Greek Hedonists, Pleasure and Plato. What are the bad pleasures?

The sensation of flying is pleasurable. So go jump off a cliff.
Falling is exhilarating, but landing is unpleasant.
Therefore, bungee jumping.

Philosophy is rather stupid about feelings. Life cannot be reduced to the calculus of pain and pleasure or any one dimension of positive and negative, even after allowing that consequences are complex. Consider chronic negative states for example: — ennui, anxiety, depression, hyper-vigilance, stress.
What may alleviate ennui, might well increase stress or anxiety.

Call no man happy until he is dead.

Solon, according to Herodotus.

Because a life worth living makes a story worth telling, and unmitigated good is no story at all; it needs the relief of a crucifixion.

It is uncontroversial that pleasure can lead to pain, and happiness to misery. And vice versa. It is worth getting tired and sore gathering food and fuel for the winter. And there is joy in overcoming fear or pain in some achievement; indeed it is some such difficulty that makes it an achievement in the first place.



Or consider satisfaction or contentment - the condition of not seeking either pleasure or to avoid pain. This might be a happy state to be in sometimes, but supposing it could be prolonged, would lead to an empty, apathetic life.

And all this without mention of the complexities of social interaction - the happiness of my friends and neighbours is essential to my own happiness, and when things go wrong with you, it hurts me too.

There is a metaphysical distinction, sometimes made, between aesthetics and ethics. The principal difference is that "the good" of ethics is always sought for the sake of a higher end, a further good. Therefore there is always a reason why it is deemed as good. "It is good because...". On the other hand, the pleasure of aesthetics is sought for the sake of itself, there is no further end. This is known as "beauty", and there is no rational answer as to why it is good or pleasant.

Aristotle insisted that we must put an end to the good of ethics, or else we'd have an infinite regress. A is good for the sake of B, which is needed to bring about C, which is required for D, and onward ad infinitum. Without the end, there would be no grounding for "good" in general. The theological position inserts "God" as the ultimate end, as a sort of grounding. Aristotle proposed "happiness" as the ultimate end, that which is sought for the sake of itself.

But happiness may easily be conflated with pleasure and beauty, and this results in a unification of ethics and aesthetics. Then "the good" of ethics is supported by the pleasure of aesthetics, and everything which is deemed "good" is done so because it supports that further end, pleasure, which is desired for the sake of itself.

Quoting javi2541997

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato?

Plato demonstrated that pleasure is not properly opposed to pain. If these two are opposed, then the desire for pleasure, which is a lack of pleasure in one's present condition, would necessarily be an existence of pain. This implies that pain is a requirement for pleasure, as necessarily prior to it. So he had some argumentative tricks (which I can't recall off hand), to show that there must be a type of pleasure which is independent from, therefore not properly opposed to pain. He assigned the highest good to this type of pleasure, because it does not require pain for its attainment.

If we take this as our guide, the highest good is that pleasure which is not at all opposed to pain, then the lowest good (most bad) would be the type of pleasure which is most readily opposed to pain.

Quoting unenlightened

It is uncontroversial that pleasure can lead to pain, and happiness to misery.

I agree with this. But I was looking for a practical or objective example. Your comment seems to be on the path of Plato's view, where pleasure depends on each individual and is subjective. I think the important fact is that Plato stated that there were "bad pleasures" in plural. Thus, a collection of actions or desires which are bad and conflict with the supposedly intrinsically good of pleasure.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

There is a metaphysical distinction, sometimes made, between aesthetics and ethics. The principal difference is that "the good" of ethics is always sought for the sake of a higher end, a further good. Therefore there is always a reason why it is deemed as good. "It is good because...". On the other hand, the pleasure of aesthetics is sought for the sake of itself, there is no further end. This is known as "beauty", and there is no rational answer as to why it is good or pleasant.

Interesting. What do you think, MU? Is pleasure related to ethics or aesthetics?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Plato demonstrated that pleasure is not properly opposed to pain.

