework, derived from the axioms of action, yields conclusions pertaining to only four domains, which correspond to the four constituent elements of a state. While the norms derived from these four domains indeed provide a framework that undergirds all aspects of our social life, their normative force is not expressed as mandating specific goals and actions such as donating to a sperm bank. The justified conclusions themselves inherently include the principle that 'Agent A possesses behavioral autonomy.'"
2?"The conclusions derived from the axioms of action are not predictions, but conclusions of logical necessity. To illustrate: If A, then B. A is the case. Therefore, B. Within the framework of the given axioms, B is an inescapable and certain conclusion."
"The 'ought' you mentioned, as in 'it ought to rain,' is a prediction. In contrast, the 'must' in a normative conclusion is a requirement for actiona behavioral standard that everyone ought to abide by."
No, I was talking about something slightly different. If "ought" is derived from "necessary," and the idea of ??"necessary" changes over time, does what is "ought" also change? Or should "ought" be enshrined in the constitution and predetermined? Then how will evolution occur?
"I, too, initially believed that institutions required constant updating to keep pace with the times. However, after rigorously deriving the relevant conclusions, I came to understand that at the constitutional level, these justified institutions are eternally valid and do not require modernization. The validity of these conclusions depends solely on the soundness of the axioms themselves and the absence of logical errors in the derivation process.
"What requires adaptation to the times is specific legislation. For example, the justified conclusion that 'one must not defraud others of their property' is eternally valid. Before the advent of the internet, there was no such thing as online fraud. Therefore, after its emergence, it became necessary to codify it within specific laws."
"When our aim is to establish behavioral requirements that are obligatory for everyone, we cannot reason from the diverse purposes of individuals. The reasoning must proceed from the fundamental purpose common to all. From this common fundamental purpose, one cannot derive dictates about how an individual must choose among their personal, differentiated goals. Individuals are solely responsible for their own choices, but these personal choices do not constitute the behavioral norms for society as a whole."
"Conclusions deduced from non-contradictory premises possess uniqueness; therefore, the fundamental 'standard' is immutable. The example you cited'we killed them, and it is justified'is indeed a violation of the justified conclusion that 'thou shalt not kill.' However, the act of 'killing' carried out during law enforcement is permitted because both injunctions (the prohibition of murder and the permission for capital punishment) can be justified under the same higher-order conclusion. They are derived from the principle of 'distribution according to efficacy.' The act of murder imposes a negative efficacy on society, and thus the perpetrator must receive a negative benefitpunishmentof which the death penalty is one form."
Okay, so let's say you enshrine the right to work in the constitution. Robots appear and replace humans in every field. The state can no longer guarantee the right to work. Do we change the constitution or get rid of the robots?
This theory does not require you, as an individual, to choose survival. I also postulate an axiom of cognition, which consists of three parts, one of which states that 'human cognition can be erroneous.' This axiom can be used to explain phenomena that appear to deviate from the fundamental purpose.
The reason I assert that people ought to abide by these normative conclusions derived from the fundamental purpose is that these conclusions coincide with the moral duties we universally recognize. I maintain that this coincidence is not accidental. When we establish a constitution in this manner, the constitution rests on a solid foundation. You are free to choose death, but you are not free to break the law. Choosing death may be a tendency formed by your personal, differentiated purposes and potentially erroneous cognition, but it is not a social norm that can be derived from the fundamental purpose common to all.
At present, robots are incapable of autonomously deliberating on constitutional principles. The idea of handing my five postulated axioms to a robot for reasoning is, frankly, laughable. Currently, robots cannot independently undertake the selection of axioms or make judgments about their reasonableness. However, they are indeed far superior to most humans in checking the validity and rigor of arguments, which is how I primarily use them.The robot pointed out that my argument was as rigorous as mathematics.
