Ideological Evil
I assert that the commonly portrayed image of ideologically driven evil is somewhat specious; I do not think that, say, jihadism is the greatest evil on earth - although it is very significant - but rather that those types of ideologies that tend towards manifesting in positions of power and causing mass suffering are indeed the most salient evils because of that suffering and certain inherent qualities they possess. Many consequentialists seem to maintain that intent matters in moral considerations of good or evil at least as a way of predicting or analyzing outcomes, and I will continue with reasoning along these lines.
To begin, I propose a stratification of ideologies in terms of their structures and will provide examples of these categories:
Tier (1) ideologies are those that spontaneously radicalize individuals. This is through media not originating from, not legitimized by, and that do not sustain concentrations of political power as much. A good example of this is the arising of IS and their subsequent violent rampages and insurgencies, which, according to various iterations of IS, were attempts, at least in part, to fight social injustice and marginalization (which is, of course, ridiculous, but no one ever thinks they are the bad guys, and this claim helped them recruit many fighters). Their propaganda efforts in general are excellent examples of the kind of media I'm referring to.
Tier (2) ideologies are those that occupy nexuses of power, openly legitimate that occupation, and manifest in governmental power structures. They tend towards sustaining concentrations of political power. Think ideologies like Zionism, neoconservatism, fascism, etc. The example of Zionism, in its modern-day form, is relatively straightforward: many Israeli Jews believe they are justified in stealing land in the West Bank. They likely would not have these beliefs if not for the decisions made by politicians and powerful people that resulted in the decision to create a Jewish ethnostate. The very existence of this state, and the propaganda it puts out, encourages the attempted vindication of Zionism through governmental channels.
One might argue that Tier (1) ideologies inevitably, or are likely to, morph into something resembling a Tier (2) ideology as they gain adherents and power. After all, IS is intent on ushering in a Caliphate or whatever. I think this is true, but we will be considering the likelihood of ideologies attaining power as part of this analysis.
Given we define the evil an ideology is capable of causing as being a function of both the intent of its adherents and the consequences of their actions, and we demarcate tier (1) ideologies from tier (2) on the basis of the definitions provided above, the evil of ideologies in either tier is thus determined (at least in part) by:
(1) The level of intent to cause destruction and suffering propagated by an ideology.
(2) The actual suffering and destruction reliably caused by adherents of an ideology.
(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it.
My question is this: if Tier (2) ideologies do not propagate as much bad intent, but they result in larger numbers of deaths, more suffering, etc., then can we actually say that certain Tier (1) ideologies are more evil than Tier (2) ideologies even given that if a certain Tier (1) would result in more suffering and death if it enjoyed as much power as other ideologies that do tend more often to manifest in positions of power? Given that Tier (2) ideologies can actually result in more suffering because they reliably manifest in power structures, and not just because of the efficacy of the associated propaganda of a given government and its content, it seems to me we must accept that Tier (2) ideologies are usually inherently more destructive according to a consequentialist criterion. That is to say that the capability of being more likely to manifest in power structures, nexuses of power, etc. is fundamental, and this capability affects the consequences of the actions of adherents of a given ideology - which is the bottom line. So, we could add the criteria that evil is also (conditionally) determined by an additional factor inherent to Tier (2) ideologies if we frame this input purely in terms of one-way, predicted consequences much like how (2) is a function of (1):
(1.5) The tendency towards originating from, legitimizing, and sustaining concentrations of political power.
I say that (1.5) conditionally determines evil because an ideology could also be a source of good depending upon the ideology and context. If one wants to maintain consequentialism while also condemning certain ideological actors as being a significant, or perhaps the most significant, evil based upon their intent, one might need to consider this critique.
Also: please don't fixate on the examples too much. I just used what was convenient and would allow for something concise. IS and Zionism don't need to be what is actually discussed, and I'm not even totally sure how they would measure up against each other in terms of bad consequences.
To begin, I propose a stratification of ideologies in terms of their structures and will provide examples of these categories:
Tier (1) ideologies are those that spontaneously radicalize individuals. This is through media not originating from, not legitimized by, and that do not sustain concentrations of political power as much. A good example of this is the arising of IS and their subsequent violent rampages and insurgencies, which, according to various iterations of IS, were attempts, at least in part, to fight social injustice and marginalization (which is, of course, ridiculous, but no one ever thinks they are the bad guys, and this claim helped them recruit many fighters). Their propaganda efforts in general are excellent examples of the kind of media I'm referring to.