Yes, exactly. I get this from Plato. But I think it is a bit subjective when he debates about good, bad, pain and pleasure. It seems that pleasure and pain need to be experienced by the subject, and then they conclude if something is bad or good. For example, smoking. In my humble opinion, I think smoking is a bad pleasure (following Plato's points) but completely objective because it is scientifically demonstrated that smoking kills and causes cancer. Therefore, smoking is a bad objective pleasure that does not depend on subjectiveness.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

If we take this as our guide, the highest good is that pleasure which is not at all opposed to pain, then the lowest good (most bad) would be the type of pleasure which is most readily opposed to pain.

I can't disagree with this, but I consider it a bit ambiguous. What are the boundaries of pain and good? There are people who enjoy sadomasochism. Is this sexual practice objectively good or bad even though it clearly implies pain?

Quoting javi2541997

Interesting. What do you think, MU? Is pleasure related to ethics or aesthetics?

Pleasure is definitely related to aesthetics. The question is how these two are related to ethics. The two extremes would be, one, that they are completely separate and unrelated, and the other that ethics is completely determined by pleasure and aesthetics. I would think that reality is somewhere in between.

Quoting javi2541997

Yes, exactly. I get this from Plato. But I think it is a bit subjective when he debates about good, bad, pain and pleasure. It seems that pleasure and pain need to be experienced by the subject, and then they conclude if something is bad or good. For example, smoking. In my humble opinion, I think smoking is a bad pleasure (following Plato's points) but completely objective because it is scientifically demonstrated that smoking kills and causes cancer. Therefore, smoking is a bad objective pleasure that does not depend on subjectiveness.

I think you need to consider that goods, as that which is desired, need to weighted and prioritized relative to each other. This is because they often conflict, so we commonly need to exclude one for the pursuit of another. This is why Plato compared an immediate pleasure to a distant one.

Sometimes we need to resist an immediate pleasure for a distant one if the distant one is more highly prized and the immediate one conflicts. This is difficult, because being immediate it appears bigger and better than it truly is. But we need to understand that the distant one is actually better, so we need to resist the immediate one which conflicts.

I think that this might be the case in your example of smoking. Smoking is an immediate pleasure, but reason informs us that it conflicts with the long term, less immediate desires. Since the long term is more highly prioritized, we need to resist from smoking for the sake of the other. Then smoking is a "bad pleasure" because it conflicts with the other which is more highly sought after.

Quoting javi2541997

I can't disagree with this, but I consider it a bit ambiguous. What are the boundaries of pain and good? There are people who enjoy sadomasochism. Is this sexual practice objectively good or bad even though it clearly implies pain?

I don't quite understand what you are asking here. Plato was looking for a type of pleasure which was unrelated to pain, which would be determined as "good". Incorporating pain and pleasure together within the same activity, as is the case in sadomasochism is a move in the opposite direction. We're supposed to be looking for a pleasure which is unrelated to pain, not one which is more closely related to pain.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Pleasure is definitely related to aesthetics.

I wanted to express this, but I wasn't very clear, I guess. :wink:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The question is how these two are related to ethics. The two extremes would be, one, that they are completely separate and unrelated, and the other that ethics is completely determined by pleasure and aesthetics. I would think that reality is somewhere in between.

It is true that it is better to choose the most eclectic choice and put pleasure between ethics and aesthetics. Perhaps the key to this distinction is more related to what we understand as "good" rather than how we experience pleasure. On this point, Plato (if I am not wrong) argued that everyone has to when he is doing good when something is good. I mean, it is subjective. There is not an objective approach to pleasure, apparently.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Smoking is an immediate pleasure, but reason informs us that it conflicts with the long term, less immediate desires. Since the long term is more highly prioritized, we need to resist from smoking for the sake of the other. Then smoking is a "bad pleasure" because it conflicts with the other which is more highly sought after.

Understood! Thanks for this clear and informative explanation, MU. :up:

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

I don't quite understand what you are asking here.

I'd try to express myself better.

Since Plato argued that pleasure is unrelated to pain and this determined the "good", what do "pleasure" and "pain" mean? Do you think that their understanding of these concepts depends on each of us because it is a purely subjective experience? What I may consider as "painful", you could feel otherwise, and vice versa. So, when I read that paragraph by Plato, I thought in the first place that pleasure, good and pain are "universals" and they do not have objective existence. They are dependent upon how we experience them. But is there the possibility that pain and pleasure exist in an objective perspective?