The institutional argument I refer to begins with the five axioms of action I have postulated. Starting from these axioms, I have systematically derived a series of institutional conclusions that comprehensively address the four constituent elements of a state. I argue that these conclusions should form the constitution. When having an AI review the argumentation, I consistently need to address the Humean dilemma it raises. The content I posted above summarizes my responses to the AI on this matter, and it has proven to be an effective rebuttal in the AI's assessment.
??I thought the core idea itself was quite suitable for a forum post, which is why I shared these paragraphs.??
I gave this example not to discuss the quality or capabilities of modern robots, but to illustrate one example of the world's fluidity, which continually raises new questions. You spoke of the constitution and its immutability, but how can it be immutable, and CAN it be? Also, in your opening post, you spoke of the emergence of the "ought" from the "necessary." But what if the necessary disappears? Does the "ought" also disappear? You haven't answered my opening question or my follow-up questions.
Why are the justified constitutional conclusions immutable? Because conclusions like 'A must not kill,' deduced from given non-contradictory premises, possess uniqueness. It is impossible for both 'A must not kill' and 'A may kill' to be true under the same conditions. Similarly, it is impossible for 'A must not kill today' to later become 'A may kill tomorrow.' Therefore, the conclusion 'A must not kill' does not require updates across time.
Due to the nuances of translation, I cannot guarantee that I have understood your meaning with perfect accuracy.
I don't speak English very well myself and use a translator. I'll try to explain it sentence by sentence.
The world is fluid. I gave an example of change. For example, robots appeared. They replaced human labor. The Constitution guarantees the right to work. Labor has become impossible. What should we do with the Constitution?
You claim: Morality arises from the "necessary." Let's say the "necessary" disappears (as in the case of minority rights). What happens to morality?
I perceive a fundamental difference in the levels at which we are discussing. You are concerned with the 'fluidity' of specific conditions and technologies within the empirical world, whereas my theory aims to demonstrate the 'logical necessity' of fundamental principles within the normative domain.
The questions you raise belong to the level of 'legal application'that is, how to apply eternal principles to a changing world. This necessitates solutions through new, specific legislation. However, this process does not undermine the validity of normative conclusions at the constitutional level, such as the prohibitions of fraud and murder.
The 'necessity' of these normative conclusions is metaphysical and logical; it is not dependent on, nor does it change with, any specific form of society. Consequently, the 'disappearance of necessity' scenario you hypothesize occurs, within my framework, only at the level of 'specific laws' and never at the level of 'constitutional principles.' The strength of my theory lies precisely in providing an eternal foundation for a fluid reality.
You distinguish between logical and empirical necessity, but it seems to me you fail to notice that even your "logical necessity" doesn't exist in a vacuumit itself presupposes a condition of applicability, that is, the presence of a subject of action and an environment in which that subject is capable of acting.
When you assert that "A must not kill" is a logically necessary conclusion from consistent axioms, you thereby presuppose the very possibility of the existence of living agents with goals, interests, and consciousness. But this is not a logical constant, but an ontological given that can disappear or change.
The "eternal foundation" you propose rests on a premise that itself belongs to the world of becoming, not the world of pure logic. You appeal to the eternity of the conclusion, but fail to note that its axioms can cease to be true.
Even if life as such persists, its strategy can change.
For example, during war, the act of killing ceases to be a violation of the principle of survivalon the contrary, it becomes a condition for it. In this context, the very "necessity" on which your original "ought" was based disappears. Another example: the state has weakened and can't maintain order. Neighbors break into your house and steal your food. Do they still have a "right to life" in you?
Therefore, your theory is not eternalit is simply temporarily universal, as long as conditions exist in which "action for a purpose" is possible.
You speak of "normative principles" independent of the form of society, but I am saying that the very possibility of a norm depends on the form of existence. And in this sense, everything "eternal" in your model is nothing more than a stable fragment of a changing world.