Tier (2) ideologies are those that occupy nexuses of power, openly legitimate that occupation, and manifest in governmental power structures. They tend towards sustaining concentrations of political power. Think ideologies like Zionism, neoconservatism, fascism, etc. The example of Zionism, in its modern-day form, is relatively straightforward: many Israeli Jews believe they are justified in stealing land in the West Bank. They likely would not have these beliefs if not for the decisions made by politicians and powerful people that resulted in the decision to create a Jewish ethnostate. The very existence of this state, and the propaganda it puts out, encourages the attempted vindication of Zionism through governmental channels.
One might argue that Tier (1) ideologies inevitably, or are likely to, morph into something resembling a Tier (2) ideology as they gain adherents and power. After all, IS is intent on ushering in a Caliphate or whatever. I think this is true, but we will be considering the likelihood of ideologies attaining power as part of this analysis.
Given we define the evil an ideology is capable of causing as being a function of both the intent of its adherents and the consequences of their actions, and we demarcate tier (1) ideologies from tier (2) on the basis of the definitions provided above, the evil of ideologies in either tier is thus determined (at least in part) by:
(1) The level of intent to cause destruction and suffering propagated by an ideology.
(2) The actual suffering and destruction reliably caused by adherents of an ideology.
(1) clearly affects (2), and perhaps vice versa, but it is a little harder to pull these two things apart and see the exact relationship than to just consider (2) to be a function of (1), which is how I'm going to treat it.
My question is this: if Tier (2) ideologies do not propagate as much bad intent, but they result in larger numbers of deaths, more suffering, etc., then can we actually say that certain Tier (1) ideologies are more evil than Tier (2) ideologies even given that if a certain Tier (1) would result in more suffering and death if it enjoyed as much power as other ideologies that do tend more often to manifest in positions of power? Given that Tier (2) ideologies can actually result in more suffering because they reliably manifest in power structures, and not just because of the efficacy of the associated propaganda of a given government and its content, it seems to me we must accept that Tier (2) ideologies are usually inherently more destructive according to a consequentialist criterion. That is to say that the capability of being more likely to manifest in power structures, nexuses of power, etc. is fundamental, and this capability affects the consequences of the actions of adherents of a given ideology - which is the bottom line. So, we could add the criteria that evil is also (conditionally) determined by an additional factor inherent to Tier (2) ideologies if we frame this input purely in terms of one-way, predicted consequences much like how (2) is a function of (1):
(1.5) The tendency towards originating from, legitimizing, and sustaining concentrations of political power.
I say that (1.5) conditionally determines evil because an ideology could also be a source of good depending upon the ideology and context. If one wants to maintain consequentialism while also condemning certain ideological actors as being a significant, or perhaps the most significant, evil based upon their intent, one might need to consider this critique.
Also: please don't fixate on the examples too much. I just used what was convenient and would allow for something concise. IS and Zionism don't need to be what is actually discussed, and I'm not even totally sure how they would measure up against each other in terms of bad consequences.
Comments (8)
Going to visit an isolated or uncontacted people because you want to give them money, yet end up introducing a modern bacteria that 99% of people are immune from that ends up reducing their population to a few dozen, and had no idea, probably wasn't evil, or at very least wasn't "as evil" as if you wanted to visit them to steal from them, or otherwise were fully aware of biology and had such intentions in mind, and ended up doing the same.
Reason I mention such, is it seems your flagship example of religion hinges on not only the idea that a god exists or does not exist, but whether or not the people who perform actions or inaction under the ideological mindset of such genuinely believe a god exists or not. Theoretically speaking, if they were right, and we were all wrong, they would be preventing us from eternal damnation (or whatever) and therefore, despite acts of violence that would normally be considered evil, are actually the greatest good one could ever perform. Theoretically speaking, of course.
In short, imagine an isolated, ultra-religious family believing their 6-year-old child is the devil incarnate and so they drown him to "save the world" or what have you. They'll sleep soundly at night, and never perform any other act of violence again. Take real actual examples of history. Botched exorcisms for example. Giving people the benefit of the doubt (things were much, much different back then, superstition wasn't the exclusive domain of fools and the mentally unwell as it is often considered today) that they actually believed they were doing the right thing and preventing evil, one should clearly be able to draw a line between unfortunate, misguided deeds and intentional misdeeds.