Quoting javi2541997

What I consider a good pleasure, such as listening to opera, may be insufferable to you. According to this, pleasure seems to be a purely subjective concept.

Not necessarily. Opera is not itself pleasure, it is something that brings pleasure to you. If it is insufferable to me, it brings me no pleasure. The stimulus is not the response. Different stimuli may be needed to bring about the same pleasurable response in each of us.

What is and isn't pleasurable is subjective. But is pleasure itself subjective? On the one hand, pleasure, like other feelings, is a private sensation which can be experienced only by the one who feels it. On the other hand, pleasure universally attracts us to that which is pleasurable. Pleasure is a manifestation, made to a mind, of the body's instinct to do this thing, to seek this or that out. It is the carrot to pain's whip, and both work together to steer all the sentient animals. And so pleasure is an objective feature of the biology of everything with a mind.

Quoting hypericin

Not necessarily. Opera is not itself pleasure, it is something that brings pleasure to you. If it is insufferable to me, it brings me no pleasure. The stimulus is not the response. Different stimuli may be needed to bring about the same pleasurable response in each of us.

Therefore, you agree with the points of Epicurus and other philosophers who stated that pleasure is subjective. Since something (like opera, for instance) may be considered pleasure/non-pleasure at the same time by different perceivers, then music is dependent upon subjectiveness. The complexity is in the concepts. Plato doesn't use 'insufferable' or 'non-pleasant'. He states that pleasure could be good or bad, and each of us should know where we are in one or the other. But here we find another issue: if opera is insufferable to you. Does this mean that opera (or music) is bad?

And furthermore, are there insufferable experiences which are good? An appointment with the dentist, perhaps?

Quoting hypericin

And so pleasure is an objective feature of the biology of everything with a mind.

What do you mean by this? That pleasure is objectively existent from a biological perspective? It is intriguing. I can't disagree with this, but the debate arises when we distinguish between bad and good pleasures. Don't you think?

Quoting javi2541997

Since Plato argued that pleasure is unrelated to pain and this determined the "good", what do "pleasure" and "pain" mean?

Let me clarify what I believe that Plato did. He did not argue that pleasure is unrelated to pain, some pleasures very much seem to be related to pains. But I think he demonstrated that since pleasures come in different types, if there is a type which is not related to pain, that type could be related to good. What I believe he explicitly argued was that as long as we understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, then it is impossible that pleasure can be equated with good.

As to what "pleasure" and "pain" mean, we'd have to look somewhere else. I suppose the common tendency at Plato's time, was to oppose the two in meaning. That allows us to avoid the effort required to define them. We understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, and pain as the opposite of pleasure.

Quoting javi2541997

Do you think that their understanding of these concepts depends on each of us because it is a purely subjective experience? What I may consider as "painful", you could feel otherwise, and vice versa. So, when I read that paragraph by Plato, I thought in the first place that pleasure, good and pain are "universals" and they do not have objective existence. They are dependent upon how we experience them. But is there the possibility that pain and pleasure exist in an objective perspective?

I see all three, pleasure, pain, and good, as subjective at this point. Pleasure and pain are definitely subjective because when I feel pleasure or pain you do not necessarily feel what I feel. There may be a type of pleasure though, which when a person feels it, it is subjective, felt only by that person, but it is good for everyone. Then that good could be objective. This, I believe is the pleasure we get from being morally good. Like the pleasure from being a philanthropist for example, the specific pleasure is felt only by that person, and is subjective, but the good is related to all.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Let me clarify what I believe that Plato did. He did not argue that pleasure is unrelated to pain, some pleasures very much seem to be related to pains. But I think he demonstrated that since pleasures come in different types, if there is a type which is not related to pain, that type could be related to good. What I believe he explicitly argued was that as long as we understand pleasure as the opposite of pain, then it is impossible that pleasure can be equated with good.

Interesting. What surprises me the most is that just one phrase of Plato in his book caused an intriguing discussion here. It is astonishing what Plato contributed to philosophy.