The conclusions I argue for are, of course, valid only under the premises of my postulated axioms. When the axioms themselves are challenged, the conclusions derived from them are naturally challenged as well. I have postulated five axioms of action. Three are foundational: first, the Axiom of Efficacy, which is an analytical truth'to achieve a purpose, efficacy must occur'whose truth value is directly determined by the definitions I have provided. Second, the Axiom of Purpose, which states that human action is directed toward a fundamental purpose (derived from the observation that human behavior is an expression of biological adaptation). Third, the Axiom of Cognition, which states that behavioral decisions are influenced by cognition. The other two axioms are essentially integrations of the Axioms of Purpose and Cognition.
Your definition of 'must' is circular here. Circular definitions are characteristic of speech acts ("Tie your shoelaces! because I said so!") and also of analytic propositions ("Bachelor" means "unmarried man").
In such contexts, it is right to point out that their use is not necessarily inferential, because they might represent instructions, wishes, promises, postulates, conventions, orders etc, rather than assumptions or facts. But the English meaning of "ought" is used both as a speech act and as an inference, depending on the context, which reflects the fact that we often cannot know whether a sentence is meant as a speech act or as a hypothesis, especially when considering the fact that speech acts are often issued on the basis of assumptions.
This also reflects a fundamental asymmetry of information between speaker and listener; When a speaker uses "ought", they might intend it as a speech act or as a prediction but the listener cannot be certain as to what the speaker meant, even after asking the speaker to clarify himself, because we are back to circular definitions.
1. Im not sure I understand you here. Why does your example it is wrong to murder correspond to the four constituent elements of a state and not it is good for me and my kin to donate to a sperm-bank? Could you clarify?
Also, I dont see how it is good for me and my kin to donate to a sperm-bank excludes the principle of agential autonomy. One could believe it is a necessary condition to efficiently spread my genetic material to donate to a sperm-bank while respecting personal autonomy. Still, my point is that we dont feel this authority or must from this (at least not in my case), so Im skeptical that your account gives the correct explanation.
2. I see. In this case, I dont think this captures the sense of must that normativity includes.
For instance, you might see me reaching for a scalding hot plate and say, Hey, Gecko, you have an end to not feel pain and not touching that plate is a necessary condition to achieve that end.
I could then respond: I understand. If I touch the plate I will feel pain and I have an end to not feel pain. Still, why should I act in a way that efficiently achieves my ends? I then touch the plate and burn myself.
I seem to be making a mistake. But I dont see how your particular account captures the bite of that mistake. Even for this means-end statement, I believe we would still need a normative premise akin to "you should efficiently achieve your ends" for it to have that bite.
Yes, analytical truths are indeed inherently and inevitably entangled with a form of 'circularity' to a significant degree. However, this 'circularity' is not mere tautology or a logical fallacy; rather, it reveals a deep-seated structure inherent to the nature of concepts and language itself. Among the five axioms I have postulated, only the Axiom of Efficacy is an analytical truth. Therefore, the validity of this particular axiom is certain and unquestionable. It is precisely this axiom that serves as the key to deriving a special type of 'is'namely, normative conclusionsfrom another 'is'.
"Personally differentiated and specific purposes only impose requirements on the individual's own behavior. Such requirements cannot serve as behavioral norms obligatory for everyone. Norms that are common to all can only be derived from the purpose common to all.
'Donating to a sperm bank' is a requirement stemming from your personal, differentiated purpose, or from a goal under such a purpose. It is not derived from the fundamental purpose common to all humanity and therefore cannot be justified as a behavioral requirement for everyone.
Both 'thou shalt not kill' and 'behavioral autonomy' are conclusions that can be rigorously demonstrated from the common fundamental purpose. Hence, they can serve as universal requirements. 'Donating to a sperm bank' cannot be justified from the fundamental purpose.
Your second example follows the same logic."
You can assert this, but Im not yet sure I see it. Perhaps you could clarify what you mean by purpose shared by humanity, because you seemed to frame it in a Darwinian sense in your post.