Say your child really wanted to go to summer camp by the lake, and you know he or she cannot swim, yet didn't have that item of knowledge in your mind at the time, and you permit him or her to go, and they drown, resulting in your entire family disliking you, calling for your arrest, and basically putting you on par with the likes of a murderer. Or more simply, falling asleep while your kid is swimming in your backyard pool and the same fate befalls him or her. Are you evil? Did you perform an evil act? Well, did you?
Yes, I agree, thus I included that even many consequentialists have use of the concept of intentions even when all that fundamentally matters is consequence.
Quoting Outlander
I don't know what "flagship" example you are referring to exactly (Zionism?), but yes, the issue of divine command is a quagmire for anyone making any meta-ethical claims at all that don't rule it out. However, I could make up any God I want and act according to their supposed divine wisdom, but that doesn't mean other people can't be concerned with the real world; religious claims don't necessarily disprove human-based ethics.
Quoting Outlander
I'm just talking about instances in which bad intent lines up with bad actions as analyzed from a broadly consequentialist view. I acknowledge that misguided actions are not as clearly evil as intentional ones, and that the two can be considered separately. If I have an ethic, as applied with the critique in the OP, that says there is a difference along the lines you provide for two different actions, then I don't see a problem.
Quoting Outlander
I'm not entirely sure how this relates to the OP. Could you explain it to me? I might be being obtuse.
Oh, I see. You are referring to how I used religious examples for both tiers of ideology. It doesn't have to be that way; that these people believe in their ideologies because of God is not that relevant to the OP.
edit: also, Zionism can be secular
I just want to be clear: Judaism is not equivalent to Zionism. Zionism is substantially secular and makes normative claims that are not necessarily tied to any religion.
I personally agree with your first assumption, that "ideological evil" is superficial (or as you put it, "somewhat specious"). Ideologies do not exist outside of the historical framework where they are created, the ideologies by themselves are inert artifacts, not necessarily doing harm to anyone or behaving in a violent manner...because I would assume that your judgements about "evil" are mostly concerned with both the ambitions and actual completions of some sort of violence?
So by this set of assumptions I'm laying out, you can be a Nazi or Jihadist, but both are just ideas until groups of people start putting plans together to achieve the ends of Nazism or Jihadism.
I think your tiers are bunk: various ideologies influence "the nexi of power", none are inherently more or less powerful. Just using islamic fundamentalism as an example (a broader term for the ideology that motivates jihadies), there are already muslim governments, examples being saudi arabia, oman, and Iran. I'd bet you there are people who associate with jihadist movements in or closely associated with those governments, the connection between jihadist militancy and iran being fairly obvious, yet also not something the Iranian government, Hezbollah, or Hamas would speak openly about. However, it would be impossible to have a government dedicated purely to one ideology, without associating with some of the others.
The means to an end is what we judge as morally reprehensible or morally good regardless of whether they are committed through the concentrated, legitimate power, or a boorish accumulation of blind adherents.
This probably wont surprise you, but reading your post reminded me of a personal experience.
Some time ago, while browsing job postings, I stumbled upon one from a well-known local blogger who teaches business skills and personal development. The blogger needed a philosopher. Among the requirements were things like ability to create meaning and ability to construct a methodology.
It struck me because about ten years ago I watched this person, listened to him, and genuinely believed what he was saying. Only later did I realize how deliberately those messages were crafted and how strongly they shaped peoples thinking.
How does this relate to your topic? Your distinction between levels of ideology made me think that many ideologies are not merely spontaneous or organic. They are often created, refined, and maintained by people who are quite skilled in philosophy, communication, and narrative-building. Concepts like good and evil become tools in that process instruments used by those who design and legitimize the ideology.
So your framework resonates with my experience: what looks like a natural emergence of beliefs often turns out to be the product of intentional work by experts who know how to shape collective meaning.
Adolf Hitler himself did this; history has it that he practiced his messages and act as an authoritative speaker/politicians for years before he was able to seize power. In his earlier years of doing this, some people saw him looking overly awkward and strained in his mannerisms.
These examples show that ideologies themselves are tools used to benefit certain individuals or groups, and i guess the more interesting and harder to answer question is to what extent their advocates "believe the ideology". Do Islamic extremist leaders really think they are putting forth the will of God, or is it just a way to produce a short-sighted adrenaline rush?