I can't disagree with you, and I think we have a common agreement that Plato argued that pleasure came from different ways. It is important to highlight this: [i]are they not in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?[/I]

I don't know if bad pleasure is related to pain. Perhaps it is, as you explained to me with the above reasons. However, in that quote, Plato clearly refutes the idea that pleasure has a natural significance as the "good," a view held by most utilitarians and other philosophers. I believe that Plato wanted to argue that sometimes a pleasure can be bad too, but it is upon us how we distinguish when a pleasure is good from when it is bad.

Perhaps, the point seems to be what the meanings of 'good', 'bad', 'pain', etc. are when we experience pleasure. Without any doubt, it is a subjective experience. But as I said to @hypericin, such experiences can conflict with other aspects: If I dislike opera and I feel this is insufferable, does this mean that music is bad (or even painful) in my context?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Pleasure and pain are definitely subjective because when I feel pleasure or pain you do not necessarily feel what I feel.

Yes, absolutely.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

There may be a type of pleasure though, which when a person feels it, it is subjective, felt only by that person, but it is good for everyone. Then that good could be objective. This, I believe is the pleasure we get from being morally good. Like the pleasure from being a philanthropist for example, the specific pleasure is felt only by that person, and is subjective, but the good is related to all.

It is well-noted the examples of objective good, but what about objective bad? This is the issue. Remember that Plato scolded us for not admitting that there are bad pleasures too. :razz:

Quoting javi2541997

Therefore, you agree with the points of Epicurus and other philosophers who stated that pleasure is subjective. Since something (like opera, for instance) may be considered pleasure/non-pleasure at the same time by different perceivers, then music is dependent upon subjectiveness.

I think your wording threw me a bit. What brings one pleasure is subjective. Opera may be considered pleasurable or unpleasurable. I think most will agree with this, today. I tried to answer the slightly odd question, "Is pleasure [itself] subjective?", anyway.

Quoting javi2541997

And furthermore, are there insufferable experiences which are good? An appointment with the dentist, perhaps?

I fully agree that pleasure/pain and good/bad are independent axes. Whether good/bad is used in the advantageous sense, or the moral sense.

Where good/bad means advantageous/disadvantageous:

Good Pleasure:Success, hiking, social bonding
Bad Pleasure: Cigarettes, overeating, compulsive browsing/video games/etc
Good Pain: Dentists, surgery, workouts, study
Bad Pain: Illness, injury, depression

(TPF can occupy each of these!)

Where good/bad means moral/immoral:

Good Pleasure:Helping, reconciliation, activism, child rearing
Bad Pleasure: Sadism, exploitation, bullying, destruction
Good Pain: Self sacrifice, activism, child rearing
Bad Pain: Bitter arguing, war

Reply to hypericin I agree with you, hypericin.

Sorry for my wording. It is true that I don't tend to express myself clearly. Of course you did a wonderful job trying to answer my questions. I appreciate your contribution to my thread, mate. :pray:

Quoting javi2541997

Nonetheless, I have some questions that I would like to share and debate with you:

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? Does this really depend on each of us and how we understand Hedonism?

Are there objective pleasures? Can these be drawn from the boundaries of good and bad?

To me too this is a very complex topic. I’ll add to what has so far been mentioned in the thread that happiness (our bet fit modern-day term for eudemonia) and pleasure, thought best intwined, are not identical: e.g., the great happiness of a marathon runner finishing the marathon while in excruciating pain. Nor is suffering (an opposite of eudemonia) and pain identical. I don’t yet know of a more clear cut example than the following, so please excuse the sullenness of it all: some women who are raped (always against their consent, and with a great deal of traumatic suffering incurred) can experience physiological pleasure from their penetrated genitals (such that this physiological pleasure only further traumatizes the raped women and increases her suffering). Then there is masochism, wherein consensually incurred pain is juxtaposed with heightened happiness. All these, again, being complex enough topics on their own.