I dont see the difference yet. It is wrong to murder might be derived from forbidding murder is the efficient means to achieve efficient cooperation, which is the efficient means to efficiently spreading genetic material. Similarly, donate to a sperm-bank might be derived from donating to a sperm-bank is the efficient means to procreate, which is the efficient means to efficiently spreading genetic material. Please demonstrate the relevant difference.
In what sense does this logic resolve 2?
Let us say youre talking with the antinatalist David Benatar. You tell him, It is wrong to cause extinction.
Benatar disagrees and asks you to clarify.
You say, I mean that causing extinction is not the efficient means of the shared, biological end of spreading genetic material of the kind belonging to the species Homo sapiens.
There seems to be no bite at all for Benatar to agree and coherently say, Sure, it is true that spreading genetic material is our biological ends and that causing extinction is not the efficient means for that end. Yet, what does that have to do with why we should not cause extinction by collectively refusing to procreate?
This is where Kantian ethics makes a real contribution to the discussion. As I'm sure you know, Kant believed that only the good will was truly good, in an ethical sense. Put another way: My motivation for acting is of paramount importance; what I do may actually be ethically insignificant, but why I do it will always matter.
So, to your question: I may choose the better over the worse because I want to be seen as someone who chooses the better over the worse. (This is only one example; there are many we could consider.). Have I indeed chosen the better over the worse? Yes. Have I done so knowing it is the best? Yes. But have I chosen it for the right reason -- do I have a good will? No.
We can particularize this to an act of charity. I may correctly see that helping an effective AIDS charity is an act of goodness, or the right thing to do, or in accordance with spiritual principles, or however one cares to phrase it. But if I do so because (though I absolutely agree that it's good to help AIDS patients) I enjoy the attention and the gloss to my self-esteem, Kant would call the action ethically worthless. I wouldn't go that far, myself, but Kant is raising an important point. Isn't there a huge difference between the person who does the right thing for the wrong, or equivocal, reasons, and the person who does it because they want to do the right thing? (An interesting subsidiary question, by the way, is whether "wanting to do the right thing" can be stated in non-Kantian -- that is, non-procedural -- terms, or whether the Kantian conception requires some version of the categorical imperative as the basis for discussing ethics.)
Like everything in ethics, this is nuanced and endlessly complex. I don't think deontological ethics offers a knockdown argument to virtue ethics. In fact, I think they work best in tandem. But one can certainly point out that the question of motivation in virtue ethics needs a lot of elaboration. Is "wanting to be a 'good' human" (in the pre-modern sense of "good human", where it's the same sort of usage as a "good hammer" or "good poem") a sufficient motivation for ethical action? Doesn't it matter why one wants this? Or must we disregard motivation entirely, and merely speak of good or right actions, or the human good as a kind of correspondence with what is essential or natural to humans?
The point is that if someone is free to choose contrary to the "fundamental purpose," then your claim that the fundamental purpose is common to all is in jeopardy.
Sure. But doesn't your argument take steps beyond this? Either to human behaviour being determined by biological adaptation, such that we have no capacity to act against this mooted biological imperative; or that we ought only to act in accord with this biological imperative.
The first is to deny that we make choices. The second, to confuse what we do with what we ought do.
This view is known as adaptationism. It's very intuitively persuasive, but is not backed up by science. Adaptation has the biggest impact on organisms that create really large populations, like bacteria. For humans, it's definitely a factor, but not the biggest. A particular human behavior, if it is genetically determined, is as likely to be a result of genetic drift as adaptation, so we can't just assume. We have to actually do science to arrive at conclusions.
overview:
Ah, I get you now. I thought you had a typo because I was considering the case where one knowingly chooses the worse over the better, not vice versa; hence my confused response. I agree, Kant makes a crucial point here. Although, I would say that if one chooses the better strictly on the grounds that it is better (against one's other inclinations), this would still be a case of "choosing the better because it is better."
The way Plato would put it is that this is a case where the desires of the rational part of the soul (the nous, logos) weigh against those of the lower parts (or in New Testament terms, we might say the spirit, as opposed to the flesh and psyche; or the "heart," as in "the eye of the nous," not the passions, trumping the passions). And Plato's point is similar to Kant's, although I think more nuanced, in that he sees this desire for the "truly best" as known as good as what allows us to transcend current belief and desire, and thus our own finitude.