But I’m writing because I take it you are in part asking for clear cut cases of “bad/unethical pleasures” that might align to being "objectively bad" ... such that not engaging in such pleasures might then be objectively good. Here are three examples that I presume most will readily acknowledge:

• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a mass-murderer in murdering others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of a rapist in raping others are bad/unethical pleasures.
• The pleasures (and likely momentary happiness) of an extreme bigot in successfully depriving others of the dignity to their own life, and this strictly on account of these others being significantly different rather than due to these others being unethical, are bad/unethical pleasures.

Given Plato’s views of the Good—which could well be argued equivalent to perfected, complete/absolute eudemonia and, hence, to perfected happiness (one reference to this effect), this rather than being in any way associated to “perfected pleasure”—all bad pleasures (and instances of bad momentary happiness) are, in ultimate terms, bad precisely because they deviate one from proximity to the Good, i.e. perfected happiness. To not here mention their affect upon others as well. And this “deviation” can at times be far more egregious than in other cases, this as per the three examples just presented.

I have not read the thread yet but ...
Quoting javi2541997

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato?

I don't know about Plato's mumbo-jumbo, but Epicurus thinks "bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain (or fear (i.e. suffering)) because they are either unnecessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) in contrast to good pleasures which reduce pain (or fear (i.e. suffering)) and are simple but necessary (e.g. food, shelter, play, friendship, community). I think tranquility, not the "pleasure" (i.e. euphoria) of hedonists like the Cyrenaics, is the Epicurean (or disutilitarian) goal. :flower:

Quoting 180 Proof

I don't know about Plato, but Epicurus thinks "bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame) in contrast to good pleasures which reduce pain and are simple but necessary (e.g. food, shelter, play, friendship, community).

Don't know if you happened to read my post, but, pulled out from it: Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical?

Reply to javra None of your examples are the ones I gave: luxuries, excesses, wealth, power or fame (all of which cause fear of pain of losing them somehow) and therefore not "bad pleasures" per se, or "pleasures" at all.

Reply to javra Thanks for your reply and contribution, javra. It is a complex topic, indeed.

Perhaps you are right in approaching this topic from an ethical perspective. I wasn't seeing pleasure or unpleasantness as related to ethical/unethical actions. Rather, I thought it was more focused on aesthetics, but it is obvious that this philosophical matter cannot be understood by only my own perspective, I guess. The problem is that the question asked by Plato is ambiguous, and it is open to many different interpretations. He just stated: Or are not they in like manner compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?

In the first glimpse, Plato simply refuted the position of some Epicurean and other philosophers that pleasure is the good and only the good. I already understood, thanks to your explanation and MU and hypercin, that pleasure is subjective. Thus, pain, good, bad, ethical, unethical, etc., are dependent on the subjectiveness of the perceiver. However, this can be tricky, as you also noted in your examples above. Smoking, raping, and murdering are objectively bad, in my humble opinion. Yet there are people out there who see smoking and murdering as pleasant. Then, what is happening here? Isn't it possible to abstract the notions of good and bad at all?

On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that Plato's point is located in his work The Republic. Therefore, it is likely that his ideas focus on ethics (as you mentioned), and the bad pleasures may refer to those associated with unethical actions or those that negatively impact the majority of people rather than contributing to the common good.

Reply to 180 Proof But how is that possible? I thought Epicurus only conceived pleasure as good, so perhaps he never thought of bad pleasures at all.

The links I shared are nice to read. Kelley Ross says:

Quoting Kelley Ross.

From the eponymous Greek Hedonists, the doctrine was continued by Epicurus and survives in the significant modern school of Utilitarianism, with agreement that pleasure is the only intrinsic good.

Quoting javra

Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical?

That's not quite right.

Something that's difficult to understand with ancient ethics is we have a tendency to want to classify an act as good or bad, but these ancient ethics don't address the goodness and badness of acts in the way modern moral philosophy often does. For Epicurus:

[quote=Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus' Principle doctrines]
No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles.
[/quote]

to respond to your example of training for a marathon. (so it'd depend upon how much anxiety a person is burdened with in training for the marathon -- if they are tranquil and accepting of the pain then no evil is found in training and running a marathon)

For saving someone in a burning building: were you to do it because of anxiety that you would not be perceived as altruistic (even if just by yourself or before God) then that'd be bad, but if you were to do it because you have a natural kinship towards other human beings and no fear of death then ataraxia is still achieved.

That is, just as there aren't good/bad acts for Epicurus in particular there are no heroic acts one must strive towards. None of us are Odysseus and Homer is a storyteller more than a doctor: surely it's good that someone else was spared pain, and surely it's good to care for our fellow man, because this is what it means to live a good life.

But whether a particular act in a circumstance is good or evil -- as if there were some consequentialist calculus that tells us the right action to take as an individual at a given moment -- just isn't what the ethic is driving at, and is more contextual than asking after whether a particular act just is good or bad because of some rule.

Reply to 180 Proof You might then want to change your written position, namely this:

Quoting 180 Proof

"bad pleasures" are ones which cause or increase pain because they are either unncessary (e.g. luxuries, excesses) or unnatural (e.g. wealth, power, fame)

So its not "unnecessary or unnatural" but something else ...

As to wealth, power, and fame being "unnatural", one can readily find them in the animal kingdom, such as among great apes, with chimpanzee politics readily consisting of power (over other) and fame (repute) as that then leads to greater personal wealth (such as in territory and mating rights).

Reply to javi2541997

https://fourphilosophies.com/epicureanism-vs-hedonism/ (re: aponia, ataraxia)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suffering-focused_ethics (re: disutilitarianism)

Quoting Moliere

That's not quite right.

I haven't read Epicurus (who, after all, was a relative ascetic) since college, and yes, many of these issues can be argued back and forth in terms of intents and meanings.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by @180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree.

Quoting javra

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/1024189

Quoting javi2541997

I already understood, thanks to your explanation and MU and hypercin, that pleasure is subjective.

In many a way, yes, but, in addressing Plato, the question instead becomes one of whether eudemonia too is subjective ... or, else, if there is such a thing as objective eudemonia. It is on the latter which Platonic notions of ethics hinges (this as per the SEP reference previously given).

Reply to 180 Proof Not a proper reply. Or should I point you to links regarding what Epicurus in fact stated? Time is a commodity.

Quoting javra

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree.

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

I'd disagree with that link in marking a distinction between Epicureanism and Hedonism -- but I understand the distinction he's drawing (I'd just call them two types of hedonism)


Also, your post gave me an in to laying out a bit on Epicureanism -- I had been thinking about what to say yours was just the first comment that finally sparked words.

Quoting Moliere

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Reply to 180 Proof :up:

Reply to javra Yes, indeed. Happiness/unhappiness may also be related to pleasure. It is another good approach. However, I think this is a clear example of subjectivity. Eudemonia is dependent on how/what we feel. As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective.

Quoting javi2541997

As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective.

I can respect your views but, to be clear: To me, eudemonia is very much objective. The pleasures of chain smoking till you die to this world as just one relatively easy to understand example of pleasure's subjectivity vs. eudemonia's objectivity.

Quoting javi2541997

As you stated, eudaimonia is hardly objective.

I don't recall stating that. In fact, I believe eudaimonia (i.e. [I]flourishing[/I]) is objective — acquiring [I]adaptive[/I] habits (virtues) and unlearning [I]maladaptive[/I] habits (vices) — e.g. the Capability approach of M. Nussbaum & A. Sen.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_approach

Quoting javra

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was.

I want to mark a distinction here: @180 Proof's description of the good/bad pleasures is accurate to Epicureanism is what I mean -- as in, descriptively, this is what Epicurus says are the good/bad pleasures in a rough-and-ready way.

With your examples what I'm saying is that the Epicurean ethic can handle them. So with:

For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

And your example of the marathon runner, and your example of the altruistic firefighter.

It's not that all marathon runners, firefighters, or lovers are bad. It's the ones who run marathons for glory, heroes that save people for praise, and lovers that possess their object of love that the Epicurean philosophy is aiming at.

So it's not that marathons are bad -- it's the character of the person who is running marathons in order to achieve immortality that's causing themself to be miserable.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Oh, of course it does in some way, though we can still offer reasons and such for the opinions and attempt to pursue what's good, or at least enjoy reflecting for awhile.

Quoting javra

To me, eudemonia is very much objective.

Reply to javra

:up:

I misunderstood you for a moment. My bad.