One of my problems with Kant is that his notion of freedom seems to largely be a sort of consequence of his epistemology and metaphysical assumptions (which I find flawed), and so he has to assume this sort of bare, inviolable, individual freedom. Whereas I think the ancients had the right of it that freedom is arduous to attain, and has a strong social and corporate (and even historical) element as well (something Hegel, Solovyov, and Dante get at quite well too).
Quoting J
Well, why someone acts is a huge part of ethics, both for Plato and Aristotle, but even moreso for the later tradition. Understanding is crucial. Mere habituation is a sort of half measure that is not fully self-determining. So, Kant is getting at something important here, I just don't see how it is missing from the earlier tradition, whereas he also misses that the good person ideally desires the good because of its goodness.
Of course, this is maybe a bit more clear in Plato than Aristotle, and certainly it is more clear in the later tradition, but I think it's fairly clear in Aristotle (or at least many readings of him, including all ancient ones by his fellow Greeks). Where it isn't always clear is in the "Aristotle" of modern "virtue ethics," which tends to ignore that ordering of the appetites (epithumia and thymos to be ruled and shaped by logos) and want to make Aristotle a "naturalist" in a very modern sense that only reintroduces a very weak notion of teleology, normally as some sort of "emergent property" of organisms. Deprived of its metaphysical grounding, this Aristotelian ethics does face issues with including Kant's insights, because understanding and phronema are no longer "higher."
I am working on a project that compares modern character education literature to late-antique philosophy and it's almost like two wholly different Aristotles! A concern in the modern literature is that Aristotle's ethics is "selfish" because it focuses on the perfection of one's virtue. This claim is even more common against Plotinus. I imagine the late-antique thinkers would be thoroughly perplexed by this because their metaphysics of goodness (heavily influenced by Aristotle) has it as diffusive, and always related to the whole. Plotinus took in and brought up orphans at his own expense precisely because he became more like God; "being like God" could hardly result in "selfishness" ("becoming like God" being the express goal of late-antique ethics). They would ask, "how could goodness be a curse and not a blessing?"
Well, suffice to say I think that metaphysics lies at the heart of this disagreement. If man's telos simply means that certain physical inputs (including social or "intellectual" ones, which in the modern context are still considered to be emergent physical inputs) are good for him, and others bad, based on what he is, and thus sex and food sit alongside "knowing and experiencing 'the Good'" as a menu of goods that make us happy, then we face an irreducible and unordered plurality of goods. "Knowing the good and being conformed to it," gets reduced to "having certain sorts of positive experiences." Whereas, when the Platonists read Aristotle, they thought it was obvious that the lower is ordered to the higher, and that the higher required ever-increasing conformity to the Good, which of course involves the willing of the Good for its own sake. This is perhaps more obvious in the Christian tradition, particularly in the idea of Blessed Virgin as the apex all creation, showing forth creation's (and man's) proper role in "giving birth to God," to the "body of Christ" (physically for her, as the Church for mankind) in thought and deed.
Good, and sorry if I added to the confusion.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes. One of the things I dislike about the "pre-modern -- modern" distinction is that it tends to imply that there's no continuity in problematics or thought between the ancients and ourselves. (People like MacIntyre, read loosely, seem to reinforce this.) Certainly Plato knew about this question, and equally certainly, Kant had read his Plato and was not entering the conversation de novo.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I see lots of similarities between Plato and Kant on this issue (and of course Platonic Christian philosophy is the bridge between them). P and K both see a sharp divide between types of motivation, and both situate this divide as a question of immanence versus transcendence. For Kant, the vocabulary is "autonomous will" versus "heteronomous desires." In the heteronomous world, pushed and pulled, acted upon and reacting to, we find ourselves with desires particular to ourselves, as individuals. But by virtue of our participation in the autonomous world of rational freedom, the "kingdom of ends," we discover an entirely different order of motivation which is the same for everyone, though we are free to act or not act upon it. It is this motivation, or will, that Kant believed had moral value.
Your thoughts about Kant and freedom are interesting, but is it really possible for any philosopher to have a view on freedom that doesn't depend on "metaphysical assumptions"? Surely the ancients were no different. Also, I'm not sure I agree that Kant's autonomy is "bare, inviolable, individual." Mountains have been written about this, and I've only read some of it. I would say that Kant (who was a Christian apologist, though he tried to avoid being seen that way), did see individual freedom, understood as the power to choose, as an unavoidable human condition, influenced but never conditioned by social circumstances, and roughly analogous to the free will (and possibility of sin) of Christian theology. The twist here, though, is that Kantian autonomy is meant to represent a denial of a certain sort of individual freedom. It's only when we abandon our heteronomous orientation for what is categorical and valid for all humans (or rational beings) that the possibility of truly acting freely can arise.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
An important issue to raise. I'd say Kant doesn't so much miss this point, as reject it, and offer what he feels is a better description of ethical action. The good person (not a term Kant often used) is the person who acts from a good will. Is the good will a desire? That's the rub. Most interpret Kant as saying it's something else entirely, whereas the Greek/virtue ethics framework must interpret it as yet another desire, so that the "ordering of desires" idea can be preserved, and linked with an anthropology.
One place where I do see an overlap between Kant and some of the classical thinkers is this: It's possible to read Kant's discussion of autonomy and ethics as an argument for conforming to what is human nature, or at any rate rational nature. Read this way, it isn't so different from any ethics based on a view of what is essential or natural to humans, using an allegedly established or obvious definition. I go back and forth on how accurate a reading of Kant this is. The problem, as we know, is that the categorical imperative seems to depend on an anthropology no less rigorous than Aristotle's. The difference would be that Kant tries to establish his view of human possibilities on various arguments from self-contradiction. These are notoriously tricky. What counts for Kant as a "contradiction" seems to vary in meaning and implication, depending on which part of the cat. imp. we get a handle on. But anyway . . .
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This sounds interesting. I'd like to learn more about how to rescue Aristotle and the virtue-ethics tradition from the charge of selfishness. Or, for that matter, how to repair the gaping hole that seems to be there when it comes to Christian virtues such as compassion and mercy.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
See above comments. Notice that you don't speak about desiring the Good for its own sake, but of willing it. Kant would reply: "Excellent. You've just passed from the heteronomous world to the autonomous world!"
"1. Within the argumentation, the core of the teleological postulate is to posit the existenceof a fundamental purpose. The specific contentof this purpose is, for the moment, secondary. Even if I were to treat the fundamental purpose as a pure, abstract conceptfor instance, positing it as a mere point in space towards which all action is directedI could still derive constitutional-level conclusions. The content of the fundamental purpose only becomes relevant when judging what constitutes an 'interest.' In fact, this content has a dualistic structure, a significant discovery previously overlooked, which proves highly effective for explaining and predicting phenomena, though it is not utilized in the constitutional derivation itself.
2.Your reconstruction of my argument is incorrect. Your confusion stems primarily from not having identified the valid path of derivation. The two statements you presented lack the necessary logical entailment to yield an apodictic conclusion."
Within the framework of my postulated axioms, it is acknowledged that humans can perform actions that appearto deviate from the fundamental purpose. However, it is not the fundamental purpose itself that drives this deviation; rather, it is the Axiom of Cognition that influences behavioral decisions. These two axioms undertake distinct explanatory roles: the fundamental purpose provides the directional vector, while the evolved human cognitive mechanism cannot guarantee perfect alignment with it.
Let's clarify the logic:
Statement A: 'You cannot skip eating, or you will die.' This is a factual judgment that points to a causal relationship between an action and its outcome.