Reply to 180 Proof I was referring to @javra's post. But now I understand that eudaimonia is objective. :up:

------

There is a mixture of concepts in my mind right now. I started talking about pleasure, and now eudaimonia has shown up. It caught me by surprise. :lol:

Reply to Moliere Sure, but you do know you're here putting words into the mouth of a different poster. I was wanting to see what he had to say as a rebuttal, this so as to better discover were he himself stood in his own original thoughts.

As to the "correct way" to interpret Epicurus's doctrine, as I previously said, it can be argued back and forth in terms of meanings and intents. You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine. OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

His system, to me so far, seems to only lead to this very conclusion: romantic love is a wrong to be shunned, this then being indicative of wisdom.

(Which, for better or worse, then seems to have lead to the justification for Roman orgies by having the pleasure of sex in manners utterly devoid of romantic love and its likely pains. Hence, "Epicureanism" as its often connotatively understood nowadays. And no, I don't view orgies as uniform evil/bad, but I am one who much likes romantic love and the sex which comes with it; viewing the prospect of orgies as rather empty, humanistically speaking.)

Quoting javra

You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine.

I'm willing to play the apologist in order to increase understanding.

OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

Sure.

The outline of desire to which @180 Proof wrote needs further specification to address why, though.

There are three kinds of desires: the fulfillable and the unfulfillable, and that which falls in-between. Or another way to put the same categories: the natural and necessary, the unsatisfiable, and the natural and unnecessary desires.

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life. Similarly so with the marathon runner: If someone is taking on the pains to run marathons out of the pleasure of running a marathon then there's nothing wrong with pursuing a natural, unnecessary pleasure (unnecessary here because one need not run marathons to live a content life). What would be in error, though, would be to run marathons out of a fear of death because no matter what you do you'll die, and then the entire time you're here all you did was spend time pursing that fear.

To put that latter part in terms of the lover: imagine the person who never settles down because every real person doesn't satisfy them from the vantage of "The One" -- when, really, there is no "The One", there's a relationship you can build with someone who wants similar things out of their life.

It's not that we must avoid pains -- it's that we shouldn't be the cause of our own mental anguish; the pains aren't so bad as they stand, and the pleasures are not so alluring that we need to punish ourselves for not obtaining them.

Quoting Moliere

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life.

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned.

I hope I'm not misunderstanding you. If not, thanks for the reply.

Quoting javi2541997

But now I understand that eudaimonia is objective. :up:

I'm not confident it is. The idea of human flourishing is dependant upon whose version of eudaimonia one privileges. Eudaimonia is objective only if, like Aristotle or the Stoics, say, one believes in a fixed human nature or function that defines flourishing but without such a foundation, as in most modern views, it becomes subjective, reflecting personal or cultural values rather than an objective standard. Which follows the debate on a number of subjects on this forum - essentialists versus non-essentialist positions.

Quoting javra

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned.

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

Quoting Moliere

It's not that we must avoid pains -- it's that we shouldn't be the cause of our own mental anguish; the pains aren't so bad as they stand, and the pleasures are not so alluring that we need to punish ourselves for not obtaining them.

:up: :up:

Quoting javi2541997

It is well-noted the examples of objective good, but what about objective bad? This is the issue. Remember that Plato scolded us for not admitting that there are bad pleasures too. :razz:

I think you need to take what Plato said in context. He says that those who claim pleasure is good, in the most general sense, would have to admit that some pleasures are bad. We have made a qualification, so this no longer applies.

Quoting Moliere

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned. — javra

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

To be forthright, I have no interest in doing a month-long debate on the matter. Much less in rereading Epicurus’s works so as to properly reference, and then again yet debate, what Epicurus taught.

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38]

Boldface mine. What can I say, but that both of our predilections might be here readily showing.

Nor am I in any way interested in what those who followed Epicurus did, but have only addressed, and have interest in, what Epicurus himself taught. (In parallel to Epicureanism, that “some followers of Buddhism murdered and some still murder, therefore Buddhism allows for murder,” does not make for any serious argument, at least not to me.)

Quoting javra

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38]
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics

I do not think that scholarly reference is erroneous. That's why I said:

Quoting Moliere

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

Yes, there's a kind of love Epicurus cautions against. No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself.

Rather it's a natural, unnecessary desire -- Epicurus didn't want to marry, but that does not then mean that marriage is bad.

Quoting Moliere

No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself.

And where did I ever mention that to Epicurus "marriage was a bad unto itself"? I've only mentioned that it is, according to Epicurus, something to be "generally shunned".

Reply to javra Quoting javra

For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

Is the part that made me think so, along with the other two examples you meant to counter @180 Proof's summary with.

It occurs to me that we may just be disagreeing on what constitutes a good enough summary -- I read your examples as something which were counter to Epicureanism in addition to @180 Proof's rendition, but is that wrong? You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect?

Quoting Moliere

You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect?

Yes, that is correct.

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does. All this being fully aligned with the reference quote I gave.

Quoting javra

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does

Sure, makes sense. Though I'd put it that this was the man speaking more than the philosophy -- yes, Epicurus the man cautioned against it. But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that?

Whether the rendition is correct: I know more needs to be said, which is why I began with the tripartite theory of desire, but the down-and-dirty version of what is good and what is bad -- which the philosophy itself sort of doesn't pursue at all -- made sense to me. It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible.

Quoting Moliere

But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that?

Made me smile a bit. Explanations for this can be a dime a dozen, with many directly contradicting. But, again, as another example, that Christians have historically murdered galore does not make the teachings of their founder such that they allow for, much less condone, murder. (In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: ) That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

BTW, I did a brief online search to reconfirm this: The Ancient Skeptic Cicero was schooled in Epicureanism, yes, but he was nevertheless a strong opponent of it.

Quoting Moliere

It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible.

OK, I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though.

Quoting javra

(In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: )

Well, not today at least. There are times...

That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

I'm interested in that too. And in helping people to understand the philosophy generally. I had mistaken your counters to @180 Proof for what they are.

But

Quoting javra

I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though.

Hard to argue with that, isn't it? :D Thank you.

Quoting Moliere

Well, not today at least. There are times...

Yea, OK, In partial keeping with Epicurus and, maybe more, with Lucretius, mahwidge ... a perspective: You willfully enter into a pretty sturdy cage with another, lock the door to the cage, and then throw the key far, far away. Not metaphysically impossible to get back out, but pretty darn close, usually with a lot of scars to boot if you do. Not that this is an issue if only the two end up being far more happy that sorrowful in this cage together for the span of their lives. And, if so, contentedness galore.

A somewhat humongous account to me. But, as with all humor, there's some at least personal truths embedded. It might not be "The One", as you previously commented on, but it better well be "the one for you".

Anyway, I'll try to leave others to further the thread.

I figure that what the dialogue Phaedrus was concerned with was how love for other people turns into wanting things for them. Once you start doing that, it may run contrary to other desires but can no longer be just about what you want.

It seems a simple enough observation to me. I watch dogs and leaves falling from the trees.

Reply to javi2541997 If someone is satiated then they must experience something negative. Furthermore, someone who does not feel any negativity prior to some pleasure feels the pleasure in a more muted manner than those who have suffered somewhat for said pleasures.

It is probably here where we can claim that a 'bad' pleasure would be overly harmful negativity. The key is to balance and find the sweet spot. This is more of less where Aristotle ended up.

Quoting javi2541997

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato?

I'm currently reading The Republic, and this would have to be based on Socratic "justice"...so far he has not been able to grasp any firm definitions of the term, yet I assume it will be a theme throughout the entire dialogue. He also does talk about how people should be cautious about seeking wealth just for the sake of seeking wealth, without other moral/ethical considerations.

Doing a quick search, it seems that both the Epicurians and Plato advised against sensual excess, it seems that people have been sounding the virtues of moderation for a long time.

Quoting javi2541997

What are the bad pleasures according to Plato? Does this really depend on each of us and how we understand Hedonism?

If we follow Plato's good pleasure, then the bad ones are the vices -- where pleasure is mixed with pain, compulsion, deception, or obsession.
The popular "seven deadly sins" can be the examples.