Statement B: 'You can choose not to eat and accept death.' This acknowledges the human freedom to act against this causal law.
My theory operates at the level analogous to Statement A: that is, with the fundamental purpose as the premise, certain behavioral norms are necessary conclusions. Violating them necessarily causes the social system to deviate, to some extent, from a state that is advantageous for humanity. What I demonstrate is the necessity of this causal relationship.
In order to reach the conclusion "You ought not skip eating", one needs an additional premise. Perhaps "You ought seek not to die".
So your argument remains incomplete.
The Axiom of Purpose itself serves precisely as that factual postulate.
What's that, then? I don't see other mention of it.
All human actions share one and only one fundamental purpose."
That is the content of the Axiom of Purpose. Does it surprise you? It might be hard to see what one can do with it...
Which is what?
The fundamental purpose, also termed the meta-purpose, is constituted by both the service target of the action and the final state expected to be achieved for that target. I refer to the service target as "one's own group," while the final state is denoted by the term "interest," defined as the conditions for achieving or constituting that final state. The interaction between these two constituent elements causes the fundamental purpose to exist in two primary forms. It is beyond the present scope to detail these manifestations or the rationale behind this specific structure, but they are identified as: "to secure favorable living conditions for one's own group" and "to secure recognition for one's own group." Accordingly, interests fall into two corresponding categories: favorable living conditions and recognition.
The terminological mapping is as follows:
Fundamental Purpose = Service Target (One's Own Group) × Final State (Living Conditions / Recognition and their combinations);
Interest = Living Conditions / Recognition and their combinations.
I do not intend to elaborate further on this matter at this time.
Ok. If you want others to take that as axiomatic, you'll have to persuade them. As it is, no one takes it as axiomatic except you.
You only represent yourself.
You still have no argument.
'You cannot skip eating, or you will die.'
Fundamental Purpose = Service Target (One's Own Group) × Final State
therefore, you ought not skip eating.
??
Any discipline that deals with human action is incapable of explaining any single social phenomenon without relying on a meta-teleological postulate.
In Chinese history, hypotheses such as "human nature tends toward benefit" which is itself a meta-teleological postulate have been proposed repeatedly for millennia.
Contemporary economics similarly operates on the Rational Agent hypothesis, which is, in essence, also a meta-teleological postulate.
Even theories that do not explicitly set forth a meta-teleology inevitably rely on one for explanation A Theory of Justice is a case in point.
My Axiom of Purpose is likewise a meta-teleological postulate. It shares the same fundamental attribute as all the postulates mentioned above; the only difference lies in its structure.
Therefore, you can only speak for yourself.
There is content I am willing to share on this forum, and content I am not at least not for the time being. High-value ideas that have not been formally published in academic papers represent the culmination of years of personal work. This really should not require explanation.
This argument is clearly invalid.
It's how you seem to have set up your argument.
Have you a valid variant?
I certainly don't argue my point in this way, but I won't explain how I did it here, so you don't need to ask.
As long as you're happy.
I regret that this has caused you dissatisfaction; that was never my intention. However, I must protect myself in the course of this exchange. The fact that you find it difficult to comprehend how my argument is constructed only underscores its significant value.
I personally have no complaints about you. If you feel that my attitude is bad, it must be a translation problem.
So you could say that within the framework of traditional Chinese views, "human nature tends toward benefit or recognition of one's group" is an axiom. That's how axioms work: there has to be a community that views it as self evident. You can't just say, "This is my axiom" and then expect others to accept that. It doesn't work that way.
Quoting panwei
The rational agent hypothesis is that each individual rationally works for his or her own benefit. There is no expectation that an individual will consider the welfare of the group he or she belongs to. But keep in mind that the rational agent hypothesis has been called into question in recent years because of its tendency to produce wrong results.
How is this argument, provided by @Banno different from your argument?
Quoting Banno
1. You can try to understand what my presupposed axiom of purpose is.
2. You can try to understand why I replied to you with this content:
3. You can try to understand why I replied to him with this content: